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* dbe: unvalidated lengths in DbeSwapBuffers calls [CVE-2014-8097]Alan Coopersmith2015-02-141-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ProcDbeSwapBuffers() has a 32bit (n) length value that it uses to read from a buffer. The length is never validated, which can lead to out of bound reads, and possibly returning the data read from out of bounds to the misbehaving client via an X Error packet. SProcDbeSwapBuffers() swaps data (for correct endianness) before handing it off to the real proc. While doing the swapping, the length field is not validated, which can cause memory corruption. v2: reorder checks to avoid compilers optimizing out checks for overflow that happen after we'd already have done the overflowing multiplications. v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Conflicts: dbe/dbe.c
* dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE() [CVE-2014-8092 4/4]Alan Coopersmith2015-02-141-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during checks. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> RHEL5: add #include <stdint.h> for uint64_t v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
* dix: integer overflow in RegionSizeof() [CVE-2014-8092 3/4]Alan Coopersmith2015-02-142-15/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | RegionSizeof contains several integer overflows if a large length value is passed in. Once we fix it to return 0 on overflow, we also have to fix the callers to handle this error condition v2: Fixed limit calculation in RegionSizeof as pointed out by jcristau. v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> Conflicts: dix/region.c include/regionstr.h
* dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4]Alan Coopersmith2015-02-141-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory. This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname lists for X access control are insane. v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Conflicts: os/access.c
* dix: integer overflow in ProcPutImage() [CVE-2014-8092 1/4]Alan Coopersmith2015-02-141-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ProcPutImage() calculates a length field from a width, left pad and depth specified by the client (if the specified format is XYPixmap). The calculations for the total amount of memory the server needs for the pixmap can overflow a 32-bit number, causing out-of-bounds memory writes on 32-bit systems (since the length is stored in a long int variable). v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Conflicts: dix/dispatch.c
* unchecked malloc may allow unauthed client to crash Xserver [CVE-2014-8091]Alan Coopersmith2015-02-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authdes_ezdecode() calls malloc() using a length provided by the connection handshake sent by a newly connected client in order to authenticate to the server, so should be treated as untrusted. It didn't check if malloc() failed before writing to the newly allocated buffer, so could lead to a server crash if the server fails to allocate memory (up to UINT16_MAX bytes, since the len field is a CARD16 in the X protocol). Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Conflicts: os/rpcauth.c
* CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in fs_read_list_info() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-1/+55
| | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit d338f81df1e188eb16e1d6aeea7f4800f89c1218 fs_read_list_info() parses a reply from the font server. The reply contains a number of additional data items with embedded length or count fields, none of which are validated. This can cause out of bound reads when looping over these items in the reply.
* CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in fs_read_list() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit 5fa73ac18474be3032ee7af9c6e29deab163ea39 fs_read_list() parses a reply from the font server. The reply contains a list of strings with embedded length fields, none of which are validated. This can cause out of bound reads when looping over the strings in the reply.
* CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in fs_read_glyphs() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-1/+28
| | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit 520683652564c2a4e42328ae23eef9bb63271565 fs_read_glyphs() parses a reply from the font server. The reply contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated. This can cause out of bound reads when looping over the glyph bitmaps in the reply.
* CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in fs_read_extent_info() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-0/+10
| | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit a3f21421537620fc4e1f844a594a4bcd9f7e2bd8 Looping over the extents in the reply could go past the end of the reply buffer if the reply indicated more extents than could fit in the specified reply length.
* CVE-2014-0211: integer overflow in fs_alloc_glyphs() from xorg/lib/libXfont ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-1/+6
| | | | | | | | commit a42f707f8a62973f5e8bbcd08afb10a79e9cee33 fs_alloc_glyphs() is a malloc wrapper used by the font code. It contains a classic integer overflow in the malloc() call, which can cause memory corruption.
* CVE-2014-0211: integer overflow in fs_read_extent_info() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit c578408c1fd4db09e4e3173f8a9e65c81cc187c1 fs_read_extent_info() parses a reply from the font server. The reply contains a 32bit number of elements field which is used to calculate a buffer length. There is an integer overflow in this calculation which can lead to memory corruption.
* CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in fs_read_query_info() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-142-7/+52
| | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit 491291cabf78efdeec8f18b09e14726a9030cc8f fs_read_query_info() parses a reply from the font server. The reply contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated. This can cause out of bound reads in either fs_read_query_info() or in _fs_convert_props() which it calls to parse the fsPropInfo in the reply.
