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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-c.full.patch43
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-c.full.patch b/debian/patches/1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-c.full.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3177ee906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-c.full.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 37e7fb1f64b29ef06ec4d69ab0b7afa99c613383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 18:54:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 18/40] unchecked malloc may allow unauthed client to crash
+ Xserver [CVE-2014-8091]
+
+authdes_ezdecode() calls malloc() using a length provided by the
+connection handshake sent by a newly connected client in order
+to authenticate to the server, so should be treated as untrusted.
+
+It didn't check if malloc() failed before writing to the newly
+allocated buffer, so could lead to a server crash if the server
+fails to allocate memory (up to UINT16_MAX bytes, since the len
+field is a CARD16 in the X protocol).
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+
+Conflicts:
+ os/rpcauth.c
+---
+ nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c
+index 3c5cb59..a12931e 100644
+--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c
++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ authdes_ezdecode(char *inmsg, int len)
+ SVCXPRT xprt;
+
+ temp_inmsg = (char *) xalloc(len);
++ if (temp_inmsg == NULL) {
++ why = AUTH_FAILED; /* generic error, since there is no AUTH_BADALLOC */
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ memmove(temp_inmsg, inmsg, len);
+
+ memset((char *)&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+--
+2.1.4
+