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Diffstat (limited to 'nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c.NX.original')
| -rw-r--r-- | nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c.NX.original | 608 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 608 deletions
diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c.NX.original b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c.NX.original deleted file mode 100644 index dfb6f8899..000000000 --- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/auth.c.NX.original +++ /dev/null @@ -1,608 +0,0 @@ -/* $Xorg: auth.c,v 1.5 2001/02/09 02:05:23 xorgcvs Exp $ */ -/* - -Copyright 1988, 1998 The Open Group - -Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its -documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that -the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that -copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting -documentation. - -The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included -in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. - -THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS -OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF -MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. -IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OPEN GROUP BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR -OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, -ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR -OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. - -Except as contained in this notice, the name of The Open Group shall -not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or -other dealings in this Software without prior written authorization -from The Open Group. - -*/ -/* $XFree86: auth.c,v 1.13 2003/04/27 21:31:08 herrb Exp $ */ - -/**************************************************************************/ -/* */ -/* Copyright (c) 2001, 2011 NoMachine, http://www.nomachine.com/. */ -/* */ -/* NX-X11, NX protocol compression and NX extensions to this software */ -/* are copyright of NoMachine. Redistribution and use of the present */ -/* software is allowed according to terms specified in the file LICENSE */ -/* which comes in the source distribution. */ -/* */ -/* Check http://www.nomachine.com/licensing.html for applicability. */ -/* */ -/* NX and NoMachine are trademarks of Medialogic S.p.A. */ -/* */ -/* All rights reserved. */ -/* */ -/**************************************************************************/ - -/* - * authorization hooks for the server - * Author: Keith Packard, MIT X Consortium - */ - -#ifdef HAVE_DIX_CONFIG_H -#include <dix-config.h> -#endif - -#ifdef K5AUTH -# include <krb5/krb5.h> -#endif -# include <X11/X.h> -# include <X11/Xauth.h> -# include "misc.h" -# include "osdep.h" -# include "dixstruct.h" -# include <sys/types.h> -# include <sys/stat.h> -#ifdef XCSECURITY -#define _SECURITY_SERVER -# include <X11/extensions/security.h> -#endif -#ifdef WIN32 -#include <X11/Xw32defs.h> -#endif - -struct protocol { - unsigned short name_length; - char *name; - AuthAddCFunc Add; /* new authorization data */ - AuthCheckFunc Check; /* verify client authorization data */ - AuthRstCFunc Reset; /* delete all authorization data entries */ - AuthToIDFunc ToID; /* convert cookie to ID */ - AuthFromIDFunc FromID; /* convert ID to cookie */ - AuthRemCFunc Remove; /* remove a specific cookie */ -#ifdef XCSECURITY - AuthGenCFunc Generate; -#endif -}; - -static struct protocol protocols[] = { -{ (unsigned short) 18, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", - MitAddCookie, MitCheckCookie, MitResetCookie, - MitToID, MitFromID, MitRemoveCookie, -#ifdef XCSECURITY - MitGenerateCookie -#endif -}, -#ifdef HASXDMAUTH -{ (unsigned short) 19, "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1", - XdmAddCookie, XdmCheckCookie, XdmResetCookie, - XdmToID, XdmFromID, XdmRemoveCookie, -#ifdef XCSECURITY - NULL -#endif -}, -#endif -#ifdef SECURE_RPC -{ (unsigned short) 9, "SUN-DES-1", - SecureRPCAdd, SecureRPCCheck, SecureRPCReset, - SecureRPCToID, SecureRPCFromID,SecureRPCRemove, -#ifdef XCSECURITY - NULL -#endif -}, -#endif -#ifdef K5AUTH -{ (unsigned short) 14, "MIT-KERBEROS-5", - K5Add, K5Check, K5Reset, - K5ToID, K5FromID, K5Remove, -#ifdef XCSECURITY - NULL -#endif -}, -#endif -#ifdef XCSECURITY -{ (unsigned short) XSecurityAuthorizationNameLen, - XSecurityAuthorizationName, - NULL, AuthSecurityCheck, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL -}, -#endif -}; - -# define NUM_AUTHORIZATION (sizeof (protocols) /\ - sizeof (struct protocol)) - -/* - * Initialize all classes of authorization by reading the - * specified authorization file - */ - -static char *authorization_file = (char *)NULL; - -static Bool ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE; - -void -InitAuthorization (char *file_name) -{ -#ifdef __sun - char * envBuffer; -#endif - authorization_file = file_name; -#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH -#ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST - fprintf(stderr, "InitAuthorization: Going to propagate auth file '%s' to the environment.