* CVE-2014-0211: Integer overflow in fs_get_reply/_fs_start_read from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit 0f1a5d372c143f91a602bdf10c917d7eabaee09b fs_get_reply() would take any reply size, multiply it by 4 and pass to _fs_start_read. If that size was bigger than the current reply buffer size, _fs_start_read would add it to the existing buffer size plus the buffer size increment constant and realloc the buffer to that result. This math could overflow, causing the code to allocate a smaller buffer than the amount it was about to read into that buffer from the network. It could also succeed, allowing the remote font server to cause massive allocations in the X server, possibly using up all the address space in a 32-bit X server, allowing the triggering of other bugs in code that fails to handle malloc failure properly. This patch protects against both problems, by disconnecting any font server trying to feed us more than (the somewhat arbitrary) 64 mb in a single reply.
* CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated lengths when reading replies from font server ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-6/+38
| | | | | | | | from xorg/lib/libXfont commit cbb64aef35960b2882be721f4b8fbaa0fb649d12 Functions to handle replies to font server requests were casting replies from the generic form to reply specific structs without first checking that the reply was at least as long as the struct being cast to.
* Don't crash when we receive an FS_Error from the font server (Guillem ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-1/+1
| | | | Jover). from xorg/lib/libXfont commit bfb8a71f4f7e5c5ed4278cb3ee271bf9990d276d
* CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length in _fs_recv_conn_setup() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-3/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit 891e084b26837162b12f841060086a105edde86d The connection setup reply from the font server can include a list of alternate servers to contact if this font server stops working. The reply specifies a total size of all the font server names, and then provides a list of names. _fs_recv_conn_setup() allocated the specified total size for copying the names to, but didn't check to make sure it wasn't copying more data to that buffer than the size it had allocated.
* CVE-2014-0209: integer overflow of realloc() size in lexAlias() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit 05c8020a49416dd8b7510cbba45ce4f3fc81a7dc lexAlias() reads from a file in a loop. It does this by starting with a 64 byte buffer. If that size limit is hit, it does a realloc of the buffer size << 1, basically doubling the needed length every time the length limit is hit. Eventually, this will shift out to 0 (for a length of ~4gig), and that length will be passed on to realloc(). A length of 0 (with a valid pointer) causes realloc to free the buffer on most POSIX platforms, but the caller will still have a pointer to it, leading to use after free issues.
* CVE-2014-0209: integer overflow of realloc() size in FontFileAddEntry() from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xorg/lib/libXfont commit 2f5e57317339c526e6eaee1010b0e2ab8089c42e FontFileReadDirectory() opens a fonts.dir file, and reads over every line in an fscanf loop. For each successful entry read (font name, file name) a call is made to FontFileAddFontFile(). FontFileAddFontFile() will add a font file entry (for the font name and file) each time it’s called, by calling FontFileAddEntry(). FontFileAddEntry() will do the actual adding. If the table it has to add to is full, it will do a realloc, adding 100 more entries to the table size without checking to see if that will overflow the int used to store the size.
* CVE-2013-6462: unlimited sscanf overflows stack buffer in ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | bdfReadCharacters() from xorg/lib/libXfont http://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2014-January/002389.html Fixes cppcheck warning: [lib/libXfont/src/bitmap/bdfread.c:341]: (warning) scanf without field width limits can crash with huge input data.
* Avoid use-after-free in dix/dixfonts.c: doImageText() [CVE-2013-4396] from ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xorg/Xserver http://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2013-October/002332.html Save a pointer to the passed in closure structure before copying it and overwriting the *c pointer to point to our copy instead of the original. If we hit an error, once we free(c), reset c to point to the original structure before jumping to the cleanup code that references *c. Since one of the errors being checked for is whether the server was able to malloc(c->nChars * itemSize), the client can potentially pass a number of characters chosen to cause the malloc to fail and the error path to be taken, resulting in the read from freed memory. Since the memory is accessed almost immediately afterwards, and the X server is mostly single threaded, the odds of the free memory having invalid contents are low with most malloc implementations when not using memory debugging features, but some allocators will definitely overwrite the memory there, leading to a likely crash.
* Fix CVE-2011-4028: File disclosure vulnerability. upstream xorg/xserver ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | commit 6ba44b91e37622ef8c146d8f2ac92d708a18ed34 use O_NOFOLLOW to open the existing lock file, so symbolic links aren't followed, thus avoid revealing if it point to an existing file.
