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| author | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2010-11-19 10:30:56 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2010-11-19 10:30:56 +0000 |
| commit | 20a8b976130e3b2cfff5c3364169e61ec10291f3 (patch) | |
| tree | b2fbea50cfb846049fc690a252baec07397a1acc | |
| parent | 0b67cceb98ba4ab7b5cdaf9d6e9583d3c53802ea (diff) | |
| download | vcxsrv-20a8b976130e3b2cfff5c3364169e61ec10291f3.tar.gz vcxsrv-20a8b976130e3b2cfff5c3364169e61ec10291f3.tar.bz2 vcxsrv-20a8b976130e3b2cfff5c3364169e61ec10291f3.zip | |
Copied tools directory from trunk. Here the original versions will be checked in, so that we can update them and merge the changes back in.
64 files changed, 39260 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/plink/be_all.c b/tools/plink/be_all.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..05ba82d75 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/be_all.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/*
+ * Linking module for PuTTY proper: list the available backends
+ * including ssh.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "putty.h"
+
+/*
+ * This appname is not strictly in the right place, since Plink
+ * also uses this module. However, Plink doesn't currently use any
+ * of the dialog-box sorts of things that make use of appname, so
+ * it shouldn't do any harm here. I'm trying to avoid having to
+ * have tiny little source modules containing nothing but
+ * declarations of appname, for as long as I can...
+ */
+const char *const appname = "PuTTY";
+
+#ifdef TELNET_DEFAULT
+const int be_default_protocol = PROT_TELNET;
+#else
+const int be_default_protocol = PROT_SSH;
+#endif
+
+Backend *backends[] = {
+ &ssh_backend,
+ &telnet_backend,
+ &rlogin_backend,
+ &raw_backend,
+ NULL
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/cmdline.c b/tools/plink/cmdline.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f3a0e22f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/cmdline.c @@ -0,0 +1,449 @@ +/*
+ * cmdline.c - command-line parsing shared between many of the
+ * PuTTY applications
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "putty.h"
+
+/*
+ * Some command-line parameters need to be saved up until after
+ * we've loaded the saved session which will form the basis of our
+ * eventual running configuration. For this we use the macro
+ * SAVEABLE, which notices if the `need_save' parameter is set and
+ * saves the parameter and value on a list.
+ *
+ * We also assign priorities to saved parameters, just to slightly
+ * ameliorate silly ordering problems. For example, if you specify
+ * a saved session to load, it will be loaded _before_ all your
+ * local modifications such as -L are evaluated; and if you specify
+ * a protocol and a port, the protocol is set up first so that the
+ * port can override its choice of port number.
+ *
+ * (In fact -load is not saved at all, since in at least Plink the
+ * processing of further command-line options depends on whether or
+ * not the loaded session contained a hostname. So it must be
+ * executed immediately.)
+ */
+
+#define NPRIORITIES 2
+
+struct cmdline_saved_param {
+ char *p, *value;
+};
+struct cmdline_saved_param_set {
+ struct cmdline_saved_param *params;
+ int nsaved, savesize;
+};
+
+/*
+ * C guarantees this structure will be initialised to all zero at
+ * program start, which is exactly what we want.
+ */
+static struct cmdline_saved_param_set saves[NPRIORITIES];
+
+static void cmdline_save_param(char *p, char *value, int pri)
+{
+ if (saves[pri].nsaved >= saves[pri].savesize) {
+ saves[pri].savesize = saves[pri].nsaved + 32;
+ saves[pri].params = sresize(saves[pri].params, saves[pri].savesize,
+ struct cmdline_saved_param);
+ }
+ saves[pri].params[saves[pri].nsaved].p = p;
+ saves[pri].params[saves[pri].nsaved].value = value;
+ saves[pri].nsaved++;
+}
+
+void cmdline_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int pri;
+
+ for (pri = 0; pri < NPRIORITIES; pri++)
+ sfree(saves[pri].params);
+}
+
+#define SAVEABLE(pri) do { \
+ if (need_save) { cmdline_save_param(p, value, pri); return ret; } \
+} while (0)
+
+static char *cmdline_password = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Similar interface to get_userpass_input(), except that here a -1
+ * return means that we aren't capable of processing the prompt and
+ * someone else should do it.
+ */
+int cmdline_get_passwd_input(prompts_t *p, unsigned char *in, int inlen) {
+
+ static int tried_once = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We only handle prompts which don't echo (which we assume to be
+ * passwords), and (currently) we only cope with a password prompt
+ * that comes in a prompt-set on its own.
+ */
+ if (!cmdline_password || in || p->n_prompts != 1 || p->prompts[0]->echo) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we've tried once, return utter failure (no more passwords left
+ * to try).
+ */
+ if (tried_once)
+ return 0;
+
+ strncpy(p->prompts[0]->result, cmdline_password,
+ p->prompts[0]->result_len);
+ p->prompts[0]->result[p->prompts[0]->result_len-1] = '\0';
+ memset(cmdline_password, 0, strlen(cmdline_password));
+ tried_once = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Here we have a flags word which describes the capabilities of
+ * the particular tool on whose behalf we're running. We will
+ * refuse certain command-line options if a particular tool
+ * inherently can't do anything sensible. For example, the file
+ * transfer tools (psftp, pscp) can't do a great deal with protocol
+ * selections (ever tried running scp over telnet?) or with port
+ * forwarding (even if it wasn't a hideously bad idea, they don't
+ * have the select() infrastructure to make them work).
+ */
+int cmdline_tooltype = 0;
+
+static int cmdline_check_unavailable(int flag, char *p)
+{
+ if (cmdline_tooltype & flag) {
+ cmdline_error("option \"%s\" not available in this tool", p);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define UNAVAILABLE_IN(flag) do { \
+ if (cmdline_check_unavailable(flag, p)) return ret; \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Process a standard command-line parameter. `p' is the parameter
+ * in question; `value' is the subsequent element of argv, which
+ * may or may not be required as an operand to the parameter.
+ * If `need_save' is 1, arguments which need to be saved as
+ * described at this top of this file are, for later execution;
+ * if 0, they are processed normally. (-1 is a special value used
+ * by pterm to count arguments for a preliminary pass through the
+ * argument list; it causes immediate return with an appropriate
+ * value with no action taken.)
+ * Return value is 2 if both arguments were used; 1 if only p was
+ * used; 0 if the parameter wasn't one we recognised; -2 if it
+ * should have been 2 but value was NULL.
+ */
+
+#define RETURN(x) do { \
+ if ((x) == 2 && !value) return -2; \
+ ret = x; \
+ if (need_save < 0) return x; \
+} while (0)
+
+int cmdline_process_param(char *p, char *value, int need_save, Config *cfg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-load")) {
+ RETURN(2);
+ /* This parameter must be processed immediately rather than being
+ * saved. */
+ do_defaults(value, cfg);
+ loaded_session = TRUE;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-ssh")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ default_protocol = cfg->protocol = PROT_SSH;
+ default_port = cfg->port = 22;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-telnet")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ default_protocol = cfg->protocol = PROT_TELNET;
+ default_port = cfg->port = 23;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-rlogin")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ default_protocol = cfg->protocol = PROT_RLOGIN;
+ default_port = cfg->port = 513;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-raw")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ default_protocol = cfg->protocol = PROT_RAW;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-v")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ flags |= FLAG_VERBOSE;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-l")) {
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ strncpy(cfg->username, value, sizeof(cfg->username));
+ cfg->username[sizeof(cfg->username) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-loghost")) {
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ strncpy(cfg->loghost, value, sizeof(cfg->loghost));
+ cfg->loghost[sizeof(cfg->loghost) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ if ((!strcmp(p, "-L") || !strcmp(p, "-R") || !strcmp(p, "-D"))) {
+ char *fwd, *ptr, *q, *qq;
+ int dynamic, i=0;
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ dynamic = !strcmp(p, "-D");
+ fwd = value;
+ ptr = cfg->portfwd;
+ /* if existing forwards, find end of list */
+ while (*ptr) {
+ while (*ptr)
+ ptr++;
+ ptr++;
+ }
+ i = ptr - cfg->portfwd;
+ ptr[0] = p[1]; /* insert a 'L', 'R' or 'D' at the start */
+ ptr++;
+ if (1 + strlen(fwd) + 2 > sizeof(cfg->portfwd) - i) {
+ cmdline_error("out of space for port forwardings");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ strncpy(ptr, fwd, sizeof(cfg->portfwd) - i - 2);
+ if (!dynamic) {
+ /*
+ * We expect _at least_ two colons in this string. The
+ * possible formats are `sourceport:desthost:destport',
+ * or `sourceip:sourceport:desthost:destport' if you're
+ * specifying a particular loopback address. We need to
+ * replace the one between source and dest with a \t;
+ * this means we must find the second-to-last colon in
+ * the string.
+ */
+ q = qq = strchr(ptr, ':');
+ while (qq) {
+ char *qqq = strchr(qq+1, ':');
+ if (qqq)
+ q = qq;
+ qq = qqq;
+ }
+ if (q) *q = '\t'; /* replace second-last colon with \t */
+ }
+ cfg->portfwd[sizeof(cfg->portfwd) - 1] = '\0';
+ cfg->portfwd[sizeof(cfg->portfwd) - 2] = '\0';
+ ptr[strlen(ptr)+1] = '\000'; /* append 2nd '\000' */
+ }
+ if ((!strcmp(p, "-nc"))) {
+ char *host, *portp;
+
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+
+ host = portp = value;
+ while (*portp && *portp != ':')
+ portp++;
+ if (*portp) {
+ unsigned len = portp - host;
+ if (len >= sizeof(cfg->ssh_nc_host))
+ len = sizeof(cfg->ssh_nc_host) - 1;
+ memcpy(cfg->ssh_nc_host, value, len);
+ cfg->ssh_nc_host[len] = '\0';
+ cfg->ssh_nc_port = atoi(portp+1);
+ } else {
+ cmdline_error("-nc expects argument of form 'host:port'");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-m")) {
+ char *filename, *command;
+ int cmdlen, cmdsize;
+ FILE *fp;
+ int c, d;
+
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+
+ filename = value;
+
+ cmdlen = cmdsize = 0;
+ command = NULL;
+ fp = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!fp) {
+ cmdline_error("unable to open command "
+ "file \"%s\"", filename);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ do {
+ c = fgetc(fp);
+ d = c;
+ if (c == EOF)
+ d = 0;
+ if (cmdlen >= cmdsize) {
+ cmdsize = cmdlen + 512;
+ command = sresize(command, cmdsize, char);
+ }
+ command[cmdlen++] = d;
+ } while (c != EOF);
+ cfg->remote_cmd_ptr = command;
+ cfg->remote_cmd_ptr2 = NULL;
+ cfg->nopty = TRUE; /* command => no terminal */
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-P")) {
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(1); /* lower priority than -ssh,-telnet */
+ cfg->port = atoi(value);
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-pw")) {
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(1);
+ /* We delay evaluating this until after the protocol is decided,
+ * so that we can warn if it's of no use with the selected protocol */
+ if (cfg->protocol != PROT_SSH)
+ cmdline_error("the -pw option can only be used with the "
+ "SSH protocol");
+ else {
+ cmdline_password = dupstr(value);
+ /* Assuming that `value' is directly from argv, make a good faith
+ * attempt to trample it, to stop it showing up in `ps' output
+ * on Unix-like systems. Not guaranteed, of course. */
+ memset(value, 0, strlen(value));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-agent") || !strcmp(p, "-pagent") ||
+ !strcmp(p, "-pageant")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->tryagent = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-noagent") || !strcmp(p, "-nopagent") ||
+ !strcmp(p, "-nopageant")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->tryagent = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-A")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->agentfwd = 1;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-a")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->agentfwd = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-X")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->x11_forward = 1;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-x")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->x11_forward = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-t")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(1); /* lower priority than -m */
+ cfg->nopty = 0;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-T")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(1);
+ cfg->nopty = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-N")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER | TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->ssh_no_shell = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-C")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->compression = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-1")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->sshprot = 0; /* ssh protocol 1 only */
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-2")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->sshprot = 3; /* ssh protocol 2 only */
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-i")) {
+ RETURN(2);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ cfg->keyfile = filename_from_str(value);
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-4") || !strcmp(p, "-ipv4")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ SAVEABLE(1);
+ cfg->addressfamily = ADDRTYPE_IPV4;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-6") || !strcmp(p, "-ipv6")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ SAVEABLE(1);
+ cfg->addressfamily = ADDRTYPE_IPV6;
+ }
+
+ return ret; /* unrecognised */
+}
+
+void cmdline_run_saved(Config *cfg)
+{
+ int pri, i;
+ for (pri = 0; pri < NPRIORITIES; pri++)
+ for (i = 0; i < saves[pri].nsaved; i++)
+ cmdline_process_param(saves[pri].params[i].p,
+ saves[pri].params[i].value, 0, cfg);
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/cproxy.c b/tools/plink/cproxy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5537fca80 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/cproxy.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/*
+ * Routines to do cryptographic interaction with proxies in PuTTY.
+ * This is in a separate module from proxy.c, so that it can be
+ * conveniently removed in PuTTYtel by replacing this module with
+ * the stub version nocproxy.c.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define DEFINE_PLUG_METHOD_MACROS
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "ssh.h" /* For MD5 support */
+#include "network.h"
+#include "proxy.h"
+
+static void hmacmd5_chap(const unsigned char *challenge, int challen,
+ const char *passwd, unsigned char *response)
+{
+ void *hmacmd5_ctx;
+ int pwlen;
+
+ hmacmd5_ctx = hmacmd5_make_context();
+
+ pwlen = strlen(passwd);
+ if (pwlen>64) {
+ unsigned char md5buf[16];
+ MD5Simple(passwd, pwlen, md5buf);
+ hmacmd5_key(hmacmd5_ctx, md5buf, 16);
+ } else {
+ hmacmd5_key(hmacmd5_ctx, passwd, pwlen);
+ }
+
+ hmacmd5_do_hmac(hmacmd5_ctx, challenge, challen, response);
+ hmacmd5_free_context(hmacmd5_ctx);
+}
+
+void proxy_socks5_offerencryptedauth(char *command, int *len)
+{
+ command[*len] = 0x03; /* CHAP */
+ (*len)++;
+}
+
+int proxy_socks5_handlechap (Proxy_Socket p)
+{
+
+ /* CHAP authentication reply format:
+ * version number (1 bytes) = 1
+ * number of commands (1 byte)
+ *
+ * For each command:
+ * command identifier (1 byte)
+ * data length (1 byte)
+ */
+ unsigned char data[260];
+ unsigned char outbuf[20];
+
+ while(p->chap_num_attributes == 0 ||
+ p->chap_num_attributes_processed < p->chap_num_attributes) {
+ if (p->chap_num_attributes == 0 ||
+ p->chap_current_attribute == -1) {
+ /* CHAP normally reads in two bytes, either at the
+ * beginning or for each attribute/value pair. But if
+ * we're waiting for the value's data, we might not want
+ * to read 2 bytes.
+ */
+
+ if (bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data) < 2)
+ return 1; /* not got anything yet */
+
+ /* get the response */
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data, 2);
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, 2);
+ }
+
+ if (p->chap_num_attributes == 0) {
+ /* If there are no attributes, this is our first msg
+ * with the server, where we negotiate version and
+ * number of attributes
+ */
+ if (data[0] != 0x01) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy wants"
+ " a different CHAP version",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (data[1] == 0x00) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy won't"
+ " negotiate CHAP with us",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ p->chap_num_attributes = data[1];
+ } else {
+ if (p->chap_current_attribute == -1) {
+ /* We have to read in each attribute/value pair -
+ * those we don't understand can be ignored, but
+ * there are a few we'll need to handle.
+ */
+ p->chap_current_attribute = data[0];
+ p->chap_current_datalen = data[1];
+ }
+ if (bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data) <
+ p->chap_current_datalen)
+ return 1; /* not got everything yet */
+
+ /* get the response */
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data,
+ p->chap_current_datalen);
+
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data,
+ p->chap_current_datalen);
+
+ switch (p->chap_current_attribute) {
+ case 0x00:
+ /* Successful authentication */
+ if (data[0] == 0x00)
+ p->state = 2;
+ else {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy"
+ " refused CHAP authentication",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 0x03:
+ outbuf[0] = 0x01; /* Version */
+ outbuf[1] = 0x01; /* One attribute */
+ outbuf[2] = 0x04; /* Response */
+ outbuf[3] = 0x10; /* Length */
+ hmacmd5_chap(data, p->chap_current_datalen,
+ p->cfg.proxy_password, &outbuf[4]);
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, (char *)outbuf, 20);
+ break;
+ case 0x11:
+ /* Chose a protocol */
+ if (data[0] != 0x85) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: Server chose "
+ "CHAP of other than HMAC-MD5 but we "
+ "didn't offer it!",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ p->chap_current_attribute = -1;
+ p->chap_num_attributes_processed++;
+ }
+ if (p->state == 8 &&
+ p->chap_num_attributes_processed >= p->chap_num_attributes) {
+ p->chap_num_attributes = 0;
+ p->chap_num_attributes_processed = 0;
+ p->chap_current_datalen = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int proxy_socks5_selectchap(Proxy_Socket p)
+{
+ if (p->cfg.proxy_username[0] || p->cfg.proxy_password[0]) {
+ char chapbuf[514];
+ int ulen;
+ chapbuf[0] = '\x01'; /* Version */
+ chapbuf[1] = '\x02'; /* Number of attributes sent */
+ chapbuf[2] = '\x11'; /* First attribute - algorithms list */
+ chapbuf[3] = '\x01'; /* Only one CHAP algorithm */
+ chapbuf[4] = '\x85'; /* ...and it's HMAC-MD5, the core one */
+ chapbuf[5] = '\x02'; /* Second attribute - username */
+
+ ulen = strlen(p->cfg.proxy_username);
+ if (ulen > 255) ulen = 255; if (ulen < 1) ulen = 1;
+
+ chapbuf[6] = ulen;
+ memcpy(chapbuf+7, p->cfg.proxy_username, ulen);
+
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, chapbuf, ulen + 7);
+ p->chap_num_attributes = 0;
+ p->chap_num_attributes_processed = 0;
+ p->chap_current_attribute = -1;
+ p->chap_current_datalen = 0;
+
+ p->state = 8;
+ } else
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: Server chose "
+ "CHAP authentication but we didn't offer it!",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/int64.h b/tools/plink/int64.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..63df3a992 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/int64.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/*
+ * Header for int64.c.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_INT64_H
+#define PUTTY_INT64_H
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned long hi, lo;
+} uint64;
+
+uint64 uint64_div10(uint64 x, int *remainder);
+void uint64_decimal(uint64 x, char *buffer);
+uint64 uint64_make(unsigned long hi, unsigned long lo);
+uint64 uint64_add(uint64 x, uint64 y);
+uint64 uint64_add32(uint64 x, unsigned long y);
+int uint64_compare(uint64 x, uint64 y);
+uint64 uint64_subtract(uint64 x, uint64 y);
+double uint64_to_double(uint64 x);
+uint64 uint64_shift_right(uint64 x, int shift);
+uint64 uint64_shift_left(uint64 x, int shift);
+uint64 uint64_from_decimal(char *str);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/ldisc.c b/tools/plink/ldisc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..20fa3c568 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/ldisc.c @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +/*
+ * ldisc.c: PuTTY line discipline. Sits between the input coming
+ * from keypresses in the window, and the output channel leading to
+ * the back end. Implements echo and/or local line editing,
+ * depending on what's currently configured.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "terminal.h"
+#include "ldisc.h"
+
+#define ECHOING (ldisc->cfg->localecho == FORCE_ON || \
+ (ldisc->cfg->localecho == AUTO && \
+ (ldisc->back->ldisc(ldisc->backhandle, LD_ECHO) || \
+ term_ldisc(ldisc->term, LD_ECHO))))
+#define EDITING (ldisc->cfg->localedit == FORCE_ON || \
+ (ldisc->cfg->localedit == AUTO && \
+ (ldisc->back->ldisc(ldisc->backhandle, LD_EDIT) || \
+ term_ldisc(ldisc->term, LD_EDIT))))
+
+static void c_write(Ldisc ldisc, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ from_backend(ldisc->frontend, 0, buf, len);
+}
+
+static int plen(Ldisc ldisc, unsigned char c)
+{
+ if ((c >= 32 && c <= 126) || (c >= 160 && !in_utf(ldisc->term)))
+ return 1;
+ else if (c < 128)
+ return 2; /* ^x for some x */
+ else if (in_utf(ldisc->term) && c >= 0xC0)
+ return 1; /* UTF-8 introducer character
+ * (FIXME: combining / wide chars) */
+ else if (in_utf(ldisc->term) && c >= 0x80 && c < 0xC0)
+ return 0; /* UTF-8 followup character */
+ else
+ return 4; /* <XY> hex representation */
+}
+
+static void pwrite(Ldisc ldisc, unsigned char c)
+{
+ if ((c >= 32 && c <= 126) ||
+ (!in_utf(ldisc->term) && c >= 0xA0) ||
+ (in_utf(ldisc->term) && c >= 0x80)) {
+ c_write(ldisc, (char *)&c, 1);
+ } else if (c < 128) {
+ char cc[2];
+ cc[1] = (c == 127 ? '?' : c + 0x40);
+ cc[0] = '^';
+ c_write(ldisc, cc, 2);
+ } else {
+ char cc[5];
+ sprintf(cc, "<%02X>", c);
+ c_write(ldisc, cc, 4);
+ }
+}
+
+static int char_start(Ldisc ldisc, unsigned char c)
+{
+ if (in_utf(ldisc->term))
+ return (c < 0x80 || c >= 0xC0);
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void bsb(Ldisc ldisc, int n)
+{
+ while (n--)
+ c_write(ldisc, "\010 \010", 3);
+}
+
+#define CTRL(x) (x^'@')
+#define KCTRL(x) ((x^'@') | 0x100)
+
+void *ldisc_create(Config *mycfg, Terminal *term,
+ Backend *back, void *backhandle,
+ void *frontend)
+{
+ Ldisc ldisc = snew(struct ldisc_tag);
+
+ ldisc->buf = NULL;
+ ldisc->buflen = 0;
+ ldisc->bufsiz = 0;
+ ldisc->quotenext = 0;
+
+ ldisc->cfg = mycfg;
+ ldisc->back = back;
+ ldisc->backhandle = backhandle;
+ ldisc->term = term;
+ ldisc->frontend = frontend;
+
+ /* Link ourselves into the backend and the terminal */
+ if (term)
+ term->ldisc = ldisc;
+ if (back)
+ back->provide_ldisc(backhandle, ldisc);
+
+ return ldisc;
+}
+
+void ldisc_free(void *handle)
+{
+ Ldisc ldisc = (Ldisc) handle;
+
+ if (ldisc->term)
+ ldisc->term->ldisc = NULL;
+ if (ldisc->back)
+ ldisc->back->provide_ldisc(ldisc->backhandle, NULL);
+ if (ldisc->buf)
+ sfree(ldisc->buf);
+ sfree(ldisc);
+}
+
+void ldisc_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len, int interactive)
+{
+ Ldisc ldisc = (Ldisc) handle;
+ int keyflag = 0;
+ /*
+ * Called with len=0 when the options change. We must inform
+ * the front end in case it needs to know.
+ */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ ldisc_update(ldisc->frontend, ECHOING, EDITING);
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Notify the front end that something was pressed, in case
+ * it's depending on finding out (e.g. keypress termination for
+ * Close On Exit).
+ */
+ frontend_keypress(ldisc->frontend);
+
+ /*
+ * Less than zero means null terminated special string.
+ */
+ if (len < 0) {
+ len = strlen(buf);
+ keyflag = KCTRL('@');
+ }
+ /*
+ * Either perform local editing, or just send characters.
+ */
+ if (EDITING) {
+ while (len--) {
+ int c;
+ c = *buf++ + keyflag;
+ if (!interactive && c == '\r')
+ c += KCTRL('@');
+ switch (ldisc->quotenext ? ' ' : c) {
+ /*
+ * ^h/^?: delete, and output BSBs, to return to
+ * last character boundary (in UTF-8 mode this may
+ * be more than one byte)
+ * ^w: delete, and output BSBs, to return to last
+ * space/nonspace boundary
+ * ^u: delete, and output BSBs, to return to BOL
+ * ^c: Do a ^u then send a telnet IP
+ * ^z: Do a ^u then send a telnet SUSP
+ * ^\: Do a ^u then send a telnet ABORT
+ * ^r: echo "^R\n" and redraw line
+ * ^v: quote next char
+ * ^d: if at BOL, end of file and close connection,
+ * else send line and reset to BOL
+ * ^m: send line-plus-\r\n and reset to BOL
+ */
+ case KCTRL('H'):
+ case KCTRL('?'): /* backspace/delete */
+ if (ldisc->buflen > 0) {
+ do {
+ if (ECHOING)
+ bsb(ldisc, plen(ldisc, ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen - 1]));
+ ldisc->buflen--;
+ } while (!char_start(ldisc, ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen]));
+ }
+ break;
+ case CTRL('W'): /* delete word */
+ while (ldisc->buflen > 0) {
+ if (ECHOING)
+ bsb(ldisc, plen(ldisc, ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen - 1]));
+ ldisc->buflen--;
+ if (ldisc->buflen > 0 &&
+ isspace((unsigned char)ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen-1]) &&
+ !isspace((unsigned char)ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen]))
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CTRL('U'): /* delete line */
+ case CTRL('C'): /* Send IP */
+ case CTRL('\\'): /* Quit */
+ case CTRL('Z'): /* Suspend */
+ while (ldisc->buflen > 0) {
+ if (ECHOING)
+ bsb(ldisc, plen(ldisc, ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen - 1]));
+ ldisc->buflen--;
+ }
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_EL);
+ /*
+ * We don't send IP, SUSP or ABORT if the user has
+ * configured telnet specials off! This breaks
+ * talkers otherwise.
+ */
+ if (!ldisc->cfg->telnet_keyboard)
+ goto default_case;
+ if (c == CTRL('C'))
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_IP);
+ if (c == CTRL('Z'))
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_SUSP);
+ if (c == CTRL('\\'))
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_ABORT);
+ break;
+ case CTRL('R'): /* redraw line */
+ if (ECHOING) {
+ int i;
+ c_write(ldisc, "^R\r\n", 4);
+ for (i = 0; i < ldisc->buflen; i++)
+ pwrite(ldisc, ldisc->buf[i]);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CTRL('V'): /* quote next char */
+ ldisc->quotenext = TRUE;
+ break;
+ case CTRL('D'): /* logout or send */
+ if (ldisc->buflen == 0) {
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_EOF);
+ } else {
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, ldisc->buf, ldisc->buflen);
+ ldisc->buflen = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ /*
+ * This particularly hideous bit of code from RDB
+ * allows ordinary ^M^J to do the same thing as
+ * magic-^M when in Raw protocol. The line `case
+ * KCTRL('M'):' is _inside_ the if block. Thus:
+ *
+ * - receiving regular ^M goes straight to the
+ * default clause and inserts as a literal ^M.
+ * - receiving regular ^J _not_ directly after a
+ * literal ^M (or not in Raw protocol) fails the
+ * if condition, leaps to the bottom of the if,
+ * and falls through into the default clause
+ * again.
+ * - receiving regular ^J just after a literal ^M
+ * in Raw protocol passes the if condition,
+ * deletes the literal ^M, and falls through
+ * into the magic-^M code
+ * - receiving a magic-^M empties the line buffer,
+ * signals end-of-line in one of the various
+ * entertaining ways, and _doesn't_ fall out of
+ * the bottom of the if and through to the
+ * default clause because of the break.
+ */
+ case CTRL('J'):
+ if (ldisc->cfg->protocol == PROT_RAW &&
+ ldisc->buflen > 0 && ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen - 1] == '\r') {
+ if (ECHOING)
+ bsb(ldisc, plen(ldisc, ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen - 1]));
+ ldisc->buflen--;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KCTRL('M'): /* send with newline */
+ if (ldisc->buflen > 0)
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, ldisc->buf, ldisc->buflen);
+ if (ldisc->cfg->protocol == PROT_RAW)
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, "\r\n", 2);
+ else if (ldisc->cfg->protocol == PROT_TELNET && ldisc->cfg->telnet_newline)
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_EOL);
+ else
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, "\r", 1);
+ if (ECHOING)
+ c_write(ldisc, "\r\n", 2);
+ ldisc->buflen = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: /* get to this label from ^V handler */
+ default_case:
+ if (ldisc->buflen >= ldisc->bufsiz) {
+ ldisc->bufsiz = ldisc->buflen + 256;
+ ldisc->buf = sresize(ldisc->buf, ldisc->bufsiz, char);
+ }
+ ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen++] = c;
+ if (ECHOING)
+ pwrite(ldisc, (unsigned char) c);
+ ldisc->quotenext = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ldisc->buflen != 0) {
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, ldisc->buf, ldisc->buflen);
+ while (ldisc->buflen > 0) {
+ bsb(ldisc, plen(ldisc, ldisc->buf[ldisc->buflen - 1]));
+ ldisc->buflen--;
+ }
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if (ECHOING)
+ c_write(ldisc, buf, len);
+ if (keyflag && ldisc->cfg->protocol == PROT_TELNET && len == 1) {
+ switch (buf[0]) {
+ case CTRL('M'):
+ if (ldisc->cfg->protocol == PROT_TELNET && ldisc->cfg->telnet_newline)
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_EOL);
+ else
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, "\r", 1);
+ break;
+ case CTRL('?'):
+ case CTRL('H'):
+ if (ldisc->cfg->telnet_keyboard) {
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_EC);
+ break;
+ }
+ case CTRL('C'):
+ if (ldisc->cfg->telnet_keyboard) {
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_IP);
+ break;
+ }
+ case CTRL('Z'):
+ if (ldisc->cfg->telnet_keyboard) {
+ ldisc->back->special(ldisc->backhandle, TS_SUSP);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, buf, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ ldisc->back->send(ldisc->backhandle, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/ldisc.h b/tools/plink/ldisc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ef84f6d6d --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/ldisc.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/*
+ * ldisc.h: defines the Ldisc data structure used by ldisc.c and
+ * ldiscucs.c. (Unfortunately it was necessary to split the ldisc
+ * module in two, to avoid unnecessarily linking in the Unicode
+ * stuff in tools that don't require it.)
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_LDISC_H
+#define PUTTY_LDISC_H
+
+typedef struct ldisc_tag {
+ Terminal *term;
+ Backend *back;
+ Config *cfg;
+ void *backhandle;
+ void *frontend;
+
+ char *buf;
+ int buflen, bufsiz, quotenext;
+} *Ldisc;
+
+#endif /* PUTTY_LDISC_H */
diff --git a/tools/plink/logging.c b/tools/plink/logging.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6b8eaa7c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/logging.c @@ -0,0 +1,423 @@ +/*
+ * Session logging.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <time.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+/* log session to file stuff ... */
+struct LogContext {
+ FILE *lgfp;
+ enum { L_CLOSED, L_OPENING, L_OPEN, L_ERROR } state;
+ bufchain queue;
+ Filename currlogfilename;
+ void *frontend;
+ Config cfg;
+};
+
+static void xlatlognam(Filename *d, Filename s, char *hostname, struct tm *tm);
+
+/*
+ * Internal wrapper function which must be called for _all_ output
+ * to the log file. It takes care of opening the log file if it
+ * isn't open, buffering data if it's in the process of being
+ * opened asynchronously, etc.
+ */
+static void logwrite(struct LogContext *ctx, void *data, int len)
+{
+ /*
+ * In state L_CLOSED, we call logfopen, which will set the state
+ * to one of L_OPENING, L_OPEN or L_ERROR. Hence we process all of
+ * those three _after_ processing L_CLOSED.
+ */
+ if (ctx->state == L_CLOSED)
+ logfopen(ctx);
+
+ if (ctx->state == L_OPENING) {
+ bufchain_add(&ctx->queue, data, len);
+ } else if (ctx->state == L_OPEN) {
+ assert(ctx->lgfp);
+ fwrite(data, 1, len, ctx->lgfp);
+ } /* else L_ERROR, so ignore the write */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convenience wrapper on logwrite() which printf-formats the
+ * string.
+ */
+static void logprintf(struct LogContext *ctx, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *data;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ data = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ logwrite(ctx, data, strlen(data));
+ sfree(data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Flush any open log file.
+ */
+void logflush(void *handle) {
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ if (ctx->cfg.logtype > 0)
+ if (ctx->state == L_OPEN)
+ fflush(ctx->lgfp);
+}
+
+static void logfopen_callback(void *handle, int mode)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ char buf[256], *event;
+ struct tm tm;
+ const char *fmode;
+
+ if (mode == 0) {
+ ctx->state = L_ERROR; /* disable logging */
+ } else {
+ fmode = (mode == 1 ? "ab" : "wb");
+ ctx->lgfp = f_open(ctx->currlogfilename, fmode, FALSE);
+ if (ctx->lgfp)
+ ctx->state = L_OPEN;
+ else
+ ctx->state = L_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->state == L_OPEN) {
+ /* Write header line into log file. */
+ tm = ltime();
+ strftime(buf, 24, "%Y.%m.%d %H:%M:%S", &tm);
+ logprintf(ctx, "=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= PuTTY log %s"
+ " =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=\r\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ event = dupprintf("%s session log (%s mode) to file: %s",
+ (mode == 0 ? "Disabled writing" :
+ mode == 1 ? "Appending" : "Writing new"),
+ (ctx->cfg.logtype == LGTYP_ASCII ? "ASCII" :
+ ctx->cfg.logtype == LGTYP_DEBUG ? "raw" :
+ ctx->cfg.logtype == LGTYP_PACKETS ? "SSH packets" :
+ ctx->cfg.logtype == LGTYP_SSHRAW ? "SSH raw data" :
+ "unknown"),
+ filename_to_str(&ctx->currlogfilename));
+ logevent(ctx->frontend, event);
+ sfree(event);
+
+ /*
+ * Having either succeeded or failed in opening the log file,
+ * we should write any queued data out.
+ */
+ assert(ctx->state != L_OPENING); /* make _sure_ it won't be requeued */
+ while (bufchain_size(&ctx->queue)) {
+ void *data;
+ int len;
+ bufchain_prefix(&ctx->queue, &data, &len);
+ logwrite(ctx, data, len);
+ bufchain_consume(&ctx->queue, len);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open the log file. Takes care of detecting an already-existing
+ * file and asking the user whether they want to append, overwrite
+ * or cancel logging.
+ */
+void logfopen(void *handle)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ struct tm tm;
+ int mode;
+
+ /* Prevent repeat calls */
+ if (ctx->state != L_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (!ctx->cfg.logtype)
+ return;
+
+ tm = ltime();
+
+ /* substitute special codes in file name */
+ xlatlognam(&ctx->currlogfilename, ctx->cfg.logfilename,ctx->cfg.host, &tm);
+
+ ctx->lgfp = f_open(ctx->currlogfilename, "r", FALSE); /* file already present? */
+ if (ctx->lgfp) {
+ fclose(ctx->lgfp);
+ if (ctx->cfg.logxfovr != LGXF_ASK) {
+ mode = ((ctx->cfg.logxfovr == LGXF_OVR) ? 2 : 1);
+ } else
+ mode = askappend(ctx->frontend, ctx->currlogfilename,
+ logfopen_callback, ctx);
+ } else
+ mode = 2; /* create == overwrite */
+
+ if (mode < 0)
+ ctx->state = L_OPENING;
+ else
+ logfopen_callback(ctx, mode); /* open the file */
+}
+
+void logfclose(void *handle)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ if (ctx->lgfp) {
+ fclose(ctx->lgfp);
+ ctx->lgfp = NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->state = L_CLOSED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log session traffic.
+ */
+void logtraffic(void *handle, unsigned char c, int logmode)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ if (ctx->cfg.logtype > 0) {
+ if (ctx->cfg.logtype == logmode)
+ logwrite(ctx, &c, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log an Event Log entry. Used in SSH packet logging mode; this is
+ * also as convenient a place as any to put the output of Event Log
+ * entries to stderr when a command-line tool is in verbose mode.
+ * (In particular, this is a better place to put it than in the
+ * front ends, because it only has to be done once for all
+ * platforms. Platforms which don't have a meaningful stderr can
+ * just avoid defining FLAG_STDERR.
+ */
+void log_eventlog(void *handle, const char *event)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ if ((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", event);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ }
+ /* If we don't have a context yet (eg winnet.c init) then skip entirely */
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+ if (ctx->cfg.logtype != LGTYP_PACKETS &&
+ ctx->cfg.logtype != LGTYP_SSHRAW)
+ return;
+ logprintf(ctx, "Event Log: %s\r\n", event);
+ logflush(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Log an SSH packet.
+ * If n_blanks != 0, blank or omit some parts.
+ * Set of blanking areas must be in increasing order.
+ */
+void log_packet(void *handle, int direction, int type,
+ char *texttype, const void *data, int len,
+ int n_blanks, const struct logblank_t *blanks,
+ const unsigned long *seq)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ char dumpdata[80], smalldata[5];
+ int p = 0, b = 0, omitted = 0;
+ int output_pos = 0; /* NZ if pending output in dumpdata */
+
+ if (!(ctx->cfg.logtype == LGTYP_SSHRAW ||
+ (ctx->cfg.logtype == LGTYP_PACKETS && texttype)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Packet header. */
+ if (texttype) {
+ if (seq) {
+ logprintf(ctx, "%s packet #0x%lx, type %d / 0x%02x (%s)\r\n",
+ direction == PKT_INCOMING ? "Incoming" : "Outgoing",
+ *seq, type, type, texttype);
+ } else {
+ logprintf(ctx, "%s packet type %d / 0x%02x (%s)\r\n",
+ direction == PKT_INCOMING ? "Incoming" : "Outgoing",
+ type, type, texttype);
+ }
+ } else {
+ logprintf(ctx, "%s raw data\r\n",
+ direction == PKT_INCOMING ? "Incoming" : "Outgoing");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Output a hex/ASCII dump of the packet body, blanking/omitting
+ * parts as specified.
+ */
+ while (p < len) {
+ int blktype;
+
+ /* Move to a current entry in the blanking array. */
+ while ((b < n_blanks) &&
+ (p >= blanks[b].offset + blanks[b].len))
+ b++;
+ /* Work out what type of blanking to apply to
+ * this byte. */
+ blktype = PKTLOG_EMIT; /* default */
+ if ((b < n_blanks) &&
+ (p >= blanks[b].offset) &&
+ (p < blanks[b].offset + blanks[b].len))
+ blktype = blanks[b].type;
+
+ /* If we're about to stop omitting, it's time to say how
+ * much we omitted. */
+ if ((blktype != PKTLOG_OMIT) && omitted) {
+ logprintf(ctx, " (%d byte%s omitted)\r\n",
+ omitted, (omitted==1?"":"s"));
+ omitted = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* (Re-)initialise dumpdata as necessary
+ * (start of row, or if we've just stopped omitting) */
+ if (!output_pos && !omitted)
+ sprintf(dumpdata, " %08x%*s\r\n", p-(p%16), 1+3*16+2+16, "");
+
+ /* Deal with the current byte. */
+ if (blktype == PKTLOG_OMIT) {
+ omitted++;
+ } else {
+ int c;
+ if (blktype == PKTLOG_BLANK) {
+ c = 'X';
+ sprintf(smalldata, "XX");
+ } else { /* PKTLOG_EMIT */
+ c = ((unsigned char *)data)[p];
+ sprintf(smalldata, "%02x", c);
+ }
+ dumpdata[10+2+3*(p%16)] = smalldata[0];
+ dumpdata[10+2+3*(p%16)+1] = smalldata[1];
+ dumpdata[10+1+3*16+2+(p%16)] = (isprint(c) ? c : '.');
+ output_pos = (p%16) + 1;
+ }
+
+ p++;
+
+ /* Flush row if necessary */
+ if (((p % 16) == 0) || (p == len) || omitted) {
+ if (output_pos) {
+ strcpy(dumpdata + 10+1+3*16+2+output_pos, "\r\n");
+ logwrite(ctx, dumpdata, strlen(dumpdata));
+ output_pos = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /* Tidy up */
+ if (omitted)
+ logprintf(ctx, " (%d byte%s omitted)\r\n",
+ omitted, (omitted==1?"":"s"));
+ logflush(ctx);
+}
+
+void *log_init(void *frontend, Config *cfg)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = snew(struct LogContext);
+ ctx->lgfp = NULL;
+ ctx->state = L_CLOSED;
+ ctx->frontend = frontend;
+ ctx->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
+ bufchain_init(&ctx->queue);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+void log_free(void *handle)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+
+ logfclose(ctx);
+ bufchain_clear(&ctx->queue);
+ sfree(ctx);
+}
+
+void log_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
+{
+ struct LogContext *ctx = (struct LogContext *)handle;
+ int reset_logging;
+
+ if (!filename_equal(ctx->cfg.logfilename, cfg->logfilename) ||
+ ctx->cfg.logtype != cfg->logtype)
+ reset_logging = TRUE;
+ else
+ reset_logging = FALSE;
+
+ if (reset_logging)
+ logfclose(ctx);
+
+ ctx->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
+
+ if (reset_logging)
+ logfopen(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * translate format codes into time/date strings
+ * and insert them into log file name
+ *
+ * "&Y":YYYY "&m":MM "&d":DD "&T":hhmmss "&h":<hostname> "&&":&
+ */
+static void xlatlognam(Filename *dest, Filename src,
+ char *hostname, struct tm *tm) {
+ char buf[10], *bufp;
+ int size;
+ char buffer[FILENAME_MAX];
+ int len = sizeof(buffer)-1;
+ char *d;
+ const char *s;
+
+ d = buffer;
+ s = filename_to_str(&src);
+
+ while (*s) {
+ /* Let (bufp, len) be the string to append. */
+ bufp = buf; /* don't usually override this */
+ if (*s == '&') {
+ char c;
+ s++;
+ size = 0;
+ if (*s) switch (c = *s++, tolower((unsigned char)c)) {
+ case 'y':
+ size = strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y", tm);
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ size = strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%m", tm);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ size = strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", tm);
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ size = strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%H%M%S", tm);
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ bufp = hostname;
+ size = strlen(bufp);
+ break;
+ default:
+ buf[0] = '&';
+ size = 1;
+ if (c != '&')
+ buf[size++] = c;
+ }
+ } else {
+ buf[0] = *s++;
+ size = 1;
+ }
+ if (size > len)
+ size = len;
+ memcpy(d, bufp, size);
+ d += size;
+ len -= size;
+ }
+ *d = '\0';
+
+ *dest = filename_from_str(buffer);
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/misc.c b/tools/plink/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4aeab5028 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,655 @@ +/*
+ * Platform-independent routines shared between all PuTTY programs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "putty.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a string block size specification. This is approximately a
+ * subset of the block size specs supported by GNU fileutils:
+ * "nk" = n kilobytes
+ * "nM" = n megabytes
+ * "nG" = n gigabytes
+ * All numbers are decimal, and suffixes refer to powers of two.
+ * Case-insensitive.
+ */
+unsigned long parse_blocksize(const char *bs)
+{
+ char *suf;
+ unsigned long r = strtoul(bs, &suf, 10);
+ if (*suf != '\0') {
+ while (*suf && isspace((unsigned char)*suf)) suf++;
+ switch (*suf) {
+ case 'k': case 'K':
+ r *= 1024ul;
+ break;
+ case 'm': case 'M':
+ r *= 1024ul * 1024ul;
+ break;
+ case 'g': case 'G':
+ r *= 1024ul * 1024ul * 1024ul;
+ break;
+ case '\0':
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a ^C style character specification.
+ * Returns NULL in `next' if we didn't recognise it as a control character,
+ * in which case `c' should be ignored.
+ * The precise current parsing is an oddity inherited from the terminal
+ * answerback-string parsing code. All sequences start with ^; all except
+ * ^<123> are two characters. The ones that are worth keeping are probably:
+ * ^? 127
+ * ^@A-Z[\]^_ 0-31
+ * a-z 1-26
+ * <num> specified by number (decimal, 0octal, 0xHEX)
+ * ~ ^ escape
+ */
+char ctrlparse(char *s, char **next)
+{
+ char c = 0;
+ if (*s != '^') {
+ *next = NULL;
+ } else {
+ s++;
+ if (*s == '\0') {
+ *next = NULL;
+ } else if (*s == '<') {
+ s++;
+ c = (char)strtol(s, next, 0);
+ if ((*next == s) || (**next != '>')) {
+ c = 0;
+ *next = NULL;
+ } else
+ (*next)++;
+ } else if (*s >= 'a' && *s <= 'z') {
+ c = (*s - ('a' - 1));
+ *next = s+1;
+ } else if ((*s >= '@' && *s <= '_') || *s == '?' || (*s & 0x80)) {
+ c = ('@' ^ *s);
+ *next = s+1;
+ } else if (*s == '~') {
+ c = '^';
+ *next = s+1;
+ }
+ }
+ return c;
+}
+
+prompts_t *new_prompts(void *frontend)
+{
+ prompts_t *p = snew(prompts_t);
+ p->prompts = NULL;
+ p->n_prompts = 0;
+ p->frontend = frontend;
+ p->data = NULL;
+ p->to_server = TRUE; /* to be on the safe side */
+ p->name = p->instruction = NULL;
+ p->name_reqd = p->instr_reqd = FALSE;
+ return p;
+}
+void add_prompt(prompts_t *p, char *promptstr, int echo, size_t len)
+{
+ prompt_t *pr = snew(prompt_t);
+ char *result = snewn(len, char);
+ pr->prompt = promptstr;
+ pr->echo = echo;
+ pr->result = result;
+ pr->result_len = len;
+ p->n_prompts++;
+ p->prompts = sresize(p->prompts, p->n_prompts, prompt_t *);
+ p->prompts[p->n_prompts-1] = pr;
+}
+void free_prompts(prompts_t *p)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i=0; i < p->n_prompts; i++) {
+ prompt_t *pr = p->prompts[i];
+ memset(pr->result, 0, pr->result_len); /* burn the evidence */
+ sfree(pr->result);
+ sfree(pr->prompt);
+ sfree(pr);
+ }
+ sfree(p->prompts);
+ sfree(p->name);
+ sfree(p->instruction);
+ sfree(p);
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * String handling routines.
+ */
+
+char *dupstr(const char *s)
+{
+ char *p = NULL;
+ if (s) {
+ int len = strlen(s);
+ p = snewn(len + 1, char);
+ strcpy(p, s);
+ }
+ return p;
+}
+
+/* Allocate the concatenation of N strings. Terminate arg list with NULL. */
+char *dupcat(const char *s1, ...)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *p, *q, *sn;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ len = strlen(s1);
+ va_start(ap, s1);
+ while (1) {
+ sn = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (!sn)
+ break;
+ len += strlen(sn);
+ }
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ p = snewn(len + 1, char);
+ strcpy(p, s1);
+ q = p + strlen(p);
+
+ va_start(ap, s1);
+ while (1) {
+ sn = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (!sn)
+ break;
+ strcpy(q, sn);
+ q += strlen(q);
+ }
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do an sprintf(), but into a custom-allocated buffer.
+ *
+ * Currently I'm doing this via vsnprintf. This has worked so far,
+ * but it's not good, because vsnprintf is not available on all
+ * platforms. There's an ifdef to use `_vsnprintf', which seems
+ * to be the local name for it on Windows. Other platforms may
+ * lack it completely, in which case it'll be time to rewrite
+ * this function in a totally different way.
+ *
+ * The only `properly' portable solution I can think of is to
+ * implement my own format string scanner, which figures out an
+ * upper bound for the length of each formatting directive,
+ * allocates the buffer as it goes along, and calls sprintf() to
+ * actually process each directive. If I ever need to actually do
+ * this, some caveats:
+ *
+ * - It's very hard to find a reliable upper bound for
+ * floating-point values. %f, in particular, when supplied with
+ * a number near to the upper or lower limit of representable
+ * numbers, could easily take several hundred characters. It's
+ * probably feasible to predict this statically using the
+ * constants in <float.h>, or even to predict it dynamically by
+ * looking at the exponent of the specific float provided, but
+ * it won't be fun.
+ *
+ * - Don't forget to _check_, after calling sprintf, that it's
+ * used at most the amount of space we had available.
+ *
+ * - Fault any formatting directive we don't fully understand. The
+ * aim here is to _guarantee_ that we never overflow the buffer,
+ * because this is a security-critical function. If we see a
+ * directive we don't know about, we should panic and die rather
+ * than run any risk.
+ */
+char *dupprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return ret;
+}
+char *dupvprintf(const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ int len, size;
+
+ buf = snewn(512, char);
+ size = 512;
+
+ while (1) {
+#ifdef _WINDOWS
+#define vsnprintf _vsnprintf
+#endif
+#ifdef va_copy
+ /* Use the `va_copy' macro mandated by C99, if present.
+ * XXX some environments may have this as __va_copy() */
+ va_list aq;
+ va_copy(aq, ap);
+ len = vsnprintf(buf, size, fmt, aq);
+ va_end(aq);
+#else
+ /* Ugh. No va_copy macro, so do something nasty.
+ * Technically, you can't reuse a va_list like this: it is left
+ * unspecified whether advancing a va_list pointer modifies its
+ * value or something it points to, so on some platforms calling
+ * vsnprintf twice on the same va_list might fail hideously
+ * (indeed, it has been observed to).
+ * XXX the autoconf manual suggests that using memcpy() will give
+ * "maximum portability". */
+ len = vsnprintf(buf, size, fmt, ap);
+#endif
+ if (len >= 0 && len < size) {
+ /* This is the C99-specified criterion for snprintf to have
+ * been completely successful. */
+ return buf;
+ } else if (len > 0) {
+ /* This is the C99 error condition: the returned length is
+ * the required buffer size not counting the NUL. */
+ size = len + 1;
+ } else {
+ /* This is the pre-C99 glibc error condition: <0 means the
+ * buffer wasn't big enough, so we enlarge it a bit and hope. */
+ size += 512;
+ }
+ buf = sresize(buf, size, char);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read an entire line of text from a file. Return a buffer
+ * malloced to be as big as necessary (caller must free).
+ */
+char *fgetline(FILE *fp)
+{
+ char *ret = snewn(512, char);
+ int size = 512, len = 0;
+ while (fgets(ret + len, size - len, fp)) {
+ len += strlen(ret + len);
+ if (ret[len-1] == '\n')
+ break; /* got a newline, we're done */
+ size = len + 512;
+ ret = sresize(ret, size, char);
+ }
+ if (len == 0) { /* first fgets returned NULL */
+ sfree(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret[len] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Base64 encoding routine. This is required in public-key writing
+ * but also in HTTP proxy handling, so it's centralised here.
+ */
+
+void base64_encode_atom(unsigned char *data, int n, char *out)
+{
+ static const char base64_chars[] =
+ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+ unsigned word;
+
+ word = data[0] << 16;
+ if (n > 1)
+ word |= data[1] << 8;
+ if (n > 2)
+ word |= data[2];
+ out[0] = base64_chars[(word >> 18) & 0x3F];
+ out[1] = base64_chars[(word >> 12) & 0x3F];
+ if (n > 1)
+ out[2] = base64_chars[(word >> 6) & 0x3F];
+ else
+ out[2] = '=';
+ if (n > 2)
+ out[3] = base64_chars[word & 0x3F];
+ else
+ out[3] = '=';
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Generic routines to deal with send buffers: a linked list of
+ * smallish blocks, with the operations
+ *
+ * - add an arbitrary amount of data to the end of the list
+ * - remove the first N bytes from the list
+ * - return a (pointer,length) pair giving some initial data in
+ * the list, suitable for passing to a send or write system
+ * call
+ * - retrieve a larger amount of initial data from the list
+ * - return the current size of the buffer chain in bytes
+ */
+
+#define BUFFER_GRANULE 512
+
+struct bufchain_granule {
+ struct bufchain_granule *next;
+ int buflen, bufpos;
+ char buf[BUFFER_GRANULE];
+};
+
+void bufchain_init(bufchain *ch)
+{
+ ch->head = ch->tail = NULL;
+ ch->buffersize = 0;
+}
+
+void bufchain_clear(bufchain *ch)
+{
+ struct bufchain_granule *b;
+ while (ch->head) {
+ b = ch->head;
+ ch->head = ch->head->next;
+ sfree(b);
+ }
+ ch->tail = NULL;
+ ch->buffersize = 0;
+}
+
+int bufchain_size(bufchain *ch)
+{
+ return ch->buffersize;
+}
+
+void bufchain_add(bufchain *ch, const void *data, int len)
+{
+ const char *buf = (const char *)data;
+
+ if (len == 0) return;
+
+ ch->buffersize += len;
+
+ if (ch->tail && ch->tail->buflen < BUFFER_GRANULE) {
+ int copylen = min(len, BUFFER_GRANULE - ch->tail->buflen);
+ memcpy(ch->tail->buf + ch->tail->buflen, buf, copylen);
+ buf += copylen;
+ len -= copylen;
+ ch->tail->buflen += copylen;
+ }
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int grainlen = min(len, BUFFER_GRANULE);
+ struct bufchain_granule *newbuf;
+ newbuf = snew(struct bufchain_granule);
+ newbuf->bufpos = 0;
+ newbuf->buflen = grainlen;
+ memcpy(newbuf->buf, buf, grainlen);
+ buf += grainlen;
+ len -= grainlen;
+ if (ch->tail)
+ ch->tail->next = newbuf;
+ else
+ ch->head = ch->tail = newbuf;
+ newbuf->next = NULL;
+ ch->tail = newbuf;
+ }
+}
+
+void bufchain_consume(bufchain *ch, int len)
+{
+ struct bufchain_granule *tmp;
+
+ assert(ch->buffersize >= len);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int remlen = len;
+ assert(ch->head != NULL);
+ if (remlen >= ch->head->buflen - ch->head->bufpos) {
+ remlen = ch->head->buflen - ch->head->bufpos;
+ tmp = ch->head;
+ ch->head = tmp->next;
+ sfree(tmp);
+ if (!ch->head)
+ ch->tail = NULL;
+ } else
+ ch->head->bufpos += remlen;
+ ch->buffersize -= remlen;
+ len -= remlen;
+ }
+}
+
+void bufchain_prefix(bufchain *ch, void **data, int *len)
+{
+ *len = ch->head->buflen - ch->head->bufpos;
+ *data = ch->head->buf + ch->head->bufpos;
+}
+
+void bufchain_fetch(bufchain *ch, void *data, int len)
+{
+ struct bufchain_granule *tmp;
+ char *data_c = (char *)data;
+
+ tmp = ch->head;
+
+ assert(ch->buffersize >= len);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int remlen = len;
+
+ assert(tmp != NULL);
+ if (remlen >= tmp->buflen - tmp->bufpos)
+ remlen = tmp->buflen - tmp->bufpos;
+ memcpy(data_c, tmp->buf + tmp->bufpos, remlen);
+
+ tmp = tmp->next;
+ len -= remlen;
+ data_c += remlen;
+ }
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * My own versions of malloc, realloc and free. Because I want
+ * malloc and realloc to bomb out and exit the program if they run
+ * out of memory, realloc to reliably call malloc if passed a NULL
+ * pointer, and free to reliably do nothing if passed a NULL
+ * pointer. We can also put trace printouts in, if we need to; and
+ * we can also replace the allocator with an ElectricFence-like
+ * one.
+ */
+
+#ifdef MINEFIELD
+void *minefield_c_malloc(size_t size);
+void minefield_c_free(void *p);
+void *minefield_c_realloc(void *p, size_t size);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+static FILE *fp = NULL;
+
+static char *mlog_file = NULL;
+static int mlog_line = 0;
+
+void mlog(char *file, int line)
+{
+ mlog_file = file;
+ mlog_line = line;
+ if (!fp) {
+ fp = fopen("putty_mem.log", "w");
+ setvbuf(fp, NULL, _IONBF, BUFSIZ);
+ }
+ if (fp)
+ fprintf(fp, "%s:%d: ", file, line);
+}
+#endif
+
+void *safemalloc(size_t n, size_t size)
+{
+ void *p;
+
+ if (n > INT_MAX / size) {
+ p = NULL;
+ } else {
+ size *= n;
+ if (size == 0) size = 1;
+#ifdef MINEFIELD
+ p = minefield_c_malloc(size);
+#else
+ p = malloc(size);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (!p) {
+ char str[200];
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+ sprintf(str, "Out of memory! (%s:%d, size=%d)",
+ mlog_file, mlog_line, size);
+ fprintf(fp, "*** %s\n", str);
+ fclose(fp);
+#else
+ strcpy(str, "Out of memory!");
+#endif
+ modalfatalbox(str);
+ }
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+ if (fp)
+ fprintf(fp, "malloc(%d) returns %p\n", size, p);
+#endif
+ return p;
+}
+
+void *saferealloc(void *ptr, size_t n, size_t size)
+{
+ void *p;
+
+ if (n > INT_MAX / size) {
+ p = NULL;
+ } else {
+ size *= n;
+ if (!ptr) {
+#ifdef MINEFIELD
+ p = minefield_c_malloc(size);
+#else
+ p = malloc(size);
+#endif
+ } else {
+#ifdef MINEFIELD
+ p = minefield_c_realloc(ptr, size);
+#else
+ p = realloc(ptr, size);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!p) {
+ char str[200];
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+ sprintf(str, "Out of memory! (%s:%d, size=%d)",
+ mlog_file, mlog_line, size);
+ fprintf(fp, "*** %s\n", str);
+ fclose(fp);
+#else
+ strcpy(str, "Out of memory!");
+#endif
+ modalfatalbox(str);
+ }
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+ if (fp)
+ fprintf(fp, "realloc(%p,%d) returns %p\n", ptr, size, p);
+#endif
+ return p;
+}
+
+void safefree(void *ptr)
+{
+ if (ptr) {
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+ if (fp)
+ fprintf(fp, "free(%p)\n", ptr);
+#endif
+#ifdef MINEFIELD
+ minefield_c_free(ptr);
+#else
+ free(ptr);
+#endif
+ }
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+ else if (fp)
+ fprintf(fp, "freeing null pointer - no action taken\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Debugging routines.
+ */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+extern void dputs(char *); /* defined in per-platform *misc.c */
+
+void debug_printf(char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
+ dputs(buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+ va_end(ap);
+}
+
+
+void debug_memdump(void *buf, int len, int L)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ char foo[17];
+ if (L) {
+ int delta;
+ debug_printf("\t%d (0x%x) bytes:\n", len, len);
+ delta = 15 & (unsigned long int) p;
+ p -= delta;
+ len += delta;
+ }
+ for (; 0 < len; p += 16, len -= 16) {
+ dputs(" ");
+ if (L)
+ debug_printf("%p: ", p);
+ strcpy(foo, "................"); /* sixteen dots */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16 && i < len; ++i) {
+ if (&p[i] < (unsigned char *) buf) {
+ dputs(" "); /* 3 spaces */
+ foo[i] = ' ';
+ } else {
+ debug_printf("%c%02.2x",
+ &p[i] != (unsigned char *) buf
+ && i % 4 ? '.' : ' ', p[i]
+ );
+ if (p[i] >= ' ' && p[i] <= '~')
+ foo[i] = (char) p[i];
+ }
+ }
+ foo[i] = '\0';
+ debug_printf("%*s%s\n", (16 - i) * 3 + 2, "", foo);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* def DEBUG */
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether or not a Config structure represents a session
+ * which can sensibly be launched right now.
+ */
+int cfg_launchable(const Config *cfg)
+{
+ if (cfg->protocol == PROT_SERIAL)
+ return cfg->serline[0] != 0;
+ else
+ return cfg->host[0] != 0;
+}
+
+char const *cfg_dest(const Config *cfg)
+{
+ if (cfg->protocol == PROT_SERIAL)
+ return cfg->serline;
+ else
+ return cfg->host;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/misc.h b/tools/plink/misc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..11233147a --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/*
+ * Header for misc.c.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_MISC_H
+#define PUTTY_MISC_H
+
+#include "puttymem.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h> /* for FILE * */
+#include <stdarg.h> /* for va_list */
+#include <time.h> /* for struct tm */
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+
+typedef struct Filename Filename;
+typedef struct FontSpec FontSpec;
+
+unsigned long parse_blocksize(const char *bs);
+char ctrlparse(char *s, char **next);
+
+char *dupstr(const char *s);
+char *dupcat(const char *s1, ...);
+char *dupprintf(const char *fmt, ...);
+char *dupvprintf(const char *fmt, va_list ap);
+
+char *fgetline(FILE *fp);
+
+void base64_encode_atom(unsigned char *data, int n, char *out);
+
+struct bufchain_granule;
+typedef struct bufchain_tag {
+ struct bufchain_granule *head, *tail;
+ int buffersize; /* current amount of buffered data */
+} bufchain;
+
+void bufchain_init(bufchain *ch);
+void bufchain_clear(bufchain *ch);
+int bufchain_size(bufchain *ch);
+void bufchain_add(bufchain *ch, const void *data, int len);
+void bufchain_prefix(bufchain *ch, void **data, int *len);
+void bufchain_consume(bufchain *ch, int len);
+void bufchain_fetch(bufchain *ch, void *data, int len);
+
+struct tm ltime(void);
+
+/*
+ * Debugging functions.
+ *
+ * Output goes to debug.log
+ *
+ * debug(()) (note the double brackets) is like printf().
+ *
+ * dmemdump() and dmemdumpl() both do memory dumps. The difference
+ * is that dmemdumpl() is more suited for when the memory address is
+ * important (say because you'll be recording pointer values later
+ * on). dmemdump() is more concise.
+ */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+void debug_printf(char *fmt, ...);
+void debug_memdump(void *buf, int len, int L);
+#define debug(x) (debug_printf x)
+#define dmemdump(buf,len) debug_memdump (buf, len, 0);
+#define dmemdumpl(buf,len) debug_memdump (buf, len, 1);
+#else
+#define debug(x)
+#define dmemdump(buf,len)
+#define dmemdumpl(buf,len)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef lenof
+#define lenof(x) ( (sizeof((x))) / (sizeof(*(x))))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef min
+#define min(x,y) ( (x) < (y) ? (x) : (y) )
+#endif
+#ifndef max
+#define max(x,y) ( (x) > (y) ? (x) : (y) )
+#endif
+
+#define GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp) \
+ (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0]) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 8) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[2] << 16) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[3] << 24))
+
+#define PUT_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp, value) ( \
+ (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)(value), \
+ (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8), \
+ (cp)[2] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 16), \
+ (cp)[3] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 24) )
+
+#define GET_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp) \
+ (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0]) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 8))
+
+#define PUT_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp, value) ( \
+ (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)(value), \
+ (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8) )
+
+#define GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp) \
+ (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[3]))
+
+#define GET_32BIT(cp) GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp)
+
+#define PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp, value) ( \
+ (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 24), \
+ (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 16), \
+ (cp)[2] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8), \
+ (cp)[3] = (unsigned char)(value) )
+
+#define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp, value)
+
+#define GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp) \
+ (((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0] << 8) | \
+ ((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1]))
+
+#define PUT_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp, value) ( \
+ (cp)[0] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8), \
+ (cp)[1] = (unsigned char)(value) )
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/network.h b/tools/plink/network.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b1b559047 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/network.h @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +/*
+ * Networking abstraction in PuTTY.
+ *
+ * The way this works is: a back end can choose to open any number
+ * of sockets - including zero, which might be necessary in some.
+ * It can register a bunch of callbacks (most notably for when
+ * data is received) for each socket, and it can call the networking
+ * abstraction to send data without having to worry about blocking.
+ * The stuff behind the abstraction takes care of selects and
+ * nonblocking writes and all that sort of painful gubbins.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_NETWORK_H
+#define PUTTY_NETWORK_H
+
+#ifndef DONE_TYPEDEFS
+#define DONE_TYPEDEFS
+typedef struct config_tag Config;
+typedef struct backend_tag Backend;
+typedef struct terminal_tag Terminal;
+#endif
+
+typedef struct SockAddr_tag *SockAddr;
+/* pay attention to levels of indirection */
+typedef struct socket_function_table **Socket;
+typedef struct plug_function_table **Plug;
+
+#ifndef OSSOCKET_DEFINED
+typedef void *OSSocket;
+#endif
+
+struct socket_function_table {
+ Plug(*plug) (Socket s, Plug p);
+ /* use a different plug (return the old one) */
+ /* if p is NULL, it doesn't change the plug */
+ /* but it does return the one it's using */
+ void (*close) (Socket s);
+ int (*write) (Socket s, const char *data, int len);
+ int (*write_oob) (Socket s, const char *data, int len);
+ void (*flush) (Socket s);
+ void (*set_private_ptr) (Socket s, void *ptr);
+ void *(*get_private_ptr) (Socket s);
+ void (*set_frozen) (Socket s, int is_frozen);
+ /* ignored by tcp, but vital for ssl */
+ const char *(*socket_error) (Socket s);
+};
+
+struct plug_function_table {
+ void (*log)(Plug p, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code);
+ /*
+ * Passes the client progress reports on the process of setting
+ * up the connection.
+ *
+ * - type==0 means we are about to try to connect to address
+ * `addr' (error_msg and error_code are ignored)
+ * - type==1 means we have failed to connect to address `addr'
+ * (error_msg and error_code are supplied). This is not a
+ * fatal error - we may well have other candidate addresses
+ * to fall back to. When it _is_ fatal, the closing()
+ * function will be called.
+ */
+ int (*closing)
+ (Plug p, const char *error_msg, int error_code, int calling_back);
+ /* error_msg is NULL iff it is not an error (ie it closed normally) */
+ /* calling_back != 0 iff there is a Plug function */
+ /* currently running (would cure the fixme in try_send()) */
+ int (*receive) (Plug p, int urgent, char *data, int len);
+ /*
+ * - urgent==0. `data' points to `len' bytes of perfectly
+ * ordinary data.
+ *
+ * - urgent==1. `data' points to `len' bytes of data,
+ * which were read from before an Urgent pointer.
+ *
+ * - urgent==2. `data' points to `len' bytes of data,
+ * the first of which was the one at the Urgent mark.
+ */
+ void (*sent) (Plug p, int bufsize);
+ /*
+ * The `sent' function is called when the pending send backlog
+ * on a socket is cleared or partially cleared. The new backlog
+ * size is passed in the `bufsize' parameter.
+ */
+ int (*accepting)(Plug p, OSSocket sock);
+ /*
+ * returns 0 if the host at address addr is a valid host for connecting or error
+ */
+};
+
+/* proxy indirection layer */
+/* NB, control of 'addr' is passed via new_connection, which takes
+ * responsibility for freeing it */
+Socket new_connection(SockAddr addr, char *hostname,
+ int port, int privport,
+ int oobinline, int nodelay, int keepalive,
+ Plug plug, const Config *cfg);
+Socket new_listener(char *srcaddr, int port, Plug plug, int local_host_only,
+ const Config *cfg, int addressfamily);
+SockAddr name_lookup(char *host, int port, char **canonicalname,
+ const Config *cfg, int addressfamily);
+
+/* platform-dependent callback from new_connection() */
+/* (same caveat about addr as new_connection()) */
+Socket platform_new_connection(SockAddr addr, char *hostname,
+ int port, int privport,
+ int oobinline, int nodelay, int keepalive,
+ Plug plug, const Config *cfg);
+
+/* socket functions */
+
+void sk_init(void); /* called once at program startup */
+void sk_cleanup(void); /* called just before program exit */
+
+SockAddr sk_namelookup(const char *host, char **canonicalname, int address_family);
+SockAddr sk_nonamelookup(const char *host);
+void sk_getaddr(SockAddr addr, char *buf, int buflen);
+int sk_hostname_is_local(char *name);
+int sk_address_is_local(SockAddr addr);
+int sk_addrtype(SockAddr addr);
+void sk_addrcopy(SockAddr addr, char *buf);
+void sk_addr_free(SockAddr addr);
+/* sk_addr_dup generates another SockAddr which contains the same data
+ * as the original one and can be freed independently. May not actually
+ * physically _duplicate_ it: incrementing a reference count so that
+ * one more free is required before it disappears is an acceptable
+ * implementation. */
+SockAddr sk_addr_dup(SockAddr addr);
+
+/* NB, control of 'addr' is passed via sk_new, which takes responsibility
+ * for freeing it, as for new_connection() */
+Socket sk_new(SockAddr addr, int port, int privport, int oobinline,
+ int nodelay, int keepalive, Plug p);
+
+Socket sk_newlistener(char *srcaddr, int port, Plug plug, int local_host_only, int address_family);
+
+Socket sk_register(OSSocket sock, Plug plug);
+
+#define sk_plug(s,p) (((*s)->plug) (s, p))
+#define sk_close(s) (((*s)->close) (s))
+#define sk_write(s,buf,len) (((*s)->write) (s, buf, len))
+#define sk_write_oob(s,buf,len) (((*s)->write_oob) (s, buf, len))
+#define sk_flush(s) (((*s)->flush) (s))
+
+#ifdef DEFINE_PLUG_METHOD_MACROS
+#define plug_log(p,type,addr,port,msg,code) (((*p)->log) (p, type, addr, port, msg, code))
+#define plug_closing(p,msg,code,callback) (((*p)->closing) (p, msg, code, callback))
+#define plug_receive(p,urgent,buf,len) (((*p)->receive) (p, urgent, buf, len))
+#define plug_sent(p,bufsize) (((*p)->sent) (p, bufsize))
+#define plug_accepting(p, sock) (((*p)->accepting)(p, sock))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Each socket abstraction contains a `void *' private field in
+ * which the client can keep state.
+ *
+ * This is perhaps unnecessary now that we have the notion of a plug,
+ * but there is some existing code that uses it, so it stays.
+ */
+#define sk_set_private_ptr(s, ptr) (((*s)->set_private_ptr) (s, ptr))
+#define sk_get_private_ptr(s) (((*s)->get_private_ptr) (s))
+
+/*
+ * Special error values are returned from sk_namelookup and sk_new
+ * if there's a problem. These functions extract an error message,
+ * or return NULL if there's no problem.
+ */
+const char *sk_addr_error(SockAddr addr);
+#define sk_socket_error(s) (((*s)->socket_error) (s))
+
+/*
+ * Set the `frozen' flag on a socket. A frozen socket is one in
+ * which all READABLE notifications are ignored, so that data is
+ * not accepted from the peer until the socket is unfrozen. This
+ * exists for two purposes:
+ *
+ * - Port forwarding: when a local listening port receives a
+ * connection, we do not want to receive data from the new
+ * socket until we have somewhere to send it. Hence, we freeze
+ * the socket until its associated SSH channel is ready; then we
+ * unfreeze it and pending data is delivered.
+ *
+ * - Socket buffering: if an SSH channel (or the whole connection)
+ * backs up or presents a zero window, we must freeze the
+ * associated local socket in order to avoid unbounded buffer
+ * growth.
+ */
+#define sk_set_frozen(s, is_frozen) (((*s)->set_frozen) (s, is_frozen))
+
+/*
+ * Call this after an operation that might have tried to send on a
+ * socket, to clean up any pending network errors.
+ */
+void net_pending_errors(void);
+
+/*
+ * Simple wrapper on getservbyname(), needed by ssh.c. Returns the
+ * port number, in host byte order (suitable for printf and so on).
+ * Returns 0 on failure. Any platform not supporting getservbyname
+ * can just return 0 - this function is not required to handle
+ * numeric port specifications.
+ */
+int net_service_lookup(char *service);
+
+/*
+ * Look up the local hostname; return value needs freeing.
+ * May return NULL.
+ */
+char *get_hostname(void);
+
+/********** SSL stuff **********/
+
+/*
+ * This section is subject to change, but you get the general idea
+ * of what it will eventually look like.
+ */
+
+typedef struct certificate *Certificate;
+typedef struct our_certificate *Our_Certificate;
+ /* to be defined somewhere else, somehow */
+
+typedef struct ssl_client_socket_function_table **SSL_Client_Socket;
+typedef struct ssl_client_plug_function_table **SSL_Client_Plug;
+
+struct ssl_client_socket_function_table {
+ struct socket_function_table base;
+ void (*renegotiate) (SSL_Client_Socket s);
+ /* renegotiate the cipher spec */
+};
+
+struct ssl_client_plug_function_table {
+ struct plug_function_table base;
+ int (*refuse_cert) (SSL_Client_Plug p, Certificate cert[]);
+ /* do we accept this certificate chain? If not, why not? */
+ /* cert[0] is the server's certificate, cert[] is NULL-terminated */
+ /* the last certificate may or may not be the root certificate */
+ Our_Certificate(*client_cert) (SSL_Client_Plug p);
+ /* the server wants us to identify ourselves */
+ /* may return NULL if we want anonymity */
+};
+
+SSL_Client_Socket sk_ssl_client_over(Socket s, /* pre-existing (tcp) connection */
+ SSL_Client_Plug p);
+
+#define sk_renegotiate(s) (((*s)->renegotiate) (s))
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/pinger.c b/tools/plink/pinger.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b6fde2456 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/pinger.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/*
+ * pinger.c: centralised module that deals with sending TS_PING
+ * keepalives, to avoid replicating this code in multiple backends.
+ */
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+struct pinger_tag {
+ int interval;
+ int pending;
+ long next;
+ Backend *back;
+ void *backhandle;
+};
+
+static void pinger_schedule(Pinger pinger);
+
+static void pinger_timer(void *ctx, long now)
+{
+ Pinger pinger = (Pinger)ctx;
+
+ if (pinger->pending && now - pinger->next >= 0) {
+ pinger->back->special(pinger->backhandle, TS_PING);
+ pinger->pending = FALSE;
+ pinger_schedule(pinger);
+ }
+}
+
+static void pinger_schedule(Pinger pinger)
+{
+ int next;
+
+ if (!pinger->interval) {
+ pinger->pending = FALSE; /* cancel any pending ping */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ next = schedule_timer(pinger->interval * TICKSPERSEC,
+ pinger_timer, pinger);
+ if (!pinger->pending || next < pinger->next) {
+ pinger->next = next;
+ pinger->pending = TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+Pinger pinger_new(Config *cfg, Backend *back, void *backhandle)
+{
+ Pinger pinger = snew(struct pinger_tag);
+
+ pinger->interval = cfg->ping_interval;
+ pinger->pending = FALSE;
+ pinger->back = back;
+ pinger->backhandle = backhandle;
+ pinger_schedule(pinger);
+
+ return pinger;
+}
+
+void pinger_reconfig(Pinger pinger, Config *oldcfg, Config *newcfg)
+{
+ if (oldcfg->ping_interval != newcfg->ping_interval) {
+ pinger->interval = newcfg->ping_interval;
+ pinger_schedule(pinger);
+ }
+}
+
+void pinger_free(Pinger pinger)
+{
+ expire_timer_context(pinger);
+ sfree(pinger);
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/portfwd.c b/tools/plink/portfwd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e5874a697 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/portfwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +/*
+ * SSH port forwarding.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+
+struct PFwdPrivate {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */
+ void *c; /* (channel) data used by ssh.c */
+ void *backhandle; /* instance of SSH backend itself */
+ /* Note that backhandle need not be filled in if c is non-NULL */
+ Socket s;
+ int throttled, throttle_override;
+ int ready;
+ /*
+ * `dynamic' does double duty. It's set to 0 for an ordinary
+ * forwarded port, and nonzero for SOCKS-style dynamic port
+ * forwarding; but it also represents the state of the SOCKS
+ * exchange.
+ */
+ int dynamic;
+ /*
+ * `hostname' and `port' are the real hostname and port, once
+ * we know what we're connecting to; they're unused for this
+ * purpose while conducting a local SOCKS exchange, which means
+ * we can also use them as a buffer and pointer for reading
+ * data from the SOCKS client.
+ */
+ char hostname[256+8];
+ int port;
+ /*
+ * When doing dynamic port forwarding, we can receive
+ * connection data before we are actually able to send it; so
+ * we may have to temporarily hold some in a dynamically
+ * allocated buffer here.
+ */
+ void *buffer;
+ int buflen;
+};
+
+static void pfd_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ /* we have to dump these since we have no interface to logging.c */
+}
+
+static int pfd_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
+ int calling_back)
+{
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr = (struct PFwdPrivate *) plug;
+
+ /*
+ * We have no way to communicate down the forwarded connection,
+ * so if an error occurred on the socket, we just ignore it
+ * and treat it like a proper close.
+ */
+ if (pr->c)
+ sshfwd_close(pr->c);
+ pfd_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pfd_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr = (struct PFwdPrivate *) plug;
+ if (pr->dynamic) {
+ while (len--) {
+ /*
+ * Throughout SOCKS negotiation, "hostname" is re-used as a
+ * random protocol buffer with "port" storing the length.
+ */
+ if (pr->port >= lenof(pr->hostname)) {
+ /* Request too long. */
+ if ((pr->dynamic >> 12) == 4) {
+ /* Send back a SOCKS 4 error before closing. */
+ char data[8];
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
+ data[1] = 91; /* generic `request rejected' */
+ sk_write(pr->s, data, 8);
+ }
+ pfd_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ pr->hostname[pr->port++] = *data++;
+
+ /*
+ * Now check what's in the buffer to see if it's a
+ * valid and complete message in the SOCKS exchange.
+ */
+ if ((pr->dynamic == 1 || (pr->dynamic >> 12) == 4) &&
+ pr->hostname[0] == 4) {
+ /*
+ * SOCKS 4.
+ */
+ if (pr->dynamic == 1)
+ pr->dynamic = 0x4000;
+ if (pr->port < 2) continue;/* don't have command code yet */
+ if (pr->hostname[1] != 1) {
+ /* Not CONNECT. */
+ /* Send back a SOCKS 4 error before closing. */
+ char data[8];
+ memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
+ data[1] = 91; /* generic `request rejected' */
+ sk_write(pr->s, data, 8);
+ pfd_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (pr->port <= 8) continue; /* haven't started user/hostname */
+ if (pr->hostname[pr->port-1] != 0)
+ continue; /* haven't _finished_ user/hostname */
+ /*
+ * Now we have a full SOCKS 4 request. Check it to
+ * see if it's a SOCKS 4A request.
+ */
+ if (pr->hostname[4] == 0 && pr->hostname[5] == 0 &&
+ pr->hostname[6] == 0 && pr->hostname[7] != 0) {
+ /*
+ * It's SOCKS 4A. So if we haven't yet
+ * collected the host name, we should continue
+ * waiting for data in order to do so; if we
+ * have, we can go ahead.
+ */
+ int len;
+ if (pr->dynamic == 0x4000) {
+ pr->dynamic = 0x4001;
+ pr->port = 8; /* reset buffer to overwrite name */
+ continue;
+ }
+ pr->hostname[0] = 0; /* reply version code */
+ pr->hostname[1] = 90; /* request granted */
+ sk_write(pr->s, pr->hostname, 8);
+ len= pr->port - 8;
+ pr->port = GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(pr->hostname+2);
+ memmove(pr->hostname, pr->hostname + 8, len);
+ goto connect;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * It's SOCKS 4, which means we should format
+ * the IP address into the hostname string and
+ * then just go.
+ */
+ pr->hostname[0] = 0; /* reply version code */
+ pr->hostname[1] = 90; /* request granted */
+ sk_write(pr->s, pr->hostname, 8);
+ pr->port = GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(pr->hostname+2);
+ sprintf(pr->hostname, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[4],
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[5],
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[6],
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[7]);
+ goto connect;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((pr->dynamic == 1 || (pr->dynamic >> 12) == 5) &&
+ pr->hostname[0] == 5) {
+ /*
+ * SOCKS 5.
+ */
+ if (pr->dynamic == 1)
+ pr->dynamic = 0x5000;
+
+ if (pr->dynamic == 0x5000) {
+ int i, method;
+ char data[2];
+ /*
+ * We're receiving a set of method identifiers.
+ */
+ if (pr->port < 2) continue;/* no method count yet */
+ if (pr->port < 2 + (unsigned char)pr->hostname[1])
+ continue; /* no methods yet */
+ method = 0xFF; /* invalid */
+ for (i = 0; i < (unsigned char)pr->hostname[1]; i++)
+ if (pr->hostname[2+i] == 0) {
+ method = 0;/* no auth */
+ break;
+ }
+ data[0] = 5;
+ data[1] = method;
+ sk_write(pr->s, data, 2);
+ pr->dynamic = 0x5001;
+ pr->port = 0; /* re-empty the buffer */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (pr->dynamic == 0x5001) {
+ /*
+ * We're receiving a SOCKS request.
+ */
+ unsigned char reply[10]; /* SOCKS5 atyp=1 reply */
+ int atype, alen = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-fill reply packet.
+ * In all cases, we set BND.{HOST,ADDR} to 0.0.0.0:0
+ * (atyp=1) in the reply; if we succeed, we don't know
+ * the right answers, and if we fail, they should be
+ * ignored.
+ */
+ memset(reply, 0, lenof(reply));
+ reply[0] = 5; /* VER */
+ reply[3] = 1; /* ATYP = 1 (IPv4, 0.0.0.0:0) */
+
+ if (pr->port < 6) continue;
+ atype = (unsigned char)pr->hostname[3];
+ if (atype == 1) /* IPv4 address */
+ alen = 4;
+ if (atype == 4) /* IPv6 address */
+ alen = 16;
+ if (atype == 3) /* domain name has leading length */
+ alen = 1 + (unsigned char)pr->hostname[4];
+ if (pr->port < 6 + alen) continue;
+ if (pr->hostname[1] != 1 || pr->hostname[2] != 0) {
+ /* Not CONNECT or reserved field nonzero - error */
+ reply[1] = 1; /* generic failure */
+ sk_write(pr->s, (char *) reply, lenof(reply));
+ pfd_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we have a viable connect request. Switch
+ * on atype.
+ */
+ pr->port = GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(pr->hostname+4+alen);
+ if (atype == 1) {
+ /* REP=0 (success) already */
+ sk_write(pr->s, (char *) reply, lenof(reply));
+ sprintf(pr->hostname, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[4],
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[5],
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[6],
+ (unsigned char)pr->hostname[7]);
+ goto connect;
+ } else if (atype == 3) {
+ /* REP=0 (success) already */
+ sk_write(pr->s, (char *) reply, lenof(reply));
+ memmove(pr->hostname, pr->hostname + 5, alen-1);
+ pr->hostname[alen-1] = '\0';
+ goto connect;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Unknown address type. (FIXME: support IPv6!)
+ */
+ reply[1] = 8; /* atype not supported */
+ sk_write(pr->s, (char *) reply, lenof(reply));
+ pfd_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here without either having done `continue'
+ * or `goto connect', it must be because there is no
+ * sensible interpretation of what's in our buffer. So
+ * close the connection rudely.
+ */
+ pfd_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * We come here when we're ready to make an actual
+ * connection.
+ */
+ connect:
+
+ /*
+ * Freeze the socket until the SSH server confirms the
+ * connection.
+ */
+ sk_set_frozen(pr->s, 1);
+
+ pr->c = new_sock_channel(pr->backhandle, pr->s);
+ if (pr->c == NULL) {
+ pfd_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ /* asks to forward to the specified host/port for this */
+ ssh_send_port_open(pr->c, pr->hostname, pr->port, "forwarding");
+ }
+ pr->dynamic = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If there's any data remaining in our current buffer,
+ * save it to be sent on pfd_confirm().
+ */
+ if (len > 0) {
+ pr->buffer = snewn(len, char);
+ memcpy(pr->buffer, data, len);
+ pr->buflen = len;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pr->ready) {
+ if (sshfwd_write(pr->c, data, len) > 0) {
+ pr->throttled = 1;
+ sk_set_frozen(pr->s, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void pfd_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
+{
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr = (struct PFwdPrivate *) plug;
+
+ if (pr->c)
+ sshfwd_unthrottle(pr->c, bufsize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when receiving a PORT OPEN from the server
+ */
+const char *pfd_newconnect(Socket *s, char *hostname, int port,
+ void *c, const Config *cfg, int addressfamily)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ pfd_log,
+ pfd_closing,
+ pfd_receive,
+ pfd_sent,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ SockAddr addr;
+ const char *err;
+ char *dummy_realhost;
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to find host.
