CVE security review [1/2].

* CVE security review [1/2]:
  - Update 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch.
    Use xfree() instead of free() in nx-libs.
  - Update 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch.
    Apply correctly on nx-libs 3.6.x.
  - Update 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch.
    Human-readable version of "1 MB".

5 files changed, 175 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch b/debian/patches/1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch
index b71627214..2b2fa76c8 100644
--- a/debian/patches/1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 94c6de0649cd295044b1e4ff7265949c9c787519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 31322c2bd9be76493a5a04a23ea68e063fe3b7e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com>
 Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 21:03:33 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH 07/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length in
@@ -13,15 +13,17 @@ then provides a list of names. _fs_recv_conn_setup() allocated the
 specified total size for copying the names to, but didn't check to
 make sure it wasn't copying more data to that buffer than the size
 it had allocated.
+
+v2: use xfree() instead of free() for nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)
 ---
  nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
-index bac0b8e..0fdcc1d 100644
+index 0d792c7..86b5753 100644
 --- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
 +++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
-@@ -2782,7 +2782,7 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
+@@ -2985,7 +2985,7 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
      int			ret;
      fsConnSetup		*setup;
      FSFpeAltPtr		alts;
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ index bac0b8e..0fdcc1d 100644
      int			setup_len;
      char		*alt_save, *alt_names;
      
-@@ -2809,9 +2809,9 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
+@@ -3012,9 +3012,9 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
  	}
  	if (setup->num_alternates)
  	{
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ index bac0b8e..0fdcc1d 100644
  	    if (alts)
  	    {
  		alt_names = (char *) (setup + 1);
-@@ -2820,10 +2820,25 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
+@@ -3023,10 +3023,25 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
  		{
  		    alts[i].subset = alt_names[0];
  		    alt_len = alt_names[1];
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ index bac0b8e..0fdcc1d 100644
 +				 "invalid alt list (length %lx >= %lx)\n",
 +				 (long) alt_len, (long) alt_name_len);
 +#endif
-+			free(alts);
++			xfree(alts);
 +			return FSIO_ERROR;
 +		    }
  		    alts[i].name = alt_save;
diff --git a/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch b/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch
index 96b7b9749..9d0f3f875 100644
--- a/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From c6aebf9284855a0e24ad9c5ffdd36aa65e16bec7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From e29bbd5bf0565eaf7c02f85a57b87f66531fa6b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com>
 Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:08:09 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH 11/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in
@@ -9,13 +9,15 @@ fs_read_query_info() parses a reply from the font server.  The reply
 contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated.  This
 can cause out of bound reads in either fs_read_query_info() or in
 _fs_convert_props() which it calls to parse the fsPropInfo in the reply.
+
+v2: apply correctly on nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)
 ---
  nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
- nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c    | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c    | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c
-index 9ff54f5..d41e0b8 100644
+index 9a5e194..afa2c32 100644
 --- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c
 +++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c
 @@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd,
@@ -56,18 +58,18 @@ index 9ff54f5..d41e0b8 100644
  	}
  	off_adr += SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
 diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
-index 7762653..2a6f6c9 100644
+index 9e652d2..75cabdd 100644
 --- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
 +++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
-@@ -865,6 +865,7 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
+@@ -866,6 +866,7 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
      FSFpePtr		conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private;
      fsQueryXInfoReply	*rep;
      char		*buf;
-+    long		bufleft; /* length of reply left to use */
++    long		bufleft = 0; /* length of reply left to use */
      fsPropInfo		*pi;
      fsPropOffset	*po;
      pointer		pd;
-@@ -895,7 +896,10 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
+@@ -896,7 +897,10 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
  
      buf = (char *) rep;
      buf += SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply);
@@ -79,7 +81,7 @@ index 7762653..2a6f6c9 100644
      /* move the data over */
      fsUnpack_XFontInfoHeader(rep, pInfo);
      
-@@ -903,19 +907,51 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
+@@ -904,19 +908,52 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
      _fs_init_fontinfo(conn, pInfo);
  
      /* Compute offsets into the reply */
@@ -94,22 +96,24 @@ index 7762653..2a6f6c9 100644
 +    }
      pi = (fsPropInfo *) buf;
      buf += SIZEOF (fsPropInfo);
-+    bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
-     
-+    if (bufleft < pi->data_len)
+-    
++    bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsPropInfo);
++
++    if ((bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset)) < pi->num_offsets)
 +    {
 +	ret = -1;
 +#ifdef DEBUG
 +	fprintf(stderr,
-+		"fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < data_len (%d)\n",
-+		bufleft, pi->data_len);
++		"fsQueryXInfo: (bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset)) (%ld) < pi->num_offsets (%d)\n",
++		bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset), pi->num_offsets);
 +#endif
 +	goto bail;
 +    }
      po = (fsPropOffset *) buf;
      buf += pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
-+    bufleft -= pi->data_len;
++    bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
  
++    if (bufleft < pi->data_len)
 +    {
 +	ret = -1;
 +#ifdef DEBUG
diff --git a/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
index 619794f7e..1d880399f 100644
--- a/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From d4c76981f7fddb364166464c571ed8d3de3086cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From b6b5b14e4190048fadbfbcf063d873d318127e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
 Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800
 Subject: [PATCH 20/40] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4]
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname
 lists for X access control are insane.
 
 v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
+v3: human-readable version of "1 MB" (Mihai Moldovan)
 Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
 Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
 Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ Conflicts:
  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c
-index b6a70a7..0e9d138 100644
+index b6a70a7..532a2f8 100644
 --- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c
 +++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c
 @@ -1719,6 +1719,10 @@ GetHosts (
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ index b6a70a7..0e9d138 100644
  	n += (((host->len + 3) >> 2) << 2) + sizeof(xHostEntry);
 +        /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of
 +           hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */
-+        if (n >= 1048576)
++        if (n >= 1024*1024)
 +            break;
      }
      if (n)
diff --git a/debian/patches/1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remaining-buf.patch b/debian/patches/1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remaining-buf.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4203bf674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remaining-buf.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From b04f11915e29d9563d279e1326f61b50ea414dba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de>
+Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2015 06:03:48 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 07/15] nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c: initialize remaining
+ bufleft variables.
+
+---
+ nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
+index 86b5753..6bbb8c2 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
+@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
+     FontInfoPtr		    pfi = &pfont->info;
+     fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply  *rep;
+     char		    *buf;
+-    long		    bufleft; /* length of reply left to use */
++    long		    bufleft = 0; /* length of reply left to use */
+     fsOffset32		    *ppbits;
+     fsOffset32		    local_off;
+     char		    *off_adr;
+@@ -2501,7 +2501,7 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
+     FSBlockedListInfoPtr	binfo = (FSBlockedListInfoPtr) blockrec->data;
+     fsListFontsWithXInfoReply	*rep;
+     char			*buf;
+-    long			bufleft;
++    long			bufleft = 0;
+     FSFpePtr			conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private;
+     fsPropInfo			*pi;
+     fsPropOffset		*po;
+-- 
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895.patch b/debian/patches/1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e5d00e98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 6acafc9334828da22446380c81af81bde14b5d86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@britannica.bec.de>
+Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2011 18:51:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/15] Do proper input validation to fix for CVE-2011-2895.
+
+It ensures that all valid input can be decompressed, checks that the
+overflow conditions doesn't happen and generally tightens the
+validation of the LZW stream and doesn't pessimize the inner loop for
+no good reason. It's derived from a change in libarchive from 2004.
+
+v2: backports to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)
+Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu.herrb@laas.fr>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>
+---
+ nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c
+index 553b315..12b9f0a 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c
++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static char_type magic_header[] = { "\037\235" };	/* 1F 9D */
+ #define FIRST	257	/* first free entry */
+ #define	CLEAR	256	/* table clear output code */
+ 
+-#define STACK_SIZE  8192
++#define STACK_SIZE  65300
+ 
+ typedef struct _compressedFILE {
+     BufFilePtr	    file;
+@@ -180,14 +180,12 @@ BufFilePushCompressed (BufFilePtr f)
+ 	file->tab_suffix[code] = (char_type) code;
+     }
+     file->free_ent = ((file->block_compress) ? FIRST : 256 );
++    file->oldcode = -1;
+     file->clear_flg = 0;
+     file->offset = 0;
+     file->size = 0;
+     file->stackp = file->de_stack;
+     bzero(file->buf, BITS);
+-    file->finchar = file->oldcode = getcode (file);
+-    if (file->oldcode != -1)
+-	*file->stackp++ = file->finchar;
+     return BufFileCreate ((char *) file,
+ 			  BufCompressedFill,
+ 			  0,
+@@ -232,9 +230,6 @@ BufCompressedFill (BufFilePtr f)
+ 	if (buf == bufend)
+ 	    break;
+ 
+-	if (oldcode == -1)
+-	    break;
+-
+ 	code = getcode (file);
+ 	if (code == -1)
+ 	    break;
+@@ -243,26 +238,34 @@ BufCompressedFill (BufFilePtr f)
+ 	    for ( code = 255; code >= 0; code-- )
+ 	    	file->tab_prefix[code] = 0;
+ 	    file->clear_flg = 1;
+-	    file->free_ent = FIRST - 1;
+-	    if ( (code = getcode (file)) == -1 )	/* O, untimely death! */
+-	    	break;
++	    file->free_ent = FIRST;
++	    oldcode = -1;
++	    continue;
+     	}
+     	incode = code;
+     	/*
+      	 * Special case for KwKwK string.
+      	 */
+     	if ( code >= file->free_ent ) {
++	    if ( code > file->free_ent || oldcode == -1 ) {
++		/* Bad stream. */
++		return BUFFILEEOF;
++	    }
+ 	    *stackp++ = finchar;
+ 	    code = oldcode;
+     	}
+-    
+++	/*
+++	 * The above condition ensures that code < free_ent.
+++	 * The construction of tab_prefixof in turn guarantees that
+++	 * each iteration decreases code and therefore stack usage is
+++	 * bound by 1 << BITS - 256.
+++	 */
++
+     	/*
+      	 * Generate output characters in reverse order
+      	 */
+     	while ( code >= 256 )
+     	{
+-	    if (stackp - de_stack >= STACK_SIZE - 1)
+-		return BUFFILEEOF;
+ 	    *stackp++ = file->tab_suffix[code];
+ 	    code = file->tab_prefix[code];
+     	}
+@@ -272,7 +275,7 @@ BufCompressedFill (BufFilePtr f)
+     	/*
+      	 * Generate the new entry.
+      	 */
+-    	if ( (code=file->free_ent) < file->maxmaxcode ) {
++    	if ( (code=file->free_ent) < file->maxmaxcode && oldcode != -1) {
+ 	    file->tab_prefix[code] = (unsigned short)oldcode;
+ 	    file->tab_suffix[code] = finchar;
+ 	    file->free_ent = code+1;
+-- 
+2.1.4
+