* LZW decompress: fix for CVE-2011-2895 From xorg/lib/Xfont commit ↵Mike DePaulo2015-02-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | | d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0 Specially crafted LZW stream can crash an application using libXfont that is used to open untrusted font files. With X server, this may allow privilege escalation when exploited
* Move COPYING.full+lite as COPYING to /Mike Gabriel2015-02-143-5/+7
| | | | | | | Adapted packaging scripts: debian/roll-tarballs.sh nx-libs.spec
* Move all config files from $(srcbase)/debian/ into $(srcbase)/etc/ folder.Mike Gabriel2015-02-147-27/+0
| | | | | | | | Affected packagings scripts: debian/roll-tarballs.sh debian/rules nx-libs.spec
* Provide wrapper scripts for launch NX components in $(src)/bin/.Mike Gabriel2015-02-1425-31/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The installation process copies NX wrapper scripts into $(srcbase)/bin/ before build time. Those wrapper scripts are now in place natively and need not to be copied prior to building NX. Packaging scripts with adaptation: debian/roll-tarballs.sh debian/rules debian/*.docs nx-libs.spec
* Prepare for maintaing upstream changes in upstream ChangeLog.Mike Gabriel2015-02-144-24/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This makes it obsolete to add changes to debian/changelog. We document our changes in Git (3.6.x branch and other related branches). On release, we generate an upstream ChangeLog from Git history. Only on the 3.5.0.x, we continue maintaining our changes in debian/changelog (to be compliant with current nx-libs release workflow in X2Go). The following packaging scripts needed adaptations to this change: debian/roll-tarballs.sh debian/rules nx-libs.spec
* VERSION file: master VERSION file is in base folder, symlinked from ↵Mike Gabriel2015-02-1410-13/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | nx*/VERSION and hw/nxagent/VERSION. This commit removes the debian/VERSION file at makes it now unnecessary to copy/symlink the VERSION file at build time. These build scripts got adapted: debian/roll-tarballs.sh debian/rules nx-libs.spec Furthermore, all NX component now use the main VERSION file as reference. typechange: nxcomp/VERSION typechange: nxcompext/VERSION typechange: nxcompshad/VERSION typechange: nxproxy/VERSION
* Move Makefile (and auxiliary file replace.sh) into base folder. Adapt ↵Mike Gabriel2015-02-145-11/+1
| | | | | | | | packaging these scripts: debian/roll-tarballs.sh debian/rules nx-libs.spec
* Add README.keystrokes file. Fix for commit ↵Mike Gabriel2015-02-141-0/+83
| | | | e91277d02bf1288909daed3b0de8f876f6403acf.
* nxcomp: Add Version.c file. Fix for commit ↵Mike Gabriel2015-02-141-0/+106
| | | | d4d3fe0e6e77a58e68defc5895a589a681d7d092.
* Version bump, continuing NX 3.x development.. Targetting NX 3.6.x some time.Mike Gabriel2015-02-143-4/+11
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* Use proper quoting on build flag vars (they may contain spaces).Mike Gabriel2015-02-142-1/+2
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* Revert "Fix build when LDFLAGS (etc) contains spaces."Mike Gabriel2015-02-141-4/+4
| | | | This reverts commit 4436e97903aa6e2a7732fb98dcb46758a73fe130.
* nx-X11 vs. X.Org 6.9 patches for further studying / documentationMike Gabriel2015-02-1388-0/+20245
| | | | | | | | | | NoMachine kept all original X.Org 6.9 files in the nx-X11 source tree. These files have been removed in Feb 2015 during a major code cleanup. For later studying we provide all diffs of the changes that NoMachine employed on the original X.Org X11 code tree in the doc/nx-X11_vs_XOrg69_patches folder.
* Unbrand NX Agent Startup Screen / Brand X2Go Agent Startup Screen ↵Oleksandr Shneyder2015-02-137-445/+158
| | | | | | | | | | (999_nxagent_unbrand-nxagent-brand-x2goagent.full.patch). When launched with NX Agent flavour, the startup screen gets unbranded by this patch (the !M logo does not get shown). When launched with X2Go Agent flavour, the startup screen gets branded with the X2GO logo.
* Fix several typos in nxcomp.Mike Gabriel2015-02-1314-147/+12
| | | | | | Former patch file names: 991_fix-hr-typos.full+lite.patch 991_fix-hr-typos.full.patch
* Several fixes for building debug versions of NX ↵Mihai Moldovan2015-02-136-77/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (990_fix-DEBUG-and-TEST-builds.full.patch). (1) In nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix: Fix several compile errors when specifying -DDEBUG globally. Previous GCC versions were more liberal and the code thus compiled. Also initialize/reset a count variable correctly. (2) In nx-X11/programs/Xserver/hw/nxagent/Render.c: Check for pSrc->pDrawable to exist instead of having nxagent segfault when it does not. This enables the possibility of compiling all nxagent modules in TEST mode.