+ */
+ addr = name_lookup(hostname, port, &dummy_realhost, cfg, addressfamily);
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ pr = snew(struct PFwdPrivate);
+ pr->buffer = NULL;
+ pr->fn = &fn_table;
+ pr->throttled = pr->throttle_override = 0;
+ pr->ready = 1;
+ pr->c = c;
+ pr->backhandle = NULL; /* we shouldn't need this */
+ pr->dynamic = 0;
+
+ pr->s = *s = new_connection(addr, dummy_realhost, port,
+ 0, 1, 0, 0, (Plug) pr, cfg);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(*s)) != NULL) {
+ sfree(pr);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ sk_set_private_ptr(*s, pr);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ called when someone connects to the local port
+ */
+
+static int pfd_accepting(Plug p, OSSocket sock)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ pfd_log,
+ pfd_closing,
+ pfd_receive,
+ pfd_sent,
+ NULL
+ };
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr, *org;
+ Socket s;
+ const char *err;
+
+ org = (struct PFwdPrivate *)p;
+ pr = snew(struct PFwdPrivate);
+ pr->buffer = NULL;
+ pr->fn = &fn_table;
+
+ pr->c = NULL;
+ pr->backhandle = org->backhandle;
+
+ pr->s = s = sk_register(sock, (Plug) pr);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(s)) != NULL) {
+ sfree(pr);
+ return err != NULL;
+ }
+
+ sk_set_private_ptr(s, pr);
+
+ pr->throttled = pr->throttle_override = 0;
+ pr->ready = 0;
+
+ if (org->dynamic) {
+ pr->dynamic = 1;
+ pr->port = 0; /* "hostname" buffer is so far empty */
+ sk_set_frozen(s, 0); /* we want to receive SOCKS _now_! */
+ } else {
+ pr->dynamic = 0;
+ strcpy(pr->hostname, org->hostname);
+ pr->port = org->port;
+ pr->c = new_sock_channel(org->backhandle, s);
+
+ if (pr->c == NULL) {
+ sfree(pr);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ /* asks to forward to the specified host/port for this */
+ ssh_send_port_open(pr->c, pr->hostname, pr->port, "forwarding");
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Add a new forwarding from port -> desthost:destport
+ sets up a listener on the local machine on (srcaddr:)port
+ */
+const char *pfd_addforward(char *desthost, int destport, char *srcaddr,
+ int port, void *backhandle, const Config *cfg,
+ void **sockdata, int address_family)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ pfd_log,
+ pfd_closing,
+ pfd_receive, /* should not happen... */
+ pfd_sent, /* also should not happen */
+ pfd_accepting
+ };
+
+ const char *err;
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr;
+ Socket s;
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ pr = snew(struct PFwdPrivate);
+ pr->buffer = NULL;
+ pr->fn = &fn_table;
+ pr->c = NULL;
+ if (desthost) {
+ strcpy(pr->hostname, desthost);
+ pr->port = destport;
+ pr->dynamic = 0;
+ } else
+ pr->dynamic = 1;
+ pr->throttled = pr->throttle_override = 0;
+ pr->ready = 0;
+ pr->backhandle = backhandle;
+
+ pr->s = s = new_listener(srcaddr, port, (Plug) pr,
+ !cfg->lport_acceptall, cfg, address_family);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(s)) != NULL) {
+ sfree(pr);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ sk_set_private_ptr(s, pr);
+
+ *sockdata = (void *)s;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void pfd_close(Socket s)
+{
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr;
+
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+
+ pr = (struct PFwdPrivate *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+
+ sfree(pr->buffer);
+ sfree(pr);
+
+ sk_close(s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Terminate a listener.
+ */
+void pfd_terminate(void *sv)
+{
+ pfd_close((Socket)sv);
+}
+
+void pfd_unthrottle(Socket s)
+{
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr;
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+ pr = (struct PFwdPrivate *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+
+ pr->throttled = 0;
+ sk_set_frozen(s, pr->throttled || pr->throttle_override);
+}
+
+void pfd_override_throttle(Socket s, int enable)
+{
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr;
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+ pr = (struct PFwdPrivate *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+
+ pr->throttle_override = enable;
+ sk_set_frozen(s, pr->throttled || pr->throttle_override);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to send data down the raw connection.
+ */
+int pfd_send(Socket s, char *data, int len)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return sk_write(s, data, len);
+}
+
+
+void pfd_confirm(Socket s)
+{
+ struct PFwdPrivate *pr;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ pr = (struct PFwdPrivate *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+ pr->ready = 1;
+ sk_set_frozen(s, 0);
+ sk_write(s, NULL, 0);
+ if (pr->buffer) {
+ sshfwd_write(pr->c, pr->buffer, pr->buflen);
+ sfree(pr->buffer);
+ pr->buffer = NULL;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/proxy.c b/tools/plink/proxy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f4299951 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/proxy.c @@ -0,0 +1,1478 @@ +/*
+ * Network proxy abstraction in PuTTY
+ *
+ * A proxy layer, if necessary, wedges itself between the network
+ * code and the higher level backend.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define DEFINE_PLUG_METHOD_MACROS
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "network.h"
+#include "proxy.h"
+
+#define do_proxy_dns(cfg) \
+ (cfg->proxy_dns == FORCE_ON || \
+ (cfg->proxy_dns == AUTO && cfg->proxy_type != PROXY_SOCKS4))
+
+/*
+ * Call this when proxy negotiation is complete, so that this
+ * socket can begin working normally.
+ */
+void proxy_activate (Proxy_Socket p)
+{
+ void *data;
+ int len;
+ long output_before, output_after;
+
+ p->state = PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE;
+
+ /* we want to ignore new receive events until we have sent
+ * all of our buffered receive data.
+ */
+ sk_set_frozen(p->sub_socket, 1);
+
+ /* how many bytes of output have we buffered? */
+ output_before = bufchain_size(&p->pending_oob_output_data) +
+ bufchain_size(&p->pending_output_data);
+ /* and keep track of how many bytes do not get sent. */
+ output_after = 0;
+
+ /* send buffered OOB writes */
+ while (bufchain_size(&p->pending_oob_output_data) > 0) {
+ bufchain_prefix(&p->pending_oob_output_data, &data, &len);
+ output_after += sk_write_oob(p->sub_socket, data, len);
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_oob_output_data, len);
+ }
+
+ /* send buffered normal writes */
+ while (bufchain_size(&p->pending_output_data) > 0) {
+ bufchain_prefix(&p->pending_output_data, &data, &len);
+ output_after += sk_write(p->sub_socket, data, len);
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_output_data, len);
+ }
+
+ /* if we managed to send any data, let the higher levels know. */
+ if (output_after < output_before)
+ plug_sent(p->plug, output_after);
+
+ /* if we were asked to flush the output during
+ * the proxy negotiation process, do so now.
+ */
+ if (p->pending_flush) sk_flush(p->sub_socket);
+
+ /* if the backend wanted the socket unfrozen, try to unfreeze.
+ * our set_frozen handler will flush buffered receive data before
+ * unfreezing the actual underlying socket.
+ */
+ if (!p->freeze)
+ sk_set_frozen((Socket)p, 0);
+}
+
+/* basic proxy socket functions */
+
+static Plug sk_proxy_plug (Socket s, Plug p)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+ Plug ret = ps->plug;
+ if (p)
+ ps->plug = p;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void sk_proxy_close (Socket s)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ sk_close(ps->sub_socket);
+ sk_addr_free(ps->remote_addr);
+ sfree(ps);
+}
+
+static int sk_proxy_write (Socket s, const char *data, int len)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ bufchain_add(&ps->pending_output_data, data, len);
+ return bufchain_size(&ps->pending_output_data);
+ }
+ return sk_write(ps->sub_socket, data, len);
+}
+
+static int sk_proxy_write_oob (Socket s, const char *data, int len)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ bufchain_clear(&ps->pending_output_data);
+ bufchain_clear(&ps->pending_oob_output_data);
+ bufchain_add(&ps->pending_oob_output_data, data, len);
+ return len;
+ }
+ return sk_write_oob(ps->sub_socket, data, len);
+}
+
+static void sk_proxy_flush (Socket s)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ ps->pending_flush = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ sk_flush(ps->sub_socket);
+}
+
+static void sk_proxy_set_private_ptr (Socket s, void *ptr)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+ sk_set_private_ptr(ps->sub_socket, ptr);
+}
+
+static void * sk_proxy_get_private_ptr (Socket s)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+ return sk_get_private_ptr(ps->sub_socket);
+}
+
+static void sk_proxy_set_frozen (Socket s, int is_frozen)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ ps->freeze = is_frozen;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* handle any remaining buffered recv data first */
+ if (bufchain_size(&ps->pending_input_data) > 0) {
+ ps->freeze = is_frozen;
+
+ /* loop while we still have buffered data, and while we are
+ * unfrozen. the plug_receive call in the loop could result
+ * in a call back into this function refreezing the socket,
+ * so we have to check each time.
+ */
+ while (!ps->freeze && bufchain_size(&ps->pending_input_data) > 0) {
+ void *data;
+ char databuf[512];
+ int len;
+ bufchain_prefix(&ps->pending_input_data, &data, &len);
+ if (len > lenof(databuf))
+ len = lenof(databuf);
+ memcpy(databuf, data, len);
+ bufchain_consume(&ps->pending_input_data, len);
+ plug_receive(ps->plug, 0, databuf, len);
+ }
+
+ /* if we're still frozen, we'll have to wait for another
+ * call from the backend to finish unbuffering the data.
+ */
+ if (ps->freeze) return;
+ }
+
+ sk_set_frozen(ps->sub_socket, is_frozen);
+}
+
+static const char * sk_proxy_socket_error (Socket s)
+{
+ Proxy_Socket ps = (Proxy_Socket) s;
+ if (ps->error != NULL || ps->sub_socket == NULL) {
+ return ps->error;
+ }
+ return sk_socket_error(ps->sub_socket);
+}
+
+/* basic proxy plug functions */
+
+static void plug_proxy_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ Proxy_Plug pp = (Proxy_Plug) plug;
+ Proxy_Socket ps = pp->proxy_socket;
+
+ plug_log(ps->plug, type, addr, port, error_msg, error_code);
+}
+
+static int plug_proxy_closing (Plug p, const char *error_msg,
+ int error_code, int calling_back)
+{
+ Proxy_Plug pp = (Proxy_Plug) p;
+ Proxy_Socket ps = pp->proxy_socket;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ ps->closing_error_msg = error_msg;
+ ps->closing_error_code = error_code;
+ ps->closing_calling_back = calling_back;
+ return ps->negotiate(ps, PROXY_CHANGE_CLOSING);
+ }
+ return plug_closing(ps->plug, error_msg,
+ error_code, calling_back);
+}
+
+static int plug_proxy_receive (Plug p, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ Proxy_Plug pp = (Proxy_Plug) p;
+ Proxy_Socket ps = pp->proxy_socket;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ /* we will lose the urgentness of this data, but since most,
+ * if not all, of this data will be consumed by the negotiation
+ * process, hopefully it won't affect the protocol above us
+ */
+ bufchain_add(&ps->pending_input_data, data, len);
+ ps->receive_urgent = urgent;
+ ps->receive_data = data;
+ ps->receive_len = len;
+ return ps->negotiate(ps, PROXY_CHANGE_RECEIVE);
+ }
+ return plug_receive(ps->plug, urgent, data, len);
+}
+
+static void plug_proxy_sent (Plug p, int bufsize)
+{
+ Proxy_Plug pp = (Proxy_Plug) p;
+ Proxy_Socket ps = pp->proxy_socket;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ ps->sent_bufsize = bufsize;
+ ps->negotiate(ps, PROXY_CHANGE_SENT);
+ return;
+ }
+ plug_sent(ps->plug, bufsize);
+}
+
+static int plug_proxy_accepting (Plug p, OSSocket sock)
+{
+ Proxy_Plug pp = (Proxy_Plug) p;
+ Proxy_Socket ps = pp->proxy_socket;
+
+ if (ps->state != PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ ps->accepting_sock = sock;
+ return ps->negotiate(ps, PROXY_CHANGE_ACCEPTING);
+ }
+ return plug_accepting(ps->plug, sock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function can accept a NULL pointer as `addr', in which case
+ * it will only check the host name.
+ */
+static int proxy_for_destination (SockAddr addr, char *hostname, int port,
+ const Config *cfg)
+{
+ int s = 0, e = 0;
+ char hostip[64];
+ int hostip_len, hostname_len;
+ const char *exclude_list;
+
+ /*
+ * Check the host name and IP against the hard-coded
+ * representations of `localhost'.
+ */
+ if (!cfg->even_proxy_localhost &&
+ (sk_hostname_is_local(hostname) ||
+ (addr && sk_address_is_local(addr))))
+ return 0; /* do not proxy */
+
+ /* we want a string representation of the IP address for comparisons */
+ if (addr) {
+ sk_getaddr(addr, hostip, 64);
+ hostip_len = strlen(hostip);
+ } else
+ hostip_len = 0; /* placate gcc; shouldn't be required */
+
+ hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
+
+ exclude_list = cfg->proxy_exclude_list;
+
+ /* now parse the exclude list, and see if either our IP
+ * or hostname matches anything in it.
+ */
+
+ while (exclude_list[s]) {
+ while (exclude_list[s] &&
+ (isspace((unsigned char)exclude_list[s]) ||
+ exclude_list[s] == ',')) s++;
+
+ if (!exclude_list[s]) break;
+
+ e = s;
+
+ while (exclude_list[e] &&
+ (isalnum((unsigned char)exclude_list[e]) ||
+ exclude_list[e] == '-' ||
+ exclude_list[e] == '.' ||
+ exclude_list[e] == '*')) e++;
+
+ if (exclude_list[s] == '*') {
+ /* wildcard at beginning of entry */
+
+ if ((addr && strnicmp(hostip + hostip_len - (e - s - 1),
+ exclude_list + s + 1, e - s - 1) == 0) ||
+ strnicmp(hostname + hostname_len - (e - s - 1),
+ exclude_list + s + 1, e - s - 1) == 0)
+ return 0; /* IP/hostname range excluded. do not use proxy. */
+
+ } else if (exclude_list[e-1] == '*') {
+ /* wildcard at end of entry */
+
+ if ((addr && strnicmp(hostip, exclude_list + s, e - s - 1) == 0) ||
+ strnicmp(hostname, exclude_list + s, e - s - 1) == 0)
+ return 0; /* IP/hostname range excluded. do not use proxy. */
+
+ } else {
+ /* no wildcard at either end, so let's try an absolute
+ * match (ie. a specific IP)
+ */
+
+ if (addr && strnicmp(hostip, exclude_list + s, e - s) == 0)
+ return 0; /* IP/hostname excluded. do not use proxy. */
+ if (strnicmp(hostname, exclude_list + s, e - s) == 0)
+ return 0; /* IP/hostname excluded. do not use proxy. */
+ }
+
+ s = e;
+
+ /* Make sure we really have reached the next comma or end-of-string */
+ while (exclude_list[s] &&
+ !isspace((unsigned char)exclude_list[s]) &&
+ exclude_list[s] != ',') s++;
+ }
+
+ /* no matches in the exclude list, so use the proxy */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SockAddr name_lookup(char *host, int port, char **canonicalname,
+ const Config *cfg, int addressfamily)
+{
+ if (cfg->proxy_type != PROXY_NONE &&
+ do_proxy_dns(cfg) &&
+ proxy_for_destination(NULL, host, port, cfg)) {
+ *canonicalname = dupstr(host);
+ return sk_nonamelookup(host);
+ }
+
+ return sk_namelookup(host, canonicalname, addressfamily);
+}
+
+Socket new_connection(SockAddr addr, char *hostname,
+ int port, int privport,
+ int oobinline, int nodelay, int keepalive,
+ Plug plug, const Config *cfg)
+{
+ static const struct socket_function_table socket_fn_table = {
+ sk_proxy_plug,
+ sk_proxy_close,
+ sk_proxy_write,
+ sk_proxy_write_oob,
+ sk_proxy_flush,
+ sk_proxy_set_private_ptr,
+ sk_proxy_get_private_ptr,
+ sk_proxy_set_frozen,
+ sk_proxy_socket_error
+ };
+
+ static const struct plug_function_table plug_fn_table = {
+ plug_proxy_log,
+ plug_proxy_closing,
+ plug_proxy_receive,
+ plug_proxy_sent,
+ plug_proxy_accepting
+ };
+
+ if (cfg->proxy_type != PROXY_NONE &&
+ proxy_for_destination(addr, hostname, port, cfg))
+ {
+ Proxy_Socket ret;
+ Proxy_Plug pplug;
+ SockAddr proxy_addr;
+ char *proxy_canonical_name;
+ Socket sret;
+
+ if ((sret = platform_new_connection(addr, hostname, port, privport,
+ oobinline, nodelay, keepalive,
+ plug, cfg)) !=
+ NULL)
+ return sret;
+
+ ret = snew(struct Socket_proxy_tag);
+ ret->fn = &socket_fn_table;
+ ret->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
+ ret->plug = plug;
+ ret->remote_addr = addr; /* will need to be freed on close */
+ ret->remote_port = port;
+
+ ret->error = NULL;
+ ret->pending_flush = 0;
+ ret->freeze = 0;
+
+ bufchain_init(&ret->pending_input_data);
+ bufchain_init(&ret->pending_output_data);
+ bufchain_init(&ret->pending_oob_output_data);
+
+ ret->sub_socket = NULL;
+ ret->state = PROXY_STATE_NEW;
+ ret->negotiate = NULL;
+
+ if (cfg->proxy_type == PROXY_HTTP) {
+ ret->negotiate = proxy_http_negotiate;
+ } else if (cfg->proxy_type == PROXY_SOCKS4) {
+ ret->negotiate = proxy_socks4_negotiate;
+ } else if (cfg->proxy_type == PROXY_SOCKS5) {
+ ret->negotiate = proxy_socks5_negotiate;
+ } else if (cfg->proxy_type == PROXY_TELNET) {
+ ret->negotiate = proxy_telnet_negotiate;
+ } else {
+ ret->error = "Proxy error: Unknown proxy method";
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+ /* create the proxy plug to map calls from the actual
+ * socket into our proxy socket layer */
+ pplug = snew(struct Plug_proxy_tag);
+ pplug->fn = &plug_fn_table;
+ pplug->proxy_socket = ret;
+
+ /* look-up proxy */
+ proxy_addr = sk_namelookup(cfg->proxy_host,
+ &proxy_canonical_name, cfg->addressfamily);
+ if (sk_addr_error(proxy_addr) != NULL) {
+ ret->error = "Proxy error: Unable to resolve proxy host name";
+ return (Socket)ret;
+ }
+ sfree(proxy_canonical_name);
+
+ /* create the actual socket we will be using,
+ * connected to our proxy server and port.
+ */
+ ret->sub_socket = sk_new(proxy_addr, cfg->proxy_port,
+ privport, oobinline,
+ nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) pplug);
+ if (sk_socket_error(ret->sub_socket) != NULL)
+ return (Socket) ret;
+
+ /* start the proxy negotiation process... */
+ sk_set_frozen(ret->sub_socket, 0);
+ ret->negotiate(ret, PROXY_CHANGE_NEW);
+
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+ /* no proxy, so just return the direct socket */
+ return sk_new(addr, port, privport, oobinline, nodelay, keepalive, plug);
+}
+
+Socket new_listener(char *srcaddr, int port, Plug plug, int local_host_only,
+ const Config *cfg, int addressfamily)
+{
+ /* TODO: SOCKS (and potentially others) support inbound
+ * TODO: connections via the proxy. support them.
+ */
+
+ return sk_newlistener(srcaddr, port, plug, local_host_only, addressfamily);
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * HTTP CONNECT proxy type.
+ */
+
+static int get_line_end (char * data, int len)
+{
+ int off = 0;
+
+ while (off < len)
+ {
+ if (data[off] == '\n') {
+ /* we have a newline */
+ off++;
+
+ /* is that the only thing on this line? */
+ if (off <= 2) return off;
+
+ /* if not, then there is the possibility that this header
+ * continues onto the next line, if it starts with a space
+ * or a tab.
+ */
+
+ if (off + 1 < len &&
+ data[off+1] != ' ' &&
+ data[off+1] != '\t') return off;
+
+ /* the line does continue, so we have to keep going
+ * until we see an the header's "real" end of line.
+ */
+ off++;
+ }
+
+ off++;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int proxy_http_negotiate (Proxy_Socket p, int change)
+{
+ if (p->state == PROXY_STATE_NEW) {
+ /* we are just beginning the proxy negotiate process,
+ * so we'll send off the initial bits of the request.
+ * for this proxy method, it's just a simple HTTP
+ * request
+ */
+ char *buf, dest[512];
+
+ sk_getaddr(p->remote_addr, dest, lenof(dest));
+
+ buf = dupprintf("CONNECT %s:%i HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s:%i\r\n",
+ dest, p->remote_port, dest, p->remote_port);
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, buf, strlen(buf));
+ sfree(buf);
+
+ if (p->cfg.proxy_username[0] || p->cfg.proxy_password[0]) {
+ char buf[sizeof(p->cfg.proxy_username)+sizeof(p->cfg.proxy_password)];
+ char buf2[sizeof(buf)*4/3 + 100];
+ int i, j, len;
+ sprintf(buf, "%s:%s", p->cfg.proxy_username, p->cfg.proxy_password);
+ len = strlen(buf);
+ sprintf(buf2, "Proxy-Authorization: Basic ");
+ for (i = 0, j = strlen(buf2); i < len; i += 3, j += 4)
+ base64_encode_atom((unsigned char *)(buf+i),
+ (len-i > 3 ? 3 : len-i), buf2+j);
+ strcpy(buf2+j, "\r\n");
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, buf2, strlen(buf2));
+ }
+
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, "\r\n", 2);
+
+ p->state = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_CLOSING) {
+ /* if our proxy negotiation process involves closing and opening
+ * new sockets, then we would want to intercept this closing
+ * callback when we were expecting it. if we aren't anticipating
+ * a socket close, then some error must have occurred. we'll
+ * just pass those errors up to the backend.
+ */
+ return plug_closing(p->plug, p->closing_error_msg,
+ p->closing_error_code,
+ p->closing_calling_back);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_SENT) {
+ /* some (or all) of what we wrote to the proxy was sent.
+ * we don't do anything new, however, until we receive the
+ * proxy's response. we might want to set a timer so we can
+ * timeout the proxy negotiation after a while...
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_ACCEPTING) {
+ /* we should _never_ see this, as we are using our socket to
+ * connect to a proxy, not accepting inbound connections.
+ * what should we do? close the socket with an appropriate
+ * error message?
+ */
+ return plug_accepting(p->plug, p->accepting_sock);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_RECEIVE) {
+ /* we have received data from the underlying socket, which
+ * we'll need to parse, process, and respond to appropriately.
+ */
+
+ char *data, *datap;
+ int len;
+ int eol;
+
+ if (p->state == 1) {
+
+ int min_ver, maj_ver, status;
+
+ /* get the status line */
+ len = bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data);
+ assert(len > 0); /* or we wouldn't be here */
+ data = snewn(len+1, char);
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data, len);
+ /*
+ * We must NUL-terminate this data, because Windows
+ * sscanf appears to require a NUL at the end of the
+ * string because it strlens it _first_. Sigh.
+ */
+ data[len] = '\0';
+
+ eol = get_line_end(data, len);
+ if (eol < 0) {
+ sfree(data);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ status = -1;
+ /* We can't rely on whether the %n incremented the sscanf return */
+ if (sscanf((char *)data, "HTTP/%i.%i %n",
+ &maj_ver, &min_ver, &status) < 2 || status == -1) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: HTTP response was absent",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ sfree(data);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* remove the status line from the input buffer. */
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, eol);
+ if (data[status] != '2') {
+ /* error */
+ char *buf;
+ data[eol] = '\0';
+ while (eol > status &&
+ (data[eol-1] == '\r' || data[eol-1] == '\n'))
+ data[--eol] = '\0';
+ buf = dupprintf("Proxy error: %s", data+status);
+ plug_closing(p->plug, buf, PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ sfree(buf);
+ sfree(data);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ sfree(data);
+
+ p->state = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 2) {
+
+ /* get headers. we're done when we get a
+ * header of length 2, (ie. just "\r\n")
+ */
+
+ len = bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data);
+ assert(len > 0); /* or we wouldn't be here */
+ data = snewn(len, char);
+ datap = data;
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data, len);
+
+ eol = get_line_end(datap, len);
+ if (eol < 0) {
+ sfree(data);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ while (eol > 2)
+ {
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, eol);
+ datap += eol;
+ len -= eol;
+ eol = get_line_end(datap, len);
+ }
+
+ if (eol == 2) {
+ /* we're done */
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, 2);
+ proxy_activate(p);
+ /* proxy activate will have dealt with
+ * whatever is left of the buffer */
+ sfree(data);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ sfree(data);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: unexpected proxy error",
+ PROXY_ERROR_UNEXPECTED, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SOCKS proxy type.
+ */
+
+/* SOCKS version 4 */
+int proxy_socks4_negotiate (Proxy_Socket p, int change)
+{
+ if (p->state == PROXY_CHANGE_NEW) {
+
+ /* request format:
+ * version number (1 byte) = 4
+ * command code (1 byte)
+ * 1 = CONNECT
+ * 2 = BIND
+ * dest. port (2 bytes) [network order]
+ * dest. address (4 bytes)
+ * user ID (variable length, null terminated string)
+ */
+
+ int length, type, namelen;
+ char *command, addr[4], hostname[512];
+
+ type = sk_addrtype(p->remote_addr);
+ if (type == ADDRTYPE_IPV6) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS version 4 does"
+ " not support IPv6", PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ } else if (type == ADDRTYPE_IPV4) {
+ namelen = 0;
+ sk_addrcopy(p->remote_addr, addr);
+ } else { /* type == ADDRTYPE_NAME */
+ assert(type == ADDRTYPE_NAME);
+ sk_getaddr(p->remote_addr, hostname, lenof(hostname));
+ namelen = strlen(hostname) + 1; /* include the NUL */
+ addr[0] = addr[1] = addr[2] = 0;
+ addr[3] = 1;
+ }
+
+ length = strlen(p->cfg.proxy_username) + namelen + 9;
+ command = snewn(length, char);
+ strcpy(command + 8, p->cfg.proxy_username);
+
+ command[0] = 4; /* version 4 */
+ command[1] = 1; /* CONNECT command */
+
+ /* port */
+ command[2] = (char) (p->remote_port >> 8) & 0xff;
+ command[3] = (char) p->remote_port & 0xff;
+
+ /* address */
+ memcpy(command + 4, addr, 4);
+
+ /* hostname */
+ memcpy(command + 8 + strlen(p->cfg.proxy_username) + 1,
+ hostname, namelen);
+
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, command, length);
+ sfree(command);
+
+ p->state = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_CLOSING) {
+ /* if our proxy negotiation process involves closing and opening
+ * new sockets, then we would want to intercept this closing
+ * callback when we were expecting it. if we aren't anticipating
+ * a socket close, then some error must have occurred. we'll
+ * just pass those errors up to the backend.
+ */
+ return plug_closing(p->plug, p->closing_error_msg,
+ p->closing_error_code,
+ p->closing_calling_back);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_SENT) {
+ /* some (or all) of what we wrote to the proxy was sent.
+ * we don't do anything new, however, until we receive the
+ * proxy's response. we might want to set a timer so we can
+ * timeout the proxy negotiation after a while...
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_ACCEPTING) {
+ /* we should _never_ see this, as we are using our socket to
+ * connect to a proxy, not accepting inbound connections.
+ * what should we do? close the socket with an appropriate
+ * error message?
+ */
+ return plug_accepting(p->plug, p->accepting_sock);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_RECEIVE) {
+ /* we have received data from the underlying socket, which
+ * we'll need to parse, process, and respond to appropriately.
+ */
+
+ if (p->state == 1) {
+ /* response format:
+ * version number (1 byte) = 4
+ * reply code (1 byte)
+ * 90 = request granted
+ * 91 = request rejected or failed
+ * 92 = request rejected due to lack of IDENTD on client
+ * 93 = request rejected due to difference in user ID
+ * (what we sent vs. what IDENTD said)
+ * dest. port (2 bytes)
+ * dest. address (4 bytes)
+ */
+
+ char data[8];
+
+ if (bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data) < 8)
+ return 1; /* not got anything yet */
+
+ /* get the response */
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data, 8);
+
+ if (data[0] != 0) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy responded with "
+ "unexpected reply code version",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (data[1] != 90) {
+
+ switch (data[1]) {
+ case 92:
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS server wanted IDENTD on client",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ break;
+ case 93:
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: Username and IDENTD on client don't agree",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ break;
+ case 91:
+ default:
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: Error while communicating with proxy",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, 8);
+
+ /* we're done */
+ proxy_activate(p);
+ /* proxy activate will have dealt with
+ * whatever is left of the buffer */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: unexpected proxy error",
+ PROXY_ERROR_UNEXPECTED, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* SOCKS version 5 */
+int proxy_socks5_negotiate (Proxy_Socket p, int change)
+{
+ if (p->state == PROXY_CHANGE_NEW) {
+
+ /* initial command:
+ * version number (1 byte) = 5
+ * number of available authentication methods (1 byte)
+ * available authentication methods (1 byte * previous value)
+ * authentication methods:
+ * 0x00 = no authentication
+ * 0x01 = GSSAPI
+ * 0x02 = username/password
+ * 0x03 = CHAP
+ */
+
+ char command[5];
+ int len;
+
+ command[0] = 5; /* version 5 */
+ if (p->cfg.proxy_username[0] || p->cfg.proxy_password[0]) {
+ command[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */
+ len = 3;
+ proxy_socks5_offerencryptedauth (command, &len);
+ command[len++] = 0x02; /* username/password */
+ command[1] = len - 2; /* Number of methods supported */
+ } else {
+ command[1] = 1; /* one methods supported: */
+ command[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */
+ len = 3;
+ }
+
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, command, len);
+
+ p->state = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_CLOSING) {
+ /* if our proxy negotiation process involves closing and opening
+ * new sockets, then we would want to intercept this closing
+ * callback when we were expecting it. if we aren't anticipating
+ * a socket close, then some error must have occurred. we'll
+ * just pass those errors up to the backend.
+ */
+ return plug_closing(p->plug, p->closing_error_msg,
+ p->closing_error_code,
+ p->closing_calling_back);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_SENT) {
+ /* some (or all) of what we wrote to the proxy was sent.
+ * we don't do anything new, however, until we receive the
+ * proxy's response. we might want to set a timer so we can
+ * timeout the proxy negotiation after a while...
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_ACCEPTING) {
+ /* we should _never_ see this, as we are using our socket to
+ * connect to a proxy, not accepting inbound connections.
+ * what should we do? close the socket with an appropriate
+ * error message?
+ */
+ return plug_accepting(p->plug, p->accepting_sock);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_RECEIVE) {
+ /* we have received data from the underlying socket, which
+ * we'll need to parse, process, and respond to appropriately.
+ */
+
+ if (p->state == 1) {
+
+ /* initial response:
+ * version number (1 byte) = 5
+ * authentication method (1 byte)
+ * authentication methods:
+ * 0x00 = no authentication
+ * 0x01 = GSSAPI
+ * 0x02 = username/password
+ * 0x03 = CHAP
+ * 0xff = no acceptable methods
+ */
+ char data[2];
+
+ if (bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data) < 2)
+ return 1; /* not got anything yet */
+
+ /* get the response */
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data, 2);
+
+ if (data[0] != 5) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy returned unexpected version",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (data[1] == 0x00) p->state = 2; /* no authentication needed */
+ else if (data[1] == 0x01) p->state = 4; /* GSSAPI authentication */
+ else if (data[1] == 0x02) p->state = 5; /* username/password authentication */
+ else if (data[1] == 0x03) p->state = 6; /* CHAP authentication */
+ else {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy did not accept our authentication",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, 2);
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 7) {
+
+ /* password authentication reply format:
+ * version number (1 bytes) = 1
+ * reply code (1 byte)
+ * 0 = succeeded
+ * >0 = failed
+ */
+ char data[2];
+
+ if (bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data) < 2)
+ return 1; /* not got anything yet */
+
+ /* get the response */
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data, 2);
+
+ if (data[0] != 1) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS password "
+ "subnegotiation contained wrong version number",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (data[1] != 0) {
+
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy refused"
+ " password authentication",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, 2);
+ p->state = 2; /* now proceed as authenticated */
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 8) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = proxy_socks5_handlechap(p);
+ if (ret) return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 2) {
+
+ /* request format:
+ * version number (1 byte) = 5
+ * command code (1 byte)
+ * 1 = CONNECT
+ * 2 = BIND
+ * 3 = UDP ASSOCIATE
+ * reserved (1 byte) = 0x00
+ * address type (1 byte)
+ * 1 = IPv4
+ * 3 = domainname (first byte has length, no terminating null)
+ * 4 = IPv6
+ * dest. address (variable)
+ * dest. port (2 bytes) [network order]
+ */
+
+ char command[512];
+ int len;
+ int type;
+
+ type = sk_addrtype(p->remote_addr);
+ if (type == ADDRTYPE_IPV4) {
+ len = 10; /* 4 hdr + 4 addr + 2 trailer */
+ command[3] = 1; /* IPv4 */
+ sk_addrcopy(p->remote_addr, command+4);
+ } else if (type == ADDRTYPE_IPV6) {
+ len = 22; /* 4 hdr + 16 addr + 2 trailer */
+ command[3] = 4; /* IPv6 */
+ sk_addrcopy(p->remote_addr, command+4);
+ } else {
+ assert(type == ADDRTYPE_NAME);
+ command[3] = 3;
+ sk_getaddr(p->remote_addr, command+5, 256);
+ command[4] = strlen(command+5);
+ len = 7 + command[4]; /* 4 hdr, 1 len, N addr, 2 trailer */
+ }
+
+ command[0] = 5; /* version 5 */
+ command[1] = 1; /* CONNECT command */
+ command[2] = 0x00;
+
+ /* port */
+ command[len-2] = (char) (p->remote_port >> 8) & 0xff;
+ command[len-1] = (char) p->remote_port & 0xff;
+
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, command, len);
+
+ p->state = 3;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 3) {
+
+ /* reply format:
+ * version number (1 bytes) = 5
+ * reply code (1 byte)
+ * 0 = succeeded
+ * 1 = general SOCKS server failure
+ * 2 = connection not allowed by ruleset
+ * 3 = network unreachable
+ * 4 = host unreachable
+ * 5 = connection refused
+ * 6 = TTL expired
+ * 7 = command not supported
+ * 8 = address type not supported
+ * reserved (1 byte) = x00
+ * address type (1 byte)
+ * 1 = IPv4
+ * 3 = domainname (first byte has length, no terminating null)
+ * 4 = IPv6
+ * server bound address (variable)
+ * server bound port (2 bytes) [network order]
+ */
+ char data[5];
+ int len;
+
+ /* First 5 bytes of packet are enough to tell its length. */
+ if (bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data) < 5)
+ return 1; /* not got anything yet */
+
+ /* get the response */
+ bufchain_fetch(&p->pending_input_data, data, 5);
+
+ if (data[0] != 5) {
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy returned wrong version number",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (data[1] != 0) {
+ char buf[256];
+
+ strcpy(buf, "Proxy error: ");
+
+ switch (data[1]) {
+ case 1: strcat(buf, "General SOCKS server failure"); break;
+ case 2: strcat(buf, "Connection not allowed by ruleset"); break;
+ case 3: strcat(buf, "Network unreachable"); break;
+ case 4: strcat(buf, "Host unreachable"); break;
+ case 5: strcat(buf, "Connection refused"); break;
+ case 6: strcat(buf, "TTL expired"); break;
+ case 7: strcat(buf, "Command not supported"); break;
+ case 8: strcat(buf, "Address type not supported"); break;
+ default: sprintf(buf+strlen(buf),
+ "Unrecognised SOCKS error code %d",
+ data[1]);
+ break;
+ }
+ plug_closing(p->plug, buf, PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Eat the rest of the reply packet.
+ */
+ len = 6; /* first 4 bytes, last 2 */
+ switch (data[3]) {
+ case 1: len += 4; break; /* IPv4 address */
+ case 4: len += 16; break;/* IPv6 address */
+ case 3: len += (unsigned char)data[4]; break; /* domain name */
+ default:
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: SOCKS proxy returned "
+ "unrecognised address format",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (bufchain_size(&p->pending_input_data) < len)
+ return 1; /* not got whole reply yet */
+ bufchain_consume(&p->pending_input_data, len);
+
+ /* we're done */
+ proxy_activate(p);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 4) {
+ /* TODO: Handle GSSAPI authentication */
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: We don't support GSSAPI authentication",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 5) {
+ if (p->cfg.proxy_username[0] || p->cfg.proxy_password[0]) {
+ char userpwbuf[514];
+ int ulen, plen;
+ ulen = strlen(p->cfg.proxy_username);
+ if (ulen > 255) ulen = 255; if (ulen < 1) ulen = 1;
+ plen = strlen(p->cfg.proxy_password);
+ if (plen > 255) plen = 255; if (plen < 1) plen = 1;
+ userpwbuf[0] = 1; /* version number of subnegotiation */
+ userpwbuf[1] = ulen;
+ memcpy(userpwbuf+2, p->cfg.proxy_username, ulen);
+ userpwbuf[ulen+2] = plen;
+ memcpy(userpwbuf+ulen+3, p->cfg.proxy_password, plen);
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, userpwbuf, ulen + plen + 3);
+ p->state = 7;
+ } else
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: Server chose "
+ "username/password authentication but we "
+ "didn't offer it!",
+ PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (p->state == 6) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = proxy_socks5_selectchap(p);
+ if (ret) return ret;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: Unexpected proxy error",
+ PROXY_ERROR_UNEXPECTED, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * `Telnet' proxy type.
+ *
+ * (This is for ad-hoc proxies where you connect to the proxy's
+ * telnet port and send a command such as `connect host port'. The
+ * command is configurable, since this proxy type is typically not
+ * standardised or at all well-defined.)
+ */
+
+char *format_telnet_command(SockAddr addr, int port, const Config *cfg)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL;
+ int retlen = 0, retsize = 0;
+ int so = 0, eo = 0;
+#define ENSURE(n) do { \
+ if (retsize < retlen + n) { \
+ retsize = retlen + n + 512; \
+ ret = sresize(ret, retsize, char); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+ /* we need to escape \\, \%, \r, \n, \t, \x??, \0???,
+ * %%, %host, %port, %user, and %pass
+ */
+
+ while (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] != 0) {
+
+ /* scan forward until we hit end-of-line,
+ * or an escape character (\ or %) */
+ while (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] != 0 &&
+ cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] != '%' &&
+ cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] != '\\') eo++;
+
+ /* if we hit eol, break out of our escaping loop */
+ if (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] == 0) break;
+
+ /* if there was any unescaped text before the escape
+ * character, send that now */
+ if (eo != so) {
+ ENSURE(eo - so);
+ memcpy(ret + retlen, cfg->proxy_telnet_command + so, eo - so);
+ retlen += eo - so;
+ }
+
+ so = eo++;
+
+ /* if the escape character was the last character of
+ * the line, we'll just stop and send it. */
+ if (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] == 0) break;
+
+ if (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[so] == '\\') {
+
+ /* we recognize \\, \%, \r, \n, \t, \x??.
+ * anything else, we just send unescaped (including the \).
+ */
+
+ switch (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo]) {
+
+ case '\\':
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '\\';
+ eo++;
+ break;
+
+ case '%':
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '%';
+ eo++;
+ break;
+
+ case 'r':
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '\r';
+ eo++;
+ break;
+
+ case 'n':
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '\n';
+ eo++;
+ break;
+
+ case 't':
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '\t';
+ eo++;
+ break;
+
+ case 'x':
+ case 'X':
+ {
+ /* escaped hexadecimal value (ie. \xff) */
+ unsigned char v = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ eo++;
+ if (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] >= '0' &&
+ cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] <= '9')
+ v += cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] - '0';
+ else if (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] >= 'a' &&
+ cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] <= 'f')
+ v += cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] - 'a' + 10;
+ else if (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] >= 'A' &&
+ cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] <= 'F')
+ v += cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] - 'A' + 10;
+ else {
+ /* non hex character, so we abort and just
+ * send the whole thing unescaped (including \x)
+ */
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '\\';
+ eo = so + 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* we only extract two hex characters */
+ if (i == 1) {
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = v;
+ eo++;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ i++;
+ v <<= 4;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ENSURE(2);
+ memcpy(ret+retlen, cfg->proxy_telnet_command + so, 2);
+ retlen += 2;
+ eo++;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+
+ /* % escape. we recognize %%, %host, %port, %user, %pass.
+ * %proxyhost, %proxyport. Anything else we just send
+ * unescaped (including the %).
+ */
+
+ if (cfg->proxy_telnet_command[eo] == '%') {
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '%';
+ eo++;
+ }
+ else if (strnicmp(cfg->proxy_telnet_command + eo,
+ "host", 4) == 0) {
+ char dest[512];
+ int destlen;
+ sk_getaddr(addr, dest, lenof(dest));
+ destlen = strlen(dest);
+ ENSURE(destlen);
+ memcpy(ret+retlen, dest, destlen);
+ retlen += destlen;
+ eo += 4;
+ }
+ else if (strnicmp(cfg->proxy_telnet_command + eo,
+ "port", 4) == 0) {
+ char portstr[8], portlen;
+ portlen = sprintf(portstr, "%i", port);
+ ENSURE(portlen);
+ memcpy(ret + retlen, portstr, portlen);
+ retlen += portlen;
+ eo += 4;
+ }
+ else if (strnicmp(cfg->proxy_telnet_command + eo,
+ "user", 4) == 0) {
+ int userlen = strlen(cfg->proxy_username);
+ ENSURE(userlen);
+ memcpy(ret+retlen, cfg->proxy_username, userlen);
+ retlen += userlen;
+ eo += 4;
+ }
+ else if (strnicmp(cfg->proxy_telnet_command + eo,
+ "pass", 4) == 0) {
+ int passlen = strlen(cfg->proxy_password);
+ ENSURE(passlen);
+ memcpy(ret+retlen, cfg->proxy_password, passlen);
+ retlen += passlen;
+ eo += 4;
+ }
+ else if (strnicmp(cfg->proxy_telnet_command + eo,
+ "proxyhost", 9) == 0) {
+ int phlen = strlen(cfg->proxy_host);
+ ENSURE(phlen);
+ memcpy(ret+retlen, cfg->proxy_host, phlen);
+ retlen += phlen;
+ eo += 9;
+ }
+ else if (strnicmp(cfg->proxy_telnet_command + eo,
+ "proxyport", 9) == 0) {
+ char pport[50];
+ int pplen;
+ sprintf(pport, "%d", cfg->proxy_port);
+ pplen = strlen(pport);
+ ENSURE(pplen);
+ memcpy(ret+retlen, pport, pplen);
+ retlen += pplen;
+ eo += 9;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we don't escape this, so send the % now, and
+ * don't advance eo, so that we'll consider the
+ * text immediately following the % as unescaped.
+ */
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen++] = '%';
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* resume scanning for additional escapes after this one. */
+ so = eo;
+ }
+
+ /* if there is any unescaped text at the end of the line, send it */
+ if (eo != so) {
+ ENSURE(eo - so);
+ memcpy(ret + retlen, cfg->proxy_telnet_command + so, eo - so);
+ retlen += eo - so;
+ }
+
+ ENSURE(1);
+ ret[retlen] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+
+#undef ENSURE
+}
+
+int proxy_telnet_negotiate (Proxy_Socket p, int change)
+{
+ if (p->state == PROXY_CHANGE_NEW) {
+ char *formatted_cmd;
+
+ formatted_cmd = format_telnet_command(p->remote_addr, p->remote_port,
+ &p->cfg);
+
+ sk_write(p->sub_socket, formatted_cmd, strlen(formatted_cmd));
+ sfree(formatted_cmd);
+
+ p->state = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_CLOSING) {
+ /* if our proxy negotiation process involves closing and opening
+ * new sockets, then we would want to intercept this closing
+ * callback when we were expecting it. if we aren't anticipating
+ * a socket close, then some error must have occurred. we'll
+ * just pass those errors up to the backend.
+ */
+ return plug_closing(p->plug, p->closing_error_msg,
+ p->closing_error_code,
+ p->closing_calling_back);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_SENT) {
+ /* some (or all) of what we wrote to the proxy was sent.
+ * we don't do anything new, however, until we receive the
+ * proxy's response. we might want to set a timer so we can
+ * timeout the proxy negotiation after a while...
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_ACCEPTING) {
+ /* we should _never_ see this, as we are using our socket to
+ * connect to a proxy, not accepting inbound connections.
+ * what should we do? close the socket with an appropriate
+ * error message?
+ */
+ return plug_accepting(p->plug, p->accepting_sock);
+ }
+
+ if (change == PROXY_CHANGE_RECEIVE) {
+ /* we have received data from the underlying socket, which
+ * we'll need to parse, process, and respond to appropriately.
+ */
+
+ /* we're done */
+ proxy_activate(p);
+ /* proxy activate will have dealt with
+ * whatever is left of the buffer */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ plug_closing(p->plug, "Proxy error: Unexpected proxy error",
+ PROXY_ERROR_UNEXPECTED, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/proxy.h b/tools/plink/proxy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..683b2603d --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/proxy.h @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/*
+ * Network proxy abstraction in PuTTY
+ *
+ * A proxy layer, if necessary, wedges itself between the
+ * network code and the higher level backend.
+ *
+ * Supported proxies: HTTP CONNECT, generic telnet, SOCKS 4 & 5
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_PROXY_H
+#define PUTTY_PROXY_H
+
+#define PROXY_ERROR_GENERAL 8000
+#define PROXY_ERROR_UNEXPECTED 8001
+
+typedef struct Socket_proxy_tag * Proxy_Socket;
+
+struct Socket_proxy_tag {
+ const struct socket_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */
+
+ char * error;
+
+ Socket sub_socket;
+ Plug plug;
+ SockAddr remote_addr;
+ int remote_port;
+
+ bufchain pending_output_data;
+ bufchain pending_oob_output_data;
+ int pending_flush;
+ bufchain pending_input_data;
+
+#define PROXY_STATE_NEW -1
+#define PROXY_STATE_ACTIVE 0
+
+ int state; /* proxy states greater than 0 are implementation
+ * dependent, but represent various stages/states
+ * of the initialization/setup/negotiation with the
+ * proxy server.
+ */
+ int freeze; /* should we freeze the underlying socket when
+ * we are done with the proxy negotiation? this
+ * simply caches the value of sk_set_frozen calls.
+ */
+
+#define PROXY_CHANGE_NEW -1
+#define PROXY_CHANGE_CLOSING 0
+#define PROXY_CHANGE_SENT 1
+#define PROXY_CHANGE_RECEIVE 2
+#define PROXY_CHANGE_ACCEPTING 3
+
+ /* something has changed (a call from the sub socket
+ * layer into our Proxy Plug layer, or we were just
+ * created, etc), so the proxy layer needs to handle
+ * this change (the type of which is the second argument)
+ * and further the proxy negotiation process.
+ */
+
+ int (*negotiate) (Proxy_Socket /* this */, int /* change type */);
+
+ /* current arguments of plug handlers
+ * (for use by proxy's negotiate function)
+ */
+
+ /* closing */
+ const char *closing_error_msg;
+ int closing_error_code;
+ int closing_calling_back;
+
+ /* receive */
+ int receive_urgent;
+ char *receive_data;
+ int receive_len;
+
+ /* sent */
+ int sent_bufsize;
+
+ /* accepting */
+ OSSocket accepting_sock;
+
+ /* configuration, used to look up proxy settings */
+ Config cfg;
+
+ /* CHAP transient data */
+ int chap_num_attributes;
+ int chap_num_attributes_processed;
+ int chap_current_attribute;
+ int chap_current_datalen;
+};
+
+typedef struct Plug_proxy_tag * Proxy_Plug;
+
+struct Plug_proxy_tag {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */
+
+ Proxy_Socket proxy_socket;
+
+};
+
+extern void proxy_activate (Proxy_Socket);
+
+extern int proxy_http_negotiate (Proxy_Socket, int);
+extern int proxy_telnet_negotiate (Proxy_Socket, int);
+extern int proxy_socks4_negotiate (Proxy_Socket, int);
+extern int proxy_socks5_negotiate (Proxy_Socket, int);
+
+/*
+ * This may be reused by local-command proxies on individual
+ * platforms.
+ */
+char *format_telnet_command(SockAddr addr, int port, const Config *cfg);
+
+/*
+ * These are implemented in cproxy.c or nocproxy.c, depending on
+ * whether encrypted proxy authentication is available.
+ */
+extern void proxy_socks5_offerencryptedauth(char *command, int *len);
+extern int proxy_socks5_handlechap (Proxy_Socket p);
+extern int proxy_socks5_selectchap(Proxy_Socket p);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/putty.h b/tools/plink/putty.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1fff1e74f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/putty.h @@ -0,0 +1,1230 @@ +#ifndef PUTTY_PUTTY_H
+#define PUTTY_PUTTY_H
+
+#include <stddef.h> /* for wchar_t */
+
+/*
+ * Global variables. Most modules declare these `extern', but
+ * window.c will do `#define PUTTY_DO_GLOBALS' before including this
+ * module, and so will get them properly defined.
+ */
+#ifndef GLOBAL
+#ifdef PUTTY_DO_GLOBALS
+#define GLOBAL
+#else
+#define GLOBAL extern
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DONE_TYPEDEFS
+#define DONE_TYPEDEFS
+typedef struct config_tag Config;
+typedef struct backend_tag Backend;
+typedef struct terminal_tag Terminal;
+#endif
+
+#include "puttyps.h"
+#include "network.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Fingerprints of the PGP master keys that can be used to establish a trust
+ * path between an executable and other files.
+ */
+#define PGP_RSA_MASTER_KEY_FP \
+ "8F 15 97 DA 25 30 AB 0D 88 D1 92 54 11 CF 0C 4C"
+#define PGP_DSA_MASTER_KEY_FP \
+ "313C 3E76 4B74 C2C5 F2AE 83A8 4F5E 6DF5 6A93 B34E"
+
+/* Three attribute types:
+ * The ATTRs (normal attributes) are stored with the characters in
+ * the main display arrays
+ *
+ * The TATTRs (temporary attributes) are generated on the fly, they
+ * can overlap with characters but not with normal attributes.
+ *
+ * The LATTRs (line attributes) are an entirely disjoint space of
+ * flags.
+ *
+ * The DATTRs (display attributes) are internal to terminal.c (but
+ * defined here because their values have to match the others
+ * here); they reuse the TATTR_* space but are always masked off
+ * before sending to the front end.
+ *
+ * ATTR_INVALID is an illegal colour combination.
+ */
+
+#define TATTR_ACTCURS 0x40000000UL /* active cursor (block) */
+#define TATTR_PASCURS 0x20000000UL /* passive cursor (box) */
+#define TATTR_RIGHTCURS 0x10000000UL /* cursor-on-RHS */
+#define TATTR_COMBINING 0x80000000UL /* combining characters */
+
+#define DATTR_STARTRUN 0x80000000UL /* start of redraw run */
+
+#define TDATTR_MASK 0xF0000000UL
+#define TATTR_MASK (TDATTR_MASK)
+#define DATTR_MASK (TDATTR_MASK)
+
+#define LATTR_NORM 0x00000000UL
+#define LATTR_WIDE 0x00000001UL
+#define LATTR_TOP 0x00000002UL
+#define LATTR_BOT 0x00000003UL
+#define LATTR_MODE 0x00000003UL
+#define LATTR_WRAPPED 0x00000010UL /* this line wraps to next */
+#define LATTR_WRAPPED2 0x00000020UL /* with WRAPPED: CJK wide character
+ wrapped to next line, so last
+ single-width cell is empty */
+
+#define ATTR_INVALID 0x03FFFFU
+
+/* Like Linux use the F000 page for direct to font. */
+#define CSET_OEMCP 0x0000F000UL /* OEM Codepage DTF */
+#define CSET_ACP 0x0000F100UL /* Ansi Codepage DTF */
+
+/* These are internal use overlapping with the UTF-16 surrogates */
+#define CSET_ASCII 0x0000D800UL /* normal ASCII charset ESC ( B */
+#define CSET_LINEDRW 0x0000D900UL /* line drawing charset ESC ( 0 */
+#define CSET_SCOACS 0x0000DA00UL /* SCO Alternate charset */
+#define CSET_GBCHR 0x0000DB00UL /* UK variant charset ESC ( A */
+#define CSET_MASK 0xFFFFFF00UL /* Character set mask */
+
+#define DIRECT_CHAR(c) ((c&0xFFFFFC00)==0xD800)
+#define DIRECT_FONT(c) ((c&0xFFFFFE00)==0xF000)
+
+#define UCSERR (CSET_LINEDRW|'a') /* UCS Format error character. */
+/*
+ * UCSWIDE is a special value used in the terminal data to signify
+ * the character cell containing the right-hand half of a CJK wide
+ * character. We use 0xDFFF because it's part of the surrogate
+ * range and hence won't be used for anything else (it's impossible
+ * to input it via UTF-8 because our UTF-8 decoder correctly
+ * rejects surrogates).
+ */
+#define UCSWIDE 0xDFFF
+
+#define ATTR_NARROW 0x800000U
+#define ATTR_WIDE 0x400000U
+#define ATTR_BOLD 0x040000U
+#define ATTR_UNDER 0x080000U
+#define ATTR_REVERSE 0x100000U
+#define ATTR_BLINK 0x200000U
+#define ATTR_FGMASK 0x0001FFU
+#define ATTR_BGMASK 0x03FE00U
+#define ATTR_COLOURS 0x03FFFFU
+#define ATTR_FGSHIFT 0
+#define ATTR_BGSHIFT 9
+
+/*
+ * The definitive list of colour numbers stored in terminal
+ * attribute words is kept here. It is:
+ *
+ * - 0-7 are ANSI colours (KRGYBMCW).
+ * - 8-15 are the bold versions of those colours.
+ * - 16-255 are the remains of the xterm 256-colour mode (a
+ * 216-colour cube with R at most significant and B at least,
+ * followed by a uniform series of grey shades running between
+ * black and white but not including either on grounds of
+ * redundancy).
+ * - 256 is default foreground
+ * - 257 is default bold foreground
+ * - 258 is default background
+ * - 259 is default bold background
+ * - 260 is cursor foreground
+ * - 261 is cursor background
+ */
+
+#define ATTR_DEFFG (256 << ATTR_FGSHIFT)
+#define ATTR_DEFBG (258 << ATTR_BGSHIFT)
+#define ATTR_DEFAULT (ATTR_DEFFG | ATTR_DEFBG)
+
+struct sesslist {
+ int nsessions;
+ char **sessions;
+ char *buffer; /* so memory can be freed later */
+};
+
+struct unicode_data {
+ char **uni_tbl;
+ int dbcs_screenfont;
+ int font_codepage;
+ int line_codepage;
+ wchar_t unitab_scoacs[256];
+ wchar_t unitab_line[256];
+ wchar_t unitab_font[256];
+ wchar_t unitab_xterm[256];
+ wchar_t unitab_oemcp[256];
+ unsigned char unitab_ctrl[256];
+};
+
+#define LGXF_OVR 1 /* existing logfile overwrite */
+#define LGXF_APN 0 /* existing logfile append */
+#define LGXF_ASK -1 /* existing logfile ask */
+#define LGTYP_NONE 0 /* logmode: no logging */
+#define LGTYP_ASCII 1 /* logmode: pure ascii */
+#define LGTYP_DEBUG 2 /* logmode: all chars of traffic */
+#define LGTYP_PACKETS 3 /* logmode: SSH data packets */
+#define LGTYP_SSHRAW 4 /* logmode: SSH raw data */
+
+typedef enum {
+ /* Actual special commands. Originally Telnet, but some codes have
+ * been re-used for similar specials in other protocols. */
+ TS_AYT, TS_BRK, TS_SYNCH, TS_EC, TS_EL, TS_GA, TS_NOP, TS_ABORT,
+ TS_AO, TS_IP, TS_SUSP, TS_EOR, TS_EOF, TS_LECHO, TS_RECHO, TS_PING,
+ TS_EOL,
+ /* Special command for SSH. */
+ TS_REKEY,
+ /* POSIX-style signals. (not Telnet) */
+ TS_SIGABRT, TS_SIGALRM, TS_SIGFPE, TS_SIGHUP, TS_SIGILL,
+ TS_SIGINT, TS_SIGKILL, TS_SIGPIPE, TS_SIGQUIT, TS_SIGSEGV,
+ TS_SIGTERM, TS_SIGUSR1, TS_SIGUSR2,
+ /* Pseudo-specials used for constructing the specials menu. */
+ TS_SEP, /* Separator */
+ TS_SUBMENU, /* Start a new submenu with specified name */
+ TS_EXITMENU /* Exit current submenu or end of specials */
+} Telnet_Special;
+
+struct telnet_special {
+ const char *name;
+ int code;
+};
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBT_NOTHING,
+ MBT_LEFT, MBT_MIDDLE, MBT_RIGHT, /* `raw' button designations */
+ MBT_SELECT, MBT_EXTEND, MBT_PASTE, /* `cooked' button designations */
+ MBT_WHEEL_UP, MBT_WHEEL_DOWN /* mouse wheel */
+} Mouse_Button;
+
+typedef enum {
+ MA_NOTHING, MA_CLICK, MA_2CLK, MA_3CLK, MA_DRAG, MA_RELEASE
+} Mouse_Action;
+
+/* Keyboard modifiers -- keys the user is actually holding down */
+
+#define PKM_SHIFT 0x01
+#define PKM_CONTROL 0x02
+#define PKM_META 0x04
+#define PKM_ALT 0x08
+
+/* Keyboard flags that aren't really modifiers */
+#define PKF_CAPSLOCK 0x10
+#define PKF_NUMLOCK 0x20
+#define PKF_REPEAT 0x40
+
+/* Stand-alone keysyms for function keys */
+
+typedef enum {
+ PK_NULL, /* No symbol for this key */
+ /* Main keypad keys */
+ PK_ESCAPE, PK_TAB, PK_BACKSPACE, PK_RETURN, PK_COMPOSE,
+ /* Editing keys */
+ PK_HOME, PK_INSERT, PK_DELETE, PK_END, PK_PAGEUP, PK_PAGEDOWN,
+ /* Cursor keys */
+ PK_UP, PK_DOWN, PK_RIGHT, PK_LEFT, PK_REST,
+ /* Numeric keypad */ /* Real one looks like: */
+ PK_PF1, PK_PF2, PK_PF3, PK_PF4, /* PF1 PF2 PF3 PF4 */
+ PK_KPCOMMA, PK_KPMINUS, PK_KPDECIMAL, /* 7 8 9 - */
+ PK_KP0, PK_KP1, PK_KP2, PK_KP3, PK_KP4, /* 4 5 6 , */
+ PK_KP5, PK_KP6, PK_KP7, PK_KP8, PK_KP9, /* 1 2 3 en- */
+ PK_KPBIGPLUS, PK_KPENTER, /* 0 . ter */
+ /* Top row */
+ PK_F1, PK_F2, PK_F3, PK_F4, PK_F5,
+ PK_F6, PK_F7, PK_F8, PK_F9, PK_F10,
+ PK_F11, PK_F12, PK_F13, PK_F14, PK_F15,
+ PK_F16, PK_F17, PK_F18, PK_F19, PK_F20,
+ PK_PAUSE
+} Key_Sym;
+
+#define PK_ISEDITING(k) ((k) >= PK_HOME && (k) <= PK_PAGEDOWN)
+#define PK_ISCURSOR(k) ((k) >= PK_UP && (k) <= PK_REST)
+#define PK_ISKEYPAD(k) ((k) >= PK_PF1 && (k) <= PK_KPENTER)
+#define PK_ISFKEY(k) ((k) >= PK_F1 && (k) <= PK_F20)
+
+enum {
+ VT_XWINDOWS, VT_OEMANSI, VT_OEMONLY, VT_POORMAN, VT_UNICODE
+};
+
+enum {
+ /*
+ * SSH-2 key exchange algorithms
+ */
+ KEX_WARN,
+ KEX_DHGROUP1,
+ KEX_DHGROUP14,
+ KEX_DHGEX,
+ KEX_RSA,
+ KEX_MAX
+};
+
+enum {
+ /*
+ * SSH ciphers (both SSH-1 and SSH-2)
+ */
+ CIPHER_WARN, /* pseudo 'cipher' */
+ CIPHER_3DES,
+ CIPHER_BLOWFISH,
+ CIPHER_AES, /* (SSH-2 only) */
+ CIPHER_DES,
+ CIPHER_ARCFOUR,
+ CIPHER_MAX /* no. ciphers (inc warn) */
+};
+
+enum {
+ /*
+ * Several different bits of the PuTTY configuration seem to be
+ * three-way settings whose values are `always yes', `always
+ * no', and `decide by some more complex automated means'. This
+ * is true of line discipline options (local echo and line
+ * editing), proxy DNS, Close On Exit, and SSH server bug
+ * workarounds. Accordingly I supply a single enum here to deal
+ * with them all.
+ */
+ FORCE_ON, FORCE_OFF, AUTO
+};
+
+enum {
+ /*
+ * Proxy types.
+ */
+ PROXY_NONE, PROXY_SOCKS4, PROXY_SOCKS5,
+ PROXY_HTTP, PROXY_TELNET, PROXY_CMD
+};
+
+enum {
+ /*
+ * Line discipline options which the backend might try to control.
+ */
+ LD_EDIT, /* local line editing */
+ LD_ECHO /* local echo */
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* Actions on remote window title query */
+ TITLE_NONE, TITLE_EMPTY, TITLE_REAL
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* Protocol back ends. (cfg.protocol) */
+ PROT_RAW, PROT_TELNET, PROT_RLOGIN, PROT_SSH,
+ /* PROT_SERIAL is supported on a subset of platforms, but it doesn't
+ * hurt to define it globally. */
+ PROT_SERIAL
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* Bell settings (cfg.beep) */
+ BELL_DISABLED, BELL_DEFAULT, BELL_VISUAL, BELL_WAVEFILE, BELL_PCSPEAKER
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* Taskbar flashing indication on bell (cfg.beep_ind) */
+ B_IND_DISABLED, B_IND_FLASH, B_IND_STEADY
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* Resize actions (cfg.resize_action) */
+ RESIZE_TERM, RESIZE_DISABLED, RESIZE_FONT, RESIZE_EITHER
+};
+
+enum {
+ /* Function key types (cfg.funky_type) */
+ FUNKY_TILDE,
+ FUNKY_LINUX,
+ FUNKY_XTERM,
+ FUNKY_VT400,
+ FUNKY_VT100P,
+ FUNKY_SCO
+};
+
+enum {
+ FQ_DEFAULT, FQ_ANTIALIASED, FQ_NONANTIALIASED, FQ_CLEARTYPE
+};
+
+enum {
+ SER_PAR_NONE, SER_PAR_ODD, SER_PAR_EVEN, SER_PAR_MARK, SER_PAR_SPACE
+};
+
+enum {
+ SER_FLOW_NONE, SER_FLOW_XONXOFF, SER_FLOW_RTSCTS, SER_FLOW_DSRDTR
+};
+
+extern const char *const ttymodes[];
+
+enum {
+ /*
+ * Network address types. Used for specifying choice of IPv4/v6
+ * in config; also used in proxy.c to indicate whether a given
+ * host name has already been resolved or will be resolved at
+ * the proxy end.
+ */
+ ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC, ADDRTYPE_IPV4, ADDRTYPE_IPV6, ADDRTYPE_NAME
+};
+
+struct backend_tag {
+ const char *(*init) (void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
+ Config *cfg,
+ char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
+ int keepalive);
+ void (*free) (void *handle);
+ /* back->reconfig() passes in a replacement configuration. */
+ void (*reconfig) (void *handle, Config *cfg);
+ /* back->send() returns the current amount of buffered data. */
+ int (*send) (void *handle, char *buf, int len);
+ /* back->sendbuffer() does the same thing but without attempting a send */
+ int (*sendbuffer) (void *handle);
+ void (*size) (void *handle, int width, int height);
+ void (*special) (void *handle, Telnet_Special code);
+ const struct telnet_special *(*get_specials) (void *handle);
+ int (*connected) (void *handle);
+ int (*exitcode) (void *handle);
+ /* If back->sendok() returns FALSE, data sent to it from the frontend
+ * may be lost. */
+ int (*sendok) (void *handle);
+ int (*ldisc) (void *handle, int);
+ void (*provide_ldisc) (void *handle, void *ldisc);
+ void (*provide_logctx) (void *handle, void *logctx);
+ /*
+ * back->unthrottle() tells the back end that the front end
+ * buffer is clearing.
+ */
+ void (*unthrottle) (void *handle, int);
+ int (*cfg_info) (void *handle);
+ char *name;
+ int protocol;
+ int default_port;
+};
+
+extern Backend *backends[];
+
+/*
+ * Suggested default protocol provided by the backend link module.
+ * The application is free to ignore this.
+ */
+extern const int be_default_protocol;
+
+/*
+ * Name of this particular application, for use in the config box
+ * and other pieces of text.
+ */
+extern const char *const appname;
+
+/*
+ * IMPORTANT POLICY POINT: everything in this structure which wants
+ * to be treated like an integer must be an actual, honest-to-
+ * goodness `int'. No enum-typed variables. This is because parts
+ * of the code will want to pass around `int *' pointers to them
+ * and we can't run the risk of porting to some system on which the
+ * enum comes out as a different size from int.
+ */
+struct config_tag {
+ /* Basic options */
+ char host[512];
+ int port;
+ int protocol;
+ int addressfamily;
+ int close_on_exit;
+ int warn_on_close;
+ int ping_interval; /* in seconds */
+ int tcp_nodelay;
+ int tcp_keepalives;
+ char loghost[512]; /* logical host being contacted, for host key check */
+ /* Proxy options */
+ char proxy_exclude_list[512];
+ int proxy_dns;
+ int even_proxy_localhost;
+ int proxy_type;
+ char proxy_host[512];
+ int proxy_port;
+ char proxy_username[128];
+ char proxy_password[128];
+ char proxy_telnet_command[512];
+ /* SSH options */
+ char remote_cmd[512];
+ char *remote_cmd_ptr; /* might point to a larger command
+ * but never for loading/saving */
+ char *remote_cmd_ptr2; /* might point to a larger command
+ * but never for loading/saving */
+ int nopty;
+ int compression;
+ int ssh_kexlist[KEX_MAX];
+ int ssh_rekey_time; /* in minutes */
+ char ssh_rekey_data[16];
+ int tryagent;
+ int agentfwd;
+ int change_username; /* allow username switching in SSH-2 */
+ int ssh_cipherlist[CIPHER_MAX];
+ Filename keyfile;
+ int sshprot; /* use v1 or v2 when both available */
+ int ssh2_des_cbc; /* "des-cbc" unrecommended SSH-2 cipher */
+ int ssh_no_userauth; /* bypass "ssh-userauth" (SSH-2 only) */
+ int try_tis_auth;
+ int try_ki_auth;
+ int try_gssapi_auth; /* attempt gssapi auth */
+ int gssapifwd; /* forward tgt via gss */
+ int ssh_subsys; /* run a subsystem rather than a command */
+ int ssh_subsys2; /* fallback to go with remote_cmd_ptr2 */
+ int ssh_no_shell; /* avoid running a shell */
+ char ssh_nc_host[512]; /* host to connect to in `nc' mode */
+ int ssh_nc_port; /* port to connect to in `nc' mode */
+ /* Telnet options */
+ char termtype[32];
+ char termspeed[32];
+ char ttymodes[768]; /* MODE\tVvalue\0MODE\tA\0\0 */
+ char environmt[1024]; /* VAR\tvalue\0VAR\tvalue\0\0 */
+ char username[100];
+ int username_from_env;
+ char localusername[100];
+ int rfc_environ;
+ int passive_telnet;
+ /* Serial port options */
+ char serline[256];
+ int serspeed;
+ int serdatabits, serstopbits;
+ int serparity;
+ int serflow;
+ /* Keyboard options */
+ int bksp_is_delete;
+ int rxvt_homeend;
+ int funky_type;
+ int no_applic_c; /* totally disable app cursor keys */
+ int no_applic_k; /* totally disable app keypad */
+ int no_mouse_rep; /* totally disable mouse reporting */
+ int no_remote_resize; /* disable remote resizing */
+ int no_alt_screen; /* disable alternate screen */
+ int no_remote_wintitle; /* disable remote retitling */
+ int no_dbackspace; /* disable destructive backspace */
+ int no_remote_charset; /* disable remote charset config */
+ int remote_qtitle_action; /* remote win title query action */
+ int app_cursor;
+ int app_keypad;
+ int nethack_keypad;
+ int telnet_keyboard;
+ int telnet_newline;
+ int alt_f4; /* is it special? */
+ int alt_space; /* is it special? */
+ int alt_only; /* is it special? */
+ int localecho;
+ int localedit;
+ int alwaysontop;
+ int fullscreenonaltenter;
+ int scroll_on_key;
+ int scroll_on_disp;
+ int erase_to_scrollback;
+ int compose_key;
+ int ctrlaltkeys;
+ char wintitle[256]; /* initial window title */
+ /* Terminal options */
+ int savelines;
+ int dec_om;
+ int wrap_mode;
+ int lfhascr;
+ int cursor_type; /* 0=block 1=underline 2=vertical */
+ int blink_cur;
+ int beep;
+ int beep_ind;
+ int bellovl; /* bell overload protection active? */
+ int bellovl_n; /* number of bells to cause overload */
+ int bellovl_t; /* time interval for overload (seconds) */
+ int bellovl_s; /* period of silence to re-enable bell (s) */
+ Filename bell_wavefile;
+ int scrollbar;
+ int scrollbar_in_fullscreen;
+ int resize_action;
+ int bce;
+ int blinktext;
+ int win_name_always;
+ int width, height;
+ FontSpec font;
+ int font_quality;
+ Filename logfilename;
+ int logtype;
+ int logxfovr;
+ int logflush;
+ int logomitpass;
+ int logomitdata;
+ int hide_mouseptr;
+ int sunken_edge;
+ int window_border;
+ char answerback[256];
+ char printer[128];
+ int arabicshaping;
+ int bidi;
+ /* Colour options */
+ int ansi_colour;
+ int xterm_256_colour;
+ int system_colour;
+ int try_palette;
+ int bold_colour;
+ unsigned char colours[22][3];
+ /* Selection options */
+ int mouse_is_xterm;
+ int rect_select;
+ int rawcnp;
+ int rtf_paste;
+ int mouse_override;
+ short wordness[256];
+ /* translations */
+ int vtmode;
+ char line_codepage[128];
+ int cjk_ambig_wide;
+ int utf8_override;
+ int xlat_capslockcyr;
+ /* X11 forwarding */
+ int x11_forward;
+ char x11_display[128];
+ int x11_auth;
+ Filename xauthfile;
+ /* port forwarding */
+ int lport_acceptall; /* accept conns from hosts other than localhost */
+ int rport_acceptall; /* same for remote forwarded ports (SSH-2 only) */
+ /*
+ * The port forwarding string contains a number of
+ * NUL-terminated substrings, terminated in turn by an empty
+ * string (i.e. a second NUL immediately after the previous
+ * one). Each string can be of one of the following forms:
+ *
+ * [LR]localport\thost:port
+ * [LR]localaddr:localport\thost:port
+ * Dlocalport
+ * Dlocaladdr:localport
+ */
+ char portfwd[1024];
+ /* SSH bug compatibility modes */
+ int sshbug_ignore1, sshbug_plainpw1, sshbug_rsa1,
+ sshbug_hmac2, sshbug_derivekey2, sshbug_rsapad2,
+ sshbug_pksessid2, sshbug_rekey2, sshbug_maxpkt2;
+ /*
+ * ssh_simple means that we promise never to open any channel other
+ * than the main one, which means it can safely use a very large
+ * window in SSH-2.
+ */
+ int ssh_simple;
+ /* Options for pterm. Should split out into platform-dependent part. */
+ int stamp_utmp;
+ int login_shell;
+ int scrollbar_on_left;
+ int shadowbold;
+ FontSpec boldfont;
+ FontSpec widefont;
+ FontSpec wideboldfont;
+ int shadowboldoffset;
+ int crhaslf;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Some global flags denoting the type of application.
+ *
+ * FLAG_VERBOSE is set when the user requests verbose details.
+ *
+ * FLAG_STDERR is set in command-line applications (which have a
+ * functioning stderr that it makes sense to write to) and not in
+ * GUI applications (which don't).
+ *
+ * FLAG_INTERACTIVE is set when a full interactive shell session is
+ * being run, _either_ because no remote command has been provided
+ * _or_ because the application is GUI and can't run non-
+ * interactively.
+ *
+ * These flags describe the type of _application_ - they wouldn't
+ * vary between individual sessions - and so it's OK to have this
+ * variable be GLOBAL.
+ *
+ * Note that additional flags may be defined in platform-specific
+ * headers. It's probably best if those ones start from 0x1000, to
+ * avoid collision.
+ */
+#define FLAG_VERBOSE 0x0001
+#define FLAG_STDERR 0x0002
+#define FLAG_INTERACTIVE 0x0004
+GLOBAL int flags;
+
+/*
+ * Likewise, these two variables are set up when the application
+ * initialises, and inform all default-settings accesses after
+ * that.
+ */
+GLOBAL int default_protocol;
+GLOBAL int default_port;
+
+/*
+ * This is set TRUE by cmdline.c iff a session is loaded with "-load".
+ */
+GLOBAL int loaded_session;
+
+struct RSAKey; /* be a little careful of scope */
+
+/*
+ * Mechanism for getting text strings such as usernames and passwords
+ * from the front-end.
+ * The fields are mostly modelled after SSH's keyboard-interactive auth.
+ * FIXME We should probably mandate a character set/encoding (probably UTF-8).
+ *
+ * Since many of the pieces of text involved may be chosen by the server,
+ * the caller must take care to ensure that the server can't spoof locally-
+ * generated prompts such as key passphrase prompts. Some ground rules:
+ * - If the front-end needs to truncate a string, it should lop off the
+ * end.
+ * - The front-end should filter out any dangerous characters and
+ * generally not trust the strings. (But \n is required to behave
+ * vaguely sensibly, at least in `instruction', and ideally in
+ * `prompt[]' too.)
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ char *prompt;
+ int echo;
+ char *result; /* allocated/freed by caller */
+ size_t result_len;
+} prompt_t;
+typedef struct {
+ /*
+ * Indicates whether the information entered is to be used locally
+ * (for instance a key passphrase prompt), or is destined for the wire.
+ * This is a hint only; the front-end is at liberty not to use this
+ * information (so the caller should ensure that the supplied text is
+ * sufficient).
+ */
+ int to_server;
+ char *name; /* Short description, perhaps for dialog box title */
+ int name_reqd; /* Display of `name' required or optional? */
+ char *instruction; /* Long description, maybe with embedded newlines */
+ int instr_reqd; /* Display of `instruction' required or optional? */
+ size_t n_prompts; /* May be zero (in which case display the foregoing,
+ * if any, and return success) */
+ prompt_t **prompts;
+ void *frontend;
+ void *data; /* slot for housekeeping data, managed by
+ * get_userpass_input(); initially NULL */
+} prompts_t;
+prompts_t *new_prompts(void *frontend);
+void add_prompt(prompts_t *p, char *promptstr, int echo, size_t len);
+/* Burn the evidence. (Assumes _all_ strings want free()ing.) */
+void free_prompts(prompts_t *p);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from the front end.
+ */
+void request_resize(void *frontend, int, int);
+void do_text(Context, int, int, wchar_t *, int, unsigned long, int);
+void do_cursor(Context, int, int, wchar_t *, int, unsigned long, int);
+int char_width(Context ctx, int uc);
+#ifdef OPTIMISE_SCROLL
+void do_scroll(Context, int, int, int);
+#endif
+void set_title(void *frontend, char *);
+void set_icon(void *frontend, char *);
+void set_sbar(void *frontend, int, int, int);
+Context get_ctx(void *frontend);
+void free_ctx(Context);
+void palette_set(void *frontend, int, int, int, int);
+void palette_reset(void *frontend);
+void write_aclip(void *frontend, char *, int, int);
+void write_clip(void *frontend, wchar_t *, int *, int, int);
+void get_clip(void *frontend, wchar_t **, int *);
+void optimised_move(void *frontend, int, int, int);
+void set_raw_mouse_mode(void *frontend, int);
+void connection_fatal(void *frontend, char *, ...);
+void fatalbox(char *, ...);
+void modalfatalbox(char *, ...);
+#ifdef macintosh
+#pragma noreturn(fatalbox)
+#pragma noreturn(modalfatalbox)
+#endif
+void do_beep(void *frontend, int);
+void begin_session(void *frontend);
+void sys_cursor(void *frontend, int x, int y);
+void request_paste(void *frontend);
+void frontend_keypress(void *frontend);
+void ldisc_update(void *frontend, int echo, int edit);
+/* It's the backend's responsibility to invoke this at the start of a
+ * connection, if necessary; it can also invoke it later if the set of
+ * special commands changes. It does not need to invoke it at session
+ * shutdown. */
+void update_specials_menu(void *frontend);
+int from_backend(void *frontend, int is_stderr, const char *data, int len);
+int from_backend_untrusted(void *frontend, const char *data, int len);
+void notify_remote_exit(void *frontend);
+/* Get a sensible value for a tty mode. NULL return = don't set.
+ * Otherwise, returned value should be freed by caller. */
+char *get_ttymode(void *frontend, const char *mode);
+/*
+ * >0 = `got all results, carry on'
+ * 0 = `user cancelled' (FIXME distinguish "give up entirely" and "next auth"?)
+ * <0 = `please call back later with more in/inlen'
+ */
+int get_userpass_input(prompts_t *p, unsigned char *in, int inlen);
+#define OPTIMISE_IS_SCROLL 1
+
+void set_iconic(void *frontend, int iconic);
+void move_window(void *frontend, int x, int y);
+void set_zorder(void *frontend, int top);
+void refresh_window(void *frontend);
+void set_zoomed(void *frontend, int zoomed);
+int is_iconic(void *frontend);
+void get_window_pos(void *frontend, int *x, int *y);
+void get_window_pixels(void *frontend, int *x, int *y);
+char *get_window_title(void *frontend, int icon);
+/* Hint from backend to frontend about time-consuming operations.
+ * Initial state is assumed to be BUSY_NOT. */
+enum {
+ BUSY_NOT, /* Not busy, all user interaction OK */
+ BUSY_WAITING, /* Waiting for something; local event loops still running
+ so some local interaction (e.g. menus) OK, but network
+ stuff is suspended */
+ BUSY_CPU /* Locally busy (e.g. crypto); user interaction suspended */
+};
+void set_busy_status(void *frontend, int status);
+
+void cleanup_exit(int);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from noise.c.
+ */
+void noise_get_heavy(void (*func) (void *, int));
+void noise_get_light(void (*func) (void *, int));
+void noise_regular(void);
+void noise_ultralight(unsigned long data);
+void random_save_seed(void);
+void random_destroy_seed(void);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from settings.c.
+ */
+Backend *backend_from_name(const char *name);
+Backend *backend_from_proto(int proto);
+int get_remote_username(Config *cfg, char *user, size_t len);
+char *save_settings(char *section, Config * cfg);
+void save_open_settings(void *sesskey, Config *cfg);
+void load_settings(char *section, Config * cfg);
+void load_open_settings(void *sesskey, Config *cfg);
+void get_sesslist(struct sesslist *, int allocate);
+void do_defaults(char *, Config *);
+void registry_cleanup(void);
+
+/*
+ * Functions used by settings.c to provide platform-specific
+ * default settings.
+ *
+ * (The integer one is expected to return `def' if it has no clear
+ * opinion of its own. This is because there's no integer value
+ * which I can reliably set aside to indicate `nil'. The string
+ * function is perfectly all right returning NULL, of course. The
+ * Filename and FontSpec functions are _not allowed_ to fail to
+ * return, since these defaults _must_ be per-platform.)
+ */
+char *platform_default_s(const char *name);
+int platform_default_i(const char *name, int def);
+Filename platform_default_filename(const char *name);
+FontSpec platform_default_fontspec(const char *name);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from terminal.c.
+ */
+
+Terminal *term_init(Config *, struct unicode_data *, void *);
+void term_free(Terminal *);
+void term_size(Terminal *, int, int, int);
+void term_paint(Terminal *, Context, int, int, int, int, int);
+void term_scroll(Terminal *, int, int);
+void term_pwron(Terminal *, int);
+void term_clrsb(Terminal *);
+void term_mouse(Terminal *, Mouse_Button, Mouse_Button, Mouse_Action,
+ int,int,int,int,int);
+void term_key(Terminal *, Key_Sym, wchar_t *, size_t, unsigned int,
+ unsigned int);
+void term_deselect(Terminal *);
+void term_update(Terminal *);
+void term_invalidate(Terminal *);
+void term_blink(Terminal *, int set_cursor);
+void term_do_paste(Terminal *);
+int term_paste_pending(Terminal *);
+void term_paste(Terminal *);
+void term_nopaste(Terminal *);
+int term_ldisc(Terminal *, int option);
+void term_copyall(Terminal *);
+void term_reconfig(Terminal *, Config *);
+void term_seen_key_event(Terminal *);
+int term_data(Terminal *, int is_stderr, const char *data, int len);
+int term_data_untrusted(Terminal *, const char *data, int len);
+void term_provide_resize_fn(Terminal *term,
+ void (*resize_fn)(void *, int, int),
+ void *resize_ctx);
+void term_provide_logctx(Terminal *term, void *logctx);
+void term_set_focus(Terminal *term, int has_focus);
+char *term_get_ttymode(Terminal *term, const char *mode);
+int term_get_userpass_input(Terminal *term, prompts_t *p,
+ unsigned char *in, int inlen);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from logging.c.
+ */
+void *log_init(void *frontend, Config *cfg);
+void log_free(void *logctx);
+void log_reconfig(void *logctx, Config *cfg);
+void logfopen(void *logctx);
+void logfclose(void *logctx);
+void logtraffic(void *logctx, unsigned char c, int logmode);
+void logflush(void *logctx);
+void log_eventlog(void *logctx, const char *string);
+enum { PKT_INCOMING, PKT_OUTGOING };
+enum { PKTLOG_EMIT, PKTLOG_BLANK, PKTLOG_OMIT };
+struct logblank_t {
+ int offset;
+ int len;
+ int type;
+};
+void log_packet(void *logctx, int direction, int type,
+ char *texttype, const void *data, int len,
+ int n_blanks, const struct logblank_t *blanks,
+ const unsigned long *sequence);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from testback.c
+ */
+
+extern Backend null_backend;
+extern Backend loop_backend;
+
+/*
+ * Exports from raw.c.
+ */
+
+extern Backend raw_backend;
+
+/*
+ * Exports from rlogin.c.
+ */
+
+extern Backend rlogin_backend;
+
+/*
+ * Exports from telnet.c.
+ */
+
+extern Backend telnet_backend;
+
+/*
+ * Exports from ssh.c.
+ */
+extern Backend ssh_backend;
+
+/*
+ * Exports from ldisc.c.
+ */
+void *ldisc_create(Config *, Terminal *, Backend *, void *, void *);
+void ldisc_free(void *);
+void ldisc_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len, int interactive);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from ldiscucs.c.
+ */
+void lpage_send(void *, int codepage, char *buf, int len, int interactive);
+void luni_send(void *, wchar_t * widebuf, int len, int interactive);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from sshrand.c.
+ */
+
+void random_add_noise(void *noise, int length);
+int random_byte(void);
+void random_get_savedata(void **data, int *len);
+extern int random_active;
+/* The random number subsystem is activated if at least one other entity
+ * within the program expresses an interest in it. So each SSH session
+ * calls random_ref on startup and random_unref on shutdown. */
+void random_ref(void);
+void random_unref(void);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from pinger.c.
+ */
+typedef struct pinger_tag *Pinger;
+Pinger pinger_new(Config *cfg, Backend *back, void *backhandle);
+void pinger_reconfig(Pinger, Config *oldcfg, Config *newcfg);
+void pinger_free(Pinger);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from misc.c.
+ */
+
+#include "misc.h"
+int cfg_launchable(const Config *cfg);
+char const *cfg_dest(const Config *cfg);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from sercfg.c.
+ */
+void ser_setup_config_box(struct controlbox *b, int midsession,
+ int parity_mask, int flow_mask);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from version.c.
+ */
+extern char ver[];
+
+/*
+ * Exports from unicode.c.
