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+/* $Xorg: auth.c,v 1.5 2001/02/09 02:05:23 xorgcvs Exp $ */
+/*
+
+Copyright 1988, 1998 The Open Group
+
+Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its
+documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that
+the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that
+copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting
+documentation.
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included
+in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
+IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OPEN GROUP BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR
+OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE,
+ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
+OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+
+Except as contained in this notice, the name of The Open Group shall
+not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or
+other dealings in this Software without prior written authorization
+from The Open Group.
+
+*/
+/* $XFree86: auth.c,v 1.13 2003/04/27 21:31:08 herrb Exp $ */
+
+/**************************************************************************/
+/* */
+/* Copyright (c) 2001, 2007 NoMachine, http://www.nomachine.com/. */
+/* */
+/* NX-X11, NX protocol compression and NX extensions to this software */
+/* are copyright of NoMachine. Redistribution and use of the present */
+/* software is allowed according to terms specified in the file LICENSE */
+/* which comes in the source distribution. */
+/* */
+/* Check http://www.nomachine.com/licensing.html for applicability. */
+/* */
+/* NX and NoMachine are trademarks of NoMachine S.r.l. */
+/* */
+/* All rights reserved. */
+/* */
+/**************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * authorization hooks for the server
+ * Author: Keith Packard, MIT X Consortium
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DIX_CONFIG_H
+#include <dix-config.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef K5AUTH
+# include <krb5/krb5.h>
+#endif
+# include <X11/X.h>
+# include <X11/Xauth.h>
+# include "misc.h"
+# include "osdep.h"
+# include "dixstruct.h"
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+#define _SECURITY_SERVER
+# include <X11/extensions/security.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef WIN32
+#include <X11/Xw32defs.h>
+#endif
+
+struct protocol {
+ unsigned short name_length;
+ char *name;
+ AuthAddCFunc Add; /* new authorization data */
+ AuthCheckFunc Check; /* verify client authorization data */
+ AuthRstCFunc Reset; /* delete all authorization data entries */
+ AuthToIDFunc ToID; /* convert cookie to ID */
+ AuthFromIDFunc FromID; /* convert ID to cookie */
+ AuthRemCFunc Remove; /* remove a specific cookie */
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+ AuthGenCFunc Generate;
+#endif
+};
+
+static struct protocol protocols[] = {
+{ (unsigned short) 18, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1",
+ MitAddCookie, MitCheckCookie, MitResetCookie,
+ MitToID, MitFromID, MitRemoveCookie,
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+ MitGenerateCookie
+#endif
+},
+#ifdef HASXDMAUTH
+{ (unsigned short) 19, "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1",
+ XdmAddCookie, XdmCheckCookie, XdmResetCookie,
+ XdmToID, XdmFromID, XdmRemoveCookie,
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+ NULL
+#endif
+},
+#endif
+#ifdef SECURE_RPC
+{ (unsigned short) 9, "SUN-DES-1",
+ SecureRPCAdd, SecureRPCCheck, SecureRPCReset,
+ SecureRPCToID, SecureRPCFromID,SecureRPCRemove,
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+ NULL
+#endif
+},
+#endif
+#ifdef K5AUTH
+{ (unsigned short) 14, "MIT-KERBEROS-5",
+ K5Add, K5Check, K5Reset,
+ K5ToID, K5FromID, K5Remove,
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+ NULL
+#endif
+},
+#endif
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+{ (unsigned short) XSecurityAuthorizationNameLen,
+ XSecurityAuthorizationName,
+ NULL, AuthSecurityCheck, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL
+},
+#endif
+};
+
+# define NUM_AUTHORIZATION (sizeof (protocols) /\
+ sizeof (struct protocol))
+
+/*
+ * Initialize all classes of authorization by reading the
+ * specified authorization file
+ */
+
+static char *authorization_file = (char *)NULL;
+
+static Bool ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE;
+
+void
+InitAuthorization (char *file_name)
+{
+#ifdef __sun
+ char * envBuffer;
+#endif
+ authorization_file = file_name;
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
+ fprintf(stderr, "InitAuthorization: Going to propagate auth file '%s' to the environment.\n",
+ authorization_file);
+#endif
+#ifdef __sun
+ envBuffer = malloc(15+strlen(authorization_file));
+ sprintf(envBuffer,"NX_XAUTHORITY=%s",authorization_file);
+ putenv(envBuffer);
+#else
+ setenv("NX_XAUTHORITY", authorization_file, 1);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+}
+
+static int
+LoadAuthorization (void)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ Xauth *auth;
+ int i;
+ int count = 0;
+
+ ShouldLoadAuth = FALSE;
+ if (!authorization_file)
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
+
+ /*
+ * We think that the way LoadAuthorization() is working is wrong.
