From 82d7279ebfa04f319e68145b3adbf65716e59584 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Coopersmith Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:44:46 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 22/40] dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE() [CVE-2014-8092 4/4] Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during checks. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer RHEL5: add #include for uint64_t v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) --- nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h index 1b8fc42..d82979c 100644 --- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h +++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ SOFTWARE. #ifndef DIX_H #define DIX_H +#include + #include "gc.h" #include "window.h" #include "input.h" @@ -73,7 +75,8 @@ SOFTWARE. #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\ if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \ - (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \ + ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ + ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len)) \ return(BadLength) #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\ -- 2.1.4