+ */
+#ifndef CP_UTF8
+#define CP_UTF8 65001
+#endif
+/* void init_ucs(void); -- this is now in platform-specific headers */
+int is_dbcs_leadbyte(int codepage, char byte);
+int mb_to_wc(int codepage, int flags, char *mbstr, int mblen,
+ wchar_t *wcstr, int wclen);
+int wc_to_mb(int codepage, int flags, wchar_t *wcstr, int wclen,
+ char *mbstr, int mblen, char *defchr, int *defused,
+ struct unicode_data *ucsdata);
+wchar_t xlat_uskbd2cyrllic(int ch);
+int check_compose(int first, int second);
+int decode_codepage(char *cp_name);
+const char *cp_enumerate (int index);
+const char *cp_name(int codepage);
+void get_unitab(int codepage, wchar_t * unitab, int ftype);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from wcwidth.c
+ */
+int mk_wcwidth(wchar_t ucs);
+int mk_wcswidth(const wchar_t *pwcs, size_t n);
+int mk_wcwidth_cjk(wchar_t ucs);
+int mk_wcswidth_cjk(const wchar_t *pwcs, size_t n);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from mscrypto.c
+ */
+#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
+int crypto_startup();
+void crypto_wrapup();
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Exports from pageantc.c.
+ *
+ * agent_query returns 1 for here's-a-response, and 0 for query-in-
+ * progress. In the latter case there will be a call to `callback'
+ * at some future point, passing callback_ctx as the first
+ * parameter and the actual reply data as the second and third.
+ *
+ * The response may be a NULL pointer (in either of the synchronous
+ * or asynchronous cases), which indicates failure to receive a
+ * response.
+ */
+int agent_query(void *in, int inlen, void **out, int *outlen,
+ void (*callback)(void *, void *, int), void *callback_ctx);
+int agent_exists(void);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from wildcard.c
+ */
+const char *wc_error(int value);
+int wc_match(const char *wildcard, const char *target);
+int wc_unescape(char *output, const char *wildcard);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from frontend (windlg.c etc)
+ */
+void logevent(void *frontend, const char *);
+void pgp_fingerprints(void);
+/*
+ * verify_ssh_host_key() can return one of three values:
+ *
+ * - +1 means `key was OK' (either already known or the user just
+ * approved it) `so continue with the connection'
+ *
+ * - 0 means `key was not OK, abandon the connection'
+ *
+ * - -1 means `I've initiated enquiries, please wait to be called
+ * back via the provided function with a result that's either 0
+ * or +1'.
+ */
+int verify_ssh_host_key(void *frontend, char *host, int port, char *keytype,
+ char *keystr, char *fingerprint,
+ void (*callback)(void *ctx, int result), void *ctx);
+/*
+ * askalg has the same set of return values as verify_ssh_host_key.
+ */
+int askalg(void *frontend, const char *algtype, const char *algname,
+ void (*callback)(void *ctx, int result), void *ctx);
+/*
+ * askappend can return four values:
+ *
+ * - 2 means overwrite the log file
+ * - 1 means append to the log file
+ * - 0 means cancel logging for this session
+ * - -1 means please wait.
+ */
+int askappend(void *frontend, Filename filename,
+ void (*callback)(void *ctx, int result), void *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from console frontends (wincons.c, uxcons.c)
+ * that aren't equivalents to things in windlg.c et al.
+ */
+extern int console_batch_mode;
+int console_get_userpass_input(prompts_t *p, unsigned char *in, int inlen);
+void console_provide_logctx(void *logctx);
+int is_interactive(void);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from printing.c.
+ */
+typedef struct printer_enum_tag printer_enum;
+typedef struct printer_job_tag printer_job;
+printer_enum *printer_start_enum(int *nprinters);
+char *printer_get_name(printer_enum *, int);
+void printer_finish_enum(printer_enum *);
+printer_job *printer_start_job(char *printer);
+void printer_job_data(printer_job *, void *, int);
+void printer_finish_job(printer_job *);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from cmdline.c (and also cmdline_error(), which is
+ * defined differently in various places and required _by_
+ * cmdline.c).
+ */
+int cmdline_process_param(char *, char *, int, Config *);
+void cmdline_run_saved(Config *);
+void cmdline_cleanup(void);
+int cmdline_get_passwd_input(prompts_t *p, unsigned char *in, int inlen);
+#define TOOLTYPE_FILETRANSFER 1
+#define TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK 2
+extern int cmdline_tooltype;
+
+void cmdline_error(char *, ...);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from config.c.
+ */
+struct controlbox;
+void setup_config_box(struct controlbox *b, int midsession,
+ int protocol, int protcfginfo);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from minibidi.c.
+ */
+typedef struct bidi_char {
+ wchar_t origwc, wc;
+ unsigned short index;
+} bidi_char;
+int do_bidi(bidi_char *line, int count);
+int do_shape(bidi_char *line, bidi_char *to, int count);
+int is_rtl(int c);
+
+/*
+ * X11 auth mechanisms we know about.
+ */
+enum {
+ X11_NO_AUTH,
+ X11_MIT, /* MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 */
+ X11_XDM, /* XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 */
+ X11_NAUTHS
+};
+extern const char *const x11_authnames[]; /* declared in x11fwd.c */
+
+/*
+ * Miscellaneous exports from the platform-specific code.
+ */
+Filename filename_from_str(const char *string);
+const char *filename_to_str(const Filename *fn);
+int filename_equal(Filename f1, Filename f2);
+int filename_is_null(Filename fn);
+char *get_username(void); /* return value needs freeing */
+char *get_random_data(int bytes); /* used in cmdgen.c */
+
+/*
+ * Exports and imports from timing.c.
+ *
+ * schedule_timer() asks the front end to schedule a callback to a
+ * timer function in a given number of ticks. The returned value is
+ * the time (in ticks since an arbitrary offset) at which the
+ * callback can be expected. This value will also be passed as the
+ * `now' parameter to the callback function. Hence, you can (for
+ * example) schedule an event at a particular time by calling
+ * schedule_timer() and storing the return value in your context
+ * structure as the time when that event is due. The first time a
+ * callback function gives you that value or more as `now', you do
+ * the thing.
+ *
+ * expire_timer_context() drops all current timers associated with
+ * a given value of ctx (for when you're about to free ctx).
+ *
+ * run_timers() is called from the front end when it has reason to
+ * think some timers have reached their moment, or when it simply
+ * needs to know how long to wait next. We pass it the time we
+ * think it is. It returns TRUE and places the time when the next
+ * timer needs to go off in `next', or alternatively it returns
+ * FALSE if there are no timers at all pending.
+ *
+ * timer_change_notify() must be supplied by the front end; it
+ * notifies the front end that a new timer has been added to the
+ * list which is sooner than any existing ones. It provides the
+ * time when that timer needs to go off.
+ *
+ * *** FRONT END IMPLEMENTORS NOTE:
+ *
+ * There's an important subtlety in the front-end implementation of
+ * the timer interface. When a front end is given a `next' value,
+ * either returned from run_timers() or via timer_change_notify(),
+ * it should ensure that it really passes _that value_ as the `now'
+ * parameter to its next run_timers call. It should _not_ simply
+ * call GETTICKCOUNT() to get the `now' parameter when invoking
+ * run_timers().
+ *
+ * The reason for this is that an OS's system clock might not agree
+ * exactly with the timing mechanisms it supplies to wait for a
+ * given interval. I'll illustrate this by the simple example of
+ * Unix Plink, which uses timeouts to select() in a way which for
+ * these purposes can simply be considered to be a wait() function.
+ * Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this wait() function
+ * tends to return early by 1%. Then a possible sequence of actions
+ * is:
+ *
+ * - run_timers() tells the front end that the next timer firing
+ * is 10000ms from now.
+ * - Front end calls wait(10000ms), but according to
+ * GETTICKCOUNT() it has only waited for 9900ms.
+ * - Front end calls run_timers() again, passing time T-100ms as
+ * `now'.
+ * - run_timers() does nothing, and says the next timer firing is
+ * still 100ms from now.
+ * - Front end calls wait(100ms), which only waits for 99ms.
+ * - Front end calls run_timers() yet again, passing time T-1ms.
+ * - run_timers() says there's still 1ms to wait.
+ * - Front end calls wait(1ms).
+ *
+ * If you're _lucky_ at this point, wait(1ms) will actually wait
+ * for 1ms and you'll only have woken the program up three times.
+ * If you're unlucky, wait(1ms) might do nothing at all due to
+ * being below some minimum threshold, and you might find your
+ * program spends the whole of the last millisecond tight-looping
+ * between wait() and run_timers().
+ *
+ * Instead, what you should do is to _save_ the precise `next'
+ * value provided by run_timers() or via timer_change_notify(), and
+ * use that precise value as the input to the next run_timers()
+ * call. So:
+ *
+ * - run_timers() tells the front end that the next timer firing
+ * is at time T, 10000ms from now.
+ * - Front end calls wait(10000ms).
+ * - Front end then immediately calls run_timers() and passes it
+ * time T, without stopping to check GETTICKCOUNT() at all.
+ *
+ * This guarantees that the program wakes up only as many times as
+ * there are actual timer actions to be taken, and that the timing
+ * mechanism will never send it into a tight loop.
+ *
+ * (It does also mean that the timer action in the above example
+ * will occur 100ms early, but this is not generally critical. And
+ * the hypothetical 1% error in wait() will be partially corrected
+ * for anyway when, _after_ run_timers() returns, you call
+ * GETTICKCOUNT() and compare the result with the returned `next'
+ * value to find out how long you have to make your next wait().)
+ */
+typedef void (*timer_fn_t)(void *ctx, long now);
+long schedule_timer(int ticks, timer_fn_t fn, void *ctx);
+void expire_timer_context(void *ctx);
+int run_timers(long now, long *next);
+void timer_change_notify(long next);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/puttymem.h b/tools/plink/puttymem.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d478f7949 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/puttymem.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/*
+ * PuTTY memory-handling header.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_PUTTYMEM_H
+#define PUTTY_PUTTYMEM_H
+
+#include <stddef.h> /* for size_t */
+#include <string.h> /* for memcpy() */
+
+
+/* #define MALLOC_LOG do this if you suspect putty of leaking memory */
+#ifdef MALLOC_LOG
+#define smalloc(z) (mlog(__FILE__,__LINE__), safemalloc(z,1))
+#define snmalloc(z,s) (mlog(__FILE__,__LINE__), safemalloc(z,s))
+#define srealloc(y,z) (mlog(__FILE__,__LINE__), saferealloc(y,z,1))
+#define snrealloc(y,z,s) (mlog(__FILE__,__LINE__), saferealloc(y,z,s))
+#define sfree(z) (mlog(__FILE__,__LINE__), safefree(z))
+void mlog(char *, int);
+#else
+#define smalloc(z) safemalloc(z,1)
+#define snmalloc safemalloc
+#define srealloc(y,z) saferealloc(y,z,1)
+#define snrealloc saferealloc
+#define sfree safefree
+#endif
+
+void *safemalloc(size_t, size_t);
+void *saferealloc(void *, size_t, size_t);
+void safefree(void *);
+
+/*
+ * Direct use of smalloc within the code should be avoided where
+ * possible, in favour of these type-casting macros which ensure
+ * you don't mistakenly allocate enough space for one sort of
+ * structure and assign it to a different sort of pointer.
+ */
+#define snew(type) ((type *)snmalloc(1, sizeof(type)))
+#define snewn(n, type) ((type *)snmalloc((n), sizeof(type)))
+#define sresize(ptr, n, type) ((type *)snrealloc((ptr), (n), sizeof(type)))
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/puttyps.h b/tools/plink/puttyps.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e7d280814 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/puttyps.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/*
+ * Find the platform-specific header for this platform.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_PUTTYPS_H
+#define PUTTY_PUTTYPS_H
+
+#ifdef _WINDOWS
+
+#include "winstuff.h"
+
+#elif defined(macintosh)
+
+#include "macstuff.h"
+
+#elif defined(MACOSX)
+
+#include "osx.h"
+
+#else
+
+#include "unix.h"
+
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/raw.c b/tools/plink/raw.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ea51d74a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/raw.c @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +/*
+ * "Raw" backend.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+
+#define RAW_MAX_BACKLOG 4096
+
+typedef struct raw_backend_data {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
+
+ Socket s;
+ int bufsize;
+ void *frontend;
+} *Raw;
+
+static void raw_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
+
+static void c_write(Raw raw, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int backlog = from_backend(raw->frontend, 0, buf, len);
+ sk_set_frozen(raw->s, backlog > RAW_MAX_BACKLOG);
+}
+
+static void raw_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) plug;
+ char addrbuf[256], *msg;
+
+ sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
+
+ if (type == 0)
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
+ else
+ msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
+
+ logevent(raw->frontend, msg);
+}
+
+static int raw_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
+ int calling_back)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) plug;
+
+ if (raw->s) {
+ sk_close(raw->s);
+ raw->s = NULL;
+ notify_remote_exit(raw->frontend);
+ }
+ if (error_msg) {
+ /* A socket error has occurred. */
+ logevent(raw->frontend, error_msg);
+ connection_fatal(raw->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
+ } /* Otherwise, the remote side closed the connection normally. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int raw_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) plug;
+ c_write(raw, data, len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void raw_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) plug;
+ raw->bufsize = bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set up the raw connection.
+ *
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ *
+ * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
+ * freed by the caller.
+ */
+static const char *raw_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
+ Config *cfg,
+ char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
+ int keepalive)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ raw_log,
+ raw_closing,
+ raw_receive,
+ raw_sent
+ };
+ SockAddr addr;
+ const char *err;
+ Raw raw;
+
+ raw = snew(struct raw_backend_data);
+ raw->fn = &fn_table;
+ raw->s = NULL;
+ *backend_handle = raw;
+
+ raw->frontend = frontend_handle;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to find host.
+ */
+ {
+ char *buf;
+ buf = dupprintf("Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
+ (cfg->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
+ (cfg->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" :
+ "")));
+ logevent(raw->frontend, buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+ }
+ addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, cfg, cfg->addressfamily);
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (port < 0)
+ port = 23; /* default telnet port */
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ raw->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port, 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive,
+ (Plug) raw, cfg);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(raw->s)) != NULL)
+ return err;
+
+ if (*cfg->loghost) {
+ char *colon;
+
+ sfree(*realhost);
+ *realhost = dupstr(cfg->loghost);
+ colon = strrchr(*realhost, ':');
+ if (colon) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: if we ever update this aspect of ssh.c for
+ * IPv6 literal management, this should change in line
+ * with it.
+ */
+ *colon++ = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void raw_free(void *handle)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) handle;
+
+ if (raw->s)
+ sk_close(raw->s);
+ sfree(raw);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stub routine (we don't have any need to reconfigure this backend).
+ */
+static void raw_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to send data down the raw connection.
+ */
+static int raw_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) handle;
+
+ if (raw->s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ raw->bufsize = sk_write(raw->s, buf, len);
+
+ return raw->bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to query the current socket sendability status.
+ */
+static int raw_sendbuffer(void *handle)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) handle;
+ return raw->bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set the size of the window
+ */
+static void raw_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
+{
+ /* Do nothing! */
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send raw special codes.
+ */
+static void raw_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
+{
+ /* Do nothing! */
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
+ * protocol.
+ */
+static const struct telnet_special *raw_get_specials(void *handle)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int raw_connected(void *handle)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) handle;
+ return raw->s != NULL;
+}
+
+static int raw_sendok(void *handle)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void raw_unthrottle(void *handle, int backlog)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) handle;
+ sk_set_frozen(raw->s, backlog > RAW_MAX_BACKLOG);
+}
+
+static int raw_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
+{
+ if (option == LD_EDIT || option == LD_ECHO)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void raw_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
+{
+ /* This is a stub. */
+}
+
+static void raw_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
+{
+ /* This is a stub. */
+}
+
+static int raw_exitcode(void *handle)
+{
+ Raw raw = (Raw) handle;
+ if (raw->s != NULL)
+ return -1; /* still connected */
+ else
+ /* Exit codes are a meaningless concept in the Raw protocol */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cfg_info for Raw does nothing at all.
+ */
+static int raw_cfg_info(void *handle)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+Backend raw_backend = {
+ raw_init,
+ raw_free,
+ raw_reconfig,
+ raw_send,
+ raw_sendbuffer,
+ raw_size,
+ raw_special,
+ raw_get_specials,
+ raw_connected,
+ raw_exitcode,
+ raw_sendok,
+ raw_ldisc,
+ raw_provide_ldisc,
+ raw_provide_logctx,
+ raw_unthrottle,
+ raw_cfg_info,
+ "raw",
+ PROT_RAW,
+ 0
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/rlogin.c b/tools/plink/rlogin.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b514d7a5b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/rlogin.c @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/*
+ * Rlogin backend.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+
+#define RLOGIN_MAX_BACKLOG 4096
+
+typedef struct rlogin_tag {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
+
+ Socket s;
+ int bufsize;
+ int firstbyte;
+ int cansize;
+ int term_width, term_height;
+ void *frontend;
+} *Rlogin;
+
+static void rlogin_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
+
+static void c_write(Rlogin rlogin, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int backlog = from_backend(rlogin->frontend, 0, buf, len);
+ sk_set_frozen(rlogin->s, backlog > RLOGIN_MAX_BACKLOG);
+}
+
+static void rlogin_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) plug;
+ char addrbuf[256], *msg;
+
+ sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
+
+ if (type == 0)
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
+ else
+ msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
+
+ logevent(rlogin->frontend, msg);
+}
+
+static int rlogin_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
+ int calling_back)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) plug;
+ if (rlogin->s) {
+ sk_close(rlogin->s);
+ rlogin->s = NULL;
+ notify_remote_exit(rlogin->frontend);
+ }
+ if (error_msg) {
+ /* A socket error has occurred. */
+ logevent(rlogin->frontend, error_msg);
+ connection_fatal(rlogin->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
+ } /* Otherwise, the remote side closed the connection normally. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rlogin_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) plug;
+ if (urgent == 2) {
+ char c;
+
+ c = *data++;
+ len--;
+ if (c == '\x80') {
+ rlogin->cansize = 1;
+ rlogin_size(rlogin, rlogin->term_width, rlogin->term_height);
+ }
+ /*
+ * We should flush everything (aka Telnet SYNCH) if we see
+ * 0x02, and we should turn off and on _local_ flow control
+ * on 0x10 and 0x20 respectively. I'm not convinced it's
+ * worth it...
+ */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Main rlogin protocol. This is really simple: the first
+ * byte is expected to be NULL and is ignored, and the rest
+ * is printed.
+ */
+ if (rlogin->firstbyte) {
+ if (data[0] == '\0') {
+ data++;
+ len--;
+ }
+ rlogin->firstbyte = 0;
+ }
+ if (len > 0)
+ c_write(rlogin, data, len);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void rlogin_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) plug;
+ rlogin->bufsize = bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set up the rlogin connection.
+ *
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ *
+ * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
+ * freed by the caller.
+ */
+static const char *rlogin_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
+ Config *cfg,
+ char *host, int port, char **realhost,
+ int nodelay, int keepalive)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ rlogin_log,
+ rlogin_closing,
+ rlogin_receive,
+ rlogin_sent
+ };
+ SockAddr addr;
+ const char *err;
+ Rlogin rlogin;
+
+ rlogin = snew(struct rlogin_tag);
+ rlogin->fn = &fn_table;
+ rlogin->s = NULL;
+ rlogin->frontend = frontend_handle;
+ rlogin->term_width = cfg->width;
+ rlogin->term_height = cfg->height;
+ rlogin->firstbyte = 1;
+ rlogin->cansize = 0;
+ *backend_handle = rlogin;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to find host.
+ */
+ {
+ char *buf;
+ buf = dupprintf("Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
+ (cfg->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
+ (cfg->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" :
+ "")));
+ logevent(rlogin->frontend, buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+ }
+ addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, cfg, cfg->addressfamily);
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (port < 0)
+ port = 513; /* default rlogin port */
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ rlogin->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port, 1, 0,
+ nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) rlogin, cfg);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(rlogin->s)) != NULL)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * Send local username, remote username, terminal/speed
+ */
+
+ {
+ char z = 0;
+ char *p;
+ char ruser[sizeof(cfg->username)];
+ (void) get_remote_username(cfg, ruser, sizeof(ruser));
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, &z, 1);
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, cfg->localusername,
+ strlen(cfg->localusername));
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, &z, 1);
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, ruser,
+ strlen(ruser));
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, &z, 1);
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, cfg->termtype,
+ strlen(cfg->termtype));
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, "/", 1);
+ for (p = cfg->termspeed; isdigit((unsigned char)*p); p++) continue;
+ sk_write(rlogin->s, cfg->termspeed, p - cfg->termspeed);
+ rlogin->bufsize = sk_write(rlogin->s, &z, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (*cfg->loghost) {
+ char *colon;
+
+ sfree(*realhost);
+ *realhost = dupstr(cfg->loghost);
+ colon = strrchr(*realhost, ':');
+ if (colon) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: if we ever update this aspect of ssh.c for
+ * IPv6 literal management, this should change in line
+ * with it.
+ */
+ *colon++ = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void rlogin_free(void *handle)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle;
+
+ if (rlogin->s)
+ sk_close(rlogin->s);
+ sfree(rlogin);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stub routine (we don't have any need to reconfigure this backend).
+ */
+static void rlogin_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to send data down the rlogin connection.
+ */
+static int rlogin_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle;
+
+ if (rlogin->s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ rlogin->bufsize = sk_write(rlogin->s, buf, len);
+
+ return rlogin->bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to query the current socket sendability status.
+ */
+static int rlogin_sendbuffer(void *handle)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle;
+ return rlogin->bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set the size of the window
+ */
+static void rlogin_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle;
+ char b[12] = { '\xFF', '\xFF', 0x73, 0x73, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+ rlogin->term_width = width;
+ rlogin->term_height = height;
+
+ if (rlogin->s == NULL || !rlogin->cansize)
+ return;
+
+ b[6] = rlogin->term_width >> 8;
+ b[7] = rlogin->term_width & 0xFF;
+ b[4] = rlogin->term_height >> 8;
+ b[5] = rlogin->term_height & 0xFF;
+ rlogin->bufsize = sk_write(rlogin->s, b, 12);
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send rlogin special codes.
+ */
+static void rlogin_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
+{
+ /* Do nothing! */
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
+ * protocol.
+ */
+static const struct telnet_special *rlogin_get_specials(void *handle)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rlogin_connected(void *handle)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle;
+ return rlogin->s != NULL;
+}
+
+static int rlogin_sendok(void *handle)
+{
+ /* Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle; */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void rlogin_unthrottle(void *handle, int backlog)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle;
+ sk_set_frozen(rlogin->s, backlog > RLOGIN_MAX_BACKLOG);
+}
+
+static int rlogin_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
+{
+ /* Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle; */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void rlogin_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
+{
+ /* This is a stub. */
+}
+
+static void rlogin_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
+{
+ /* This is a stub. */
+}
+
+static int rlogin_exitcode(void *handle)
+{
+ Rlogin rlogin = (Rlogin) handle;
+ if (rlogin->s != NULL)
+ return -1; /* still connected */
+ else
+ /* If we ever implement RSH, we'll probably need to do this properly */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cfg_info for rlogin does nothing at all.
+ */
+static int rlogin_cfg_info(void *handle)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+Backend rlogin_backend = {
+ rlogin_init,
+ rlogin_free,
+ rlogin_reconfig,
+ rlogin_send,
+ rlogin_sendbuffer,
+ rlogin_size,
+ rlogin_special,
+ rlogin_get_specials,
+ rlogin_connected,
+ rlogin_exitcode,
+ rlogin_sendok,
+ rlogin_ldisc,
+ rlogin_provide_ldisc,
+ rlogin_provide_logctx,
+ rlogin_unthrottle,
+ rlogin_cfg_info,
+ "rlogin",
+ PROT_RLOGIN,
+ 513
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/settings.c b/tools/plink/settings.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31d4e1fff --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/settings.c @@ -0,0 +1,936 @@ +/*
+ * settings.c: read and write saved sessions. (platform-independent)
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "storage.h"
+
+/*
+ * Tables of string <-> enum value mappings
+ */
+struct keyval { char *s; int v; };
+
+/* The cipher order given here is the default order. */
+static const struct keyval ciphernames[] = {
+ { "aes", CIPHER_AES },
+ { "blowfish", CIPHER_BLOWFISH },
+ { "3des", CIPHER_3DES },
+ { "WARN", CIPHER_WARN },
+ { "arcfour", CIPHER_ARCFOUR },
+ { "des", CIPHER_DES }
+};
+
+static const struct keyval kexnames[] = {
+ { "dh-gex-sha1", KEX_DHGEX },
+ { "dh-group14-sha1", KEX_DHGROUP14 },
+ { "dh-group1-sha1", KEX_DHGROUP1 },
+ { "rsa", KEX_RSA },
+ { "WARN", KEX_WARN }
+};
+
+/*
+ * All the terminal modes that we know about for the "TerminalModes"
+ * setting. (Also used by config.c for the drop-down list.)
+ * This is currently precisely the same as the set in ssh.c, but could
+ * in principle differ if other backends started to support tty modes
+ * (e.g., the pty backend).
+ */
+const char *const ttymodes[] = {
+ "INTR", "QUIT", "ERASE", "KILL", "EOF",
+ "EOL", "EOL2", "START", "STOP", "SUSP",
+ "DSUSP", "REPRINT", "WERASE", "LNEXT", "FLUSH",
+ "SWTCH", "STATUS", "DISCARD", "IGNPAR", "PARMRK",
+ "INPCK", "ISTRIP", "INLCR", "IGNCR", "ICRNL",
+ "IUCLC", "IXON", "IXANY", "IXOFF", "IMAXBEL",
+ "ISIG", "ICANON", "XCASE", "ECHO", "ECHOE",
+ "ECHOK", "ECHONL", "NOFLSH", "TOSTOP", "IEXTEN",
+ "ECHOCTL", "ECHOKE", "PENDIN", "OPOST", "OLCUC",
+ "ONLCR", "OCRNL", "ONOCR", "ONLRET", "CS7",
+ "CS8", "PARENB", "PARODD", NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * Convenience functions to access the backends[] array
+ * (which is only present in tools that manage settings).
+ */
+
+Backend *backend_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+ Backend **p;
+ for (p = backends; *p != NULL; p++)
+ if (!strcmp((*p)->name, name))
+ return *p;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Backend *backend_from_proto(int proto)
+{
+ Backend **p;
+ for (p = backends; *p != NULL; p++)
+ if ((*p)->protocol == proto)
+ return *p;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int get_remote_username(Config *cfg, char *user, size_t len)
+{
+ if (*cfg->username) {
+ strncpy(user, cfg->username, len);
+ user[len-1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ if (cfg->username_from_env) {
+ /* Use local username. */
+ char *luser = get_username();
+ strncpy(user, luser, len);
+ user[len-1] = '\0';
+ sfree(luser);
+ } else {
+ *user = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ return (*user != '\0');
+}
+
+static void gpps(void *handle, const char *name, const char *def,
+ char *val, int len)
+{
+ if (!read_setting_s(handle, name, val, len)) {
+ char *pdef;
+
+ pdef = platform_default_s(name);
+ if (pdef) {
+ strncpy(val, pdef, len);
+ sfree(pdef);
+ } else {
+ strncpy(val, def, len);
+ }
+
+ val[len - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * gppfont and gppfile cannot have local defaults, since the very
+ * format of a Filename or Font is platform-dependent. So the
+ * platform-dependent functions MUST return some sort of value.
+ */
+static void gppfont(void *handle, const char *name, FontSpec *result)
+{
+ if (!read_setting_fontspec(handle, name, result))
+ *result = platform_default_fontspec(name);
+}
+static void gppfile(void *handle, const char *name, Filename *result)
+{
+ if (!read_setting_filename(handle, name, result))
+ *result = platform_default_filename(name);
+}
+
+static void gppi(void *handle, char *name, int def, int *i)
+{
+ def = platform_default_i(name, def);
+ *i = read_setting_i(handle, name, def);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a set of name-value pairs in the format we occasionally use:
+ * NAME\tVALUE\0NAME\tVALUE\0\0 in memory
+ * NAME=VALUE,NAME=VALUE, in storage
+ * `def' is in the storage format.
+ */
+static void gppmap(void *handle, char *name, char *def, char *val, int len)
+{
+ char *buf = snewn(2*len, char), *p, *q;
+ gpps(handle, name, def, buf, 2*len);
+ p = buf;
+ q = val;
+ while (*p) {
+ while (*p && *p != ',') {
+ int c = *p++;
+ if (c == '=')
+ c = '\t';
+ if (c == '\\')
+ c = *p++;
+ *q++ = c;
+ }
+ if (*p == ',')
+ p++;
+ *q++ = '\0';
+ }
+ *q = '\0';
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a set of name/value pairs in the above format.
+ */
+static void wmap(void *handle, char const *key, char const *value, int len)
+{
+ char *buf = snewn(2*len, char), *p;
+ const char *q;
+ p = buf;
+ q = value;
+ while (*q) {
+ while (*q) {
+ int c = *q++;
+ if (c == '=' || c == ',' || c == '\\')
+ *p++ = '\\';
+ if (c == '\t')
+ c = '=';
+ *p++ = c;
+ }
+ *p++ = ',';
+ q++;
+ }
+ *p = '\0';
+ write_setting_s(handle, key, buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+static int key2val(const struct keyval *mapping, int nmaps, char *key)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < nmaps; i++)
+ if (!strcmp(mapping[i].s, key)) return mapping[i].v;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static const char *val2key(const struct keyval *mapping, int nmaps, int val)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < nmaps; i++)
+ if (mapping[i].v == val) return mapping[i].s;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to parse a comma-separated list of strings into
+ * a preference list array of values. Any missing values are added
+ * to the end and duplicates are weeded.
+ * XXX: assumes vals in 'mapping' are small +ve integers
+ */
+static void gprefs(void *sesskey, char *name, char *def,
+ const struct keyval *mapping, int nvals,
+ int *array)
+{
+ char commalist[80];
+ char *tokarg = commalist;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long seen = 0; /* bitmap for weeding dups etc */
+ gpps(sesskey, name, def, commalist, sizeof(commalist));
+
+ /* Grotty parsing of commalist. */
+ n = 0;
+ do {
+ int v;
+ char *key;
+ key = strtok(tokarg, ","); /* sorry */
+ tokarg = NULL;
+ if (!key) break;
+ if (((v = key2val(mapping, nvals, key)) != -1) &&
+ !(seen & 1<<v)) {
+ array[n] = v;
+ n++;
+ seen |= 1<<v;
+ }
+ } while (n < nvals);
+ /* Add any missing values (backward compatibility ect). */
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < nvals; i++) {
+ assert(mapping[i].v < 32);
+ if (!(seen & 1<<mapping[i].v)) {
+ array[n] = mapping[i].v;
+ n++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write out a preference list.
+ */
+static void wprefs(void *sesskey, char *name,
+ const struct keyval *mapping, int nvals,
+ int *array)
+{
+ char buf[80] = ""; /* XXX assumed big enough */
+ int l = sizeof(buf)-1, i;
+ buf[l] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; l > 0 && i < nvals; i++) {
+ const char *s = val2key(mapping, nvals, array[i]);
+ if (s) {
+ int sl = strlen(s);
+ if (i > 0) {
+ strncat(buf, ",", l);
+ l--;
+ }
+ strncat(buf, s, l);
+ l -= sl;
+ }
+ }
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, name, buf);
+}
+
+char *save_settings(char *section, Config * cfg)
+{
+ void *sesskey;
+ char *errmsg;
+
+ sesskey = open_settings_w(section, &errmsg);
+ if (!sesskey)
+ return errmsg;
+ save_open_settings(sesskey, cfg);
+ close_settings_w(sesskey);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void save_open_settings(void *sesskey, Config *cfg)
+{
+ int i;
+ char *p;
+
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "Present", 1);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "HostName", cfg->host);
+ write_setting_filename(sesskey, "LogFileName", cfg->logfilename);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LogType", cfg->logtype);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LogFileClash", cfg->logxfovr);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LogFlush", cfg->logflush);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SSHLogOmitPasswords", cfg->logomitpass);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SSHLogOmitData", cfg->logomitdata);
+ p = "raw";
+ {
+ const Backend *b = backend_from_proto(cfg->protocol);
+ if (b)
+ p = b->name;
+ }
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "Protocol", p);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "PortNumber", cfg->port);
+ /* The CloseOnExit numbers are arranged in a different order from
+ * the standard FORCE_ON / FORCE_OFF / AUTO. */
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "CloseOnExit", (cfg->close_on_exit+2)%3);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "WarnOnClose", !!cfg->warn_on_close);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "PingInterval", cfg->ping_interval / 60); /* minutes */
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "PingIntervalSecs", cfg->ping_interval % 60); /* seconds */
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TCPNoDelay", cfg->tcp_nodelay);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TCPKeepalives", cfg->tcp_keepalives);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "TerminalType", cfg->termtype);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "TerminalSpeed", cfg->termspeed);
+ wmap(sesskey, "TerminalModes", cfg->ttymodes, lenof(cfg->ttymodes));
+
+ /* Address family selection */
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AddressFamily", cfg->addressfamily);
+
+ /* proxy settings */
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "ProxyExcludeList", cfg->proxy_exclude_list);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ProxyDNS", (cfg->proxy_dns+2)%3);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ProxyLocalhost", cfg->even_proxy_localhost);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ProxyMethod", cfg->proxy_type);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "ProxyHost", cfg->proxy_host);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ProxyPort", cfg->proxy_port);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "ProxyUsername", cfg->proxy_username);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "ProxyPassword", cfg->proxy_password);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "ProxyTelnetCommand", cfg->proxy_telnet_command);
+ wmap(sesskey, "Environment", cfg->environmt, lenof(cfg->environmt));
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "UserName", cfg->username);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "UserNameFromEnvironment", cfg->username_from_env);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "LocalUserName", cfg->localusername);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoPTY", cfg->nopty);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "Compression", cfg->compression);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TryAgent", cfg->tryagent);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AgentFwd", cfg->agentfwd);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "GssapiFwd", cfg->gssapifwd);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ChangeUsername", cfg->change_username);
+ wprefs(sesskey, "Cipher", ciphernames, CIPHER_MAX,
+ cfg->ssh_cipherlist);
+ wprefs(sesskey, "KEX", kexnames, KEX_MAX, cfg->ssh_kexlist);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "RekeyTime", cfg->ssh_rekey_time);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "RekeyBytes", cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SshNoAuth", cfg->ssh_no_userauth);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AuthTIS", cfg->try_tis_auth);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AuthKI", cfg->try_ki_auth);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AuthGSSAPI", cfg->try_gssapi_auth);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SshNoShell", cfg->ssh_no_shell);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SshProt", cfg->sshprot);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "LogHost", cfg->loghost);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SSH2DES", cfg->ssh2_des_cbc);
+ write_setting_filename(sesskey, "PublicKeyFile", cfg->keyfile);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "RemoteCommand", cfg->remote_cmd);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "RFCEnviron", cfg->rfc_environ);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "PassiveTelnet", cfg->passive_telnet);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BackspaceIsDelete", cfg->bksp_is_delete);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "RXVTHomeEnd", cfg->rxvt_homeend);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LinuxFunctionKeys", cfg->funky_type);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoApplicationKeys", cfg->no_applic_k);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoApplicationCursors", cfg->no_applic_c);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoMouseReporting", cfg->no_mouse_rep);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoRemoteResize", cfg->no_remote_resize);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoAltScreen", cfg->no_alt_screen);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoRemoteWinTitle", cfg->no_remote_wintitle);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "RemoteQTitleAction", cfg->remote_qtitle_action);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoDBackspace", cfg->no_dbackspace);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NoRemoteCharset", cfg->no_remote_charset);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ApplicationCursorKeys", cfg->app_cursor);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ApplicationKeypad", cfg->app_keypad);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "NetHackKeypad", cfg->nethack_keypad);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AltF4", cfg->alt_f4);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AltSpace", cfg->alt_space);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AltOnly", cfg->alt_only);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ComposeKey", cfg->compose_key);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "CtrlAltKeys", cfg->ctrlaltkeys);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TelnetKey", cfg->telnet_keyboard);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TelnetRet", cfg->telnet_newline);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LocalEcho", cfg->localecho);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LocalEdit", cfg->localedit);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "Answerback", cfg->answerback);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AlwaysOnTop", cfg->alwaysontop);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "FullScreenOnAltEnter", cfg->fullscreenonaltenter);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "HideMousePtr", cfg->hide_mouseptr);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SunkenEdge", cfg->sunken_edge);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "WindowBorder", cfg->window_border);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "CurType", cfg->cursor_type);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BlinkCur", cfg->blink_cur);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "Beep", cfg->beep);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BeepInd", cfg->beep_ind);
+ write_setting_filename(sesskey, "BellWaveFile", cfg->bell_wavefile);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BellOverload", cfg->bellovl);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BellOverloadN", cfg->bellovl_n);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BellOverloadT", cfg->bellovl_t
+#ifdef PUTTY_UNIX_H
+ * 1000
+#endif
+ );
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BellOverloadS", cfg->bellovl_s
+#ifdef PUTTY_UNIX_H
+ * 1000
+#endif
+ );
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ScrollbackLines", cfg->savelines);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "DECOriginMode", cfg->dec_om);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "AutoWrapMode", cfg->wrap_mode);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LFImpliesCR", cfg->lfhascr);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "CRImpliesLF", cfg->crhaslf);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "DisableArabicShaping", cfg->arabicshaping);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "DisableBidi", cfg->bidi);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "WinNameAlways", cfg->win_name_always);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "WinTitle", cfg->wintitle);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TermWidth", cfg->width);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TermHeight", cfg->height);
+ write_setting_fontspec(sesskey, "Font", cfg->font);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "FontQuality", cfg->font_quality);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "FontVTMode", cfg->vtmode);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "UseSystemColours", cfg->system_colour);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "TryPalette", cfg->try_palette);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ANSIColour", cfg->ansi_colour);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "Xterm256Colour", cfg->xterm_256_colour);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BoldAsColour", cfg->bold_colour);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 22; i++) {
+ char buf[20], buf2[30];
+ sprintf(buf, "Colour%d", i);
+ sprintf(buf2, "%d,%d,%d", cfg->colours[i][0],
+ cfg->colours[i][1], cfg->colours[i][2]);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, buf, buf2);
+ }
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "RawCNP", cfg->rawcnp);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "PasteRTF", cfg->rtf_paste);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "MouseIsXterm", cfg->mouse_is_xterm);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "RectSelect", cfg->rect_select);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "MouseOverride", cfg->mouse_override);
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 32) {
+ char buf[20], buf2[256];
+ int j;
+ sprintf(buf, "Wordness%d", i);
+ *buf2 = '\0';
+ for (j = i; j < i + 32; j++) {
+ sprintf(buf2 + strlen(buf2), "%s%d",
+ (*buf2 ? "," : ""), cfg->wordness[j]);
+ }
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, buf, buf2);
+ }
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "LineCodePage", cfg->line_codepage);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "CJKAmbigWide", cfg->cjk_ambig_wide);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "UTF8Override", cfg->utf8_override);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "Printer", cfg->printer);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "CapsLockCyr", cfg->xlat_capslockcyr);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ScrollBar", cfg->scrollbar);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ScrollBarFullScreen", cfg->scrollbar_in_fullscreen);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ScrollOnKey", cfg->scroll_on_key);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ScrollOnDisp", cfg->scroll_on_disp);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "EraseToScrollback", cfg->erase_to_scrollback);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LockSize", cfg->resize_action);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BCE", cfg->bce);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BlinkText", cfg->blinktext);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "X11Forward", cfg->x11_forward);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "X11Display", cfg->x11_display);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "X11AuthType", cfg->x11_auth);
+ write_setting_filename(sesskey, "X11AuthFile", cfg->xauthfile);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LocalPortAcceptAll", cfg->lport_acceptall);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "RemotePortAcceptAll", cfg->rport_acceptall);
+ wmap(sesskey, "PortForwardings", cfg->portfwd, lenof(cfg->portfwd));
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugIgnore1", 2-cfg->sshbug_ignore1);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugPlainPW1", 2-cfg->sshbug_plainpw1);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugRSA1", 2-cfg->sshbug_rsa1);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugHMAC2", 2-cfg->sshbug_hmac2);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugDeriveKey2", 2-cfg->sshbug_derivekey2);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugRSAPad2", 2-cfg->sshbug_rsapad2);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugPKSessID2", 2-cfg->sshbug_pksessid2);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugRekey2", 2-cfg->sshbug_rekey2);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "BugMaxPkt2", 2-cfg->sshbug_maxpkt2);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "StampUtmp", cfg->stamp_utmp);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "LoginShell", cfg->login_shell);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ScrollbarOnLeft", cfg->scrollbar_on_left);
+ write_setting_fontspec(sesskey, "BoldFont", cfg->boldfont);
+ write_setting_fontspec(sesskey, "WideFont", cfg->widefont);
+ write_setting_fontspec(sesskey, "WideBoldFont", cfg->wideboldfont);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ShadowBold", cfg->shadowbold);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "ShadowBoldOffset", cfg->shadowboldoffset);
+ write_setting_s(sesskey, "SerialLine", cfg->serline);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SerialSpeed", cfg->serspeed);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SerialDataBits", cfg->serdatabits);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SerialStopHalfbits", cfg->serstopbits);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SerialParity", cfg->serparity);
+ write_setting_i(sesskey, "SerialFlowControl", cfg->serflow);
+}
+
+void load_settings(char *section, Config * cfg)
+{
+ void *sesskey;
+
+ sesskey = open_settings_r(section);
+ load_open_settings(sesskey, cfg);
+ close_settings_r(sesskey);
+}
+
+void load_open_settings(void *sesskey, Config *cfg)
+{
+ int i;
+ char prot[10];
+
+ cfg->ssh_subsys = 0; /* FIXME: load this properly */
+ cfg->remote_cmd_ptr = NULL;
+ cfg->remote_cmd_ptr2 = NULL;
+ cfg->ssh_nc_host[0] = '\0';
+
+ gpps(sesskey, "HostName", "", cfg->host, sizeof(cfg->host));
+ gppfile(sesskey, "LogFileName", &cfg->logfilename);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LogType", 0, &cfg->logtype);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LogFileClash", LGXF_ASK, &cfg->logxfovr);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LogFlush", 1, &cfg->logflush);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SSHLogOmitPasswords", 1, &cfg->logomitpass);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SSHLogOmitData", 0, &cfg->logomitdata);
+
+ gpps(sesskey, "Protocol", "default", prot, 10);
+ cfg->protocol = default_protocol;
+ cfg->port = default_port;
+ {
+ const Backend *b = backend_from_name(prot);
+ if (b) {
+ cfg->protocol = b->protocol;
+ gppi(sesskey, "PortNumber", default_port, &cfg->port);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Address family selection */
+ gppi(sesskey, "AddressFamily", ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC, &cfg->addressfamily);
+
+ /* The CloseOnExit numbers are arranged in a different order from
+ * the standard FORCE_ON / FORCE_OFF / AUTO. */
+ gppi(sesskey, "CloseOnExit", 1, &i); cfg->close_on_exit = (i+1)%3;
+ gppi(sesskey, "WarnOnClose", 1, &cfg->warn_on_close);
+ {
+ /* This is two values for backward compatibility with 0.50/0.51 */
+ int pingmin, pingsec;
+ gppi(sesskey, "PingInterval", 0, &pingmin);
+ gppi(sesskey, "PingIntervalSecs", 0, &pingsec);
+ cfg->ping_interval = pingmin * 60 + pingsec;
+ }
+ gppi(sesskey, "TCPNoDelay", 1, &cfg->tcp_nodelay);
+ gppi(sesskey, "TCPKeepalives", 0, &cfg->tcp_keepalives);
+ gpps(sesskey, "TerminalType", "xterm", cfg->termtype,
+ sizeof(cfg->termtype));
+ gpps(sesskey, "TerminalSpeed", "38400,38400", cfg->termspeed,
+ sizeof(cfg->termspeed));
+ {
+ /* This hardcodes a big set of defaults in any new saved
+ * sessions. Let's hope we don't change our mind. */
+ int i;
+ char *def = dupstr("");
+ /* Default: all set to "auto" */
+ for (i = 0; ttymodes[i]; i++) {
+ char *def2 = dupprintf("%s%s=A,", def, ttymodes[i]);
+ sfree(def);
+ def = def2;
+ }
+ gppmap(sesskey, "TerminalModes", def,
+ cfg->ttymodes, lenof(cfg->ttymodes));
+ sfree(def);
+ }
+
+ /* proxy settings */
+ gpps(sesskey, "ProxyExcludeList", "", cfg->proxy_exclude_list,
+ sizeof(cfg->proxy_exclude_list));
+ gppi(sesskey, "ProxyDNS", 1, &i); cfg->proxy_dns = (i+1)%3;
+ gppi(sesskey, "ProxyLocalhost", 0, &cfg->even_proxy_localhost);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ProxyMethod", -1, &cfg->proxy_type);
+ if (cfg->proxy_type == -1) {
+ int i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "ProxyType", 0, &i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ cfg->proxy_type = PROXY_NONE;
+ else if (i == 1)
+ cfg->proxy_type = PROXY_HTTP;
+ else if (i == 3)
+ cfg->proxy_type = PROXY_TELNET;
+ else if (i == 4)
+ cfg->proxy_type = PROXY_CMD;
+ else {
+ gppi(sesskey, "ProxySOCKSVersion", 5, &i);
+ if (i == 5)
+ cfg->proxy_type = PROXY_SOCKS5;
+ else
+ cfg->proxy_type = PROXY_SOCKS4;
+ }
+ }
+ gpps(sesskey, "ProxyHost", "proxy", cfg->proxy_host,
+ sizeof(cfg->proxy_host));
+ gppi(sesskey, "ProxyPort", 80, &cfg->proxy_port);
+ gpps(sesskey, "ProxyUsername", "", cfg->proxy_username,
+ sizeof(cfg->proxy_username));
+ gpps(sesskey, "ProxyPassword", "", cfg->proxy_password,
+ sizeof(cfg->proxy_password));
+ gpps(sesskey, "ProxyTelnetCommand", "connect %host %port\\n",
+ cfg->proxy_telnet_command, sizeof(cfg->proxy_telnet_command));
+ gppmap(sesskey, "Environment", "", cfg->environmt, lenof(cfg->environmt));
+ gpps(sesskey, "UserName", "", cfg->username, sizeof(cfg->username));
+ gppi(sesskey, "UserNameFromEnvironment", 0, &cfg->username_from_env);
+ gpps(sesskey, "LocalUserName", "", cfg->localusername,
+ sizeof(cfg->localusername));
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoPTY", 0, &cfg->nopty);
+ gppi(sesskey, "Compression", 0, &cfg->compression);
+ gppi(sesskey, "TryAgent", 1, &cfg->tryagent);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AgentFwd", 0, &cfg->agentfwd);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ChangeUsername", 0, &cfg->change_username);
+ gppi(sesskey, "GssapiFwd", 0, &cfg->gssapifwd);
+ gprefs(sesskey, "Cipher", "\0",
+ ciphernames, CIPHER_MAX, cfg->ssh_cipherlist);
+ {
+ /* Backward-compatibility: we used to have an option to
+ * disable gex under the "bugs" panel after one report of
+ * a server which offered it then choked, but we never got
+ * a server version string or any other reports. */
+ char *default_kexes;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugDHGEx2", 0, &i); i = 2-i;
+ if (i == FORCE_ON)
+ default_kexes = "dh-group14-sha1,dh-group1-sha1,rsa,WARN,dh-gex-sha1";
+ else
+ default_kexes = "dh-gex-sha1,dh-group14-sha1,dh-group1-sha1,rsa,WARN";
+ gprefs(sesskey, "KEX", default_kexes,
+ kexnames, KEX_MAX, cfg->ssh_kexlist);
+ }
+ gppi(sesskey, "RekeyTime", 60, &cfg->ssh_rekey_time);
+ gpps(sesskey, "RekeyBytes", "1G", cfg->ssh_rekey_data,
+ sizeof(cfg->ssh_rekey_data));
+ gppi(sesskey, "SshProt", 2, &cfg->sshprot);
+ gpps(sesskey, "LogHost", "", cfg->loghost, sizeof(cfg->loghost));
+ gppi(sesskey, "SSH2DES", 0, &cfg->ssh2_des_cbc);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SshNoAuth", 0, &cfg->ssh_no_userauth);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AuthTIS", 0, &cfg->try_tis_auth);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AuthKI", 1, &cfg->try_ki_auth);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AuthGSSAPI", 1, &cfg->try_gssapi_auth);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SshNoShell", 0, &cfg->ssh_no_shell);
+ gppfile(sesskey, "PublicKeyFile", &cfg->keyfile);
+ gpps(sesskey, "RemoteCommand", "", cfg->remote_cmd,
+ sizeof(cfg->remote_cmd));
+ gppi(sesskey, "RFCEnviron", 0, &cfg->rfc_environ);
+ gppi(sesskey, "PassiveTelnet", 0, &cfg->passive_telnet);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BackspaceIsDelete", 1, &cfg->bksp_is_delete);
+ gppi(sesskey, "RXVTHomeEnd", 0, &cfg->rxvt_homeend);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LinuxFunctionKeys", 0, &cfg->funky_type);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoApplicationKeys", 0, &cfg->no_applic_k);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoApplicationCursors", 0, &cfg->no_applic_c);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoMouseReporting", 0, &cfg->no_mouse_rep);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoRemoteResize", 0, &cfg->no_remote_resize);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoAltScreen", 0, &cfg->no_alt_screen);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoRemoteWinTitle", 0, &cfg->no_remote_wintitle);
+ {
+ /* Backward compatibility */
+ int no_remote_qtitle;
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoRemoteQTitle", 1, &no_remote_qtitle);
+ /* We deliberately interpret the old setting of "no response" as
+ * "empty string". This changes the behaviour, but hopefully for
+ * the better; the user can always recover the old behaviour. */
+ gppi(sesskey, "RemoteQTitleAction",
+ no_remote_qtitle ? TITLE_EMPTY : TITLE_REAL,
+ &cfg->remote_qtitle_action);
+ }
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoDBackspace", 0, &cfg->no_dbackspace);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NoRemoteCharset", 0, &cfg->no_remote_charset);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ApplicationCursorKeys", 0, &cfg->app_cursor);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ApplicationKeypad", 0, &cfg->app_keypad);
+ gppi(sesskey, "NetHackKeypad", 0, &cfg->nethack_keypad);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AltF4", 1, &cfg->alt_f4);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AltSpace", 0, &cfg->alt_space);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AltOnly", 0, &cfg->alt_only);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ComposeKey", 0, &cfg->compose_key);
+ gppi(sesskey, "CtrlAltKeys", 1, &cfg->ctrlaltkeys);
+ gppi(sesskey, "TelnetKey", 0, &cfg->telnet_keyboard);
+ gppi(sesskey, "TelnetRet", 1, &cfg->telnet_newline);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LocalEcho", AUTO, &cfg->localecho);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LocalEdit", AUTO, &cfg->localedit);
+ gpps(sesskey, "Answerback", "PuTTY", cfg->answerback,
+ sizeof(cfg->answerback));
+ gppi(sesskey, "AlwaysOnTop", 0, &cfg->alwaysontop);
+ gppi(sesskey, "FullScreenOnAltEnter", 0, &cfg->fullscreenonaltenter);
+ gppi(sesskey, "HideMousePtr", 0, &cfg->hide_mouseptr);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SunkenEdge", 0, &cfg->sunken_edge);
+ gppi(sesskey, "WindowBorder", 1, &cfg->window_border);
+ gppi(sesskey, "CurType", 0, &cfg->cursor_type);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BlinkCur", 0, &cfg->blink_cur);
+ /* pedantic compiler tells me I can't use &cfg->beep as an int * :-) */
+ gppi(sesskey, "Beep", 1, &cfg->beep);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BeepInd", 0, &cfg->beep_ind);
+ gppfile(sesskey, "BellWaveFile", &cfg->bell_wavefile);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BellOverload", 1, &cfg->bellovl);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BellOverloadN", 5, &cfg->bellovl_n);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BellOverloadT", 2*TICKSPERSEC
+#ifdef PUTTY_UNIX_H
+ *1000
+#endif
+ , &i);
+ cfg->bellovl_t = i
+#ifdef PUTTY_UNIX_H
+ / 1000
+#endif
+ ;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BellOverloadS", 5*TICKSPERSEC
+#ifdef PUTTY_UNIX_H
+ *1000
+#endif
+ , &i);
+ cfg->bellovl_s = i
+#ifdef PUTTY_UNIX_H
+ / 1000
+#endif
+ ;
+ gppi(sesskey, "ScrollbackLines", 200, &cfg->savelines);
+ gppi(sesskey, "DECOriginMode", 0, &cfg->dec_om);
+ gppi(sesskey, "AutoWrapMode", 1, &cfg->wrap_mode);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LFImpliesCR", 0, &cfg->lfhascr);
+ gppi(sesskey, "CRImpliesLF", 0, &cfg->crhaslf);
+ gppi(sesskey, "DisableArabicShaping", 0, &cfg->arabicshaping);
+ gppi(sesskey, "DisableBidi", 0, &cfg->bidi);
+ gppi(sesskey, "WinNameAlways", 1, &cfg->win_name_always);
+ gpps(sesskey, "WinTitle", "", cfg->wintitle, sizeof(cfg->wintitle));
+ gppi(sesskey, "TermWidth", 80, &cfg->width);
+ gppi(sesskey, "TermHeight", 24, &cfg->height);
+ gppfont(sesskey, "Font", &cfg->font);
+ gppi(sesskey, "FontQuality", FQ_DEFAULT, &cfg->font_quality);
+ gppi(sesskey, "FontVTMode", VT_UNICODE, (int *) &cfg->vtmode);
+ gppi(sesskey, "UseSystemColours", 0, &cfg->system_colour);
+ gppi(sesskey, "TryPalette", 0, &cfg->try_palette);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ANSIColour", 1, &cfg->ansi_colour);
+ gppi(sesskey, "Xterm256Colour", 1, &cfg->xterm_256_colour);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BoldAsColour", 1, &cfg->bold_colour);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 22; i++) {
+ static const char *const defaults[] = {
+ "187,187,187", "255,255,255", "0,0,0", "85,85,85", "0,0,0",
+ "0,255,0", "0,0,0", "85,85,85", "187,0,0", "255,85,85",
+ "0,187,0", "85,255,85", "187,187,0", "255,255,85", "0,0,187",
+ "85,85,255", "187,0,187", "255,85,255", "0,187,187",
+ "85,255,255", "187,187,187", "255,255,255"
+ };
+ char buf[20], buf2[30];
+ int c0, c1, c2;
+ sprintf(buf, "Colour%d", i);
+ gpps(sesskey, buf, defaults[i], buf2, sizeof(buf2));
+ if (sscanf(buf2, "%d,%d,%d", &c0, &c1, &c2) == 3) {
+ cfg->colours[i][0] = c0;
+ cfg->colours[i][1] = c1;
+ cfg->colours[i][2] = c2;
+ }
+ }
+ gppi(sesskey, "RawCNP", 0, &cfg->rawcnp);
+ gppi(sesskey, "PasteRTF", 0, &cfg->rtf_paste);
+ gppi(sesskey, "MouseIsXterm", 0, &cfg->mouse_is_xterm);
+ gppi(sesskey, "RectSelect", 0, &cfg->rect_select);
+ gppi(sesskey, "MouseOverride", 1, &cfg->mouse_override);
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 32) {
+ static const char *const defaults[] = {
+ "0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0",
+ "0,1,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1",
+ "1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,2",
+ "1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1",
+ "1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1",
+ "1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1",
+ "2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2",
+ "2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2"
+ };
+ char buf[20], buf2[256], *p;
+ int j;
+ sprintf(buf, "Wordness%d", i);
+ gpps(sesskey, buf, defaults[i / 32], buf2, sizeof(buf2));
+ p = buf2;
+ for (j = i; j < i + 32; j++) {
+ char *q = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ',')
+ p++;
+ if (*p == ',')
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ cfg->wordness[j] = atoi(q);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * The empty default for LineCodePage will be converted later
+ * into a plausible default for the locale.
+ */
+ gpps(sesskey, "LineCodePage", "", cfg->line_codepage,
+ sizeof(cfg->line_codepage));
+ gppi(sesskey, "CJKAmbigWide", 0, &cfg->cjk_ambig_wide);
+ gppi(sesskey, "UTF8Override", 1, &cfg->utf8_override);
+ gpps(sesskey, "Printer", "", cfg->printer, sizeof(cfg->printer));
+ gppi (sesskey, "CapsLockCyr", 0, &cfg->xlat_capslockcyr);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ScrollBar", 1, &cfg->scrollbar);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ScrollBarFullScreen", 0, &cfg->scrollbar_in_fullscreen);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ScrollOnKey", 0, &cfg->scroll_on_key);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ScrollOnDisp", 1, &cfg->scroll_on_disp);
+ gppi(sesskey, "EraseToScrollback", 1, &cfg->erase_to_scrollback);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LockSize", 0, &cfg->resize_action);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BCE", 1, &cfg->bce);
+ gppi(sesskey, "BlinkText", 0, &cfg->blinktext);
+ gppi(sesskey, "X11Forward", 0, &cfg->x11_forward);
+ gpps(sesskey, "X11Display", "", cfg->x11_display,
+ sizeof(cfg->x11_display));
+ gppi(sesskey, "X11AuthType", X11_MIT, &cfg->x11_auth);
+ gppfile(sesskey, "X11AuthFile", &cfg->xauthfile);
+
+ gppi(sesskey, "LocalPortAcceptAll", 0, &cfg->lport_acceptall);
+ gppi(sesskey, "RemotePortAcceptAll", 0, &cfg->rport_acceptall);
+ gppmap(sesskey, "PortForwardings", "", cfg->portfwd, lenof(cfg->portfwd));
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugIgnore1", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_ignore1 = 2-i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugPlainPW1", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_plainpw1 = 2-i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugRSA1", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_rsa1 = 2-i;
+ {
+ int i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugHMAC2", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_hmac2 = 2-i;
+ if (cfg->sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO) {
+ gppi(sesskey, "BuggyMAC", 0, &i);
+ if (i == 1)
+ cfg->sshbug_hmac2 = FORCE_ON;
+ }
+ }
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugDeriveKey2", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_derivekey2 = 2-i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugRSAPad2", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_rsapad2 = 2-i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugPKSessID2", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_pksessid2 = 2-i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugRekey2", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_rekey2 = 2-i;
+ gppi(sesskey, "BugMaxPkt2", 0, &i); cfg->sshbug_maxpkt2 = 2-i;
+ cfg->ssh_simple = FALSE;
+ gppi(sesskey, "StampUtmp", 1, &cfg->stamp_utmp);
+ gppi(sesskey, "LoginShell", 1, &cfg->login_shell);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ScrollbarOnLeft", 0, &cfg->scrollbar_on_left);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ShadowBold", 0, &cfg->shadowbold);
+ gppfont(sesskey, "BoldFont", &cfg->boldfont);
+ gppfont(sesskey, "WideFont", &cfg->widefont);
+ gppfont(sesskey, "WideBoldFont", &cfg->wideboldfont);
+ gppi(sesskey, "ShadowBoldOffset", 1, &cfg->shadowboldoffset);
+ gpps(sesskey, "SerialLine", "", cfg->serline, sizeof(cfg->serline));
+ gppi(sesskey, "SerialSpeed", 9600, &cfg->serspeed);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SerialDataBits", 8, &cfg->serdatabits);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SerialStopHalfbits", 2, &cfg->serstopbits);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SerialParity", SER_PAR_NONE, &cfg->serparity);
+ gppi(sesskey, "SerialFlowControl", SER_FLOW_XONXOFF, &cfg->serflow);
+}
+
+void do_defaults(char *session, Config * cfg)
+{
+ load_settings(session, cfg);
+}
+
+static int sessioncmp(const void *av, const void *bv)
+{
+ const char *a = *(const char *const *) av;
+ const char *b = *(const char *const *) bv;
+
+ /*
+ * Alphabetical order, except that "Default Settings" is a
+ * special case and comes first.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(a, "Default Settings"))
+ return -1; /* a comes first */
+ if (!strcmp(b, "Default Settings"))
+ return +1; /* b comes first */
+ /*
+ * FIXME: perhaps we should ignore the first & in determining
+ * sort order.
+ */
+ return strcmp(a, b); /* otherwise, compare normally */
+}
+
+void get_sesslist(struct sesslist *list, int allocate)
+{
+ char otherbuf[2048];
+ int buflen, bufsize, i;
+ char *p, *ret;
+ void *handle;
+
+ if (allocate) {
+
+ buflen = bufsize = 0;
+ list->buffer = NULL;
+ if ((handle = enum_settings_start()) != NULL) {
+ do {
+ ret = enum_settings_next(handle, otherbuf, sizeof(otherbuf));
+ if (ret) {
+ int len = strlen(otherbuf) + 1;
+ if (bufsize < buflen + len) {
+ bufsize = buflen + len + 2048;
+ list->buffer = sresize(list->buffer, bufsize, char);
+ }
+ strcpy(list->buffer + buflen, otherbuf);
+ buflen += strlen(list->buffer + buflen) + 1;
+ }
+ } while (ret);
+ enum_settings_finish(handle);
+ }
+ list->buffer = sresize(list->buffer, buflen + 1, char);
+ list->buffer[buflen] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Now set up the list of sessions. Note that "Default
+ * Settings" must always be claimed to exist, even if it
+ * doesn't really.
+ */
+
+ p = list->buffer;
+ list->nsessions = 1; /* "Default Settings" counts as one */
+ while (*p) {
+ if (strcmp(p, "Default Settings"))
+ list->nsessions++;
+ while (*p)
+ p++;
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ list->sessions = snewn(list->nsessions + 1, char *);
+ list->sessions[0] = "Default Settings";
+ p = list->buffer;
+ i = 1;
+ while (*p) {
+ if (strcmp(p, "Default Settings"))
+ list->sessions[i++] = p;
+ while (*p)
+ p++;
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ qsort(list->sessions, i, sizeof(char *), sessioncmp);
+ } else {
+ sfree(list->buffer);
+ sfree(list->sessions);
+ list->buffer = NULL;
+ list->sessions = NULL;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/ssh.c b/tools/plink/ssh.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..89c0433ca --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/ssh.c @@ -0,0 +1,9737 @@ +/*
+ * SSH backend.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+#include "sshgss.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+
+#define SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* 0x2 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* 0x3 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_USER 4 /* 0x4 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* 0x6 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* 0x7 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* 0x8 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* 0x9 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* 0xa */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* 0xb */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* 0xc */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* 0xd */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* 0xe */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* 0xf */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* 0x10 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* 0x11 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* 0x12 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_EOF 19 /* 0x13 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS 20 /* 0x14 */
+#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* 0x15 */
+#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* 0x16 */
+#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* 0x17 */
+#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* 0x18 */
+#define SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* 0x19 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* 0x1b */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* 0x1c */
+#define SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* 0x1d */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* 0x1e */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* 0x1f */
+#define SSH1_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* 0x20 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* 0x21 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* 0x22 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* 0x23 */
+#define SSH1_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* 0x24 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* 0x25 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* 0x27 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* 0x28 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* 0x29 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD 70 /* 0x46 */
+#define SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE 71 /* 0x47 */
+#define SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE 72 /* 0x48 */
+
+#define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 /* 0x1 */
+#define SSH1_AUTH_RSA 2 /* 0x2 */
+#define SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 /* 0x3 */
+#define SSH1_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 /* 0x4 */
+#define SSH1_AUTH_TIS 5 /* 0x5 */
+#define SSH1_AUTH_CCARD 16 /* 0x10 */
+
+#define SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* 0x1 */
+/* Mask for protoflags we will echo back to server if seen */
+#define SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED 0 /* 0x1 */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 /* 0x2 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 /* 0x3 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 /* 0x4 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 /* 0x5 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 /* 0x6 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 /* 0x14 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 /* 0x15 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 /* 0x1e */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 /* 0x1f */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 30 /* 0x1e */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 /* 0x1f */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 /* 0x20 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 /* 0x21 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30 /* 0x1e */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31 /* 0x1f */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32 /* 0x20 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 /* 0x32 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 /* 0x33 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 /* 0x34 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 /* 0x35 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 /* 0x3c */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 /* 0x3c */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 /* 0x3c */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 /* 0x3d */
+#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 /* 0x50 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 /* 0x51 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 /* 0x52 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 /* 0x5a */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 /* 0x5b */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 /* 0x5c */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 /* 0x5d */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 /* 0x5e */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 /* 0x5f */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 /* 0x60 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 /* 0x61 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 /* 0x62 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 /* 0x63 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 /* 0x64 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
+
+/*
+ * Packet type contexts, so that ssh2_pkt_type can correctly decode
+ * the ambiguous type numbers back into the correct type strings.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX
+} Pkt_KCtx;
+typedef enum {
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI,
+ SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER
+} Pkt_ACtx;
+
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 /* 0x1 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 /* 0x2 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 /* 0x3 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 /* 0x4 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 /* 0x5 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 /* 0x6 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 /* 0x7 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 /* 0x8 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 /* 0x9 */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 /* 0xa */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 /* 0xb */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 /* 0xc */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 /* 0xd */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 /* 0xe */
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 /* 0xf */
+
+static const char *const ssh2_disconnect_reasons[] = {
+ NULL,
+ "host not allowed to connect",
+ "protocol error",
+ "key exchange failed",
+ "host authentication failed",
+ "MAC error",
+ "compression error",
+ "service not available",
+ "protocol version not supported",
+ "host key not verifiable",
+ "connection lost",
+ "by application",
+ "too many connections",
+ "auth cancelled by user",
+ "no more auth methods available",
+ "illegal user name",
+};
+
+#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 /* 0x1 */
+#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 /* 0x2 */
+#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 /* 0x3 */
+#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 /* 0x4 */
+
+#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 /* 0x1 */
+
+/*
+ * Various remote-bug flags.
+ */
+#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE 1
+#define BUG_SSH2_HMAC 2
+#define BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD 4
+#define BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA 8
+#define BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING 16
+#define BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY 32
+#define BUG_SSH2_REKEY 64
+#define BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID 128
+#define BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT 256
+
+/*
+ * Codes for terminal modes.
+ * Most of these are the same in SSH-1 and SSH-2.
+ * This list is derived from RFC 4254 and
+ * SSH-1 RFC-1.2.31.
+ */
+static const struct {
+ const char* const mode;
+ int opcode;
+ enum { TTY_OP_CHAR, TTY_OP_BOOL } type;
+} ssh_ttymodes[] = {
+ /* "V" prefix discarded for special characters relative to SSH specs */
+ { "INTR", 1, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "QUIT", 2, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "ERASE", 3, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "KILL", 4, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "EOF", 5, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "EOL", 6, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "EOL2", 7, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "START", 8, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "STOP", 9, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "SUSP", 10, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "DSUSP", 11, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "REPRINT", 12, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "WERASE", 13, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "LNEXT", 14, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "FLUSH", 15, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "SWTCH", 16, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "STATUS", 17, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "DISCARD", 18, TTY_OP_CHAR },
+ { "IGNPAR", 30, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PARMRK", 31, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "INPCK", 32, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ISTRIP", 33, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "INLCR", 34, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IGNCR", 35, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ICRNL", 36, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IUCLC", 37, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IXON", 38, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IXANY", 39, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IXOFF", 40, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IMAXBEL", 41, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ISIG", 50, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ICANON", 51, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "XCASE", 52, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHO", 53, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOE", 54, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOK", 55, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHONL", 56, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "NOFLSH", 57, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "TOSTOP", 58, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "IEXTEN", 59, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOCTL", 60, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ECHOKE", 61, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PENDIN", 62, TTY_OP_BOOL }, /* XXX is this a real mode? */
+ { "OPOST", 70, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "OLCUC", 71, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ONLCR", 72, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "OCRNL", 73, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ONOCR", 74, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "ONLRET", 75, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "CS7", 90, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "CS8", 91, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PARENB", 92, TTY_OP_BOOL },
+ { "PARODD", 93, TTY_OP_BOOL }
+};
+
+/* Miscellaneous other tty-related constants. */
+#define SSH_TTY_OP_END 0
+/* The opcodes for ISPEED/OSPEED differ between SSH-1 and SSH-2. */
+#define SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED 192
+#define SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED 193
+#define SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
+#define SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
+
+/* Helper functions for parsing tty-related config. */
+static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_specchar(char *s)
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ if (*s) {
+ char *next = NULL;
+ ret = ctrlparse(s, &next);
+ if (!next) ret = s[0];
+ } else {
+ ret = 255; /* special value meaning "don't set" */
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+static unsigned int ssh_tty_parse_boolean(char *s)
+{
+ if (stricmp(s, "yes") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "on") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "true") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "+") == 0)
+ return 1; /* true */
+ else if (stricmp(s, "no") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "off") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "false") == 0 ||
+ stricmp(s, "-") == 0)
+ return 0; /* false */
+ else
+ return (atoi(s) != 0);
+}
+
+#define translate(x) if (type == x) return #x
+#define translatek(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_kctx == ctx)) return #x
+#define translatea(x,ctx) if (type == x && (pkt_actx == ctx)) return #x
+static char *ssh1_pkt_type(int type)
+{
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_USER);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EOF);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_IGNORE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
+ translate(SSH1_MSG_DEBUG);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD);
+ translate(SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE);
+ translate(SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE);
+ return "unknown";
+}
+static char *ssh2_pkt_type(Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx, Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx, int type)
+{
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK,SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
+ translatek(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE, SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
+ translatea(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS);
+ translate(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+ return "unknown";
+}
+#undef translate
+#undef translatec
+
+/* Enumeration values for fields in SSH-1 packets */
+enum {
+ PKT_END, PKT_INT, PKT_CHAR, PKT_DATA, PKT_STR, PKT_BIGNUM,
+ /* These values are for communicating relevant semantics of
+ * fields to the packet logging code. */
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKTT_PASSWORD, PKTT_DATA
+};
+
+/*
+ * Coroutine mechanics for the sillier bits of the code. If these
+ * macros look impenetrable to you, you might find it helpful to
+ * read
+ *
+ * http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/coroutines.html
+ *
+ * which explains the theory behind these macros.
+ *
+ * In particular, if you are getting `case expression not constant'
+ * errors when building with MS Visual Studio, this is because MS's
+ * Edit and Continue debugging feature causes their compiler to
+ * violate ANSI C. To disable Edit and Continue debugging:
+ *
+ * - right-click ssh.c in the FileView
+ * - click Settings
+ * - select the C/C++ tab and the General category
+ * - under `Debug info:', select anything _other_ than `Program
+ * Database for Edit and Continue'.
+ */
+#define crBegin(v) { int *crLine = &v; switch(v) { case 0:;
+#define crState(t) \
+ struct t *s; \
+ if (!ssh->t) ssh->t = snew(struct t); \
+ s = ssh->t;
+#define crFinish(z) } *crLine = 0; return (z); }
+#define crFinishV } *crLine = 0; return; }
+#define crReturn(z) \
+ do {\
+ *crLine =__LINE__; return (z); case __LINE__:;\
+ } while (0)
+#define crReturnV \
+ do {\
+ *crLine=__LINE__; return; case __LINE__:;\
+ } while (0)
+#define crStop(z) do{ *crLine = 0; return (z); }while(0)
+#define crStopV do{ *crLine = 0; return; }while(0)
+#define crWaitUntil(c) do { crReturn(0); } while (!(c))
+#define crWaitUntilV(c) do { crReturnV; } while (!(c))
+
+typedef struct ssh_tag *Ssh;
+struct Packet;
+
+static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
+static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type);
+static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *, int length);
+static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *, void *data, int len);
+static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
+static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *, unsigned char value);
+static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *, unsigned long value);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *, char *data);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *, char *data, int len);
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *, char *data);
+static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len);
+static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
+static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *, Bignum b);
+static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh, struct Packet *);
+static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh, struct Packet *);
+static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *);
+static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+
+/*
+ * Buffer management constants. There are several of these for
+ * various different purposes:
+ *
+ * - SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT is the amount of backlog that must build up
+ * on a local data stream before we throttle the whole SSH
+ * connection (in SSH-1 only). Throttling the whole connection is
+ * pretty drastic so we set this high in the hope it won't
+ * happen very often.
+ *
+ * - SSH_MAX_BACKLOG is the amount of backlog that must build up
+ * on the SSH connection itself before we defensively throttle
+ * _all_ local data streams. This is pretty drastic too (though
+ * thankfully unlikely in SSH-2 since the window mechanism should
+ * ensure that the server never has any need to throttle its end
+ * of the connection), so we set this high as well.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_WINSIZE is the maximum window size we present on SSH-2
+ * channels.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_BIGWIN is the window size we advertise for the only
+ * channel in a simple connection. It must be <= INT_MAX.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_MAXPKT is the official "maximum packet size" we send
+ * to the remote side. This actually has nothing to do with the
+ * size of the _packet_, but is instead a limit on the amount
+ * of data we're willing to receive in a single SSH2 channel
+ * data message.
+ *
+ * - OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT is actually the maximum size of SSH
+ * _packet_ we're prepared to cope with. It must be a multiple
+ * of the cipher block size, and must be at least 35000.
+ */
+
+#define SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT 32768
+#define SSH_MAX_BACKLOG 32768
+#define OUR_V2_WINSIZE 16384
+#define OUR_V2_BIGWIN 0x7fffffff
+#define OUR_V2_MAXPKT 0x4000UL
+#define OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT 0x9000UL
+
+/* Maximum length of passwords/passphrases (arbitrary) */
+#define SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 100
+
+const static struct ssh_signkey *hostkey_algs[] = { &ssh_rsa, &ssh_dss };
+
+const static struct ssh_mac *macs[] = {
+ &ssh_hmac_sha1, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96, &ssh_hmac_md5
+};
+const static struct ssh_mac *buggymacs[] = {
+ &ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy, &ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy, &ssh_hmac_md5
+};
+
+static void *ssh_comp_none_init(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+static void ssh_comp_none_cleanup(void *handle)
+{
+}
+static int ssh_comp_none_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static int ssh_comp_none_disable(void *handle)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+const static struct ssh_compress ssh_comp_none = {
+ "none",
+ ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
+ ssh_comp_none_init, ssh_comp_none_cleanup, ssh_comp_none_block,
+ ssh_comp_none_disable, NULL
+};
+extern const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib;
+const static struct ssh_compress *compressions[] = {
+ &ssh_zlib, &ssh_comp_none
+};
+
+enum { /* channel types */
+ CHAN_MAINSESSION,
+ CHAN_X11,
+ CHAN_AGENT,
+ CHAN_SOCKDATA,
+ CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT /* one the remote hasn't confirmed */
+};
+
+/*
+ * little structure to keep track of outstanding WINDOW_ADJUSTs
+ */
+struct winadj {
+ struct winadj *next;
+ unsigned size;
+};
+
+/*
+ * 2-3-4 tree storing channels.
+ */
+struct ssh_channel {
+ Ssh ssh; /* pointer back to main context */
+ unsigned remoteid, localid;
+ int type;
+ /* True if we opened this channel but server hasn't confirmed. */
+ int halfopen;
+ /*
+ * In SSH-1, this value contains four bits:
+ *
+ * 1 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
+ * 2 We have sent SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
+ * 4 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE.
+ * 8 We have received SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
+ *
+ * A channel is completely finished with when all four bits are set.
+ */
+ int closes;
+ /*
+ * True if this channel is causing the underlying connection to be
+ * throttled.
+ */
+ int throttling_conn;
+ union {
+ struct ssh2_data_channel {
+ bufchain outbuffer;
+ unsigned remwindow, remmaxpkt;
+ /* locwindow is signed so we can cope with excess data. */
+ int locwindow, locmaxwin;
+ /*
+ * remlocwin is the amount of local window that we think
+ * the remote end had available to it after it sent the
+ * last data packet or window adjust ack.
+ */
+ int remlocwin;
+ /*
+ * These store the list of window adjusts that haven't
+ * been acked.
+ */
+ struct winadj *winadj_head, *winadj_tail;
+ enum { THROTTLED, UNTHROTTLING, UNTHROTTLED } throttle_state;
+ } v2;
+ } v;
+ union {
+ struct ssh_agent_channel {
+ unsigned char *message;
+ unsigned char msglen[4];
+ unsigned lensofar, totallen;
+ } a;
+ struct ssh_x11_channel {
+ Socket s;
+ } x11;
+ struct ssh_pfd_channel {
+ Socket s;
+ } pfd;
+ } u;
+};
+
+/*
+ * 2-3-4 tree storing remote->local port forwardings. SSH-1 and SSH-2
+ * use this structure in different ways, reflecting SSH-2's
+ * altogether saner approach to port forwarding.
+ *
+ * In SSH-1, you arrange a remote forwarding by sending the server
+ * the remote port number, and the local destination host:port.
+ * When a connection comes in, the server sends you back that
+ * host:port pair, and you connect to it. This is a ready-made
+ * security hole if you're not on the ball: a malicious server
+ * could send you back _any_ host:port pair, so if you trustingly
+ * connect to the address it gives you then you've just opened the
+ * entire inside of your corporate network just by connecting
+ * through it to a dodgy SSH server. Hence, we must store a list of
+ * host:port pairs we _are_ trying to forward to, and reject a
+ * connection request from the server if it's not in the list.
+ *
+ * In SSH-2, each side of the connection minds its own business and
+ * doesn't send unnecessary information to the other. You arrange a
+ * remote forwarding by sending the server just the remote port
+ * number. When a connection comes in, the server tells you which
+ * of its ports was connected to; and _you_ have to remember what
+ * local host:port pair went with that port number.
+ *
+ * Hence, in SSH-1 this structure is indexed by destination
+ * host:port pair, whereas in SSH-2 it is indexed by source port.
+ */
+struct ssh_portfwd; /* forward declaration */
+
+struct ssh_rportfwd {
+ unsigned sport, dport;
+ char dhost[256];
+ char *sportdesc;
+ struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec;
+};
+#define free_rportfwd(pf) ( \
+ ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->sportdesc)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
+
+/*
+ * Separately to the rportfwd tree (which is for looking up port
+ * open requests from the server), a tree of _these_ structures is
+ * used to keep track of all the currently open port forwardings,
+ * so that we can reconfigure in mid-session if the user requests
+ * it.
+ */
+struct ssh_portfwd {
+ enum { DESTROY, KEEP, CREATE } status;
+ int type;
+ unsigned sport, dport;
+ char *saddr, *daddr;
+ char *sserv, *dserv;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *remote;
+ int addressfamily;
+ void *local;
+};
+#define free_portfwd(pf) ( \
+ ((pf) ? (sfree((pf)->saddr), sfree((pf)->daddr), \
+ sfree((pf)->sserv), sfree((pf)->dserv)) : (void)0 ), sfree(pf) )
+
+struct Packet {
+ long length; /* length of `data' actually used */
+ long forcepad; /* SSH-2: force padding to at least this length */
+ int type; /* only used for incoming packets */
+ unsigned long sequence; /* SSH-2 incoming sequence number */
+ unsigned char *data; /* allocated storage */
+ unsigned char *body; /* offset of payload within `data' */
+ long savedpos; /* temporary index into `data' (for strings) */
+ long maxlen; /* amount of storage allocated for `data' */
+ long encrypted_len; /* for SSH-2 total-size counting */
+
+ /*
+ * State associated with packet logging
+ */
+ int logmode;
+ int nblanks;
+ struct logblank_t *blanks;
+};
+
+static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
+static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh);
+static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
+static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special);
+static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c);
+static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len);
+static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize);
+static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin);
+static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle);
+static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit);
+static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt);
+static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt);
+static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length);
+static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now);
+static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin);
+
+struct rdpkt1_state_tag {
+ long len, pad, biglen, to_read;
+ unsigned long realcrc, gotcrc;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ int chunk;
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+};
+
+struct rdpkt2_state_tag {
+ long len, pad, payload, packetlen, maclen;
+ int i;
+ int cipherblk;
+ unsigned long incoming_sequence;
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+};
+
+typedef void (*handler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin);
+typedef void (*chandler_fn_t)(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx);
+
+struct queued_handler;
+struct queued_handler {
+ int msg1, msg2;
+ chandler_fn_t handler;
+ void *ctx;
+ struct queued_handler *next;
+};
+
+struct ssh_tag {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
+
+ char *v_c, *v_s;
+ void *exhash;
+
+ Socket s;
+
+ void *ldisc;
+ void *logctx;
+
+ unsigned char session_key[32];
+ int v1_compressing;
+ int v1_remote_protoflags;
+ int v1_local_protoflags;
+ int agentfwd_enabled;
+ int X11_fwd_enabled;
+ int remote_bugs;
+ const struct ssh_cipher *cipher;
+ void *v1_cipher_ctx;
+ void *crcda_ctx;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher, *sccipher;
+ void *cs_cipher_ctx, *sc_cipher_ctx;
+ const struct ssh_mac *csmac, *scmac;
+ void *cs_mac_ctx, *sc_mac_ctx;
+ const struct ssh_compress *cscomp, *sccomp;
+ void *cs_comp_ctx, *sc_comp_ctx;
+ const struct ssh_kex *kex;
+ const struct ssh_signkey *hostkey;
+ unsigned char v2_session_id[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ int v2_session_id_len;
+ void *kex_ctx;
+
+ char *savedhost;
+ int savedport;
+ int send_ok;
+ int echoing, editing;
+
+ void *frontend;
+
+ int ospeed, ispeed; /* temporaries */
+ int term_width, term_height;
+
+ tree234 *channels; /* indexed by local id */
+ struct ssh_channel *mainchan; /* primary session channel */
+ int ncmode; /* is primary channel direct-tcpip? */
+ int exitcode;
+ int close_expected;
+ int clean_exit;
+
+ tree234 *rportfwds, *portfwds;
+
+ enum {
+ SSH_STATE_PREPACKET,
+ SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE,
+ SSH_STATE_INTERMED,
+ SSH_STATE_SESSION,
+ SSH_STATE_CLOSED
+ } state;
+
+ int size_needed, eof_needed;
+
+ struct Packet **queue;
+ int queuelen, queuesize;
+ int queueing;
+ unsigned char *deferred_send_data;
+ int deferred_len, deferred_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to
+ * scp1 if that fails. This variable is the means by which
+ * scp.c can reach into the SSH code and find out which one it
+ * got.
+ */
+ int fallback_cmd;
+
+ bufchain banner; /* accumulates banners during do_ssh2_authconn */
+
+ Pkt_KCtx pkt_kctx;
+ Pkt_ACtx pkt_actx;
+
+ struct X11Display *x11disp;
+
+ int version;
+ int conn_throttle_count;
+ int overall_bufsize;
+ int throttled_all;
+ int v1_stdout_throttling;
+ unsigned long v2_outgoing_sequence;
+
+ int ssh1_rdpkt_crstate;
+ int ssh2_rdpkt_crstate;
+ int do_ssh_init_crstate;
+ int ssh_gotdata_crstate;
+ int do_ssh1_login_crstate;
+ int do_ssh1_connection_crstate;
+ int do_ssh2_transport_crstate;
+ int do_ssh2_authconn_crstate;
+
+ void *do_ssh_init_state;
+ void *do_ssh1_login_state;
+ void *do_ssh2_transport_state;
+ void *do_ssh2_authconn_state;
+
+ struct rdpkt1_state_tag rdpkt1_state;
+ struct rdpkt2_state_tag rdpkt2_state;
+
+ /* SSH-1 and SSH-2 use this for different things, but both use it */
+ int protocol_initial_phase_done;
+
+ void (*protocol) (Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pkt);
+ struct Packet *(*s_rdpkt) (Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen);
+
+ /*
+ * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
+ * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
+ * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
+ * potentially reconfigure port forwardings etc in mid-session.
+ */
+ Config cfg;
+
+ /*
+ * Used to transfer data back from async callbacks.
+ */
+ void *agent_response;
+ int agent_response_len;
+ int user_response;
+
+ /*
+ * The SSH connection can be set as `frozen', meaning we are
+ * not currently accepting incoming data from the network. This
+ * is slightly more serious than setting the _socket_ as
+ * frozen, because we may already have had data passed to us
+ * from the network which we need to delay processing until
+ * after the freeze is lifted, so we also need a bufchain to
+ * store that data.
+ */
+ int frozen;
+ bufchain queued_incoming_data;
+
+ /*
+ * Dispatch table for packet types that we may have to deal
+ * with at any time.
+ */
+ handler_fn_t packet_dispatch[256];
+
+ /*
+ * Queues of one-off handler functions for success/failure
+ * indications from a request.
