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author | Mike Gabriel <mike.gabriel@das-netzwerkteam.de> | 2015-02-14 16:40:07 +0100 |
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committer | Mike Gabriel <mike.gabriel@das-netzwerkteam.de> | 2015-02-14 17:45:36 +0100 |
commit | 4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb (patch) | |
tree | 7afc9d2782badf4f6f6b044a9f9540be247ece2b /debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch | |
parent | f46d117903c4bc4fe9863041f470e8816d355709 (diff) | |
download | nx-libs-4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb.tar.gz nx-libs-4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb.tar.bz2 nx-libs-4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb.zip |
40 patches, fixing several X.Org CVEs in NX.
* Security fixes:
- Rebase loads of X.Org patches (mainly from RHEL-5) against NX. If not
all patches from a CVE patch series appear here, then it means that
the affected file/code is not used in NX at build time.
- X.Org CVE-2011-2895:
1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch
- X.Org CVE-2011-4028:
1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch
- X.Org CVE-2013-4396:
1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch
- X.Org CVE-2013-6462:
1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-0209:
1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch
1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-0210:
1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch
1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch
1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch
1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch
1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch
1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-0211:
1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch
1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch
1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch
1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8092:
1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch
1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch
1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8097:
1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8095:
1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8096:
1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8099:
1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8100:
1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch
1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8102:
1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8101:
1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8093:
1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch
1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch
1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch
1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch
1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8098:
1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch
1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch
1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch
1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch
1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch
- Security fixes with no assigned CVE:
1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch | 137 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch b/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..96b7b9749 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +From c6aebf9284855a0e24ad9c5ffdd36aa65e16bec7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:08:09 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 11/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in + fs_read_query_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 491291cabf78efdeec8f18b09e14726a9030cc8f + +fs_read_query_info() parses a reply from the font server. The reply +contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated. This +can cause out of bound reads in either fs_read_query_info() or in +_fs_convert_props() which it calls to parse the fsPropInfo in the reply. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c +index 9ff54f5..d41e0b8 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c +@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd, + for (i = 0; i < nprops; i++, dprop++, is_str++) + { + memcpy(&local_off, off_adr, SIZEOF(fsPropOffset)); ++ if ((local_off.name.position >= pi->data_len) || ++ (local_off.name.length > ++ (pi->data_len - local_off.name.position))) ++ goto bail; + dprop->name = MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.name.position], + local_off.name.length, 1); + if (local_off.type != PropTypeString) { +@@ -130,15 +134,20 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd, + dprop->value = local_off.value.position; + } else { + *is_str = TRUE; ++ if ((local_off.value.position >= pi->data_len) || ++ (local_off.value.length > ++ (pi->data_len - local_off.value.position))) ++ goto bail; + dprop->value = (INT32) MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.value.position], + local_off.value.length, 1); + if (dprop->value == BAD_RESOURCE) + { +- xfree (pfi->props); +- pfi->nprops = 0; +- pfi->props = 0; +- pfi->isStringProp = 0; +- return -1; ++ bail: ++ xfree (pfi->props); ++ pfi->nprops = 0; ++ pfi->props = 0; ++ pfi->isStringProp = 0; ++ return -1; + } + } + off_adr += SIZEOF(fsPropOffset); +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 7762653..2a6f6c9 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -865,6 +865,7 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + FSFpePtr conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private; + fsQueryXInfoReply *rep; + char *buf; ++ long bufleft; /* length of reply left to use */ + fsPropInfo *pi; + fsPropOffset *po; + pointer pd; +@@ -895,7 +896,10 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + + buf = (char *) rep; + buf += SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply); +- ++ ++ bufleft = rep->length << 2; ++ bufleft -= SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply); ++ + /* move the data over */ + fsUnpack_XFontInfoHeader(rep, pInfo); + +@@ -903,19 +907,51 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + _fs_init_fontinfo(conn, pInfo); + + /* Compute offsets into the reply */ ++ if (bufleft < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo)) ++ { ++ ret = -1; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo)\n", ++ bufleft); ++#endif ++ goto bail; ++ } + pi = (fsPropInfo *) buf; + buf += SIZEOF (fsPropInfo); ++ bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset); + ++ if (bufleft < pi->data_len) ++ { ++ ret = -1; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < data_len (%d)\n", ++ bufleft, pi->data_len); ++#endif ++ goto bail; ++ } + po = (fsPropOffset *) buf; + buf += pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset); ++ bufleft -= pi->data_len; + ++ { ++ ret = -1; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < data_len (%d)\n", ++ bufleft, pi->data_len); ++#endif ++ goto bail; ++ } + pd = (pointer) buf; + buf += pi->data_len; ++ bufleft -= pi->data_len; + + /* convert the properties and step over the reply */ + ret = _fs_convert_props(pi, po, pd, pInfo); ++ bail: + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); +- ++ + if (ret == -1) + { + fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont); +-- +2.1.4 + |