rename original NX patches, so that we can see the patched file's name in the patch file name.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 271 deletions

diff --git a/doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch b/doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d7549c487..000000000
--- a/doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
---- ./nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c.X.original	2015-02-13 14:03:44.788440645 +0100
-+++ ./nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c	2015-02-10 19:13:13.452699065 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,23 @@
- */
- /* $XFree86: auth.c,v 1.13 2003/04/27 21:31:08 herrb Exp $ */
- 
-+/**************************************************************************/
-+/*                                                                        */
-+/* Copyright (c) 2001, 2011 NoMachine, http://www.nomachine.com/.         */
-+/*                                                                        */
-+/* NX-X11, NX protocol compression and NX extensions to this software     */
-+/* are copyright of NoMachine. Redistribution and use of the present      */
-+/* software is allowed according to terms specified in the file LICENSE   */
-+/* which comes in the source distribution.                                */
-+/*                                                                        */
-+/* Check http://www.nomachine.com/licensing.html for applicability.       */
-+/*                                                                        */
-+/* NX and NoMachine are trademarks of Medialogic S.p.A.                   */
-+/*                                                                        */
-+/* All rights reserved.                                                   */
-+/*                                                                        */
-+/**************************************************************************/
-+
- /*
-  * authorization hooks for the server
-  * Author:  Keith Packard, MIT X Consortium
-@@ -129,7 +146,24 @@
- void
- InitAuthorization (char *file_name)
- {
-+#ifdef __sun 
-+    char * envBuffer;
-+#endif
-     authorization_file = file_name;
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
-+    fprintf(stderr, "InitAuthorization: Going to propagate auth file '%s' to the environment.\n",
-+                authorization_file);
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __sun 
-+    envBuffer = malloc(15+strlen(authorization_file));
-+    sprintf(envBuffer,"NX_XAUTHORITY=%s",authorization_file);
-+    putenv(envBuffer);
-+#else
-+    setenv("NX_XAUTHORITY", authorization_file, 1);
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -144,6 +178,68 @@
-     if (!authorization_file)
- 	return 0;
- 
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
-+
-+    /*
-+     * We think that the way LoadAuthorization() is working is wrong.
-+     * It doesn't reset the list of stored authorizations before reading
-+     * the new cookies. Our take is that if a new auth file is to be
-+     * read, the only cookies that are to be accepted are those that are
-+     * in the new file, not those in the file -plus- those that have
-+     * been in the file in the past. Furthermore, if the list can't be
-+     * read or it is empty, it should assume that it ignores which co-
-+     * okies are valid and thus it should disable any access. Your mile-
-+     * age can vary. A less draconian approach could be to leave the old
-+     * cookies if the file can't be read and remove them only if the
-+     * file is empty.
-+     *
-+     * Adding the cookies without removing the old values for the same
-+     * protocol has an important implication. If an user shares the co-
-+     * okie with somebody and later wants to revoke the access to the
-+     * display, changing the cookie will not work. This is especially
-+     * important with NX. For security reasons, after reconnecting the
-+     * session to a different display, it is advisable to generate a
-+     * new set of cookies, but doing that it is useless with the current
-+     * code, as the old cookies are going to be still accepted. On the
-+     * same topic, consider that once an user has got access to the X
-+     * server, he/she can freely enable host authentication from any
-+     * host, so the safe behaviour should be to reset the host based
-+     * authenthication at least at reconnection, and keep as valid only
-+     * the cookies that are actually in the file. This behaviour would
-+     * surely break many applications, among them a SSH connection run
-+     * inside a NX session, as ssh -X reads the cookie for the display
-+     * only at session startup and does not read the cookies again
-+     * when the auth file is changed.
-+     *
-+     * Another bug (or feature, depending on how you want to consider
-+     * it) is that if the authority file contains entries for different
-+     * displays (as it is the norm when the authority file is the default
-+     * .Xauthority in the user's home), the server will match -any- of
-+     * the cookies, even cookies that are not for its own display. This 
-+     * means that you have be careful when passing an authority file to
-+     * nxagent or Xnest and maybe keep separate files for letting nxagent
-+     * find the cookie to be used to connect to the remote display and
-+     * for letting it find what cookies to accept. If the file is the
-+     * same, clients will be able to connect to nxagent with both the
-+     * cookies.
-+     */
-+
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH_RESET
-+
-+    #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
-+    fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Resetting authorization info.\n");
-+    #endif
-+
-+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
-+        if (protocols[i].Reset) {
-+            (*protocols[i].Reset) ();
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */
-+
-     f = Fopen (authorization_file, "r");
-     if (!f)
- 	return -1;
-@@ -154,6 +250,14 @@
- 		memcmp (protocols[i].name, auth->name, (int) auth->name_length) == 0 &&
- 		protocols[i].Add)
- 	    {
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
-+
-+                #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
-+                fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Adding new record from file [%s].\n",
-+                            authorization_file);
-+                #endif
-+
-+#endif
- 		++count;
- 		(*protocols[i].Add) (auth->data_length, auth->data,
- 					 FakeClientID(0));
-@@ -162,7 +266,46 @@
- 	XauDisposeAuth (auth);
-     }
- 
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
-+
-+    if (count == 0)
-+    {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "Warning: No authorization record could be read from file '%s'.\n",
-+                  authorization_file);
-+
-+      fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Please, create a valid authorization cookie using the command\n"
-+                  "Warning: 'xauth -f %s add <display> MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 <cookie>'.\n",
-+                      authorization_file);
-+    }
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
-+    if (Fclose (f) != 0)
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * If the Fclose() fails, for example because of a signal,
-+         * it's advisable to return the number of protocols read,
-+         * if any, or otherwise the server would believe that no
-+         * cookie is valid and eventually fall back to host based
-+         * authentication. Note anyway that the new code in Check-
-+         * Authorization() doesn't care the return value and gives
-+         * a chance to the function to check the file at the next
-+         * connection.
-+         */
-+
-+        if (count > 0)
-+        {
-+            return count;
-+        }
-+        else
-+        {
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-+    }
-+#else
-     Fclose (f);
-+#endif
-     return count;
- }
- 
-@@ -194,7 +337,10 @@
-     int	i;
-     struct stat buf;
-     static time_t lastmod = 0;
-+
-+    #ifndef NX_TRANS_AUTH
-     static Bool loaded = FALSE;
-+    #endif
- 
-     if (!authorization_file || stat(authorization_file, &buf))
-     {
-@@ -225,7 +371,67 @@
- 	 * entries for this server), and reloading it later fails, don't
- 	 * change anything. (loadauth == -1 && loaded)
- 	 */
--	
-+
-+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
-+
-+        /*
-+         * The implementation of CheckAuthorization() was changed. The way
-+         * the auth file was handled previously was questionable and could
-+         * open the way to a vast array of security problems. There might be
-+         * ways for an attacker to prevent the server from reading the file
-+         * and it was enough for the server to fail reading the file once
-+         * (because of a not blocked signal, for example) to leave the dis-
-+         * play open to all the users running a session on the same terminal
-+         * server.
-+         *
-+         * In NX we want to have only two cases: either we have to check an
-+         * authorization file or we don't. In the first case we need to do our
-+         * best to read the file at any new client access and never fall back
-+         * to host based authentication. Falling back to local host access has
-+         * no way back, as it will always take precedence over the auth cookie
-+         * (unless the user explicitly disables, one by one, all the rules
-+         * allowing local access, if and only if he/she becomes aware of the
-+         * problem). In the second case we assume that user doesn't care secu-
-+         * rity and so allow unrestricted access from the local machine.
-+         */
-+
-+        #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
-+        fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Going to set authorization with loadauth [%d].\n",
-+                    loadauth);
-+        #endif
-+
-+        if (authorization_file)
-+        {
-+            #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
-+            fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Disabling local host access.\n");
-+            #endif
-+
-+            DisableLocalHost();
-+        }
-+        else
-+        {
-+            /*
-+             * Enable host-based authentication only if
-+             * the authorization file was not specified
-+             * either on the command line or in the env-
-+             * ironment.
-+             */
-+
-+            #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
-+            fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Enabling local host access.\n");
-+            #endif
-+
-+            EnableLocalHost();
-+        }
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Avoid the 'unused variable' warning.
-+         */
-+
-+        loadauth = loadauth;
-+
-+#else /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */
-+
- 	if (loadauth > 0)
- 	{
- 	    DisableLocalHost(); /* got at least one */
-@@ -233,6 +439,8 @@
- 	}
- 	else if (loadauth == 0 || !loaded)
- 	    EnableLocalHost ();
-+
-+#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */
-     }
-     if (name_length) {
- 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {