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author | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2014-01-06 23:30:14 -0800 |
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committer | Mihai Moldovan <ionic@ionic.de> | 2015-02-16 05:58:21 +0100 |
commit | b6b5b14e4190048fadbfbcf063d873d318127e81 (patch) | |
tree | 795a7219075f8163f0da81c91807a7c37ba7af8c /doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/IfEvent.c.NX.patch | |
parent | 03a2922d9cc17af26bd91d4a471061c54db50789 (diff) | |
download | nx-libs-b6b5b14e4190048fadbfbcf063d873d318127e81.tar.gz nx-libs-b6b5b14e4190048fadbfbcf063d873d318127e81.tar.bz2 nx-libs-b6b5b14e4190048fadbfbcf063d873d318127e81.zip |
dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4]
GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies
them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over
all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a
potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with
a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly
calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory.
This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname
lists for X access control are insane.
v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
v3: human-readable version of "1 MB" (Mihai Moldovan)
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Conflicts:
os/access.c
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/IfEvent.c.NX.patch')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions