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authorMike Gabriel <mike.gabriel@das-netzwerkteam.de>2015-02-14 16:40:07 +0100
committerMike Gabriel <mike.gabriel@das-netzwerkteam.de>2015-02-14 17:45:36 +0100
commit4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb (patch)
tree7afc9d2782badf4f6f6b044a9f9540be247ece2b /debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch
parentf46d117903c4bc4fe9863041f470e8816d355709 (diff)
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40 patches, fixing several X.Org CVEs in NX.
* Security fixes: - Rebase loads of X.Org patches (mainly from RHEL-5) against NX. If not all patches from a CVE patch series appear here, then it means that the affected file/code is not used in NX at build time. - X.Org CVE-2011-2895: 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch - X.Org CVE-2011-4028: 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch - X.Org CVE-2013-4396: 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch - X.Org CVE-2013-6462: 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-0209: 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-0210: 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-0211: 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8092: 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8097: 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8095: 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8096: 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8099: 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8100: 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8102: 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8101: 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8093: 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8098: 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch - Security fixes with no assigned CVE: 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch')
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch290
1 files changed, 290 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91433b6e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+From 9c558f9ca2c0d4e34fa71dff272ed1c39c22cd9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:43 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 39/40] glx: Length checking for RenderLarge requests (v2)
+ [CVE-2014-8098 3/8] (v3)
+
+This is a half-measure until we start passing request length into the
+varsize function, but it's better than the nothing we had before.
+
+v2: Verify that there's at least a large render header's worth of
+dataBytes (Julien Cristau)
+
+v3: backport to RHEL5
+
+v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
+
+Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
+
+fixup swap
+---
+ nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++-----------
+ nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c
+index 831c65b..20c12f3 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c
++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c
+@@ -1535,6 +1535,8 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** duplicated there.
+ */
+
++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq);
++
+ req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc;
+ glxc = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error);
+ if (!glxc) {
+@@ -1542,12 +1544,15 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return error;
+ }
++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ dataBytes = req->dataBytes;
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request length.
+ */
+- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
+ client->errorValue = req->length;
+ /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+@@ -1557,7 +1562,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+
+ if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) {
+ __GLXrenderSizeData *entry;
+- int extra, cmdlen;
++ int extra = 0, cmdlen;
+ /*
+ ** This is the first request of a multi request command.
+ ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request.
+@@ -1567,9 +1572,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+ }
+
++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc;
+- cmdlen = hdr->length;
+ opcode = hdr->opcode;
++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
+
+ /*
+ ** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data.
+@@ -1603,16 +1612,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ if (extra < 0) {
+ return BadLength;
+ }
+- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+- } else {
+- /* constant size command */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+ }
++
++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry.bytes is small */
++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) {
++ return BadLength;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request.
+ */
+@@ -1641,6 +1647,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a
+ ** multi request command.
+ */
++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request number and the total request count.
+@@ -1659,7 +1666,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ /*
+ ** Check that we didn't get too much data.
+ */
+- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) {
++ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
++ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
++ }
++
++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+@@ -1673,17 +1686,16 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete
+ ** the command.
+ */
+- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed
+- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not
+- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the
+- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be
+- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total
+- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile,
+- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow
+- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server.
++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library
++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts.
++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be
++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the
++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving
++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below
++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to
++ ** be accepted by the server.
+ */
+- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) !=
+- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) {
++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c
+index 2685355..2e228c0 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c
++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c
+@@ -587,6 +587,8 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** duplicated there.
+ */
+
++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq);
++
+ req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc;
+ __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
+ __GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->contextTag);
+@@ -599,12 +601,15 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return error;
+ }
++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ dataBytes = req->dataBytes;
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request length.
+ */
+- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
+ client->errorValue = req->length;
+ /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+@@ -614,7 +619,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+
+ if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) {
+ __GLXrenderSizeData *entry;
+- int extra;
++ int extra = 0;
+ size_t cmdlen;
+ /*
+ ** This is the first request of a multi request command.
+@@ -624,12 +629,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ client->errorValue = req->requestNumber;
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+ }
++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc;
+ __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->length);
+ __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->opcode);
+- cmdlen = hdr->length;
+ opcode = hdr->opcode;
+
++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ if ( (opcode >= __GLX_MIN_RENDER_OPCODE) &&
+ (opcode <= __GLX_MAX_RENDER_OPCODE) ) {
+ entry = &__glXRenderSizeTable[opcode];
+@@ -661,16 +671,12 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ if (extra < 0) {
+ return BadLength;
+ }
+- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+- } else {
+- /* constant size command */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+ }
++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry->bytes is small */
++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) {
++ return BadLength;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request.
+ */
+@@ -698,6 +704,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a
+ ** multi request command.
+ */
++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request number and the total request count.
+@@ -716,7 +723,13 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ /*
+ ** Check that we didn't get too much data.
+ */
+- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) {
++ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
++ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
++ }
++
++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+@@ -730,17 +743,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete
+ ** the command.
+ */
+- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed
+- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not
+- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the
+- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be
+- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total
+- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile,
+- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow
+- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server.
++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library
++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts.
++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be
++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the
++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving
++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below
++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to
++ ** be accepted by the server.
+ */
+- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) !=
+- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) {
++
++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+--
+2.1.4
+