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author | Mike Gabriel <mike.gabriel@das-netzwerkteam.de> | 2015-02-14 16:40:07 +0100 |
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committer | Mike Gabriel <mike.gabriel@das-netzwerkteam.de> | 2015-02-14 17:45:36 +0100 |
commit | 4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb (patch) | |
tree | 7afc9d2782badf4f6f6b044a9f9540be247ece2b /debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch | |
parent | f46d117903c4bc4fe9863041f470e8816d355709 (diff) | |
download | nx-libs-4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb.tar.gz nx-libs-4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb.tar.bz2 nx-libs-4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb.zip |
40 patches, fixing several X.Org CVEs in NX.
* Security fixes:
- Rebase loads of X.Org patches (mainly from RHEL-5) against NX. If not
all patches from a CVE patch series appear here, then it means that
the affected file/code is not used in NX at build time.
- X.Org CVE-2011-2895:
1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch
- X.Org CVE-2011-4028:
1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch
- X.Org CVE-2013-4396:
1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch
- X.Org CVE-2013-6462:
1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-0209:
1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch
1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-0210:
1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch
1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch
1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch
1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch
1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch
1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-0211:
1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch
1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch
1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch
1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8092:
1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch
1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch
1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8097:
1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8095:
1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8096:
1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8099:
1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8100:
1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch
1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8102:
1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8101:
1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8093:
1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch
1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch
1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch
1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch
1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch
- X.Org CVE-2014-8098:
1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch
1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch
1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch
1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch
1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch
- Security fixes with no assigned CVE:
1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch | 290 |
1 files changed, 290 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91433b6e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +From 9c558f9ca2c0d4e34fa71dff272ed1c39c22cd9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:43 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 39/40] glx: Length checking for RenderLarge requests (v2) + [CVE-2014-8098 3/8] (v3) + +This is a half-measure until we start passing request length into the +varsize function, but it's better than the nothing we had before. + +v2: Verify that there's at least a large render header's worth of +dataBytes (Julien Cristau) + +v3: backport to RHEL5 + +v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> + +fixup swap +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++----------- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +index 831c65b..20c12f3 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +@@ -1535,6 +1535,8 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** duplicated there. + */ + ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq); ++ + req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc; + glxc = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error); + if (!glxc) { +@@ -1542,12 +1544,15 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return error; + } ++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0) ++ return BadLength; ++ + dataBytes = req->dataBytes; + + /* + ** Check the request length. + */ +- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { ++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { + client->errorValue = req->length; + /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */ + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); +@@ -1557,7 +1562,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; +- int extra, cmdlen; ++ int extra = 0, cmdlen; + /* + ** This is the first request of a multi request command. + ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. +@@ -1567,9 +1572,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + return __glXBadLargeRequest; + } + ++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE) ++ return BadLength; ++ + hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc; +- cmdlen = hdr->length; + opcode = hdr->opcode; ++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0) ++ return BadLength; + + /* + ** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data. +@@ -1603,16 +1612,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) { +- return BadLength; +- } +- } else { +- /* constant size command */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) { +- return BadLength; +- } + } ++ ++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry.bytes is small */ ++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) { ++ return BadLength; ++ } ++ + /* + ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. + */ +@@ -1641,6 +1647,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a + ** multi request command. + */ ++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */ + + /* + ** Check the request number and the total request count. +@@ -1659,7 +1666,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + /* + ** Check that we didn't get too much data. + */ +- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { ++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) { ++ client->errorValue = dataBytes; ++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); ++ return __glXBadLargeRequest; ++ } ++ ++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +@@ -1673,17 +1686,16 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete + ** the command. + */ +- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed +- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not +- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the +- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be +- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total +- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile, +- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow +- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server. ++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library ++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts. ++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be ++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the ++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving ++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below ++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to ++ ** be accepted by the server. + */ +- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != +- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) { ++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +index 2685355..2e228c0 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +@@ -587,6 +587,8 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** duplicated there. + */ + ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq); ++ + req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc; + __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->contextTag); +@@ -599,12 +601,15 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return error; + } ++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0) ++ return BadLength; ++ + dataBytes = req->dataBytes; + + /* + ** Check the request length. + */ +- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { ++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { + client->errorValue = req->length; + /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */ + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); +@@ -614,7 +619,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; +- int extra; ++ int extra = 0; + size_t cmdlen; + /* + ** This is the first request of a multi request command. +@@ -624,12 +629,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + client->errorValue = req->requestNumber; + return __glXBadLargeRequest; + } ++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE) ++ return BadLength; ++ + hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc; + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->length); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->opcode); +- cmdlen = hdr->length; + opcode = hdr->opcode; + ++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if ( (opcode >= __GLX_MIN_RENDER_OPCODE) && + (opcode <= __GLX_MAX_RENDER_OPCODE) ) { + entry = &__glXRenderSizeTable[opcode]; +@@ -661,16 +671,12 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) { +- return BadLength; +- } +- } else { +- /* constant size command */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) { +- return BadLength; +- } + } ++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry->bytes is small */ ++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) { ++ return BadLength; ++ } ++ + /* + ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. + */ +@@ -698,6 +704,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a + ** multi request command. + */ ++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */ + + /* + ** Check the request number and the total request count. +@@ -716,7 +723,13 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + /* + ** Check that we didn't get too much data. + */ +- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { ++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) { ++ client->errorValue = dataBytes; ++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); ++ return __glXBadLargeRequest; ++ } ++ ++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +@@ -730,17 +743,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete + ** the command. + */ +- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed +- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not +- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the +- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be +- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total +- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile, +- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow +- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server. ++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library ++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts. ++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be ++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the ++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving ++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below ++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to ++ ** be accepted by the server. + */ +- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != +- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) { ++ ++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +-- +2.1.4 + |