+ */
+ struct queued_handler *qhead, *qtail;
+
+ /*
+ * This module deals with sending keepalives.
+ */
+ Pinger pinger;
+
+ /*
+ * Track incoming and outgoing data sizes and time, for
+ * size-based rekeys.
+ */
+ unsigned long incoming_data_size, outgoing_data_size, deferred_data_size;
+ unsigned long max_data_size;
+ int kex_in_progress;
+ long next_rekey, last_rekey;
+ char *deferred_rekey_reason; /* points to STATIC string; don't free */
+
+ /*
+ * Fully qualified host name, which we need if doing GSSAPI.
+ */
+ char *fullhostname;
+};
+
+#define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
+
+/* logevent, only printf-formatted. */
+static void logeventf(Ssh ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *buf;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ buf = dupvprintf(fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ logevent(buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+#define bombout(msg) \
+ do { \
+ char *text = dupprintf msg; \
+ ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE); \
+ logevent(text); \
+ connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", text); \
+ sfree(text); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/* Functions to leave bits out of the SSH packet log file. */
+
+static void dont_log_password(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
+{
+ if (ssh->cfg.logomitpass)
+ pkt->logmode = blanktype;
+}
+
+static void dont_log_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int blanktype)
+{
+ if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata)
+ pkt->logmode = blanktype;
+}
+
+static void end_log_omission(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
+}
+
+/* Helper function for common bits of parsing cfg.ttymodes. */
+static void parse_ttymodes(Ssh ssh, char *modes,
+ void (*do_mode)(void *data, char *mode, char *val),
+ void *data)
+{
+ while (*modes) {
+ char *t = strchr(modes, '\t');
+ char *m = snewn(t-modes+1, char);
+ char *val;
+ strncpy(m, modes, t-modes);
+ m[t-modes] = '\0';
+ if (*(t+1) == 'A')
+ val = get_ttymode(ssh->frontend, m);
+ else
+ val = dupstr(t+2);
+ if (val)
+ do_mode(data, m, val);
+ sfree(m);
+ sfree(val);
+ modes += strlen(modes) + 1;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssh_channelcmp(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *a = (struct ssh_channel *) av;
+ struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
+ if (a->localid < b->localid)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->localid > b->localid)
+ return +1;
+ return 0;
+}
+static int ssh_channelfind(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ unsigned *a = (unsigned *) av;
+ struct ssh_channel *b = (struct ssh_channel *) bv;
+ if (*a < b->localid)
+ return -1;
+ if (*a > b->localid)
+ return +1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh1(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
+ int i;
+ if ( (i = strcmp(a->dhost, b->dhost)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
+ if (a->dport > b->dport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->dport < b->dport)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssh_rportcmp_ssh2(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *a = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) av;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *b = (struct ssh_rportfwd *) bv;
+
+ if (a->sport > b->sport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->sport < b->sport)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Special form of strcmp which can cope with NULL inputs. NULL is
+ * defined to sort before even the empty string.
+ */
+static int nullstrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (b == NULL)
+ return +1;
+ return strcmp(a, b);
+}
+
+static int ssh_portcmp(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct ssh_portfwd *a = (struct ssh_portfwd *) av;
+ struct ssh_portfwd *b = (struct ssh_portfwd *) bv;
+ int i;
+ if (a->type > b->type)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->type < b->type)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->addressfamily > b->addressfamily)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->addressfamily < b->addressfamily)
+ return -1;
+ if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->saddr, b->saddr)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
+ if (a->sport > b->sport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->sport < b->sport)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->type != 'D') {
+ if ( (i = nullstrcmp(a->daddr, b->daddr)) != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : +1;
+ if (a->dport > b->dport)
+ return +1;
+ if (a->dport < b->dport)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int alloc_channel_id(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ const unsigned CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET = 256;
+ unsigned low, high, mid;
+ int tsize;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ /*
+ * First-fit allocation of channel numbers: always pick the
+ * lowest unused one. To do this, binary-search using the
+ * counted B-tree to find the largest channel ID which is in a
+ * contiguous sequence from the beginning. (Precisely
+ * everything in that sequence must have ID equal to its tree
+ * index plus CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET.)
+ */
+ tsize = count234(ssh->channels);
+
+ low = -1;
+ high = tsize;
+ while (high - low > 1) {
+ mid = (high + low) / 2;
+ c = index234(ssh->channels, mid);
+ if (c->localid == mid + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET)
+ low = mid; /* this one is fine */
+ else
+ high = mid; /* this one is past it */
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now low points to either -1, or the tree index of the
+ * largest ID in the initial sequence.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned i = low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
+ assert(NULL == find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind));
+ }
+ return low + 1 + CHANNEL_NUMBER_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static void c_write_stderr(int trusted, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ if (buf[i] != '\r' && (trusted || buf[i] == '\n' || (buf[i] & 0x60)))
+ fputc(buf[i], stderr);
+}
+
+static void c_write(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
+ c_write_stderr(1, buf, len);
+ else
+ from_backend(ssh->frontend, 1, buf, len);
+}
+
+static void c_write_untrusted(Ssh ssh, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ if (flags & FLAG_STDERR)
+ c_write_stderr(0, buf, len);
+ else
+ from_backend_untrusted(ssh->frontend, buf, len);
+}
+
+static void c_write_str(Ssh ssh, const char *buf)
+{
+ c_write(ssh, buf, strlen(buf));
+}
+
+static void ssh_free_packet(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ sfree(pkt->data);
+ sfree(pkt);
+}
+static struct Packet *ssh_new_packet(void)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt = snew(struct Packet);
+
+ pkt->body = pkt->data = NULL;
+ pkt->maxlen = 0;
+ pkt->logmode = PKTLOG_EMIT;
+ pkt->nblanks = 0;
+ pkt->blanks = NULL;
+
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect incoming data in the incoming packet buffer.
+ * Decipher and verify the packet when it is completely read.
+ * Drop SSH1_MSG_DEBUG and SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets.
+ * Update the *data and *datalen variables.
+ * Return a Packet structure when a packet is completed.
+ */
+static struct Packet *ssh1_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ struct rdpkt1_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt1_state;
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate);
+
+ st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
+
+ st->pktin->type = 0;
+ st->pktin->length = 0;
+
+ for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < 4; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->len = (st->len << 8) + **data;
+ (*data)++, (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
+ st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
+ st->pktin->length = st->len - 5;
+
+ if (st->biglen < 0) {
+ bombout(("Extremely large packet length from server suggests"
+ " data stream corruption"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->biglen;
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(st->biglen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
+
+ st->to_read = st->biglen;
+ st->p = st->pktin->data;
+ while (st->to_read > 0) {
+ st->chunk = st->to_read;
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ if (st->chunk > (*datalen))
+ st->chunk = (*datalen);
+ memcpy(st->p, *data, st->chunk);
+ *data += st->chunk;
+ *datalen -= st->chunk;
+ st->p += st->chunk;
+ st->to_read -= st->chunk;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->crcda_ctx, st->pktin->data,
+ st->biglen, NULL)) {
+ bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cipher)
+ ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, st->pktin->data, st->biglen);
+
+ st->realcrc = crc32_compute(st->pktin->data, st->biglen - 4);
+ st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data + st->biglen - 4);
+ if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) {
+ bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
+ unsigned char *decompblk;
+ int decomplen;
+ if (!zlib_decompress_block(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
+ st->pktin->body - 1, st->pktin->length + 1,
+ &decompblk, &decomplen)) {
+ bombout(("Zlib decompression encountered invalid data"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (st->pktin->maxlen < st->pad + decomplen) {
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->pad + decomplen;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data + st->pad + 1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(st->pktin->body - 1, decompblk, decomplen);
+ sfree(decompblk);
+ st->pktin->length = decomplen - 1;
+ }
+
+ st->pktin->type = st->pktin->body[-1];
+
+ /*
+ * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
+ */
+ if (ssh->logctx) {
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blank;
+ if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
+ int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
+ if ((st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA) ||
+ (st->pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA)) {
+ do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 4;
+ } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
+ do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
+ }
+ if (do_blank) {
+ blank.offset = blank_prefix;
+ blank.len = st->pktin->length;
+ blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ nblanks = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx,
+ PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
+ ssh1_pkt_type(st->pktin->type),
+ st->pktin->body, st->pktin->length,
+ nblanks, &blank, NULL);
+ }
+
+ crFinish(st->pktin);
+}
+
+static struct Packet *ssh2_rdpkt(Ssh ssh, unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ struct rdpkt2_state_tag *st = &ssh->rdpkt2_state;
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate);
+
+ st->pktin = ssh_new_packet();
+
+ st->pktin->type = 0;
+ st->pktin->length = 0;
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ st->cipherblk = ssh->sccipher->blksize;
+ else
+ st->cipherblk = 8;
+ if (st->cipherblk < 8)
+ st->cipherblk = 8;
+ st->maclen = ssh->scmac ? ssh->scmac->len : 0;
+
+ if (ssh->sccipher && (ssh->sccipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
+ ssh->scmac) {
+ /*
+ * When dealing with a CBC-mode cipher, we want to avoid the
+ * possibility of an attacker's tweaking the ciphertext stream
+ * so as to cause us to feed the same block to the block
+ * cipher more than once and thus leak information
+ * (VU#958563). The way we do this is not to take any
+ * decisions on the basis of anything we've decrypted until
+ * we've verified it with a MAC. That includes the packet
+ * length, so we just read data and check the MAC repeatedly,
+ * and when the MAC passes, see if the length we've got is
+ * plausible.
+ */
+
+ /* May as well allocate the whole lot now. */
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT + st->maclen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+
+ /* Read an amount corresponding to the MAC. */
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->maclen; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ st->packetlen = 0;
+ {
+ unsigned char seq[4];
+ ssh->scmac->start(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
+ PUT_32BIT(seq, st->incoming_sequence);
+ ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, seq, 4);
+ }
+
+ for (;;) { /* Once around this loop per cipher block. */
+ /* Read another cipher-block's worth, and tack it onto the end. */
+ for (st->i = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->packetlen+st->maclen+st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+ /* Decrypt one more block (a little further back in the stream). */
+ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->packetlen,
+ st->cipherblk);
+ /* Feed that block to the MAC. */
+ ssh->scmac->bytes(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->packetlen, st->cipherblk);
+ st->packetlen += st->cipherblk;
+ /* See if that gives us a valid packet. */
+ if (ssh->scmac->verresult(ssh->sc_mac_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->packetlen) &&
+ (st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data)) + 4 == st->packetlen)
+ break;
+ if (st->packetlen >= OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT) {
+ bombout(("No valid incoming packet found"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+ } else {
+ st->pktin->data = snewn(st->cipherblk + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire and decrypt the first block of the packet. This will
+ * contain the length and padding details.
+ */
+ for (st->i = st->len = 0; st->i < st->cipherblk; st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data, st->cipherblk);
+
+ /*
+ * Now get the length figure.
+ */
+ st->len = GET_32BIT(st->pktin->data);
+
+ /*
+ * _Completely_ silly lengths should be stomped on before they
+ * do us any more damage.
+ */
+ if (st->len < 0 || st->len > OUR_V2_PACKETLIMIT ||
+ (st->len + 4) % st->cipherblk != 0) {
+ bombout(("Incoming packet was garbled on decryption"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * So now we can work out the total packet length.
+ */
+ st->packetlen = st->len + 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate memory for the rest of the packet.
+ */
+ st->pktin->maxlen = st->packetlen + st->maclen;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * Read and decrypt the remainder of the packet.
+ */
+ for (st->i = st->cipherblk; st->i < st->packetlen + st->maclen;
+ st->i++) {
+ while ((*datalen) == 0)
+ crReturn(NULL);
+ st->pktin->data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
+ (*datalen)--;
+ }
+ /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. */
+ if (ssh->sccipher)
+ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + st->cipherblk,
+ st->packetlen - st->cipherblk);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the MAC.
+ */
+ if (ssh->scmac
+ && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, st->pktin->data,
+ st->len + 4, st->incoming_sequence)) {
+ bombout(("Incorrect MAC received on packet"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Get and sanity-check the amount of random padding. */
+ st->pad = st->pktin->data[4];
+ if (st->pad < 4 || st->len - st->pad < 1) {
+ bombout(("Invalid padding length on received packet"));
+ ssh_free_packet(st->pktin);
+ crStop(NULL);
+ }
+ /*
+ * This enables us to deduce the payload length.
+ */
+ st->payload = st->len - st->pad - 1;
+
+ st->pktin->length = st->payload + 5;
+ st->pktin->encrypted_len = st->packetlen;
+
+ st->pktin->sequence = st->incoming_sequence++;
+
+ /*
+ * Decompress packet payload.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char *newpayload;
+ int newlen;
+ if (ssh->sccomp &&
+ ssh->sccomp->decompress(ssh->sc_comp_ctx,
+ st->pktin->data + 5, st->pktin->length - 5,
+ &newpayload, &newlen)) {
+ if (st->pktin->maxlen < newlen + 5) {
+ st->pktin->maxlen = newlen + 5;
+ st->pktin->data = sresize(st->pktin->data,
+ st->pktin->maxlen + APIEXTRA,
+ unsigned char);
+ }
+ st->pktin->length = 5 + newlen;
+ memcpy(st->pktin->data + 5, newpayload, newlen);
+ sfree(newpayload);
+ }
+ }
+
+ st->pktin->savedpos = 6;
+ st->pktin->body = st->pktin->data;
+ st->pktin->type = st->pktin->data[5];
+
+ /*
+ * Log incoming packet, possibly omitting sensitive fields.
+ */
+ if (ssh->logctx) {
+ int nblanks = 0;
+ struct logblank_t blank;
+ if (ssh->cfg.logomitdata) {
+ int do_blank = FALSE, blank_prefix = 0;
+ /* "Session data" packets - omit the data field */
+ if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) {
+ do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 8;
+ } else if (st->pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) {
+ do_blank = TRUE; blank_prefix = 12;
+ }
+ if (do_blank) {
+ blank.offset = blank_prefix;
+ blank.len = (st->pktin->length-6) - blank_prefix;
+ blank.type = PKTLOG_OMIT;
+ nblanks = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, st->pktin->type,
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
+ st->pktin->type),
+ st->pktin->data+6, st->pktin->length-6,
+ nblanks, &blank, &st->pktin->sequence);
+ }
+
+ crFinish(st->pktin);
+}
+
+static int s_wrpkt_prepare(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int *offset_p)
+{
+ int pad, biglen, i, pktoffs;
+ unsigned long crc;
+#ifdef __SC__
+ /*
+ * XXX various versions of SC (including 8.8.4) screw up the
+ * register allocation in this function and use the same register
+ * (D6) for len and as a temporary, with predictable results. The
+ * following sledgehammer prevents this.
+ */
+ volatile
+#endif
+ int len;
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[12],
+ ssh1_pkt_type(pkt->data[12]),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
+ pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, NULL);
+ sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
+ pkt->nblanks = 0;
+
+ if (ssh->v1_compressing) {
+ unsigned char *compblk;
+ int complen;
+ zlib_compress_block(ssh->cs_comp_ctx,
+ pkt->data + 12, pkt->length - 12,
+ &compblk, &complen);
+ ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, complen + 2); /* just in case it's got bigger */
+ memcpy(pkt->data + 12, compblk, complen);
+ sfree(compblk);
+ pkt->length = complen + 12;
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + 4); /* space for CRC */
+ pkt->length += 4;
+ len = pkt->length - 4 - 8; /* len(type+data+CRC) */
+ pad = 8 - (len % 8);
+ pktoffs = 8 - pad;
+ biglen = len + pad; /* len(padding+type+data+CRC) */
+
+ for (i = pktoffs; i < 4+8; i++)
+ pkt->data[i] = random_byte();
+ crc = crc32_compute(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen - 4); /* all ex len */
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs + 4 + biglen - 4, crc);
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pktoffs, len);
+
+ if (ssh->cipher)
+ ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx,
+ pkt->data + pktoffs + 4, biglen);
+
+ if (offset_p) *offset_p = pktoffs;
+ return biglen + 4; /* len(length+padding+type+data+CRC) */
+}
+
+static int s_write(Ssh ssh, void *data, int len)
+{
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, -1, NULL, data, len,
+ 0, NULL, NULL);
+ return sk_write(ssh->s, (char *)data, len);
+}
+
+static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int len, backlog, offset;
+ len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
+ backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
+ if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+static void s_wrpkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int len, offset;
+ len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
+ if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
+ ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
+ ssh->deferred_size,
+ unsigned char);
+ }
+ memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len,
+ pkt->data + offset, len);
+ ssh->deferred_len += len;
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a SSH-1 packet with the specified contents.
+ * (This all-at-once interface used to be the only one, but now SSH-1
+ * packets can also be constructed incrementally.)
+ */
+static struct Packet *construct_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, va_list ap)
+{
+ int argtype;
+ Bignum bn;
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+
+ pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(pkttype);
+
+ while ((argtype = va_arg(ap, int)) != PKT_END) {
+ unsigned char *argp, argchar;
+ char *sargp;
+ unsigned long argint;
+ int arglen;
+ switch (argtype) {
+ /* Actual fields in the packet */
+ case PKT_INT:
+ argint = va_arg(ap, int);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, argint);
+ break;
+ case PKT_CHAR:
+ argchar = (unsigned char) va_arg(ap, int);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, argchar);
+ break;
+ case PKT_DATA:
+ argp = va_arg(ap, unsigned char *);
+ arglen = va_arg(ap, int);
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, argp, arglen);
+ break;
+ case PKT_STR:
+ sargp = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, sargp);
+ break;
+ case PKT_BIGNUM:
+ bn = va_arg(ap, Bignum);
+ ssh1_pkt_addmp(pkt, bn);
+ break;
+ /* Tokens for modifications to packet logging */
+ case PKTT_PASSWORD:
+ dont_log_password(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_BLANK);
+ break;
+ case PKTT_DATA:
+ dont_log_data(ssh, pkt, PKTLOG_OMIT);
+ break;
+ case PKTT_OTHER:
+ end_log_omission(ssh, pkt);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+static void send_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, pkttype);
+ pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
+static void defer_packet(Ssh ssh, int pkttype, ...)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, pkttype);
+ pkt = construct_packet(ssh, pkttype, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ s_wrpkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
+static int ssh_versioncmp(char *a, char *b)
+{
+ char *ae, *be;
+ unsigned long av, bv;
+
+ av = strtoul(a, &ae, 10);
+ bv = strtoul(b, &be, 10);
+ if (av != bv)
+ return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
+ if (*ae == '.')
+ ae++;
+ if (*be == '.')
+ be++;
+ av = strtoul(ae, &ae, 10);
+ bv = strtoul(be, &be, 10);
+ if (av != bv)
+ return (av < bv ? -1 : +1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Utility routines for putting an SSH-protocol `string' and
+ * `uint32' into a hash state.
+ */
+static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
+{
+ unsigned char lenblk[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
+ h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
+ h->bytes(s, str, len);
+}
+
+static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
+{
+ unsigned char intblk[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
+ h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Packet construction functions. Mostly shared between SSH-1 and SSH-2.
+ */
+static void ssh_pkt_ensure(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
+{
+ if (pkt->maxlen < length) {
+ unsigned char *body = pkt->body;
+ int offset = body ? body - pkt->data : 0;
+ pkt->maxlen = length + 256;
+ pkt->data = sresize(pkt->data, pkt->maxlen + APIEXTRA, unsigned char);
+ if (body) pkt->body = pkt->data + offset;
+ }
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_adddata(struct Packet *pkt, void *data, int len)
+{
+ if (pkt->logmode != PKTLOG_EMIT) {
+ pkt->nblanks++;
+ pkt->blanks = sresize(pkt->blanks, pkt->nblanks, struct logblank_t);
+ assert(pkt->body);
+ pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].offset = pkt->length -
+ (pkt->body - pkt->data);
+ pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].len = len;
+ pkt->blanks[pkt->nblanks-1].type = pkt->logmode;
+ }
+ pkt->length += len;
+ ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length);
+ memcpy(pkt->data + pkt->length - len, data, len);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
+}
+static void ssh2_pkt_addbool(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char value)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &value, 1);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_adduint32(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned long value)
+{
+ unsigned char x[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(x, value);
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, x, 4);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_start(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0);
+ pkt->savedpos = pkt->length;
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_str(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, strlen(data));
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring_data(struct Packet *pkt, char *data, int len)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data + pkt->savedpos - 4, pkt->length - pkt->savedpos);
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, char *data)
+{
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
+}
+static void ssh1_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
+{
+ int len = ssh1_bignum_length(b);
+ unsigned char *data = snewn(len, unsigned char);
+ (void) ssh1_write_bignum(data, b);
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len);
+ sfree(data);
+}
+static unsigned char *ssh2_mpint_fmt(Bignum b, int *len)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i, n = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 7) / 8;
+ p = snewn(n + 1, unsigned char);
+ p[0] = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
+ p[i] = bignum_byte(b, n - i);
+ i = 0;
+ while (i <= n && p[i] == 0 && (p[i + 1] & 0x80) == 0)
+ i++;
+ memmove(p, p + i, n + 1 - i);
+ *len = n + 1 - i;
+ return p;
+}
+static void ssh2_pkt_addmp(struct Packet *pkt, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int len;
+ p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)p, len);
+ sfree(p);
+}
+
+static struct Packet *ssh1_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
+ pkt->length = 4 + 8; /* space for length + max padding */
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, pkt_type);
+ pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length;
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+/* For legacy code (SSH-1 and -2 packet construction used to be separate) */
+#define ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, length) ssh_pkt_ensure(pkt, length)
+#define ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, data, len)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte) ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, byte)
+#define ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value) ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, value)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt) ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len) ssh_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, data, len)
+#define ssh2_pkt_addstring(pkt, data) ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, data)
+
+static struct Packet *ssh2_pkt_init(int pkt_type)
+{
+ struct Packet *pkt = ssh_new_packet();
+ pkt->length = 5; /* space for packet length + padding length */
+ pkt->forcepad = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, (unsigned char) pkt_type);
+ pkt->body = pkt->data + pkt->length; /* after packet type */
+ return pkt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an SSH-2 final-form packet: compress it, encrypt it,
+ * put the MAC on it. Final packet, ready to be sent, is stored in
+ * pkt->data. Total length is returned.
+ */
+static int ssh2_pkt_construct(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int cipherblk, maclen, padding, i;
+
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_OUTGOING, pkt->data[5],
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx, pkt->data[5]),
+ pkt->body, pkt->length - (pkt->body - pkt->data),
+ pkt->nblanks, pkt->blanks, &ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
+ sfree(pkt->blanks); pkt->blanks = NULL;
+ pkt->nblanks = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Compress packet payload.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char *newpayload;
+ int newlen;
+ if (ssh->cscomp &&
+ ssh->cscomp->compress(ssh->cs_comp_ctx, pkt->data + 5,
+ pkt->length - 5,
+ &newpayload, &newlen)) {
+ pkt->length = 5;
+ ssh2_pkt_adddata(pkt, newpayload, newlen);
+ sfree(newpayload);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add padding. At least four bytes, and must also bring total
+ * length (minus MAC) up to a multiple of the block size.
+ * If pkt->forcepad is set, make sure the packet is at least that size
+ * after padding.
+ */
+ cipherblk = ssh->cscipher ? ssh->cscipher->blksize : 8; /* block size */
+ cipherblk = cipherblk < 8 ? 8 : cipherblk; /* or 8 if blksize < 8 */
+ padding = 4;
+ if (pkt->length + padding < pkt->forcepad)
+ padding = pkt->forcepad - pkt->length;
+ padding +=
+ (cipherblk - (pkt->length + padding) % cipherblk) % cipherblk;
+ assert(padding <= 255);
+ maclen = ssh->csmac ? ssh->csmac->len : 0;
+ ssh2_pkt_ensure(pkt, pkt->length + padding + maclen);
+ pkt->data[4] = padding;
+ for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
+ pkt->data[pkt->length + i] = random_byte();
+ PUT_32BIT(pkt->data, pkt->length + padding - 4);
+ if (ssh->csmac)
+ ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, pkt->data,
+ pkt->length + padding,
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence);
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed */
+
+ if (ssh->cscipher)
+ ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx,
+ pkt->data, pkt->length + padding);
+
+ pkt->encrypted_len = pkt->length + padding;
+
+ /* Ready-to-send packet starts at pkt->data. We return length. */
+ return pkt->length + padding + maclen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Routines called from the main SSH code to send packets. There
+ * are quite a few of these, because we have two separate
+ * mechanisms for delaying the sending of packets:
+ *
+ * - In order to send an IGNORE message and a password message in
+ * a single fixed-length blob, we require the ability to
+ * concatenate the encrypted forms of those two packets _into_ a
+ * single blob and then pass it to our <network.h> transport
+ * layer in one go. Hence, there's a deferment mechanism which
+ * works after packet encryption.
+ *
+ * - In order to avoid sending any connection-layer messages
+ * during repeat key exchange, we have to queue up any such
+ * outgoing messages _before_ they are encrypted (and in
+ * particular before they're allocated sequence numbers), and
+ * then send them once we've finished.
+ *
+ * I call these mechanisms `defer' and `queue' respectively, so as
+ * to distinguish them reasonably easily.
+ *
+ * The functions send_noqueue() and defer_noqueue() free the packet
+ * structure they are passed. Every outgoing packet goes through
+ * precisely one of these functions in its life; packets passed to
+ * ssh2_pkt_send() or ssh2_pkt_defer() either go straight to one of
+ * these or get queued, and then when the queue is later emptied
+ * the packets are all passed to defer_noqueue().
+ *
+ * When using a CBC-mode cipher, it's necessary to ensure that an
+ * attacker can't provide data to be encrypted using an IV that they
+ * know. We ensure this by prefixing each packet that might contain
+ * user data with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE. This is done using the deferral
+ * mechanism, so in this case send_noqueue() ends up redirecting to
+ * defer_noqueue(). If you don't like this inefficiency, don't use
+ * CBC.
+ */
+
+static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh, struct Packet *, int);
+static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh);
+
+/*
+ * Send an SSH-2 packet immediately, without queuing or deferring.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int len;
+ int backlog;
+ if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
+ /* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+ return;
+ }
+ len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
+ backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data, len);
+ if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
+
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
+
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Defer an SSH-2 packet.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
+{
+ int len;
+ if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
+ ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore) {
+ /*
+ * Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
+ * get encrypted with a known IV.
+ */
+ struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
+ }
+ len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
+ if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
+ ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
+ ssh->deferred_size,
+ unsigned char);
+ }
+ memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->data, len);
+ ssh->deferred_len += len;
+ ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
+ ssh_free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Queue an SSH-2 packet.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_queue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ assert(ssh->queueing);
+
+ if (ssh->queuelen >= ssh->queuesize) {
+ ssh->queuesize = ssh->queuelen + 32;
+ ssh->queue = sresize(ssh->queue, ssh->queuesize, struct Packet *);
+ }
+
+ ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen++] = pkt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Either queue or send a packet, depending on whether queueing is
+ * set.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_send(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ if (ssh->queueing)
+ ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
+ else
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pkt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Either queue or defer a packet, depending on whether queueing is
+ * set.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_defer(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ if (ssh->queueing)
+ ssh2_pkt_queue(ssh, pkt);
+ else
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send the whole deferred data block constructed by
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer() or SSH-1's defer_packet().
+ *
+ * The expected use of the defer mechanism is that you call
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer() a few times, then call ssh_pkt_defersend(). If
+ * not currently queueing, this simply sets up deferred_send_data
+ * and then sends it. If we _are_ currently queueing, the calls to
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer() put the deferred packets on to the queue
+ * instead, and therefore ssh_pkt_defersend() has no deferred data
+ * to send. Hence, there's no need to make it conditional on
+ * ssh->queueing.
+ */
+static void ssh_pkt_defersend(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int backlog;
+ backlog = s_write(ssh, ssh->deferred_send_data, ssh->deferred_len);
+ ssh->deferred_len = ssh->deferred_size = 0;
+ sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
+ if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
+
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size += ssh->deferred_data_size;
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
+ ssh->deferred_data_size = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send a packet whose length needs to be disguised (typically
+ * passwords or keyboard-interactive responses).
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
+ int padsize)
+{
+#if 0
+ if (0) {
+ /*
+ * The simplest way to do this is to adjust the
+ * variable-length padding field in the outgoing packet.
+ *
+ * Currently compiled out, because some Cisco SSH servers
+ * don't like excessively padded packets (bah, why's it
+ * always Cisco?)
+ */
+ pkt->forcepad = padsize;
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pkt);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ /*
+ * If we can't do that, however, an alternative approach is
+ * to use the pkt_defer mechanism to bundle the packet
+ * tightly together with an SSH_MSG_IGNORE such that their
+ * combined length is a constant. So first we construct the
+ * final form of this packet and defer its sending.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
+
+ /*
+ * Now construct an SSH_MSG_IGNORE which includes a string
+ * that's an exact multiple of the cipher block size. (If
+ * the cipher is NULL so that the block size is
+ * unavailable, we don't do this trick at all, because we
+ * gain nothing by it.)
+ */
+ if (ssh->cscipher) {
+ int stringlen, i;
+
+ stringlen = (256 - ssh->deferred_len);
+ stringlen += ssh->cscipher->blksize - 1;
+ stringlen -= (stringlen % ssh->cscipher->blksize);
+ if (ssh->cscomp) {
+ /*
+ * Temporarily disable actual compression, so we
+ * can guarantee to get this string exactly the
+ * length we want it. The compression-disabling
+ * routine should return an integer indicating how
+ * many bytes we should adjust our string length
+ * by.
+ */
+ stringlen -=
+ ssh->cscomp->disable_compression(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ }
+ pkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ for (i = 0; i < stringlen; i++) {
+ char c = (char) random_byte();
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, &c, 1);
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_defer(ssh, pkt);
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send all queued SSH-2 packets. We send them by means of
+ * ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(), in case they included a pair of
+ * packets that needed to be lumped together.
+ */
+static void ssh2_pkt_queuesend(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ assert(!ssh->queueing);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ssh->queuelen; i++)
+ ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ssh->queue[i], FALSE);
+ ssh->queuelen = 0;
+
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+}
+
+#if 0
+void bndebug(char *string, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i, len;
+ p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
+ debug(("%s", string));
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ debug((" %02x", p[i]));
+ debug(("\n"));
+ sfree(p);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void hash_mpint(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int len;
+ p = ssh2_mpint_fmt(b, &len);
+ hash_string(h, s, p, len);
+ sfree(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Packet decode functions for both SSH-1 and SSH-2.
+ */
+static unsigned long ssh_pkt_getuint32(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned long value;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
+ return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
+ value = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
+ pkt->savedpos += 4;
+ return value;
+}
+static int ssh2_pkt_getbool(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ unsigned long value;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 1)
+ return 0; /* arrgh, no way to decline (FIXME?) */
+ value = pkt->body[pkt->savedpos] != 0;
+ pkt->savedpos++;
+ return value;
+}
+static void ssh_pkt_getstring(struct Packet *pkt, char **p, int *length)
+{
+ int len;
+ *p = NULL;
+ *length = 0;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < 4)
+ return;
+ len = GET_32BIT(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return;
+ *length = len;
+ pkt->savedpos += 4;
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < *length)
+ return;
+ *p = (char *)(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos);
+ pkt->savedpos += *length;
+}
+static void *ssh_pkt_getdata(struct Packet *pkt, int length)
+{
+ if (pkt->length - pkt->savedpos < length)
+ return NULL;
+ pkt->savedpos += length;
+ return pkt->body + (pkt->savedpos - length);
+}
+static int ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(struct Packet *pkt, struct RSAKey *key,
+ unsigned char **keystr)
+{
+ int j;
+
+ j = makekey(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
+ pkt->length - pkt->savedpos,
+ key, keystr, 0);
+
+ if (j < 0)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ pkt->savedpos += j;
+ assert(pkt->savedpos < pkt->length);
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+static Bignum ssh1_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ int j;
+ Bignum b;
+
+ j = ssh1_read_bignum(pkt->body + pkt->savedpos,
+ pkt->length - pkt->savedpos, &b);
+
+ if (j < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pkt->savedpos += j;
+ return b;
+}
+static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int length;
+ Bignum b;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+ if (p[0] & 0x80)
+ return NULL;
+ b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
+ return b;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet.
+ * Expects to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature
+ * blob. Normally works just like ssh2_pkt_addstring, but will
+ * fiddle with the signature packet if necessary for
+ * BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
+ */
+static void ssh2_add_sigblob(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt,
+ void *pkblob_v, int pkblob_len,
+ void *sigblob_v, int sigblob_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *pkblob = (unsigned char *)pkblob_v;
+ unsigned char *sigblob = (unsigned char *)sigblob_v;
+
+ /* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
+ /* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
+
+ /*
+ * See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
+ * server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
+ */
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
+ (GET_32BIT(pkblob) == 7 && !memcmp(pkblob+4, "ssh-rsa", 7))) {
+ int pos, len, siglen;
+
+ /*
+ * Find the byte length of the modulus.
+ */
+
+ pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
+ pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* skip over exponent */
+ len = GET_32BIT(pkblob+pos); /* find length of modulus */
+ pos += 4; /* find modulus itself */
+ while (len > 0 && pkblob[pos] == 0)
+ len--, pos++;
+ /* debug(("modulus length is %d\n", len)); */
+
+ /*
+ * Now find the signature integer.
+ */
+ pos = 4+7; /* skip over "ssh-rsa" */
+ siglen = GET_32BIT(sigblob+pos);
+ /* debug(("signature length is %d\n", siglen)); */
+
+ if (len != siglen) {
+ unsigned char newlen[4];
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, pos);
+ /* dmemdump(sigblob, pos); */
+ pos += 4; /* point to start of actual sig */
+ PUT_32BIT(newlen, len);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 4);
+ /* dmemdump(newlen, 4); */
+ newlen[0] = 0;
+ while (len-- > siglen) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)newlen, 1);
+ /* dmemdump(newlen, 1); */
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)(sigblob+pos), siglen);
+ /* dmemdump(sigblob+pos, siglen); */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. */
+ }
+
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pkt, (char *)sigblob, sigblob_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the remote side's version string and compare it against
+ * a list of known buggy implementations.
+ */
+static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
+{
+ char *imp; /* pointer to implementation part */
+ imp = vstring;
+ imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
+ if (*imp) imp++;
+ imp += strcspn(imp, "-");
+ if (*imp) imp++;
+
+ ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * General notes on server version strings:
+ * - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
+ * here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
+ * with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
+ * so we can't distinguish them.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
+ (!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
+ !strcmp(imp, "1.2.20") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.21") ||
+ !strcmp(imp, "1.2.22") || !strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") ||
+ !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.5alpha4")))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions don't support SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so we have
+ * to use a different defence against password length
+ * sniffing.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-1 ignore bug");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_plainpw1 == AUTO &&
+ (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25") || !strcmp(imp, "OSU_1.4alpha3")))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions need a plain password sent; they can't
+ * handle having a null and a random length of data after
+ * the password.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD;
+ logevent("We believe remote version needs a plain SSH-1 password");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsa1 == AUTO &&
+ (!strcmp(imp, "Cisco-1.25")))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions apparently have no clue whatever about
+ * RSA authentication and will panic and die if they see
+ * an AUTH_RSA message.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA;
+ logevent("We believe remote version can't handle SSH-1 RSA authentication");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_hmac2 == AUTO &&
+ !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
+ (wc_match("2.1.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("2.2.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.3.0*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("2.1 *", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the HMAC bug.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_HMAC;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 HMAC bug");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_derivekey2 == AUTO &&
+ !wc_match("* VShell", imp) &&
+ (wc_match("2.0.0*", imp) || wc_match("2.0.10*", imp) ))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the key-derivation bug (failing to
+ * include the literal shared secret in the hashes that
+ * generate the keys).
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 key-derivation bug");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rsapad2 == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[5-9]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_3.[0-2]*", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the SSH-2 RSA padding bug.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 RSA padding bug");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_pksessid2 == AUTO &&
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-2]*", imp))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the SSH-2 session-ID bug in
+ * public-key authentication.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 public-key-session-ID bug");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_rekey2 == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("DigiSSH_2.0", imp) ||
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_2.[0-4]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("OpenSSH_2.5.[0-3]*", imp) ||
+ wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0", imp) ||
+ wc_match("Sun_SSH_1.0.1", imp) ||
+ /* All versions <= 1.2.6 (they changed their format in 1.2.7) */
+ wc_match("WeOnlyDo-*", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * These versions have the SSH-2 rekey bug.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_REKEY;
+ logevent("We believe remote version has SSH-2 rekey bug");
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == FORCE_ON ||
+ (ssh->cfg.sshbug_maxpkt2 == AUTO &&
+ (wc_match("1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE", imp) ||
+ wc_match("1.36 sshlib: GlobalScape", imp)))) {
+ /*
+ * This version ignores our makpkt and needs to be throttled.
+ */
+ ssh->remote_bugs |= BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT;
+ logevent("We believe remote version ignores SSH-2 maximum packet size");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * The `software version' part of an SSH version string is required
+ * to contain no spaces or minus signs.
+ */
+static void ssh_fix_verstring(char *str)
+{
+ /* Eat "SSH-<protoversion>-". */
+ assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
+ assert(*str == 'S'); str++;
+ assert(*str == 'H'); str++;
+ assert(*str == '-'); str++;
+ while (*str && *str != '-') str++;
+ assert(*str == '-'); str++;
+
+ /* Convert minus signs and spaces in the remaining string into
+ * underscores. */
+ while (*str) {
+ if (*str == '-' || *str == ' ')
+ *str = '_';
+ str++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send an appropriate SSH version string.
+ */
+static void ssh_send_verstring(Ssh ssh, char *svers)
+{
+ char *verstring;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ /*
+ * Construct a v2 version string.
+ */
+ verstring = dupprintf("SSH-2.0-%s\015\012", sshver);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Construct a v1 version string.
+ */
+ verstring = dupprintf("SSH-%s-%s\012",
+ (ssh_versioncmp(svers, "1.5") <= 0 ?
+ svers : "1.5"),
+ sshver);
+ }
+
+ ssh_fix_verstring(verstring);
+
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ size_t len;
+ /*
+ * Record our version string.
+ */
+ len = strcspn(verstring, "\015\012");
+ ssh->v_c = snewn(len + 1, char);
+ memcpy(ssh->v_c, verstring, len);
+ ssh->v_c[len] = 0;
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "We claim version: %.*s",
+ strcspn(verstring, "\015\012"), verstring);
+ s_write(ssh, verstring, strlen(verstring));
+ sfree(verstring);
+}
+
+static int do_ssh_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
+{
+ struct do_ssh_init_state {
+ int vslen;
+ char version[10];
+ char *vstring;
+ int vstrsize;
+ int i;
+ int proto1, proto2;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh_init_state);
+
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate);
+
+ /* Search for a line beginning with the string "SSH-" in the input. */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (c != 'S') goto no;
+ crReturn(1);
+ if (c != 'S') goto no;
+ crReturn(1);
+ if (c != 'H') goto no;
+ crReturn(1);
+ if (c != '-') goto no;
+ break;
+ no:
+ while (c != '\012')
+ crReturn(1);
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+
+ s->vstrsize = 16;
+ s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
+ strcpy(s->vstring, "SSH-");
+ s->vslen = 4;
+ s->i = 0;
+ while (1) {
+ crReturn(1); /* get another char */
+ if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
+ s->vstrsize += 16;
+ s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
+ }
+ s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
+ if (s->i >= 0) {
+ if (c == '-') {
+ s->version[s->i] = '\0';
+ s->i = -1;
+ } else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
+ s->version[s->i++] = c;
+ } else if (c == '\012')
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
+ ssh->rdpkt2_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
+
+ s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
+ s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
+ ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
+
+ /*
+ * Decide which SSH protocol version to support.
+ */
+
+ /* Anything strictly below "2.0" means protocol 1 is supported. */
+ s->proto1 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0;
+ /* Anything greater or equal to "1.99" means protocol 2 is supported. */
+ s->proto2 = ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "1.99") >= 0;
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0 && !s->proto1) {
+ bombout(("SSH protocol version 1 required by user but not provided by server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3 && !s->proto2) {
+ bombout(("SSH protocol version 2 required by user but not provided by server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ if (s->proto2 && (ssh->cfg.sshprot >= 2 || !s->proto1))
+ ssh->version = 2;
+ else
+ ssh->version = 1;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using SSH protocol version %d", ssh->version);
+
+ /* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshprot != 3)
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, s->version);
+
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ size_t len;
+ /*
+ * Record their version string.
+ */
+ len = strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012");
+ ssh->v_s = snewn(len + 1, char);
+ memcpy(ssh->v_s, s->vstring, len);
+ ssh->v_s[len] = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise SSH-2 protocol.
+ */
+ ssh->protocol = ssh2_protocol;
+ ssh2_protocol_setup(ssh);
+ ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_rdpkt;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Initialise SSH-1 protocol.
+ */
+ ssh->protocol = ssh1_protocol;
+ ssh1_protocol_setup(ssh);
+ ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh1_rdpkt;
+ }
+ if (ssh->version == 2)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
+ ssh->pinger = pinger_new(&ssh->cfg, &ssh_backend, ssh);
+
+ sfree(s->vstring);
+
+ crFinish(0);
+}
+
+static void ssh_process_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
+ unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktin;
+
+ pktin = ssh->s_rdpkt(ssh, data, datalen);
+ if (pktin) {
+ ssh->protocol(ssh, NULL, 0, pktin);
+ ssh_free_packet(pktin);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_queue_incoming_data(Ssh ssh,
+ unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ bufchain_add(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, *data, *datalen);
+ *data += *datalen;
+ *datalen = 0;
+}
+
+static void ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ void *vdata;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ int len, origlen;
+
+ while (!ssh->frozen && bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data)) {
+ bufchain_prefix(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, &vdata, &len);
+ data = vdata;
+ origlen = len;
+
+ while (!ssh->frozen && len > 0)
+ ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &len);
+
+ if (origlen > len)
+ bufchain_consume(&ssh->queued_incoming_data, origlen - len);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
+{
+ if (ssh->s)
+ sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
+ ssh->frozen = frozen;
+}
+
+static void ssh_gotdata(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ /* Log raw data, if we're in that mode. */
+ if (ssh->logctx)
+ log_packet(ssh->logctx, PKT_INCOMING, -1, NULL, data, datalen,
+ 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ crBegin(ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate);
+
+ /*
+ * To begin with, feed the characters one by one to the
+ * protocol initialisation / selection function do_ssh_init().
+ * When that returns 0, we're done with the initial greeting
+ * exchange and can move on to packet discipline.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept across crReturn */
+ if (datalen == 0)
+ crReturnV; /* more data please */
+ ret = do_ssh_init(ssh, *data);
+ data++;
+ datalen--;
+ if (ret == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We emerge from that loop when the initial negotiation is
+ * over and we have selected an s_rdpkt function. Now pass
+ * everything to s_rdpkt, and then pass the resulting packets
+ * to the proper protocol handler.
+ */
+
+ while (1) {
+ while (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0 || datalen > 0) {
+ if (ssh->frozen) {
+ ssh_queue_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
+ /* This uses up all data and cannot cause anything interesting
+ * to happen; indeed, for anything to happen at all, we must
+ * return, so break out. */
+ break;
+ } else if (bufchain_size(&ssh->queued_incoming_data) > 0) {
+ /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
+ * session. */
+ ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
+ } else {
+ /* This uses up some or all data, and may freeze the
+ * session. */
+ ssh_process_incoming_data(ssh, &data, &datalen);
+ }
+ /* FIXME this is probably EBW. */
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+ }
+ /* We're out of data. Go and get some more. */
+ crReturnV;
+ }
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+static int ssh_do_close(Ssh ssh, int notify_exit)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
+ expire_timer_context(ssh);
+ if (ssh->s) {
+ sk_close(ssh->s);
+ ssh->s = NULL;
+ if (notify_exit)
+ notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we must shut down any port- and X-forwarded channels going
+ * through this connection.
+ */
+ if (ssh->channels) {
+ while (NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, 0))) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ break;
+ }
+ del234(ssh->channels, c); /* moving next one to index 0 */
+ if (ssh->version == 2)
+ bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Go through port-forwardings, and close any associated
+ * listening sockets.
+ */
+ if (ssh->portfwds) {
+ struct ssh_portfwd *pf;
+ while (NULL != (pf = index234(ssh->portfwds, 0))) {
+ /* Dispose of any listening socket. */
+ if (pf->local)
+ pfd_terminate(pf->local);
+ del234(ssh->portfwds, pf); /* moving next one to index 0 */
+ free_portfwd(pf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void ssh_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ char addrbuf[256], *msg;
+
+ sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
+
+ if (type == 0)
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
+ else
+ msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
+
+ logevent(msg);
+ sfree(msg);
+}
+
+static int ssh_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
+ int calling_back)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ int need_notify = ssh_do_close(ssh, FALSE);
+
+ if (!error_msg) {
+ if (!ssh->close_expected)
+ error_msg = "Server unexpectedly closed network connection";
+ else
+ error_msg = "Server closed network connection";
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->close_expected && ssh->clean_exit && ssh->exitcode < 0)
+ ssh->exitcode = 0;
+
+ if (need_notify)
+ notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
+
+ if (error_msg)
+ logevent(error_msg);
+ if (!ssh->close_expected || !ssh->clean_exit)
+ connection_fatal(ssh->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssh_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ ssh_gotdata(ssh, (unsigned char *)data, len);
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED) {
+ ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void ssh_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) plug;
+ /*
+ * If the send backlog on the SSH socket itself clears, we
+ * should unthrottle the whole world if it was throttled.
+ */
+ if (bufsize < SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
+ ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 0, bufsize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connect to specified host and port.
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
+ * freed by the caller.
+ */
+static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, char *host, int port,
+ char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ ssh_log,
+ ssh_closing,
+ ssh_receive,
+ ssh_sent,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ SockAddr addr;
+ const char *err;
+
+ if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
+ char *colon;
+
+ ssh->savedhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
+ ssh->savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
+
+ /*
+ * A colon suffix on savedhost also lets us affect
+ * savedport.
+ *
+ * (FIXME: do something about IPv6 address literals here.)
+ */
+ colon = strrchr(ssh->savedhost, ':');
+ if (colon) {
+ *colon++ = '\0';
+ if (*colon)
+ ssh->savedport = atoi(colon);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->savedhost = dupstr(host);
+ if (port < 0)
+ port = 22; /* default ssh port */
+ ssh->savedport = port;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try to find host.
+ */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
+ (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
+ (ssh->cfg.addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" : "")));
+ addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &ssh->cfg,
+ ssh->cfg.addressfamily);
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+ return err;
+ }
+ ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ ssh->fn = &fn_table;
+ ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
+ 0, 1, nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) ssh, &ssh->cfg);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
+ ssh->s = NULL;
+ notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the SSH version number's fixed, set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
+ * send the version string too.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 0)
+ ssh->version = 1;
+ if (ssh->cfg.sshprot == 3) {
+ ssh->version = 2;
+ ssh_send_verstring(ssh, NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
+ */
+ if (*ssh->cfg.loghost) {
+ sfree(*realhost);
+ *realhost = dupstr(ssh->cfg.loghost);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Throttle or unthrottle the SSH connection.
+ */
+static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
+{
+ int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
+ ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
+ assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
+ if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ } else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Throttle or unthrottle _all_ local data streams (for when sends
+ * on the SSH connection itself back up).
+ */
+static void ssh_throttle_all(Ssh ssh, int enable, int bufsize)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ if (enable == ssh->throttled_all)
+ return;
+ ssh->throttled_all = enable;
+ ssh->overall_bufsize = bufsize;
+ if (!ssh->channels)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ /*
+ * This is treated separately, outside the switch.
+ */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_override_throttle(c->u.x11.s, enable);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* Agent channels require no buffer management. */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ pfd_override_throttle(c->u.pfd.s, enable);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_agent_callback(void *sshv, void *reply, int replylen)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
+
+ ssh->agent_response = reply;
+ ssh->agent_response_len = replylen;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1)
+ do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+ else
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+}
+
+static void ssh_dialog_callback(void *sshv, int ret)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) sshv;
+
+ ssh->user_response = ret;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1)
+ do_ssh1_login(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+ else
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, NULL, -1, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * This may have unfrozen the SSH connection, so do a
+ * queued-data run.
+ */
+ ssh_process_queued_incoming_data(ssh);
+}
+
+static void ssh_agentf_callback(void *cv, void *reply, int replylen)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)cv;
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ void *sentreply = reply;
+
+ if (!sentreply) {
+ /* Fake SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. */
+ sentreply = "\0\0\0\1\5";
+ replylen = 5;
+ }
+ if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ ssh2_add_channel_data(c, sentreply, replylen);
+ ssh2_try_send(c);
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_INT, replylen,
+ PKTT_DATA,
+ PKT_DATA, sentreply, replylen,
+ PKTT_OTHER,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+ if (reply)
+ sfree(reply);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Client-initiated disconnection. Send a DISCONNECT if `wire_reason'
+ * non-NULL, otherwise just close the connection. `client_reason' == NULL
+ * => log `wire_reason'.
+ */
+static void ssh_disconnect(Ssh ssh, char *client_reason, char *wire_reason,
+ int code, int clean_exit)
+{
+ char *error;
+ if (!client_reason)
+ client_reason = wire_reason;
+ if (client_reason)
+ error = dupprintf("Disconnected: %s", client_reason);
+ else
+ error = dupstr("Disconnected");
+ if (wire_reason) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT, PKT_STR, wire_reason,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, code);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, wire_reason);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ }
+ ssh->close_expected = TRUE;
+ ssh->clean_exit = clean_exit;
+ ssh_closing((Plug)ssh, error, 0, 0);
+ sfree(error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the key exchange and user authentication phases.
+ */
+static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ int i, j, ret;
+ unsigned char cookie[8], *ptr;
+ struct RSAKey servkey, hostkey;
+ struct MD5Context md5c;
+ struct do_ssh1_login_state {
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *rsabuf, *keystr1, *keystr2;
+ unsigned long supported_ciphers_mask, supported_auths_mask;
+ int tried_publickey, tried_agent;
+ int tis_auth_refused, ccard_auth_refused;
+ unsigned char session_id[16];
+ int cipher_type;
+ char username[100];
+ void *publickey_blob;
+ int publickey_bloblen;
+ char *publickey_comment;
+ int publickey_encrypted;
+ prompts_t *cur_prompt;
+ char c;
+ int pwpkt_type;
+ unsigned char request[5], *response, *p;
+ int responselen;
+ int keyi, nkeys;
+ int authed;
+ struct RSAKey key;
+ Bignum challenge;
+ char *commentp;
+ int commentlen;
+ int dlgret;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh1_login_state);
+
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate);
+
+ if (!pktin)
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ bombout(("Public key packet not received"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Received public keys");
+
+ ptr = ssh_pkt_getdata(pktin, 8);
+ if (!ptr) {
+ bombout(("SSH-1 public key packet stopped before random cookie"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ memcpy(cookie, ptr, 8);
+
+ if (!ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &servkey, &s->keystr1) ||
+ !ssh1_pkt_getrsakey(pktin, &hostkey, &s->keystr2)) {
+ bombout(("Failed to read SSH-1 public keys from public key packet"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Log the host key fingerprint.
+ */
+ {
+ char logmsg[80];
+ logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
+ strcpy(logmsg, " ");
+ hostkey.comment = NULL;
+ rsa_fingerprint(logmsg + strlen(logmsg),
+ sizeof(logmsg) - strlen(logmsg), &hostkey);
+ logevent(logmsg);
+ }
+
+ ssh->v1_remote_protoflags = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ s->supported_ciphers_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ s->supported_auths_mask = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_RSA))
+ s->supported_auths_mask &= ~(1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA);
+
+ ssh->v1_local_protoflags =
+ ssh->v1_remote_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAGS_SUPPORTED;
+ ssh->v1_local_protoflags |= SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr2, hostkey.bytes);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, s->keystr1, servkey.bytes);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, cookie, 8);
+ MD5Final(s->session_id, &md5c);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+ ssh->session_key[i] = random_byte();
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the `bits' and `bytes' parameters match.
+ */
+ if (hostkey.bits > hostkey.bytes * 8 ||
+ servkey.bits > servkey.bytes * 8) {
+ bombout(("SSH-1 public keys were badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ s->len = (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes ? hostkey.bytes : servkey.bytes);
+
+ s->rsabuf = snewn(s->len, unsigned char);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify the host key.
+ */
+ {
+ /*
+ * First format the key into a string.
+ */
+ int len = rsastr_len(&hostkey);
+ char fingerprint[100];
+ char *keystr = snewn(len, char);
+ rsastr_fmt(keystr, &hostkey);
+ rsa_fingerprint(fingerprint, sizeof(fingerprint), &hostkey);
+
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
+ ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ "rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ sfree(keystr);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user host key response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
+ NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ s->rsabuf[i] = ssh->session_key[i];
+ if (i < 16)
+ s->rsabuf[i] ^= s->session_id[i];
+ }
+
+ if (hostkey.bytes > servkey.bytes) {
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &servkey);
+ if (ret)
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, servkey.bytes, &hostkey);
+ } else {
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, 32, &hostkey);
+ if (ret)
+ ret = rsaencrypt(s->rsabuf, hostkey.bytes, &servkey);
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ bombout(("SSH-1 public key encryptions failed due to bad formatting"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Encrypted session key");
+
+ {
+ int cipher_chosen = 0, warn = 0;
+ char *cipher_string = NULL;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; !cipher_chosen && i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
+ int next_cipher = ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i];
+ if (next_cipher == CIPHER_WARN) {
+ /* If/when we choose a cipher, warn about it */
+ warn = 1;
+ } else if (next_cipher == CIPHER_AES) {
+ /* XXX Probably don't need to mention this. */
+ logevent("AES not supported in SSH-1, skipping");
+ } else {
+ switch (next_cipher) {
+ case CIPHER_3DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
+ cipher_string = "3DES"; break;
+ case CIPHER_BLOWFISH: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
+ cipher_string = "Blowfish"; break;
+ case CIPHER_DES: s->cipher_type = SSH_CIPHER_DES;
+ cipher_string = "single-DES"; break;
+ }
+ if (s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << s->cipher_type))
+ cipher_chosen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!cipher_chosen) {
+ if ((s->supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES)) == 0)
+ bombout(("Server violates SSH-1 protocol by not "
+ "supporting 3DES encryption"));
+ else
+ /* shouldn't happen */
+ bombout(("No supported ciphers found"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ /* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
+ if (warn) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (s->cipher_type) {
+ case SSH_CIPHER_3DES:
+ logevent("Using 3DES encryption");
+ break;
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ logevent("Using single-DES encryption");
+ break;
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+ logevent("Using Blowfish encryption");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_SESSION_KEY,
+ PKT_CHAR, s->cipher_type,
+ PKT_DATA, cookie, 8,
+ PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) >> 8, PKT_CHAR, (s->len * 8) & 0xFF,
+ PKT_DATA, s->rsabuf, s->len,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->v1_local_protoflags, PKT_END);
+
+ logevent("Trying to enable encryption...");
+
+ sfree(s->rsabuf);
+
+ ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 :
+ s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des :
+ &ssh_3des);
+ ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context();
+ ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name);
+
+ ssh->crcda_ctx = crcda_make_context();
+ logevent("Installing CRC compensation attack detector");
+
+ if (servkey.modulus) {
+ sfree(servkey.modulus);
+ servkey.modulus = NULL;
+ }
+ if (servkey.exponent) {
+ sfree(servkey.exponent);
+ servkey.exponent = NULL;
+ }
+ if (hostkey.modulus) {
+ sfree(hostkey.modulus);
+ hostkey.modulus = NULL;
+ }
+ if (hostkey.exponent) {
+ sfree(hostkey.exponent);
+ hostkey.exponent = NULL;
+ }
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Successfully started encryption");
+
+ fflush(stdout); /* FIXME eh? */
+ {
+ if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
+ sizeof(s->username))) {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
+ lenof(s->username));
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntil(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get a username. Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
+ lenof(s->username));
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ }
+
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_USER, PKT_STR, s->username, PKT_END);
+ {
+ char *userlog = dupprintf("Sent username \"%s\"", s->username);
+ logevent(userlog);
+ if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE &&
+ (!((flags & FLAG_STDERR) && (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)))) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, userlog);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
+ }
+ sfree(userlog);
+ }
+ }
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+
+ if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_RSA)) == 0) {
+ /* We must not attempt PK auth. Pretend we've already tried it. */
+ s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 1;
+ } else {
+ s->tried_publickey = s->tried_agent = 0;
+ }
+ s->tis_auth_refused = s->ccard_auth_refused = 0;
+ /*
+ * Load the public half of any configured keyfile for later use.
+ */
+ if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
+ int keytype;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
+ keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
+ if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1) {
+ const char *error;
+ if (rsakey_pubblob(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
+ &s->publickey_blob, &s->publickey_bloblen,
+ &s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
+ s->publickey_encrypted = rsakey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)", error);
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
+ "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
+ error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
+ " (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ }
+ } else
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+
+ while (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD;
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists() && !s->tried_agent) {
+ /*
+ * Attempt RSA authentication using Pageant.
+ */
+ void *r;
+
+ s->authed = FALSE;
+ s->tried_agent = 1;
+ logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
+
+ /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
+ PUT_32BIT(s->request, 1);
+ s->request[4] = SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ if (!agent_query(s->request, 5, &r, &s->responselen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for agent response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ r = ssh->agent_response;
+ s->responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ }
+ s->response = (unsigned char *) r;
+ if (s->response && s->responselen >= 5 &&
+ s->response[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+ s->p = s->response + 5;
+ s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(s->p);
+ s->p += 4;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-1 keys", s->nkeys);
+ for (s->keyi = 0; s->keyi < s->nkeys; s->keyi++) {
+ unsigned char *pkblob = s->p;
+ s->p += 4;
+ {
+ int n, ok = FALSE;
+ do { /* do while (0) to make breaking easy */
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum
+ (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
+ &s->key.exponent);
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ s->p += n;
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum
+ (s->p, s->responselen-(s->p-s->response),
+ &s->key.modulus);
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ s->p += n;
+ if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) < 4)
+ break;
+ s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->p);
+ s->p += 4;
+ if (s->responselen - (s->p-s->response) <
+ s->commentlen)
+ break;
+ s->commentp = (char *)s->p;
+ s->p += s->commentlen;
+ ok = TRUE;
+ } while (0);
+ if (!ok) {
+ logevent("Pageant key list packet was truncated");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ if (!memcmp(pkblob, s->publickey_blob,
+ s->publickey_bloblen)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
+ "configured key file", s->keyi);
+ s->tried_publickey = 1;
+ } else
+ /* Skip non-configured key */
+ continue;
+ }
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
+ PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("Key refused");
+ continue;
+ }
+ logevent("Received RSA challenge");
+ if ((s->challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *agentreq, *q, *ret;
+ void *vret;
+ int len, retlen;
+ len = 1 + 4; /* message type, bit count */
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.exponent);
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->key.modulus);
+ len += ssh1_bignum_length(s->challenge);
+ len += 16; /* session id */
+ len += 4; /* response format */
+ agentreq = snewn(4 + len, char);
+ PUT_32BIT(agentreq, len);
+ q = agentreq + 4;
+ *q++ = SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
+ PUT_32BIT(q, bignum_bitcount(s->key.modulus));
+ q += 4;
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.exponent);
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->key.modulus);
+ q += ssh1_write_bignum(q, s->challenge);
+ memcpy(q, s->session_id, 16);
+ q += 16;
+ PUT_32BIT(q, 1); /* response format */
+ if (!agent_query(agentreq, len + 4, &vret, &retlen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ sfree(agentreq);
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
+ " while waiting for agent"
+ " response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ vret = ssh->agent_response;
+ retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ } else
+ sfree(agentreq);
+ ret = vret;
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret[4] == SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
+ logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
+ PKT_DATA, ret + 5, 16,
+ PKT_END);
+ sfree(ret);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant's response accepted");
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticated using"
+ " RSA key \"");
+ c_write(ssh, s->commentp,
+ s->commentlen);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
+ }
+ s->authed = TRUE;
+ } else
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant's response not accepted");
+ } else {
+ logevent
+ ("Pageant failed to answer challenge");
+ sfree(ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+ logevent("No reply received from Pageant");
+ }
+ }
+ freebn(s->key.exponent);
+ freebn(s->key.modulus);
+ freebn(s->challenge);
+ if (s->authed)
+ break;
+ }
+ sfree(s->response);
+ if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey)
+ logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
+ }
+ if (s->authed)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (s->publickey_blob && !s->tried_publickey) {
+ /*
+ * Try public key authentication with the specified
+ * key file.
+ */
+ int got_passphrase; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Trying public key authentication.\r\n");
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying public key \"%s\"",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
+ s->tried_publickey = 1;
+ got_passphrase = FALSE;
+ while (!got_passphrase) {
+ /*
+ * Get a passphrase, if necessary.
+ */
+ char *passphrase = NULL; /* only written after crReturn */
+ const char *error;
+ if (!s->publickey_encrypted) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "No passphrase required.\r\n");
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ } else {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
+ s->publickey_comment),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntil(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ passphrase = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Try decrypting key with passphrase.
+ */
+ ret = loadrsakey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, &s->key, passphrase,
+ &error);
+ if (passphrase) {
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ sfree(passphrase);
+ }
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ /* Correct passphrase. */
+ got_passphrase = TRUE;
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Couldn't load private key from ");
+ c_write_str(ssh, filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
+ c_write_str(ssh, " (");
+ c_write_str(ssh, error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, ").\r\n");
+ got_passphrase = FALSE;
+ break; /* go and try something else */
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase.\r\n"); /* FIXME */
+ got_passphrase = FALSE;
+ /* and try again */
+ } else {
+ assert(0 && "unexpected return from loadrsakey()");
+ got_passphrase = FALSE; /* placate optimisers */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_passphrase) {
+
+ /*
+ * Send a public key attempt.
+ */
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA,
+ PKT_BIGNUM, s->key.modulus, PKT_END);
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our public key.\r\n");
+ continue; /* go and try something else */
+ }
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) {
+ bombout(("Bizarre response to offer of public key"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ int i;
+ unsigned char buffer[32];
+ Bignum challenge, response;
+
+ if ((challenge = ssh1_pkt_getmp(pktin)) == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Server's RSA challenge was badly formatted"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ response = rsadecrypt(challenge, &s->key);
+ freebn(s->key.private_exponent);/* burn the evidence */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ buffer[i] = bignum_byte(response, 31 - i);
+ }
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, buffer, 32);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, s->session_id, 16);
+ MD5Final(buffer, &md5c);
+
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE,
+ PKT_DATA, buffer, 16, PKT_END);
+
+ freebn(challenge);
+ freebn(response);
+ }
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Failed to authenticate with"
+ " our public key.\r\n");
+ continue; /* go and try something else */
+ } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Bizarre response to RSA authentication response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ break; /* we're through! */
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, try various forms of password-like authentication.
+ */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
+ (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_TIS)) &&
+ !s->tis_auth_refused) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE;
+ logevent("Requested TIS authentication");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("TIS authentication declined");
+ if (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "TIS authentication refused.\r\n");
+ s->tis_auth_refused = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ char *challenge;
+ int challengelen;
+ char *instr_suf, *prompt;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ bombout(("TIS challenge packet was badly formed"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ logevent("Received TIS challenge");
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH TIS authentication");
+ /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
+ if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
+ instr_suf = dupstr("");
+ prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ } else {
+ instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
+ }
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("Using TIS authentication.%s%s",
+ (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
+ instr_suf);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ sfree(instr_suf);
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssh->cfg.try_tis_auth &&
+ (s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_CCARD)) &&
+ !s->ccard_auth_refused) {
+ s->pwpkt_type = SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD_RESPONSE;
+ logevent("Requested CryptoCard authentication");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_CCARD, PKT_END);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_AUTH_CCARD_CHALLENGE) {
+ logevent("CryptoCard authentication declined");
+ c_write_str(ssh, "CryptoCard authentication refused.\r\n");
+ s->ccard_auth_refused = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ char *challenge;
+ int challengelen;
+ char *instr_suf, *prompt;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &challenge, &challengelen);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ bombout(("CryptoCard challenge packet was badly formed"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ logevent("Received CryptoCard challenge");
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH CryptoCard authentication");
+ s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
+ /* Prompt heuristic comes from OpenSSH */
+ if (memchr(challenge, '\n', challengelen)) {
+ instr_suf = dupstr("");
+ prompt = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ } else {
+ instr_suf = dupprintf("%.*s", challengelen, challenge);
+ prompt = dupstr("Response: ");
+ }
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("Using CryptoCard authentication.%s%s",
+ (*instr_suf) ? "\n" : "",
+ instr_suf);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, prompt, FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ sfree(instr_suf);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
+ if ((s->supported_auths_mask & (1 << SSH1_AUTH_PASSWORD)) == 0) {
+ bombout(("No supported authentication methods available"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
+ s->username, ssh->savedhost),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Show password prompt, having first obtained it via a TIS
+ * or CryptoCard exchange if we're doing TIS or CryptoCard
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntil(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get a password (for example
+ * because one was supplied on the command line
+ * which has already failed to work). Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate", 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->pwpkt_type == SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
+ /*
+ * Defence against traffic analysis: we send a
+ * whole bunch of packets containing strings of
+ * different lengths. One of these strings is the
+ * password, in a SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD packet.
+ * The others are all random data in
+ * SSH1_MSG_IGNORE packets. This way a passive
+ * listener can't tell which is the password, and
+ * hence can't deduce the password length.
+ *
+ * Anybody with a password length greater than 16
+ * bytes is going to have enough entropy in their
+ * password that a listener won't find it _that_
+ * much help to know how long it is. So what we'll
+ * do is:
+ *
+ * - if password length < 16, we send 15 packets
+ * containing string lengths 1 through 15
+ *
+ * - otherwise, we let N be the nearest multiple
+ * of 8 below the password length, and send 8
+ * packets containing string lengths N through
+ * N+7. This won't obscure the order of
+ * magnitude of the password length, but it will
+ * introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
+ *
+ * A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
+ * least in this context. For these servers, we need
+ * an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
+ * that the password is interpreted as a C string:
+ * so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
+ *
+ * A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
+ * here _nor_ a padded password string.
+ * For these servers we are left with no defences
+ * against password length sniffing.
+ */
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
+ !(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
+ /*
+ * The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
+ * we can use the primary defence.
+ */
+ int bottom, top, pwlen, i;
+ char *randomstr;
+
+ pwlen = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ if (pwlen < 16) {
+ bottom = 0; /* zero length passwords are OK! :-) */
+ top = 15;
+ } else {
+ bottom = pwlen & ~7;
+ top = bottom + 7;
+ }
+
+ assert(pwlen >= bottom && pwlen <= top);
+
+ randomstr = snewn(top + 1, char);
+
+ for (i = bottom; i <= top; i++) {
+ if (i == pwlen) {
+ defer_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_STR,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ do {
+ randomstr[j] = random_byte();
+ } while (randomstr[j] == '\0');
+ }
+ randomstr[i] = '\0';
+ defer_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE,
+ PKT_STR, randomstr, PKT_END);
+ }
+ }
+ logevent("Sending password with camouflage packets");
+ ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
+ sfree(randomstr);
+ }
+ else if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
+ /*
+ * The server can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
+ * but can deal with padded passwords, so we
+ * can use the secondary defence.
+ */
+ char string[64];
+ char *ss;
+ int len;
+
+ len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ if (len < sizeof(string)) {
+ ss = string;
+ strcpy(string, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ len++; /* cover the zero byte */
+ while (len < sizeof(string)) {
+ string[len++] = (char) random_byte();
+ }
+ } else {
+ ss = s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result;
+ }
+ logevent("Sending length-padded password");
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKT_DATA, ss, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The server is believed unable to cope with
+ * any of our password camouflage methods.
+ */
+ int len;
+ len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ logevent("Sending unpadded password");
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type,
+ PKTT_PASSWORD, PKT_INT, len,
+ PKT_DATA, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ }
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, s->pwpkt_type, PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ PKT_STR, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ }
+ logevent("Sent password");
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
+ logevent("Authentication refused");
+ } else if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received, type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clear up */
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ sfree(s->publickey_blob);
+ sfree(s->publickey_comment);
+ }
+
+ logevent("Authentication successful");
+
+ crFinish(1);
+}
+
+void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (c && !c->closes) {
+ /*
+ * If halfopen is true, we have sent
+ * CHANNEL_OPEN for this channel, but it hasn't even been
+ * acknowledged by the server. So we must set a close flag
+ * on it now, and then when the server acks the channel
+ * open, we can close it then.
+ */
+ if (!c->halfopen) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ }
+ c->closes = 1; /* sent MSG_CLOSE */
+ if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
+ c->u.x11.s = NULL;
+ logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA ||
+ c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
+ logevent("Forwarded port closed");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, buf, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ /*
+ * In SSH-1 we can return 0 here - implying that forwarded
+ * connections are never individually throttled - because
+ * the only circumstance that can cause throttling will be
+ * the whole SSH connection backing up, in which case
+ * _everything_ will be throttled as a whole.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ ssh2_add_channel_data(c, buf, len);
+ return ssh2_try_send(c);
+ }
+}
+
+void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ int buflimit;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ buflimit = SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT;
+ } else {
+ buflimit = c->v.v2.locmaxwin;
+ ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < buflimit ? buflimit - bufsize : 0);
+ }
+ if (c->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_queueing_handler(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
+
+ assert(qh != NULL);
+
+ assert(pktin->type == qh->msg1 || pktin->type == qh->msg2);
+
+ if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == ssh_queueing_handler);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == ssh_queueing_handler);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (qh->next) {
+ ssh->qhead = qh->next;
+
+ if (ssh->qhead->msg1 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ if (ssh->qhead->msg2 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[ssh->qhead->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ qh->handler(ssh, pktin, qh->ctx);
+
+ sfree(qh);
+}
+
+static void ssh_queue_handler(Ssh ssh, int msg1, int msg2,
+ chandler_fn_t handler, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct queued_handler *qh;
+
+ qh = snew(struct queued_handler);
+ qh->msg1 = msg1;
+ qh->msg2 = msg2;
+ qh->handler = handler;
+ qh->ctx = ctx;
+ qh->next = NULL;
+
+ if (ssh->qtail == NULL) {
+ ssh->qhead = qh;
+
+ if (qh->msg1 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg1] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ if (qh->msg2 > 0) {
+ assert(ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] == NULL);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[qh->msg2] = ssh_queueing_handler;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->qtail->next = qh;
+ }
+ ssh->qtail = qh;
+}
+
+static void ssh_rportfwd_succfail(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin, void *ctx)
+{
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf, *pf = (struct ssh_rportfwd *)ctx;
+
+ if (pktin->type == (ssh->version == 1 ? SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS :
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s enabled",
+ pf->sportdesc);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote port forwarding from %s refused",
+ pf->sportdesc);
+
+ rpf = del234(ssh->rportfwds, pf);
+ assert(rpf == pf);
+ free_rportfwd(pf);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh_setup_portfwd(Ssh ssh, const Config *cfg)
+{
+ const char *portfwd_strptr = cfg->portfwd;
+ struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!ssh->portfwds) {
+ ssh->portfwds = newtree234(ssh_portcmp);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Go through the existing port forwardings and tag them
+ * with status==DESTROY. Any that we want to keep will be
+ * re-enabled (status==KEEP) as we go through the
+ * configuration and find out which bits are the same as
+ * they were before.
+ */
+ struct ssh_portfwd *epf;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ epf->status = DESTROY;
+ }
+
+ while (*portfwd_strptr) {
+ char address_family, type;
+ int sport,dport,sserv,dserv;
+ char sports[256], dports[256], saddr[256], host[256];
+ int n;
+
+ address_family = 'A';
+ type = 'L';
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == 'A' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == '4' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == '6')
+ address_family = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == 'L' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == 'R' ||
+ *portfwd_strptr == 'D')
+ type = *portfwd_strptr++;
+
+ saddr[0] = '\0';
+
+ n = 0;
+ while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != '\t') {
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == ':') {
+ /*
+ * We've seen a colon in the middle of the
+ * source port number. This means that
+ * everything we've seen until now is the
+ * source _address_, so we'll move it into
+ * saddr and start sports from the beginning
+ * again.
+ */
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ sports[n] = '\0';
+ if (ssh->version == 1 && type == 'R') {
+ logeventf(ssh, "SSH-1 cannot handle remote source address "
+ "spec \"%s\"; ignoring", sports);
+ } else
+ strcpy(saddr, sports);
+ n = 0;
+ }
+ if (n < lenof(sports)-1) sports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ }
+ sports[n] = 0;
+ if (type != 'D') {
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == '\t')
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ n = 0;
+ while (*portfwd_strptr && *portfwd_strptr != ':') {
+ if (n < lenof(host)-1) host[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ }
+ host[n] = 0;
+ if (*portfwd_strptr == ':')
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ n = 0;
+ while (*portfwd_strptr) {
+ if (n < lenof(dports)-1) dports[n++] = *portfwd_strptr++;
+ }
+ dports[n] = 0;
+ portfwd_strptr++;
+ dport = atoi(dports);
+ dserv = 0;
+ if (dport == 0) {
+ dserv = 1;
+ dport = net_service_lookup(dports);
+ if (!dport) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for destination"
+ " port \"%s\"", dports);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (*portfwd_strptr) portfwd_strptr++;
+ host[0] = 0;
+ dports[0] = 0;
+ dport = dserv = -1;
+ portfwd_strptr++; /* eat the NUL and move to next one */
+ }
+ sport = atoi(sports);
+ sserv = 0;
+ if (sport == 0) {
+ sserv = 1;
+ sport = net_service_lookup(sports);
+ if (!sport) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Service lookup failed for source"
+ " port \"%s\"", sports);
+ }
+ }
+ if (sport && dport) {
+ /* Set up a description of the source port. */
+ struct ssh_portfwd *pfrec, *epfrec;
+
+ pfrec = snew(struct ssh_portfwd);
+ pfrec->type = type;
+ pfrec->saddr = *saddr ? dupstr(saddr) : NULL;
+ pfrec->sserv = sserv ? dupstr(sports) : NULL;
+ pfrec->sport = sport;
+ pfrec->daddr = *host ? dupstr(host) : NULL;
+ pfrec->dserv = dserv ? dupstr(dports) : NULL;
+ pfrec->dport = dport;
+ pfrec->local = NULL;
+ pfrec->remote = NULL;
+ pfrec->addressfamily = (address_family == '4' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
+ address_family == '6' ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
+ ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
+
+ epfrec = add234(ssh->portfwds, pfrec);
+ if (epfrec != pfrec) {
+ /*
+ * We already have a port forwarding with precisely
+ * these parameters. Hence, no need to do anything;
+ * simply tag the existing one as KEEP.
+ */
+ epfrec->status = KEEP;
+ free_portfwd(pfrec);
+ } else {
+ pfrec->status = CREATE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now go through and destroy any port forwardings which were
+ * not re-enabled.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ if (epf->status == DESTROY) {
+ char *message;
+
+ message = dupprintf("%s port forwarding from %s%s%d",
+ epf->type == 'L' ? "local" :
+ epf->type == 'R' ? "remote" : "dynamic",
+ epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
+ epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
+ epf->sport);
+
+ if (epf->type != 'D') {
+ char *msg2 = dupprintf("%s to %s:%d", message,
+ epf->daddr, epf->dport);
+ sfree(message);
+ message = msg2;
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Cancelling %s", message);
+ sfree(message);
+
+ if (epf->remote) {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *rpf = epf->remote;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ /*
+ * Cancel the port forwarding at the server
+ * end.
+ */
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ /*
+ * We cannot cancel listening ports on the
+ * server side in SSH-1! There's no message
+ * to support it. Instead, we simply remove
+ * the rportfwd record from the local end
+ * so that any connections the server tries
+ * to make on it are rejected.
+ */
+ } else {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "cancel-tcpip-forward");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);/* _don't_ want reply */
+ if (epf->saddr) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
+ } else if (ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall) {
+ /* XXX: ssh->cfg.rport_acceptall may not represent
+ * what was used to open the original connection,
+ * since it's reconfigurable. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
+ } else {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+
+ del234(ssh->rportfwds, rpf);
+ free_rportfwd(rpf);
+ } else if (epf->local) {
+ pfd_terminate(epf->local);
+ }
+
+ delpos234(ssh->portfwds, i);
+ free_portfwd(epf);
+ i--; /* so we don't skip one in the list */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * And finally, set up any new port forwardings (status==CREATE).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (epf = index234(ssh->portfwds, i)) != NULL; i++)
+ if (epf->status == CREATE) {
+ char *sportdesc, *dportdesc;
+ sportdesc = dupprintf("%s%s%s%s%d%s",
+ epf->saddr ? epf->saddr : "",
+ epf->saddr ? ":" : "",
+ epf->sserv ? epf->sserv : "",
+ epf->sserv ? "(" : "",
+ epf->sport,
+ epf->sserv ? ")" : "");
+ if (epf->type == 'D') {
+ dportdesc = NULL;
+ } else {
+ dportdesc = dupprintf("%s:%s%s%d%s",
+ epf->daddr,
+ epf->dserv ? epf->dserv : "",
+ epf->dserv ? "(" : "",
+ epf->dport,
+ epf->dserv ? ")" : "");
+ }
+
+ if (epf->type == 'L') {
+ const char *err = pfd_addforward(epf->daddr, epf->dport,
+ epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, cfg,
+ &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s forwarding to %s%s%s",
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
+ sportdesc, dportdesc,
+ err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+ } else if (epf->type == 'D') {
+ const char *err = pfd_addforward(NULL, -1,
+ epf->saddr, epf->sport,
+ ssh, cfg,
+ &epf->local,
+ epf->addressfamily);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Local %sport %s SOCKS dynamic forwarding%s%s",
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? "IPv4 " :
+ epf->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? "IPv6 " : "",
+ sportdesc,
+ err ? " failed: " : "", err ? err : "");
+ } else {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the remote port forwardings tree exists.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->rportfwds) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1)
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh1);
+ else
+ ssh->rportfwds = newtree234(ssh_rportcmp_ssh2);
+ }
+
+ pf = snew(struct ssh_rportfwd);
+ strncpy(pf->dhost, epf->daddr, lenof(pf->dhost)-1);
+ pf->dhost[lenof(pf->dhost)-1] = '\0';
+ pf->dport = epf->dport;
+ pf->sport = epf->sport;
+ if (add234(ssh->rportfwds, pf) != pf) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Duplicate remote port forwarding to %s:%d",
+ epf->daddr, epf->dport);
+ sfree(pf);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Requesting remote port %s"
+ " forward to %s", sportdesc, dportdesc);
+
+ pf->sportdesc = sportdesc;
+ sportdesc = NULL;
+ epf->remote = pf;
+ pf->pfrec = epf;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST,
+ PKT_INT, epf->sport,
+ PKT_STR, epf->daddr,
+ PKT_INT, epf->dport,
+ PKT_END);
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS,
+ SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE,
+ ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
+ } else {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "tcpip-forward");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 1);/* want reply */
+ if (epf->saddr) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, epf->saddr);
+ } else if (cfg->rport_acceptall) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
+ } else {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "127.0.0.1");
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, epf->sport);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ ssh_queue_handler(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS,
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE,
+ ssh_rportfwd_succfail, pf);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sfree(sportdesc);
+ sfree(dportdesc);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *string;
+ int stringlen, bufsize;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &string, &stringlen);
+ if (string == NULL) {
+ bombout(("Incoming terminal data packet was badly formed"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bufsize = from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA,
+ string, stringlen);
+ if (!ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 1;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_x11_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
+ * X-Server. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ logevent("Received X11 connect request");
+ /* Refuse if X11 forwarding is disabled. */
+ if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Rejected X11 connect request");
+ } else {
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ if (x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
+ NULL, -1, &ssh->cfg) != NULL) {
+ logevent("Opening X11 forward connection failed");
+ sfree(c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ logevent
+ ("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_X11; /* identify channel type */
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
+ c->localid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Opened X11 forward channel");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_agent_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to our
+ * agent. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ /* Refuse if agent forwarding is disabled. */
+ if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT, c->localid,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_port_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side is trying to open a channel to talk to a
+ * forwarded port. Give them back a local channel number. */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *pfp;
+ int remoteid;
+ int hostsize, port;
+ char *host;
+ const char *e;
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &host, &hostsize);
+ port = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ if (hostsize >= lenof(pf.dhost))
+ hostsize = lenof(pf.dhost)-1;
+ memcpy(pf.dhost, host, hostsize);
+ pf.dhost[hostsize] = '\0';
+ pf.dport = port;
+ pfp = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
+
+ if (pfp == NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Rejected remote port open request for %s:%d",
+ pf.dhost, port);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port open request for %s:%d",
+ pf.dhost, port);
+ e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s, pf.dhost, port,
+ c, &ssh->cfg, pfp->pfrec->addressfamily);
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
+ sfree(c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE,
+ PKT_INT, remoteid, PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ c->remoteid = remoteid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA; /* identify channel type */
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_INT,
+ c->localid, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ unsigned int localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ c->remoteid = localid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
+ c->throttling_conn = 0;
+ pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
+ }
+
+ if (c && c->closes) {
+ /*
+ * We have a pending close on this channel,
+ * which we decided on before the server acked
+ * the channel open. So now we know the
+ * remoteid, we can close it again.
+ */
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE,
+ PKT_INT, c->remoteid, PKT_END);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned int remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &remoteid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT) {
+ logevent("Forwarded connection refused by server");
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Remote side closes a channel. */
+ unsigned i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c && !c->halfopen) {
+ int closetype;
+ closetype =
+ (pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? 1 : 2);
+
+ if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_X11)) {
+ logevent("Forwarded X11 connection terminated");
+ assert(c->u.x11.s != NULL);
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ c->u.x11.s = NULL;
+ }
+ if ((c->closes == 0) && (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA)) {
+ logevent("Forwarded port closed");
+ assert(c->u.pfd.s != NULL);
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ c->u.pfd.s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ c->closes |= (closetype << 2); /* seen this message */
+ if (!(c->closes & closetype)) {
+ send_packet(ssh, pktin->type, PKT_INT, c->remoteid,
+ PKT_END);
+ c->closes |= closetype; /* sent it too */
+ }
+
+ if (c->closes == 15) {
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Received CHANNEL_CLOSE%s for %s channel %d\n",
+ pktin->type == SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE ? "" :
+ "_CONFIRMATION", c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent",
+ i));
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Data sent down one of our channels. */
+ int i = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ char *p;
+ int len;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &p, &len);
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &i, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (c) {
+ int bufsize = 0;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, p, len);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, p, len);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* Data for an agent message. Buffer it. */
+ while (len > 0) {
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
+ unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar, (unsigned)len);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
+ l);
+ p += l;
+ len -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
+ c->u.a.totallen =
+ 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
+ c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
+ unsigned char);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && len > 0) {
+ unsigned int l =
+ min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ (unsigned)len);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar, p,
+ l);
+ p += l;
+ len -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
+ void *reply;
+ int replylen;
+ if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
+ c->u.a.totallen,
+ &reply, &replylen,
+ ssh_agentf_callback, c))
+ ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
+ sfree(c->u.a.message);
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ bufsize = 0; /* agent channels never back up */
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!c->throttling_conn && bufsize > SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ c->throttling_conn = 1;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh1_smsg_exit_status(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d", ssh->exitcode);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
+ /*
+ * In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
+ * extra human-readable text on the end of the
+ * session which we might mistake for another
+ * encrypted packet, we close the session once
+ * we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
+ */
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, NULL, 0, TRUE);
+}
+
+/* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for REQUEST_PTY */
+static void ssh1_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int arg = 0;
+ while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
+ if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
+ switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
+ case TTY_OP_CHAR:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
+ break;
+ case TTY_OP_BOOL:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
+ break;
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, arg);
+}
+
+
+static void do_ssh1_connection(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate);
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_STDERR_DATA] =
+ ssh1_smsg_stdout_stderr_data;
+
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_open_failure;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh1_msg_channel_close;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = ssh1_msg_channel_data;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS] = ssh1_smsg_exit_status;
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
+ logevent("Requesting agent forwarding");
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING, PKT_END);
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_agent_open;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
+ (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
+ ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
+ logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
+ /*
+ * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
+ * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
+ * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
+ * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
+ * cookie into the log.