+ * It doesn't reset the list of stored authorizations before reading
+ * the new cookies. Our take is that if a new auth file is to be
+ * read, the only cookies that are to be accepted are those that are
+ * in the new file, not those in the file -plus- those that have
+ * been in the file in the past. Furthermore, if the list can't be
+ * read or it is empty, it should assume that it ignores which co-
+ * okies are valid and thus it should disable any access. Your mile-
+ * age can vary. A less draconian approach could be to leave the old
+ * cookies if the file can't be read and remove them only if the
+ * file is empty.
+ *
+ * Adding the cookies without removing the old values for the same
+ * protocol has an important implication. If an user shares the co-
+ * okie with somebody and later wants to revoke the access to the
+ * display, changing the cookie will not work. This is especially
+ * important with NX. For security reasons, after reconnecting the
+ * session to a different display, it is advisable to generate a
+ * new set of cookies, but doing that it is useless with the current
+ * code, as the old cookies are going to be still accepted. On the
+ * same topic, consider that once an user has got access to the X
+ * server, he/she can freely enable host authentication from any
+ * host, so the safe behaviour should be to reset the host based
+ * authenthication at least at reconnection, and keep as valid only
+ * the cookies that are actually in the file. This behaviour would
+ * surely break many applications, among them a SSH connection run
+ * inside a NX session, as ssh -X reads the cookie for the display
+ * only at session startup and does not read the cookies again
+ * when the auth file is changed.
+ *
+ * Another bug (or feature, depending on how you want to consider
+ * it) is that if the authority file contains entries for different
+ * displays (as it is the norm when the authority file is the default
+ * .Xauthority in the user's home), the server will match -any- of
+ * the cookies, even cookies that are not for its own display. This
+ * means that you have be careful when passing an authority file to
+ * nxagent or Xnest and maybe keep separate files for letting nxagent
+ * find the cookie to be used to connect to the remote display and
+ * for letting it find what cookies to accept. If the file is the
+ * same, clients will be able to connect to nxagent with both the
+ * cookies.
+ */
+
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH_RESET
+
+ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
+ fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Resetting authorization info.\n");
+ #endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].Reset) {
+ (*protocols[i].Reset) ();
+ }
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */
+
+ f = Fopen (authorization_file, "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return -1;
+
+ while ((auth = XauReadAuth (f)) != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].name_length == auth->name_length &&
+ memcmp (protocols[i].name, auth->name, (int) auth->name_length) == 0 &&
+ protocols[i].Add)
+ {
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
+
+ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
+ fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Adding new record from file [%s].\n",
+ authorization_file);
+ #endif
+
+#endif
+ ++count;
+ (*protocols[i].Add) (auth->data_length, auth->data,
+ FakeClientID(0));
+ }
+ }
+ XauDisposeAuth (auth);
+ }
+
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
+
+ if (count == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: No authorization record could be read from file '%s'.\n",
+ authorization_file);
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Please, create a valid authorization cookie using the command\n"
+ "Warning: 'xauth -f %s add <display> MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 <cookie>'.\n",
+ authorization_file);
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
+ if (Fclose (f) != 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If the Fclose() fails, for example because of a signal,
+ * it's advisable to return the number of protocols read,
+ * if any, or otherwise the server would believe that no
+ * cookie is valid and eventually fall back to host based
+ * authentication. Note anyway that the new code in Check-
+ * Authorization() doesn't care the return value and gives
+ * a chance to the function to check the file at the next
+ * connection.
+ */
+
+ if (count > 0)
+ {
+ return count;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ Fclose (f);
+#endif
+ return count;
+}
+
+#ifdef XDMCP
+/*
+ * XdmcpInit calls this function to discover all authorization
+ * schemes supported by the display
+ */
+void
+RegisterAuthorizations (void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++)
+ XdmcpRegisterAuthorization (protocols[i].name,
+ (int)protocols[i].name_length);
+}
+#endif
+
+XID
+CheckAuthorization (
+ unsigned int name_length,
+ char *name,
+ unsigned int data_length,
+ char *data,
+ ClientPtr client,
+ char **reason) /* failure message. NULL for default msg */
+{
+ int i;
+ struct stat buf;
+ static time_t lastmod = 0;
+
+ #ifndef NX_TRANS_AUTH
+ static Bool loaded = FALSE;
+ #endif
+
+ if (!authorization_file || stat(authorization_file, &buf))
+ {
+ if (lastmod != 0) {
+ lastmod = 0;
+ ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE; /* stat lost, so force reload */
+ }
+ }
+ else if (buf.st_mtime > lastmod)
+ {
+ lastmod = buf.st_mtime;
+ ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (ShouldLoadAuth)
+ {
+ int loadauth = LoadAuthorization();
+
+ /*
+ * If the authorization file has at least one entry for this server,
+ * disable local host access. (loadauth > 0)
+ *
+ * If there are zero entries (either initially or when the
+ * authorization file is later reloaded), or if a valid
+ * authorization file was never loaded, enable local host access.
