40 patches, fixing several X.Org CVEs in NX.

* Security fixes:
  - Rebase loads of X.Org patches (mainly from RHEL-5) against NX. If not
    all patches from a CVE patch series appear here, then it means that
    the affected file/code is not used in NX at build time.
  - X.Org CVE-2011-2895:
      1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2011-4028:
      1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2013-4396:
      1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2013-6462:
      1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-0209:
      1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch
      1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-0210:
      1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch
      1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch
      1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch
      1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch
      1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch
      1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
      1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-0211:
      1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch
      1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch
      1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch
      1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8092:
      1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch
      1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
      1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch
      1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8097:
      1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8095:
      1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8096:
      1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8099:
      1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8100:
      1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch
      1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8102:
      1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8101:
      1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8093:
      1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch
      1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch
      1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch
      1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch
      1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch
  - X.Org CVE-2014-8098:
      1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch
      1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch
      1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch
      1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch
      1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch
  - Security fixes with no assigned CVE:
      1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch

1 files changed, 80 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch b/debian/patches/1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5b9beb1c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 985ca320f841bd9a3efc484f92436b3d65ec1b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:12:04 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 23/40] dbe: unvalidated lengths in DbeSwapBuffers calls
+ [CVE-2014-8097]
+
+ProcDbeSwapBuffers() has a 32bit (n) length value that it uses to read
+from a buffer. The length is never validated, which can lead to out of
+bound reads, and possibly returning the data read from out of bounds to
+the misbehaving client via an X Error packet.
+
+SProcDbeSwapBuffers() swaps data (for correct endianness) before
+handing it off to the real proc.  While doing the swapping, the
+length field is not validated, which can cause memory corruption.
+
+v2: reorder checks to avoid compilers optimizing out checks for overflow
+that happen after we'd already have done the overflowing multiplications.
+v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+Conflicts:
+	dbe/dbe.c
+---
+ nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c
+index c0d6131..5a1e9b0 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c
++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c
+@@ -725,8 +725,8 @@ ProcDbeSwapBuffers(client)
+     DbeSwapInfoPtr	swapInfo;
+     xDbeSwapInfo	*dbeSwapInfo;
+     int			error;
+-    register int	i, j;
+-    int			nStuff;
++    unsigned int	i, j;
++    unsigned int	nStuff;
+ 
+ 
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq);
+@@ -734,11 +734,13 @@ ProcDbeSwapBuffers(client)
+ 
+     if (nStuff == 0)
+     {
++        REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDbeSwapBuffersReq);
+         return(Success);
+     }
+ 
+     if (nStuff > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DbeSwapInfoRec))
+ 	    return BadAlloc;
++    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq, nStuff * sizeof(xDbeSwapInfo));
+ 
+     /* Get to the swap info appended to the end of the request. */
+     dbeSwapInfo = (xDbeSwapInfo *)&stuff[1];
+@@ -1289,7 +1291,7 @@ SProcDbeSwapBuffers(client)
+     ClientPtr client;
+ {
+     REQUEST(xDbeSwapBuffersReq);
+-    register int	i, n;
++    unsigned int	i, n;
+     xDbeSwapInfo	*pSwapInfo;
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1297,6 +1299,9 @@ SProcDbeSwapBuffers(client)
+     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq);
+ 
+     swapl(&stuff->n, n);
++    if (stuff->n > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DbeSwapInfoRec))
++        return BadAlloc;
++    REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq, stuff->n * sizeof(xDbeSwapInfo));
+ 
+     if (stuff->n != 0)
+     { 
+-- 
+2.1.4
+