diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch | 271 |
1 files changed, 271 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch b/doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7549c487 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches/auth.c.NX.patch @@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +--- ./nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c.X.original 2015-02-13 14:03:44.788440645 +0100 ++++ ./nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c 2015-02-10 19:13:13.452699065 +0100 +@@ -28,6 +28,23 @@ + */ + /* $XFree86: auth.c,v 1.13 2003/04/27 21:31:08 herrb Exp $ */ + ++/**************************************************************************/ ++/* */ ++/* Copyright (c) 2001, 2011 NoMachine, http://www.nomachine.com/. */ ++/* */ ++/* NX-X11, NX protocol compression and NX extensions to this software */ ++/* are copyright of NoMachine. Redistribution and use of the present */ ++/* software is allowed according to terms specified in the file LICENSE */ ++/* which comes in the source distribution. */ ++/* */ ++/* Check http://www.nomachine.com/licensing.html for applicability. */ ++/* */ ++/* NX and NoMachine are trademarks of Medialogic S.p.A. */ ++/* */ ++/* All rights reserved. */ ++/* */ ++/**************************************************************************/ ++ + /* + * authorization hooks for the server + * Author: Keith Packard, MIT X Consortium +@@ -129,7 +146,24 @@ + void + InitAuthorization (char *file_name) + { ++#ifdef __sun ++ char * envBuffer; ++#endif + authorization_file = file_name; ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST ++ fprintf(stderr, "InitAuthorization: Going to propagate auth file '%s' to the environment.\n", ++ authorization_file); ++#endif ++#ifdef __sun ++ envBuffer = malloc(15+strlen(authorization_file)); ++ sprintf(envBuffer,"NX_XAUTHORITY=%s",authorization_file); ++ putenv(envBuffer); ++#else ++ setenv("NX_XAUTHORITY", authorization_file, 1); ++#endif ++#endif ++ + } + + static int +@@ -144,6 +178,68 @@ + if (!authorization_file) + return 0; + ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH ++ ++ /* ++ * We think that the way LoadAuthorization() is working is wrong. ++ * It doesn't reset the list of stored authorizations before reading ++ * the new cookies. Our take is that if a new auth file is to be ++ * read, the only cookies that are to be accepted are those that are ++ * in the new file, not those in the file -plus- those that have ++ * been in the file in the past. Furthermore, if the list can't be ++ * read or it is empty, it should assume that it ignores which co- ++ * okies are valid and thus it should disable any access. Your mile- ++ * age can vary. A less draconian approach could be to leave the old ++ * cookies if the file can't be read and remove them only if the ++ * file is empty. ++ * ++ * Adding the cookies without removing the old values for the same ++ * protocol has an important implication. If an user shares the co- ++ * okie with somebody and later wants to revoke the access to the ++ * display, changing the cookie will not work. This is especially ++ * important with NX. For security reasons, after reconnecting the ++ * session to a different display, it is advisable to generate a ++ * new set of cookies, but doing that it is useless with the current ++ * code, as the old cookies are going to be still accepted. On the ++ * same topic, consider that once an user has got access to the X ++ * server, he/she can freely enable host authentication from any ++ * host, so the safe behaviour should be to reset the host based ++ * authenthication at least at reconnection, and keep as valid only ++ * the cookies that are actually in the file. This behaviour would ++ * surely break many applications, among them a SSH connection run ++ * inside a NX session, as ssh -X reads the cookie for the display ++ * only at session startup and does not read the cookies again ++ * when the auth file is changed. ++ * ++ * Another bug (or feature, depending on how you want to consider ++ * it) is that if the authority file contains entries for different ++ * displays (as it is the norm when the authority file is the default ++ * .Xauthority in the user's home), the server will match -any- of ++ * the cookies, even cookies that are not for its own display. This ++ * means that you have be careful when passing an authority file to ++ * nxagent or Xnest and maybe keep separate files for letting nxagent ++ * find the cookie to be used to connect to the remote display and ++ * for letting it find what cookies to accept. If the file is the ++ * same, clients will be able to connect to nxagent with both the ++ * cookies. ++ */ ++ ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH_RESET ++ ++ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST ++ fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Resetting authorization info.