+ * (loadauth == 0 || !loaded)
+ *
+ * If the authorization file was loaded initially (with valid
+ * entries for this server), and reloading it later fails, don't
+ * change anything. (loadauth == -1 && loaded)
+ */
+
+#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH
+
+ /*
+ * The implementation of CheckAuthorization() was changed. The way
+ * the auth file was handled previously was questionable and could
+ * open the way to a vast array of security problems. There might be
+ * ways for an attacker to prevent the server from reading the file
+ * and it was enough for the server to fail reading the file once
+ * (because of a not blocked signal, for example) to leave the dis-
+ * play open to all the users running a session on the same terminal
+ * server.
+ *
+ * In NX we want to have only two cases: either we have to check an
+ * authorization file or we don't. In the first case we need to do our
+ * best to read the file at any new client access and never fall back
+ * to host based authentication. Falling back to local host access has
+ * no way back, as it will always take precedence over the auth cookie
+ * (unless the user explicitly disables, one by one, all the rules
+ * allowing local access, if and only if he/she becomes aware of the
+ * problem). In the second case we assume that user doesn't care secu-
+ * rity and so allow unrestricted access from the local machine.
+ */
+
+ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
+ fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Going to set authorization with loadauth [%d].\n",
+ loadauth);
+ #endif
+
+ if (authorization_file)
+ {
+ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
+ fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Disabling local host access.\n");
+ #endif
+
+ DisableLocalHost();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Enable host-based authentication only if
+ * the authorization file was not specified
+ * either on the command line or in the env-
+ * ironment.
+ */
+
+ #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST
+ fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Enabling local host access.\n");
+ #endif
+
+ EnableLocalHost();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid the 'unused variable' warning.
+ */
+
+ loadauth = loadauth;
+
+#else /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */
+
+ if (loadauth > 0)
+ {
+ DisableLocalHost(); /* got at least one */
+ loaded = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (loadauth == 0 || !loaded)
+ EnableLocalHost ();
+
+#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */
+ }
+ if (name_length) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length &&
+ memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0)
+ {
+ return (*protocols[i].Check) (data_length, data, client, reason);
+ }
+ *reason = "Protocol not supported by server\n";
+ }
+ } else *reason = "No protocol specified\n";
+ return (XID) ~0L;
+}
+
+void
+ResetAuthorization (void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++)
+ if (protocols[i].Reset)
+ (*protocols[i].Reset)();
+ ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE;
+}
+
+XID
+AuthorizationToID (
+ unsigned short name_length,
+ char *name,
+ unsigned short data_length,
+ char *data)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length &&
+ memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 &&
+ protocols[i].ToID)
+ {
+ return (*protocols[i].ToID) (data_length, data);
+ }
+ }
+ return (XID) ~0L;
+}
+
+int
+AuthorizationFromID (
+ XID id,
+ unsigned short *name_lenp,
+ char **namep,
+ unsigned short *data_lenp,
+ char **datap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].FromID &&
+ (*protocols[i].FromID) (id, data_lenp, datap)) {
+ *name_lenp = protocols[i].name_length;
+ *namep = protocols[i].name;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+RemoveAuthorization (
+ unsigned short name_length,
+ char *name,
+ unsigned short data_length,
+ char *data)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length &&
+ memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 &&
+ protocols[i].Remove)
+ {
+ return (*protocols[i].Remove) (data_length, data);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+AddAuthorization (unsigned name_length, char *name, unsigned data_length, char *data)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length &&
+ memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 &&
+ protocols[i].Add)
+ {
+ return (*protocols[i].Add) (data_length, data, FakeClientID(0));
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef XCSECURITY
+
+XID
+GenerateAuthorization(
+ unsigned name_length,
+ char *name,
+ unsigned data_length,
+ char *data,
+ unsigned *data_length_return,
+ char **data_return)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) {
+ if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length &&
+ memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 &&
+ protocols[i].Generate)
+ {
+ return (*protocols[i].Generate) (data_length, data,
+ FakeClientID(0), data_length_return, data_return);
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* A random number generator that is more unpredictable
+ than that shipped with some systems.
+ This code is taken from the C standard. */
+
+static unsigned long int next = 1;
+
+static int
+xdm_rand(void)
+{
+ next = next * 1103515245 + 12345;
+ return (unsigned int)(next/65536) % 32768;
+}
+
+static void
+xdm_srand(unsigned int seed)
+{
+ next = seed;
+}
+
+void
+GenerateRandomData (int len, char *buf)
+{
+ static int seed;
+ int value;
+ int i;
+
+ seed += GetTimeInMillis();
+ xdm_srand (seed);
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ {
+ value = xdm_rand ();
+ buf[i] ^= (value & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX add getrusage, popen("ps -ale") */
+}
+
+#endif /* XCSECURITY */