diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch | 54 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1d880399f --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From b6b5b14e4190048fadbfbcf063d873d318127e81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 20/40] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4] + +GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies +them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over +all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a +potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with +a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly +calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory. + +This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname +lists for X access control are insane. + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) +v3: human-readable version of "1 MB" (Mihai Moldovan) +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + os/access.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c +index b6a70a7..532a2f8 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c +@@ -1719,6 +1719,10 @@ GetHosts ( + { + nHosts++; + n += (((host->len + 3) >> 2) << 2) + sizeof(xHostEntry); ++ /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of ++ hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */ ++ if (n >= 1024*1024) ++ break; + } + if (n) + { +@@ -1730,6 +1734,8 @@ GetHosts ( + for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) + { + len = host->len; ++ if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n)) ++ break; + ((xHostEntry *)ptr)->family = host->family; + ((xHostEntry *)ptr)->length = len; + ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry); +-- +2.1.4 + |