+ */
+ if (ssh->v1_local_protoflags & SSH1_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
+ PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
+ PKTT_OTHER,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->x11disp->screennum,
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname,
+ PKTT_PASSWORD,
+ PKT_STR, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring,
+ PKTT_OTHER,
+ PKT_END);
+ }
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_SMSG_X11_OPEN] = ssh1_smsg_x11_open;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN] = ssh1_msg_port_open;
+
+ if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
+ struct Packet *pkt;
+ /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
+ /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
+ ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
+ sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
+ /* Send the pty request. */
+ pkt = ssh1_pkt_init(SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(pkt, ssh->cfg.termtype);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_height);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->term_width);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* width in pixels */
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, 0); /* height in pixels */
+ parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
+ ssh1_send_ttymode, (void *)pkt);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ispeed);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH1_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
+ ssh_pkt_adduint32(pkt, ssh->ospeed);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(pkt, SSH_TTY_OP_END);
+ s_wrpkt(ssh, pkt);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ }
+ logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
+ ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
+ } else {
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.compression) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION, PKT_INT, 6, PKT_END);
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ } while (!pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ && pktin->type != SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Protocol confusion"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to compress\r\n");
+ }
+ logevent("Started compression");
+ ssh->v1_compressing = TRUE;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = zlib_compress_init();
+ logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) compression");
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = zlib_decompress_init();
+ logevent("Initialised zlib (RFC1950) decompression");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Start the shell or command.
+ *
+ * Special case: if the first-choice command is an SSH-2
+ * subsystem (hence not usable here) and the second choice
+ * exists, we fall straight back to that.
+ */
+ {
+ char *cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
+
+ if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2) {
+ cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (*cmd)
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_CMD, PKT_STR, cmd, PKT_END);
+ else
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL, PKT_END);
+ logevent("Started session");
+ }
+
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
+ if (ssh->size_needed)
+ ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
+ if (ssh->eof_needed)
+ ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
+
+ if (ssh->ldisc)
+ ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
+ while (1) {
+
+ /*
+ * By this point, most incoming packets are already being
+ * handled by the dispatch table, and we need only pay
+ * attention to the unusual ones.
+ */
+
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers */
+ } else if (pktin->type == SSH1_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ /* may be from EXEC_SHELL on some servers
+ * if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (inlen > 0) {
+ int len = min(inlen, 512);
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_STDIN_DATA,
+ PKT_INT, len, PKTT_DATA, PKT_DATA, in, len,
+ PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
+ in += len;
+ inlen -= len;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
+ */
+static void ssh1_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
+}
+
+static void ssh1_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* log reason code in disconnect message */
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ bombout(("Server sent disconnect message:\n\"%.*s\"", msglen, msg));
+}
+
+static void ssh_msg_ignore(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Do nothing, because we're ignoring it! Duhh. */
+}
+
+static void ssh1_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Most messages are handled by the coroutines.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * These special message types we install handlers for.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh1_msg_disconnect;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH1_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh1_msg_debug;
+}
+
+static void ssh1_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in=(unsigned char*)vin;
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
+ if (do_ssh1_login(ssh, in, inlen, pktin))
+ ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
+ else
+ return;
+ }
+
+ do_ssh1_connection(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Utility routine for decoding comma-separated strings in KEXINIT.
+ */
+static int in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+{
+ int needlen;
+ if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
+ return 0;
+ needlen = strlen(needle);
+ while (1) {
+ /*
+ * Is it at the start of the string?
+ */
+ if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
+ !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
+ (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
+ /* either , or EOS follows */
+ )
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * If not, search for the next comma and resume after that.
+ * If no comma found, terminate.
+ */
+ while (haylen > 0 && *haystack != ',')
+ haylen--, haystack++;
+ if (haylen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ haylen--, haystack++; /* skip over comma itself */
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar routine for checking whether we have the first string in a list.
+ */
+static int first_in_commasep_string(char *needle, char *haystack, int haylen)
+{
+ int needlen;
+ if (!needle || !haystack) /* protect against null pointers */
+ return 0;
+ needlen = strlen(needle);
+ /*
+ * Is it at the start of the string?
+ */
+ if (haylen >= needlen && /* haystack is long enough */
+ !memcmp(needle, haystack, needlen) && /* initial match */
+ (haylen == needlen || haystack[needlen] == ',')
+ /* either , or EOS follows */
+ )
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * SSH-2 key creation method.
+ * (Currently assumes 2 lots of any hash are sufficient to generate
+ * keys/IVs for any cipher/MAC. SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS documents this assumption.)
+ */
+#define SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS (2)
+static void ssh2_mkkey(Ssh ssh, Bignum K, unsigned char *H, char chr,
+ unsigned char *keyspace)
+{
+ const struct ssh_hash *h = ssh->kex->hash;
+ void *s;
+ /* First hlen bytes. */
+ s = h->init();
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
+ hash_mpint(h, s, K);
+ h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
+ h->bytes(s, &chr, 1);
+ h->bytes(s, ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ h->final(s, keyspace);
+ /* Next hlen bytes. */
+ s = h->init();
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_DERIVEKEY))
+ hash_mpint(h, s, K);
+ h->bytes(s, H, h->hlen);
+ h->bytes(s, keyspace, h->hlen);
+ h->final(s, keyspace + h->hlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the SSH-2 transport layer.
+ */
+static int do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ struct do_ssh2_transport_state {
+ int nbits, pbits, warn_kex, warn_cscipher, warn_sccipher;
+ Bignum p, g, e, f, K;
+ void *our_kexinit;
+ int our_kexinitlen;
+ int kex_init_value, kex_reply_value;
+ const struct ssh_mac **maclist;
+ int nmacs;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *cscipher_tobe;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *sccipher_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_mac *csmac_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_mac *scmac_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_compress *cscomp_tobe;
+ const struct ssh_compress *sccomp_tobe;
+ char *hostkeydata, *sigdata, *rsakeydata, *keystr, *fingerprint;
+ int hostkeylen, siglen, rsakeylen;
+ void *hkey; /* actual host key */
+ void *rsakey; /* for RSA kex */
+ unsigned char exchange_hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ int n_preferred_kex;
+ const struct ssh_kexes *preferred_kex[KEX_MAX];
+ int n_preferred_ciphers;
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *preferred_ciphers[CIPHER_MAX];
+ const struct ssh_compress *preferred_comp;
+ int got_session_id, activated_authconn;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ int dlgret;
+ int guessok;
+ int ignorepkt;
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh2_transport_state);
+
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate);
+
+ s->cscipher_tobe = s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->csmac_tobe = s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->cscomp_tobe = s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
+
+ s->got_session_id = s->activated_authconn = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Be prepared to work around the buggy MAC problem.
+ */
+ if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_HMAC)
+ s->maclist = buggymacs, s->nmacs = lenof(buggymacs);
+ else
+ s->maclist = macs, s->nmacs = lenof(macs);
+
+ begin_key_exchange:
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
+ {
+ int i, j, commalist_started;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the preferred key exchange. (NULL => warn below here)
+ */
+ s->n_preferred_kex = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_MAX; i++) {
+ switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_kexlist[i]) {
+ case KEX_DHGEX:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHGROUP14:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHGROUP1:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
+ break;
+ case KEX_RSA:
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] =
+ &ssh_rsa_kex;
+ break;
+ case KEX_WARN:
+ /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
+ * the list. */
+ if (i < KEX_MAX - 1) {
+ s->preferred_kex[s->n_preferred_kex++] = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the preferred ciphers. (NULL => warn below here)
+ */
+ s->n_preferred_ciphers = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_MAX; i++) {
+ switch (ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist[i]) {
+ case CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_blowfish;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_DES:
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc) {
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_des;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_3DES:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_3des;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_AES:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_aes;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_ARCFOUR:
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = &ssh2_arcfour;
+ break;
+ case CIPHER_WARN:
+ /* Flag for later. Don't bother if it's the last in
+ * the list. */
+ if (i < CIPHER_MAX - 1) {
+ s->preferred_ciphers[s->n_preferred_ciphers++] = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up preferred compression.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cfg.compression)
+ s->preferred_comp = &ssh_zlib;
+ else
+ s->preferred_comp = &ssh_comp_none;
+
+ /*
+ * Enable queueing of outgoing auth- or connection-layer
+ * packets while we are in the middle of a key exchange.
+ */
+ ssh->queueing = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag that KEX is in progress.
+ */
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Construct and send our key exchange packet.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) random_byte());
+ /* List key exchange algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
+ if (!k) continue; /* warning flag */
+ for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, k->list[j]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* List server host key algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, hostkey_algs[i]->name);
+ if (i < lenof(hostkey_algs) - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ /* List client->server encryption algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* List server->client encryption algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ commalist_started = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) continue; /* warning flag */
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (commalist_started)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->list[j]->name);
+ commalist_started = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* List client->server MAC algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
+ if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ /* List server->client MAC algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->maclist[i]->name);
+ if (i < s->nmacs - 1)
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ }
+ /* List client->server compression algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
+ if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
+ }
+ }
+ /* List server->client compression algorithms. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ assert(lenof(compressions) > 1);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, s->preferred_comp->name);
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions); i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c = compressions[i];
+ if (c != s->preferred_comp) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, ",");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_str(s->pktout, c->name);
+ }
+ }
+ /* List client->server languages. Empty list. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ /* List server->client languages. Empty list. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ /* First KEX packet does _not_ follow, because we're not that brave. */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
+ /* Reserved. */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
+ }
+
+ s->our_kexinitlen = s->pktout->length - 5;
+ s->our_kexinit = snewn(s->our_kexinitlen, unsigned char);
+ memcpy(s->our_kexinit, s->pktout->data + 5, s->our_kexinitlen);
+
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ if (!pktin)
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+
+ /*
+ * Now examine the other side's KEXINIT to see what we're up
+ * to.
+ */
+ {
+ char *str, *preferred;
+ int i, j, len;
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
+ ssh->hostkey = NULL;
+ s->cscipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->sccipher_tobe = NULL;
+ s->csmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->scmac_tobe = NULL;
+ s->cscomp_tobe = NULL;
+ s->sccomp_tobe = NULL;
+ s->warn_kex = s->warn_cscipher = s->warn_sccipher = FALSE;
+
+ pktin->savedpos += 16; /* skip garbage cookie */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* key exchange algorithms */
+
+ preferred = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_kex; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_kexes *k = s->preferred_kex[i];
+ if (!k) {
+ s->warn_kex = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < k->nkexes; j++) {
+ if (!preferred) preferred = k->list[j]->name;
+ if (in_commasep_string(k->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ ssh->kex = k->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ssh->kex) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a key exchange algorithm (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Note that the server's guess is considered wrong if it doesn't match
+ * the first algorithm in our list, even if it's still the algorithm
+ * we end up using.
+ */
+ s->guessok = first_in_commasep_string(preferred, str, len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* host key algorithms */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(hostkey_algs); i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ s->guessok = s->guessok &&
+ first_in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[0]->name, str, len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server cipher */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) {
+ s->warn_cscipher = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->cscipher_tobe = c->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->cscipher_tobe)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!s->cscipher_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a client-to-server cipher (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client cipher */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->n_preferred_ciphers; i++) {
+ const struct ssh2_ciphers *c = s->preferred_ciphers[i];
+ if (!c) {
+ s->warn_sccipher = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < c->nciphers; j++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->list[j]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->sccipher_tobe = c->list[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->sccipher_tobe)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!s->sccipher_tobe) {
+ bombout(("Couldn't agree a server-to-client cipher (available: %s)",
+ str ? str : "(null)"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server mac */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->csmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client mac */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->nmacs; i++) {
+ if (in_commasep_string(s->maclist[i]->name, str, len)) {
+ s->scmac_tobe = s->maclist[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server compression */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c =
+ i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
+ s->cscomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client compression */
+ for (i = 0; i < lenof(compressions) + 1; i++) {
+ const struct ssh_compress *c =
+ i == 0 ? s->preferred_comp : compressions[i - 1];
+ if (in_commasep_string(c->name, str, len)) {
+ s->sccomp_tobe = c;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* client->server language */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &str, &len); /* server->client language */
+ s->ignorepkt = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin) && !s->guessok;
+
+ if (s->warn_kex) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
+ ssh->kex->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->warn_cscipher) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
+ "client-to-server cipher",
+ s->cscipher_tobe->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->warn_sccipher) {
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
+ "server-to-client cipher",
+ s->sccipher_tobe->name,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for user response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssh->exhash = ssh->kex->hash->init();
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_c, strlen(ssh->v_c));
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, ssh->v_s, strlen(ssh->v_s));
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ s->our_kexinit, s->our_kexinitlen);
+ sfree(s->our_kexinit);
+ if (pktin->length > 5)
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ pktin->data + 5, pktin->length - 5);
+
+ if (s->ignorepkt) /* first_kex_packet_follows */
+ crWaitUntil(pktin); /* Ignore packet */
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->kex->main_type == KEXTYPE_DH) {
+ /*
+ * Work out the number of bits of key we will need from the
+ * key exchange. We start with the maximum key length of
+ * either cipher...
+ */
+ {
+ int csbits, scbits;
+
+ csbits = s->cscipher_tobe->keylen;
+ scbits = s->sccipher_tobe->keylen;
+ s->nbits = (csbits > scbits ? csbits : scbits);
+ }
+ /* The keys only have hlen-bit entropy, since they're based on
+ * a hash. So cap the key size at hlen bits. */
+ if (s->nbits > ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8)
+ s->nbits = ssh->kex->hash->hlen * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange, start by
+ * requesting a group.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ logevent("Doing Diffie-Hellman group exchange");
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGEX;
+ /*
+ * Work out how big a DH group we will need to allow that
+ * much data.
+ */
+ s->pbits = 512 << ((s->nbits - 1) / 64);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->pbits);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange group packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ s->p = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ s->g = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ if (!s->p || !s->g) {
+ bombout(("unable to read mp-ints from incoming group packet"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_gex(s->p, s->g);
+ s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT;
+ s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY;
+ } else {
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_DHGROUP;
+ ssh->kex_ctx = dh_setup_group(ssh->kex);
+ s->kex_init_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT;
+ s->kex_reply_value = SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Using Diffie-Hellman with standard group \"%s\"",
+ ssh->kex->groupname);
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Doing Diffie-Hellman key exchange with hash %s",
+ ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
+ /*
+ * Now generate and send e for Diffie-Hellman.
+ */
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* this can take a while */
+ s->e = dh_create_e(ssh->kex_ctx, s->nbits * 2);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(s->kex_init_value);
+ ssh2_pkt_addmp(s->pktout, s->e);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_WAITING); /* wait for server */
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != s->kex_reply_value) {
+ bombout(("expected key exchange reply packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_CPU); /* cogitate */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ s->f = ssh2_pkt_getmp(pktin);
+ if (!s->f) {
+ bombout(("unable to parse key exchange reply packet"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
+
+ s->K = dh_find_K(ssh->kex_ctx, s->f);
+
+ /* We assume everything from now on will be quick, and it might
+ * involve user interaction. */
+ set_busy_status(ssh->frontend, BUSY_NOT);
+
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ hash_uint32(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->pbits);
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->p);
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->g);
+ }
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->e);
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->f);
+
+ dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
+ freebn(s->f);
+ if (!ssh->kex->pdata) {
+ freebn(s->g);
+ freebn(s->p);
+ }
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Doing RSA key exchange with hash %s",
+ ssh->kex->hash->text_name);
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_RSAKEX;
+ /*
+ * RSA key exchange. First expect a KEXRSA_PUBKEY packet
+ * from the server.
+ */
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY) {
+ bombout(("expected RSA public key packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->hostkeydata, &s->hostkeylen);
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash,
+ s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+ s->hkey = ssh->hostkey->newkey(s->hostkeydata, s->hostkeylen);
+
+ {
+ char *keydata;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &keydata, &s->rsakeylen);
+ s->rsakeydata = snewn(s->rsakeylen, char);
+ memcpy(s->rsakeydata, keydata, s->rsakeylen);
+ }
+
+ s->rsakey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
+ if (!s->rsakey) {
+ sfree(s->rsakeydata);
+ bombout(("unable to parse RSA public key from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->rsakeydata, s->rsakeylen);
+
+ /*
+ * Next, set up a shared secret K, of precisely KLEN -
+ * 2*HLEN - 49 bits, where KLEN is the bit length of the
+ * RSA key modulus and HLEN is the bit length of the hash
+ * we're using.
+ */
+ {
+ int klen = ssh_rsakex_klen(s->rsakey);
+ int nbits = klen - (2*ssh->kex->hash->hlen*8 + 49);
+ int i, byte = 0;
+ unsigned char *kstr1, *kstr2, *outstr;
+ int kstr1len, kstr2len, outstrlen;
+
+ s->K = bn_power_2(nbits - 1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
+ if ((i & 7) == 0) {
+ byte = random_byte();
+ }
+ bignum_set_bit(s->K, i, (byte >> (i & 7)) & 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode this as an mpint.
+ */
+ kstr1 = ssh2_mpint_fmt(s->K, &kstr1len);
+ kstr2 = snewn(kstr2len = 4 + kstr1len, unsigned char);
+ PUT_32BIT(kstr2, kstr1len);
+ memcpy(kstr2 + 4, kstr1, kstr1len);
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt it with the given RSA key.
+ */
+ outstrlen = (klen + 7) / 8;
+ outstr = snewn(outstrlen, unsigned char);
+ ssh_rsakex_encrypt(ssh->kex->hash, kstr2, kstr2len,
+ outstr, outstrlen, s->rsakey);
+
+ /*
+ * And send it off in a return packet.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)outstr, outstrlen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ hash_string(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, outstr, outstrlen);
+
+ sfree(kstr2);
+ sfree(kstr1);
+ sfree(outstr);
+ }
+
+ ssh_rsakex_freekey(s->rsakey);
+
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE) {
+ sfree(s->rsakeydata);
+ bombout(("expected signature packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &s->sigdata, &s->siglen);
+
+ sfree(s->rsakeydata);
+ }
+
+ hash_mpint(ssh->kex->hash, ssh->exhash, s->K);
+ assert(ssh->kex->hash->hlen <= sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
+ ssh->kex->hash->final(ssh->exhash, s->exchange_hash);
+
+ ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
+
+#if 0
+ debug(("Exchange hash is:\n"));
+ dmemdump(s->exchange_hash, ssh->kex->hash->hlen);
+#endif
+
+ if (!s->hkey ||
+ !ssh->hostkey->verifysig(s->hkey, s->sigdata, s->siglen,
+ (char *)s->exchange_hash,
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen)) {
+ bombout(("Server's host key did not match the signature supplied"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Authenticate remote host: verify host key. (We've already
+ * checked the signature of the exchange hash.)
+ */
+ s->keystr = ssh->hostkey->fmtkey(s->hkey);
+ s->fingerprint = ssh->hostkey->fingerprint(s->hkey);
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
+ s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
+ ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
+ ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr,
+ s->fingerprint,
+ ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
+ if (s->dlgret < 0) {
+ do {
+ crReturn(0);
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while waiting"
+ " for user host key response"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
+ }
+ ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
+ if (s->dlgret == 0) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification", NULL,
+ 0, TRUE);
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ if (!s->got_session_id) { /* don't bother logging this in rekeys */
+ logevent("Host key fingerprint is:");
+ logevent(s->fingerprint);
+ }
+ sfree(s->fingerprint);
+ sfree(s->keystr);
+ ssh->hostkey->freekey(s->hkey);
+
+ /*
+ * The exchange hash from the very first key exchange is also
+ * the session id, used in session key construction and
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (!s->got_session_id) {
+ assert(sizeof(s->exchange_hash) <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
+ memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash,
+ sizeof(s->exchange_hash));
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len = ssh->kex->hash->hlen;
+ assert(ssh->v2_session_id_len <= sizeof(ssh->v2_session_id));
+ s->got_session_id = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
+
+ /*
+ * We've sent client NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
+ * client-to-server session keys.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
+ ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
+ ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_mac_ctx = ssh->csmac->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx)
+ ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = ssh->cscomp->compress_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Set IVs on client-to-server keys. Here we use the exchange
+ * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
+ assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'C',keyspace);
+ assert((ssh->cscipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'A',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->cscipher->blksize <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'E',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->csmac->len <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->csmac->setkey(ssh->cs_mac_ctx, keyspace);
+ memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption",
+ ssh->cscipher->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s client->server MAC algorithm",
+ ssh->csmac->text_name);
+ if (ssh->cscomp->text_name)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s compression",
+ ssh->cscomp->text_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Now our end of the key exchange is complete, we can send all
+ * our queued higher-layer packets.
+ */
+ ssh->queueing = FALSE;
+ ssh2_pkt_queuesend(ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Expect SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS from server.
+ */
+ crWaitUntil(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
+ bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server"));
+ crStop(0);
+ }
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = 0; /* start counting from here */
+
+ /*
+ * We've seen server NEWKEYS, so create and initialise
+ * server-to-client session keys.
+ */
+ if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
+ ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
+ ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_mac_ctx = ssh->scmac->make_context();
+
+ if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx)
+ ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
+ ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe;
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = ssh->sccomp->decompress_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Set IVs on server-to-client keys. Here we use the exchange
+ * hash from the _first_ key exchange.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char keyspace[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS];
+ assert(sizeof(keyspace) >= ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'D',keyspace);
+ assert((ssh->sccipher->keylen+7) / 8 <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'B',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->sccipher->blksize <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace);
+ ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,'F',keyspace);
+ assert(ssh->scmac->len <=
+ ssh->kex->hash->hlen * SSH2_MKKEY_ITERS);
+ ssh->scmac->setkey(ssh->sc_mac_ctx, keyspace);
+ memset(keyspace, 0, sizeof(keyspace));
+ }
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption",
+ ssh->sccipher->text_name);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %.200s server->client MAC algorithm",
+ ssh->scmac->text_name);
+ if (ssh->sccomp->text_name)
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initialised %s decompression",
+ ssh->sccomp->text_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Free shared secret.
+ */
+ freebn(s->K);
+
+ /*
+ * Key exchange is over. Loop straight back round if we have a
+ * deferred rekey reason.
+ */
+ if (ssh->deferred_rekey_reason) {
+ logevent(ssh->deferred_rekey_reason);
+ pktin = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
+ goto begin_key_exchange;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, schedule a timer for our next rekey.
+ */
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
+ ssh->last_rekey = GETTICKCOUNT();
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0)
+ ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
+ ssh2_timer, ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the
+ * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it
+ * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise
+ * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key
+ * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
+ * it would only confuse the layer above.
+ */
+ if (s->activated_authconn) {
+ crReturn(0);
+ }
+ s->activated_authconn = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we're encrypting. Begin returning 1 to the protocol main
+ * function so that other things can run on top of the
+ * transport. If we ever see a KEXINIT, we must go back to the
+ * start.
+ *
+ * We _also_ go back to the start if we see pktin==NULL and
+ * inlen==-1, because this is a special signal meaning
+ * `initiate client-driven rekey', and `in' contains a message
+ * giving the reason for the rekey.
+ */
+ while (!((pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) ||
+ (!pktin && inlen == -1))) {
+ wait_for_rekey:
+ crReturn(1);
+ }
+ if (pktin) {
+ logevent("Server initiated key re-exchange");
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Special case: if the server bug is set that doesn't
+ * allow rekeying, we give a different log message and
+ * continue waiting. (If such a server _initiates_ a rekey,
+ * we process it anyway!)
+ */
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_REKEY)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server bug prevents key re-exchange (%s)",
+ (char *)in);
+ /* Reset the counters, so that at least this message doesn't
+ * hit the event log _too_ often. */
+ ssh->outgoing_data_size = 0;
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = 0;
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
+ ssh->next_rekey =
+ schedule_timer(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC,
+ ssh2_timer, ssh);
+ }
+ goto wait_for_rekey; /* this is utterly horrid */
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Initiating key re-exchange (%s)", (char *)in);
+ }
+ }
+ goto begin_key_exchange;
+
+ crFinish(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add data to an SSH-2 channel output buffer.
+ */
+static void ssh2_add_channel_data(struct ssh_channel *c, char *buf,
+ int len)
+{
+ bufchain_add(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, buf, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to send data on an SSH-2 channel.
+ */
+static int ssh2_try_send(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ while (c->v.v2.remwindow > 0 && bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer) > 0) {
+ int len;
+ void *data;
+ bufchain_prefix(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, &data, &len);
+ if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remwindow)
+ len = c->v.v2.remwindow;
+ if ((unsigned)len > c->v.v2.remmaxpkt)
+ len = c->v.v2.remmaxpkt;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
+ dont_log_data(ssh, pktout, PKTLOG_OMIT);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(pktout, data, len);
+ end_log_omission(ssh, pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ bufchain_consume(&c->v.v2.outbuffer, len);
+ c->v.v2.remwindow -= len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * After having sent as much data as we can, return the amount
+ * still buffered.
+ */
+ return bufchain_size(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ int bufsize;
+ if (c->closes)
+ return; /* don't send on closing channels */
+ bufsize = ssh2_try_send(c);
+ if (bufsize == 0) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ /* stdin need not receive an unthrottle
+ * notification since it will be polled */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ x11_unthrottle(c->u.x11.s);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ /* agent sockets are request/response and need no
+ * buffer management */
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ pfd_unthrottle(c->u.pfd.s);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up most of a new ssh_channel for SSH-2.
+ */
+static void ssh2_channel_init(struct ssh_channel *c)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ c->localid = alloc_channel_id(ssh);
+ c->closes = 0;
+ c->throttling_conn = FALSE;
+ c->v.v2.locwindow = c->v.v2.locmaxwin = c->v.v2.remlocwin =
+ ssh->cfg.ssh_simple ? OUR_V2_BIGWIN : OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
+ c->v.v2.winadj_head = c->v.v2.winadj_tail = NULL;
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
+ bufchain_init(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Potentially enlarge the window on an SSH-2 channel.
+ */
+static void ssh2_set_window(struct ssh_channel *c, int newwin)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+
+ /*
+ * Never send WINDOW_ADJUST for a channel that the remote side
+ * already thinks it's closed; there's no point, since it won't
+ * be sending any more data anyway.
+ */
+ if (c->closes != 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the remote end has a habit of ignoring maxpkt, limit the
+ * window so that it has no choice (assuming it doesn't ignore the
+ * window as well).
+ */
+ if ((ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_MAXPKT) && newwin > OUR_V2_MAXPKT)
+ newwin = OUR_V2_MAXPKT;
+
+
+ /*
+ * Only send a WINDOW_ADJUST if there's significantly more window
+ * available than the other end thinks there is. This saves us
+ * sending a WINDOW_ADJUST for every character in a shell session.
+ *
+ * "Significant" is arbitrarily defined as half the window size.
+ */
+ if (newwin / 2 >= c->v.v2.locwindow) {
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ struct winadj *wa;
+
+ /*
+ * In order to keep track of how much window the client
+ * actually has available, we'd like it to acknowledge each
+ * WINDOW_ADJUST. We can't do that directly, so we accompany
+ * it with a CHANNEL_REQUEST that has to be acknowledged.
+ *
+ * This is only necessary if we're opening the window wide.
+ * If we're not, then throughput is being constrained by
+ * something other than the maximum window size anyway.
+ *
+ * We also only send this if the main channel has finished its
+ * initial CHANNEL_REQUESTs and installed the default
+ * CHANNEL_FAILURE handler, so as not to risk giving it
+ * unexpected CHANNEL_FAILUREs.
+ */
+ if (newwin == c->v.v2.locmaxwin &&
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE]) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, TRUE);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+
+ /*
+ * CHANNEL_FAILURE doesn't come with any indication of
+ * what message caused it, so we have to keep track of the
+ * outstanding CHANNEL_REQUESTs ourselves.
+ */
+ wa = snew(struct winadj);
+ wa->size = newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow;
+ wa->next = NULL;
+ if (!c->v.v2.winadj_head)
+ c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa;
+ else
+ c->v.v2.winadj_tail->next = wa;
+ c->v.v2.winadj_tail = wa;
+ if (c->v.v2.throttle_state != UNTHROTTLED)
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLING;
+ } else {
+ /* Pretend the WINDOW_ADJUST was acked immediately. */
+ c->v.v2.remlocwin = newwin;
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = THROTTLED;
+ }
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, newwin - c->v.v2.locwindow);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ c->v.v2.locwindow = newwin;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the channel associated with a message. If there's no channel,
+ * or it's not properly open, make a noise about it and return NULL.
+ */
+static struct ssh_channel *ssh2_channel_msg(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned localid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = find234(ssh->channels, &localid, ssh_channelfind);
+ if (!c ||
+ (c->halfopen && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION &&
+ pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) {
+ char *buf = dupprintf("Received %s for %s channel %u",
+ ssh2_pkt_type(ssh->pkt_kctx, ssh->pkt_actx,
+ pktin->type),
+ c ? "half-open" : "nonexistent", localid);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, buf, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
+ sfree(buf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return c;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_success(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /*
+ * This should never get called. All channel requests are either
+ * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
+ * installed.
+ */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct winadj *wa;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
+ if (wa)
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS for "
+ "\"winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org\"",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
+ else
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
+ "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /*
+ * The only time this should get called is for "winadj@putty"
+ * messages sent above. All other channel requests are either
+ * sent with want_reply false or are sent before this handler gets
+ * installed.
+ */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct winadj *wa;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ wa = c->v.v2.winadj_head;
+ if (!wa) {
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
+ "Received unsolicited SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR, FALSE);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->v.v2.winadj_head = wa->next;
+ c->v.v2.remlocwin += wa->size;
+ sfree(wa);
+ /*
+ * winadj messages are only sent when the window is fully open, so
+ * if we get an ack of one, we know any pending unthrottle is
+ * complete.
+ */
+ if (c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLING)
+ c->v.v2.throttle_state = UNTHROTTLED;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (!c->closes) {
+ c->v.v2.remwindow += ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_data(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *data;
+ int length;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA &&
+ ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)
+ return; /* extended but not stderr */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &length);
+ if (data) {
+ int bufsize = 0;
+ c->v.v2.locwindow -= length;
+ c->v.v2.remlocwin -= length;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ bufsize =
+ from_backend(ssh->frontend, pktin->type ==
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA,
+ data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ bufsize = x11_send(c->u.x11.s, data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ bufsize = pfd_send(c->u.pfd.s, data, length);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ while (length > 0) {
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar < 4) {
+ unsigned int l = min(4 - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ (unsigned)length);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.msglen + c->u.a.lensofar,
+ data, l);
+ data += l;
+ length -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == 4) {
+ c->u.a.totallen =
+ 4 + GET_32BIT(c->u.a.msglen);
+ c->u.a.message = snewn(c->u.a.totallen,
+ unsigned char);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message, c->u.a.msglen, 4);
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar >= 4 && length > 0) {
+ unsigned int l =
+ min(c->u.a.totallen - c->u.a.lensofar,
+ (unsigned)length);
+ memcpy(c->u.a.message + c->u.a.lensofar,
+ data, l);
+ data += l;
+ length -= l;
+ c->u.a.lensofar += l;
+ }
+ if (c->u.a.lensofar == c->u.a.totallen) {
+ void *reply;
+ int replylen;
+ if (agent_query(c->u.a.message,
+ c->u.a.totallen,
+ &reply, &replylen,
+ ssh_agentf_callback, c))
+ ssh_agentf_callback(c, reply, replylen);
+ sfree(c->u.a.message);
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ bufsize = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If it looks like the remote end hit the end of its window,
+ * and we didn't want it to do that, think about using a
+ * larger window.
+ */
+ if (c->v.v2.remlocwin <= 0 && c->v.v2.throttle_state == UNTHROTTLED &&
+ c->v.v2.locmaxwin < 0x40000000)
+ c->v.v2.locmaxwin += OUR_V2_WINSIZE;
+ /*
+ * If we are not buffering too much data,
+ * enlarge the window again at the remote side.
+ * If we are buffering too much, we may still
+ * need to adjust the window if the server's
+ * sent excess data.
+ */
+ ssh2_set_window(c, bufsize < c->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
+ c->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
+ /*
+ * If we're either buffering way too much data, or if we're
+ * buffering anything at all and we're in "simple" mode,
+ * throttle the whole channel.
+ */
+ if ((bufsize > c->v.v2.locmaxwin ||
+ (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple && bufsize > 0)) &&
+ !c->throttling_conn) {
+ c->throttling_conn = 1;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, +1);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_eof(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+
+ if (c->type == CHAN_X11) {
+ /*
+ * Remote EOF on an X11 channel means we should
+ * wrap up and close the channel ourselves.
+ */
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_AGENT) {
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ } else if (c->type == CHAN_SOCKDATA) {
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_close(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ /* Do pre-close processing on the channel. */
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_MAINSESSION:
+ ssh->mainchan = NULL;
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_AGENT:
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ sshfwd_close(c);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (c->closes == 0) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ bufchain_clear(&c->v.v2.outbuffer);
+ sfree(c);
+
+ /*
+ * See if that was the last channel left open.
+ * (This is only our termination condition if we're
+ * not running in -N mode.)
+ */
+ if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell && count234(ssh->channels) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We used to send SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT here,
+ * because I'd believed that _every_ conforming
+ * SSH-2 connection had to end with a disconnect
+ * being sent by at least one side; apparently
+ * I was wrong and it's perfectly OK to
+ * unceremoniously slam the connection shut
+ * when you're done, and indeed OpenSSH feels
+ * this is more polite than sending a
+ * DISCONNECT. So now we don't.
+ */
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "All channels closed", NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
+ return; /* dunno why they're confirming this */
+ c->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
+ c->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ if (c->u.pfd.s)
+ pfd_confirm(c->u.pfd.s);
+ if (c->closes) {
+ /*
+ * We have a pending close on this channel,
+ * which we decided on before the server acked
+ * the channel open. So now we know the
+ * remoteid, we can close it again.
+ */
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ static const char *const reasons[] = {
+ "<unknown reason code>",
+ "Administratively prohibited",
+ "Connect failed",
+ "Unknown channel type",
+ "Resource shortage",
+ };
+ unsigned reason_code;
+ char *reason_string;
+ int reason_length;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ if (c->type != CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT)
+ return; /* dunno why they're failing this */
+
+ reason_code = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ if (reason_code >= lenof(reasons))
+ reason_code = 0; /* ensure reasons[reason_code] in range */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &reason_string, &reason_length);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Forwarded connection refused by server: %s [%.*s]",
+ reasons[reason_code], reason_length, reason_string);
+
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+
+ del234(ssh->channels, c);
+ sfree(c);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *type;
+ int typelen, want_reply;
+ int reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE; /* default */
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ c = ssh2_channel_msg(ssh, pktin);
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
+ want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+
+ /*
+ * Having got the channel number, we now look at
+ * the request type string to see if it's something
+ * we recognise.
+ */
+ if (c == ssh->mainchan) {
+ /*
+ * We recognise "exit-status" and "exit-signal" on
+ * the primary channel.
+ */
+ if (typelen == 11 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "exit-status", 11)) {
+
+ ssh->exitcode = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server sent command exit status %d",
+ ssh->exitcode);
+ reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
+
+ } else if (typelen == 11 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "exit-signal", 11)) {
+
+ int is_plausible = TRUE, is_int = FALSE;
+ char *fmt_sig = "", *fmt_msg = "";
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen = 0, core = FALSE;
+ /* ICK: older versions of OpenSSH (e.g. 3.4p1)
+ * provide an `int' for the signal, despite its
+ * having been a `string' in the drafts of RFC 4254 since at
+ * least 2001. (Fixed in session.c 1.147.) Try to
+ * infer which we can safely parse it as. */
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = pktin->body +
+ pktin->savedpos;
+ long len = pktin->length - pktin->savedpos;
+ unsigned long num = GET_32BIT(p); /* what is it? */
+ /* If it's 0, it hardly matters; assume string */
+ if (num == 0) {
+ is_int = FALSE;
+ } else {
+ int maybe_int = FALSE, maybe_str = FALSE;
+#define CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(offset, result) \
+ do { \
+ long q = offset; \
+ if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len) { \
+ q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q); \
+ if (q >= 0 && q+4 <= len && \
+ ((q = q + 4 + GET_32BIT(p+q))!= 0) && q == len) \
+ result = TRUE; \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+ CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+1, maybe_int);
+ CHECK_HYPOTHESIS(4+num+1, maybe_str);
+#undef CHECK_HYPOTHESIS
+ if (maybe_int && !maybe_str)
+ is_int = TRUE;
+ else if (!maybe_int && maybe_str)
+ is_int = FALSE;
+ else
+ /* Crikey. Either or neither. Panic. */
+ is_plausible = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ ssh->exitcode = 128; /* means `unknown signal' */
+ if (is_plausible) {
+ if (is_int) {
+ /* Old non-standard OpenSSH. */
+ int signum = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ fmt_sig = dupprintf(" %d", signum);
+ ssh->exitcode = 128 + signum;
+ } else {
+ /* As per RFC 4254. */
+ char *sig;
+ int siglen;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &sig, &siglen);
+ /* Signal name isn't supposed to be blank, but
+ * let's cope gracefully if it is. */
+ if (siglen) {
+ fmt_sig = dupprintf(" \"%.*s\"",
+ siglen, sig);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Really hideous method of translating the
+ * signal description back into a locally
+ * meaningful number.
+ */
+
+ if (0)
+ ;
+#define TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(s) \
+ else if (siglen == lenof(#s)-1 && !memcmp(sig, #s, siglen)) \
+ ssh->exitcode = 128 + SIG ## s
+#ifdef SIGABRT
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ABRT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGALRM
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ALRM);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGFPE
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(FPE);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGHUP
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(HUP);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGILL
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(ILL);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGINT
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(INT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGKILL
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(KILL);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGPIPE
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(PIPE);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGQUIT
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(QUIT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGSEGV
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(SEGV);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGTERM
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(TERM);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGUSR1
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR1);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGUSR2
+ TRANSLATE_SIGNAL(USR2);
+#endif
+#undef TRANSLATE_SIGNAL
+ else
+ ssh->exitcode = 128;
+ }
+ core = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+ if (msglen) {
+ fmt_msg = dupprintf(" (\"%.*s\")", msglen, msg);
+ }
+ /* ignore lang tag */
+ } /* else don't attempt to parse */
+ logeventf(ssh, "Server exited on signal%s%s%s",
+ fmt_sig, core ? " (core dumped)" : "",
+ fmt_msg);
+ if (*fmt_sig) sfree(fmt_sig);
+ if (*fmt_msg) sfree(fmt_msg);
+ reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
+
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * This is a channel request we don't know
+ * about, so we now either ignore the request
+ * or respond with CHANNEL_FAILURE, depending
+ * on want_reply.
+ */
+ reply = SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (want_reply) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(reply);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_global_request(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *type;
+ int typelen, want_reply;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
+ want_reply = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+
+ /*
+ * We currently don't support any global requests
+ * at all, so we either ignore the request or
+ * respond with REQUEST_FAILURE, depending on
+ * want_reply.
+ */
+ if (want_reply) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_channel_open(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ char *type;
+ int typelen;
+ char *peeraddr;
+ int peeraddrlen;
+ int peerport;
+ char *error = NULL;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ unsigned remid, winsize, pktsize;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &type, &typelen);
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+
+ remid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ winsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ pktsize = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ if (typelen == 3 && !memcmp(type, "x11", 3)) {
+ char *addrstr;
+ const char *x11err;
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
+ addrstr = snewn(peeraddrlen+1, char);
+ memcpy(addrstr, peeraddr, peeraddrlen);
+ addrstr[peeraddrlen] = '\0';
+ peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received X11 connect request from %s:%d",
+ addrstr, peerport);
+
+ if (!ssh->X11_fwd_enabled)
+ error = "X11 forwarding is not enabled";
+ else if ((x11err = x11_init(&c->u.x11.s, ssh->x11disp, c,
+ addrstr, peerport, &ssh->cfg)) != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Local X11 connection failed: %s", x11err);
+ error = "Unable to open an X11 connection";
+ } else {
+ logevent("Opening X11 forward connection succeeded");
+ c->type = CHAN_X11;
+ }
+
+ sfree(addrstr);
+ } else if (typelen == 15 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "forwarded-tcpip", 15)) {
+ struct ssh_rportfwd pf, *realpf;
+ char *dummy;
+ int dummylen;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &dummy, &dummylen);/* skip address */
+ pf.sport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &peeraddr, &peeraddrlen);
+ peerport = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ realpf = find234(ssh->rportfwds, &pf, NULL);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Received remote port %d open request "
+ "from %s:%d", pf.sport, peeraddr, peerport);
+ if (realpf == NULL) {
+ error = "Remote port is not recognised";
+ } else {
+ const char *e = pfd_newconnect(&c->u.pfd.s,
+ realpf->dhost,
+ realpf->dport, c,
+ &ssh->cfg,
+ realpf->pfrec->addressfamily);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Attempting to forward remote port to "
+ "%s:%d", realpf->dhost, realpf->dport);
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Port open failed: %s", e);
+ error = "Port open failed";
+ } else {
+ logevent("Forwarded port opened successfully");
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (typelen == 22 &&
+ !memcmp(type, "auth-agent@openssh.com", 22)) {
+ if (!ssh->agentfwd_enabled)
+ error = "Agent forwarding is not enabled";
+ else {
+ c->type = CHAN_AGENT; /* identify channel type */
+ c->u.a.lensofar = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ error = "Unsupported channel type requested";
+ }
+
+ c->remoteid = remid;
+ c->halfopen = FALSE;
+ if (error) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, error);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "en"); /* language tag */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Rejected channel open: %s", error);
+ sfree(c);
+ } else {
+ ssh2_channel_init(c);
+ c->v.v2.remwindow = winsize;
+ c->v.v2.remmaxpkt = pktsize;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Buffer banner messages for later display at some convenient point.
+ */
+static void ssh2_msg_userauth_banner(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* Arbitrary limit to prevent unbounded inflation of buffer */
+ if (bufchain_size(&ssh->banner) <= 131072) {
+ char *banner = NULL;
+ int size = 0;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &banner, &size);
+ if (banner)
+ bufchain_add(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Helper function to deal with sending tty modes for "pty-req" */
+static void ssh2_send_ttymode(void *data, char *mode, char *val)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout = (struct Packet *)data;
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int arg = 0;
+ while (strcmp(mode, ssh_ttymodes[i].mode) != 0) i++;
+ if (i == lenof(ssh_ttymodes)) return;
+ switch (ssh_ttymodes[i].type) {
+ case TTY_OP_CHAR:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_specchar(val);
+ break;
+ case TTY_OP_BOOL:
+ arg = ssh_tty_parse_boolean(val);
+ break;
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(pktout, ssh_ttymodes[i].opcode);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the SSH-2 userauth and connection layers.
+ */
+static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct do_ssh2_authconn_state {
+ enum {
+ AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
+ AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
+ AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI,
+ AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
+ AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
+ } type;
+ int done_service_req;
+ int gotit, need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
+ int tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ int can_gssapi;
+ int tried_gssapi;
+#endif
+ int kbd_inter_refused;
+ int we_are_in;
+ prompts_t *cur_prompt;
+ int num_prompts;
+ char username[100];
+ char *password;
+ int got_username;
+ void *publickey_blob;
+ int publickey_bloblen;
+ int publickey_encrypted;
+ char *publickey_algorithm;
+ char *publickey_comment;
+ unsigned char agent_request[5], *agent_response, *agentp;
+ int agent_responselen;
+ unsigned char *pkblob_in_agent;
+ int keyi, nkeys;
+ char *pkblob, *alg, *commentp;
+ int pklen, alglen, commentlen;
+ int siglen, retlen, len;
+ char *q, *agentreq, *ret;
+ int try_send;
+ int num_env, env_left, env_ok;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ Ssh_gss_ctx gss_ctx;
+ Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
+ Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
+ Ssh_gss_name gss_srv_name;
+ Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
+#endif
+ };
+ crState(do_ssh2_authconn_state);
+
+ crBegin(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate);
+
+ s->done_service_req = FALSE;
+ s->we_are_in = FALSE;
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ s->tried_gssapi = FALSE;
+#endif
+
+ if (!ssh->cfg.ssh_no_userauth) {
+ /*
+ * Request userauth protocol, and await a response to it.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-userauth");
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
+ s->done_service_req = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!s->done_service_req) {
+ /*
+ * Request connection protocol directly, without authentication.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
+ s->we_are_in = TRUE; /* no auth required */
+ } else {
+ bombout(("Server refused service request"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Arrange to be able to deal with any BANNERs that come in.
+ * (We do this now as packets may come in during the next bit.) */
+ bufchain_init(&ssh->banner);
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] =
+ ssh2_msg_userauth_banner;
+
+ /*
+ * Misc one-time setup for authentication.
+ */
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ if (!s->we_are_in) {
+
+ /*
+ * Load the public half of any configured public key file
+ * for later use.
+ */
+ if (!filename_is_null(ssh->cfg.keyfile)) {
+ int keytype;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Reading private key file \"%.150s\"",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile));
+ keytype = key_type(&ssh->cfg.keyfile);
+ if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
+ const char *error;
+ s->publickey_blob =
+ ssh2_userkey_loadpub(&ssh->cfg.keyfile,
+ &s->publickey_algorithm,
+ &s->publickey_bloblen,
+ &s->publickey_comment, &error);
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ s->publickey_encrypted =
+ ssh2_userkey_encrypted(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, NULL);
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to load private key (%s)",
+ error);
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to load private key file "
+ "\"%.150s\" (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
+ error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ }
+ } else {
+ char *msgbuf;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Unable to use this key file (%s)",
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ msgbuf = dupprintf("Unable to use key file \"%.150s\""
+ " (%s)\r\n",
+ filename_to_str(&ssh->cfg.keyfile),
+ key_type_to_str(keytype));
+ c_write_str(ssh, msgbuf);
+ sfree(msgbuf);
+ s->publickey_blob = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a
+ * public key configured, filter out all others).
+ */
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ s->agent_response = NULL;
+ s->pkblob_in_agent = NULL;
+ if (ssh->cfg.tryagent && agent_exists()) {
+
+ void *r;
+
+ logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
+
+ /* Request the keys held by the agent. */
+ PUT_32BIT(s->agent_request, 1);
+ s->agent_request[4] = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+ if (!agent_query(s->agent_request, 5, &r, &s->agent_responselen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server while"
+ " waiting for agent response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ r = ssh->agent_response;
+ s->agent_responselen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ }
+ s->agent_response = (unsigned char *) r;
+ if (s->agent_response && s->agent_responselen >= 5 &&
+ s->agent_response[4] == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+ int keyi;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ p = s->agent_response + 5;
+ s->nkeys = GET_32BIT(p);
+ p += 4;
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant has %d SSH-2 keys", s->nkeys);
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ /* See if configured key is in agent. */
+ for (keyi = 0; keyi < s->nkeys; keyi++) {
+ s->pklen = GET_32BIT(p);
+ if (s->pklen == s->publickey_bloblen &&
+ !memcmp(p+4, s->publickey_blob,
+ s->publickey_bloblen)) {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Pageant key #%d matches "
+ "configured key file", keyi);
+ s->keyi = keyi;
+ s->pkblob_in_agent = p;
+ break;
+ }
+ p += 4 + s->pklen;
+ p += GET_32BIT(p) + 4; /* comment */
+ }
+ if (!s->pkblob_in_agent) {
+ logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
+ s->nkeys = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
+ * until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
+ * types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
+ * beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
+ * (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
+ * asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
+ *
+ * I think this best serves the needs of
+ *
+ * - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
+ * want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
+ * type both correctly
+ *
+ * - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
+ * need to fall back to passwords
+ *
+ * - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
+ * logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
+ * type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
+ * accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
+ * the username they will want to be able to get back and
+ * retype it!
+ */
+ s->username[0] = '\0';
+ s->got_username = FALSE;
+ while (!s->we_are_in) {
+ /*
+ * Get a username.
+ */
+ if (s->got_username && !ssh->cfg.change_username) {
+ /*
+ * We got a username last time round this loop, and
+ * with change_username turned off we don't try to get
+ * it again.
+ */
+ } else if (!get_remote_username(&ssh->cfg, s->username,
+ sizeof(s->username))) {
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), TRUE,
+ lenof(s->username));
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
+ * Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, "No username provided", NULL, 0, TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->username, s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result,
+ lenof(s->username));
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ } else {
+ char *stuff;
+ if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
+ stuff = dupprintf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
+ c_write_str(ssh, stuff);
+ sfree(stuff);
+ }
+ }
+ s->got_username = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
+ * just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
+ * authentication methods we can usefully try next.
+ */
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");/* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+ s->gotit = FALSE;
+ s->we_are_in = FALSE;
+
+ s->tried_pubkey_config = FALSE;
+ s->kbd_inter_refused = FALSE;
+
+ /* Reset agent request state. */
+ s->done_agent = FALSE;
+ if (s->agent_response) {
+ if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
+ s->agentp = s->pkblob_in_agent;
+ } else {
+ s->agentp = s->agent_response + 5 + 4;
+ s->keyi = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ /*
+ * Wait for the result of the last authentication request.
+ */
+ if (!s->gotit)
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ /*
+ * Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
+ * that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
+ * we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
+ * with.)
+ */
+ {
+ int size = bufchain_size(&ssh->banner);
+ /*
+ * Don't show the banner if we're operating in
+ * non-verbose non-interactive mode. (It's probably
+ * a script, which means nobody will read the
+ * banner _anyway_, and moreover the printing of
+ * the banner will screw up processing on the
+ * output of (say) plink.)
+ */
+ if (size && (flags & (FLAG_VERBOSE | FLAG_INTERACTIVE))) {
+ char *banner = snewn(size, char);
+ bufchain_fetch(&ssh->banner, banner, size);
+ c_write_untrusted(ssh, banner, size);
+ sfree(banner);
+ }
+ bufchain_clear(&ssh->banner);
+ }
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
+ logevent("Access granted");
+ s->we_are_in = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE && s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
+ bombout(("Strange packet received during authentication: "
+ "type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ s->gotit = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
+ * we can look at the string in it and know what we can
+ * helpfully try next.
+ */
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
+ char *methods;
+ int methlen;
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &methods, &methlen);
+ if (!ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin)) {
+ /*
+ * We have received an unequivocal Access
+ * Denied. This can translate to a variety of
+ * messages:
+ *
+ * - if we'd just tried "none" authentication,
+ * it's not worth printing anything at all
+ *
+ * - if we'd just tried a public key _offer_,
+ * the message should be "Server refused our
+ * key" (or no message at all if the key
+ * came from Pageant)
+ *
+ * - if we'd just tried anything else, the
+ * message really should be "Access denied".
+ *
+ * Additionally, if we'd just tried password
+ * authentication, we should break out of this
+ * whole loop so as to go back to the username
+ * prompt (iff we're configured to allow
+ * username change attempts).
+ */
+ if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
+ /* do nothing */
+ } else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
+ s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
+ if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused our key\r\n");
+ logevent("Server refused public key");
+ } else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
+ /* server declined keyboard-interactive; ignore */
+ } else {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Access denied\r\n");
+ logevent("Access denied");
+ if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
+ ssh->cfg.change_username) {
+ /* XXX perhaps we should allow
+ * keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
+ s->we_are_in = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Further authentication required\r\n");
+ logevent("Further authentication required");
+ }
+
+ s->can_pubkey =
+ in_commasep_string("publickey", methods, methlen);
+ s->can_passwd =
+ in_commasep_string("password", methods, methlen);
+ s->can_keyb_inter = ssh->cfg.try_ki_auth &&
+ in_commasep_string("keyboard-interactive", methods, methlen);
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ s->can_gssapi = ssh->cfg.try_gssapi_auth &&
+ in_commasep_string("gssapi-with-mic", methods, methlen) &&
+ ssh_gss_init();
+#endif
+ }
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
+
+ if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent && s->nkeys) {
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
+ */
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Trying Pageant key #%d", s->keyi);
+
+ /* Unpack key from agent response */
+ s->pklen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
+ s->agentp += 4;
+ s->pkblob = (char *)s->agentp;
+ s->agentp += s->pklen;
+ s->alglen = GET_32BIT(s->pkblob);
+ s->alg = s->pkblob + 4;
+ s->commentlen = GET_32BIT(s->agentp);
+ s->agentp += 4;
+ s->commentp = (char *)s->agentp;
+ s->agentp += s->commentlen;
+ /* s->agentp now points at next key, if any */
+
+ /* See if server will accept it */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE); /* no signature included */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
+
+ /* Offer of key refused. */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+
+ } else {
+
+ void *vret;
+
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with "
+ "public key \"");
+ c_write(ssh, s->commentp, s->commentlen);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\" from agent\r\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Server is willing to accept the key.
+ * Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE); /* signature included */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->alg, s->alglen);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
+
+ /* Ask agent for signature. */
+ s->siglen = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
+ s->siglen -= 4;
+ s->len = 1; /* message type */
+ s->len += 4 + s->pklen; /* key blob */
+ s->len += 4 + s->siglen; /* data to sign */
+ s->len += 4; /* flags */
+ s->agentreq = snewn(4 + s->len, char);
+ PUT_32BIT(s->agentreq, s->len);
+ s->q = s->agentreq + 4;
+ *s->q++ = SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST;
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->pklen);
+ s->q += 4;
+ memcpy(s->q, s->pkblob, s->pklen);
+ s->q += s->pklen;
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, s->siglen);
+ s->q += 4;
+ /* Now the data to be signed... */
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ s->q += 4;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->q, ssh->v2_session_id,
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ s->q += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ memcpy(s->q, s->pktout->data + 5,
+ s->pktout->length - 5);
+ s->q += s->pktout->length - 5;
+ /* And finally the (zero) flags word. */
+ PUT_32BIT(s->q, 0);
+ if (!agent_query(s->agentreq, s->len + 4,
+ &vret, &s->retlen,
+ ssh_agent_callback, ssh)) {
+ do {
+ crReturnV;
+ if (pktin) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected data from server"
+ " while waiting for agent"
+ " response"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } while (pktin || inlen > 0);
+ vret = ssh->agent_response;
+ s->retlen = ssh->agent_response_len;
+ }
+ s->ret = vret;
+ sfree(s->agentreq);
+ if (s->ret) {
+ if (s->ret[4] == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+ logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
+ ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout,
+ s->pkblob, s->pklen,
+ s->ret + 9,
+ GET_32BIT(s->ret + 5));
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
+ } else {
+ /* FIXME: less drastic response */
+ bombout(("Pageant failed to answer challenge"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Do we have any keys left to try? */
+ if (s->pkblob_in_agent) {
+ s->done_agent = TRUE;
+ s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ s->keyi++;
+ if (s->keyi >= s->nkeys)
+ s->done_agent = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ } else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
+ !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
+
+ struct ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
+ char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
+
+ s->tried_pubkey_config = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
+ *
+ * First, offer the public blob to see if the server is
+ * willing to accept it.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
+ /* no signature included */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,
+ (char *)s->publickey_blob,
+ s->publickey_bloblen);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ logevent("Offered public key");
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
+ /* Key refused. Give up. */
+ s->gotit = TRUE; /* reconsider message next loop */
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
+ continue; /* process this new message */
+ }
+ logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
+
+ /*
+ * Actually attempt a serious authentication using
+ * the key.
+ */
+ if (flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Authenticating with public key \"");
+ c_write_str(ssh, s->publickey_comment);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\"\r\n");
+ }
+ key = NULL;
+ while (!key) {
+ const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
+ if (s->publickey_encrypted) {
+ /*
+ * Get a passphrase from the user.
+ */
+ int ret; /* need not be kept over crReturn */
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = FALSE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%.100s\": ",
+ s->publickey_comment),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt,
+ in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
+ "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ passphrase =
+ dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ } else {
+ passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try decrypting the key.
+ */
+ key = ssh2_load_userkey(&ssh->cfg.keyfile, passphrase,
+ &error);
+ if (passphrase) {
+ /* burn the evidence */
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ sfree(passphrase);
+ }
+ if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
+ if (passphrase &&
+ (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Wrong passphrase\r\n");
+ key = NULL;
+ /* and loop again */
+ } else {
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Unable to load private key (");
+ c_write_str(ssh, error);
+ c_write_str(ssh, ")\r\n");
+ key = NULL;
+ break; /* try something else */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (key) {
+ unsigned char *pkblob, *sigblob, *sigdata;
+ int pkblob_len, sigblob_len, sigdata_len;
+ int p;
+
+ /*
+ * We have loaded the private key and the server
+ * has announced that it's willing to accept it.
+ * Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "publickey");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
+ /* signature follows */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, key->alg->name);
+ pkblob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data,
+ &pkblob_len);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)pkblob,
+ pkblob_len);
+
+ /*
+ * The data to be signed is:
+ *
+ * string session-id
+ *
+ * followed by everything so far placed in the
+ * outgoing packet.
+ */
+ sigdata_len = s->pktout->length - 5 + 4 +
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ if (ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)
+ sigdata_len -= 4;
+ sigdata = snewn(sigdata_len, unsigned char);
+ p = 0;
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID)) {
+ PUT_32BIT(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ p += 4;
+ }
+ memcpy(sigdata+p, ssh->v2_session_id,
+ ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ p += ssh->v2_session_id_len;
+ memcpy(sigdata+p, s->pktout->data + 5,
+ s->pktout->length - 5);
+ p += s->pktout->length - 5;
+ assert(p == sigdata_len);
+ sigblob = key->alg->sign(key->data, (char *)sigdata,
+ sigdata_len, &sigblob_len);
+ ssh2_add_sigblob(ssh, s->pktout, pkblob, pkblob_len,
+ sigblob, sigblob_len);
+ sfree(pkblob);
+ sfree(sigblob);
+ sfree(sigdata);
+
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
+ key->alg->freekey(key->data);
+ }
+
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+ } else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
+
+ /* GSSAPI Authentication */
+
+ int micoffset, len;
+ char *data;
+ Ssh_gss_buf mic;
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
+ s->tried_gssapi = TRUE;
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
+
+ /* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+ /* add mechanism info */
+ ssh_gss_indicate_mech(&s->gss_buf);
+
+ /* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout,1);
+
+ /* length of OID + 2 */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
+
+ /* length of OID */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, (unsigned char) s->gss_buf.length);
+
+ ssh_pkt_adddata(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value,
+ s->gss_buf.length);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* check returned packet ... */
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
+ s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
+ s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
+ if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
+ ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
+ ((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
+ memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
+ s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response from server");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* now start running */
+ s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_import_name(ssh->fullhostname,
+ &s->gss_srv_name);
+ if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
+ logevent("GSSAPI import name failed - Bad service name");
+ else
+ logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* fetch TGT into GSS engine */
+ s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_acquire_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
+
+ if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get credentials");
+ ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* initial tokens are empty */
+ SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
+ SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
+
+ /* now enter the loop */
+ do {
+ s->gss_stat = ssh_gss_init_sec_context(&s->gss_ctx,
+ s->gss_srv_name,
+ ssh->cfg.gssapifwd,
+ &s->gss_rcvtok,
+ &s->gss_sndtok);
+
+ if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
+ s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation failed");
+
+ if (ssh_gss_display_status(s->gss_ctx,&s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ logevent(s->gss_buf.value);
+ sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
+
+ /* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
+ * no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED */
+
+ if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout,s->gss_sndtok.value,s->gss_sndtok.length);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh_gss_free_tok(&s->gss_sndtok);
+ }
+
+ if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication - bad server response");
+ s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
+ break;
+ }
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &data, &len);
+ s->gss_rcvtok.value = data;
+ s->gss_rcvtok.length = len;
+ }
+ } while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
+ ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
+ ssh_gss_release_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
+ continue;
+ }
+ logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
+
+ /* Now send the MIC */
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(0);
+ micoffset = s->pktout->length;
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, (char *)ssh->v2_session_id, ssh->v2_session_id_len);
+ ssh_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ ssh_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+ s->gss_buf.value = (char *)s->pktout->data + micoffset;
+ s->gss_buf.length = s->pktout->length - micoffset;
+
+ ssh_gss_get_mic(s->gss_ctx, &s->gss_buf, &mic);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, mic.value, mic.length);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh_gss_free_mic(&mic);
+
+ s->gotit = FALSE;
+
+ ssh_gss_release_name(&s->gss_srv_name);
+ ssh_gss_release_cred(&s->gss_ctx);
+ continue;
+#endif
+ } else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
+
+ /*
+ * Keyboard-interactive authentication.
+ */
+
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
+ /* method */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
+ /* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
+ * at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
+ * user without actually issuing any prompts).
+ * Give up on it entirely. */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+ if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
+ logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication refused");
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
+ s->kbd_inter_refused = TRUE; /* don't try it again */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
+ */
+ while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
+
+ char *name, *inst, *lang;
+ int name_len, inst_len, lang_len;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
+ * Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
+ */
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &name, &name_len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &inst, &inst_len);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &lang, &lang_len);
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
+ */
+ s->num_prompts = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
+ char *prompt;
+ int prompt_len;
+ int echo;
+ static char noprompt[] =
+ "<server failed to send prompt>: ";
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
+ echo = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+ if (!prompt_len) {
+ prompt = noprompt;
+ prompt_len = lenof(noprompt)-1;
+ }
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt),
+ echo, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ }
+
+ if (name_len) {
+ /* FIXME: better prefix to distinguish from
+ * local prompts? */
+ s->cur_prompt->name =
+ dupprintf("SSH server: %.*s", name_len, name);
+ s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ s->cur_prompt->name =
+ dupstr("SSH server authentication");
+ s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = FALSE;
+ }
+ /* We add a prefix to try to make it clear that a prompt
+ * has come from the server.
+ * FIXME: ugly to print "Using..." in prompt _every_
+ * time round. Can this be done more subtly? */
+ /* Special case: for reasons best known to themselves,
+ * some servers send k-i requests with no prompts and
+ * nothing to display. Keep quiet in this case. */
+ if (s->num_prompts || name_len || inst_len) {
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("Using keyboard-interactive authentication.%s%.*s",
+ inst_len ? "\n" : "", inst_len, inst);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Display any instructions, and get the user's
+ * response(s).
+ */
+ {
+ int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send the response(s) to the server.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
+ for (i=0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
+ dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]->result);
+ end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
+
+ /*
+ * Get the next packet in case it's another
+ * INFO_REQUEST.
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
+ */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+
+ } else if (s->can_passwd) {
+
+ /*
+ * Plain old password authentication.
+ */
+ int ret; /* not live over crReturn */
+ int changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
+
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
+
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%.90s@%.90s's password: ",
+ s->username,
+ ssh->savedhost),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
+ */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
+ * asked to change it.)
+ */
+ s->password = dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+
+ /*
+ * Send the password packet.
+ *
+ * We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
+ * it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
+ * user's password.
+ *
+ * Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
+ * probably doesn't have much to worry about from
+ * people who find out how long their password is!
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, FALSE);
+ dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
+ end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
+ logevent("Sent password");
+ s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
+ * request.
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ changereq_first_time = TRUE;
+
+ while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
+
+ /*
+ * We're being asked for a new password
+ * (perhaps not for the first time).
+ * Loop until the server accepts it.
+ */
+
+ int got_new = FALSE; /* not live over crReturn */
+ char *prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
+ int prompt_len; /* not live over crReturn */
+
+ {
+ char *msg;
+ if (changereq_first_time)
+ msg = "Server requested password change";
+ else
+ msg = "Server rejected new password";
+ logevent(msg);
+ c_write_str(ssh, msg);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "\r\n");
+ }
+
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &prompt, &prompt_len);
+
+ s->cur_prompt = new_prompts(ssh->frontend);
+ s->cur_prompt->to_server = TRUE;
+ s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
+ s->cur_prompt->instruction =
+ dupprintf("%.*s", prompt_len, prompt);
+ s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
+ * for the "old" passwords in the original and
+ * password-change messages to be the same, and
+ * apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
+ * by the user entering a blank password originally
+ * and the real password subsequently, so,
+ * reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
+ *
+ * (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
+ * to check this field.)
+ */
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
+ dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+ add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
+ FALSE, SSH_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
+
+ /*
+ * Loop until the user manages to enter the same
+ * password twice.
+ */
+ while (!got_new) {
+
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, NULL, 0);
+ while (ret < 0) {
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ crWaitUntilV(!pktin);
+ ret = get_userpass_input(s->cur_prompt, in, inlen);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * Failed to get responses. Terminate.
+ */
+ /* burn the evidence */
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
+ sfree(s->password);
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL, "Unable to authenticate",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER,
+ TRUE);
+ crStopV;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the user specified a new original password
+ * (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
+ * one.
+ * (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
+ * re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
+ */
+ if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result[0]) {
+ memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
+ /* burn the evidence */
+ sfree(s->password);
+ s->password =
+ dupstr(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the two new passwords match.
+ */
+ got_new = (strcmp(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]->result)
+ == 0);
+ if (!got_new)
+ /* They don't. Silly user. */
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Passwords do not match\r\n");
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send the new password (along with the old one).
+ * (see above for padding rationale)
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->username);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "ssh-connection");
+ /* service requested */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "password");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, TRUE);
+ dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, s->password);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout,
+ s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]->result);
+ free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
+ end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_with_padding(ssh, s->pktout, 256);
+ logevent("Sent new password");
+
+ /*
+ * Now see what the server has to say about it.
+ * (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
+ * new password.)
+ */
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ changereq_first_time = FALSE;
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
+ * of the loop. Either:
+ * - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
+ * which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
+ * usual meaning
+ * - we sent a new password, and the server was
+ * either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
+ * success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
+ * (FAILURE w/o partial success)
+ * In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
+ * the loop and start again.
+ */
+ s->gotit = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need the old password any more, in any
+ * case. Burn the evidence.
+ */
+ memset(s->password, 0, strlen(s->password));
+ sfree(s->password);
+
+ } else {
+
+ ssh_disconnect(ssh, NULL,
+ "No supported authentication methods available",
+ SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE,
+ FALSE);
+ crStopV;
+
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
+
+ /* Clear up various bits and pieces from authentication. */
+ if (s->publickey_blob) {
+ sfree(s->publickey_blob);
+ sfree(s->publickey_comment);
+ }
+ if (s->agent_response)
+ sfree(s->agent_response);
+
+ /*
+ * Now the connection protocol has started, one way or another.
+ */
+
+ ssh->channels = newtree234(ssh_channelcmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Set up handlers for some connection protocol messages, so we
+ * don't have to handle them repeatedly in this coroutine.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_window_adjust;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] =
+ ssh2_msg_global_request;
+
+ /*
+ * Create the main session channel.
+ */
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_no_shell) {
+ ssh->mainchan = NULL;
+ } else if (*ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host) {
+ /*
+ * Just start a direct-tcpip channel and use it as the main
+ * channel.
+ */
+ ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
+ ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
+ logeventf(ssh,
+ "Opening direct-tcpip channel to %s:%d in place of session",
+ ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "direct-tcpip");
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_host);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.ssh_nc_port);
+ /*
+ * There's nothing meaningful to put in the originator
+ * fields, but some servers insist on syntactically correct
+ * information.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "0.0.0.0");
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
+ bombout(("Server refused to open a direct-tcpip channel"));
+ crStopV;
+ /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
+ }
+ if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
+ bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
+ ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ logevent("Opened direct-tcpip channel");
+ ssh->ncmode = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ ssh->mainchan = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+ ssh->mainchan->ssh = ssh;
+ ssh2_channel_init(ssh->mainchan);
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "session");
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->localid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) {
+ bombout(("Server refused to open a session"));
+ crStopV;
+ /* FIXME: error data comes back in FAILURE packet */
+ }
+ if (ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin) != ssh->mainchan->localid) {
+ bombout(("Server's channel confirmation cited wrong channel"));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ ssh->mainchan->remoteid = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh->mainchan->halfopen = FALSE;
+ ssh->mainchan->type = CHAN_MAINSESSION;
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remwindow = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.remmaxpkt = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ add234(ssh->channels, ssh->mainchan);
+ update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
+ logevent("Opened channel for session");
+ ssh->ncmode = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have a channel, make dispatch table entries for
+ * general channel-based messages.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] =
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_data;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = ssh2_msg_channel_eof;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = ssh2_msg_channel_close;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_open_confirmation;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_open_failure;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_request;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] =
+ ssh2_msg_channel_open;
+
+ if (ssh->mainchan && ssh->cfg.ssh_simple) {
+ /*
+ * This message indicates to the server that we promise
+ * not to try to run any other channel in parallel with
+ * this one, so it's safe for it to advertise a very large
+ * window and leave the flow control to TCP.
+ */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "simple@putty.projects.tartarus.org");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* no reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Potentially enable X11 forwarding.
+ */
+ if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.x11_forward &&
+ (ssh->x11disp = x11_setup_display(ssh->cfg.x11_display,
+ ssh->cfg.x11_auth, &ssh->cfg))) {
+ logevent("Requesting X11 forwarding");
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "x11-req");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 0); /* many connections */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthprotoname);
+ /*
+ * Note that while we blank the X authentication data here, we don't
+ * take any special action to blank the start of an X11 channel,
+ * so using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 and actually opening an X connection
+ * without having session blanking enabled is likely to leak your
+ * cookie into the log.
+ */
+ dont_log_password(ssh, s->pktout, PKTLOG_BLANK);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->remoteauthdatastring);
+ end_log_omission(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->x11disp->screennum);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected response to X11 forwarding request:"
+ " packet type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ logevent("X11 forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("X11 forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->X11_fwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Enable port forwardings.
+ */
+ ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, &ssh->cfg);
+
+ /*
+ * Potentially enable agent forwarding.
+ */
+ if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && ssh->cfg.agentfwd && agent_exists()) {
+ logevent("Requesting OpenSSH-style agent forwarding");
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected response to agent forwarding request:"
+ " packet type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ logevent("Agent forwarding refused");
+ } else {
+ logevent("Agent forwarding enabled");
+ ssh->agentfwd_enabled = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now allocate a pty for the session.
+ */
+ if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && !ssh->cfg.nopty) {
+ /* Unpick the terminal-speed string. */
+ /* XXX perhaps we should allow no speeds to be sent. */
+ ssh->ospeed = 38400; ssh->ispeed = 38400; /* last-resort defaults */
+ sscanf(ssh->cfg.termspeed, "%d,%d", &ssh->ospeed, &ssh->ispeed);
+ /* Build the pty request. */
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "pty-req");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, ssh->cfg.termtype);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_width);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->term_height);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel width */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, 0); /* pixel height */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ parse_ttymodes(ssh, ssh->cfg.ttymodes,
+ ssh2_send_ttymode, (void *)s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_ISPEED);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ispeed);
+ ssh2_pkt_addbyte(s->pktout, SSH2_TTY_OP_OSPEED);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->ospeed);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, "\0", 1); /* TTY_OP_END */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_INTERMED;
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected response to pty request:"
+ " packet type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to allocate pty\r\n");
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "Allocated pty (ospeed %dbps, ispeed %dbps)",
+ ssh->ospeed, ssh->ispeed);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssh->editing = ssh->echoing = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send environment variables.
+ *
+ * Simplest thing here is to send all the requests at once, and
+ * then wait for a whole bunch of successes or failures.
+ */
+ if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode && *ssh->cfg.environmt) {
+ char *e = ssh->cfg.environmt;
+ char *var, *varend, *val;
+
+ s->num_env = 0;
+
+ while (*e) {
+ var = e;
+ while (*e && *e != '\t') e++;
+ varend = e;
+ if (*e == '\t') e++;
+ val = e;
+ while (*e) e++;
+ e++;
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "env");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(s->pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_data(s->pktout, var, varend-var);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, val);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ s->num_env++;
+ }
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Sent %d environment variables", s->num_env);
+
+ s->env_ok = 0;
+ s->env_left = s->num_env;
+
+ while (s->env_left > 0) {
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected response to environment request:"
+ " packet type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->env_ok++;
+ }
+
+ s->env_left--;
+ }
+
+ if (s->env_ok == s->num_env) {
+ logevent("All environment variables successfully set");
+ } else if (s->env_ok == 0) {
+ logevent("All environment variables refused");
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set environment variables\r\n");
+ } else {
+ logeventf(ssh, "%d environment variables refused",
+ s->num_env - s->env_ok);
+ c_write_str(ssh, "Server refused to set all environment variables\r\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Start a shell or a remote command. We may have to attempt
+ * this twice if the config data has provided a second choice
+ * of command.
+ */
+ if (ssh->mainchan && !ssh->ncmode) while (1) {
+ int subsys;
+ char *cmd;
+
+ if (ssh->fallback_cmd) {
+ subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys2;
+ cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2;
+ } else {
+ subsys = ssh->cfg.ssh_subsys;
+ cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr;
+ if (!cmd) cmd = ssh->cfg.remote_cmd;
+ }
+
+ s->pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(s->pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid); /* recipient channel */
+ if (subsys) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "subsystem");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
+ } else if (*cmd) {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "exec");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, cmd);
+ } else {
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(s->pktout, "shell");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(s->pktout, 1); /* want reply */
+ }
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, s->pktout);
+
+ crWaitUntilV(pktin);
+
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+ if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+ bombout(("Unexpected response to shell/command request:"
+ " packet type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We failed to start the command. If this is the
+ * fallback command, we really are finished; if it's
+ * not, and if the fallback command exists, try falling
+ * back to it before complaining.
+ */
+ if (!ssh->fallback_cmd && ssh->cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 != NULL) {
+ logevent("Primary command failed; attempting fallback");
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = TRUE;
+ continue;
+ }
+ bombout(("Server refused to start a shell/command"));
+ crStopV;
+ } else {
+ logevent("Started a shell/command");
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_SESSION;
+ if (ssh->size_needed)
+ ssh_size(ssh, ssh->term_width, ssh->term_height);
+ if (ssh->eof_needed)
+ ssh_special(ssh, TS_EOF);
+
+ /*
+ * All the initial channel requests are done, so install the default
+ * failure handler.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = ssh2_msg_channel_success;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = ssh2_msg_channel_failure;
+
+ /*
+ * Transfer data!
+ */
+ if (ssh->ldisc)
+ ldisc_send(ssh->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);/* cause ldisc to notice changes */
+ if (ssh->mainchan)
+ ssh->send_ok = 1;
+ while (1) {
+ crReturnV;
+ s->try_send = FALSE;
+ if (pktin) {
+
+ /*
+ * _All_ the connection-layer packets we expect to
+ * receive are now handled by the dispatch table.
+ * Anything that reaches here must be bogus.
+ */
+
+ bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin->type));
+ crStopV;
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ /*
+ * We have spare data. Add it to the channel buffer.
+ */
+ ssh2_add_channel_data(ssh->mainchan, (char *)in, inlen);
+ s->try_send = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (s->try_send) {
+ int i;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ /*
+ * Try to send data on all channels if we can.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; NULL != (c = index234(ssh->channels, i)); i++)
+ ssh2_try_send_and_unthrottle(c);
+ }
+ }
+
+ crFinishV;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handlers for SSH-2 messages that might arrive at any moment.
+ */
+static void ssh2_msg_disconnect(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* log reason code in disconnect message */
+ char *buf, *msg;
+ int reason, msglen;
+
+ reason = ssh_pkt_getuint32(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+
+ if (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) {
+ buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (%s)",
+ ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason]);
+ } else {
+ buf = dupprintf("Received disconnect message (unknown"
+ " type %d)", reason);
+ }
+ logevent(buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+ buf = dupprintf("Disconnection message text: %.*s",
+ msglen, msg);
+ logevent(buf);
+ bombout(("Server sent disconnect message\ntype %d (%s):\n\"%.*s\"",
+ reason,
+ (reason > 0 && reason < lenof(ssh2_disconnect_reasons)) ?
+ ssh2_disconnect_reasons[reason] : "unknown",
+ msglen, msg));
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_debug(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ /* log the debug message */
+ char *msg;
+ int msglen;
+ int always_display;
+
+ /* XXX maybe we should actually take notice of this */
+ always_display = ssh2_pkt_getbool(pktin);
+ ssh_pkt_getstring(pktin, &msg, &msglen);
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Remote debug message: %.*s", msglen, msg);
+}
+
+static void ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, pktin->sequence);
+ /*
+ * UNIMPLEMENTED messages MUST appear in the same order as the
+ * messages they respond to. Hence, never queue them.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the top-level SSH-2 protocol.
+ */
+static void ssh2_protocol_setup(Ssh ssh)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Most messages cause SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[i] = ssh2_msg_something_unimplemented;
+
+ /*
+ * Any message we actually understand, we set to NULL so that
+ * the coroutines will get it.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY] = NULL;
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP] = NULL; duplicate case value */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK] = NULL;
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ] = NULL; duplicate case value */
+ /* ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST] = NULL; duplicate case value */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS] = NULL;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * These special message types we install handlers for.
+ */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT] = ssh2_msg_disconnect;
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_IGNORE] = ssh_msg_ignore; /* shared with SSH-1 */
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[SSH2_MSG_DEBUG] = ssh2_msg_debug;
+}
+
+static void ssh2_timer(void *ctx, long now)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
+
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != 0 &&
+ now - ssh->next_rekey >= 0) {
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "timeout", -1, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssh2_protocol(Ssh ssh, void *vin, int inlen,
+ struct Packet *pktin)
+{
+ unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)vin;
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED)
+ return;
+
+ if (pktin) {
+ ssh->incoming_data_size += pktin->encrypted_len;
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
+ ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data received", -1, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (pktin && ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type]) {
+ ssh->packet_dispatch[pktin->type](ssh, pktin);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done ||
+ (pktin && pktin->type >= 20 && pktin->type < 50)) {
+ if (do_ssh2_transport(ssh, in, inlen, pktin) &&
+ !ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done) {
+ ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * Allow authconn to initialise itself.
+ */
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ }
+ } else {
+ do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, in, inlen, pktin);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set up the connection.
+ *
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ */
+static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
+ Config *cfg,
+ char *host, int port, char **realhost, int nodelay,
+ int keepalive)
+{
+ const char *p;
+ Ssh ssh;
+
+ ssh = snew(struct ssh_tag);
+ ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
+ ssh->version = 0; /* when not ready yet */
+ ssh->s = NULL;
+ ssh->cipher = NULL;
+ ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->cscipher = NULL;
+ ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->sccipher = NULL;
+ ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->csmac = NULL;
+ ssh->cs_mac_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->scmac = NULL;
+ ssh->sc_mac_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->cscomp = NULL;
+ ssh->cs_comp_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->sccomp = NULL;
+ ssh->sc_comp_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
+ ssh->kex_ctx = NULL;
+ ssh->hostkey = NULL;
+ ssh->exitcode = -1;
+ ssh->close_expected = FALSE;
+ ssh->clean_exit = FALSE;
+ ssh->state = SSH_STATE_PREPACKET;
+ ssh->size_needed = FALSE;
+ ssh->eof_needed = FALSE;
+ ssh->ldisc = NULL;
+ ssh->logctx = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_send_data = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_len = 0;
+ ssh->deferred_size = 0;
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
+ ssh->pkt_kctx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOKEX;
+ ssh->pkt_actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
+ ssh->x11disp = NULL;
+ ssh->v1_compressing = FALSE;
+ ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence = 0;
+ ssh->ssh1_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->ssh2_rdpkt_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh_init_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->ssh_gotdata_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh1_connection_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh1_login_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh2_transport_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_crstate = 0;
+ ssh->do_ssh_init_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh1_login_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state = NULL;
+ ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state = NULL;
+ ssh->v_c = NULL;
+ ssh->v_s = NULL;
+ ssh->mainchan = NULL;
+ ssh->throttled_all = 0;
+ ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
+ ssh->queue = NULL;
+ ssh->queuelen = ssh->queuesize = 0;
+ ssh->queueing = FALSE;
+ ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
+ ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = NULL;
+ bufchain_init(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
+ ssh->frozen = FALSE;
+
+ *backend_handle = ssh;
+
+#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
+ if (crypto_startup() == 0)
+ return "Microsoft high encryption pack not installed!";
+#endif
+
+ ssh->frontend = frontend_handle;
+ ssh->term_width = ssh->cfg.width;
+ ssh->term_height = ssh->cfg.height;
+
+ ssh->channels = NULL;
+ ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
+ ssh->portfwds = NULL;
+
+ ssh->send_ok = 0;
+ ssh->editing = 0;
+ ssh->echoing = 0;
+ ssh->conn_throttle_count = 0;
+ ssh->overall_bufsize = 0;
+ ssh->fallback_cmd = 0;
+
+ ssh->protocol = NULL;
+
+ ssh->protocol_initial_phase_done = FALSE;
+
+ ssh->pinger = NULL;
+
+ ssh->incoming_data_size = ssh->outgoing_data_size =
+ ssh->deferred_data_size = 0L;
+ ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_data);
+ ssh->kex_in_progress = FALSE;
+
+ p = connect_to_host(ssh, host, port, realhost, nodelay, keepalive);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ return p;
+
+ random_ref();
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void ssh_free(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ struct ssh_rportfwd *pf;
+
+ if (ssh->v1_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->cipher->free_context(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx)
+ ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx);
+ if (ssh->cs_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->csmac->free_context(ssh->cs_mac_ctx);
+ if (ssh->sc_mac_ctx)
+ ssh->scmac->free_context(ssh->sc_mac_ctx);
+ if (ssh->cs_comp_ctx) {
+ if (ssh->cscomp)
+ ssh->cscomp->compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ else
+ zlib_compress_cleanup(ssh->cs_comp_ctx);
+ }
+ if (ssh->sc_comp_ctx) {
+ if (ssh->sccomp)
+ ssh->sccomp->decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
+ else
+ zlib_decompress_cleanup(ssh->sc_comp_ctx);
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex_ctx)
+ dh_cleanup(ssh->kex_ctx);
+ sfree(ssh->savedhost);
+
+ while (ssh->queuelen-- > 0)
+ ssh_free_packet(ssh->queue[ssh->queuelen]);
+ sfree(ssh->queue);
+
+ while (ssh->qhead) {
+ struct queued_handler *qh = ssh->qhead;
+ ssh->qhead = qh->next;
+ sfree(ssh->qhead);
+ }
+ ssh->qhead = ssh->qtail = NULL;
+
+ if (ssh->channels) {
+ while ((c = delpos234(ssh->channels, 0)) != NULL) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case CHAN_X11:
+ if (c->u.x11.s != NULL)
+ x11_close(c->u.x11.s);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_SOCKDATA:
+ if (c->u.pfd.s != NULL)
+ pfd_close(c->u.pfd.s);
+ break;
+ }
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+ freetree234(ssh->channels);
+ ssh->channels = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->rportfwds) {
+ while ((pf = delpos234(ssh->rportfwds, 0)) != NULL)
+ sfree(pf);
+ freetree234(ssh->rportfwds);
+ ssh->rportfwds = NULL;
+ }
+ sfree(ssh->deferred_send_data);
+ if (ssh->x11disp)
+ x11_free_display(ssh->x11disp);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh_init_state);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh1_login_state);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_transport_state);
+ sfree(ssh->do_ssh2_authconn_state);
+ sfree(ssh->v_c);
+ sfree(ssh->v_s);
+ sfree(ssh->fullhostname);
+ if (ssh->crcda_ctx) {
+ crcda_free_context(ssh->crcda_ctx);
+ ssh->crcda_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ssh->s)
+ ssh_do_close(ssh, TRUE);
+ expire_timer_context(ssh);
+ if (ssh->pinger)
+ pinger_free(ssh->pinger);
+ bufchain_clear(&ssh->queued_incoming_data);
+ sfree(ssh);
+
+ random_unref();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reconfigure the SSH backend.
+ */
+static void ssh_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ char *rekeying = NULL, rekey_mandatory = FALSE;
+ unsigned long old_max_data_size;
+
+ pinger_reconfig(ssh->pinger, &ssh->cfg, cfg);
+ if (ssh->portfwds)
+ ssh_setup_portfwd(ssh, cfg);
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_rekey_time != cfg->ssh_rekey_time &&
+ cfg->ssh_rekey_time != 0) {
+ long new_next = ssh->last_rekey + cfg->ssh_rekey_time*60*TICKSPERSEC;
+ long now = GETTICKCOUNT();
+
+ if (new_next - now < 0) {
+ rekeying = "timeout shortened";
+ } else {
+ ssh->next_rekey = schedule_timer(new_next - now, ssh2_timer, ssh);
+ }
+ }
+
+ old_max_data_size = ssh->max_data_size;
+ ssh->max_data_size = parse_blocksize(cfg->ssh_rekey_data);
+ if (old_max_data_size != ssh->max_data_size &&
+ ssh->max_data_size != 0) {
+ if (ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size ||
+ ssh->incoming_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
+ rekeying = "data limit lowered";
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.compression != cfg->compression) {
+ rekeying = "compression setting changed";
+ rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh2_des_cbc != cfg->ssh2_des_cbc ||
+ memcmp(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist, cfg->ssh_cipherlist,
+ sizeof(ssh->cfg.ssh_cipherlist))) {
+ rekeying = "cipher settings changed";
+ rekey_mandatory = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ ssh->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
+
+ if (rekeying) {
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress) {
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, rekeying, -1, NULL);
+ } else if (rekey_mandatory) {
+ ssh->deferred_rekey_reason = rekeying;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to send data down the SSH connection.