* Detection for Mac OS X's launchd service on Mac OS X 10.10 and beyond ↵Mike Gabriel2015-02-133-16/+1
| | | | (607_nxcomp_macosx-X11-launcher-in-private-tmp.full+lite.patch).
* Provide build support for aarch64 architecture ↵Orion Poplawski2015-02-136-78/+39
| | | | (606_nx-X11_build-on-aarch64.full.patch).
* In Types.h, don't use STL internals on libc++ ↵Clemens Lang2015-02-133-53/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (605_nxcomp_Types.h-dont-use-STL-internals-on-libc++.full+lite.patch). The nx-libs-lite package does not compile on OS X Mavericks because Apple's clang compilers now default to compiling against the libc++ STL rather than (their outdated copy of) libstdc++. While the compiler still allows changing that, we should not rely on this being possible forever. The compiler chokes in Types.h, specifically the clear() methods in subclasses of vectors that use implementation details of the GNU STL. The attached patch fixes these compilation issues by not overriding the clear() method when compiling against libc++, since the libc++ headers seem to do essentially the same as the overriden method.
* Handle some serious compilation warnings ↵Mirraz Mirraz2015-02-135-41/+7
| | | | (603_nx-X11_compilation_warnings.full.patch).
* Be compliant with POS36-C: Observe correct revocation order while ↵Orion Poplawski2015-02-134-68/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | relinquishing privileges (602_nx-X11_initgroups.full.patch). The Fedora review of NX (redistributed) caught the following rpmlint issue: This executable is calling setuid and setgid without setgroups or initgroups. There is a high probability this mean it didn't relinquish all groups, and this would be a potential security issue to be fixed. Seek POS36-C on the web for details about the problem. Ref POS36-C: https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/POS36-C.+Observe+correct+revocation+order+while+relinquishing+privileges This patch adds initgroups() calls to the code to initialize the supplemental group list.
* Do not build bundled libraries ↵Orion Poplawski2015-02-135-111/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | (601_nx-X11_build-option-changes-to-not-use-bundled-libraries.full.patch). This commit has been submitted by Orion in two portions. One was submitted to X2Go BTS and created on Wed, 10 Jul 2013. The other portion has been taken from the Fedora package by Mike Gabriel and worked into this patch on Fri, 06 Dec 2013.
* Unique Library Names Patch ↵Jan Engelhardt2015-02-1332-1356/+172
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (600_nx-X11+nxcompext+nxcompshad_unique-libnames.full.patch). We really want to make use of rpm's automatic dependency finding. Binaries are scanned for DT_NEEDED entries, the latter of which are then used for populating the "Requires"-type deps. The "nxagent" binary for example would require libX11.so.6. That incurs problems: 1. A package manager told to install nxagent could select xorg-x11 rather than nx-libs, even though nxagent depends on the NX version. 2. A package manager told to install $some_program could select nx-libs rather than xorg-x11 (since both provide libX11.so.6), but, since the NX library is in an obscure directory, running $some_program would fail as libX11.so.6 is not found. To solve this, give the NX libraries unique names different from the Xorg ones.
* Allow version 4-digit version comparison/handshake ↵Nito Martinez2015-02-137-276/+26
| | | | (400_nxcomp-version.full+lite.patch).
* Adapt paths of keystrokes.cfg if nxagent runs as x2goagent ↵Horst Schirmeier2015-02-133-26/+6
| | | | (321_nxagent_x2go-specific-keystroke-config.full.patch).
* Make nxagent-specific keyboard bindings configurable ↵Alexander Wuerstlein2015-02-138-1269/+546
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | (320_nxagent_configurable-keystrokes.full.patch). Replaces the hardcoded nxagent keybindings by a configurable table of keybindings. The default configuration is the same as the original one, to maintain compatibility. A user/administrator can either specify a command line parameter, environment variable or place a file in ~/.nx/config/keystrokes.cfg or /etc/nxagent/keystrokes.cfg to reconfigure these keybindings. The configuration file format is XML, a dependency on libxml2 is added to allow parsing the configuration.
* Test for xkb/rules/base instead of xkb/keymap.dir for setting XkbBaseDir ↵Mike Gabriel2015-02-133-101/+16
| | | | | | | | (302_nx-X11_xkbbasedir-detection.full.patch). In recent (as of 2014/06) X.org release, the keymap.dir file has become obsolete. Let's test for the xkb/rules/base file instead.
* update changelogMike Gabriel2015-02-131-0/+12
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