40 patches, fixing several X.Org CVEs in NX.

* Security fixes:
  - Rebase loads of X.Org patches (mainly from RHEL-5) against NX. If not
    all patches from a CVE patch series appear here, then it means that
    the affected file/code is not used in NX at build time.
  - X.Org CVE-2011-2895:
      1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2011-4028:
      1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2013-4396:
      1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2013-6462:
      1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-0209:
      1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch
      1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-0210:
      1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch
      1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch
      1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch
      1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch
      1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch
      1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
      1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-0211:
      1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch
      1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch
      1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch
      1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8092:
      1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch
      1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
      1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch
      1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8097:
      1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8095:
      1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8096:
      1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8099:
      1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8100:
      1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch
      1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8102:
      1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8101:
      1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8093:
      1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch
      1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch
      1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch
      1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch
      1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8098:
      1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch
      1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch
      1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch
      1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch
      1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch
  - Security fixes with no assigned CVE:
      1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch

1 files changed, 53 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..619794f7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From d4c76981f7fddb364166464c571ed8d3de3086cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 20/40] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4]
+
+GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies
+them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over
+all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a
+potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with
+a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly
+calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory.
+
+This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname
+lists for X access control are insane.
+
+v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+Conflicts:
+	os/access.c
+---
+ nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c
+index b6a70a7..0e9d138 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c
++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c
+@@ -1719,6 +1719,10 @@ GetHosts (
+     {
+ 	nHosts++;
+ 	n += (((host->len + 3) >> 2) << 2) + sizeof(xHostEntry);
++        /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of
++           hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */
++        if (n >= 1048576)
++            break;
+     }
+     if (n)
+     {
+@@ -1730,6 +1734,8 @@ GetHosts (
+         for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next)
+ 	{
+ 	    len = host->len;
++            if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n))
++                break;
+ 	    ((xHostEntry *)ptr)->family = host->family;
+ 	    ((xHostEntry *)ptr)->length = len;
+ 	    ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry);
+-- 
+2.1.4
+