+ */
+static int ssh_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+
+ if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ssh->protocol(ssh, (unsigned char *)buf, len, 0);
+
+ return ssh_sendbuffer(ssh);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to query the current amount of buffered stdin data.
+ */
+static int ssh_sendbuffer(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ int override_value;
+
+ if (ssh == NULL || ssh->s == NULL || ssh->protocol == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If the SSH socket itself has backed up, add the total backup
+ * size on that to any individual buffer on the stdin channel.
+ */
+ override_value = 0;
+ if (ssh->throttled_all)
+ override_value = ssh->overall_bufsize;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ return override_value;
+ } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ if (!ssh->mainchan || ssh->mainchan->closes > 0)
+ return override_value;
+ else
+ return (override_value +
+ bufchain_size(&ssh->mainchan->v.v2.outbuffer));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set the size of the window from SSH's POV.
+ */
+static void ssh_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ ssh->term_width = width;
+ ssh->term_height = height;
+
+ switch (ssh->state) {
+ case SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE:
+ case SSH_STATE_PREPACKET:
+ case SSH_STATE_CLOSED:
+ break; /* do nothing */
+ case SSH_STATE_INTERMED:
+ ssh->size_needed = TRUE; /* buffer for later */
+ break;
+ case SSH_STATE_SESSION:
+ if (!ssh->cfg.nopty) {
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->term_height,
+ PKT_INT, ssh->term_width,
+ PKT_INT, 0, PKT_INT, 0, PKT_END);
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "window-change");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_width);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->term_height);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the special codes that make sense in this
+ * protocol.
+ */
+static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
+{
+ static const struct telnet_special ssh1_ignore_special[] = {
+ {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP}
+ };
+ static const struct telnet_special ssh2_transport_specials[] = {
+ {"IGNORE message", TS_NOP},
+ {"Repeat key exchange", TS_REKEY},
+ };
+ static const struct telnet_special ssh2_session_specials[] = {
+ {NULL, TS_SEP},
+ {"Break", TS_BRK},
+ /* These are the signal names defined by RFC 4254.
+ * They include all the ISO C signals, but are a subset of the POSIX
+ * required signals. */
+ {"SIGINT (Interrupt)", TS_SIGINT},
+ {"SIGTERM (Terminate)", TS_SIGTERM},
+ {"SIGKILL (Kill)", TS_SIGKILL},
+ {"SIGQUIT (Quit)", TS_SIGQUIT},
+ {"SIGHUP (Hangup)", TS_SIGHUP},
+ {"More signals", TS_SUBMENU},
+ {"SIGABRT", TS_SIGABRT}, {"SIGALRM", TS_SIGALRM},
+ {"SIGFPE", TS_SIGFPE}, {"SIGILL", TS_SIGILL},
+ {"SIGPIPE", TS_SIGPIPE}, {"SIGSEGV", TS_SIGSEGV},
+ {"SIGUSR1", TS_SIGUSR1}, {"SIGUSR2", TS_SIGUSR2},
+ {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
+ };
+ static const struct telnet_special specials_end[] = {
+ {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
+ };
+ /* XXX review this length for any changes: */
+ static struct telnet_special ssh_specials[lenof(ssh2_transport_specials) +
+ lenof(ssh2_session_specials) +
+ lenof(specials_end)];
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ int i = 0;
+#define ADD_SPECIALS(name) \
+ do { \
+ assert((i + lenof(name)) <= lenof(ssh_specials)); \
+ memcpy(&ssh_specials[i], name, sizeof name); \
+ i += lenof(name); \
+ } while(0)
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ /* Don't bother offering IGNORE if we've decided the remote
+ * won't cope with it, since we wouldn't bother sending it if
+ * asked anyway. */
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
+ ADD_SPECIALS(ssh1_ignore_special);
+ } else if (ssh->version == 2) {
+ ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_transport_specials);
+ if (ssh->mainchan)
+ ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
+ } /* else we're not ready yet */
+
+ if (i) {
+ ADD_SPECIALS(specials_end);
+ return ssh_specials;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#undef ADD_SPECIALS
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send special codes. TS_EOF is useful for `plink', so you
+ * can send an EOF and collect resulting output (e.g. `plink
+ * hostname sort').
+ */
+static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ if (code == TS_EOF) {
+ if (ssh->state != SSH_STATE_SESSION) {
+ /*
+ * Buffer the EOF in case we are pre-SESSION, so we can
+ * send it as soon as we reach SESSION.
+ */
+ if (code == TS_EOF)
+ ssh->eof_needed = TRUE;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_CMSG_EOF, PKT_END);
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ struct Packet *pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ ssh->send_ok = 0; /* now stop trying to read from stdin */
+ }
+ logevent("Sent EOF message");
+ } else if (code == TS_PING || code == TS_NOP) {
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
+ || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE))
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, PKT_STR, "", PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(pktout);
+ ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ } else if (code == TS_REKEY) {
+ if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && ssh->version == 2) {
+ do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
+ }
+ } else if (code == TS_BRK) {
+ if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
+ || ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ logevent("Unable to send BREAK signal in SSH-1");
+ } else if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "break");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0); /* default break length */
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Is is a POSIX signal? */
+ char *signame = NULL;
+ if (code == TS_SIGABRT) signame = "ABRT";
+ if (code == TS_SIGALRM) signame = "ALRM";
+ if (code == TS_SIGFPE) signame = "FPE";
+ if (code == TS_SIGHUP) signame = "HUP";
+ if (code == TS_SIGILL) signame = "ILL";
+ if (code == TS_SIGINT) signame = "INT";
+ if (code == TS_SIGKILL) signame = "KILL";
+ if (code == TS_SIGPIPE) signame = "PIPE";
+ if (code == TS_SIGQUIT) signame = "QUIT";
+ if (code == TS_SIGSEGV) signame = "SEGV";
+ if (code == TS_SIGTERM) signame = "TERM";
+ if (code == TS_SIGUSR1) signame = "USR1";
+ if (code == TS_SIGUSR2) signame = "USR2";
+ /* The SSH-2 protocol does in principle support arbitrary named
+ * signals, including signame@domain, but we don't support those. */
+ if (signame) {
+ /* It's a signal. */
+ if (ssh->version == 2 && ssh->mainchan) {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, ssh->mainchan->remoteid);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "signal");
+ ssh2_pkt_addbool(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, signame);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ logeventf(ssh, "Sent signal SIG%s", signame);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Never heard of it. Do nothing */
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ struct ssh_channel *c;
+ c = snew(struct ssh_channel);
+
+ c->ssh = ssh;
+ ssh2_channel_init(c);
+ c->halfopen = TRUE;
+ c->type = CHAN_SOCKDATA_DORMANT;/* identify channel type */
+ c->u.pfd.s = s;
+ add234(ssh->channels, c);
+ return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when stdout/stderr (the entity to which
+ * from_backend sends data) manages to clear some backlog.
+ */
+static void ssh_unthrottle(void *handle, int bufsize)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ int buflimit;
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ if (ssh->v1_stdout_throttling && bufsize < SSH1_BUFFER_LIMIT) {
+ ssh->v1_stdout_throttling = 0;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ssh->mainchan) {
+ ssh2_set_window(ssh->mainchan,
+ bufsize < ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin ?
+ ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin - bufsize : 0);
+ if (ssh->cfg.ssh_simple)
+ buflimit = 0;
+ else
+ buflimit = ssh->mainchan->v.v2.locmaxwin;
+ if (ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn && bufsize <= buflimit) {
+ ssh->mainchan->throttling_conn = 0;
+ ssh_throttle_conn(ssh, -1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org)
+{
+ struct ssh_channel *c = (struct ssh_channel *)channel;
+ Ssh ssh = c->ssh;
+ struct Packet *pktout;
+
+ logeventf(ssh, "Opening forwarded connection to %s:%d", hostname, port);
+
+ if (ssh->version == 1) {
+ send_packet(ssh, SSH1_MSG_PORT_OPEN,
+ PKT_INT, c->localid,
+ PKT_STR, hostname,
+ PKT_INT, port,
+ /* PKT_STR, <org:orgport>, */
+ PKT_END);
+ } else {
+ pktout = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "direct-tcpip");
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->localid);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, c->v.v2.locwindow);/* our window size */
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, OUR_V2_MAXPKT); /* our max pkt size */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, hostname);
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, port);
+ /*
+ * We make up values for the originator data; partly it's
+ * too much hassle to keep track, and partly I'm not
+ * convinced the server should be told details like that
+ * about my local network configuration.
+ * The "originator IP address" is syntactically a numeric
+ * IP address, and some servers (e.g., Tectia) get upset
+ * if it doesn't match this syntax.
+ */
+ ssh2_pkt_addstring(pktout, "0.0.0.0");
+ ssh2_pkt_adduint32(pktout, 0);
+ ssh2_pkt_send(ssh, pktout);
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssh_connected(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->s != NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssh_sendok(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->send_ok;
+}
+
+static int ssh_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ if (option == LD_ECHO)
+ return ssh->echoing;
+ if (option == LD_EDIT)
+ return ssh->editing;
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static void ssh_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ ssh->ldisc = ldisc;
+}
+
+static void ssh_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ ssh->logctx = logctx;
+}
+
+static int ssh_return_exitcode(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ if (ssh->s != NULL)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return (ssh->exitcode >= 0 ? ssh->exitcode : INT_MAX);
+}
+
+/*
+ * cfg_info for SSH is the currently running version of the
+ * protocol. (1 for 1; 2 for 2; 0 for not-decided-yet.)
+ */
+static int ssh_cfg_info(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->version;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
+ * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
+ * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
+ */
+extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle)
+{
+ Ssh ssh = (Ssh) handle;
+ return ssh->fallback_cmd;
+}
+
+Backend ssh_backend = {
+ ssh_init,
+ ssh_free,
+ ssh_reconfig,
+ ssh_send,
+ ssh_sendbuffer,
+ ssh_size,
+ ssh_special,
+ ssh_get_specials,
+ ssh_connected,
+ ssh_return_exitcode,
+ ssh_sendok,
+ ssh_ldisc,
+ ssh_provide_ldisc,
+ ssh_provide_logctx,
+ ssh_unthrottle,
+ ssh_cfg_info,
+ "ssh",
+ PROT_SSH,
+ 22
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/ssh.h b/tools/plink/ssh.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..814939c2b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/ssh.h @@ -0,0 +1,583 @@ +#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "puttymem.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+#include "network.h"
+#include "int64.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+struct ssh_channel;
+
+extern void sshfwd_close(struct ssh_channel *c);
+extern int sshfwd_write(struct ssh_channel *c, char *, int);
+extern void sshfwd_unthrottle(struct ssh_channel *c, int bufsize);
+
+/*
+ * Useful thing.
+ */
+#ifndef lenof
+#define lenof(x) ( (sizeof((x))) / (sizeof(*(x))))
+#endif
+
+#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1
+#define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2
+#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6
+
+#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
+#define APIEXTRA 8
+#else
+#define APIEXTRA 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef BIGNUM_INTERNAL
+typedef void *Bignum;
+#endif
+
+struct RSAKey {
+ int bits;
+ int bytes;
+#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
+ unsigned long exponent;
+ unsigned char *modulus;
+#else
+ Bignum modulus;
+ Bignum exponent;
+ Bignum private_exponent;
+ Bignum p;
+ Bignum q;
+ Bignum iqmp;
+#endif
+ char *comment;
+};
+
+struct dss_key {
+ Bignum p, q, g, y, x;
+};
+
+int makekey(unsigned char *data, int len, struct RSAKey *result,
+ unsigned char **keystr, int order);
+int makeprivate(unsigned char *data, int len, struct RSAKey *result);
+int rsaencrypt(unsigned char *data, int length, struct RSAKey *key);
+Bignum rsadecrypt(Bignum input, struct RSAKey *key);
+void rsasign(unsigned char *data, int length, struct RSAKey *key);
+void rsasanitise(struct RSAKey *key);
+int rsastr_len(struct RSAKey *key);
+void rsastr_fmt(char *str, struct RSAKey *key);
+void rsa_fingerprint(char *str, int len, struct RSAKey *key);
+int rsa_verify(struct RSAKey *key);
+unsigned char *rsa_public_blob(struct RSAKey *key, int *len);
+int rsa_public_blob_len(void *data, int maxlen);
+void freersakey(struct RSAKey *key);
+
+typedef unsigned int word32;
+typedef unsigned int uint32;
+
+unsigned long crc32_compute(const void *s, size_t len);
+unsigned long crc32_update(unsigned long crc_input, const void *s, size_t len);
+
+/* SSH CRC compensation attack detector */
+void *crcda_make_context(void);
+void crcda_free_context(void *handle);
+int detect_attack(void *handle, unsigned char *buf, uint32 len,
+ unsigned char *IV);
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 RSA key exchange functions
+ */
+struct ssh_hash;
+void *ssh_rsakex_newkey(char *data, int len);
+void ssh_rsakex_freekey(void *key);
+int ssh_rsakex_klen(void *key);
+void ssh_rsakex_encrypt(const struct ssh_hash *h, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ unsigned char *out, int outlen,
+ void *key);
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32 h[4];
+} MD5_Core_State;
+
+struct MD5Context {
+#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
+ unsigned long hHash;
+#else
+ MD5_Core_State core;
+ unsigned char block[64];
+ int blkused;
+ uint32 lenhi, lenlo;
+#endif
+};
+
+void MD5Init(struct MD5Context *context);
+void MD5Update(struct MD5Context *context, unsigned char const *buf,
+ unsigned len);
+void MD5Final(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *context);
+void MD5Simple(void const *p, unsigned len, unsigned char output[16]);
+
+void *hmacmd5_make_context(void);
+void hmacmd5_free_context(void *handle);
+void hmacmd5_key(void *handle, void const *key, int len);
+void hmacmd5_do_hmac(void *handle, unsigned char const *blk, int len,
+ unsigned char *hmac);
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32 h[5];
+ unsigned char block[64];
+ int blkused;
+ uint32 lenhi, lenlo;
+} SHA_State;
+void SHA_Init(SHA_State * s);
+void SHA_Bytes(SHA_State * s, void *p, int len);
+void SHA_Final(SHA_State * s, unsigned char *output);
+void SHA_Simple(void *p, int len, unsigned char *output);
+
+void hmac_sha1_simple(void *key, int keylen, void *data, int datalen,
+ unsigned char *output);
+typedef struct {
+ uint32 h[8];
+ unsigned char block[64];
+ int blkused;
+ uint32 lenhi, lenlo;
+} SHA256_State;
+void SHA256_Init(SHA256_State * s);
+void SHA256_Bytes(SHA256_State * s, const void *p, int len);
+void SHA256_Final(SHA256_State * s, unsigned char *output);
+void SHA256_Simple(const void *p, int len, unsigned char *output);
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint64 h[8];
+ unsigned char block[128];
+ int blkused;
+ uint32 len[4];
+} SHA512_State;
+void SHA512_Init(SHA512_State * s);
+void SHA512_Bytes(SHA512_State * s, const void *p, int len);
+void SHA512_Final(SHA512_State * s, unsigned char *output);
+void SHA512_Simple(const void *p, int len, unsigned char *output);
+
+struct ssh_cipher {
+ void *(*make_context)(void);
+ void (*free_context)(void *);
+ void (*sesskey) (void *, unsigned char *key); /* for SSH-1 */
+ void (*encrypt) (void *, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+ void (*decrypt) (void *, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+ int blksize;
+ char *text_name;
+};
+
+struct ssh2_cipher {
+ void *(*make_context)(void);
+ void (*free_context)(void *);
+ void (*setiv) (void *, unsigned char *key); /* for SSH-2 */
+ void (*setkey) (void *, unsigned char *key);/* for SSH-2 */
+ void (*encrypt) (void *, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+ void (*decrypt) (void *, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+ char *name;
+ int blksize;
+ int keylen;
+ unsigned int flags;
+#define SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC 1
+ char *text_name;
+};
+
+struct ssh2_ciphers {
+ int nciphers;
+ const struct ssh2_cipher *const *list;
+};
+
+struct ssh_mac {
+ void *(*make_context)(void);
+ void (*free_context)(void *);
+ void (*setkey) (void *, unsigned char *key);
+ /* whole-packet operations */
+ void (*generate) (void *, unsigned char *blk, int len, unsigned long seq);
+ int (*verify) (void *, unsigned char *blk, int len, unsigned long seq);
+ /* partial-packet operations */
+ void (*start) (void *);
+ void (*bytes) (void *, unsigned char const *, int);
+ void (*genresult) (void *, unsigned char *);
+ int (*verresult) (void *, unsigned char const *);
+ char *name;
+ int len;
+ char *text_name;
+};
+
+struct ssh_hash {
+ void *(*init)(void); /* also allocates context */
+ void (*bytes)(void *, void *, int);
+ void (*final)(void *, unsigned char *); /* also frees context */
+ int hlen; /* output length in bytes */
+ char *text_name;
+};
+
+struct ssh_kex {
+ char *name, *groupname;
+ enum { KEXTYPE_DH, KEXTYPE_RSA } main_type;
+ /* For DH */
+ const unsigned char *pdata, *gdata; /* NULL means group exchange */
+ int plen, glen;
+ const struct ssh_hash *hash;
+};
+
+struct ssh_kexes {
+ int nkexes;
+ const struct ssh_kex *const *list;
+};
+
+struct ssh_signkey {
+ void *(*newkey) (char *data, int len);
+ void (*freekey) (void *key);
+ char *(*fmtkey) (void *key);
+ unsigned char *(*public_blob) (void *key, int *len);
+ unsigned char *(*private_blob) (void *key, int *len);
+ void *(*createkey) (unsigned char *pub_blob, int pub_len,
+ unsigned char *priv_blob, int priv_len);
+ void *(*openssh_createkey) (unsigned char **blob, int *len);
+ int (*openssh_fmtkey) (void *key, unsigned char *blob, int len);
+ int (*pubkey_bits) (void *blob, int len);
+ char *(*fingerprint) (void *key);
+ int (*verifysig) (void *key, char *sig, int siglen,
+ char *data, int datalen);
+ unsigned char *(*sign) (void *key, char *data, int datalen,
+ int *siglen);
+ char *name;
+ char *keytype; /* for host key cache */
+};
+
+struct ssh_compress {
+ char *name;
+ void *(*compress_init) (void);
+ void (*compress_cleanup) (void *);
+ int (*compress) (void *, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen);
+ void *(*decompress_init) (void);
+ void (*decompress_cleanup) (void *);
+ int (*decompress) (void *, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen);
+ int (*disable_compression) (void *);
+ char *text_name;
+};
+
+struct ssh2_userkey {
+ const struct ssh_signkey *alg; /* the key algorithm */
+ void *data; /* the key data */
+ char *comment; /* the key comment */
+};
+
+/* The maximum length of any hash algorithm used in kex. (bytes) */
+#define SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN (32) /* SHA-256 */
+
+extern const struct ssh_cipher ssh_3des;
+extern const struct ssh_cipher ssh_des;
+extern const struct ssh_cipher ssh_blowfish_ssh1;
+extern const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_3des;
+extern const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_des;
+extern const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_aes;
+extern const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_blowfish;
+extern const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_arcfour;
+extern const struct ssh_hash ssh_sha1;
+extern const struct ssh_hash ssh_sha256;
+extern const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group1;
+extern const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group14;
+extern const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_gex;
+extern const struct ssh_kexes ssh_rsa_kex;
+extern const struct ssh_signkey ssh_dss;
+extern const struct ssh_signkey ssh_rsa;
+extern const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_md5;
+extern const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1;
+extern const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy;
+extern const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1_96;
+extern const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy;
+
+
+/*
+ * PuTTY version number formatted as an SSH version string.
+ */
+extern char sshver[];
+
+/*
+ * Gross hack: pscp will try to start SFTP but fall back to scp1 if
+ * that fails. This variable is the means by which scp.c can reach
+ * into the SSH code and find out which one it got.
+ */
+extern int ssh_fallback_cmd(void *handle);
+
+#ifndef MSCRYPTOAPI
+void SHATransform(word32 * digest, word32 * data);
+#endif
+
+int random_byte(void);
+void random_add_noise(void *noise, int length);
+void random_add_heavynoise(void *noise, int length);
+
+void logevent(void *, const char *);
+
+/* Allocate and register a new channel for port forwarding */
+void *new_sock_channel(void *handle, Socket s);
+void ssh_send_port_open(void *channel, char *hostname, int port, char *org);
+
+/* Exports from portfwd.c */
+extern const char *pfd_newconnect(Socket * s, char *hostname, int port,
+ void *c, const Config *cfg,
+ int addressfamily);
+/* desthost == NULL indicates dynamic (SOCKS) port forwarding */
+extern const char *pfd_addforward(char *desthost, int destport, char *srcaddr,
+ int port, void *backhandle,
+ const Config *cfg, void **sockdata,
+ int address_family);
+extern void pfd_close(Socket s);
+extern void pfd_terminate(void *sockdata);
+extern int pfd_send(Socket s, char *data, int len);
+extern void pfd_confirm(Socket s);
+extern void pfd_unthrottle(Socket s);
+extern void pfd_override_throttle(Socket s, int enable);
+
+/* Exports from x11fwd.c */
+enum {
+ X11_TRANS_IPV4 = 0, X11_TRANS_IPV6 = 6, X11_TRANS_UNIX = 256
+};
+struct X11Display {
+ /* Broken-down components of the display name itself */
+ int unixdomain;
+ char *hostname;
+ int displaynum;
+ int screennum;
+ /* OSX sometimes replaces all the above with a full Unix-socket pathname */
+ char *unixsocketpath;
+
+ /* PuTTY networking SockAddr to connect to the display, and associated
+ * gubbins */
+ SockAddr addr;
+ int port;
+ char *realhost;
+
+ /* Auth details we invented for the virtual display on the SSH server. */
+ int remoteauthproto;
+ unsigned char *remoteauthdata;
+ int remoteauthdatalen;
+ char *remoteauthprotoname;
+ char *remoteauthdatastring;
+
+ /* Our local auth details for talking to the real X display. */
+ int localauthproto;
+ unsigned char *localauthdata;
+ int localauthdatalen;
+
+ /*
+ * Used inside x11fwd.c to remember recently seen
+ * XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 strings, to avoid replay attacks.
+ */
+ tree234 *xdmseen;
+};
+/*
+ * x11_setup_display() parses the display variable and fills in an
+ * X11Display structure. Some remote auth details are invented;
+ * the supplied authtype parameter configures the preferred
+ * authorisation protocol to use at the remote end. The local auth
+ * details are looked up by calling platform_get_x11_auth.
+ */
+extern struct X11Display *x11_setup_display(char *display, int authtype,
+ const Config *);
+void x11_free_display(struct X11Display *disp);
+extern const char *x11_init(Socket *, struct X11Display *, void *,
+ const char *, int, const Config *);
+extern void x11_close(Socket);
+extern int x11_send(Socket, char *, int);
+extern void x11_unthrottle(Socket s);
+extern void x11_override_throttle(Socket s, int enable);
+char *x11_display(const char *display);
+/* Platform-dependent X11 functions */
+extern void platform_get_x11_auth(struct X11Display *display,
+ const Config *);
+ /* examine a mostly-filled-in X11Display and fill in localauth* */
+extern const int platform_uses_x11_unix_by_default;
+ /* choose default X transport in the absence of a specified one */
+SockAddr platform_get_x11_unix_address(const char *path, int displaynum);
+ /* make up a SockAddr naming the address for displaynum */
+char *platform_get_x_display(void);
+ /* allocated local X display string, if any */
+/* Callbacks in x11.c usable _by_ platform X11 functions */
+/*
+ * This function does the job of platform_get_x11_auth, provided
+ * it is told where to find a normally formatted .Xauthority file:
+ * it opens that file, parses it to find an auth record which
+ * matches the display details in "display", and fills in the
+ * localauth fields.
+ *
+ * It is expected that most implementations of
+ * platform_get_x11_auth() will work by finding their system's
+ * .Xauthority file, adjusting the display details if necessary
+ * for local oddities like Unix-domain socket transport, and
+ * calling this function to do the rest of the work.
+ */
+void x11_get_auth_from_authfile(struct X11Display *display,
+ const char *authfilename);
+
+Bignum copybn(Bignum b);
+Bignum bn_power_2(int n);
+void bn_restore_invariant(Bignum b);
+Bignum bignum_from_long(unsigned long n);
+void freebn(Bignum b);
+Bignum modpow(Bignum base, Bignum exp, Bignum mod);
+Bignum modmul(Bignum a, Bignum b, Bignum mod);
+void decbn(Bignum n);
+extern Bignum Zero, One;
+Bignum bignum_from_bytes(const unsigned char *data, int nbytes);
+int ssh1_read_bignum(const unsigned char *data, int len, Bignum * result);
+int bignum_bitcount(Bignum bn);
+int ssh1_bignum_length(Bignum bn);
+int ssh2_bignum_length(Bignum bn);
+int bignum_byte(Bignum bn, int i);
+int bignum_bit(Bignum bn, int i);
+void bignum_set_bit(Bignum bn, int i, int value);
+int ssh1_write_bignum(void *data, Bignum bn);
+Bignum biggcd(Bignum a, Bignum b);
+unsigned short bignum_mod_short(Bignum number, unsigned short modulus);
+Bignum bignum_add_long(Bignum number, unsigned long addend);
+Bignum bigmul(Bignum a, Bignum b);
+Bignum bigmuladd(Bignum a, Bignum b, Bignum addend);
+Bignum bigdiv(Bignum a, Bignum b);
+Bignum bigmod(Bignum a, Bignum b);
+Bignum modinv(Bignum number, Bignum modulus);
+Bignum bignum_bitmask(Bignum number);
+Bignum bignum_rshift(Bignum number, int shift);
+int bignum_cmp(Bignum a, Bignum b);
+char *bignum_decimal(Bignum x);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+void diagbn(char *prefix, Bignum md);
+#endif
+
+void *dh_setup_group(const struct ssh_kex *kex);
+void *dh_setup_gex(Bignum pval, Bignum gval);
+void dh_cleanup(void *);
+Bignum dh_create_e(void *, int nbits);
+Bignum dh_find_K(void *, Bignum f);
+
+int loadrsakey(const Filename *filename, struct RSAKey *key,
+ char *passphrase, const char **errorstr);
+int rsakey_encrypted(const Filename *filename, char **comment);
+int rsakey_pubblob(const Filename *filename, void **blob, int *bloblen,
+ char **commentptr, const char **errorstr);
+
+int saversakey(const Filename *filename, struct RSAKey *key, char *passphrase);
+
+extern int base64_decode_atom(char *atom, unsigned char *out);
+extern int base64_lines(int datalen);
+extern void base64_encode_atom(unsigned char *data, int n, char *out);
+extern void base64_encode(FILE *fp, unsigned char *data, int datalen, int cpl);
+
+/* ssh2_load_userkey can return this as an error */
+extern struct ssh2_userkey ssh2_wrong_passphrase;
+#define SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE (&ssh2_wrong_passphrase)
+
+int ssh2_userkey_encrypted(const Filename *filename, char **comment);
+struct ssh2_userkey *ssh2_load_userkey(const Filename *filename,
+ char *passphrase, const char **errorstr);
+unsigned char *ssh2_userkey_loadpub(const Filename *filename, char **algorithm,
+ int *pub_blob_len, char **commentptr,
+ const char **errorstr);
+int ssh2_save_userkey(const Filename *filename, struct ssh2_userkey *key,
+ char *passphrase);
+const struct ssh_signkey *find_pubkey_alg(const char *name);
+
+enum {
+ SSH_KEYTYPE_UNOPENABLE,
+ SSH_KEYTYPE_UNKNOWN,
+ SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1, SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2,
+ SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH, SSH_KEYTYPE_SSHCOM
+};
+int key_type(const Filename *filename);
+char *key_type_to_str(int type);
+
+int import_possible(int type);
+int import_target_type(int type);
+int import_encrypted(const Filename *filename, int type, char **comment);
+int import_ssh1(const Filename *filename, int type,
+ struct RSAKey *key, char *passphrase, const char **errmsg_p);
+struct ssh2_userkey *import_ssh2(const Filename *filename, int type,
+ char *passphrase, const char **errmsg_p);
+int export_ssh1(const Filename *filename, int type,
+ struct RSAKey *key, char *passphrase);
+int export_ssh2(const Filename *filename, int type,
+ struct ssh2_userkey *key, char *passphrase);
+
+void des3_decrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+void des3_encrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+void des3_decrypt_pubkey_ossh(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv,
+ unsigned char *blk, int len);
+void des3_encrypt_pubkey_ossh(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv,
+ unsigned char *blk, int len);
+void aes256_encrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk,
+ int len);
+void aes256_decrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk,
+ int len);
+
+void des_encrypt_xdmauth(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+void des_decrypt_xdmauth(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len);
+
+/*
+ * For progress updates in the key generation utility.
+ */
+#define PROGFN_INITIALISE 1
+#define PROGFN_LIN_PHASE 2
+#define PROGFN_EXP_PHASE 3
+#define PROGFN_PHASE_EXTENT 4
+#define PROGFN_READY 5
+#define PROGFN_PROGRESS 6
+typedef void (*progfn_t) (void *param, int action, int phase, int progress);
+
+int rsa_generate(struct RSAKey *key, int bits, progfn_t pfn,
+ void *pfnparam);
+int dsa_generate(struct dss_key *key, int bits, progfn_t pfn,
+ void *pfnparam);
+Bignum primegen(int bits, int modulus, int residue, Bignum factor,
+ int phase, progfn_t pfn, void *pfnparam);
+
+
+/*
+ * zlib compression.
+ */
+void *zlib_compress_init(void);
+void zlib_compress_cleanup(void *);
+void *zlib_decompress_init(void);
+void zlib_decompress_cleanup(void *);
+int zlib_compress_block(void *, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen);
+int zlib_decompress_block(void *, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen);
+
+/*
+ * SSH-1 agent messages.
+ */
+#define SSH1_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
+#define SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
+#define SSH1_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
+#define SSH1_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
+#define SSH1_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
+#define SSH1_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
+#define SSH1_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 /* openssh private? */
+
+/*
+ * Messages common to SSH-1 and OpenSSH's SSH-2.
+ */
+#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
+#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSH's SSH-2 agent messages.
+ */
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
+#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
+#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
+
+/*
+ * Need this to warn about support for the original SSH-2 keyfile
+ * format.
+ */
+void old_keyfile_warning(void);
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshaes.c b/tools/plink/sshaes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..089e6c5d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshaes.c @@ -0,0 +1,1234 @@ +/*
+ * aes.c - implementation of AES / Rijndael
+ *
+ * AES is a flexible algorithm as regards endianness: it has no
+ * inherent preference as to which way round you should form words
+ * from the input byte stream. It talks endlessly of four-byte
+ * _vectors_, but never of 32-bit _words_ - there's no 32-bit
+ * addition at all, which would force an endianness by means of
+ * which way the carries went. So it would be possible to write a
+ * working AES that read words big-endian, and another working one
+ * that read them little-endian, just by computing a different set
+ * of tables - with no speed drop.
+ *
+ * It's therefore tempting to do just that, and remove the overhead
+ * of GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST() et al, allowing every system to use its
+ * own endianness-native code; but I decided not to, partly for
+ * ease of testing, and mostly because I like the flexibility that
+ * allows you to encrypt a non-word-aligned block of memory (which
+ * many systems would stop being able to do if I went the
+ * endianness-dependent route).
+ *
+ * This implementation reads and stores words big-endian, but
+ * that's a minor implementation detail. By flipping the endianness
+ * of everything in the E0..E3, D0..D3 tables, and substituting
+ * GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST for GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST, I could create an
+ * implementation that worked internally little-endian and gave the
+ * same answers at the same speed.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+#define MAX_NR 14 /* max no of rounds */
+#define MAX_NK 8 /* max no of words in input key */
+#define MAX_NB 8 /* max no of words in cipher blk */
+
+#define mulby2(x) ( ((x&0x7F) << 1) ^ (x & 0x80 ? 0x1B : 0) )
+
+typedef struct AESContext AESContext;
+
+struct AESContext {
+ word32 keysched[(MAX_NR + 1) * MAX_NB];
+ word32 invkeysched[(MAX_NR + 1) * MAX_NB];
+ void (*encrypt) (AESContext * ctx, word32 * block);
+ void (*decrypt) (AESContext * ctx, word32 * block);
+ word32 iv[MAX_NB];
+ int Nb, Nr;
+};
+
+static const unsigned char Sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5,
+ 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76,
+ 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
+ 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0,
+ 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc,
+ 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
+ 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a,
+ 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
+ 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
+ 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84,
+ 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
+ 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
+ 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
+ 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
+ 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2,
+ 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17,
+ 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
+ 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88,
+ 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
+ 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
+ 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
+ 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9,
+ 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
+ 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6,
+ 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
+ 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
+ 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94,
+ 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
+ 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68,
+ 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+static const unsigned char Sboxinv[256] = {
+ 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38,
+ 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb,
+ 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87,
+ 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb,
+ 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d,
+ 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e,
+ 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2,
+ 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25,
+ 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
+ 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92,
+ 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda,
+ 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84,
+ 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a,
+ 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06,
+ 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02,
+ 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b,
+ 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea,
+ 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73,
+ 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85,
+ 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e,
+ 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89,
+ 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b,
+ 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20,
+ 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4,
+ 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31,
+ 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f,
+ 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d,
+ 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef,
+ 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0,
+ 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
+ 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26,
+ 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
+};
+
+static const word32 E0[256] = {
+ 0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d,
+ 0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554,
+ 0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d,
+ 0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a,
+ 0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87,
+ 0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b,
+ 0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea,
+ 0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b,
+ 0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a,
+ 0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f,
+ 0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108,
+ 0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f,
+ 0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e,
+ 0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5,
+ 0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d,
+ 0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f,
+ 0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e,
+ 0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb,
+ 0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce,
+ 0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497,
+ 0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c,
+ 0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed,
+ 0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b,
+ 0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a,
+ 0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16,
+ 0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594,
+ 0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81,
+ 0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3,
+ 0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a,
+ 0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504,
+ 0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163,
+ 0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d,
+ 0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f,
+ 0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739,
+ 0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47,
+ 0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395,
+ 0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f,
+ 0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883,
+ 0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c,
+ 0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76,
+ 0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e,
+ 0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4,
+ 0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6,
+ 0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b,
+ 0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7,
+ 0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0,
+ 0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25,
+ 0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818,
+ 0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72,
+ 0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651,
+ 0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21,
+ 0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85,
+ 0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa,
+ 0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12,
+ 0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0,
+ 0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9,
+ 0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133,
+ 0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7,
+ 0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920,
+ 0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a,
+ 0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17,
+ 0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8,
+ 0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11,
+ 0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a,
+};
+static const word32 E1[256] = {
+ 0xa5c66363, 0x84f87c7c, 0x99ee7777, 0x8df67b7b,
+ 0x0dfff2f2, 0xbdd66b6b, 0xb1de6f6f, 0x5491c5c5,
+ 0x50603030, 0x03020101, 0xa9ce6767, 0x7d562b2b,
+ 0x19e7fefe, 0x62b5d7d7, 0xe64dabab, 0x9aec7676,
+ 0x458fcaca, 0x9d1f8282, 0x4089c9c9, 0x87fa7d7d,
+ 0x15effafa, 0xebb25959, 0xc98e4747, 0x0bfbf0f0,
+ 0xec41adad, 0x67b3d4d4, 0xfd5fa2a2, 0xea45afaf,
+ 0xbf239c9c, 0xf753a4a4, 0x96e47272, 0x5b9bc0c0,
+ 0xc275b7b7, 0x1ce1fdfd, 0xae3d9393, 0x6a4c2626,
+ 0x5a6c3636, 0x417e3f3f, 0x02f5f7f7, 0x4f83cccc,
+ 0x5c683434, 0xf451a5a5, 0x34d1e5e5, 0x08f9f1f1,
+ 0x93e27171, 0x73abd8d8, 0x53623131, 0x3f2a1515,
+ 0x0c080404, 0x5295c7c7, 0x65462323, 0x5e9dc3c3,
+ 0x28301818, 0xa1379696, 0x0f0a0505, 0xb52f9a9a,
+ 0x090e0707, 0x36241212, 0x9b1b8080, 0x3ddfe2e2,
+ 0x26cdebeb, 0x694e2727, 0xcd7fb2b2, 0x9fea7575,
+ 0x1b120909, 0x9e1d8383, 0x74582c2c, 0x2e341a1a,
+ 0x2d361b1b, 0xb2dc6e6e, 0xeeb45a5a, 0xfb5ba0a0,
+ 0xf6a45252, 0x4d763b3b, 0x61b7d6d6, 0xce7db3b3,
+ 0x7b522929, 0x3edde3e3, 0x715e2f2f, 0x97138484,
+ 0xf5a65353, 0x68b9d1d1, 0x00000000, 0x2cc1eded,
+ 0x60402020, 0x1fe3fcfc, 0xc879b1b1, 0xedb65b5b,
+ 0xbed46a6a, 0x468dcbcb, 0xd967bebe, 0x4b723939,
+ 0xde944a4a, 0xd4984c4c, 0xe8b05858, 0x4a85cfcf,
+ 0x6bbbd0d0, 0x2ac5efef, 0xe54faaaa, 0x16edfbfb,
+ 0xc5864343, 0xd79a4d4d, 0x55663333, 0x94118585,
+ 0xcf8a4545, 0x10e9f9f9, 0x06040202, 0x81fe7f7f,
+ 0xf0a05050, 0x44783c3c, 0xba259f9f, 0xe34ba8a8,
+ 0xf3a25151, 0xfe5da3a3, 0xc0804040, 0x8a058f8f,
+ 0xad3f9292, 0xbc219d9d, 0x48703838, 0x04f1f5f5,
+ 0xdf63bcbc, 0xc177b6b6, 0x75afdada, 0x63422121,
+ 0x30201010, 0x1ae5ffff, 0x0efdf3f3, 0x6dbfd2d2,
+ 0x4c81cdcd, 0x14180c0c, 0x35261313, 0x2fc3ecec,
+ 0xe1be5f5f, 0xa2359797, 0xcc884444, 0x392e1717,
+ 0x5793c4c4, 0xf255a7a7, 0x82fc7e7e, 0x477a3d3d,
+ 0xacc86464, 0xe7ba5d5d, 0x2b321919, 0x95e67373,
+ 0xa0c06060, 0x98198181, 0xd19e4f4f, 0x7fa3dcdc,
+ 0x66442222, 0x7e542a2a, 0xab3b9090, 0x830b8888,
+ 0xca8c4646, 0x29c7eeee, 0xd36bb8b8, 0x3c281414,
+ 0x79a7dede, 0xe2bc5e5e, 0x1d160b0b, 0x76addbdb,
+ 0x3bdbe0e0, 0x56643232, 0x4e743a3a, 0x1e140a0a,
+ 0xdb924949, 0x0a0c0606, 0x6c482424, 0xe4b85c5c,
+ 0x5d9fc2c2, 0x6ebdd3d3, 0xef43acac, 0xa6c46262,
+ 0xa8399191, 0xa4319595, 0x37d3e4e4, 0x8bf27979,
+ 0x32d5e7e7, 0x438bc8c8, 0x596e3737, 0xb7da6d6d,
+ 0x8c018d8d, 0x64b1d5d5, 0xd29c4e4e, 0xe049a9a9,
+ 0xb4d86c6c, 0xfaac5656, 0x07f3f4f4, 0x25cfeaea,
+ 0xafca6565, 0x8ef47a7a, 0xe947aeae, 0x18100808,
+ 0xd56fbaba, 0x88f07878, 0x6f4a2525, 0x725c2e2e,
+ 0x24381c1c, 0xf157a6a6, 0xc773b4b4, 0x5197c6c6,
+ 0x23cbe8e8, 0x7ca1dddd, 0x9ce87474, 0x213e1f1f,
+ 0xdd964b4b, 0xdc61bdbd, 0x860d8b8b, 0x850f8a8a,
+ 0x90e07070, 0x427c3e3e, 0xc471b5b5, 0xaacc6666,
+ 0xd8904848, 0x05060303, 0x01f7f6f6, 0x121c0e0e,
+ 0xa3c26161, 0x5f6a3535, 0xf9ae5757, 0xd069b9b9,
+ 0x91178686, 0x5899c1c1, 0x273a1d1d, 0xb9279e9e,
+ 0x38d9e1e1, 0x13ebf8f8, 0xb32b9898, 0x33221111,
+ 0xbbd26969, 0x70a9d9d9, 0x89078e8e, 0xa7339494,
+ 0xb62d9b9b, 0x223c1e1e, 0x92158787, 0x20c9e9e9,
+ 0x4987cece, 0xffaa5555, 0x78502828, 0x7aa5dfdf,
+ 0x8f038c8c, 0xf859a1a1, 0x80098989, 0x171a0d0d,
+ 0xda65bfbf, 0x31d7e6e6, 0xc6844242, 0xb8d06868,
+ 0xc3824141, 0xb0299999, 0x775a2d2d, 0x111e0f0f,
+ 0xcb7bb0b0, 0xfca85454, 0xd66dbbbb, 0x3a2c1616,
+};
+static const word32 E2[256] = {
+ 0x63a5c663, 0x7c84f87c, 0x7799ee77, 0x7b8df67b,
+ 0xf20dfff2, 0x6bbdd66b, 0x6fb1de6f, 0xc55491c5,
+ 0x30506030, 0x01030201, 0x67a9ce67, 0x2b7d562b,
+ 0xfe19e7fe, 0xd762b5d7, 0xabe64dab, 0x769aec76,
+ 0xca458fca, 0x829d1f82, 0xc94089c9, 0x7d87fa7d,
+ 0xfa15effa, 0x59ebb259, 0x47c98e47, 0xf00bfbf0,
+ 0xadec41ad, 0xd467b3d4, 0xa2fd5fa2, 0xafea45af,
+ 0x9cbf239c, 0xa4f753a4, 0x7296e472, 0xc05b9bc0,
+ 0xb7c275b7, 0xfd1ce1fd, 0x93ae3d93, 0x266a4c26,
+ 0x365a6c36, 0x3f417e3f, 0xf702f5f7, 0xcc4f83cc,
+ 0x345c6834, 0xa5f451a5, 0xe534d1e5, 0xf108f9f1,
+ 0x7193e271, 0xd873abd8, 0x31536231, 0x153f2a15,
+ 0x040c0804, 0xc75295c7, 0x23654623, 0xc35e9dc3,
+ 0x18283018, 0x96a13796, 0x050f0a05, 0x9ab52f9a,
+ 0x07090e07, 0x12362412, 0x809b1b80, 0xe23ddfe2,
+ 0xeb26cdeb, 0x27694e27, 0xb2cd7fb2, 0x759fea75,
+ 0x091b1209, 0x839e1d83, 0x2c74582c, 0x1a2e341a,
+ 0x1b2d361b, 0x6eb2dc6e, 0x5aeeb45a, 0xa0fb5ba0,
+ 0x52f6a452, 0x3b4d763b, 0xd661b7d6, 0xb3ce7db3,
+ 0x297b5229, 0xe33edde3, 0x2f715e2f, 0x84971384,
+ 0x53f5a653, 0xd168b9d1, 0x00000000, 0xed2cc1ed,
+ 0x20604020, 0xfc1fe3fc, 0xb1c879b1, 0x5bedb65b,
+ 0x6abed46a, 0xcb468dcb, 0xbed967be, 0x394b7239,
+ 0x4ade944a, 0x4cd4984c, 0x58e8b058, 0xcf4a85cf,
+ 0xd06bbbd0, 0xef2ac5ef, 0xaae54faa, 0xfb16edfb,
+ 0x43c58643, 0x4dd79a4d, 0x33556633, 0x85941185,
+ 0x45cf8a45, 0xf910e9f9, 0x02060402, 0x7f81fe7f,
+ 0x50f0a050, 0x3c44783c, 0x9fba259f, 0xa8e34ba8,
+ 0x51f3a251, 0xa3fe5da3, 0x40c08040, 0x8f8a058f,
+ 0x92ad3f92, 0x9dbc219d, 0x38487038, 0xf504f1f5,
+ 0xbcdf63bc, 0xb6c177b6, 0xda75afda, 0x21634221,
+ 0x10302010, 0xff1ae5ff, 0xf30efdf3, 0xd26dbfd2,
+ 0xcd4c81cd, 0x0c14180c, 0x13352613, 0xec2fc3ec,
+ 0x5fe1be5f, 0x97a23597, 0x44cc8844, 0x17392e17,
+ 0xc45793c4, 0xa7f255a7, 0x7e82fc7e, 0x3d477a3d,
+ 0x64acc864, 0x5de7ba5d, 0x192b3219, 0x7395e673,
+ 0x60a0c060, 0x81981981, 0x4fd19e4f, 0xdc7fa3dc,
+ 0x22664422, 0x2a7e542a, 0x90ab3b90, 0x88830b88,
+ 0x46ca8c46, 0xee29c7ee, 0xb8d36bb8, 0x143c2814,
+ 0xde79a7de, 0x5ee2bc5e, 0x0b1d160b, 0xdb76addb,
+ 0xe03bdbe0, 0x32566432, 0x3a4e743a, 0x0a1e140a,
+ 0x49db9249, 0x060a0c06, 0x246c4824, 0x5ce4b85c,
+ 0xc25d9fc2, 0xd36ebdd3, 0xacef43ac, 0x62a6c462,
+ 0x91a83991, 0x95a43195, 0xe437d3e4, 0x798bf279,
+ 0xe732d5e7, 0xc8438bc8, 0x37596e37, 0x6db7da6d,
+ 0x8d8c018d, 0xd564b1d5, 0x4ed29c4e, 0xa9e049a9,
+ 0x6cb4d86c, 0x56faac56, 0xf407f3f4, 0xea25cfea,
+ 0x65afca65, 0x7a8ef47a, 0xaee947ae, 0x08181008,
+ 0xbad56fba, 0x7888f078, 0x256f4a25, 0x2e725c2e,
+ 0x1c24381c, 0xa6f157a6, 0xb4c773b4, 0xc65197c6,
+ 0xe823cbe8, 0xdd7ca1dd, 0x749ce874, 0x1f213e1f,
+ 0x4bdd964b, 0xbddc61bd, 0x8b860d8b, 0x8a850f8a,
+ 0x7090e070, 0x3e427c3e, 0xb5c471b5, 0x66aacc66,
+ 0x48d89048, 0x03050603, 0xf601f7f6, 0x0e121c0e,
+ 0x61a3c261, 0x355f6a35, 0x57f9ae57, 0xb9d069b9,
+ 0x86911786, 0xc15899c1, 0x1d273a1d, 0x9eb9279e,
+ 0xe138d9e1, 0xf813ebf8, 0x98b32b98, 0x11332211,
+ 0x69bbd269, 0xd970a9d9, 0x8e89078e, 0x94a73394,
+ 0x9bb62d9b, 0x1e223c1e, 0x87921587, 0xe920c9e9,
+ 0xce4987ce, 0x55ffaa55, 0x28785028, 0xdf7aa5df,
+ 0x8c8f038c, 0xa1f859a1, 0x89800989, 0x0d171a0d,
+ 0xbfda65bf, 0xe631d7e6, 0x42c68442, 0x68b8d068,
+ 0x41c38241, 0x99b02999, 0x2d775a2d, 0x0f111e0f,
+ 0xb0cb7bb0, 0x54fca854, 0xbbd66dbb, 0x163a2c16,
+};
+static const word32 E3[256] = {
+ 0x6363a5c6, 0x7c7c84f8, 0x777799ee, 0x7b7b8df6,
+ 0xf2f20dff, 0x6b6bbdd6, 0x6f6fb1de, 0xc5c55491,
+ 0x30305060, 0x01010302, 0x6767a9ce, 0x2b2b7d56,
+ 0xfefe19e7, 0xd7d762b5, 0xababe64d, 0x76769aec,
+ 0xcaca458f, 0x82829d1f, 0xc9c94089, 0x7d7d87fa,
+ 0xfafa15ef, 0x5959ebb2, 0x4747c98e, 0xf0f00bfb,
+ 0xadadec41, 0xd4d467b3, 0xa2a2fd5f, 0xafafea45,
+ 0x9c9cbf23, 0xa4a4f753, 0x727296e4, 0xc0c05b9b,
+ 0xb7b7c275, 0xfdfd1ce1, 0x9393ae3d, 0x26266a4c,
+ 0x36365a6c, 0x3f3f417e, 0xf7f702f5, 0xcccc4f83,
+ 0x34345c68, 0xa5a5f451, 0xe5e534d1, 0xf1f108f9,
+ 0x717193e2, 0xd8d873ab, 0x31315362, 0x15153f2a,
+ 0x04040c08, 0xc7c75295, 0x23236546, 0xc3c35e9d,
+ 0x18182830, 0x9696a137, 0x05050f0a, 0x9a9ab52f,
+ 0x0707090e, 0x12123624, 0x80809b1b, 0xe2e23ddf,
+ 0xebeb26cd, 0x2727694e, 0xb2b2cd7f, 0x75759fea,
+ 0x09091b12, 0x83839e1d, 0x2c2c7458, 0x1a1a2e34,
+ 0x1b1b2d36, 0x6e6eb2dc, 0x5a5aeeb4, 0xa0a0fb5b,
+ 0x5252f6a4, 0x3b3b4d76, 0xd6d661b7, 0xb3b3ce7d,
+ 0x29297b52, 0xe3e33edd, 0x2f2f715e, 0x84849713,
+ 0x5353f5a6, 0xd1d168b9, 0x00000000, 0xeded2cc1,
+ 0x20206040, 0xfcfc1fe3, 0xb1b1c879, 0x5b5bedb6,
+ 0x6a6abed4, 0xcbcb468d, 0xbebed967, 0x39394b72,
+ 0x4a4ade94, 0x4c4cd498, 0x5858e8b0, 0xcfcf4a85,
+ 0xd0d06bbb, 0xefef2ac5, 0xaaaae54f, 0xfbfb16ed,
+ 0x4343c586, 0x4d4dd79a, 0x33335566, 0x85859411,
+ 0x4545cf8a, 0xf9f910e9, 0x02020604, 0x7f7f81fe,
+ 0x5050f0a0, 0x3c3c4478, 0x9f9fba25, 0xa8a8e34b,
+ 0x5151f3a2, 0xa3a3fe5d, 0x4040c080, 0x8f8f8a05,
+ 0x9292ad3f, 0x9d9dbc21, 0x38384870, 0xf5f504f1,
+ 0xbcbcdf63, 0xb6b6c177, 0xdada75af, 0x21216342,
+ 0x10103020, 0xffff1ae5, 0xf3f30efd, 0xd2d26dbf,
+ 0xcdcd4c81, 0x0c0c1418, 0x13133526, 0xecec2fc3,
+ 0x5f5fe1be, 0x9797a235, 0x4444cc88, 0x1717392e,
+ 0xc4c45793, 0xa7a7f255, 0x7e7e82fc, 0x3d3d477a,
+ 0x6464acc8, 0x5d5de7ba, 0x19192b32, 0x737395e6,
+ 0x6060a0c0, 0x81819819, 0x4f4fd19e, 0xdcdc7fa3,
+ 0x22226644, 0x2a2a7e54, 0x9090ab3b, 0x8888830b,
+ 0x4646ca8c, 0xeeee29c7, 0xb8b8d36b, 0x14143c28,
+ 0xdede79a7, 0x5e5ee2bc, 0x0b0b1d16, 0xdbdb76ad,
+ 0xe0e03bdb, 0x32325664, 0x3a3a4e74, 0x0a0a1e14,
+ 0x4949db92, 0x06060a0c, 0x24246c48, 0x5c5ce4b8,
+ 0xc2c25d9f, 0xd3d36ebd, 0xacacef43, 0x6262a6c4,
+ 0x9191a839, 0x9595a431, 0xe4e437d3, 0x79798bf2,
+ 0xe7e732d5, 0xc8c8438b, 0x3737596e, 0x6d6db7da,
+ 0x8d8d8c01, 0xd5d564b1, 0x4e4ed29c, 0xa9a9e049,
+ 0x6c6cb4d8, 0x5656faac, 0xf4f407f3, 0xeaea25cf,
+ 0x6565afca, 0x7a7a8ef4, 0xaeaee947, 0x08081810,
+ 0xbabad56f, 0x787888f0, 0x25256f4a, 0x2e2e725c,
+ 0x1c1c2438, 0xa6a6f157, 0xb4b4c773, 0xc6c65197,
+ 0xe8e823cb, 0xdddd7ca1, 0x74749ce8, 0x1f1f213e,
+ 0x4b4bdd96, 0xbdbddc61, 0x8b8b860d, 0x8a8a850f,
+ 0x707090e0, 0x3e3e427c, 0xb5b5c471, 0x6666aacc,
+ 0x4848d890, 0x03030506, 0xf6f601f7, 0x0e0e121c,
+ 0x6161a3c2, 0x35355f6a, 0x5757f9ae, 0xb9b9d069,
+ 0x86869117, 0xc1c15899, 0x1d1d273a, 0x9e9eb927,
+ 0xe1e138d9, 0xf8f813eb, 0x9898b32b, 0x11113322,
+ 0x6969bbd2, 0xd9d970a9, 0x8e8e8907, 0x9494a733,
+ 0x9b9bb62d, 0x1e1e223c, 0x87879215, 0xe9e920c9,
+ 0xcece4987, 0x5555ffaa, 0x28287850, 0xdfdf7aa5,
+ 0x8c8c8f03, 0xa1a1f859, 0x89898009, 0x0d0d171a,
+ 0xbfbfda65, 0xe6e631d7, 0x4242c684, 0x6868b8d0,
+ 0x4141c382, 0x9999b029, 0x2d2d775a, 0x0f0f111e,
+ 0xb0b0cb7b, 0x5454fca8, 0xbbbbd66d, 0x16163a2c,
+};
+static const word32 D0[256] = {
+ 0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96,
+ 0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393,
+ 0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25,
+ 0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f,
+ 0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1,
+ 0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6,
+ 0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da,
+ 0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844,
+ 0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd,
+ 0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4,
+ 0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45,
+ 0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94,
+ 0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7,
+ 0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a,
+ 0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5,
+ 0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c,
+ 0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1,
+ 0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a,
+ 0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75,
+ 0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051,
+ 0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46,
+ 0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff,
+ 0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77,
+ 0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb,
+ 0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000,
+ 0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e,
+ 0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927,
+ 0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a,
+ 0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e,
+ 0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16,
+ 0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d,
+ 0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8,
+ 0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd,
+ 0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34,
+ 0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163,
+ 0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120,
+ 0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d,
+ 0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0,
+ 0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422,
+ 0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef,
+ 0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36,
+ 0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4,
+ 0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662,
+ 0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5,
+ 0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3,
+ 0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b,
+ 0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8,
+ 0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6,
+ 0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6,
+ 0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0,
+ 0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815,
+ 0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f,
+ 0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df,
+ 0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f,
+ 0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e,
+ 0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713,
+ 0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89,
+ 0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c,
+ 0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf,
+ 0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86,
+ 0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f,
+ 0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541,
+ 0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190,
+ 0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742,
+};
+static const word32 D1[256] = {
+ 0x5051f4a7, 0x537e4165, 0xc31a17a4, 0x963a275e,
+ 0xcb3bab6b, 0xf11f9d45, 0xabacfa58, 0x934be303,
+ 0x552030fa, 0xf6ad766d, 0x9188cc76, 0x25f5024c,
+ 0xfc4fe5d7, 0xd7c52acb, 0x80263544, 0x8fb562a3,
+ 0x49deb15a, 0x6725ba1b, 0x9845ea0e, 0xe15dfec0,
+ 0x02c32f75, 0x12814cf0, 0xa38d4697, 0xc66bd3f9,
+ 0xe7038f5f, 0x9515929c, 0xebbf6d7a, 0xda955259,
+ 0x2dd4be83, 0xd3587421, 0x2949e069, 0x448ec9c8,
+ 0x6a75c289, 0x78f48e79, 0x6b99583e, 0xdd27b971,
+ 0xb6bee14f, 0x17f088ad, 0x66c920ac, 0xb47dce3a,
+ 0x1863df4a, 0x82e51a31, 0x60975133, 0x4562537f,
+ 0xe0b16477, 0x84bb6bae, 0x1cfe81a0, 0x94f9082b,
+ 0x58704868, 0x198f45fd, 0x8794de6c, 0xb7527bf8,
+ 0x23ab73d3, 0xe2724b02, 0x57e31f8f, 0x2a6655ab,
+ 0x07b2eb28, 0x032fb5c2, 0x9a86c57b, 0xa5d33708,
+ 0xf2302887, 0xb223bfa5, 0xba02036a, 0x5ced1682,
+ 0x2b8acf1c, 0x92a779b4, 0xf0f307f2, 0xa14e69e2,
+ 0xcd65daf4, 0xd50605be, 0x1fd13462, 0x8ac4a6fe,
+ 0x9d342e53, 0xa0a2f355, 0x32058ae1, 0x75a4f6eb,
+ 0x390b83ec, 0xaa4060ef, 0x065e719f, 0x51bd6e10,
+ 0xf93e218a, 0x3d96dd06, 0xaedd3e05, 0x464de6bd,
+ 0xb591548d, 0x0571c45d, 0x6f0406d4, 0xff605015,
+ 0x241998fb, 0x97d6bde9, 0xcc894043, 0x7767d99e,
+ 0xbdb0e842, 0x8807898b, 0x38e7195b, 0xdb79c8ee,
+ 0x47a17c0a, 0xe97c420f, 0xc9f8841e, 0x00000000,
+ 0x83098086, 0x48322bed, 0xac1e1170, 0x4e6c5a72,
+ 0xfbfd0eff, 0x560f8538, 0x1e3daed5, 0x27362d39,
+ 0x640a0fd9, 0x21685ca6, 0xd19b5b54, 0x3a24362e,
+ 0xb10c0a67, 0x0f9357e7, 0xd2b4ee96, 0x9e1b9b91,
+ 0x4f80c0c5, 0xa261dc20, 0x695a774b, 0x161c121a,
+ 0x0ae293ba, 0xe5c0a02a, 0x433c22e0, 0x1d121b17,
+ 0x0b0e090d, 0xadf28bc7, 0xb92db6a8, 0xc8141ea9,
+ 0x8557f119, 0x4caf7507, 0xbbee99dd, 0xfda37f60,
+ 0x9ff70126, 0xbc5c72f5, 0xc544663b, 0x345bfb7e,
+ 0x768b4329, 0xdccb23c6, 0x68b6edfc, 0x63b8e4f1,
+ 0xcad731dc, 0x10426385, 0x40139722, 0x2084c611,
+ 0x7d854a24, 0xf8d2bb3d, 0x11aef932, 0x6dc729a1,
+ 0x4b1d9e2f, 0xf3dcb230, 0xec0d8652, 0xd077c1e3,
+ 0x6c2bb316, 0x99a970b9, 0xfa119448, 0x2247e964,
+ 0xc4a8fc8c, 0x1aa0f03f, 0xd8567d2c, 0xef223390,
+ 0xc787494e, 0xc1d938d1, 0xfe8ccaa2, 0x3698d40b,
+ 0xcfa6f581, 0x28a57ade, 0x26dab78e, 0xa43fadbf,
+ 0xe42c3a9d, 0x0d507892, 0x9b6a5fcc, 0x62547e46,
+ 0xc2f68d13, 0xe890d8b8, 0x5e2e39f7, 0xf582c3af,
+ 0xbe9f5d80, 0x7c69d093, 0xa96fd52d, 0xb3cf2512,
+ 0x3bc8ac99, 0xa710187d, 0x6ee89c63, 0x7bdb3bbb,
+ 0x09cd2678, 0xf46e5918, 0x01ec9ab7, 0xa8834f9a,
+ 0x65e6956e, 0x7eaaffe6, 0x0821bccf, 0xe6ef15e8,
+ 0xd9bae79b, 0xce4a6f36, 0xd4ea9f09, 0xd629b07c,
+ 0xaf31a4b2, 0x312a3f23, 0x30c6a594, 0xc035a266,
+ 0x37744ebc, 0xa6fc82ca, 0xb0e090d0, 0x1533a7d8,
+ 0x4af10498, 0xf741ecda, 0x0e7fcd50, 0x2f1791f6,
+ 0x8d764dd6, 0x4d43efb0, 0x54ccaa4d, 0xdfe49604,
+ 0xe39ed1b5, 0x1b4c6a88, 0xb8c12c1f, 0x7f466551,
+ 0x049d5eea, 0x5d018c35, 0x73fa8774, 0x2efb0b41,
+ 0x5ab3671d, 0x5292dbd2, 0x33e91056, 0x136dd647,
+ 0x8c9ad761, 0x7a37a10c, 0x8e59f814, 0x89eb133c,
+ 0xeecea927, 0x35b761c9, 0xede11ce5, 0x3c7a47b1,
+ 0x599cd2df, 0x3f55f273, 0x791814ce, 0xbf73c737,
+ 0xea53f7cd, 0x5b5ffdaa, 0x14df3d6f, 0x867844db,
+ 0x81caaff3, 0x3eb968c4, 0x2c382434, 0x5fc2a340,
+ 0x72161dc3, 0x0cbce225, 0x8b283c49, 0x41ff0d95,
+ 0x7139a801, 0xde080cb3, 0x9cd8b4e4, 0x906456c1,
+ 0x617bcb84, 0x70d532b6, 0x74486c5c, 0x42d0b857,
+};
+static const word32 D2[256] = {
+ 0xa75051f4, 0x65537e41, 0xa4c31a17, 0x5e963a27,
+ 0x6bcb3bab, 0x45f11f9d, 0x58abacfa, 0x03934be3,
+ 0xfa552030, 0x6df6ad76, 0x769188cc, 0x4c25f502,
+ 0xd7fc4fe5, 0xcbd7c52a, 0x44802635, 0xa38fb562,
+ 0x5a49deb1, 0x1b6725ba, 0x0e9845ea, 0xc0e15dfe,
+ 0x7502c32f, 0xf012814c, 0x97a38d46, 0xf9c66bd3,
+ 0x5fe7038f, 0x9c951592, 0x7aebbf6d, 0x59da9552,
+ 0x832dd4be, 0x21d35874, 0x692949e0, 0xc8448ec9,
+ 0x896a75c2, 0x7978f48e, 0x3e6b9958, 0x71dd27b9,
+ 0x4fb6bee1, 0xad17f088, 0xac66c920, 0x3ab47dce,
+ 0x4a1863df, 0x3182e51a, 0x33609751, 0x7f456253,
+ 0x77e0b164, 0xae84bb6b, 0xa01cfe81, 0x2b94f908,
+ 0x68587048, 0xfd198f45, 0x6c8794de, 0xf8b7527b,
+ 0xd323ab73, 0x02e2724b, 0x8f57e31f, 0xab2a6655,
+ 0x2807b2eb, 0xc2032fb5, 0x7b9a86c5, 0x08a5d337,
+ 0x87f23028, 0xa5b223bf, 0x6aba0203, 0x825ced16,
+ 0x1c2b8acf, 0xb492a779, 0xf2f0f307, 0xe2a14e69,
+ 0xf4cd65da, 0xbed50605, 0x621fd134, 0xfe8ac4a6,
+ 0x539d342e, 0x55a0a2f3, 0xe132058a, 0xeb75a4f6,
+ 0xec390b83, 0xefaa4060, 0x9f065e71, 0x1051bd6e,
+ 0x8af93e21, 0x063d96dd, 0x05aedd3e, 0xbd464de6,
+ 0x8db59154, 0x5d0571c4, 0xd46f0406, 0x15ff6050,
+ 0xfb241998, 0xe997d6bd, 0x43cc8940, 0x9e7767d9,
+ 0x42bdb0e8, 0x8b880789, 0x5b38e719, 0xeedb79c8,
+ 0x0a47a17c, 0x0fe97c42, 0x1ec9f884, 0x00000000,
+ 0x86830980, 0xed48322b, 0x70ac1e11, 0x724e6c5a,
+ 0xfffbfd0e, 0x38560f85, 0xd51e3dae, 0x3927362d,
+ 0xd9640a0f, 0xa621685c, 0x54d19b5b, 0x2e3a2436,
+ 0x67b10c0a, 0xe70f9357, 0x96d2b4ee, 0x919e1b9b,
+ 0xc54f80c0, 0x20a261dc, 0x4b695a77, 0x1a161c12,
+ 0xba0ae293, 0x2ae5c0a0, 0xe0433c22, 0x171d121b,
+ 0x0d0b0e09, 0xc7adf28b, 0xa8b92db6, 0xa9c8141e,
+ 0x198557f1, 0x074caf75, 0xddbbee99, 0x60fda37f,
+ 0x269ff701, 0xf5bc5c72, 0x3bc54466, 0x7e345bfb,
+ 0x29768b43, 0xc6dccb23, 0xfc68b6ed, 0xf163b8e4,
+ 0xdccad731, 0x85104263, 0x22401397, 0x112084c6,
+ 0x247d854a, 0x3df8d2bb, 0x3211aef9, 0xa16dc729,
+ 0x2f4b1d9e, 0x30f3dcb2, 0x52ec0d86, 0xe3d077c1,
+ 0x166c2bb3, 0xb999a970, 0x48fa1194, 0x642247e9,
+ 0x8cc4a8fc, 0x3f1aa0f0, 0x2cd8567d, 0x90ef2233,
+ 0x4ec78749, 0xd1c1d938, 0xa2fe8cca, 0x0b3698d4,
+ 0x81cfa6f5, 0xde28a57a, 0x8e26dab7, 0xbfa43fad,
+ 0x9de42c3a, 0x920d5078, 0xcc9b6a5f, 0x4662547e,
+ 0x13c2f68d, 0xb8e890d8, 0xf75e2e39, 0xaff582c3,
+ 0x80be9f5d, 0x937c69d0, 0x2da96fd5, 0x12b3cf25,
+ 0x993bc8ac, 0x7da71018, 0x636ee89c, 0xbb7bdb3b,
+ 0x7809cd26, 0x18f46e59, 0xb701ec9a, 0x9aa8834f,
+ 0x6e65e695, 0xe67eaaff, 0xcf0821bc, 0xe8e6ef15,
+ 0x9bd9bae7, 0x36ce4a6f, 0x09d4ea9f, 0x7cd629b0,
+ 0xb2af31a4, 0x23312a3f, 0x9430c6a5, 0x66c035a2,
+ 0xbc37744e, 0xcaa6fc82, 0xd0b0e090, 0xd81533a7,
+ 0x984af104, 0xdaf741ec, 0x500e7fcd, 0xf62f1791,
+ 0xd68d764d, 0xb04d43ef, 0x4d54ccaa, 0x04dfe496,
+ 0xb5e39ed1, 0x881b4c6a, 0x1fb8c12c, 0x517f4665,
+ 0xea049d5e, 0x355d018c, 0x7473fa87, 0x412efb0b,
+ 0x1d5ab367, 0xd25292db, 0x5633e910, 0x47136dd6,
+ 0x618c9ad7, 0x0c7a37a1, 0x148e59f8, 0x3c89eb13,
+ 0x27eecea9, 0xc935b761, 0xe5ede11c, 0xb13c7a47,
+ 0xdf599cd2, 0x733f55f2, 0xce791814, 0x37bf73c7,
+ 0xcdea53f7, 0xaa5b5ffd, 0x6f14df3d, 0xdb867844,
+ 0xf381caaf, 0xc43eb968, 0x342c3824, 0x405fc2a3,
+ 0xc372161d, 0x250cbce2, 0x498b283c, 0x9541ff0d,
+ 0x017139a8, 0xb3de080c, 0xe49cd8b4, 0xc1906456,
+ 0x84617bcb, 0xb670d532, 0x5c74486c, 0x5742d0b8,
+};
+static const word32 D3[256] = {
+ 0xf4a75051, 0x4165537e, 0x17a4c31a, 0x275e963a,
+ 0xab6bcb3b, 0x9d45f11f, 0xfa58abac, 0xe303934b,
+ 0x30fa5520, 0x766df6ad, 0xcc769188, 0x024c25f5,
+ 0xe5d7fc4f, 0x2acbd7c5, 0x35448026, 0x62a38fb5,
+ 0xb15a49de, 0xba1b6725, 0xea0e9845, 0xfec0e15d,
+ 0x2f7502c3, 0x4cf01281, 0x4697a38d, 0xd3f9c66b,
+ 0x8f5fe703, 0x929c9515, 0x6d7aebbf, 0x5259da95,
+ 0xbe832dd4, 0x7421d358, 0xe0692949, 0xc9c8448e,
+ 0xc2896a75, 0x8e7978f4, 0x583e6b99, 0xb971dd27,
+ 0xe14fb6be, 0x88ad17f0, 0x20ac66c9, 0xce3ab47d,
+ 0xdf4a1863, 0x1a3182e5, 0x51336097, 0x537f4562,
+ 0x6477e0b1, 0x6bae84bb, 0x81a01cfe, 0x082b94f9,
+ 0x48685870, 0x45fd198f, 0xde6c8794, 0x7bf8b752,
+ 0x73d323ab, 0x4b02e272, 0x1f8f57e3, 0x55ab2a66,
+ 0xeb2807b2, 0xb5c2032f, 0xc57b9a86, 0x3708a5d3,
+ 0x2887f230, 0xbfa5b223, 0x036aba02, 0x16825ced,
+ 0xcf1c2b8a, 0x79b492a7, 0x07f2f0f3, 0x69e2a14e,
+ 0xdaf4cd65, 0x05bed506, 0x34621fd1, 0xa6fe8ac4,
+ 0x2e539d34, 0xf355a0a2, 0x8ae13205, 0xf6eb75a4,
+ 0x83ec390b, 0x60efaa40, 0x719f065e, 0x6e1051bd,
+ 0x218af93e, 0xdd063d96, 0x3e05aedd, 0xe6bd464d,
+ 0x548db591, 0xc45d0571, 0x06d46f04, 0x5015ff60,
+ 0x98fb2419, 0xbde997d6, 0x4043cc89, 0xd99e7767,
+ 0xe842bdb0, 0x898b8807, 0x195b38e7, 0xc8eedb79,
+ 0x7c0a47a1, 0x420fe97c, 0x841ec9f8, 0x00000000,
+ 0x80868309, 0x2bed4832, 0x1170ac1e, 0x5a724e6c,
+ 0x0efffbfd, 0x8538560f, 0xaed51e3d, 0x2d392736,
+ 0x0fd9640a, 0x5ca62168, 0x5b54d19b, 0x362e3a24,
+ 0x0a67b10c, 0x57e70f93, 0xee96d2b4, 0x9b919e1b,
+ 0xc0c54f80, 0xdc20a261, 0x774b695a, 0x121a161c,
+ 0x93ba0ae2, 0xa02ae5c0, 0x22e0433c, 0x1b171d12,
+ 0x090d0b0e, 0x8bc7adf2, 0xb6a8b92d, 0x1ea9c814,
+ 0xf1198557, 0x75074caf, 0x99ddbbee, 0x7f60fda3,
+ 0x01269ff7, 0x72f5bc5c, 0x663bc544, 0xfb7e345b,
+ 0x4329768b, 0x23c6dccb, 0xedfc68b6, 0xe4f163b8,
+ 0x31dccad7, 0x63851042, 0x97224013, 0xc6112084,
+ 0x4a247d85, 0xbb3df8d2, 0xf93211ae, 0x29a16dc7,
+ 0x9e2f4b1d, 0xb230f3dc, 0x8652ec0d, 0xc1e3d077,
+ 0xb3166c2b, 0x70b999a9, 0x9448fa11, 0xe9642247,
+ 0xfc8cc4a8, 0xf03f1aa0, 0x7d2cd856, 0x3390ef22,
+ 0x494ec787, 0x38d1c1d9, 0xcaa2fe8c, 0xd40b3698,
+ 0xf581cfa6, 0x7ade28a5, 0xb78e26da, 0xadbfa43f,
+ 0x3a9de42c, 0x78920d50, 0x5fcc9b6a, 0x7e466254,
+ 0x8d13c2f6, 0xd8b8e890, 0x39f75e2e, 0xc3aff582,
+ 0x5d80be9f, 0xd0937c69, 0xd52da96f, 0x2512b3cf,
+ 0xac993bc8, 0x187da710, 0x9c636ee8, 0x3bbb7bdb,
+ 0x267809cd, 0x5918f46e, 0x9ab701ec, 0x4f9aa883,
+ 0x956e65e6, 0xffe67eaa, 0xbccf0821, 0x15e8e6ef,
+ 0xe79bd9ba, 0x6f36ce4a, 0x9f09d4ea, 0xb07cd629,
+ 0xa4b2af31, 0x3f23312a, 0xa59430c6, 0xa266c035,
+ 0x4ebc3774, 0x82caa6fc, 0x90d0b0e0, 0xa7d81533,
+ 0x04984af1, 0xecdaf741, 0xcd500e7f, 0x91f62f17,
+ 0x4dd68d76, 0xefb04d43, 0xaa4d54cc, 0x9604dfe4,
+ 0xd1b5e39e, 0x6a881b4c, 0x2c1fb8c1, 0x65517f46,
+ 0x5eea049d, 0x8c355d01, 0x877473fa, 0x0b412efb,
+ 0x671d5ab3, 0xdbd25292, 0x105633e9, 0xd647136d,
+ 0xd7618c9a, 0xa10c7a37, 0xf8148e59, 0x133c89eb,
+ 0xa927eece, 0x61c935b7, 0x1ce5ede1, 0x47b13c7a,
+ 0xd2df599c, 0xf2733f55, 0x14ce7918, 0xc737bf73,
+ 0xf7cdea53, 0xfdaa5b5f, 0x3d6f14df, 0x44db8678,
+ 0xaff381ca, 0x68c43eb9, 0x24342c38, 0xa3405fc2,
+ 0x1dc37216, 0xe2250cbc, 0x3c498b28, 0x0d9541ff,
+ 0xa8017139, 0x0cb3de08, 0xb4e49cd8, 0x56c19064,
+ 0xcb84617b, 0x32b670d5, 0x6c5c7448, 0xb85742d0,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Common macros in both the encryption and decryption routines.
+ */
+#define ADD_ROUND_KEY_4 (block[0]^=*keysched++, block[1]^=*keysched++, \
+ block[2]^=*keysched++, block[3]^=*keysched++)
+#define ADD_ROUND_KEY_6 (block[0]^=*keysched++, block[1]^=*keysched++, \
+ block[2]^=*keysched++, block[3]^=*keysched++, \
+ block[4]^=*keysched++, block[5]^=*keysched++)
+#define ADD_ROUND_KEY_8 (block[0]^=*keysched++, block[1]^=*keysched++, \
+ block[2]^=*keysched++, block[3]^=*keysched++, \
+ block[4]^=*keysched++, block[5]^=*keysched++, \
+ block[6]^=*keysched++, block[7]^=*keysched++)
+#define MOVEWORD(i) ( block[i] = newstate[i] )
+
+/*
+ * Macros for the encryption routine. There are three encryption
+ * cores, for Nb=4,6,8.
+ */
+#define MAKEWORD(i) ( newstate[i] = (E0[(block[i] >> 24) & 0xFF] ^ \
+ E1[(block[(i+C1)%Nb] >> 16) & 0xFF] ^ \
+ E2[(block[(i+C2)%Nb] >> 8) & 0xFF] ^ \
+ E3[block[(i+C3)%Nb] & 0xFF]) )
+#define LASTWORD(i) ( newstate[i] = (Sbox[(block[i] >> 24) & 0xFF] << 24) | \
+ (Sbox[(block[(i+C1)%Nb] >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16) | \
+ (Sbox[(block[(i+C2)%Nb] >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8) | \
+ (Sbox[(block[(i+C3)%Nb] ) & 0xFF] ) )
+
+/*
+ * Core encrypt routines, expecting word32 inputs read big-endian
+ * from the byte-oriented input stream.
+ */
+static void aes_encrypt_nb_4(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ int i;
+ static const int C1 = 1, C2 = 2, C3 = 3, Nb = 4;
+ word32 *keysched = ctx->keysched;
+ word32 newstate[4];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->Nr - 1; i++) {
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_4;
+ MAKEWORD(0);
+ MAKEWORD(1);
+ MAKEWORD(2);
+ MAKEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ }
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_4;
+ LASTWORD(0);
+ LASTWORD(1);
+ LASTWORD(2);
+ LASTWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_4;
+}
+static void aes_encrypt_nb_6(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ int i;
+ static const int C1 = 1, C2 = 2, C3 = 3, Nb = 6;
+ word32 *keysched = ctx->keysched;
+ word32 newstate[6];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->Nr - 1; i++) {
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_6;
+ MAKEWORD(0);
+ MAKEWORD(1);
+ MAKEWORD(2);
+ MAKEWORD(3);
+ MAKEWORD(4);
+ MAKEWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ }
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_6;
+ LASTWORD(0);
+ LASTWORD(1);
+ LASTWORD(2);
+ LASTWORD(3);
+ LASTWORD(4);
+ LASTWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_6;
+}
+static void aes_encrypt_nb_8(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ int i;
+ static const int C1 = 1, C2 = 3, C3 = 4, Nb = 8;
+ word32 *keysched = ctx->keysched;
+ word32 newstate[8];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->Nr - 1; i++) {
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_8;
+ MAKEWORD(0);
+ MAKEWORD(1);
+ MAKEWORD(2);
+ MAKEWORD(3);
+ MAKEWORD(4);
+ MAKEWORD(5);
+ MAKEWORD(6);
+ MAKEWORD(7);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(6);
+ MOVEWORD(7);
+ }
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_8;
+ LASTWORD(0);
+ LASTWORD(1);
+ LASTWORD(2);
+ LASTWORD(3);
+ LASTWORD(4);
+ LASTWORD(5);
+ LASTWORD(6);
+ LASTWORD(7);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(6);
+ MOVEWORD(7);
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_8;
+}
+
+#undef MAKEWORD
+#undef LASTWORD
+
+/*
+ * Macros for the decryption routine. There are three decryption
+ * cores, for Nb=4,6,8.
+ */
+#define MAKEWORD(i) ( newstate[i] = (D0[(block[i] >> 24) & 0xFF] ^ \
+ D1[(block[(i+C1)%Nb] >> 16) & 0xFF] ^ \
+ D2[(block[(i+C2)%Nb] >> 8) & 0xFF] ^ \
+ D3[block[(i+C3)%Nb] & 0xFF]) )
+#define LASTWORD(i) (newstate[i] = (Sboxinv[(block[i] >> 24) & 0xFF] << 24) | \
+ (Sboxinv[(block[(i+C1)%Nb] >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16) | \
+ (Sboxinv[(block[(i+C2)%Nb] >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8) | \
+ (Sboxinv[(block[(i+C3)%Nb] ) & 0xFF] ) )
+
+/*
+ * Core decrypt routines, expecting word32 inputs read big-endian
+ * from the byte-oriented input stream.
+ */
+static void aes_decrypt_nb_4(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ int i;
+ static const int C1 = 4 - 1, C2 = 4 - 2, C3 = 4 - 3, Nb = 4;
+ word32 *keysched = ctx->invkeysched;
+ word32 newstate[4];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->Nr - 1; i++) {
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_4;
+ MAKEWORD(0);
+ MAKEWORD(1);
+ MAKEWORD(2);
+ MAKEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ }
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_4;
+ LASTWORD(0);
+ LASTWORD(1);
+ LASTWORD(2);
+ LASTWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_4;
+}
+static void aes_decrypt_nb_6(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ int i;
+ static const int C1 = 6 - 1, C2 = 6 - 2, C3 = 6 - 3, Nb = 6;
+ word32 *keysched = ctx->invkeysched;
+ word32 newstate[6];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->Nr - 1; i++) {
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_6;
+ MAKEWORD(0);
+ MAKEWORD(1);
+ MAKEWORD(2);
+ MAKEWORD(3);
+ MAKEWORD(4);
+ MAKEWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ }
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_6;
+ LASTWORD(0);
+ LASTWORD(1);
+ LASTWORD(2);
+ LASTWORD(3);
+ LASTWORD(4);
+ LASTWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_6;
+}
+static void aes_decrypt_nb_8(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ int i;
+ static const int C1 = 8 - 1, C2 = 8 - 3, C3 = 8 - 4, Nb = 8;
+ word32 *keysched = ctx->invkeysched;
+ word32 newstate[8];
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->Nr - 1; i++) {
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_8;
+ MAKEWORD(0);
+ MAKEWORD(1);
+ MAKEWORD(2);
+ MAKEWORD(3);
+ MAKEWORD(4);
+ MAKEWORD(5);
+ MAKEWORD(6);
+ MAKEWORD(7);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(6);
+ MOVEWORD(7);
+ }
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_8;
+ LASTWORD(0);
+ LASTWORD(1);
+ LASTWORD(2);
+ LASTWORD(3);
+ LASTWORD(4);
+ LASTWORD(5);
+ LASTWORD(6);
+ LASTWORD(7);
+ MOVEWORD(0);
+ MOVEWORD(1);
+ MOVEWORD(2);
+ MOVEWORD(3);
+ MOVEWORD(4);
+ MOVEWORD(5);
+ MOVEWORD(6);
+ MOVEWORD(7);
+ ADD_ROUND_KEY_8;
+}
+
+#undef MAKEWORD
+#undef LASTWORD
+
+
+/*
+ * Set up an AESContext. `keylen' and `blocklen' are measured in
+ * bytes; each can be either 16 (128-bit), 24 (192-bit), or 32
+ * (256-bit).
+ */
+static void aes_setup(AESContext * ctx, int blocklen,
+ unsigned char *key, int keylen)
+{
+ int i, j, Nk, rconst;
+
+ assert(blocklen == 16 || blocklen == 24 || blocklen == 32);
+ assert(keylen == 16 || keylen == 24 || keylen == 32);
+
+ /*
+ * Basic parameters. Words per block, words in key, rounds.
+ */
+ Nk = keylen / 4;
+ ctx->Nb = blocklen / 4;
+ ctx->Nr = 6 + (ctx->Nb > Nk ? ctx->Nb : Nk);
+
+ /*
+ * Assign core-function pointers.
+ */
+ if (ctx->Nb == 8)
+ ctx->encrypt = aes_encrypt_nb_8, ctx->decrypt = aes_decrypt_nb_8;
+ else if (ctx->Nb == 6)
+ ctx->encrypt = aes_encrypt_nb_6, ctx->decrypt = aes_decrypt_nb_6;
+ else if (ctx->Nb == 4)
+ ctx->encrypt = aes_encrypt_nb_4, ctx->decrypt = aes_decrypt_nb_4;
+
+ /*
+ * Now do the key setup itself.
+ */
+ rconst = 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < (ctx->Nr + 1) * ctx->Nb; i++) {
+ if (i < Nk)
+ ctx->keysched[i] = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4 * i);
+ else {
+ word32 temp = ctx->keysched[i - 1];
+ if (i % Nk == 0) {
+ int a, b, c, d;
+ a = (temp >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ b = (temp >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c = (temp >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ d = (temp >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ temp = Sbox[a] ^ rconst;
+ temp = (temp << 8) | Sbox[b];
+ temp = (temp << 8) | Sbox[c];
+ temp = (temp << 8) | Sbox[d];
+ rconst = mulby2(rconst);
+ } else if (i % Nk == 4 && Nk > 6) {
+ int a, b, c, d;
+ a = (temp >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ b = (temp >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c = (temp >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ d = (temp >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ temp = Sbox[a];
+ temp = (temp << 8) | Sbox[b];
+ temp = (temp << 8) | Sbox[c];
+ temp = (temp << 8) | Sbox[d];
+ }
+ ctx->keysched[i] = ctx->keysched[i - Nk] ^ temp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now prepare the modified keys for the inverse cipher.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i <= ctx->Nr; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < ctx->Nb; j++) {
+ word32 temp;
+ temp = ctx->keysched[(ctx->Nr - i) * ctx->Nb + j];
+ if (i != 0 && i != ctx->Nr) {
+ /*
+ * Perform the InvMixColumn operation on i. The D
+ * tables give the result of InvMixColumn applied
+ * to Sboxinv on individual bytes, so we should
+ * compose Sbox with the D tables for this.