\n", - authorization_file); -#endif -#ifdef __sun - envBuffer = malloc(15+strlen(authorization_file)); - sprintf(envBuffer,"NX_XAUTHORITY=%s",authorization_file); - putenv(envBuffer); -#else - setenv("NX_XAUTHORITY", authorization_file, 1); -#endif -#endif - -} - -static int -LoadAuthorization (void) -{ - FILE *f; - Xauth *auth; - int i; - int count = 0; - - ShouldLoadAuth = FALSE; - if (!authorization_file) - return 0; - -#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH - - /* - * We think that the way LoadAuthorization() is working is wrong. - * It doesn't reset the list of stored authorizations before reading - * the new cookies. Our take is that if a new auth file is to be - * read, the only cookies that are to be accepted are those that are - * in the new file, not those in the file -plus- those that have - * been in the file in the past. Furthermore, if the list can't be - * read or it is empty, it should assume that it ignores which co- - * okies are valid and thus it should disable any access. Your mile- - * age can vary. A less draconian approach could be to leave the old - * cookies if the file can't be read and remove them only if the - * file is empty. - * - * Adding the cookies without removing the old values for the same - * protocol has an important implication. If an user shares the co- - * okie with somebody and later wants to revoke the access to the - * display, changing the cookie will not work. This is especially - * important with NX. For security reasons, after reconnecting the - * session to a different display, it is advisable to generate a - * new set of cookies, but doing that it is useless with the current - * code, as the old cookies are going to be still accepted. On the - * same topic, consider that once an user has got access to the X - * server, he/she can freely enable host authentication from any - * host, so the safe behaviour should be to reset the host based - * authenthication at least at reconnection, and keep as valid only - * the cookies that are actually in the file. This behaviour would - * surely break many applications, among them a SSH connection run - * inside a NX session, as ssh -X reads the cookie for the display - * only at session startup and does not read the cookies again - * when the auth file is changed. - * - * Another bug (or feature, depending on how you want to consider - * it) is that if the authority file contains entries for different - * displays (as it is the norm when the authority file is the default - * .Xauthority in the user's home), the server will match -any- of - * the cookies, even cookies that are not for its own display. This - * means that you have be careful when passing an authority file to - * nxagent or Xnest and maybe keep separate files for letting nxagent - * find the cookie to be used to connect to the remote display and - * for letting it find what cookies to accept. If the file is the - * same, clients will be able to connect to nxagent with both the - * cookies. - */ - -#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH_RESET - - #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST - fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Resetting authorization info.\n"); - #endif - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].Reset) { - (*protocols[i].Reset) (); - } - } - -#endif - -#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */ - - f = Fopen (authorization_file, "r"); - if (!f) - return -1; - - while ((auth = XauReadAuth (f)) != 0) { - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].name_length == auth->name_length && - memcmp (protocols[i].name, auth->name, (int) auth->name_length) == 0 && - protocols[i].Add) - { -#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH - - #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST - fprintf(stderr, "LoadAuthorization: Adding new record from file [%s].\n", - authorization_file); - #endif - -#endif - ++count; - (*protocols[i].Add) (auth->data_length, auth->data, - FakeClientID(0)); - } - } - XauDisposeAuth (auth); - } - -#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH - - if (count == 0) - { - fprintf(stderr, "Warning: No authorization record could be read from file '%s'.\n", - authorization_file); - - fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Please, create a valid authorization cookie using the command\n" - "Warning: 'xauth -f %s add <display> MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 <cookie>'.\n", - authorization_file); - } - -#endif - -#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH - if (Fclose (f) != 0) - { - /* - * If the Fclose() fails, for example because of a signal, - * it's advisable to return the number of protocols read, - * if any, or otherwise the server would believe that no - * cookie is valid and eventually fall back to host based - * authentication. Note anyway that the new code in Check- - * Authorization() doesn't care the return value and gives - * a chance to the function to check the file at the next - * connection. - */ - - if (count > 0) - { - return count; - } - else - { - return -1; - } - } -#else - Fclose (f); -#endif - return count; -} - -#ifdef XDMCP -/* - * XdmcpInit calls this function to discover all authorization - * schemes supported by the display - */ -void -RegisterAuthorizations (void) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) - XdmcpRegisterAuthorization (protocols[i].name, - (int)protocols[i].name_length); -} -#endif - -XID -CheckAuthorization ( - unsigned int name_length, - char *name, - unsigned int data_length, - char *data, - ClientPtr client, - char **reason) /* failure message. NULL for default msg */ -{ - int i; - struct stat buf; - static time_t lastmod = 0; - - #ifndef NX_TRANS_AUTH - static Bool loaded = FALSE; - #endif - - if (!authorization_file || stat(authorization_file, &buf)) - { - if (lastmod != 0) { - lastmod = 0; - ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE; /* stat lost, so force reload */ - } - } - else if (buf.st_mtime > lastmod) - { - lastmod = buf.st_mtime; - ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE; - } - if (ShouldLoadAuth) - { - int loadauth = LoadAuthorization(); - - /* - * If the authorization file has at least one entry for this server, - * disable local host access. (loadauth > 0) - * - * If