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author | Ted Gould <ted@gould.cx> | 2012-09-04 08:30:35 -0500 |
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committer | Ted Gould <ted@gould.cx> | 2012-09-04 08:30:35 -0500 |
commit | d2358d6e2b75eb26f7dd61172a77331bfc5ea5f8 (patch) | |
tree | 6803ba8a892c303636203e9c6fe6272be896d498 | |
parent | c5207337b01bc9f0836ee0a82d611549b963245c (diff) | |
download | libpam-x2go-d2358d6e2b75eb26f7dd61172a77331bfc5ea5f8.tar.gz libpam-x2go-d2358d6e2b75eb26f7dd61172a77331bfc5ea5f8.tar.bz2 libpam-x2go-d2358d6e2b75eb26f7dd61172a77331bfc5ea5f8.zip |
Moving the kill code into a function
-rw-r--r-- | src/pam-freerdp.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/pam-freerdp.c b/src/pam-freerdp.c index b271834..17b5996 100644 --- a/src/pam-freerdp.c +++ b/src/pam-freerdp.c @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ #define PAM_TYPE_DOMAIN 1234 #define ALL_GOOD_SIGNAL "Ar, ready to authenticate cap'n" +static int unpriveleged_kill (struct passwd * pwdent); + static char * global_domain = NULL; /* FIXME? This is a work around to the fact that PAM seems to be clearing the auth token between authorize and open_session. Which then requires @@ -523,6 +525,20 @@ pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv goto done; } + retval = unpriveleged_kill(pwdent); + +done: + return retval; +} + +/* Drop privs and try to kill the process with the PID of session_pid. + This ensures that we don't kill something important if there is PID wrap + around. */ +static int +unpriveleged_kill (struct passwd * pwdent) +{ + int retval = PAM_SUCCESS; + pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { /* Setting groups, but allowing EPERM as if we're not 100% root @@ -566,7 +582,6 @@ pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv want to try again. We'll just return the error for this time. */ session_pid = 0; -done: return retval; } |