From 96efadac50bf40bc502680072570a2950f132fe3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mihai Moldovan Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2015 23:32:32 +0200 Subject: CVE patches were previously not included in release tarballs. Rename: - 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch => 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-.full.patch - 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch => 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.full.patch - 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch => 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageT.full.patch - 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch => 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-.full.patch - 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch => 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-.full.patch - 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch => 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-.full.patch - 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch => 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_co.full.patch - 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch => 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-th.full.patch - 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch => 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-.full.patch - 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch => 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch - 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch => 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch => 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_exten.full.patch - 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch => 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyp.full.patch - 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch => 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch => 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch => 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch => 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch - 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch => 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-c.full.patch - 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch => 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8.full.patch - 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch => 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch - 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch => 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8.full.patch - 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch => 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-.full.patch - 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch => 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls.full.patch - 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch => 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-.full.patch - 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch => 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDL.full.patch - 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch => 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swap.full.patch - 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch => 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE.full.patch - 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch => 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swap.full.patch - 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch => 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectS.full.patch - 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch => 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-sw.full.patch - 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch => 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requ.full.patch - 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch => 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-imag.full.patch - 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch => 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer.full.patch - 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch => 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-.full.patch - 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch => 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-C.full.patch - 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch => 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generat.full.patch - 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch => 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-Vendo.full.patch - 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch => 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-re.full.patch - 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch => 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch - 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch => 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-.full.patch - 1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remaining-buf.patch => 1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remainin.full.patch - 1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895.patch => 1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-.full.patch - 1101-Coverity-844-845-846-Fix-memory-leaks.patch => 1101-Coverity-844-845-846-Fix-memory-leaks.full.patch - 1102-include-introduce-byte-counting-functions.patch => 1102-include-introduce-byte-counting-functions.full.patch - 1103-xkb-Don-t-swap-XkbSetGeometry-data-in-the-input-buff.patch => 1103-xkb-Don-t-swap-XkbSetGeometry-data-in-the-input.full.patch - 1104-xkb-Check-strings-length-against-request-size.patch => 1104-xkb-Check-strings-length-against-request-size.full.patch --- ...11-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+) create mode 100644 debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch (limited to 'debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch') diff --git a/debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch b/debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba883427f --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 2d724c1a0416895dd39bf33678f42cbb4c51b1ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 21:43:42 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 10/40] CVE-2014-0211: Integer overflow in + fs_get_reply/_fs_start_read from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 0f1a5d372c143f91a602bdf10c917d7eabaee09b + +fs_get_reply() would take any reply size, multiply it by 4 and pass to +_fs_start_read. If that size was bigger than the current reply buffer +size, _fs_start_read would add it to the existing buffer size plus the +buffer size increment constant and realloc the buffer to that result. + +This math could overflow, causing the code to allocate a smaller +buffer than the amount it was about to read into that buffer from +the network. It could also succeed, allowing the remote font server +to cause massive allocations in the X server, possibly using up all +the address space in a 32-bit X server, allowing the triggering of +other bugs in code that fails to handle malloc failure properly. + +This patch protects against both problems, by disconnecting any +font server trying to feed us more than (the somewhat arbitrary) +64 mb in a single reply. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index ca10aa4..7762653 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group. + */ + #define LENGTHOF(r) (SIZEOF(r) >> 2) + ++/* Somewhat arbitrary limit on maximum reply size we'll try to read. */ ++#define MAX_REPLY_LENGTH ((64 * 1024 * 1024) >> 2) ++ + extern void ErrorF(const char *f, ...); + + static int fs_read_glyphs ( FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec ); +@@ -630,6 +633,21 @@ fs_get_reply (FSFpePtr conn, int *error) + + rep = (fsGenericReply *) buf; + ++ /* ++ * Refuse to accept replies longer than a maximum reasonable length, ++ * before we pass to _fs_start_read, since it will try to resize the ++ * incoming connection buffer to this size. Also avoids integer overflow ++ * on 32-bit systems. ++ */ ++ if (rep->length > MAX_REPLY_LENGTH) ++ { ++ ErrorF("fserve: reply length %d > MAX_REPLY_LENGTH, disconnecting" ++ " from font server\n", rep->length); ++ _fs_connection_died (conn); ++ *error = FSIO_ERROR; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + ret = _fs_start_read (conn, rep->length << 2, &buf); + if (ret != FSIO_READY) + { +-- +2.1.4 + -- cgit v1.2.3