there are zero entries (either initially or when the - * authorization file is later reloaded), or if a valid - * authorization file was never loaded, enable local host access. - * (loadauth == 0 || !loaded) - * - * If the authorization file was loaded initially (with valid - * entries for this server), and reloading it later fails, don't - * change anything. (loadauth == -1 && loaded) - */ - -#ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH - - /* - * The implementation of CheckAuthorization() was changed. The way - * the auth file was handled previously was questionable and could - * open the way to a vast array of security problems. There might be - * ways for an attacker to prevent the server from reading the file - * and it was enough for the server to fail reading the file once - * (because of a not blocked signal, for example) to leave the dis- - * play open to all the users running a session on the same terminal - * server. - * - * In NX we want to have only two cases: either we have to check an - * authorization file or we don't. In the first case we need to do our - * best to read the file at any new client access and never fall back - * to host based authentication. Falling back to local host access has - * no way back, as it will always take precedence over the auth cookie - * (unless the user explicitly disables, one by one, all the rules - * allowing local access, if and only if he/she becomes aware of the - * problem). In the second case we assume that user doesn't care secu- - * rity and so allow unrestricted access from the local machine. - */ - - #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST - fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Going to set authorization with loadauth [%d].\n", - loadauth); - #endif - - if (authorization_file) - { - #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST - fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Disabling local host access.\n"); - #endif - - DisableLocalHost(); - } - else - { - /* - * Enable host-based authentication only if - * the authorization file was not specified - * either on the command line or in the env- - * ironment. - */ - - #ifdef NX_TRANS_TEST - fprintf(stderr, "CheckAuthorization: Enabling local host access.\n"); - #endif - - EnableLocalHost(); - } - - /* - * Avoid the 'unused variable' warning. - */ - - loadauth = loadauth; - -#else /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */ - - if (loadauth > 0) - { - DisableLocalHost(); /* got at least one */ - loaded = TRUE; - } - else if (loadauth == 0 || !loaded) - EnableLocalHost (); - -#endif /* #ifdef NX_TRANS_AUTH */ - } - if (name_length) { - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length && - memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0) - { - return (*protocols[i].Check) (data_length, data, client, reason); - } - *reason = "Protocol not supported by server\n"; - } - } else *reason = "No protocol specified\n"; - return (XID) ~0L; -} - -void -ResetAuthorization (void) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) - if (protocols[i].Reset) - (*protocols[i].Reset)(); - ShouldLoadAuth = TRUE; -} - -XID -AuthorizationToID ( - unsigned short name_length, - char *name, - unsigned short data_length, - char *data) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length && - memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 && - protocols[i].ToID) - { - return (*protocols[i].ToID) (data_length, data); - } - } - return (XID) ~0L; -} - -int -AuthorizationFromID ( - XID id, - unsigned short *name_lenp, - char **namep, - unsigned short *data_lenp, - char **datap) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].FromID && - (*protocols[i].FromID) (id, data_lenp, datap)) { - *name_lenp = protocols[i].name_length; - *namep = protocols[i].name; - return 1; - } - } - return 0; -} - -int -RemoveAuthorization ( - unsigned short name_length, - char *name, - unsigned short data_length, - char *data) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length && - memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 && - protocols[i].Remove) - { - return (*protocols[i].Remove) (data_length, data); - } - } - return 0; -} - -int -AddAuthorization (unsigned name_length, char *name, unsigned data_length, char *data) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length && - memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 && - protocols[i].Add) - { - return (*protocols[i].Add) (data_length, data, FakeClientID(0)); - } - } - return 0; -} - -#ifdef XCSECURITY - -XID -GenerateAuthorization( - unsigned name_length, - char *name, - unsigned data_length, - char *data, - unsigned *data_length_return, - char **data_return) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHORIZATION; i++) { - if (protocols[i].name_length == name_length && - memcmp (protocols[i].name, name, (int) name_length) == 0 && - protocols[i].Generate) - { - return (*protocols[i].Generate) (data_length, data, - FakeClientID(0), data_length_return, data_return); - } - } - return -1; -} - -/* A random number generator that is more unpredictable - than that shipped with some systems. - This code is taken from the C standard. */ - -static unsigned long int next = 1; - -static int -xdm_rand(void) -{ - next = next * 1103515245 + 12345; - return (unsigned int)(next/65536) % 32768; -} - -static void -xdm_srand(unsigned int seed) -{ - next = seed; -} - -void -GenerateRandomData (int len, char *buf) -{ - static int seed; - int value; - int i; - - seed += GetTimeInMillis(); - xdm_srand (seed); - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) - { - value = xdm_rand (); - buf[i] ^= (value & 0xff00) >> 8; - } - - /* XXX add getrusage, popen("ps -ale") */ -} - -#endif /* XCSECURITY */ |