+ */
+ int a, b, c, d;
+ a = (temp >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ b = (temp >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c = (temp >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ d = (temp >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ temp = D0[Sbox[a]];
+ temp ^= D1[Sbox[b]];
+ temp ^= D2[Sbox[c]];
+ temp ^= D3[Sbox[d]];
+ }
+ ctx->invkeysched[i * ctx->Nb + j] = temp;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void aes_encrypt(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ ctx->encrypt(ctx, block);
+}
+
+static void aes_decrypt(AESContext * ctx, word32 * block)
+{
+ ctx->decrypt(ctx, block);
+}
+
+static void aes_encrypt_cbc(unsigned char *blk, int len, AESContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 iv[4];
+ int i;
+
+ assert((len & 15) == 0);
+
+ memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, sizeof(iv));
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ iv[i] ^= GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4 * i);
+ aes_encrypt(ctx, iv);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4 * i, iv[i]);
+ blk += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, sizeof(iv));
+}
+
+static void aes_decrypt_cbc(unsigned char *blk, int len, AESContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 iv[4], x[4], ct[4];
+ int i;
+
+ assert((len & 15) == 0);
+
+ memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, sizeof(iv));
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ x[i] = ct[i] = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4 * i);
+ aes_decrypt(ctx, x);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4 * i, iv[i] ^ x[i]);
+ iv[i] = ct[i];
+ }
+ blk += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, sizeof(iv));
+}
+
+static void aes_sdctr(unsigned char *blk, int len, AESContext *ctx)
+{
+ word32 iv[4], b[4], tmp;
+ int i;
+
+ assert((len & 15) == 0);
+
+ memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, sizeof(iv));
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ memcpy(b, iv, sizeof(b));
+ aes_encrypt(ctx, b);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ tmp = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4 * i);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4 * i, tmp ^ b[i]);
+ }
+ for (i = 3; i >= 0; i--)
+ if ((iv[i] = (iv[i] + 1) & 0xffffffff) != 0)
+ break;
+ blk += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, sizeof(iv));
+}
+
+static void *aes_make_context(void)
+{
+ return snew(AESContext);
+}
+
+static void aes_free_context(void *handle)
+{
+ sfree(handle);
+}
+
+static void aes128_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ AESContext *ctx = (AESContext *)handle;
+ aes_setup(ctx, 16, key, 16);
+}
+
+static void aes192_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ AESContext *ctx = (AESContext *)handle;
+ aes_setup(ctx, 16, key, 24);
+}
+
+static void aes256_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ AESContext *ctx = (AESContext *)handle;
+ aes_setup(ctx, 16, key, 32);
+}
+
+static void aes_iv(void *handle, unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ AESContext *ctx = (AESContext *)handle;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ ctx->iv[i] = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(iv + 4 * i);
+}
+
+static void aes_ssh2_encrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ AESContext *ctx = (AESContext *)handle;
+ aes_encrypt_cbc(blk, len, ctx);
+}
+
+static void aes_ssh2_decrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ AESContext *ctx = (AESContext *)handle;
+ aes_decrypt_cbc(blk, len, ctx);
+}
+
+static void aes_ssh2_sdctr(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ AESContext *ctx = (AESContext *)handle;
+ aes_sdctr(blk, len, ctx);
+}
+
+void aes256_encrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ AESContext ctx;
+ aes_setup(&ctx, 16, key, 32);
+ memset(ctx.iv, 0, sizeof(ctx.iv));
+ aes_encrypt_cbc(blk, len, &ctx);
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+}
+
+void aes256_decrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ AESContext ctx;
+ aes_setup(&ctx, 16, key, 32);
+ memset(ctx.iv, 0, sizeof(ctx.iv));
+ aes_decrypt_cbc(blk, len, &ctx);
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+}
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_aes128_ctr = {
+ aes_make_context, aes_free_context, aes_iv, aes128_key,
+ aes_ssh2_sdctr, aes_ssh2_sdctr,
+ "aes128-ctr",
+ 16, 128, 0, "AES-128 SDCTR"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_aes192_ctr = {
+ aes_make_context, aes_free_context, aes_iv, aes192_key,
+ aes_ssh2_sdctr, aes_ssh2_sdctr,
+ "aes192-ctr",
+ 16, 192, 0, "AES-192 SDCTR"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_aes256_ctr = {
+ aes_make_context, aes_free_context, aes_iv, aes256_key,
+ aes_ssh2_sdctr, aes_ssh2_sdctr,
+ "aes256-ctr",
+ 16, 256, 0, "AES-256 SDCTR"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_aes128 = {
+ aes_make_context, aes_free_context, aes_iv, aes128_key,
+ aes_ssh2_encrypt_blk, aes_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "aes128-cbc",
+ 16, 128, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "AES-128 CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_aes192 = {
+ aes_make_context, aes_free_context, aes_iv, aes192_key,
+ aes_ssh2_encrypt_blk, aes_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "aes192-cbc",
+ 16, 192, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "AES-192 CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_aes256 = {
+ aes_make_context, aes_free_context, aes_iv, aes256_key,
+ aes_ssh2_encrypt_blk, aes_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "aes256-cbc",
+ 16, 256, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "AES-256 CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_rijndael_lysator = {
+ aes_make_context, aes_free_context, aes_iv, aes256_key,
+ aes_ssh2_encrypt_blk, aes_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
+ 16, 256, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "AES-256 CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher *const aes_list[] = {
+ &ssh_aes256_ctr,
+ &ssh_aes256,
+ &ssh_rijndael_lysator,
+ &ssh_aes192_ctr,
+ &ssh_aes192,
+ &ssh_aes128_ctr,
+ &ssh_aes128,
+};
+
+const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_aes = {
+ sizeof(aes_list) / sizeof(*aes_list),
+ aes_list
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/ssharcf.c b/tools/plink/ssharcf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e0b247e51 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/ssharcf.c @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/*
+ * Arcfour (RC4) implementation for PuTTY.
+ *
+ * Coded from Schneier.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char i, j, s[256];
+} ArcfourContext;
+
+static void arcfour_block(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ ArcfourContext *ctx = (ArcfourContext *)handle;
+ unsigned k;
+ unsigned char tmp, i, j, *s;
+
+ s = ctx->s;
+ i = ctx->i; j = ctx->j;
+ for (k = 0; (int)k < len; k++) {
+ i = (i + 1) & 0xff;
+ j = (j + s[i]) & 0xff;
+ tmp = s[i]; s[i] = s[j]; s[j] = tmp;
+ blk[k] ^= s[(s[i]+s[j]) & 0xff];
+ }
+ ctx->i = i; ctx->j = j;
+}
+
+static void arcfour_setkey(ArcfourContext *ctx, unsigned char const *key,
+ unsigned keybytes)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp, k[256], *s;
+ unsigned i, j;
+
+ s = ctx->s;
+ assert(keybytes <= 256);
+ ctx->i = ctx->j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ s[i] = i;
+ k[i] = key[i % keybytes];
+ }
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ j = (j + s[i] + k[i]) & 0xff;
+ tmp = s[i]; s[i] = s[j]; s[j] = tmp;
+ }
+}
+
+/* -- Interface with PuTTY -- */
+
+/*
+ * We don't implement Arcfour in SSH-1 because it's utterly insecure in
+ * several ways. See CERT Vulnerability Notes VU#25309, VU#665372,
+ * and VU#565052.
+ *
+ * We don't implement the "arcfour" algorithm in SSH-2 because it doesn't
+ * stir the cipher state before emitting keystream, and hence is likely
+ * to leak data about the key.
+ */
+
+static void *arcfour_make_context(void)
+{
+ return snew(ArcfourContext);
+}
+
+static void arcfour_free_context(void *handle)
+{
+ sfree(handle);
+}
+
+static void arcfour_stir(ArcfourContext *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned char *junk = snewn(1536, unsigned char);
+ memset(junk, 0, 1536);
+ arcfour_block(ctx, junk, 1536);
+ memset(junk, 0, 1536);
+ sfree(junk);
+}
+
+static void arcfour128_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ ArcfourContext *ctx = (ArcfourContext *)handle;
+ arcfour_setkey(ctx, key, 16);
+ arcfour_stir(ctx);
+}
+
+static void arcfour256_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ ArcfourContext *ctx = (ArcfourContext *)handle;
+ arcfour_setkey(ctx, key, 32);
+ arcfour_stir(ctx);
+}
+
+static void arcfour_iv(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+
+}
+
+const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_arcfour128_ssh2 = {
+ arcfour_make_context, arcfour_free_context, arcfour_iv, arcfour128_key,
+ arcfour_block, arcfour_block,
+ "arcfour128",
+ 1, 128, 0, "Arcfour-128"
+};
+
+const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_arcfour256_ssh2 = {
+ arcfour_make_context, arcfour_free_context, arcfour_iv, arcfour256_key,
+ arcfour_block, arcfour_block,
+ "arcfour256",
+ 1, 256, 0, "Arcfour-256"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher *const arcfour_list[] = {
+ &ssh_arcfour256_ssh2,
+ &ssh_arcfour128_ssh2,
+};
+
+const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_arcfour = {
+ sizeof(arcfour_list) / sizeof(*arcfour_list),
+ arcfour_list
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshblowf.c b/tools/plink/sshblowf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f770170c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshblowf.c @@ -0,0 +1,588 @@ +/*
+ * Blowfish implementation for PuTTY.
+ *
+ * Coded from scratch from the algorithm description.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+ word32 S0[256], S1[256], S2[256], S3[256], P[18];
+ word32 iv0, iv1; /* for CBC mode */
+} BlowfishContext;
+
+/*
+ * The Blowfish init data: hex digits of the fractional part of pi.
+ * (ie pi as a hex fraction is 3.243F6A8885A308D3...)
+ */
+static const word32 parray[] = {
+ 0x243F6A88, 0x85A308D3, 0x13198A2E, 0x03707344, 0xA4093822, 0x299F31D0,
+ 0x082EFA98, 0xEC4E6C89, 0x452821E6, 0x38D01377, 0xBE5466CF, 0x34E90C6C,
+ 0xC0AC29B7, 0xC97C50DD, 0x3F84D5B5, 0xB5470917, 0x9216D5D9, 0x8979FB1B,
+};
+
+static const word32 sbox0[] = {
+ 0xD1310BA6, 0x98DFB5AC, 0x2FFD72DB, 0xD01ADFB7, 0xB8E1AFED, 0x6A267E96,
+ 0xBA7C9045, 0xF12C7F99, 0x24A19947, 0xB3916CF7, 0x0801F2E2, 0x858EFC16,
+ 0x636920D8, 0x71574E69, 0xA458FEA3, 0xF4933D7E, 0x0D95748F, 0x728EB658,
+ 0x718BCD58, 0x82154AEE, 0x7B54A41D, 0xC25A59B5, 0x9C30D539, 0x2AF26013,
+ 0xC5D1B023, 0x286085F0, 0xCA417918, 0xB8DB38EF, 0x8E79DCB0, 0x603A180E,
+ 0x6C9E0E8B, 0xB01E8A3E, 0xD71577C1, 0xBD314B27, 0x78AF2FDA, 0x55605C60,
+ 0xE65525F3, 0xAA55AB94, 0x57489862, 0x63E81440, 0x55CA396A, 0x2AAB10B6,
+ 0xB4CC5C34, 0x1141E8CE, 0xA15486AF, 0x7C72E993, 0xB3EE1411, 0x636FBC2A,
+ 0x2BA9C55D, 0x741831F6, 0xCE5C3E16, 0x9B87931E, 0xAFD6BA33, 0x6C24CF5C,
+ 0x7A325381, 0x28958677, 0x3B8F4898, 0x6B4BB9AF, 0xC4BFE81B, 0x66282193,
+ 0x61D809CC, 0xFB21A991, 0x487CAC60, 0x5DEC8032, 0xEF845D5D, 0xE98575B1,
+ 0xDC262302, 0xEB651B88, 0x23893E81, 0xD396ACC5, 0x0F6D6FF3, 0x83F44239,
+ 0x2E0B4482, 0xA4842004, 0x69C8F04A, 0x9E1F9B5E, 0x21C66842, 0xF6E96C9A,
+ 0x670C9C61, 0xABD388F0, 0x6A51A0D2, 0xD8542F68, 0x960FA728, 0xAB5133A3,
+ 0x6EEF0B6C, 0x137A3BE4, 0xBA3BF050, 0x7EFB2A98, 0xA1F1651D, 0x39AF0176,
+ 0x66CA593E, 0x82430E88, 0x8CEE8619, 0x456F9FB4, 0x7D84A5C3, 0x3B8B5EBE,
+ 0xE06F75D8, 0x85C12073, 0x401A449F, 0x56C16AA6, 0x4ED3AA62, 0x363F7706,
+ 0x1BFEDF72, 0x429B023D, 0x37D0D724, 0xD00A1248, 0xDB0FEAD3, 0x49F1C09B,
+ 0x075372C9, 0x80991B7B, 0x25D479D8, 0xF6E8DEF7, 0xE3FE501A, 0xB6794C3B,
+ 0x976CE0BD, 0x04C006BA, 0xC1A94FB6, 0x409F60C4, 0x5E5C9EC2, 0x196A2463,
+ 0x68FB6FAF, 0x3E6C53B5, 0x1339B2EB, 0x3B52EC6F, 0x6DFC511F, 0x9B30952C,
+ 0xCC814544, 0xAF5EBD09, 0xBEE3D004, 0xDE334AFD, 0x660F2807, 0x192E4BB3,
+ 0xC0CBA857, 0x45C8740F, 0xD20B5F39, 0xB9D3FBDB, 0x5579C0BD, 0x1A60320A,
+ 0xD6A100C6, 0x402C7279, 0x679F25FE, 0xFB1FA3CC, 0x8EA5E9F8, 0xDB3222F8,
+ 0x3C7516DF, 0xFD616B15, 0x2F501EC8, 0xAD0552AB, 0x323DB5FA, 0xFD238760,
+ 0x53317B48, 0x3E00DF82, 0x9E5C57BB, 0xCA6F8CA0, 0x1A87562E, 0xDF1769DB,
+ 0xD542A8F6, 0x287EFFC3, 0xAC6732C6, 0x8C4F5573, 0x695B27B0, 0xBBCA58C8,
+ 0xE1FFA35D, 0xB8F011A0, 0x10FA3D98, 0xFD2183B8, 0x4AFCB56C, 0x2DD1D35B,
+ 0x9A53E479, 0xB6F84565, 0xD28E49BC, 0x4BFB9790, 0xE1DDF2DA, 0xA4CB7E33,
+ 0x62FB1341, 0xCEE4C6E8, 0xEF20CADA, 0x36774C01, 0xD07E9EFE, 0x2BF11FB4,
+ 0x95DBDA4D, 0xAE909198, 0xEAAD8E71, 0x6B93D5A0, 0xD08ED1D0, 0xAFC725E0,
+ 0x8E3C5B2F, 0x8E7594B7, 0x8FF6E2FB, 0xF2122B64, 0x8888B812, 0x900DF01C,
+ 0x4FAD5EA0, 0x688FC31C, 0xD1CFF191, 0xB3A8C1AD, 0x2F2F2218, 0xBE0E1777,
+ 0xEA752DFE, 0x8B021FA1, 0xE5A0CC0F, 0xB56F74E8, 0x18ACF3D6, 0xCE89E299,
+ 0xB4A84FE0, 0xFD13E0B7, 0x7CC43B81, 0xD2ADA8D9, 0x165FA266, 0x80957705,
+ 0x93CC7314, 0x211A1477, 0xE6AD2065, 0x77B5FA86, 0xC75442F5, 0xFB9D35CF,
+ 0xEBCDAF0C, 0x7B3E89A0, 0xD6411BD3, 0xAE1E7E49, 0x00250E2D, 0x2071B35E,
+ 0x226800BB, 0x57B8E0AF, 0x2464369B, 0xF009B91E, 0x5563911D, 0x59DFA6AA,
+ 0x78C14389, 0xD95A537F, 0x207D5BA2, 0x02E5B9C5, 0x83260376, 0x6295CFA9,
+ 0x11C81968, 0x4E734A41, 0xB3472DCA, 0x7B14A94A, 0x1B510052, 0x9A532915,
+ 0xD60F573F, 0xBC9BC6E4, 0x2B60A476, 0x81E67400, 0x08BA6FB5, 0x571BE91F,
+ 0xF296EC6B, 0x2A0DD915, 0xB6636521, 0xE7B9F9B6, 0xFF34052E, 0xC5855664,
+ 0x53B02D5D, 0xA99F8FA1, 0x08BA4799, 0x6E85076A,
+};
+
+static const word32 sbox1[] = {
+ 0x4B7A70E9, 0xB5B32944, 0xDB75092E, 0xC4192623, 0xAD6EA6B0, 0x49A7DF7D,
+ 0x9CEE60B8, 0x8FEDB266, 0xECAA8C71, 0x699A17FF, 0x5664526C, 0xC2B19EE1,
+ 0x193602A5, 0x75094C29, 0xA0591340, 0xE4183A3E, 0x3F54989A, 0x5B429D65,
+ 0x6B8FE4D6, 0x99F73FD6, 0xA1D29C07, 0xEFE830F5, 0x4D2D38E6, 0xF0255DC1,
+ 0x4CDD2086, 0x8470EB26, 0x6382E9C6, 0x021ECC5E, 0x09686B3F, 0x3EBAEFC9,
+ 0x3C971814, 0x6B6A70A1, 0x687F3584, 0x52A0E286, 0xB79C5305, 0xAA500737,
+ 0x3E07841C, 0x7FDEAE5C, 0x8E7D44EC, 0x5716F2B8, 0xB03ADA37, 0xF0500C0D,
+ 0xF01C1F04, 0x0200B3FF, 0xAE0CF51A, 0x3CB574B2, 0x25837A58, 0xDC0921BD,
+ 0xD19113F9, 0x7CA92FF6, 0x94324773, 0x22F54701, 0x3AE5E581, 0x37C2DADC,
+ 0xC8B57634, 0x9AF3DDA7, 0xA9446146, 0x0FD0030E, 0xECC8C73E, 0xA4751E41,
+ 0xE238CD99, 0x3BEA0E2F, 0x3280BBA1, 0x183EB331, 0x4E548B38, 0x4F6DB908,
+ 0x6F420D03, 0xF60A04BF, 0x2CB81290, 0x24977C79, 0x5679B072, 0xBCAF89AF,
+ 0xDE9A771F, 0xD9930810, 0xB38BAE12, 0xDCCF3F2E, 0x5512721F, 0x2E6B7124,
+ 0x501ADDE6, 0x9F84CD87, 0x7A584718, 0x7408DA17, 0xBC9F9ABC, 0xE94B7D8C,
+ 0xEC7AEC3A, 0xDB851DFA, 0x63094366, 0xC464C3D2, 0xEF1C1847, 0x3215D908,
+ 0xDD433B37, 0x24C2BA16, 0x12A14D43, 0x2A65C451, 0x50940002, 0x133AE4DD,
+ 0x71DFF89E, 0x10314E55, 0x81AC77D6, 0x5F11199B, 0x043556F1, 0xD7A3C76B,
+ 0x3C11183B, 0x5924A509, 0xF28FE6ED, 0x97F1FBFA, 0x9EBABF2C, 0x1E153C6E,
+ 0x86E34570, 0xEAE96FB1, 0x860E5E0A, 0x5A3E2AB3, 0x771FE71C, 0x4E3D06FA,
+ 0x2965DCB9, 0x99E71D0F, 0x803E89D6, 0x5266C825, 0x2E4CC978, 0x9C10B36A,
+ 0xC6150EBA, 0x94E2EA78, 0xA5FC3C53, 0x1E0A2DF4, 0xF2F74EA7, 0x361D2B3D,
+ 0x1939260F, 0x19C27960, 0x5223A708, 0xF71312B6, 0xEBADFE6E, 0xEAC31F66,
+ 0xE3BC4595, 0xA67BC883, 0xB17F37D1, 0x018CFF28, 0xC332DDEF, 0xBE6C5AA5,
+ 0x65582185, 0x68AB9802, 0xEECEA50F, 0xDB2F953B, 0x2AEF7DAD, 0x5B6E2F84,
+ 0x1521B628, 0x29076170, 0xECDD4775, 0x619F1510, 0x13CCA830, 0xEB61BD96,
+ 0x0334FE1E, 0xAA0363CF, 0xB5735C90, 0x4C70A239, 0xD59E9E0B, 0xCBAADE14,
+ 0xEECC86BC, 0x60622CA7, 0x9CAB5CAB, 0xB2F3846E, 0x648B1EAF, 0x19BDF0CA,
+ 0xA02369B9, 0x655ABB50, 0x40685A32, 0x3C2AB4B3, 0x319EE9D5, 0xC021B8F7,
+ 0x9B540B19, 0x875FA099, 0x95F7997E, 0x623D7DA8, 0xF837889A, 0x97E32D77,
+ 0x11ED935F, 0x16681281, 0x0E358829, 0xC7E61FD6, 0x96DEDFA1, 0x7858BA99,
+ 0x57F584A5, 0x1B227263, 0x9B83C3FF, 0x1AC24696, 0xCDB30AEB, 0x532E3054,
+ 0x8FD948E4, 0x6DBC3128, 0x58EBF2EF, 0x34C6FFEA, 0xFE28ED61, 0xEE7C3C73,
+ 0x5D4A14D9, 0xE864B7E3, 0x42105D14, 0x203E13E0, 0x45EEE2B6, 0xA3AAABEA,
+ 0xDB6C4F15, 0xFACB4FD0, 0xC742F442, 0xEF6ABBB5, 0x654F3B1D, 0x41CD2105,
+ 0xD81E799E, 0x86854DC7, 0xE44B476A, 0x3D816250, 0xCF62A1F2, 0x5B8D2646,
+ 0xFC8883A0, 0xC1C7B6A3, 0x7F1524C3, 0x69CB7492, 0x47848A0B, 0x5692B285,
+ 0x095BBF00, 0xAD19489D, 0x1462B174, 0x23820E00, 0x58428D2A, 0x0C55F5EA,
+ 0x1DADF43E, 0x233F7061, 0x3372F092, 0x8D937E41, 0xD65FECF1, 0x6C223BDB,
+ 0x7CDE3759, 0xCBEE7460, 0x4085F2A7, 0xCE77326E, 0xA6078084, 0x19F8509E,
+ 0xE8EFD855, 0x61D99735, 0xA969A7AA, 0xC50C06C2, 0x5A04ABFC, 0x800BCADC,
+ 0x9E447A2E, 0xC3453484, 0xFDD56705, 0x0E1E9EC9, 0xDB73DBD3, 0x105588CD,
+ 0x675FDA79, 0xE3674340, 0xC5C43465, 0x713E38D8, 0x3D28F89E, 0xF16DFF20,
+ 0x153E21E7, 0x8FB03D4A, 0xE6E39F2B, 0xDB83ADF7,
+};
+
+static const word32 sbox2[] = {
+ 0xE93D5A68, 0x948140F7, 0xF64C261C, 0x94692934, 0x411520F7, 0x7602D4F7,
+ 0xBCF46B2E, 0xD4A20068, 0xD4082471, 0x3320F46A, 0x43B7D4B7, 0x500061AF,
+ 0x1E39F62E, 0x97244546, 0x14214F74, 0xBF8B8840, 0x4D95FC1D, 0x96B591AF,
+ 0x70F4DDD3, 0x66A02F45, 0xBFBC09EC, 0x03BD9785, 0x7FAC6DD0, 0x31CB8504,
+ 0x96EB27B3, 0x55FD3941, 0xDA2547E6, 0xABCA0A9A, 0x28507825, 0x530429F4,
+ 0x0A2C86DA, 0xE9B66DFB, 0x68DC1462, 0xD7486900, 0x680EC0A4, 0x27A18DEE,
+ 0x4F3FFEA2, 0xE887AD8C, 0xB58CE006, 0x7AF4D6B6, 0xAACE1E7C, 0xD3375FEC,
+ 0xCE78A399, 0x406B2A42, 0x20FE9E35, 0xD9F385B9, 0xEE39D7AB, 0x3B124E8B,
+ 0x1DC9FAF7, 0x4B6D1856, 0x26A36631, 0xEAE397B2, 0x3A6EFA74, 0xDD5B4332,
+ 0x6841E7F7, 0xCA7820FB, 0xFB0AF54E, 0xD8FEB397, 0x454056AC, 0xBA489527,
+ 0x55533A3A, 0x20838D87, 0xFE6BA9B7, 0xD096954B, 0x55A867BC, 0xA1159A58,
+ 0xCCA92963, 0x99E1DB33, 0xA62A4A56, 0x3F3125F9, 0x5EF47E1C, 0x9029317C,
+ 0xFDF8E802, 0x04272F70, 0x80BB155C, 0x05282CE3, 0x95C11548, 0xE4C66D22,
+ 0x48C1133F, 0xC70F86DC, 0x07F9C9EE, 0x41041F0F, 0x404779A4, 0x5D886E17,
+ 0x325F51EB, 0xD59BC0D1, 0xF2BCC18F, 0x41113564, 0x257B7834, 0x602A9C60,
+ 0xDFF8E8A3, 0x1F636C1B, 0x0E12B4C2, 0x02E1329E, 0xAF664FD1, 0xCAD18115,
+ 0x6B2395E0, 0x333E92E1, 0x3B240B62, 0xEEBEB922, 0x85B2A20E, 0xE6BA0D99,
+ 0xDE720C8C, 0x2DA2F728, 0xD0127845, 0x95B794FD, 0x647D0862, 0xE7CCF5F0,
+ 0x5449A36F, 0x877D48FA, 0xC39DFD27, 0xF33E8D1E, 0x0A476341, 0x992EFF74,
+ 0x3A6F6EAB, 0xF4F8FD37, 0xA812DC60, 0xA1EBDDF8, 0x991BE14C, 0xDB6E6B0D,
+ 0xC67B5510, 0x6D672C37, 0x2765D43B, 0xDCD0E804, 0xF1290DC7, 0xCC00FFA3,
+ 0xB5390F92, 0x690FED0B, 0x667B9FFB, 0xCEDB7D9C, 0xA091CF0B, 0xD9155EA3,
+ 0xBB132F88, 0x515BAD24, 0x7B9479BF, 0x763BD6EB, 0x37392EB3, 0xCC115979,
+ 0x8026E297, 0xF42E312D, 0x6842ADA7, 0xC66A2B3B, 0x12754CCC, 0x782EF11C,
+ 0x6A124237, 0xB79251E7, 0x06A1BBE6, 0x4BFB6350, 0x1A6B1018, 0x11CAEDFA,
+ 0x3D25BDD8, 0xE2E1C3C9, 0x44421659, 0x0A121386, 0xD90CEC6E, 0xD5ABEA2A,
+ 0x64AF674E, 0xDA86A85F, 0xBEBFE988, 0x64E4C3FE, 0x9DBC8057, 0xF0F7C086,
+ 0x60787BF8, 0x6003604D, 0xD1FD8346, 0xF6381FB0, 0x7745AE04, 0xD736FCCC,
+ 0x83426B33, 0xF01EAB71, 0xB0804187, 0x3C005E5F, 0x77A057BE, 0xBDE8AE24,
+ 0x55464299, 0xBF582E61, 0x4E58F48F, 0xF2DDFDA2, 0xF474EF38, 0x8789BDC2,
+ 0x5366F9C3, 0xC8B38E74, 0xB475F255, 0x46FCD9B9, 0x7AEB2661, 0x8B1DDF84,
+ 0x846A0E79, 0x915F95E2, 0x466E598E, 0x20B45770, 0x8CD55591, 0xC902DE4C,
+ 0xB90BACE1, 0xBB8205D0, 0x11A86248, 0x7574A99E, 0xB77F19B6, 0xE0A9DC09,
+ 0x662D09A1, 0xC4324633, 0xE85A1F02, 0x09F0BE8C, 0x4A99A025, 0x1D6EFE10,
+ 0x1AB93D1D, 0x0BA5A4DF, 0xA186F20F, 0x2868F169, 0xDCB7DA83, 0x573906FE,
+ 0xA1E2CE9B, 0x4FCD7F52, 0x50115E01, 0xA70683FA, 0xA002B5C4, 0x0DE6D027,
+ 0x9AF88C27, 0x773F8641, 0xC3604C06, 0x61A806B5, 0xF0177A28, 0xC0F586E0,
+ 0x006058AA, 0x30DC7D62, 0x11E69ED7, 0x2338EA63, 0x53C2DD94, 0xC2C21634,
+ 0xBBCBEE56, 0x90BCB6DE, 0xEBFC7DA1, 0xCE591D76, 0x6F05E409, 0x4B7C0188,
+ 0x39720A3D, 0x7C927C24, 0x86E3725F, 0x724D9DB9, 0x1AC15BB4, 0xD39EB8FC,
+ 0xED545578, 0x08FCA5B5, 0xD83D7CD3, 0x4DAD0FC4, 0x1E50EF5E, 0xB161E6F8,
+ 0xA28514D9, 0x6C51133C, 0x6FD5C7E7, 0x56E14EC4, 0x362ABFCE, 0xDDC6C837,
+ 0xD79A3234, 0x92638212, 0x670EFA8E, 0x406000E0,
+};
+
+static const word32 sbox3[] = {
+ 0x3A39CE37, 0xD3FAF5CF, 0xABC27737, 0x5AC52D1B, 0x5CB0679E, 0x4FA33742,
+ 0xD3822740, 0x99BC9BBE, 0xD5118E9D, 0xBF0F7315, 0xD62D1C7E, 0xC700C47B,
+ 0xB78C1B6B, 0x21A19045, 0xB26EB1BE, 0x6A366EB4, 0x5748AB2F, 0xBC946E79,
+ 0xC6A376D2, 0x6549C2C8, 0x530FF8EE, 0x468DDE7D, 0xD5730A1D, 0x4CD04DC6,
+ 0x2939BBDB, 0xA9BA4650, 0xAC9526E8, 0xBE5EE304, 0xA1FAD5F0, 0x6A2D519A,
+ 0x63EF8CE2, 0x9A86EE22, 0xC089C2B8, 0x43242EF6, 0xA51E03AA, 0x9CF2D0A4,
+ 0x83C061BA, 0x9BE96A4D, 0x8FE51550, 0xBA645BD6, 0x2826A2F9, 0xA73A3AE1,
+ 0x4BA99586, 0xEF5562E9, 0xC72FEFD3, 0xF752F7DA, 0x3F046F69, 0x77FA0A59,
+ 0x80E4A915, 0x87B08601, 0x9B09E6AD, 0x3B3EE593, 0xE990FD5A, 0x9E34D797,
+ 0x2CF0B7D9, 0x022B8B51, 0x96D5AC3A, 0x017DA67D, 0xD1CF3ED6, 0x7C7D2D28,
+ 0x1F9F25CF, 0xADF2B89B, 0x5AD6B472, 0x5A88F54C, 0xE029AC71, 0xE019A5E6,
+ 0x47B0ACFD, 0xED93FA9B, 0xE8D3C48D, 0x283B57CC, 0xF8D56629, 0x79132E28,
+ 0x785F0191, 0xED756055, 0xF7960E44, 0xE3D35E8C, 0x15056DD4, 0x88F46DBA,
+ 0x03A16125, 0x0564F0BD, 0xC3EB9E15, 0x3C9057A2, 0x97271AEC, 0xA93A072A,
+ 0x1B3F6D9B, 0x1E6321F5, 0xF59C66FB, 0x26DCF319, 0x7533D928, 0xB155FDF5,
+ 0x03563482, 0x8ABA3CBB, 0x28517711, 0xC20AD9F8, 0xABCC5167, 0xCCAD925F,
+ 0x4DE81751, 0x3830DC8E, 0x379D5862, 0x9320F991, 0xEA7A90C2, 0xFB3E7BCE,
+ 0x5121CE64, 0x774FBE32, 0xA8B6E37E, 0xC3293D46, 0x48DE5369, 0x6413E680,
+ 0xA2AE0810, 0xDD6DB224, 0x69852DFD, 0x09072166, 0xB39A460A, 0x6445C0DD,
+ 0x586CDECF, 0x1C20C8AE, 0x5BBEF7DD, 0x1B588D40, 0xCCD2017F, 0x6BB4E3BB,
+ 0xDDA26A7E, 0x3A59FF45, 0x3E350A44, 0xBCB4CDD5, 0x72EACEA8, 0xFA6484BB,
+ 0x8D6612AE, 0xBF3C6F47, 0xD29BE463, 0x542F5D9E, 0xAEC2771B, 0xF64E6370,
+ 0x740E0D8D, 0xE75B1357, 0xF8721671, 0xAF537D5D, 0x4040CB08, 0x4EB4E2CC,
+ 0x34D2466A, 0x0115AF84, 0xE1B00428, 0x95983A1D, 0x06B89FB4, 0xCE6EA048,
+ 0x6F3F3B82, 0x3520AB82, 0x011A1D4B, 0x277227F8, 0x611560B1, 0xE7933FDC,
+ 0xBB3A792B, 0x344525BD, 0xA08839E1, 0x51CE794B, 0x2F32C9B7, 0xA01FBAC9,
+ 0xE01CC87E, 0xBCC7D1F6, 0xCF0111C3, 0xA1E8AAC7, 0x1A908749, 0xD44FBD9A,
+ 0xD0DADECB, 0xD50ADA38, 0x0339C32A, 0xC6913667, 0x8DF9317C, 0xE0B12B4F,
+ 0xF79E59B7, 0x43F5BB3A, 0xF2D519FF, 0x27D9459C, 0xBF97222C, 0x15E6FC2A,
+ 0x0F91FC71, 0x9B941525, 0xFAE59361, 0xCEB69CEB, 0xC2A86459, 0x12BAA8D1,
+ 0xB6C1075E, 0xE3056A0C, 0x10D25065, 0xCB03A442, 0xE0EC6E0E, 0x1698DB3B,
+ 0x4C98A0BE, 0x3278E964, 0x9F1F9532, 0xE0D392DF, 0xD3A0342B, 0x8971F21E,
+ 0x1B0A7441, 0x4BA3348C, 0xC5BE7120, 0xC37632D8, 0xDF359F8D, 0x9B992F2E,
+ 0xE60B6F47, 0x0FE3F11D, 0xE54CDA54, 0x1EDAD891, 0xCE6279CF, 0xCD3E7E6F,
+ 0x1618B166, 0xFD2C1D05, 0x848FD2C5, 0xF6FB2299, 0xF523F357, 0xA6327623,
+ 0x93A83531, 0x56CCCD02, 0xACF08162, 0x5A75EBB5, 0x6E163697, 0x88D273CC,
+ 0xDE966292, 0x81B949D0, 0x4C50901B, 0x71C65614, 0xE6C6C7BD, 0x327A140A,
+ 0x45E1D006, 0xC3F27B9A, 0xC9AA53FD, 0x62A80F00, 0xBB25BFE2, 0x35BDD2F6,
+ 0x71126905, 0xB2040222, 0xB6CBCF7C, 0xCD769C2B, 0x53113EC0, 0x1640E3D3,
+ 0x38ABBD60, 0x2547ADF0, 0xBA38209C, 0xF746CE76, 0x77AFA1C5, 0x20756060,
+ 0x85CBFE4E, 0x8AE88DD8, 0x7AAAF9B0, 0x4CF9AA7E, 0x1948C25C, 0x02FB8A8C,
+ 0x01C36AE4, 0xD6EBE1F9, 0x90D4F869, 0xA65CDEA0, 0x3F09252D, 0xC208E69F,
+ 0xB74E6132, 0xCE77E25B, 0x578FDFE3, 0x3AC372E6,
+};
+
+#define Fprime(a,b,c,d) ( ( (S0[a] + S1[b]) ^ S2[c] ) + S3[d] )
+#define F(x) Fprime( ((x>>24)&0xFF), ((x>>16)&0xFF), ((x>>8)&0xFF), (x&0xFF) )
+#define ROUND(n) ( xL ^= P[n], t = xL, xL = F(xL) ^ xR, xR = t )
+
+static void blowfish_encrypt(word32 xL, word32 xR, word32 * output,
+ BlowfishContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 *S0 = ctx->S0;
+ word32 *S1 = ctx->S1;
+ word32 *S2 = ctx->S2;
+ word32 *S3 = ctx->S3;
+ word32 *P = ctx->P;
+ word32 t;
+
+ ROUND(0);
+ ROUND(1);
+ ROUND(2);
+ ROUND(3);
+ ROUND(4);
+ ROUND(5);
+ ROUND(6);
+ ROUND(7);
+ ROUND(8);
+ ROUND(9);
+ ROUND(10);
+ ROUND(11);
+ ROUND(12);
+ ROUND(13);
+ ROUND(14);
+ ROUND(15);
+ xL ^= P[16];
+ xR ^= P[17];
+
+ output[0] = xR;
+ output[1] = xL;
+}
+
+static void blowfish_decrypt(word32 xL, word32 xR, word32 * output,
+ BlowfishContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 *S0 = ctx->S0;
+ word32 *S1 = ctx->S1;
+ word32 *S2 = ctx->S2;
+ word32 *S3 = ctx->S3;
+ word32 *P = ctx->P;
+ word32 t;
+
+ ROUND(17);
+ ROUND(16);
+ ROUND(15);
+ ROUND(14);
+ ROUND(13);
+ ROUND(12);
+ ROUND(11);
+ ROUND(10);
+ ROUND(9);
+ ROUND(8);
+ ROUND(7);
+ ROUND(6);
+ ROUND(5);
+ ROUND(4);
+ ROUND(3);
+ ROUND(2);
+ xL ^= P[1];
+ xR ^= P[0];
+
+ output[0] = xR;
+ output[1] = xL;
+}
+
+static void blowfish_lsb_encrypt_cbc(unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ BlowfishContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 xL, xR, out[2], iv0, iv1;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = ctx->iv0;
+ iv1 = ctx->iv1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ xL = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk);
+ xR = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ iv0 ^= xL;
+ iv1 ^= xR;
+ blowfish_encrypt(iv0, iv1, out, ctx);
+ iv0 = out[0];
+ iv1 = out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ blk += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+
+ ctx->iv0 = iv0;
+ ctx->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void blowfish_lsb_decrypt_cbc(unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ BlowfishContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 xL, xR, out[2], iv0, iv1;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = ctx->iv0;
+ iv1 = ctx->iv1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ xL = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk);
+ xR = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ blowfish_decrypt(xL, xR, out, ctx);
+ iv0 ^= out[0];
+ iv1 ^= out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ iv0 = xL;
+ iv1 = xR;
+ blk += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+
+ ctx->iv0 = iv0;
+ ctx->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void blowfish_msb_encrypt_cbc(unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ BlowfishContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 xL, xR, out[2], iv0, iv1;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = ctx->iv0;
+ iv1 = ctx->iv1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ xL = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ xR = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ iv0 ^= xL;
+ iv1 ^= xR;
+ blowfish_encrypt(iv0, iv1, out, ctx);
+ iv0 = out[0];
+ iv1 = out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ blk += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+
+ ctx->iv0 = iv0;
+ ctx->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void blowfish_msb_decrypt_cbc(unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ BlowfishContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 xL, xR, out[2], iv0, iv1;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = ctx->iv0;
+ iv1 = ctx->iv1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ xL = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ xR = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ blowfish_decrypt(xL, xR, out, ctx);
+ iv0 ^= out[0];
+ iv1 ^= out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ iv0 = xL;
+ iv1 = xR;
+ blk += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+
+ ctx->iv0 = iv0;
+ ctx->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void blowfish_msb_sdctr(unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ BlowfishContext * ctx)
+{
+ word32 b[2], iv0, iv1, tmp;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = ctx->iv0;
+ iv1 = ctx->iv1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ blowfish_encrypt(iv0, iv1, b, ctx);
+ tmp = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, tmp ^ b[0]);
+ tmp = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4, tmp ^ b[1]);
+ if ((iv1 = (iv1 + 1) & 0xffffffff) == 0)
+ iv0 = (iv0 + 1) & 0xffffffff;
+ blk += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+
+ ctx->iv0 = iv0;
+ ctx->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void blowfish_setkey(BlowfishContext * ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, short keybytes)
+{
+ word32 *S0 = ctx->S0;
+ word32 *S1 = ctx->S1;
+ word32 *S2 = ctx->S2;
+ word32 *S3 = ctx->S3;
+ word32 *P = ctx->P;
+ word32 str[2];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 18; i++) {
+ P[i] = parray[i];
+ P[i] ^=
+ ((word32) (unsigned char) (key[(i * 4 + 0) % keybytes])) << 24;
+ P[i] ^=
+ ((word32) (unsigned char) (key[(i * 4 + 1) % keybytes])) << 16;
+ P[i] ^=
+ ((word32) (unsigned char) (key[(i * 4 + 2) % keybytes])) << 8;
+ P[i] ^= ((word32) (unsigned char) (key[(i * 4 + 3) % keybytes]));
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ S0[i] = sbox0[i];
+ S1[i] = sbox1[i];
+ S2[i] = sbox2[i];
+ S3[i] = sbox3[i];
+ }
+
+ str[0] = str[1] = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 18; i += 2) {
+ blowfish_encrypt(str[0], str[1], str, ctx);
+ P[i] = str[0];
+ P[i + 1] = str[1];
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 2) {
+ blowfish_encrypt(str[0], str[1], str, ctx);
+ S0[i] = str[0];
+ S0[i + 1] = str[1];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 2) {
+ blowfish_encrypt(str[0], str[1], str, ctx);
+ S1[i] = str[0];
+ S1[i + 1] = str[1];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 2) {
+ blowfish_encrypt(str[0], str[1], str, ctx);
+ S2[i] = str[0];
+ S2[i + 1] = str[1];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 2) {
+ blowfish_encrypt(str[0], str[1], str, ctx);
+ S3[i] = str[0];
+ S3[i + 1] = str[1];
+ }
+}
+
+/* -- Interface with PuTTY -- */
+
+#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32
+
+static void *blowfish_make_context(void)
+{
+ return snew(BlowfishContext);
+}
+
+static void *blowfish_ssh1_make_context(void)
+{
+ /* In SSH-1, need one key for each direction */
+ return snewn(2, BlowfishContext);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_free_context(void *handle)
+{
+ sfree(handle);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_setkey(ctx, key, 16);
+}
+
+static void blowfish256_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_setkey(ctx, key, 32);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_iv(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ ctx->iv0 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key);
+ ctx->iv1 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_sesskey(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_setkey(ctx, key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+ ctx->iv0 = 0;
+ ctx->iv1 = 0;
+ ctx[1] = ctx[0]; /* structure copy */
+}
+
+static void blowfish_ssh1_encrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk,
+ int len)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_lsb_encrypt_cbc(blk, len, ctx);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_ssh1_decrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk,
+ int len)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_lsb_decrypt_cbc(blk, len, ctx+1);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_ssh2_encrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk,
+ int len)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_msb_encrypt_cbc(blk, len, ctx);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_ssh2_decrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk,
+ int len)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_msb_decrypt_cbc(blk, len, ctx);
+}
+
+static void blowfish_ssh2_sdctr(void *handle, unsigned char *blk,
+ int len)
+{
+ BlowfishContext *ctx = (BlowfishContext *)handle;
+ blowfish_msb_sdctr(blk, len, ctx);
+}
+
+const struct ssh_cipher ssh_blowfish_ssh1 = {
+ blowfish_ssh1_make_context, blowfish_free_context, blowfish_sesskey,
+ blowfish_ssh1_encrypt_blk, blowfish_ssh1_decrypt_blk,
+ 8, "Blowfish-128 CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_blowfish_ssh2 = {
+ blowfish_make_context, blowfish_free_context, blowfish_iv, blowfish_key,
+ blowfish_ssh2_encrypt_blk, blowfish_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "blowfish-cbc",
+ 8, 128, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "Blowfish-128 CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_blowfish_ssh2_ctr = {
+ blowfish_make_context, blowfish_free_context, blowfish_iv, blowfish256_key,
+ blowfish_ssh2_sdctr, blowfish_ssh2_sdctr,
+ "blowfish-ctr",
+ 8, 256, 0, "Blowfish-256 SDCTR"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher *const blowfish_list[] = {
+ &ssh_blowfish_ssh2_ctr,
+ &ssh_blowfish_ssh2
+};
+
+const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_blowfish = {
+ sizeof(blowfish_list) / sizeof(*blowfish_list),
+ blowfish_list
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshbn.c b/tools/plink/sshbn.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e9ff0cde4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshbn.c @@ -0,0 +1,1092 @@ +/*
+ * Bignum routines for RSA and DH and stuff.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Usage notes:
+ * * Do not call the DIVMOD_WORD macro with expressions such as array
+ * subscripts, as some implementations object to this (see below).
+ * * Note that none of the division methods below will cope if the
+ * quotient won't fit into BIGNUM_INT_BITS. Callers should be careful
+ * to avoid this case.
+ * If this condition occurs, in the case of the x86 DIV instruction,
+ * an overflow exception will occur, which (according to a correspondent)
+ * will manifest on Windows as something like
+ * 0xC0000095: Integer overflow
+ * The C variant won't give the right answer, either.
+ */
+
+#if defined __GNUC__ && defined __i386__
+typedef unsigned long BignumInt;
+typedef unsigned long long BignumDblInt;
+#define BIGNUM_INT_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFUL
+#define BIGNUM_TOP_BIT 0x80000000UL
+#define BIGNUM_INT_BITS 32
+#define MUL_WORD(w1, w2) ((BignumDblInt)w1 * w2)
+#define DIVMOD_WORD(q, r, hi, lo, w) \
+ __asm__("div %2" : \
+ "=d" (r), "=a" (q) : \
+ "r" (w), "d" (hi), "a" (lo))
+#elif defined _MSC_VER && defined _M_IX86
+typedef unsigned __int32 BignumInt;
+typedef unsigned __int64 BignumDblInt;
+#define BIGNUM_INT_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFUL
+#define BIGNUM_TOP_BIT 0x80000000UL
+#define BIGNUM_INT_BITS 32
+#define MUL_WORD(w1, w2) ((BignumDblInt)w1 * w2)
+/* Note: MASM interprets array subscripts in the macro arguments as
+ * assembler syntax, which gives the wrong answer. Don't supply them.
+ * <http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bf1dw62z.aspx> */
+#define DIVMOD_WORD(q, r, hi, lo, w) do { \
+ __asm mov edx, hi \
+ __asm mov eax, lo \
+ __asm div w \
+ __asm mov r, edx \
+ __asm mov q, eax \
+} while(0)
+#else
+typedef unsigned short BignumInt;
+typedef unsigned long BignumDblInt;
+#define BIGNUM_INT_MASK 0xFFFFU
+#define BIGNUM_TOP_BIT 0x8000U
+#define BIGNUM_INT_BITS 16
+#define MUL_WORD(w1, w2) ((BignumDblInt)w1 * w2)
+#define DIVMOD_WORD(q, r, hi, lo, w) do { \
+ BignumDblInt n = (((BignumDblInt)hi) << BIGNUM_INT_BITS) | lo; \
+ q = n / w; \
+ r = n % w; \
+} while (0)
+#endif
+
+#define BIGNUM_INT_BYTES (BIGNUM_INT_BITS / 8)
+
+#define BIGNUM_INTERNAL
+typedef BignumInt *Bignum;
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+BignumInt bnZero[1] = { 0 };
+BignumInt bnOne[2] = { 1, 1 };
+
+/*
+ * The Bignum format is an array of `BignumInt'. The first
+ * element of the array counts the remaining elements. The
+ * remaining elements express the actual number, base 2^BIGNUM_INT_BITS, _least_
+ * significant digit first. (So it's trivial to extract the bit
+ * with value 2^n for any n.)
+ *
+ * All Bignums in this module are positive. Negative numbers must
+ * be dealt with outside it.
+ *
+ * INVARIANT: the most significant word of any Bignum must be
+ * nonzero.
+ */
+
+Bignum Zero = bnZero, One = bnOne;
+
+static Bignum newbn(int length)
+{
+ Bignum b = snewn(length + 1, BignumInt);
+ if (!b)
+ abort(); /* FIXME */
+ memset(b, 0, (length + 1) * sizeof(*b));
+ b[0] = length;
+ return b;
+}
+
+void bn_restore_invariant(Bignum b)
+{
+ while (b[0] > 1 && b[b[0]] == 0)
+ b[0]--;
+}
+
+Bignum copybn(Bignum orig)
+{
+ Bignum b = snewn(orig[0] + 1, BignumInt);
+ if (!b)
+ abort(); /* FIXME */
+ memcpy(b, orig, (orig[0] + 1) * sizeof(*b));
+ return b;
+}
+
+void freebn(Bignum b)
+{
+ /*
+ * Burn the evidence, just in case.
+ */
+ memset(b, 0, sizeof(b[0]) * (b[0] + 1));
+ sfree(b);
+}
+
+Bignum bn_power_2(int n)
+{
+ Bignum ret = newbn(n / BIGNUM_INT_BITS + 1);
+ bignum_set_bit(ret, n, 1);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute c = a * b.
+ * Input is in the first len words of a and b.
+ * Result is returned in the first 2*len words of c.
+ */
+static void internal_mul(BignumInt *a, BignumInt *b,
+ BignumInt *c, int len)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ BignumDblInt t;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 2 * len; j++)
+ c[j] = 0;
+
+ for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ t = 0;
+ for (j = len - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+ t += MUL_WORD(a[i], (BignumDblInt) b[j]);
+ t += (BignumDblInt) c[i + j + 1];
+ c[i + j + 1] = (BignumInt) t;
+ t = t >> BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ }
+ c[i] = (BignumInt) t;
+ }
+}
+
+static void internal_add_shifted(BignumInt *number,
+ unsigned n, int shift)
+{
+ int word = 1 + (shift / BIGNUM_INT_BITS);
+ int bshift = shift % BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ BignumDblInt addend;
+
+ addend = (BignumDblInt)n << bshift;
+
+ while (addend) {
+ addend += number[word];
+ number[word] = (BignumInt) addend & BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ addend >>= BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ word++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a = a % m.
+ * Input in first alen words of a and first mlen words of m.
+ * Output in first alen words of a
+ * (of which first alen-mlen words will be zero).
+ * The MSW of m MUST have its high bit set.
+ * Quotient is accumulated in the `quotient' array, which is a Bignum
+ * rather than the internal bigendian format. Quotient parts are shifted
+ * left by `qshift' before adding into quot.
+ */
+static void internal_mod(BignumInt *a, int alen,
+ BignumInt *m, int mlen,
+ BignumInt *quot, int qshift)
+{
+ BignumInt m0, m1;
+ unsigned int h;
+ int i, k;
+
+ m0 = m[0];
+ if (mlen > 1)
+ m1 = m[1];
+ else
+ m1 = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= alen - mlen; i++) {
+ BignumDblInt t;
+ unsigned int q, r, c, ai1;
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ h = 0;
+ } else {
+ h = a[i - 1];
+ a[i - 1] = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i == alen - 1)
+ ai1 = 0;
+ else
+ ai1 = a[i + 1];
+
+ /* Find q = h:a[i] / m0 */
+ if (h >= m0) {
+ /*
+ * Special case.
+ *
+ * To illustrate it, suppose a BignumInt is 8 bits, and
+ * we are dividing (say) A1:23:45:67 by A1:B2:C3. Then
+ * our initial division will be 0xA123 / 0xA1, which
+ * will give a quotient of 0x100 and a divide overflow.
+ * However, the invariants in this division algorithm
+ * are not violated, since the full number A1:23:... is
+ * _less_ than the quotient prefix A1:B2:... and so the
+ * following correction loop would have sorted it out.
+ *
+ * In this situation we set q to be the largest
+ * quotient we _can_ stomach (0xFF, of course).
+ */
+ q = BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ } else {
+ /* Macro doesn't want an array subscript expression passed
+ * into it (see definition), so use a temporary. */
+ BignumInt tmplo = a[i];
+ DIVMOD_WORD(q, r, h, tmplo, m0);
+
+ /* Refine our estimate of q by looking at
+ h:a[i]:a[i+1] / m0:m1 */
+ t = MUL_WORD(m1, q);
+ if (t > ((BignumDblInt) r << BIGNUM_INT_BITS) + ai1) {
+ q--;
+ t -= m1;
+ r = (r + m0) & BIGNUM_INT_MASK; /* overflow? */
+ if (r >= (BignumDblInt) m0 &&
+ t > ((BignumDblInt) r << BIGNUM_INT_BITS) + ai1) q--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Subtract q * m from a[i...] */
+ c = 0;
+ for (k = mlen - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
+ t = MUL_WORD(q, m[k]);
+ t += c;
+ c = (unsigned)(t >> BIGNUM_INT_BITS);
+ if ((BignumInt) t > a[i + k])
+ c++;
+ a[i + k] -= (BignumInt) t;
+ }
+
+ /* Add back m in case of borrow */
+ if (c != h) {
+ t = 0;
+ for (k = mlen - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
+ t += m[k];
+ t += a[i + k];
+ a[i + k] = (BignumInt) t;
+ t = t >> BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ }
+ q--;
+ }
+ if (quot)
+ internal_add_shifted(quot, q, qshift + BIGNUM_INT_BITS * (alen - mlen - i));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute (base ^ exp) % mod.
+ */
+Bignum modpow(Bignum base_in, Bignum exp, Bignum mod)
+{
+ BignumInt *a, *b, *n, *m;
+ int mshift;
+ int mlen, i, j;
+ Bignum base, result;
+
+ /*
+ * The most significant word of mod needs to be non-zero. It
+ * should already be, but let's make sure.
+ */
+ assert(mod[mod[0]] != 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the base is smaller than the modulus, by reducing
+ * it modulo the modulus if not.
+ */
+ base = bigmod(base_in, mod);
+
+ /* Allocate m of size mlen, copy mod to m */
+ /* We use big endian internally */
+ mlen = mod[0];
+ m = snewn(mlen, BignumInt);
+ for (j = 0; j < mlen; j++)
+ m[j] = mod[mod[0] - j];
+
+ /* Shift m left to make msb bit set */
+ for (mshift = 0; mshift < BIGNUM_INT_BITS-1; mshift++)
+ if ((m[0] << mshift) & BIGNUM_TOP_BIT)
+ break;
+ if (mshift) {
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen - 1; i++)
+ m[i] = (m[i] << mshift) | (m[i + 1] >> (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ m[mlen - 1] = m[mlen - 1] << mshift;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate n of size mlen, copy base to n */
+ n = snewn(mlen, BignumInt);
+ i = mlen - base[0];
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ n[j] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < (int)base[0]; j++)
+ n[i + j] = base[base[0] - j];
+
+ /* Allocate a and b of size 2*mlen. Set a = 1 */
+ a = snewn(2 * mlen, BignumInt);
+ b = snewn(2 * mlen, BignumInt);
+ for (i = 0; i < 2 * mlen; i++)
+ a[i] = 0;
+ a[2 * mlen - 1] = 1;
+
+ /* Skip leading zero bits of exp. */
+ i = 0;
+ j = BIGNUM_INT_BITS-1;
+ while (i < (int)exp[0] && (exp[exp[0] - i] & (1 << j)) == 0) {
+ j--;
+ if (j < 0) {
+ i++;
+ j = BIGNUM_INT_BITS-1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Main computation */
+ while (i < (int)exp[0]) {
+ while (j >= 0) {
+ internal_mul(a + mlen, a + mlen, b, mlen);
+ internal_mod(b, mlen * 2, m, mlen, NULL, 0);
+ if ((exp[exp[0] - i] & (1 << j)) != 0) {
+ internal_mul(b + mlen, n, a, mlen);
+ internal_mod(a, mlen * 2, m, mlen, NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ BignumInt *t;
+ t = a;
+ a = b;
+ b = t;
+ }
+ j--;
+ }
+ i++;
+ j = BIGNUM_INT_BITS-1;
+ }
+
+ /* Fixup result in case the modulus was shifted */
+ if (mshift) {
+ for (i = mlen - 1; i < 2 * mlen - 1; i++)
+ a[i] = (a[i] << mshift) | (a[i + 1] >> (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ a[2 * mlen - 1] = a[2 * mlen - 1] << mshift;
+ internal_mod(a, mlen * 2, m, mlen, NULL, 0);
+ for (i = 2 * mlen - 1; i >= mlen; i--)
+ a[i] = (a[i] >> mshift) | (a[i - 1] << (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ }
+
+ /* Copy result to buffer */
+ result = newbn(mod[0]);
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++)
+ result[result[0] - i] = a[i + mlen];
+ while (result[0] > 1 && result[result[0]] == 0)
+ result[0]--;
+
+ /* Free temporary arrays */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2 * mlen; i++)
+ a[i] = 0;
+ sfree(a);
+ for (i = 0; i < 2 * mlen; i++)
+ b[i] = 0;
+ sfree(b);
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++)
+ m[i] = 0;
+ sfree(m);
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++)
+ n[i] = 0;
+ sfree(n);
+
+ freebn(base);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute (p * q) % mod.
+ * The most significant word of mod MUST be non-zero.
+ * We assume that the result array is the same size as the mod array.
+ */
+Bignum modmul(Bignum p, Bignum q, Bignum mod)
+{
+ BignumInt *a, *n, *m, *o;
+ int mshift;
+ int pqlen, mlen, rlen, i, j;
+ Bignum result;
+
+ /* Allocate m of size mlen, copy mod to m */
+ /* We use big endian internally */
+ mlen = mod[0];
+ m = snewn(mlen, BignumInt);
+ for (j = 0; j < mlen; j++)
+ m[j] = mod[mod[0] - j];
+
+ /* Shift m left to make msb bit set */
+ for (mshift = 0; mshift < BIGNUM_INT_BITS-1; mshift++)
+ if ((m[0] << mshift) & BIGNUM_TOP_BIT)
+ break;
+ if (mshift) {
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen - 1; i++)
+ m[i] = (m[i] << mshift) | (m[i + 1] >> (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ m[mlen - 1] = m[mlen - 1] << mshift;
+ }
+
+ pqlen = (p[0] > q[0] ? p[0] : q[0]);
+
+ /* Allocate n of size pqlen, copy p to n */
+ n = snewn(pqlen, BignumInt);
+ i = pqlen - p[0];
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ n[j] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < (int)p[0]; j++)
+ n[i + j] = p[p[0] - j];
+
+ /* Allocate o of size pqlen, copy q to o */
+ o = snewn(pqlen, BignumInt);
+ i = pqlen - q[0];
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ o[j] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < (int)q[0]; j++)
+ o[i + j] = q[q[0] - j];
+
+ /* Allocate a of size 2*pqlen for result */
+ a = snewn(2 * pqlen, BignumInt);
+
+ /* Main computation */
+ internal_mul(n, o, a, pqlen);
+ internal_mod(a, pqlen * 2, m, mlen, NULL, 0);
+
+ /* Fixup result in case the modulus was shifted */
+ if (mshift) {
+ for (i = 2 * pqlen - mlen - 1; i < 2 * pqlen - 1; i++)
+ a[i] = (a[i] << mshift) | (a[i + 1] >> (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ a[2 * pqlen - 1] = a[2 * pqlen - 1] << mshift;
+ internal_mod(a, pqlen * 2, m, mlen, NULL, 0);
+ for (i = 2 * pqlen - 1; i >= 2 * pqlen - mlen; i--)
+ a[i] = (a[i] >> mshift) | (a[i - 1] << (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ }
+
+ /* Copy result to buffer */
+ rlen = (mlen < pqlen * 2 ? mlen : pqlen * 2);
+ result = newbn(rlen);
+ for (i = 0; i < rlen; i++)
+ result[result[0] - i] = a[i + 2 * pqlen - rlen];
+ while (result[0] > 1 && result[result[0]] == 0)
+ result[0]--;
+
+ /* Free temporary arrays */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2 * pqlen; i++)
+ a[i] = 0;
+ sfree(a);
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++)
+ m[i] = 0;
+ sfree(m);
+ for (i = 0; i < pqlen; i++)
+ n[i] = 0;
+ sfree(n);
+ for (i = 0; i < pqlen; i++)
+ o[i] = 0;
+ sfree(o);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute p % mod.
+ * The most significant word of mod MUST be non-zero.
+ * We assume that the result array is the same size as the mod array.
+ * We optionally write out a quotient if `quotient' is non-NULL.
+ * We can avoid writing out the result if `result' is NULL.
+ */
+static void bigdivmod(Bignum p, Bignum mod, Bignum result, Bignum quotient)
+{
+ BignumInt *n, *m;
+ int mshift;
+ int plen, mlen, i, j;
+
+ /* Allocate m of size mlen, copy mod to m */
+ /* We use big endian internally */
+ mlen = mod[0];
+ m = snewn(mlen, BignumInt);
+ for (j = 0; j < mlen; j++)
+ m[j] = mod[mod[0] - j];
+
+ /* Shift m left to make msb bit set */
+ for (mshift = 0; mshift < BIGNUM_INT_BITS-1; mshift++)
+ if ((m[0] << mshift) & BIGNUM_TOP_BIT)
+ break;
+ if (mshift) {
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen - 1; i++)
+ m[i] = (m[i] << mshift) | (m[i + 1] >> (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ m[mlen - 1] = m[mlen - 1] << mshift;
+ }
+
+ plen = p[0];
+ /* Ensure plen > mlen */
+ if (plen <= mlen)
+ plen = mlen + 1;
+
+ /* Allocate n of size plen, copy p to n */
+ n = snewn(plen, BignumInt);
+ for (j = 0; j < plen; j++)
+ n[j] = 0;
+ for (j = 1; j <= (int)p[0]; j++)
+ n[plen - j] = p[j];
+
+ /* Main computation */
+ internal_mod(n, plen, m, mlen, quotient, mshift);
+
+ /* Fixup result in case the modulus was shifted */
+ if (mshift) {
+ for (i = plen - mlen - 1; i < plen - 1; i++)
+ n[i] = (n[i] << mshift) | (n[i + 1] >> (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ n[plen - 1] = n[plen - 1] << mshift;
+ internal_mod(n, plen, m, mlen, quotient, 0);
+ for (i = plen - 1; i >= plen - mlen; i--)
+ n[i] = (n[i] >> mshift) | (n[i - 1] << (BIGNUM_INT_BITS - mshift));
+ }
+
+ /* Copy result to buffer */
+ if (result) {
+ for (i = 1; i <= (int)result[0]; i++) {
+ int j = plen - i;
+ result[i] = j >= 0 ? n[j] : 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Free temporary arrays */
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++)
+ m[i] = 0;
+ sfree(m);
+ for (i = 0; i < plen; i++)
+ n[i] = 0;
+ sfree(n);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrement a number.
+ */
+void decbn(Bignum bn)
+{
+ int i = 1;
+ while (i < (int)bn[0] && bn[i] == 0)
+ bn[i++] = BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ bn[i]--;
+}
+
+Bignum bignum_from_bytes(const unsigned char *data, int nbytes)
+{
+ Bignum result;
+ int w, i;
+
+ w = (nbytes + BIGNUM_INT_BYTES - 1) / BIGNUM_INT_BYTES; /* bytes->words */
+
+ result = newbn(w);
+ for (i = 1; i <= w; i++)
+ result[i] = 0;
+ for (i = nbytes; i--;) {
+ unsigned char byte = *data++;
+ result[1 + i / BIGNUM_INT_BYTES] |= byte << (8*i % BIGNUM_INT_BITS);
+ }
+
+ while (result[0] > 1 && result[result[0]] == 0)
+ result[0]--;
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read an SSH-1-format bignum from a data buffer. Return the number
+ * of bytes consumed, or -1 if there wasn't enough data.
+ */
+int ssh1_read_bignum(const unsigned char *data, int len, Bignum * result)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = data;
+ int i;
+ int w, b;
+
+ if (len < 2)
+ return -1;
+
+ w = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+ w = (w << 8) + *p++;
+ b = (w + 7) / 8; /* bits -> bytes */
+
+ if (len < b+2)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!result) /* just return length */
+ return b + 2;
+
+ *result = bignum_from_bytes(p, b);
+
+ return p + b - data;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the bit count of a bignum, for SSH-1 encoding.
+ */
+int bignum_bitcount(Bignum bn)
+{
+ int bitcount = bn[0] * BIGNUM_INT_BITS - 1;
+ while (bitcount >= 0
+ && (bn[bitcount / BIGNUM_INT_BITS + 1] >> (bitcount % BIGNUM_INT_BITS)) == 0) bitcount--;
+ return bitcount + 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the byte length of a bignum when SSH-1 encoded.
+ */
+int ssh1_bignum_length(Bignum bn)
+{
+ return 2 + (bignum_bitcount(bn) + 7) / 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the byte length of a bignum when SSH-2 encoded.
+ */
+int ssh2_bignum_length(Bignum bn)
+{
+ return 4 + (bignum_bitcount(bn) + 8) / 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a byte from a bignum; 0 is least significant, etc.
+ */
+int bignum_byte(Bignum bn, int i)
+{
+ if (i >= (int)(BIGNUM_INT_BYTES * bn[0]))
+ return 0; /* beyond the end */
+ else
+ return (bn[i / BIGNUM_INT_BYTES + 1] >>
+ ((i % BIGNUM_INT_BYTES)*8)) & 0xFF;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a bit from a bignum; 0 is least significant, etc.
+ */
+int bignum_bit(Bignum bn, int i)
+{
+ if (i >= (int)(BIGNUM_INT_BITS * bn[0]))
+ return 0; /* beyond the end */
+ else
+ return (bn[i / BIGNUM_INT_BITS + 1] >> (i % BIGNUM_INT_BITS)) & 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a bit in a bignum; 0 is least significant, etc.
+ */
+void bignum_set_bit(Bignum bn, int bitnum, int value)
+{
+ if (bitnum >= (int)(BIGNUM_INT_BITS * bn[0]))
+ abort(); /* beyond the end */
+ else {
+ int v = bitnum / BIGNUM_INT_BITS + 1;
+ int mask = 1 << (bitnum % BIGNUM_INT_BITS);
+ if (value)
+ bn[v] |= mask;
+ else
+ bn[v] &= ~mask;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a SSH-1-format bignum into a buffer. It is assumed the
+ * buffer is big enough. Returns the number of bytes used.
+ */
+int ssh1_write_bignum(void *data, Bignum bn)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = data;
+ int len = ssh1_bignum_length(bn);
+ int i;
+ int bitc = bignum_bitcount(bn);
+
+ *p++ = (bitc >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ *p++ = (bitc) & 0xFF;
+ for (i = len - 2; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(bn, i);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two bignums. Returns like strcmp.
+ */
+int bignum_cmp(Bignum a, Bignum b)
+{
+ int amax = a[0], bmax = b[0];
+ int i = (amax > bmax ? amax : bmax);
+ while (i) {
+ BignumInt aval = (i > amax ? 0 : a[i]);
+ BignumInt bval = (i > bmax ? 0 : b[i]);
+ if (aval < bval)
+ return -1;
+ if (aval > bval)
+ return +1;
+ i--;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Right-shift one bignum to form another.
+ */
+Bignum bignum_rshift(Bignum a, int shift)
+{
+ Bignum ret;
+ int i, shiftw, shiftb, shiftbb, bits;
+ BignumInt ai, ai1;
+
+ bits = bignum_bitcount(a) - shift;
+ ret = newbn((bits + BIGNUM_INT_BITS - 1) / BIGNUM_INT_BITS);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ shiftw = shift / BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ shiftb = shift % BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ shiftbb = BIGNUM_INT_BITS - shiftb;
+
+ ai1 = a[shiftw + 1];
+ for (i = 1; i <= (int)ret[0]; i++) {
+ ai = ai1;
+ ai1 = (i + shiftw + 1 <= (int)a[0] ? a[i + shiftw + 1] : 0);
+ ret[i] = ((ai >> shiftb) | (ai1 << shiftbb)) & BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Non-modular multiplication and addition.
+ */
+Bignum bigmuladd(Bignum a, Bignum b, Bignum addend)
+{
+ int alen = a[0], blen = b[0];
+ int mlen = (alen > blen ? alen : blen);
+ int rlen, i, maxspot;
+ BignumInt *workspace;
+ Bignum ret;
+
+ /* mlen space for a, mlen space for b, 2*mlen for result */
+ workspace = snewn(mlen * 4, BignumInt);
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ workspace[0 * mlen + i] = (mlen - i <= (int)a[0] ? a[mlen - i] : 0);
+ workspace[1 * mlen + i] = (mlen - i <= (int)b[0] ? b[mlen - i] : 0);
+ }
+
+ internal_mul(workspace + 0 * mlen, workspace + 1 * mlen,
+ workspace + 2 * mlen, mlen);
+
+ /* now just copy the result back */
+ rlen = alen + blen + 1;
+ if (addend && rlen <= (int)addend[0])
+ rlen = addend[0] + 1;
+ ret = newbn(rlen);
+ maxspot = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= (int)ret[0]; i++) {
+ ret[i] = (i <= 2 * mlen ? workspace[4 * mlen - i] : 0);
+ if (ret[i] != 0)
+ maxspot = i;
+ }
+ ret[0] = maxspot;
+
+ /* now add in the addend, if any */
+ if (addend) {
+ BignumDblInt carry = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= rlen; i++) {
+ carry += (i <= (int)ret[0] ? ret[i] : 0);
+ carry += (i <= (int)addend[0] ? addend[i] : 0);
+ ret[i] = (BignumInt) carry & BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ carry >>= BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ if (ret[i] != 0 && i > maxspot)
+ maxspot = i;
+ }
+ }
+ ret[0] = maxspot;
+
+ sfree(workspace);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Non-modular multiplication.
+ */
+Bignum bigmul(Bignum a, Bignum b)
+{
+ return bigmuladd(a, b, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a bignum which is the bitmask covering another one. That
+ * is, the smallest integer which is >= N and is also one less than
+ * a power of two.
+ */
+Bignum bignum_bitmask(Bignum n)
+{
+ Bignum ret = copybn(n);
+ int i;
+ BignumInt j;
+
+ i = ret[0];
+ while (n[i] == 0 && i > 0)
+ i--;
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return ret; /* input was zero */
+ j = 1;
+ while (j < n[i])
+ j = 2 * j + 1;
+ ret[i] = j;
+ while (--i > 0)
+ ret[i] = BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a (max 32-bit) long into a bignum.
+ */
+Bignum bignum_from_long(unsigned long nn)
+{
+ Bignum ret;
+ BignumDblInt n = nn;
+
+ ret = newbn(3);
+ ret[1] = (BignumInt)(n & BIGNUM_INT_MASK);
+ ret[2] = (BignumInt)((n >> BIGNUM_INT_BITS) & BIGNUM_INT_MASK);
+ ret[3] = 0;
+ ret[0] = (ret[2] ? 2 : 1);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a long to a bignum.
+ */
+Bignum bignum_add_long(Bignum number, unsigned long addendx)
+{
+ Bignum ret = newbn(number[0] + 1);
+ int i, maxspot = 0;
+ BignumDblInt carry = 0, addend = addendx;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= (int)ret[0]; i++) {
+ carry += addend & BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ carry += (i <= (int)number[0] ? number[i] : 0);
+ addend >>= BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ ret[i] = (BignumInt) carry & BIGNUM_INT_MASK;
+ carry >>= BIGNUM_INT_BITS;
+ if (ret[i] != 0)
+ maxspot = i;
+ }
+ ret[0] = maxspot;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the residue of a bignum, modulo a (max 16-bit) short.
+ */
+unsigned short bignum_mod_short(Bignum number, unsigned short modulus)
+{
+ BignumDblInt mod, r;
+ int i;
+
+ r = 0;
+ mod = modulus;
+ for (i = number[0]; i > 0; i--)
+ r = (r * (BIGNUM_TOP_BIT % mod) * 2 + number[i] % mod) % mod;
+ return (unsigned short) r;
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+void diagbn(char *prefix, Bignum md)
+{
+ int i, nibbles, morenibbles;
+ static const char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+ debug(("%s0x", prefix ? prefix : ""));
+
+ nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(md)) / 4;
+ if (nibbles < 1)
+ nibbles = 1;
+ morenibbles = 4 * md[0] - nibbles;
+ for (i = 0; i < morenibbles; i++)
+ debug(("-"));
+ for (i = nibbles; i--;)
+ debug(("%c",
+ hex[(bignum_byte(md, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF]));
+
+ if (prefix)
+ debug(("\n"));
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Simple division.
+ */
+Bignum bigdiv(Bignum a, Bignum b)
+{
+ Bignum q = newbn(a[0]);
+ bigdivmod(a, b, NULL, q);
+ return q;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simple remainder.
+ */
+Bignum bigmod(Bignum a, Bignum b)
+{
+ Bignum r = newbn(b[0]);
+ bigdivmod(a, b, r, NULL);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Greatest common divisor.
+ */
+Bignum biggcd(Bignum av, Bignum bv)
+{
+ Bignum a = copybn(av);
+ Bignum b = copybn(bv);
+
+ while (bignum_cmp(b, Zero) != 0) {
+ Bignum t = newbn(b[0]);
+ bigdivmod(a, b, t, NULL);
+ while (t[0] > 1 && t[t[0]] == 0)
+ t[0]--;
+ freebn(a);
+ a = b;
+ b = t;
+ }
+
+ freebn(b);
+ return a;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modular inverse, using Euclid's extended algorithm.
+ */
+Bignum modinv(Bignum number, Bignum modulus)
+{
+ Bignum a = copybn(modulus);
+ Bignum b = copybn(number);
+ Bignum xp = copybn(Zero);
+ Bignum x = copybn(One);
+ int sign = +1;
+
+ while (bignum_cmp(b, One) != 0) {
+ Bignum t = newbn(b[0]);
+ Bignum q = newbn(a[0]);
+ bigdivmod(a, b, t, q);
+ while (t[0] > 1 && t[t[0]] == 0)
+ t[0]--;
+ freebn(a);
+ a = b;
+ b = t;
+ t = xp;
+ xp = x;
+ x = bigmuladd(q, xp, t);
+ sign = -sign;
+ freebn(t);
+ freebn(q);
+ }
+
+ freebn(b);
+ freebn(a);
+ freebn(xp);
+
+ /* now we know that sign * x == 1, and that x < modulus */
+ if (sign < 0) {
+ /* set a new x to be modulus - x */
+ Bignum newx = newbn(modulus[0]);
+ BignumInt carry = 0;
+ int maxspot = 1;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= (int)newx[0]; i++) {
+ BignumInt aword = (i <= (int)modulus[0] ? modulus[i] : 0);
+ BignumInt bword = (i <= (int)x[0] ? x[i] : 0);
+ newx[i] = aword - bword - carry;
+ bword = ~bword;
+ carry = carry ? (newx[i] >= bword) : (newx[i] > bword);
+ if (newx[i] != 0)
+ maxspot = i;
+ }
+ newx[0] = maxspot;
+ freebn(x);
+ x = newx;
+ }
+
+ /* and return. */
+ return x;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Render a bignum into decimal. Return a malloced string holding
+ * the decimal representation.
+ */
+char *bignum_decimal(Bignum x)
+{
+ int ndigits, ndigit;
+ int i, iszero;
+ BignumDblInt carry;
+ char *ret;
+ BignumInt *workspace;
+
+ /*
+ * First, estimate the number of digits. Since log(10)/log(2)
+ * is just greater than 93/28 (the joys of continued fraction
+ * approximations...) we know that for every 93 bits, we need
+ * at most 28 digits. This will tell us how much to malloc.
+ *
+ * Formally: if x has i bits, that means x is strictly less
+ * than 2^i. Since 2 is less than 10^(28/93), this is less than
+ * 10^(28i/93). We need an integer power of ten, so we must
+ * round up (rounding down might make it less than x again).
+ * Therefore if we multiply the bit count by 28/93, rounding
+ * up, we will have enough digits.
+ *
+ * i=0 (i.e., x=0) is an irritating special case.
+ */
+ i = bignum_bitcount(x);
+ if (!i)
+ ndigits = 1; /* x = 0 */
+ else
+ ndigits = (28 * i + 92) / 93; /* multiply by 28/93 and round up */
+ ndigits++; /* allow for trailing \0 */
+ ret = snewn(ndigits, char);
+
+ /*
+ * Now allocate some workspace to hold the binary form as we
+ * repeatedly divide it by ten. Initialise this to the
+ * big-endian form of the number.
+ */
+ workspace = snewn(x[0], BignumInt);
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)x[0]; i++)
+ workspace[i] = x[x[0] - i];
+
+ /*
+ * Next, write the decimal number starting with the last digit.
+ * We use ordinary short division, dividing 10 into the
+ * workspace.
+ */
+ ndigit = ndigits - 1;
+ ret[ndigit] = '\0';
+ do {
+ iszero = 1;
+ carry = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)x[0]; i++) {
+ carry = (carry << BIGNUM_INT_BITS) + workspace[i];
+ workspace[i] = (BignumInt) (carry / 10);
+ if (workspace[i])
+ iszero = 0;
+ carry %= 10;
+ }
+ ret[--ndigit] = (char) (carry + '0');
+ } while (!iszero);
+
+ /*
+ * There's a chance we've fallen short of the start of the
+ * string. Correct if so.
+ */
+ if (ndigit > 0)
+ memmove(ret, ret + ndigit, ndigits - ndigit);
+
+ /*
+ * Done.
+ */
+ sfree(workspace);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshcrc.c b/tools/plink/sshcrc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0a72a31ec --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshcrc.c @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +/*
+ * CRC32 implementation.
+ *
+ * The basic concept of a CRC is that you treat your bit-string
+ * abcdefg... as a ludicrously long polynomial M=a+bx+cx^2+dx^3+...
+ * over Z[2]. You then take a modulus polynomial P, and compute the
+ * remainder of M on division by P. Thus, an erroneous message N
+ * will only have the same CRC if the difference E = M-N is an
+ * exact multiple of P. (Note that as we are working over Z[2], M-N
+ * = N-M = M+N; but that's not very important.)
+ *
+ * What makes the CRC good is choosing P to have good properties:
+ *
+ * - If its first and last terms are both nonzero then it cannot
+ * be a factor of any single term x^i. Therefore if M and N
+ * differ by exactly one bit their CRCs will guaranteeably
+ * be distinct.
+ *
+ * - If it has a prime (irreducible) factor with three terms then
+ * it cannot divide a polynomial of the form x^i(1+x^j).
+ * Therefore if M and N differ by exactly _two_ bits they will
+ * have different CRCs.
+ *
+ * - If it has a factor (x+1) then it cannot divide a polynomial
+ * with an odd number of terms. Therefore if M and N differ by
+ * _any odd_ number of bits they will have different CRCs.
+ *
+ * - If the error term E is of the form x^i*B(x) where B(x) has
+ * order less than P (i.e. a short _burst_ of errors) then P
+ * cannot divide E (since no polynomial can divide a shorter
+ * one), so any such error burst will be spotted.
+ *
+ * The CRC32 standard polynomial is
+ * x^32+x^26+x^23+x^22+x^16+x^12+x^11+x^10+x^8+x^7+x^5+x^4+x^2+x^1+x^0
+ *
+ * In fact, we don't compute M mod P; we compute M*x^32 mod P.
+ *
+ * The concrete implementation of the CRC is this: we maintain at
+ * all times a 32-bit word which is the current remainder of the
+ * polynomial mod P. Whenever we receive an extra bit, we multiply
+ * the existing remainder by x, add (XOR) the x^32 term thus
+ * generated to the new x^32 term caused by the incoming bit, and
+ * remove the resulting combined x^32 term if present by replacing
+ * it with (P-x^32).
+ *
+ * Bit 0 of the word is the x^31 term and bit 31 is the x^0 term.
+ * Thus, multiplying by x means shifting right. So the actual
+ * algorithm goes like this:
+ *
+ * x32term = (crcword & 1) ^ newbit;
+ * crcword = (crcword >> 1) ^ (x32term * 0xEDB88320);
+ *
+ * In practice, we pre-compute what will happen to crcword on any
+ * given sequence of eight incoming bits, and store that in a table
+ * which we then use at run-time to do the job:
+ *
+ * outgoingplusnew = (crcword & 0xFF) ^ newbyte;
+ * crcword = (crcword >> 8) ^ table[outgoingplusnew];
+ *
+ * where table[outgoingplusnew] is computed by setting crcword=0
+ * and then iterating the first code fragment eight times (taking
+ * the incoming byte low bit first).
+ *
+ * Note that all shifts are rightward and thus no assumption is
+ * made about exact word length! (Although word length must be at
+ * _least_ 32 bits, but ANSI C guarantees this for `unsigned long'
+ * anyway.)
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Multi-function module. Can be compiled three ways.
+ *
+ * - Compile with no special #defines. Will generate a table
+ * that's already initialised at compile time, and one function
+ * crc32_compute(buf,len) that uses it. Normal usage.
+ *
+ * - Compile with INITFUNC defined. Will generate an uninitialised
+ * array as the table, and as well as crc32_compute(buf,len) it
+ * will also generate void crc32_init(void) which sets up the
+ * table at run time. Useful if binary size is important.
+ *
+ * - Compile with GENPROGRAM defined. Will create a standalone
+ * program that does the initialisation and outputs the table as
+ * C code.
+ */
+
+#define POLY (0xEDB88320L)
+
+#ifdef GENPROGRAM
+#define INITFUNC /* the gen program needs the init func :-) */
+#endif
+
+#ifdef INITFUNC
+
+/*
+ * This variant of the code generates the table at run-time from an
+ * init function.
+ */
+static unsigned long crc32_table[256];
+
+void crc32_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned long crcword;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ unsigned long newbyte, x32term;
+ int j;
+ crcword = 0;
+ newbyte = i;
+ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+ x32term = (crcword ^ newbyte) & 1;
+ crcword = (crcword >> 1) ^ (x32term * POLY);
+ newbyte >>= 1;
+ }
+ crc32_table[i] = crcword;
+ }
+}
+
+#else
+
+/*
+ * This variant of the code has the data already prepared.
