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From c1225fe6451d7a5f3741ce0fff8f54e38e0a14da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 21:11:16 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 19/40] dix: integer overflow in ProcPutImage() [CVE-2014-8092
1/4]
ProcPutImage() calculates a length field from a width, left pad and depth
specified by the client (if the specified format is XYPixmap).
The calculations for the total amount of memory the server needs for the
pixmap can overflow a 32-bit number, causing out-of-bounds memory writes
on 32-bit systems (since the length is stored in a long int variable).
v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Conflicts:
dix/dispatch.c
---
nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c
index 6941456..5ad2f5a 100644
--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c
+++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c
@@ -2071,7 +2071,9 @@ ProcPutImage(register ClientPtr client)
tmpImage = (char *)&stuff[1];
lengthProto = length;
-
+ if (lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (((((lengthProto * stuff->height) + (unsigned)3) >> 2) +
(sizeof(xPutImageReq) >> 2)) != client->req_len)
return BadLength;
--
2.1.4
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