\n"); ++ #endif ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { ++ if (protocols[i].Reset) { ++ (*protocols[i].Reset) (); ++ } ++ } ++ ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */ ++ + f = Fopen (authorization_file, "r"); + if (!f) + return -1; +@@ -154,6 +250,14 @@ + memcmp (protocols[i].name, auth->name, (int) auth->name_length) == 0 && + protocols[i].Add) + { ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH ++ ++ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST ++ fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Adding new record from file [%s].\n", ++ authorization_file); ++ #endif ++ ++#endif + ++count; + (*protocols[i].Add) (auth->data_length, auth->data, + FakeClientID(0)); +@@ -162,7 +266,46 @@ + XauDisposeAuth (auth); + } + ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH ++ ++ if (count == 0) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: No authorization record could be read from file '%s'.\n", ++ authorization_file); ++ ++ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Please, create a valid authorization cookie using the command\n" ++ "Warning: 'xauth -f %s add <display> MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 <cookie>'.\n", ++ authorization_file); ++ } ++ ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH ++ if (Fclose (f) != 0) ++ { ++ /* ++ * If the Fclose() fails, for example because of a signal, ++ * it's advisable to return the number of protocols read, ++ * if any, or otherwise the server would believe that no ++ * cookie is valid and eventually fall back to host based ++ * authentication. Note anyway that the new code in Check- ++ * Authorization() doesn't care the return value and gives ++ * a chance to the function to check the file at the next ++ * connection. ++ */ ++ ++ if (count > 0) ++ { ++ return count; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ } ++#else + Fclose (f); ++#endif + return count; + } + +@@ -194,7 +337,10 @@ + int i; + struct stat buf; + static time_t lastmod = 0; ++ ++ #ifndef NX_TRANS_AUTH + static Bool loaded = FALSE; ++ #endif + + if (!authorization_file || stat(authorization_file, &buf)) + { +@@ -225,7 +371,67 @@ + * entries for this server), and reloading it later fails, don't + * change anything. (loadauth == -1 && loaded) + */ +- ++ ++#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH ++ ++ /* ++ * The implementation of CheckAuthorization() was changed. The way ++ * the auth file was handled previously was questionable and could ++ * open the way to a vast array of security problems. There might be ++ * ways for an attacker to prevent the server from reading the file ++ * and it was enough for the server to fail reading the file once ++ * (because of a not blocked signal, for example) to leave the dis- ++ * play open to all the users running a session on the same terminal ++ * server. ++ * ++ * In NX we want to have only two cases: either we have to check an ++ * authorization file or we don't. In the first case we need to do our ++ * best to read the file at any new client access and never fall back ++ * to host based authentication. Falling back to local host access has ++ * no way back, as it will always take precedence over the auth cookie ++ * (unless the user explicitly disables, one by one, all the rules ++ * allowing local access, if and only if he/she becomes aware of the ++ * problem). In the second case we assume that user doesn't care secu- ++ * rity and so allow unrestricted access from the local machine. ++ */ ++ ++ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST ++ fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Going to set authorization with loadauth [%d].\n", ++ loadauth); ++ #endif ++ ++ if (authorization_file) ++ { ++ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST ++ fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Disabling local host access.\n"); ++ #endif ++ ++ DisableLocalHost(); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* ++ * Enable host-based authentication only if ++ * the authorization file was not specified ++ * either on the command line or in the env- ++ * ironment. ++ */ ++ ++ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST ++ fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Enabling local host access.\n"); ++ #endif ++ ++ EnableLocalHost(); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Avoid the 'unused variable' warning. ++ */ ++ ++ loadauth = loadauth; ++ ++#else /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */ ++ + if (loadauth > 0) + { + DisableLocalHost(); /* got at least one */ +@@ -233,6 +439,8 @@ + } + else if (loadauth == 0 || !loaded) + EnableLocalHost (); ++ ++#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */ + } + if (name_length) { + for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { |