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authorMihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de>2015-04-26 23:32:32 +0200
committerMihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de>2015-04-26 23:34:27 +0200
commit96efadac50bf40bc502680072570a2950f132fe3 (patch)
treeacbd7103b5908636a97060581ba8bed01b5e83fa /debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch
parent79a4ed92dbae5089d3ddfcc0acec427ff057ad9b (diff)
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CVE patches were previously not included in release tarballs.
Rename: - 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch => 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-.full.patch - 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch => 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.full.patch - 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch => 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageT.full.patch - 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch => 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-.full.patch - 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch => 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-.full.patch - 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch => 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-.full.patch - 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch => 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_co.full.patch - 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch => 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-th.full.patch - 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch => 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-.full.patch - 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch => 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch - 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch => 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch => 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_exten.full.patch - 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch => 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyp.full.patch - 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch => 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch => 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch => 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch => 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch => 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-c.full.patch - 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch => 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8.full.patch - 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch => 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch - 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch => 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8.full.patch - 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch => 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-.full.patch - 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch => 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls.full.patch - 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch => 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-.full.patch - 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch => 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDL.full.patch - 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch => 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swap.full.patch - 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch => 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE.full.patch - 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch => 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swap.full.patch - 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch => 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectS.full.patch - 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch => 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-sw.full.patch - 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch => 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requ.full.patch - 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch => 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-imag.full.patch - 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch => 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer.full.patch - 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch => 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-.full.patch - 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch => 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-C.full.patch - 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch => 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generat.full.patch - 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch => 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-Vendo.full.patch - 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch => 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-re.full.patch - 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch => 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch - 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch => 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-.full.patch - 1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remaining-buf.patch => 1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remainin.full.patch - 1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895.patch => 1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-.full.patch - 1101-Coverity-844-845-846-Fix-memory-leaks.patch => 1101-Coverity-844-845-846-Fix-memory-leaks.full.patch - 1102-include-introduce-byte-counting-functions.patch => 1102-include-introduce-byte-counting-functions.full.patch - 1103-xkb-Don-t-swap-XkbSetGeometry-data-in-the-input-buff.patch => 1103-xkb-Don-t-swap-XkbSetGeometry-data-in-the-input.full.patch - 1104-xkb-Check-strings-length-against-request-size.patch => 1104-xkb-Check-strings-length-against-request-size.full.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch')
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch290
1 files changed, 290 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91433b6e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+From 9c558f9ca2c0d4e34fa71dff272ed1c39c22cd9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:43 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 39/40] glx: Length checking for RenderLarge requests (v2)
+ [CVE-2014-8098 3/8] (v3)
+
+This is a half-measure until we start passing request length into the
+varsize function, but it's better than the nothing we had before.
+
+v2: Verify that there's at least a large render header's worth of
+dataBytes (Julien Cristau)
+
+v3: backport to RHEL5
+
+v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
+
+Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
+
+fixup swap
+---
+ nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++-----------
+ nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c
+index 831c65b..20c12f3 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c
++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c
+@@ -1535,6 +1535,8 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** duplicated there.
+ */
+
++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq);
++
+ req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc;
+ glxc = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error);
+ if (!glxc) {
+@@ -1542,12 +1544,15 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return error;
+ }
++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ dataBytes = req->dataBytes;
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request length.
+ */
+- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
+ client->errorValue = req->length;
+ /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+@@ -1557,7 +1562,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+
+ if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) {
+ __GLXrenderSizeData *entry;
+- int extra, cmdlen;
++ int extra = 0, cmdlen;
+ /*
+ ** This is the first request of a multi request command.
+ ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request.
+@@ -1567,9 +1572,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+ }
+
++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc;
+- cmdlen = hdr->length;
+ opcode = hdr->opcode;
++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
+
+ /*
+ ** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data.
+@@ -1603,16 +1612,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ if (extra < 0) {
+ return BadLength;
+ }
+- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+- } else {
+- /* constant size command */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+ }
++
++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry.bytes is small */
++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) {
++ return BadLength;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request.
+ */
+@@ -1641,6 +1647,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a
+ ** multi request command.
+ */
++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request number and the total request count.
+@@ -1659,7 +1666,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ /*
+ ** Check that we didn't get too much data.
+ */
+- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) {
++ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
++ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
++ }
++
++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+@@ -1673,17 +1686,16 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete
+ ** the command.
+ */
+- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed
+- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not
+- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the
+- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be
+- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total
+- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile,
+- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow
+- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server.
++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library
++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts.
++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be
++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the
++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving
++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below
++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to
++ ** be accepted by the server.
+ */
+- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) !=
+- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) {
++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c
+index 2685355..2e228c0 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c
++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c
+@@ -587,6 +587,8 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** duplicated there.
+ */
+
++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq);
++
+ req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc;
+ __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
+ __GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->contextTag);
+@@ -599,12 +601,15 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return error;
+ }
++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ dataBytes = req->dataBytes;
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request length.
+ */
+- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) {
+ client->errorValue = req->length;
+ /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+@@ -614,7 +619,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+
+ if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) {
+ __GLXrenderSizeData *entry;
+- int extra;
++ int extra = 0;
+ size_t cmdlen;
+ /*
+ ** This is the first request of a multi request command.
+@@ -624,12 +629,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ client->errorValue = req->requestNumber;
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+ }
++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc;
+ __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->length);
+ __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->opcode);
+- cmdlen = hdr->length;
+ opcode = hdr->opcode;
+
++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0)
++ return BadLength;
++
+ if ( (opcode >= __GLX_MIN_RENDER_OPCODE) &&
+ (opcode <= __GLX_MAX_RENDER_OPCODE) ) {
+ entry = &__glXRenderSizeTable[opcode];
+@@ -661,16 +671,12 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ if (extra < 0) {
+ return BadLength;
+ }
+- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+- } else {
+- /* constant size command */
+- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) {
+- return BadLength;
+- }
+ }
++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry->bytes is small */
++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) {
++ return BadLength;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request.
+ */
+@@ -698,6 +704,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a
+ ** multi request command.
+ */
++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */
+
+ /*
+ ** Check the request number and the total request count.
+@@ -716,7 +723,13 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ /*
+ ** Check that we didn't get too much data.
+ */
+- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) {
++ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
++ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
++ }
++
++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+@@ -730,17 +743,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
+ ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete
+ ** the command.
+ */
+- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed
+- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not
+- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the
+- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be
+- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total
+- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile,
+- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow
+- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server.
++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library
++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts.
++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be
++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the
++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving
++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below
++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to
++ ** be accepted by the server.
+ */
+- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) !=
+- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) {
++
++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) {
+ client->errorValue = dataBytes;
+ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl);
+ return __glXBadLargeRequest;
+--
+2.1.4
+