+ */
+static const unsigned long crc32_table[256] = {
+ 0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xEE0E612CL, 0x990951BAL,
+ 0x076DC419L, 0x706AF48FL, 0xE963A535L, 0x9E6495A3L,
+ 0x0EDB8832L, 0x79DCB8A4L, 0xE0D5E91EL, 0x97D2D988L,
+ 0x09B64C2BL, 0x7EB17CBDL, 0xE7B82D07L, 0x90BF1D91L,
+ 0x1DB71064L, 0x6AB020F2L, 0xF3B97148L, 0x84BE41DEL,
+ 0x1ADAD47DL, 0x6DDDE4EBL, 0xF4D4B551L, 0x83D385C7L,
+ 0x136C9856L, 0x646BA8C0L, 0xFD62F97AL, 0x8A65C9ECL,
+ 0x14015C4FL, 0x63066CD9L, 0xFA0F3D63L, 0x8D080DF5L,
+ 0x3B6E20C8L, 0x4C69105EL, 0xD56041E4L, 0xA2677172L,
+ 0x3C03E4D1L, 0x4B04D447L, 0xD20D85FDL, 0xA50AB56BL,
+ 0x35B5A8FAL, 0x42B2986CL, 0xDBBBC9D6L, 0xACBCF940L,
+ 0x32D86CE3L, 0x45DF5C75L, 0xDCD60DCFL, 0xABD13D59L,
+ 0x26D930ACL, 0x51DE003AL, 0xC8D75180L, 0xBFD06116L,
+ 0x21B4F4B5L, 0x56B3C423L, 0xCFBA9599L, 0xB8BDA50FL,
+ 0x2802B89EL, 0x5F058808L, 0xC60CD9B2L, 0xB10BE924L,
+ 0x2F6F7C87L, 0x58684C11L, 0xC1611DABL, 0xB6662D3DL,
+ 0x76DC4190L, 0x01DB7106L, 0x98D220BCL, 0xEFD5102AL,
+ 0x71B18589L, 0x06B6B51FL, 0x9FBFE4A5L, 0xE8B8D433L,
+ 0x7807C9A2L, 0x0F00F934L, 0x9609A88EL, 0xE10E9818L,
+ 0x7F6A0DBBL, 0x086D3D2DL, 0x91646C97L, 0xE6635C01L,
+ 0x6B6B51F4L, 0x1C6C6162L, 0x856530D8L, 0xF262004EL,
+ 0x6C0695EDL, 0x1B01A57BL, 0x8208F4C1L, 0xF50FC457L,
+ 0x65B0D9C6L, 0x12B7E950L, 0x8BBEB8EAL, 0xFCB9887CL,
+ 0x62DD1DDFL, 0x15DA2D49L, 0x8CD37CF3L, 0xFBD44C65L,
+ 0x4DB26158L, 0x3AB551CEL, 0xA3BC0074L, 0xD4BB30E2L,
+ 0x4ADFA541L, 0x3DD895D7L, 0xA4D1C46DL, 0xD3D6F4FBL,
+ 0x4369E96AL, 0x346ED9FCL, 0xAD678846L, 0xDA60B8D0L,
+ 0x44042D73L, 0x33031DE5L, 0xAA0A4C5FL, 0xDD0D7CC9L,
+ 0x5005713CL, 0x270241AAL, 0xBE0B1010L, 0xC90C2086L,
+ 0x5768B525L, 0x206F85B3L, 0xB966D409L, 0xCE61E49FL,
+ 0x5EDEF90EL, 0x29D9C998L, 0xB0D09822L, 0xC7D7A8B4L,
+ 0x59B33D17L, 0x2EB40D81L, 0xB7BD5C3BL, 0xC0BA6CADL,
+ 0xEDB88320L, 0x9ABFB3B6L, 0x03B6E20CL, 0x74B1D29AL,
+ 0xEAD54739L, 0x9DD277AFL, 0x04DB2615L, 0x73DC1683L,
+ 0xE3630B12L, 0x94643B84L, 0x0D6D6A3EL, 0x7A6A5AA8L,
+ 0xE40ECF0BL, 0x9309FF9DL, 0x0A00AE27L, 0x7D079EB1L,
+ 0xF00F9344L, 0x8708A3D2L, 0x1E01F268L, 0x6906C2FEL,
+ 0xF762575DL, 0x806567CBL, 0x196C3671L, 0x6E6B06E7L,
+ 0xFED41B76L, 0x89D32BE0L, 0x10DA7A5AL, 0x67DD4ACCL,
+ 0xF9B9DF6FL, 0x8EBEEFF9L, 0x17B7BE43L, 0x60B08ED5L,
+ 0xD6D6A3E8L, 0xA1D1937EL, 0x38D8C2C4L, 0x4FDFF252L,
+ 0xD1BB67F1L, 0xA6BC5767L, 0x3FB506DDL, 0x48B2364BL,
+ 0xD80D2BDAL, 0xAF0A1B4CL, 0x36034AF6L, 0x41047A60L,
+ 0xDF60EFC3L, 0xA867DF55L, 0x316E8EEFL, 0x4669BE79L,
+ 0xCB61B38CL, 0xBC66831AL, 0x256FD2A0L, 0x5268E236L,
+ 0xCC0C7795L, 0xBB0B4703L, 0x220216B9L, 0x5505262FL,
+ 0xC5BA3BBEL, 0xB2BD0B28L, 0x2BB45A92L, 0x5CB36A04L,
+ 0xC2D7FFA7L, 0xB5D0CF31L, 0x2CD99E8BL, 0x5BDEAE1DL,
+ 0x9B64C2B0L, 0xEC63F226L, 0x756AA39CL, 0x026D930AL,
+ 0x9C0906A9L, 0xEB0E363FL, 0x72076785L, 0x05005713L,
+ 0x95BF4A82L, 0xE2B87A14L, 0x7BB12BAEL, 0x0CB61B38L,
+ 0x92D28E9BL, 0xE5D5BE0DL, 0x7CDCEFB7L, 0x0BDBDF21L,
+ 0x86D3D2D4L, 0xF1D4E242L, 0x68DDB3F8L, 0x1FDA836EL,
+ 0x81BE16CDL, 0xF6B9265BL, 0x6FB077E1L, 0x18B74777L,
+ 0x88085AE6L, 0xFF0F6A70L, 0x66063BCAL, 0x11010B5CL,
+ 0x8F659EFFL, 0xF862AE69L, 0x616BFFD3L, 0x166CCF45L,
+ 0xA00AE278L, 0xD70DD2EEL, 0x4E048354L, 0x3903B3C2L,
+ 0xA7672661L, 0xD06016F7L, 0x4969474DL, 0x3E6E77DBL,
+ 0xAED16A4AL, 0xD9D65ADCL, 0x40DF0B66L, 0x37D83BF0L,
+ 0xA9BCAE53L, 0xDEBB9EC5L, 0x47B2CF7FL, 0x30B5FFE9L,
+ 0xBDBDF21CL, 0xCABAC28AL, 0x53B39330L, 0x24B4A3A6L,
+ 0xBAD03605L, 0xCDD70693L, 0x54DE5729L, 0x23D967BFL,
+ 0xB3667A2EL, 0xC4614AB8L, 0x5D681B02L, 0x2A6F2B94L,
+ 0xB40BBE37L, 0xC30C8EA1L, 0x5A05DF1BL, 0x2D02EF8DL
+};
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GENPROGRAM
+int main(void)
+{
+ unsigned long crcword;
+ int i;
+
+ crc32_init();
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ printf("%s0x%08XL%s",
+ (i % 4 == 0 ? " " : " "),
+ crc32_table[i],
+ (i % 4 == 3 ? (i == 255 ? "\n" : ",\n") : ","));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+unsigned long crc32_update(unsigned long crcword, const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) buf;
+ while (len--) {
+ unsigned long newbyte = *p++;
+ newbyte ^= crcword & 0xFFL;
+ crcword = (crcword >> 8) ^ crc32_table[newbyte];
+ }
+ return crcword;
+}
+
+unsigned long crc32_compute(const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ return crc32_update(0L, buf, len);
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshcrcda.c b/tools/plink/sshcrcda.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c2cf705b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshcrcda.c @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.14 2001/06/23 15:12:18 itojun Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+ *
+ * Modified for use in PuTTY by Simon Tatham
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+typedef unsigned char uchar;
+typedef unsigned short uint16;
+
+/* SSH Constants */
+#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024)
+#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8)
+
+/* Hashing constants */
+#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024)
+#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (sizeof(uint16))
+#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2)
+#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff)
+#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff)
+#define HASH_IV (0xfffe)
+
+#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE)
+
+/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
+#define HASH(x) GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(x)
+
+#define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
+
+uchar ONE[4] = { 1, 0, 0, 0 };
+uchar ZERO[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+struct crcda_ctx {
+ uint16 *h;
+ uint32 n;
+};
+
+void *crcda_make_context(void)
+{
+ struct crcda_ctx *ret = snew(struct crcda_ctx);
+ ret->h = NULL;
+ ret->n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void crcda_free_context(void *handle)
+{
+ struct crcda_ctx *ctx = (struct crcda_ctx *)handle;
+ if (ctx) {
+ sfree(ctx->h);
+ ctx->h = NULL;
+ sfree(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+static void crc_update(uint32 *a, void *b)
+{
+ *a = crc32_update(*a, b, 4);
+}
+
+/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
+static int check_crc(uchar *S, uchar *buf, uint32 len, uchar *IV)
+{
+ uint32 crc;
+ uchar *c;
+
+ crc = 0;
+ if (IV && !CMP(S, IV)) {
+ crc_update(&crc, ONE);
+ crc_update(&crc, ZERO);
+ }
+ for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (!CMP(S, c)) {
+ crc_update(&crc, ONE);
+ crc_update(&crc, ZERO);
+ } else {
+ crc_update(&crc, ZERO);
+ crc_update(&crc, ZERO);
+ }
+ }
+ return (crc == 0);
+}
+
+/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
+int detect_attack(void *handle, uchar *buf, uint32 len, uchar *IV)
+{
+ struct crcda_ctx *ctx = (struct crcda_ctx *)handle;
+ register uint32 i, j;
+ uint32 l;
+ register uchar *c;
+ uchar *d;
+
+ assert(!(len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
+ len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0));
+ for (l = ctx->n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
+ ;
+
+ if (ctx->h == NULL) {
+ ctx->n = l;
+ ctx->h = snewn(ctx->n, uint16);
+ } else {
+ if (l > ctx->n) {
+ ctx->n = l;
+ ctx->h = sresize(ctx->h, ctx->n, uint16);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
+ for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (IV && (!CMP(c, IV))) {
+ if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
+ return 1; /* attack detected */
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (!CMP(c, d)) {
+ if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
+ return 1; /* attack detected */
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0; /* ok */
+ }
+ memset(ctx->h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, ctx->n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+
+ if (IV)
+ ctx->h[HASH(IV) & (ctx->n - 1)] = HASH_IV;
+
+ for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
+ for (i = HASH(c) & (ctx->n - 1); ctx->h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
+ i = (i + 1) & (ctx->n - 1)) {
+ if (ctx->h[i] == HASH_IV) {
+ if (!CMP(c, IV)) {
+ if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
+ return 1; /* attack detected */
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (!CMP(c, buf + ctx->h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
+ if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
+ return 1; /* attack detected */
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ctx->h[i] = j;
+ }
+ return 0; /* ok */
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshdes.c b/tools/plink/sshdes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0beb273ce --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshdes.c @@ -0,0 +1,1031 @@ +#include <assert.h>
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+
+/* des.c - implementation of DES
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Description of DES
+ * ------------------
+ *
+ * Unlike the description in FIPS 46, I'm going to use _sensible_ indices:
+ * bits in an n-bit word are numbered from 0 at the LSB to n-1 at the MSB.
+ * And S-boxes are indexed by six consecutive bits, not by the outer two
+ * followed by the middle four.
+ *
+ * The DES encryption routine requires a 64-bit input, and a key schedule K
+ * containing 16 48-bit elements.
+ *
+ * First the input is permuted by the initial permutation IP.
+ * Then the input is split into 32-bit words L and R. (L is the MSW.)
+ * Next, 16 rounds. In each round:
+ * (L, R) <- (R, L xor f(R, K[i]))
+ * Then the pre-output words L and R are swapped.
+ * Then L and R are glued back together into a 64-bit word. (L is the MSW,
+ * again, but since we just swapped them, the MSW is the R that came out
+ * of the last round.)
+ * The 64-bit output block is permuted by the inverse of IP and returned.
+ *
+ * Decryption is identical except that the elements of K are used in the
+ * opposite order. (This wouldn't work if that word swap didn't happen.)
+ *
+ * The function f, used in each round, accepts a 32-bit word R and a
+ * 48-bit key block K. It produces a 32-bit output.
+ *
+ * First R is expanded to 48 bits using the bit-selection function E.
+ * The resulting 48-bit block is XORed with the key block K to produce
+ * a 48-bit block X.
+ * This block X is split into eight groups of 6 bits. Each group of 6
+ * bits is then looked up in one of the eight S-boxes to convert
+ * it to 4 bits. These eight groups of 4 bits are glued back
+ * together to produce a 32-bit preoutput block.
+ * The preoutput block is permuted using the permutation P and returned.
+ *
+ * Key setup maps a 64-bit key word into a 16x48-bit key schedule. Although
+ * the approved input format for the key is a 64-bit word, eight of the
+ * bits are discarded, so the actual quantity of key used is 56 bits.
+ *
+ * First the input key is converted to two 28-bit words C and D using
+ * the bit-selection function PC1.
+ * Then 16 rounds of key setup occur. In each round, C and D are each
+ * rotated left by either 1 or 2 bits (depending on which round), and
+ * then converted into a key schedule element using the bit-selection
+ * function PC2.
+ *
+ * That's the actual algorithm. Now for the tedious details: all those
+ * painful permutations and lookup tables.
+ *
+ * IP is a 64-to-64 bit permutation. Its output contains the following
+ * bits of its input (listed in order MSB to LSB of output).
+ *
+ * 6 14 22 30 38 46 54 62 4 12 20 28 36 44 52 60
+ * 2 10 18 26 34 42 50 58 0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56
+ * 7 15 23 31 39 47 55 63 5 13 21 29 37 45 53 61
+ * 3 11 19 27 35 43 51 59 1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57
+ *
+ * E is a 32-to-48 bit selection function. Its output contains the following
+ * bits of its input (listed in order MSB to LSB of output).
+ *
+ * 0 31 30 29 28 27 28 27 26 25 24 23 24 23 22 21 20 19 20 19 18 17 16 15
+ * 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 11 10 9 8 7 8 7 6 5 4 3 4 3 2 1 0 31
+ *
+ * The S-boxes are arbitrary table-lookups each mapping a 6-bit input to a
+ * 4-bit output. In other words, each S-box is an array[64] of 4-bit numbers.
+ * The S-boxes are listed below. The first S-box listed is applied to the
+ * most significant six bits of the block X; the last one is applied to the
+ * least significant.
+ *
+ * 14 0 4 15 13 7 1 4 2 14 15 2 11 13 8 1
+ * 3 10 10 6 6 12 12 11 5 9 9 5 0 3 7 8
+ * 4 15 1 12 14 8 8 2 13 4 6 9 2 1 11 7
+ * 15 5 12 11 9 3 7 14 3 10 10 0 5 6 0 13
+ *
+ * 15 3 1 13 8 4 14 7 6 15 11 2 3 8 4 14
+ * 9 12 7 0 2 1 13 10 12 6 0 9 5 11 10 5
+ * 0 13 14 8 7 10 11 1 10 3 4 15 13 4 1 2
+ * 5 11 8 6 12 7 6 12 9 0 3 5 2 14 15 9
+ *
+ * 10 13 0 7 9 0 14 9 6 3 3 4 15 6 5 10
+ * 1 2 13 8 12 5 7 14 11 12 4 11 2 15 8 1
+ * 13 1 6 10 4 13 9 0 8 6 15 9 3 8 0 7
+ * 11 4 1 15 2 14 12 3 5 11 10 5 14 2 7 12
+ *
+ * 7 13 13 8 14 11 3 5 0 6 6 15 9 0 10 3
+ * 1 4 2 7 8 2 5 12 11 1 12 10 4 14 15 9
+ * 10 3 6 15 9 0 0 6 12 10 11 1 7 13 13 8
+ * 15 9 1 4 3 5 14 11 5 12 2 7 8 2 4 14
+ *
+ * 2 14 12 11 4 2 1 12 7 4 10 7 11 13 6 1
+ * 8 5 5 0 3 15 15 10 13 3 0 9 14 8 9 6
+ * 4 11 2 8 1 12 11 7 10 1 13 14 7 2 8 13
+ * 15 6 9 15 12 0 5 9 6 10 3 4 0 5 14 3
+ *
+ * 12 10 1 15 10 4 15 2 9 7 2 12 6 9 8 5
+ * 0 6 13 1 3 13 4 14 14 0 7 11 5 3 11 8
+ * 9 4 14 3 15 2 5 12 2 9 8 5 12 15 3 10
+ * 7 11 0 14 4 1 10 7 1 6 13 0 11 8 6 13
+ *
+ * 4 13 11 0 2 11 14 7 15 4 0 9 8 1 13 10
+ * 3 14 12 3 9 5 7 12 5 2 10 15 6 8 1 6
+ * 1 6 4 11 11 13 13 8 12 1 3 4 7 10 14 7
+ * 10 9 15 5 6 0 8 15 0 14 5 2 9 3 2 12
+ *
+ * 13 1 2 15 8 13 4 8 6 10 15 3 11 7 1 4
+ * 10 12 9 5 3 6 14 11 5 0 0 14 12 9 7 2
+ * 7 2 11 1 4 14 1 7 9 4 12 10 14 8 2 13
+ * 0 15 6 12 10 9 13 0 15 3 3 5 5 6 8 11
+ *
+ * P is a 32-to-32 bit permutation. Its output contains the following
+ * bits of its input (listed in order MSB to LSB of output).
+ *
+ * 16 25 12 11 3 20 4 15 31 17 9 6 27 14 1 22
+ * 30 24 8 18 0 5 29 23 13 19 2 26 10 21 28 7
+ *
+ * PC1 is a 64-to-56 bit selection function. Its output is in two words,
+ * C and D. The word C contains the following bits of its input (listed
+ * in order MSB to LSB of output).
+ *
+ * 7 15 23 31 39 47 55 63 6 14 22 30 38 46
+ * 54 62 5 13 21 29 37 45 53 61 4 12 20 28
+ *
+ * And the word D contains these bits.
+ *
+ * 1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57 2 10 18 26 34 42
+ * 50 58 3 11 19 27 35 43 51 59 36 44 52 60
+ *
+ * PC2 is a 56-to-48 bit selection function. Its input is in two words,
+ * C and D. These are treated as one 56-bit word (with C more significant,
+ * so that bits 55 to 28 of the word are bits 27 to 0 of C, and bits 27 to
+ * 0 of the word are bits 27 to 0 of D). The output contains the following
+ * bits of this 56-bit input word (listed in order MSB to LSB of output).
+ *
+ * 42 39 45 32 55 51 53 28 41 50 35 46 33 37 44 52 30 48 40 49 29 36 43 54
+ * 15 4 25 19 9 1 26 16 5 11 23 8 12 7 17 0 22 3 10 14 6 20 27 24
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation details
+ * ----------------------
+ *
+ * If you look at the code in this module, you'll find it looks
+ * nothing _like_ the above algorithm. Here I explain the
+ * differences...
+ *
+ * Key setup has not been heavily optimised here. We are not
+ * concerned with key agility: we aren't codebreakers. We don't
+ * mind a little delay (and it really is a little one; it may be a
+ * factor of five or so slower than it could be but it's still not
+ * an appreciable length of time) while setting up. The only tweaks
+ * in the key setup are ones which change the format of the key
+ * schedule to speed up the actual encryption. I'll describe those
+ * below.
+ *
+ * The first and most obvious optimisation is the S-boxes. Since
+ * each S-box always targets the same four bits in the final 32-bit
+ * word, so the output from (for example) S-box 0 must always be
+ * shifted left 28 bits, we can store the already-shifted outputs
+ * in the lookup tables. This reduces lookup-and-shift to lookup,
+ * so the S-box step is now just a question of ORing together eight
+ * table lookups.
+ *
+ * The permutation P is just a bit order change; it's invariant
+ * with respect to OR, in that P(x)|P(y) = P(x|y). Therefore, we
+ * can apply P to every entry of the S-box tables and then we don't
+ * have to do it in the code of f(). This yields a set of tables
+ * which might be called SP-boxes.
+ *
+ * The bit-selection function E is our next target. Note that E is
+ * immediately followed by the operation of splitting into 6-bit
+ * chunks. Examining the 6-bit chunks coming out of E we notice
+ * they're all contiguous within the word (speaking cyclically -
+ * the end two wrap round); so we can extract those bit strings
+ * individually rather than explicitly running E. This would yield
+ * code such as
+ *
+ * y |= SPboxes[0][ (rotl(R, 5) ^ top6bitsofK) & 0x3F ];
+ * t |= SPboxes[1][ (rotl(R,11) ^ next6bitsofK) & 0x3F ];
+ *
+ * and so on; and the key schedule preparation would have to
+ * provide each 6-bit chunk separately.
+ *
+ * Really we'd like to XOR in the key schedule element before
+ * looking up bit strings in R. This we can't do, naively, because
+ * the 6-bit strings we want overlap. But look at the strings:
+ *
+ * 3322222222221111111111
+ * bit 10987654321098765432109876543210
+ *
+ * box0 XXXXX X
+ * box1 XXXXXX
+ * box2 XXXXXX
+ * box3 XXXXXX
+ * box4 XXXXXX
+ * box5 XXXXXX
+ * box6 XXXXXX
+ * box7 X XXXXX
+ *
+ * The bit strings we need to XOR in for boxes 0, 2, 4 and 6 don't
+ * overlap with each other. Neither do the ones for boxes 1, 3, 5
+ * and 7. So we could provide the key schedule in the form of two
+ * words that we can separately XOR into R, and then every S-box
+ * index is available as a (cyclically) contiguous 6-bit substring
+ * of one or the other of the results.
+ *
+ * The comments in Eric Young's libdes implementation point out
+ * that two of these bit strings require a rotation (rather than a
+ * simple shift) to extract. It's unavoidable that at least _one_
+ * must do; but we can actually run the whole inner algorithm (all
+ * 16 rounds) rotated one bit to the left, so that what the `real'
+ * DES description sees as L=0x80000001 we see as L=0x00000003.
+ * This requires rotating all our SP-box entries one bit to the
+ * left, and rotating each word of the key schedule elements one to
+ * the left, and rotating L and R one bit left just after IP and
+ * one bit right again just before FP. And in each round we convert
+ * a rotate into a shift, so we've saved a few per cent.
+ *
+ * That's about it for the inner loop; the SP-box tables as listed
+ * below are what I've described here (the original S value,
+ * shifted to its final place in the input to P, run through P, and
+ * then rotated one bit left). All that remains is to optimise the
+ * initial permutation IP.
+ *
+ * IP is not an arbitrary permutation. It has the nice property
+ * that if you take any bit number, write it in binary (6 bits),
+ * permute those 6 bits and invert some of them, you get the final
+ * position of that bit. Specifically, the bit whose initial
+ * position is given (in binary) as fedcba ends up in position
+ * AcbFED (where a capital letter denotes the inverse of a bit).
+ *
+ * We have the 64-bit data in two 32-bit words L and R, where bits
+ * in L are those with f=1 and bits in R are those with f=0. We
+ * note that we can do a simple transformation: suppose we exchange
+ * the bits with f=1,c=0 and the bits with f=0,c=1. This will cause
+ * the bit fedcba to be in position cedfba - we've `swapped' bits c
+ * and f in the position of each bit!
+ *
+ * Better still, this transformation is easy. In the example above,
+ * bits in L with c=0 are bits 0x0F0F0F0F, and those in R with c=1
+ * are 0xF0F0F0F0. So we can do
+ *
+ * difference = ((R >> 4) ^ L) & 0x0F0F0F0F
+ * R ^= (difference << 4)
+ * L ^= difference
+ *
+ * to perform the swap. Let's denote this by bitswap(4,0x0F0F0F0F).
+ * Also, we can invert the bit at the top just by exchanging L and
+ * R. So in a few swaps and a few of these bit operations we can
+ * do:
+ *
+ * Initially the position of bit fedcba is fedcba
+ * Swap L with R to make it Fedcba
+ * Perform bitswap( 4,0x0F0F0F0F) to make it cedFba
+ * Perform bitswap(16,0x0000FFFF) to make it ecdFba
+ * Swap L with R to make it EcdFba
+ * Perform bitswap( 2,0x33333333) to make it bcdFEa
+ * Perform bitswap( 8,0x00FF00FF) to make it dcbFEa
+ * Swap L with R to make it DcbFEa
+ * Perform bitswap( 1,0x55555555) to make it acbFED
+ * Swap L with R to make it AcbFED
+ *
+ * (In the actual code the four swaps are implicit: R and L are
+ * simply used the other way round in the first, second and last
+ * bitswap operations.)
+ *
+ * The final permutation is just the inverse of IP, so it can be
+ * performed by a similar set of operations.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ word32 k0246[16], k1357[16];
+ word32 iv0, iv1;
+} DESContext;
+
+#define rotl(x, c) ( (x << c) | (x >> (32-c)) )
+#define rotl28(x, c) ( ( (x << c) | (x >> (28-c)) ) & 0x0FFFFFFF)
+
+static word32 bitsel(word32 * input, const int *bitnums, int size)
+{
+ word32 ret = 0;
+ while (size--) {
+ int bitpos = *bitnums++;
+ ret <<= 1;
+ if (bitpos >= 0)
+ ret |= 1 & (input[bitpos / 32] >> (bitpos % 32));
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void des_key_setup(word32 key_msw, word32 key_lsw, DESContext * sched)
+{
+
+ static const int PC1_Cbits[] = {
+ 7, 15, 23, 31, 39, 47, 55, 63, 6, 14, 22, 30, 38, 46,
+ 54, 62, 5, 13, 21, 29, 37, 45, 53, 61, 4, 12, 20, 28
+ };
+ static const int PC1_Dbits[] = {
+ 1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41, 49, 57, 2, 10, 18, 26, 34, 42,
+ 50, 58, 3, 11, 19, 27, 35, 43, 51, 59, 36, 44, 52, 60
+ };
+ /*
+ * The bit numbers in the two lists below don't correspond to
+ * the ones in the above description of PC2, because in the
+ * above description C and D are concatenated so `bit 28' means
+ * bit 0 of C. In this implementation we're using the standard
+ * `bitsel' function above and C is in the second word, so bit
+ * 0 of C is addressed by writing `32' here.
+ */
+ static const int PC2_0246[] = {
+ 49, 36, 59, 55, -1, -1, 37, 41, 48, 56, 34, 52, -1, -1, 15, 4,
+ 25, 19, 9, 1, -1, -1, 12, 7, 17, 0, 22, 3, -1, -1, 46, 43
+ };
+ static const int PC2_1357[] = {
+ -1, -1, 57, 32, 45, 54, 39, 50, -1, -1, 44, 53, 33, 40, 47, 58,
+ -1, -1, 26, 16, 5, 11, 23, 8, -1, -1, 10, 14, 6, 20, 27, 24
+ };
+ static const int leftshifts[] =
+ { 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1 };
+
+ word32 C, D;
+ word32 buf[2];
+ int i;
+
+ buf[0] = key_lsw;
+ buf[1] = key_msw;
+
+ C = bitsel(buf, PC1_Cbits, 28);
+ D = bitsel(buf, PC1_Dbits, 28);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ C = rotl28(C, leftshifts[i]);
+ D = rotl28(D, leftshifts[i]);
+ buf[0] = D;
+ buf[1] = C;
+ sched->k0246[i] = bitsel(buf, PC2_0246, 32);
+ sched->k1357[i] = bitsel(buf, PC2_1357, 32);
+ }
+
+ sched->iv0 = sched->iv1 = 0;
+}
+
+static const word32 SPboxes[8][64] = {
+ {0x01010400, 0x00000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010404,
+ 0x01010004, 0x00010404, 0x00000004, 0x00010000,
+ 0x00000400, 0x01010400, 0x01010404, 0x00000400,
+ 0x01000404, 0x01010004, 0x01000000, 0x00000004,
+ 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00010400,
+ 0x00010400, 0x01010000, 0x01010000, 0x01000404,
+ 0x00010004, 0x01000004, 0x01000004, 0x00010004,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01000000,
+ 0x00010000, 0x01010404, 0x00000004, 0x01010000,
+ 0x01010400, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x00000400,
+ 0x01010004, 0x00010000, 0x00010400, 0x01000004,
+ 0x00000400, 0x00000004, 0x01000404, 0x00010404,
+ 0x01010404, 0x00010004, 0x01010000, 0x01000404,
+ 0x01000004, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01010400,
+ 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00010004, 0x00010400, 0x00000000, 0x01010004L},
+
+ {0x80108020, 0x80008000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020,
+ 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, 0x80008020,
+ 0x80000020, 0x80108020, 0x80108000, 0x80000000,
+ 0x80008000, 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020,
+ 0x00108000, 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x00000000,
+ 0x80000000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, 0x80100000,
+ 0x00100020, 0x80000020, 0x00000000, 0x00108000,
+ 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x80100000, 0x00008020,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00108020, 0x80100020, 0x00100000,
+ 0x80008020, 0x80100000, 0x80108000, 0x00008000,
+ 0x80100000, 0x80008000, 0x00000020, 0x80108020,
+ 0x00108020, 0x00000020, 0x00008000, 0x80000000,
+ 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x00100000, 0x80000020,
+ 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x80000020, 0x00100020,
+ 0x00108000, 0x00000000, 0x80008000, 0x00008020,
+ 0x80000000, 0x80100020, 0x80108020, 0x00108000L},
+
+ {0x00000208, 0x08020200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008,
+ 0x08000200, 0x00000000, 0x00020208, 0x08000200,
+ 0x00020008, 0x08000008, 0x08000008, 0x00020000,
+ 0x08020208, 0x00020008, 0x08020000, 0x00000208,
+ 0x08000000, 0x00000008, 0x08020200, 0x00000200,
+ 0x00020200, 0x08020000, 0x08020008, 0x00020208,
+ 0x08000208, 0x00020200, 0x00020000, 0x08000208,
+ 0x00000008, 0x08020208, 0x00000200, 0x08000000,
+ 0x08020200, 0x08000000, 0x00020008, 0x00000208,
+ 0x00020000, 0x08020200, 0x08000200, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000200, 0x00020008, 0x08020208, 0x08000200,
+ 0x08000008, 0x00000200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008,
+ 0x08000208, 0x00020000, 0x08000000, 0x08020208,
+ 0x00000008, 0x00020208, 0x00020200, 0x08000008,
+ 0x08020000, 0x08000208, 0x00000208, 0x08020000,
+ 0x00020208, 0x00000008, 0x08020008, 0x00020200L},
+
+ {0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080,
+ 0x00802080, 0x00800081, 0x00800001, 0x00002001,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00802000, 0x00802000, 0x00802081,
+ 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00800080, 0x00800001,
+ 0x00000001, 0x00002000, 0x00800000, 0x00802001,
+ 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002001, 0x00002080,
+ 0x00800081, 0x00000001, 0x00002080, 0x00800080,
+ 0x00002000, 0x00802080, 0x00802081, 0x00000081,
+ 0x00800080, 0x00800001, 0x00802000, 0x00802081,
+ 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00802000,
+ 0x00002080, 0x00800080, 0x00800081, 0x00000001,
+ 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080,
+ 0x00802081, 0x00000081, 0x00000001, 0x00002000,
+ 0x00800001, 0x00002001, 0x00802080, 0x00800081,
+ 0x00002001, 0x00002080, 0x00800000, 0x00802001,
+ 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002000, 0x00802080L},
+
+ {0x00000100, 0x02080100, 0x02080000, 0x42000100,
+ 0x00080000, 0x00000100, 0x40000000, 0x02080000,
+ 0x40080100, 0x00080000, 0x02000100, 0x40080100,
+ 0x42000100, 0x42080000, 0x00080100, 0x40000000,
+ 0x02000000, 0x40080000, 0x40080000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x40000100, 0x42080100, 0x42080100, 0x02000100,
+ 0x42080000, 0x40000100, 0x00000000, 0x42000000,
+ 0x02080100, 0x02000000, 0x42000000, 0x00080100,
+ 0x00080000, 0x42000100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000,
+ 0x40000000, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, 0x40080100,
+ 0x02000100, 0x40000000, 0x42080000, 0x02080100,
+ 0x40080100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, 0x42080000,
+ 0x42080100, 0x00080100, 0x42000000, 0x42080100,
+ 0x02080000, 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x42000000,
+ 0x00080100, 0x02000100, 0x40000100, 0x00080000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x02080100, 0x40000100L},
+
+ {0x20000010, 0x20400000, 0x00004000, 0x20404010,
+ 0x20400000, 0x00000010, 0x20404010, 0x00400000,
+ 0x20004000, 0x00404010, 0x00400000, 0x20000010,
+ 0x00400010, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00004000,
+ 0x00404000, 0x20004010, 0x00000010, 0x20400010,
+ 0x20400010, 0x00000000, 0x00404010, 0x20404000,
+ 0x00004010, 0x00404000, 0x20404000, 0x20000000,
+ 0x20004000, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, 0x00404000,
+ 0x20404010, 0x00400000, 0x00004010, 0x20000010,
+ 0x00400000, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010,
+ 0x20000010, 0x20404010, 0x00404000, 0x20400000,
+ 0x00404010, 0x20404000, 0x00000000, 0x20400010,
+ 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x20400000, 0x00404010,
+ 0x00004000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00000000,
+ 0x20404000, 0x20000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010L},
+
+ {0x00200000, 0x04200002, 0x04000802, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000800, 0x04000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800,
+ 0x04200802, 0x00200000, 0x00000000, 0x04000002,
+ 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x04200002, 0x00000802,
+ 0x04000800, 0x00200802, 0x00200002, 0x04000800,
+ 0x04000002, 0x04200000, 0x04200800, 0x00200002,
+ 0x04200000, 0x00000800, 0x00000802, 0x04200802,
+ 0x00200800, 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x00200800,
+ 0x04000000, 0x00200800, 0x00200000, 0x04000802,
+ 0x04000802, 0x04200002, 0x04200002, 0x00000002,
+ 0x00200002, 0x04000000, 0x04000800, 0x00200000,
+ 0x04200800, 0x00000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800,
+ 0x00000802, 0x04000002, 0x04200802, 0x04200000,
+ 0x00200800, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x04200802,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00200802, 0x04200000, 0x00000800,
+ 0x04000002, 0x04000800, 0x00000800, 0x00200002L},
+
+ {0x10001040, 0x00001000, 0x00040000, 0x10041040,
+ 0x10000000, 0x10001040, 0x00000040, 0x10000000,
+ 0x00040040, 0x10040000, 0x10041040, 0x00041000,
+ 0x10041000, 0x00041040, 0x00001000, 0x00000040,
+ 0x10040000, 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00001040,
+ 0x00041000, 0x00040040, 0x10040040, 0x10041000,
+ 0x00001040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10040040,
+ 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00041040, 0x00040000,
+ 0x00041040, 0x00040000, 0x10041000, 0x00001000,
+ 0x00000040, 0x10040040, 0x00001000, 0x00041040,
+ 0x10001000, 0x00000040, 0x10000040, 0x10040000,
+ 0x10040040, 0x10000000, 0x00040000, 0x10001040,
+ 0x00000000, 0x10041040, 0x00040040, 0x10000040,
+ 0x10040000, 0x10001000, 0x10001040, 0x00000000,
+ 0x10041040, 0x00041000, 0x00041000, 0x00001040,
+ 0x00001040, 0x00040040, 0x10000000, 0x10041000L}
+};
+
+#define f(R, K0246, K1357) (\
+ s0246 = R ^ K0246, \
+ s1357 = R ^ K1357, \
+ s0246 = rotl(s0246, 28), \
+ SPboxes[0] [(s0246 >> 24) & 0x3F] | \
+ SPboxes[1] [(s1357 >> 24) & 0x3F] | \
+ SPboxes[2] [(s0246 >> 16) & 0x3F] | \
+ SPboxes[3] [(s1357 >> 16) & 0x3F] | \
+ SPboxes[4] [(s0246 >> 8) & 0x3F] | \
+ SPboxes[5] [(s1357 >> 8) & 0x3F] | \
+ SPboxes[6] [(s0246 ) & 0x3F] | \
+ SPboxes[7] [(s1357 ) & 0x3F])
+
+#define bitswap(L, R, n, mask) (\
+ swap = mask & ( (R >> n) ^ L ), \
+ R ^= swap << n, \
+ L ^= swap)
+
+/* Initial permutation */
+#define IP(L, R) (\
+ bitswap(R, L, 4, 0x0F0F0F0F), \
+ bitswap(R, L, 16, 0x0000FFFF), \
+ bitswap(L, R, 2, 0x33333333), \
+ bitswap(L, R, 8, 0x00FF00FF), \
+ bitswap(R, L, 1, 0x55555555))
+
+/* Final permutation */
+#define FP(L, R) (\
+ bitswap(R, L, 1, 0x55555555), \
+ bitswap(L, R, 8, 0x00FF00FF), \
+ bitswap(L, R, 2, 0x33333333), \
+ bitswap(R, L, 16, 0x0000FFFF), \
+ bitswap(R, L, 4, 0x0F0F0F0F))
+
+static void des_encipher(word32 * output, word32 L, word32 R,
+ DESContext * sched)
+{
+ word32 swap, s0246, s1357;
+
+ IP(L, R);
+
+ L = rotl(L, 1);
+ R = rotl(R, 1);
+
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[0], sched->k1357[0]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[1], sched->k1357[1]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[2], sched->k1357[2]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[3], sched->k1357[3]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[4], sched->k1357[4]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[5], sched->k1357[5]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[6], sched->k1357[6]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[7], sched->k1357[7]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[8], sched->k1357[8]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[9], sched->k1357[9]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[10], sched->k1357[10]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[11], sched->k1357[11]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[12], sched->k1357[12]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[13], sched->k1357[13]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[14], sched->k1357[14]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[15], sched->k1357[15]);
+
+ L = rotl(L, 31);
+ R = rotl(R, 31);
+
+ swap = L;
+ L = R;
+ R = swap;
+
+ FP(L, R);
+
+ output[0] = L;
+ output[1] = R;
+}
+
+static void des_decipher(word32 * output, word32 L, word32 R,
+ DESContext * sched)
+{
+ word32 swap, s0246, s1357;
+
+ IP(L, R);
+
+ L = rotl(L, 1);
+ R = rotl(R, 1);
+
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[15], sched->k1357[15]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[14], sched->k1357[14]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[13], sched->k1357[13]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[12], sched->k1357[12]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[11], sched->k1357[11]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[10], sched->k1357[10]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[9], sched->k1357[9]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[8], sched->k1357[8]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[7], sched->k1357[7]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[6], sched->k1357[6]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[5], sched->k1357[5]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[4], sched->k1357[4]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[3], sched->k1357[3]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[2], sched->k1357[2]);
+ L ^= f(R, sched->k0246[1], sched->k1357[1]);
+ R ^= f(L, sched->k0246[0], sched->k1357[0]);
+
+ L = rotl(L, 31);
+ R = rotl(R, 31);
+
+ swap = L;
+ L = R;
+ R = swap;
+
+ FP(L, R);
+
+ output[0] = L;
+ output[1] = R;
+}
+
+static void des_cbc_encrypt(unsigned char *blk,
+ unsigned int len, DESContext * sched)
+{
+ word32 out[2], iv0, iv1;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = sched->iv0;
+ iv1 = sched->iv1;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ iv0 ^= GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ iv1 ^= GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ des_encipher(out, iv0, iv1, sched);
+ iv0 = out[0];
+ iv1 = out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ blk += 8;
+ }
+ sched->iv0 = iv0;
+ sched->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void des_cbc_decrypt(unsigned char *blk,
+ unsigned int len, DESContext * sched)
+{
+ word32 out[2], iv0, iv1, xL, xR;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = sched->iv0;
+ iv1 = sched->iv1;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ xL = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ xR = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ des_decipher(out, xL, xR, sched);
+ iv0 ^= out[0];
+ iv1 ^= out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ blk += 8;
+ iv0 = xL;
+ iv1 = xR;
+ }
+ sched->iv0 = iv0;
+ sched->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void des_3cbc_encrypt(unsigned char *blk,
+ unsigned int len, DESContext * scheds)
+{
+ des_cbc_encrypt(blk, len, &scheds[0]);
+ des_cbc_decrypt(blk, len, &scheds[1]);
+ des_cbc_encrypt(blk, len, &scheds[2]);
+}
+
+static void des_cbc3_encrypt(unsigned char *blk,
+ unsigned int len, DESContext * scheds)
+{
+ word32 out[2], iv0, iv1;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = scheds->iv0;
+ iv1 = scheds->iv1;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ iv0 ^= GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ iv1 ^= GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ des_encipher(out, iv0, iv1, &scheds[0]);
+ des_decipher(out, out[0], out[1], &scheds[1]);
+ des_encipher(out, out[0], out[1], &scheds[2]);
+ iv0 = out[0];
+ iv1 = out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ blk += 8;
+ }
+ scheds->iv0 = iv0;
+ scheds->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void des_3cbc_decrypt(unsigned char *blk,
+ unsigned int len, DESContext * scheds)
+{
+ des_cbc_decrypt(blk, len, &scheds[2]);
+ des_cbc_encrypt(blk, len, &scheds[1]);
+ des_cbc_decrypt(blk, len, &scheds[0]);
+}
+
+static void des_cbc3_decrypt(unsigned char *blk,
+ unsigned int len, DESContext * scheds)
+{
+ word32 out[2], iv0, iv1, xL, xR;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = scheds->iv0;
+ iv1 = scheds->iv1;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ xL = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ xR = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4);
+ des_decipher(out, xL, xR, &scheds[2]);
+ des_encipher(out, out[0], out[1], &scheds[1]);
+ des_decipher(out, out[0], out[1], &scheds[0]);
+ iv0 ^= out[0];
+ iv1 ^= out[1];
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, iv0);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk + 4, iv1);
+ blk += 8;
+ iv0 = xL;
+ iv1 = xR;
+ }
+ scheds->iv0 = iv0;
+ scheds->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void des_sdctr3(unsigned char *blk,
+ unsigned int len, DESContext * scheds)
+{
+ word32 b[2], iv0, iv1, tmp;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ assert((len & 7) == 0);
+
+ iv0 = scheds->iv0;
+ iv1 = scheds->iv1;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+ des_encipher(b, iv0, iv1, &scheds[0]);
+ des_decipher(b, b[0], b[1], &scheds[1]);
+ des_encipher(b, b[0], b[1], &scheds[2]);
+ tmp = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, tmp ^ b[0]);
+ blk += 4;
+ tmp = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(blk, tmp ^ b[1]);
+ blk += 4;
+ if ((iv1 = (iv1 + 1) & 0xffffffff) == 0)
+ iv0 = (iv0 + 1) & 0xffffffff;
+ }
+ scheds->iv0 = iv0;
+ scheds->iv1 = iv1;
+}
+
+static void *des3_make_context(void)
+{
+ return snewn(3, DESContext);
+}
+
+static void *des3_ssh1_make_context(void)
+{
+ /* Need 3 keys for each direction, in SSH-1 */
+ return snewn(6, DESContext);
+}
+
+static void *des_make_context(void)
+{
+ return snew(DESContext);
+}
+
+static void *des_ssh1_make_context(void)
+{
+ /* Need one key for each direction, in SSH-1 */
+ return snewn(2, DESContext);
+}
+
+static void des3_free_context(void *handle) /* used for both 3DES and DES */
+{
+ sfree(handle);
+}
+
+static void des3_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &keys[0]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 8),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 12), &keys[1]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 16),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 20), &keys[2]);
+}
+
+static void des3_iv(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ keys[0].iv0 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key);
+ keys[0].iv1 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4);
+}
+
+static void des_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &keys[0]);
+}
+
+static void des3_sesskey(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des3_key(keys, key);
+ des3_key(keys+3, key);
+}
+
+static void des3_encrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_3cbc_encrypt(blk, len, keys);
+}
+
+static void des3_decrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_3cbc_decrypt(blk, len, keys+3);
+}
+
+static void des3_ssh2_encrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_cbc3_encrypt(blk, len, keys);
+}
+
+static void des3_ssh2_decrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_cbc3_decrypt(blk, len, keys);
+}
+
+static void des3_ssh2_sdctr(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_sdctr3(blk, len, keys);
+}
+
+static void des_ssh2_encrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_cbc_encrypt(blk, len, keys);
+}
+
+static void des_ssh2_decrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_cbc_decrypt(blk, len, keys);
+}
+
+void des3_decrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext ourkeys[3];
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &ourkeys[0]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 8),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 12), &ourkeys[1]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &ourkeys[2]);
+ des_3cbc_decrypt(blk, len, ourkeys);
+ memset(ourkeys, 0, sizeof(ourkeys));
+}
+
+void des3_encrypt_pubkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext ourkeys[3];
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &ourkeys[0]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 8),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 12), &ourkeys[1]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &ourkeys[2]);
+ des_3cbc_encrypt(blk, len, ourkeys);
+ memset(ourkeys, 0, sizeof(ourkeys));
+}
+
+void des3_decrypt_pubkey_ossh(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv,
+ unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext ourkeys[3];
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &ourkeys[0]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 8),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 12), &ourkeys[1]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 16),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 20), &ourkeys[2]);
+ ourkeys[0].iv0 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(iv);
+ ourkeys[0].iv1 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(iv+4);
+ des_cbc3_decrypt(blk, len, ourkeys);
+ memset(ourkeys, 0, sizeof(ourkeys));
+}
+
+void des3_encrypt_pubkey_ossh(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv,
+ unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext ourkeys[3];
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), &ourkeys[0]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 8),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 12), &ourkeys[1]);
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 16),
+ GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 20), &ourkeys[2]);
+ ourkeys[0].iv0 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(iv);
+ ourkeys[0].iv1 = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(iv+4);
+ des_cbc3_encrypt(blk, len, ourkeys);
+ memset(ourkeys, 0, sizeof(ourkeys));
+}
+
+static void des_keysetup_xdmauth(unsigned char *keydata, DESContext *dc)
+{
+ unsigned char key[8];
+ int i, nbits, j;
+ unsigned int bits;
+
+ bits = 0;
+ nbits = 0;
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (nbits < 7) {
+ bits = (bits << 8) | keydata[j];
+ nbits += 8;
+ j++;
+ }
+ key[i] = (bits >> (nbits - 7)) << 1;
+ bits &= ~(0x7F << (nbits - 7));
+ nbits -= 7;
+ }
+
+ des_key_setup(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key), GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(key + 4), dc);
+}
+
+void des_encrypt_xdmauth(unsigned char *keydata, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext dc;
+ des_keysetup_xdmauth(keydata, &dc);
+ des_cbc_encrypt(blk, 24, &dc);
+}
+
+void des_decrypt_xdmauth(unsigned char *keydata, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext dc;
+ des_keysetup_xdmauth(keydata, &dc);
+ des_cbc_decrypt(blk, 24, &dc);
+}
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_3des_ssh2 = {
+ des3_make_context, des3_free_context, des3_iv, des3_key,
+ des3_ssh2_encrypt_blk, des3_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "3des-cbc",
+ 8, 168, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "triple-DES CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_3des_ssh2_ctr = {
+ des3_make_context, des3_free_context, des3_iv, des3_key,
+ des3_ssh2_sdctr, des3_ssh2_sdctr,
+ "3des-ctr",
+ 8, 168, 0, "triple-DES SDCTR"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Single DES in SSH-2. "des-cbc" is marked as HISTORIC in
+ * RFC 4250, referring to
+ * FIPS-46-3. ("Single DES (i.e., DES) will be permitted
+ * for legacy systems only.") , but ssh.com support it and
+ * apparently aren't the only people to do so, so we sigh
+ * and implement it anyway.
+ */
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_des_ssh2 = {
+ des_make_context, des3_free_context, des3_iv, des_key,
+ des_ssh2_encrypt_blk, des_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "des-cbc",
+ 8, 56, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "single-DES CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher ssh_des_sshcom_ssh2 = {
+ des_make_context, des3_free_context, des3_iv, des_key,
+ des_ssh2_encrypt_blk, des_ssh2_decrypt_blk,
+ "des-cbc@ssh.com",
+ 8, 56, SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC, "single-DES CBC"
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher *const des3_list[] = {
+ &ssh_3des_ssh2_ctr,
+ &ssh_3des_ssh2
+};
+
+const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_3des = {
+ sizeof(des3_list) / sizeof(*des3_list),
+ des3_list
+};
+
+static const struct ssh2_cipher *const des_list[] = {
+ &ssh_des_ssh2,
+ &ssh_des_sshcom_ssh2
+};
+
+const struct ssh2_ciphers ssh2_des = {
+ sizeof(des_list) / sizeof(*des_list),
+ des_list
+};
+
+const struct ssh_cipher ssh_3des = {
+ des3_ssh1_make_context, des3_free_context, des3_sesskey,
+ des3_encrypt_blk, des3_decrypt_blk,
+ 8, "triple-DES inner-CBC"
+};
+
+static void des_sesskey(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_key(keys, key);
+ des_key(keys+1, key);
+}
+
+static void des_encrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_cbc_encrypt(blk, len, keys);
+}
+
+static void des_decrypt_blk(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len)
+{
+ DESContext *keys = (DESContext *) handle;
+ des_cbc_decrypt(blk, len, keys+1);
+}
+
+const struct ssh_cipher ssh_des = {
+ des_ssh1_make_context, des3_free_context, des_sesskey,
+ des_encrypt_blk, des_decrypt_blk,
+ 8, "single-DES CBC"
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshdh.c b/tools/plink/sshdh.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41df756db --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +/*
+ * Diffie-Hellman implementation for PuTTY.
+ */
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+/*
+ * The primes used in the group1 and group14 key exchange.
+ */
+static const unsigned char P1[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
+ 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
+ 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
+ 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
+ 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
+ 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+static const unsigned char P14[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
+ 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
+ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
+ 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
+ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
+ 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
+ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
+ 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
+ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
+ 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
+ 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36,
+ 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
+ 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56,
+ 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
+ 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08,
+ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
+ 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2,
+ 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
+ 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C,
+ 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
+ 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+/*
+ * The generator g = 2 (used for both group1 and group14).
+ */
+static const unsigned char G[] = { 2 };
+
+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1 = {
+ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1", "group1",
+ KEXTYPE_DH, P1, G, lenof(P1), lenof(G), &ssh_sha1
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex *const group1_list[] = {
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1
+};
+
+const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group1 = {
+ sizeof(group1_list) / sizeof(*group1_list),
+ group1_list
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1 = {
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1", "group14",
+ KEXTYPE_DH, P14, G, lenof(P14), lenof(G), &ssh_sha1
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex *const group14_list[] = {
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1
+};
+
+const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group14 = {
+ sizeof(group14_list) / sizeof(*group14_list),
+ group14_list
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256 = {
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256", NULL,
+ KEXTYPE_DH, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha256
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1 = {
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1", NULL,
+ KEXTYPE_DH, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha1
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex *const gex_list[] = {
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256,
+ &ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1
+};
+
+const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_gex = {
+ sizeof(gex_list) / sizeof(*gex_list),
+ gex_list
+};
+
+/*
+ * Variables.
+ */
+struct dh_ctx {
+ Bignum x, e, p, q, qmask, g;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Common DH initialisation.
+ */
+static void dh_init(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->q = bignum_rshift(ctx->p, 1);
+ ctx->qmask = bignum_bitmask(ctx->q);
+ ctx->x = ctx->e = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise DH for a standard group.
+ */
+void *dh_setup_group(const struct ssh_kex *kex)
+{
+ struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
+ ctx->p = bignum_from_bytes(kex->pdata, kex->plen);
+ ctx->g = bignum_from_bytes(kex->gdata, kex->glen);
+ dh_init(ctx);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise DH for a server-supplied group.
+ */
+void *dh_setup_gex(Bignum pval, Bignum gval)
+{
+ struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
+ ctx->p = copybn(pval);
+ ctx->g = copybn(gval);
+ dh_init(ctx);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up and free a context.
+ */
+void dh_cleanup(void *handle)
+{
+ struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
+ freebn(ctx->x);
+ freebn(ctx->e);
+ freebn(ctx->p);
+ freebn(ctx->g);
+ freebn(ctx->q);
+ freebn(ctx->qmask);
+ sfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DH stage 1: invent a number x between 1 and q, and compute e =
+ * g^x mod p. Return e.
+ *
+ * If `nbits' is greater than zero, it is used as an upper limit
+ * for the number of bits in x. This is safe provided that (a) you
+ * use twice as many bits in x as the number of bits you expect to
+ * use in your session key, and (b) the DH group is a safe prime
+ * (which SSH demands that it must be).
+ *
+ * P. C. van Oorschot, M. J. Wiener
+ * "On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents".
+ * Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '96
+ * Springer-Verlag, May 1996.
+ */
+Bignum dh_create_e(void *handle, int nbits)
+{
+ struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
+ int i;
+
+ int nbytes;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ nbytes = ssh1_bignum_length(ctx->qmask);
+ buf = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * Create a potential x, by ANDing a string of random bytes
+ * with qmask.
+ */
+ if (ctx->x)
+ freebn(ctx->x);
+ if (nbits == 0 || nbits > bignum_bitcount(ctx->qmask)) {
+ ssh1_write_bignum(buf, ctx->qmask);
+ for (i = 2; i < nbytes; i++)
+ buf[i] &= random_byte();
+ ssh1_read_bignum(buf, nbytes, &ctx->x); /* can't fail */
+ } else {
+ int b, nb;
+ ctx->x = bn_power_2(nbits);
+ b = nb = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
+ if (nb == 0) {
+ nb = 8;
+ b = random_byte();
+ }
+ bignum_set_bit(ctx->x, i, b & 1);
+ b >>= 1;
+ nb--;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (bignum_cmp(ctx->x, One) <= 0 || bignum_cmp(ctx->x, ctx->q) >= 0);
+
+ sfree(buf);
+
+ /*
+ * Done. Now compute e = g^x mod p.
+ */
+ ctx->e = modpow(ctx->g, ctx->x, ctx->p);
+
+ return ctx->e;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DH stage 2: given a number f, compute K = f^x mod p.
+ */
+Bignum dh_find_K(void *handle, Bignum f)
+{
+ struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
+ Bignum ret;
+ ret = modpow(f, ctx->x, ctx->p);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshdss.c b/tools/plink/sshdss.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dba1db1b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshdss.c @@ -0,0 +1,643 @@ +/*
+ * Digital Signature Standard implementation for PuTTY.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static void sha_mpint(SHA_State * s, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char lenbuf[4];
+ int len;
+ len = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 8) / 8;
+ PUT_32BIT(lenbuf, len);
+ SHA_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 4);
+ while (len-- > 0) {
+ lenbuf[0] = bignum_byte(b, len);
+ SHA_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 1);
+ }
+ memset(lenbuf, 0, sizeof(lenbuf));
+}
+
+static void sha512_mpint(SHA512_State * s, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char lenbuf[4];
+ int len;
+ len = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 8) / 8;
+ PUT_32BIT(lenbuf, len);
+ SHA512_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 4);
+ while (len-- > 0) {
+ lenbuf[0] = bignum_byte(b, len);
+ SHA512_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 1);
+ }
+ memset(lenbuf, 0, sizeof(lenbuf));
+}
+
+static void getstring(char **data, int *datalen, char **p, int *length)
+{
+ *p = NULL;
+ if (*datalen < 4)
+ return;
+ *length = GET_32BIT(*data);
+ *datalen -= 4;
+ *data += 4;
+ if (*datalen < *length)
+ return;
+ *p = *data;
+ *data += *length;
+ *datalen -= *length;
+}
+static Bignum getmp(char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int length;
+ Bignum b;
+
+ getstring(data, datalen, &p, &length);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+ if (p[0] & 0x80)
+ return NULL; /* negative mp */
+ b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
+ return b;
+}
+
+static Bignum get160(char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ Bignum b;
+
+ b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)*data, 20);
+ *data += 20;
+ *datalen -= 20;
+
+ return b;
+}
+
+static void *dss_newkey(char *data, int len)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int slen;
+ struct dss_key *dss;
+
+ dss = snew(struct dss_key);
+ if (!dss)
+ return NULL;
+ getstring(&data, &len, &p, &slen);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_DSS
+ {
+ int i;
+ printf("key:");
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ printf(" %02x", (unsigned char) (data[i]));
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!p || memcmp(p, "ssh-dss", 7)) {
+ sfree(dss);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ dss->p = getmp(&data, &len);
+ dss->q = getmp(&data, &len);
+ dss->g = getmp(&data, &len);
+ dss->y = getmp(&data, &len);
+
+ return dss;
+}
+
+static void dss_freekey(void *key)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ freebn(dss->p);
+ freebn(dss->q);
+ freebn(dss->g);
+ freebn(dss->y);
+ sfree(dss);
+}
+
+static char *dss_fmtkey(void *key)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ char *p;
+ int len, i, pos, nibbles;
+ static const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+ if (!dss->p)
+ return NULL;
+ len = 8 + 4 + 1; /* 4 x "0x", punctuation, \0 */
+ len += 4 * (bignum_bitcount(dss->p) + 15) / 16;
+ len += 4 * (bignum_bitcount(dss->q) + 15) / 16;
+ len += 4 * (bignum_bitcount(dss->g) + 15) / 16;
+ len += 4 * (bignum_bitcount(dss->y) + 15) / 16;
+ p = snewn(len, char);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pos = 0;
+ pos += sprintf(p + pos, "0x");
+ nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(dss->p)) / 4;
+ if (nibbles < 1)
+ nibbles = 1;
+ for (i = nibbles; i--;)
+ p[pos++] =
+ hex[(bignum_byte(dss->p, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];
+ pos += sprintf(p + pos, ",0x");
+ nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(dss->q)) / 4;
+ if (nibbles < 1)
+ nibbles = 1;
+ for (i = nibbles; i--;)
+ p[pos++] =
+ hex[(bignum_byte(dss->q, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];
+ pos += sprintf(p + pos, ",0x");
+ nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(dss->g)) / 4;
+ if (nibbles < 1)
+ nibbles = 1;
+ for (i = nibbles; i--;)
+ p[pos++] =
+ hex[(bignum_byte(dss->g, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];
+ pos += sprintf(p + pos, ",0x");
+ nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(dss->y)) / 4;
+ if (nibbles < 1)
+ nibbles = 1;
+ for (i = nibbles; i--;)
+ p[pos++] =
+ hex[(bignum_byte(dss->y, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];
+ p[pos] = '\0';
+ return p;
+}
+
+static char *dss_fingerprint(void *key)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ struct MD5Context md5c;
+ unsigned char digest[16], lenbuf[4];
+ char buffer[16 * 3 + 40];
+ char *ret;
+ int numlen, i;
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, (unsigned char *)"\0\0\0\7ssh-dss", 11);
+
+#define ADD_BIGNUM(bignum) \
+ numlen = (bignum_bitcount(bignum)+8)/8; \
+ PUT_32BIT(lenbuf, numlen); MD5Update(&md5c, lenbuf, 4); \
+ for (i = numlen; i-- ;) { \
+ unsigned char c = bignum_byte(bignum, i); \
+ MD5Update(&md5c, &c, 1); \
+ }
+ ADD_BIGNUM(dss->p);
+ ADD_BIGNUM(dss->q);
+ ADD_BIGNUM(dss->g);
+ ADD_BIGNUM(dss->y);
+#undef ADD_BIGNUM
+
+ MD5Final(digest, &md5c);
+
+ sprintf(buffer, "ssh-dss %d ", bignum_bitcount(dss->p));
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ sprintf(buffer + strlen(buffer), "%s%02x", i ? ":" : "",
+ digest[i]);
+ ret = snewn(strlen(buffer) + 1, char);
+ if (ret)
+ strcpy(ret, buffer);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int dss_verifysig(void *key, char *sig, int siglen,
+ char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ char *p;
+ int slen;
+ char hash[20];
+ Bignum r, s, w, gu1p, yu2p, gu1yu2p, u1, u2, sha, v;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!dss->p)
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_DSS
+ {
+ int i;
+ printf("sig:");
+ for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++)
+ printf(" %02x", (unsigned char) (sig[i]));
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Commercial SSH (2.0.13) and OpenSSH disagree over the format
+ * of a DSA signature. OpenSSH is in line with RFC 4253:
+ * it uses a string "ssh-dss", followed by a 40-byte string
+ * containing two 160-bit integers end-to-end. Commercial SSH
+ * can't be bothered with the header bit, and considers a DSA
+ * signature blob to be _just_ the 40-byte string containing
+ * the two 160-bit integers. We tell them apart by measuring
+ * the length: length 40 means the commercial-SSH bug, anything
+ * else is assumed to be RFC-compliant.
+ */
+ if (siglen != 40) { /* bug not present; read admin fields */
+ getstring(&sig, &siglen, &p, &slen);
+ if (!p || slen != 7 || memcmp(p, "ssh-dss", 7)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sig += 4, siglen -= 4; /* skip yet another length field */
+ }
+ r = get160(&sig, &siglen);
+ s = get160(&sig, &siglen);
+ if (!r || !s)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Step 1. w <- s^-1 mod q.
+ */
+ w = modinv(s, dss->q);
+
+ /*
+ * Step 2. u1 <- SHA(message) * w mod q.
+ */
+ SHA_Simple(data, datalen, (unsigned char *)hash);
+ p = hash;
+ slen = 20;
+ sha = get160(&p, &slen);
+ u1 = modmul(sha, w, dss->q);
+
+ /*
+ * Step 3. u2 <- r * w mod q.
+ */
+ u2 = modmul(r, w, dss->q);
+
+ /*
+ * Step 4. v <- (g^u1 * y^u2 mod p) mod q.
+ */
+ gu1p = modpow(dss->g, u1, dss->p);
+ yu2p = modpow(dss->y, u2, dss->p);
+ gu1yu2p = modmul(gu1p, yu2p, dss->p);
+ v = modmul(gu1yu2p, One, dss->q);
+
+ /*
+ * Step 5. v should now be equal to r.
+ */
+
+ ret = !bignum_cmp(v, r);
+
+ freebn(w);
+ freebn(sha);
+ freebn(gu1p);
+ freebn(yu2p);
+ freebn(gu1yu2p);
+ freebn(v);
+ freebn(r);
+ freebn(s);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dss_public_blob(void *key, int *len)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ int plen, qlen, glen, ylen, bloblen;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *blob, *p;
+
+ plen = (bignum_bitcount(dss->p) + 8) / 8;
+ qlen = (bignum_bitcount(dss->q) + 8) / 8;
+ glen = (bignum_bitcount(dss->g) + 8) / 8;
+ ylen = (bignum_bitcount(dss->y) + 8) / 8;
+
+ /*
+ * string "ssh-dss", mpint p, mpint q, mpint g, mpint y. Total
+ * 27 + sum of lengths. (five length fields, 20+7=27).
+ */
+ bloblen = 27 + plen + qlen + glen + ylen;
+ blob = snewn(bloblen, unsigned char);
+ p = blob;
+ PUT_32BIT(p, 7);
+ p += 4;
+ memcpy(p, "ssh-dss", 7);
+ p += 7;
+ PUT_32BIT(p, plen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = plen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(dss->p, i);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, qlen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = qlen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(dss->q, i);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, glen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = glen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(dss->g, i);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, ylen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = ylen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(dss->y, i);
+ assert(p == blob + bloblen);
+ *len = bloblen;
+ return blob;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dss_private_blob(void *key, int *len)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ int xlen, bloblen;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *blob, *p;
+
+ xlen = (bignum_bitcount(dss->x) + 8) / 8;
+
+ /*
+ * mpint x, string[20] the SHA of p||q||g. Total 4 + xlen.
+ */
+ bloblen = 4 + xlen;
+ blob = snewn(bloblen, unsigned char);
+ p = blob;
+ PUT_32BIT(p, xlen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = xlen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(dss->x, i);
+ assert(p == blob + bloblen);
+ *len = bloblen;
+ return blob;
+}
+
+static void *dss_createkey(unsigned char *pub_blob, int pub_len,
+ unsigned char *priv_blob, int priv_len)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss;
+ char *pb = (char *) priv_blob;
+ char *hash;
+ int hashlen;
+ SHA_State s;
+ unsigned char digest[20];
+ Bignum ytest;
+
+ dss = dss_newkey((char *) pub_blob, pub_len);
+ dss->x = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the obsolete hash in the old DSS key format.
+ */
+ hashlen = -1;
+ getstring(&pb, &priv_len, &hash, &hashlen);
+ if (hashlen == 20) {
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ sha_mpint(&s, dss->p);
+ sha_mpint(&s, dss->q);
+ sha_mpint(&s, dss->g);
+ SHA_Final(&s, digest);
+ if (0 != memcmp(hash, digest, 20)) {
+ dss_freekey(dss);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now ensure g^x mod p really is y.
+ */
+ ytest = modpow(dss->g, dss->x, dss->p);
+ if (0 != bignum_cmp(ytest, dss->y)) {
+ dss_freekey(dss);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ freebn(ytest);
+
+ return dss;
+}
+
+static void *dss_openssh_createkey(unsigned char **blob, int *len)
+{
+ char **b = (char **) blob;
+ struct dss_key *dss;
+
+ dss = snew(struct dss_key);
+ if (!dss)
+ return NULL;
+
+ dss->p = getmp(b, len);
+ dss->q = getmp(b, len);
+ dss->g = getmp(b, len);
+ dss->y = getmp(b, len);
+ dss->x = getmp(b, len);
+
+ if (!dss->p || !dss->q || !dss->g || !dss->y || !dss->x) {
+ sfree(dss->p);
+ sfree(dss->q);
+ sfree(dss->g);
+ sfree(dss->y);
+ sfree(dss->x);
+ sfree(dss);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return dss;
+}
+
+static int dss_openssh_fmtkey(void *key, unsigned char *blob, int len)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ int bloblen, i;
+
+ bloblen =
+ ssh2_bignum_length(dss->p) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(dss->q) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(dss->g) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(dss->y) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(dss->x);
+
+ if (bloblen > len)
+ return bloblen;
+
+ bloblen = 0;
+#define ENC(x) \
+ PUT_32BIT(blob+bloblen, ssh2_bignum_length((x))-4); bloblen += 4; \
+ for (i = ssh2_bignum_length((x))-4; i-- ;) blob[bloblen++]=bignum_byte((x),i);
+ ENC(dss->p);
+ ENC(dss->q);
+ ENC(dss->g);
+ ENC(dss->y);
+ ENC(dss->x);
+
+ return bloblen;
+}
+
+static int dss_pubkey_bits(void *blob, int len)
+{
+ struct dss_key *dss;
+ int ret;
+
+ dss = dss_newkey((char *) blob, len);
+ ret = bignum_bitcount(dss->p);
+ dss_freekey(dss);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dss_sign(void *key, char *data, int datalen, int *siglen)
+{
+ /*
+ * The basic DSS signing algorithm is:
+ *
+ * - invent a random k between 1 and q-1 (exclusive).
+ * - Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q.
+ * - Compute s = k^-1 * (hash + x*r) mod q.
+ *
+ * This has the dangerous properties that:
+ *
+ * - if an attacker in possession of the public key _and_ the
+ * signature (for example, the host you just authenticated
+ * to) can guess your k, he can reverse the computation of s
+ * and work out x = r^-1 * (s*k - hash) mod q. That is, he
+ * can deduce the private half of your key, and masquerade
+ * as you for as long as the key is still valid.
+ *
+ * - since r is a function purely of k and the public key, if
+ * the attacker only has a _range of possibilities_ for k
+ * it's easy for him to work through them all and check each
+ * one against r; he'll never be unsure of whether he's got
+ * the right one.
+ *
+ * - if you ever sign two different hashes with the same k, it
+ * will be immediately obvious because the two signatures
+ * will have the same r, and moreover an attacker in
+ * possession of both signatures (and the public key of
+ * course) can compute k = (hash1-hash2) * (s1-s2)^-1 mod q,
+ * and from there deduce x as before.
+ *
+ * - the Bleichenbacher attack on DSA makes use of methods of
+ * generating k which are significantly non-uniformly
+ * distributed; in particular, generating a 160-bit random
+ * number and reducing it mod q is right out.
+ *
+ * For this reason we must be pretty careful about how we
+ * generate our k. Since this code runs on Windows, with no
+ * particularly good system entropy sources, we can't trust our
+ * RNG itself to produce properly unpredictable data. Hence, we
+ * use a totally different scheme instead.
+ *
+ * What we do is to take a SHA-512 (_big_) hash of the private
+ * key x, and then feed this into another SHA-512 hash that
+ * also includes the message hash being signed. That is:
+ *
+ * proto_k = SHA512 ( SHA512(x) || SHA160(message) )
+ *
+ * This number is 512 bits long, so reducing it mod q won't be
+ * noticeably non-uniform. So
+ *
+ * k = proto_k mod q
+ *
+ * This has the interesting property that it's _deterministic_:
+ * signing the same hash twice with the same key yields the
+ * same signature.
+ *
+ * Despite this determinism, it's still not predictable to an
+ * attacker, because in order to repeat the SHA-512
+ * construction that created it, the attacker would have to
+ * know the private key value x - and by assumption he doesn't,
+ * because if he knew that he wouldn't be attacking k!
+ *
+ * (This trick doesn't, _per se_, protect against reuse of k.
+ * Reuse of k is left to chance; all it does is prevent
+ * _excessively high_ chances of reuse of k due to entropy
+ * problems.)
+ *
+ * Thanks to Colin Plumb for the general idea of using x to
+ * ensure k is hard to guess, and to the Cambridge University
+ * Computer Security Group for helping to argue out all the
+ * fine details.
+ */
+ struct dss_key *dss = (struct dss_key *) key;
+ SHA512_State ss;
+ unsigned char digest[20], digest512[64];
+ Bignum proto_k, k, gkp, hash, kinv, hxr, r, s;
+ unsigned char *bytes;
+ int nbytes, i;
+
+ SHA_Simple(data, datalen, digest);
+
+ /*
+ * Hash some identifying text plus x.
+ */
+ SHA512_Init(&ss);
+ SHA512_Bytes(&ss, "DSA deterministic k generator", 30);
+ sha512_mpint(&ss, dss->x);
+ SHA512_Final(&ss, digest512);
+
+ /*
+ * Now hash that digest plus the message hash.
+ */
+ SHA512_Init(&ss);
+ SHA512_Bytes(&ss, digest512, sizeof(digest512));
+ SHA512_Bytes(&ss, digest, sizeof(digest));
+ SHA512_Final(&ss, digest512);
+
+ memset(&ss, 0, sizeof(ss));
+
+ /*
+ * Now convert the result into a bignum, and reduce it mod q.
+ */
+ proto_k = bignum_from_bytes(digest512, 64);
+ k = bigmod(proto_k, dss->q);
+ freebn(proto_k);
+
+ memset(digest512, 0, sizeof(digest512));
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have k, so just go ahead and compute the signature.
+ */
+ gkp = modpow(dss->g, k, dss->p); /* g^k mod p */
+ r = bigmod(gkp, dss->q); /* r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
+ freebn(gkp);
+
+ hash = bignum_from_bytes(digest, 20);
+ kinv = modinv(k, dss->q); /* k^-1 mod q */
+ hxr = bigmuladd(dss->x, r, hash); /* hash + x*r */
+ s = modmul(kinv, hxr, dss->q); /* s = k^-1 * (hash + x*r) mod q */
+ freebn(hxr);
+ freebn(kinv);
+ freebn(hash);
+
+ /*
+ * Signature blob is
+ *
+ * string "ssh-dss"
+ * string two 20-byte numbers r and s, end to end
+ *
+ * i.e. 4+7 + 4+40 bytes.
+ */
+ nbytes = 4 + 7 + 4 + 40;
+ bytes = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);
+ PUT_32BIT(bytes, 7);
+ memcpy(bytes + 4, "ssh-dss", 7);
+ PUT_32BIT(bytes + 4 + 7, 40);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+ bytes[4 + 7 + 4 + i] = bignum_byte(r, 19 - i);
+ bytes[4 + 7 + 4 + 20 + i] = bignum_byte(s, 19 - i);
+ }
+ freebn(r);
+ freebn(s);
+
+ *siglen = nbytes;
+ return bytes;
+}
+
+const struct ssh_signkey ssh_dss = {
+ dss_newkey,
+ dss_freekey,
+ dss_fmtkey,
+ dss_public_blob,
+ dss_private_blob,
+ dss_createkey,
+ dss_openssh_createkey,
+ dss_openssh_fmtkey,
+ dss_pubkey_bits,
+ dss_fingerprint,
+ dss_verifysig,
+ dss_sign,
+ "ssh-dss",
+ "dss"
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshgss.h b/tools/plink/sshgss.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2115cb124 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshgss.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +#include "puttyps.h" + +#define SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 +typedef void *Ssh_gss_ctx; + +typedef enum Ssh_gss_stat { + SSH_GSS_OK = 0, + SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, + SSH_GSS_NO_MEM, + SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME, + SSH_GSS_FAILURE +} Ssh_gss_stat; + +#define SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE SSH_GSS_OK + +#define SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(buf) do { \ + (*buf).length = 0; \ + (*buf).value = NULL; \ +} while (0) + +/* Functions, provided by either wingss.c or uxgss.c */ + +/* + * Do startup-time initialisation for using GSSAPI. (On Windows, + * for instance, this dynamically loads the GSSAPI DLL and + * retrieves some function pointers.) + * + * Return value is 1 on success, or 0 if initialisation failed. + * + * May be called multiple times (since the most convenient place + * to call it _from_ is the ssh.c setup code), and will harmlessly + * return success if already initialised. + */ +int ssh_gss_init(void); + +/* + * Fills in buf with a string describing the GSSAPI mechanism in + * use. buf->data is not dynamically allocated. + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_indicate_mech(Ssh_gss_buf *buf); + +/* + * Converts a name such as a hostname into a GSSAPI internal form, + * which is placed in "out". The result should be freed by + * ssh_gss_release_name(). + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_import_name(char *in, Ssh_gss_name *out); + +/* + * Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_name structure filled in by + * ssh_gss_import_name(). + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_release_name(Ssh_gss_name *name); + +/* + * The main GSSAPI security context setup function. The "out" + * parameter will need to be freed by ssh_gss_free_tok. + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_init_sec_context(Ssh_gss_ctx *ctx, Ssh_gss_name name, int delegate, + Ssh_gss_buf *in, Ssh_gss_buf *out); + +/* + * Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_buf filled in by + * ssh_gss_init_sec_context(). Do not accidentally call this on + * something filled in by ssh_gss_get_mic() (which requires a + * different free function) or something filled in by any other + * way. + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_free_tok(Ssh_gss_buf *); + +/* + * Acquires the credentials to perform authentication in the first + * place. Needs to be freed by ssh_gss_release_cred(). + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_acquire_cred(Ssh_gss_ctx *); + +/* + * Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_ctx filled in by + * ssh_gss_acquire_cred(). + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_release_cred(Ssh_gss_ctx *); + +/* + * Gets a MIC for some input data. "out" needs to be freed by + * ssh_gss_free_mic(). + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_get_mic(Ssh_gss_ctx ctx, Ssh_gss_buf *in, + Ssh_gss_buf *out); + +/* + * Frees the contents of an Ssh_gss_buf filled in by + * ssh_gss_get_mic(). Do not accidentally call this on something + * filled in by ssh_gss_init_sec_context() (which requires a + * different free function) or something filled in by any other + * way. + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_free_mic(Ssh_gss_buf *); + +/* + * Return an error message after authentication failed. The + * message string is returned in "buf", with buf->len giving the + * number of characters of printable message text and buf->data + * containing one more character which is a trailing NUL. + * buf->data should be manually freed by the caller. + */ +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_display_status(Ssh_gss_ctx, Ssh_gss_buf *buf); diff --git a/tools/plink/sshmd5.c b/tools/plink/sshmd5.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..80474dfad --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshmd5.c @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +#include "ssh.h"
+
+/*
+ * MD5 implementation for PuTTY. Written directly from the spec by
+ * Simon Tatham.
+ */
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Core MD5 algorithm: processes 16-word blocks into a message digest.
+ */
+
+#define F(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z)) )
+#define G(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (z)) | ((~(z)) & (y)) )
+#define H(x,y,z) ( (x) ^ (y) ^ (z) )
+#define I(x,y,z) ( (y) ^ ( (x) | ~(z) ) )
+
+#define rol(x,y) ( ((x) << (y)) | (((uint32)x) >> (32-y)) )
+
+#define subround(f,w,x,y,z,k,s,ti) \
+ w = x + rol(w + f(x,y,z) + block[k] + ti, s)
+
+static void MD5_Core_Init(MD5_Core_State * s)
+{
+ s->h[0] = 0x67452301;
+ s->h[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+ s->h[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+ s->h[3] = 0x10325476;
+}
+
+static void MD5_Block(MD5_Core_State * s, uint32 * block)
+{
+ uint32 a, b, c, d;
+
+ a = s->h[0];
+ b = s->h[1];
+ c = s->h[2];
+ d = s->h[3];
+
+ subround(F, a, b, c, d, 0, 7, 0xd76aa478);
+ subround(F, d, a, b, c, 1, 12, 0xe8c7b756);
+ subround(F, c, d, a, b, 2, 17, 0x242070db);
+ subround(F, b, c, d, a, 3, 22, 0xc1bdceee);
+ subround(F, a, b, c, d, 4, 7, 0xf57c0faf);
+ subround(F, d, a, b, c, 5, 12, 0x4787c62a);
+ subround(F, c, d, a, b, 6, 17, 0xa8304613);
+ subround(F, b, c, d, a, 7, 22, 0xfd469501);
+ subround(F, a, b, c, d, 8, 7, 0x698098d8);
+ subround(F, d, a, b, c, 9, 12, 0x8b44f7af);
+ subround(F, c, d, a, b, 10, 17, 0xffff5bb1);
+ subround(F, b, c, d, a, 11, 22, 0x895cd7be);
+ subround(F, a, b, c, d, 12, 7, 0x6b901122);
+ subround(F, d, a, b, c, 13, 12, 0xfd987193);
+ subround(F, c, d, a, b, 14, 17, 0xa679438e);
+ subround(F, b, c, d, a, 15, 22, 0x49b40821);
+ subround(G, a, b, c, d, 1, 5, 0xf61e2562);
+ subround(G, d, a, b, c, 6, 9, 0xc040b340);
+ subround(G, c, d, a, b, 11, 14, 0x265e5a51);
+ subround(G, b, c, d, a, 0, 20, 0xe9b6c7aa);
+ subround(G, a, b, c, d, 5, 5, 0xd62f105d);
+ subround(G, d, a, b, c, 10, 9, 0x02441453);
+ subround(G, c, d, a, b, 15, 14, 0xd8a1e681);
+ subround(G, b, c, d, a, 4, 20, 0xe7d3fbc8);
+ subround(G, a, b, c, d, 9, 5, 0x21e1cde6);
+ subround(G, d, a, b, c, 14, 9, 0xc33707d6);
+ subround(G, c, d, a, b, 3, 14, 0xf4d50d87);
+ subround(G, b, c, d, a, 8, 20, 0x455a14ed);
+ subround(G, a, b, c, d, 13, 5, 0xa9e3e905);
+ subround(G, d, a, b, c, 2, 9, 0xfcefa3f8);
+ subround(G, c, d, a, b, 7, 14, 0x676f02d9);
+ subround(G, b, c, d, a, 12, 20, 0x8d2a4c8a);
+ subround(H, a, b, c, d, 5, 4, 0xfffa3942);
+ subround(H, d, a, b, c, 8, 11, 0x8771f681);
+ subround(H, c, d, a, b, 11, 16, 0x6d9d6122);
+ subround(H, b, c, d, a, 14, 23, 0xfde5380c);
+ subround(H, a, b, c, d, 1, 4, 0xa4beea44);
+ subround(H, d, a, b, c, 4, 11, 0x4bdecfa9);
+ subround(H, c, d, a, b, 7, 16, 0xf6bb4b60);
+ subround(H, b, c, d, a, 10, 23, 0xbebfbc70);
+ subround(H, a, b, c, d, 13, 4, 0x289b7ec6);
+ subround(H, d, a, b, c, 0, 11, 0xeaa127fa);
+ subround(H, c, d, a, b, 3, 16, 0xd4ef3085);
+ subround(H, b, c, d, a, 6, 23, 0x04881d05);
+ subround(H, a, b, c, d, 9, 4, 0xd9d4d039);
+ subround(H, d, a, b, c, 12, 11, 0xe6db99e5);
+ subround(H, c, d, a, b, 15, 16, 0x1fa27cf8);
+ subround(H, b, c, d, a, 2, 23, 0xc4ac5665);
+ subround(I, a, b, c, d, 0, 6, 0xf4292244);
+ subround(I, d, a, b, c, 7, 10, 0x432aff97);
+ subround(I, c, d, a, b, 14, 15, 0xab9423a7);
+ subround(I, b, c, d, a, 5, 21, 0xfc93a039);
+ subround(I, a, b, c, d, 12, 6, 0x655b59c3);
+ subround(I, d, a, b, c, 3, 10, 0x8f0ccc92);
+ subround(I, c, d, a, b, 10, 15, 0xffeff47d);
+ subround(I, b, c, d, a, 1, 21, 0x85845dd1);
+ subround(I, a, b, c, d, 8, 6, 0x6fa87e4f);
+ subround(I, d, a, b, c, 15, 10, 0xfe2ce6e0);
+ subround(I, c, d, a, b, 6, 15, 0xa3014314);
+ subround(I, b, c, d, a, 13, 21, 0x4e0811a1);
+ subround(I, a, b, c, d, 4, 6, 0xf7537e82);
+ subround(I, d, a, b, c, 11, 10, 0xbd3af235);
+ subround(I, c, d, a, b, 2, 15, 0x2ad7d2bb);
+ subround(I, b, c, d, a, 9, 21, 0xeb86d391);
+
+ s->h[0] += a;
+ s->h[1] += b;
+ s->h[2] += c;
+ s->h[3] += d;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Outer MD5 algorithm: take an arbitrary length byte string,
+ * convert it into 16-word blocks with the prescribed padding at
+ * the end, and pass those blocks to the core MD5 algorithm.
+ */
+
+#define BLKSIZE 64
+
+void MD5Init(struct MD5Context *s)
+{
+ MD5_Core_Init(&s->core);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ s->lenhi = s->lenlo = 0;
+}
+
+void MD5Update(struct MD5Context *s, unsigned char const *p, unsigned len)
+{
+ unsigned char *q = (unsigned char *) p;
+ uint32 wordblock[16];
+ uint32 lenw = len;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Update the length field.
+ */
+ s->lenlo += lenw;
+ s->lenhi += (s->lenlo < lenw);
+
+ if (s->blkused + len < BLKSIZE) {
+ /*
+ * Trivial case: just add to the block.
+ */
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, len);
+ s->blkused += len;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We must complete and process at least one block.
+ */
+ while (s->blkused + len >= BLKSIZE) {
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, BLKSIZE - s->blkused);
+ q += BLKSIZE - s->blkused;
+ len -= BLKSIZE - s->blkused;
+ /* Now process the block. Gather bytes little-endian into words */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ wordblock[i] =
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 3]) << 24) |
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 2]) << 16) |
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 1]) << 8) |
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 0]) << 0);
+ }
+ MD5_Block(&s->core, wordblock);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->block, q, len);
+ s->blkused = len;
+ }
+}
+
+void MD5Final(unsigned char output[16], struct MD5Context *s)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned pad;
+ unsigned char c[64];
+ uint32 lenhi, lenlo;
+
+ if (s->blkused >= 56)
+ pad = 56 + 64 - s->blkused;
+ else
+ pad = 56 - s->blkused;
+
+ lenhi = (s->lenhi << 3) | (s->lenlo >> (32 - 3));
+ lenlo = (s->lenlo << 3);
+
+ memset(c, 0, pad);
+ c[0] = 0x80;
+ MD5Update(s, c, pad);
+
+ c[7] = (lenhi >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ c[6] = (lenhi >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c[5] = (lenhi >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c[4] = (lenhi >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ c[3] = (lenlo >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ c[2] = (lenlo >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c[1] = (lenlo >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c[0] = (lenlo >> 0) & 0xFF;
+
+ MD5Update(s, c, 8);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ output[4 * i + 3] = (s->core.h[i] >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ output[4 * i + 2] = (s->core.h[i] >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ output[4 * i + 1] = (s->core.h[i] >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ output[4 * i + 0] = (s->core.h[i] >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ }
+}
+
+void MD5Simple(void const *p, unsigned len, unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ struct MD5Context s;
+
+ MD5Init(&s);
+ MD5Update(&s, (unsigned char const *)p, len);
+ MD5Final(output, &s);
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * The above is the MD5 algorithm itself. Now we implement the
+ * HMAC wrapper on it.
+ *
+ * Some of these functions are exported directly, because they are
+ * useful elsewhere (SOCKS5 CHAP authentication uses HMAC-MD5).
+ */
+
+void *hmacmd5_make_context(void)
+{
+ return snewn(3, struct MD5Context);
+}
+
+void hmacmd5_free_context(void *handle)
+{
+ sfree(handle);
+}
+
+void hmacmd5_key(void *handle, void const *keyv, int len)
+{
+ struct MD5Context *keys = (struct MD5Context *)handle;
+ unsigned char foo[64];
+ unsigned char const *key = (unsigned char const *)keyv;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(foo, 0x36, 64);
+ for (i = 0; i < len && i < 64; i++)
+ foo[i] ^= key[i];
+ MD5Init(&keys[0]);
+ MD5Update(&keys[0], foo, 64);
+
+ memset(foo, 0x5C, 64);
+ for (i = 0; i < len && i < 64; i++)
+ foo[i] ^= key[i];
+ MD5Init(&keys[1]);
+ MD5Update(&keys[1], foo, 64);
+
+ memset(foo, 0, 64); /* burn the evidence */
+}
+
+static void hmacmd5_key_16(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ hmacmd5_key(handle, key, 16);
+}
+
+static void hmacmd5_start(void *handle)
+{
+ struct MD5Context *keys = (struct MD5Context *)handle;
+
+ keys[2] = keys[0]; /* structure copy */
+}
+
+static void hmacmd5_bytes(void *handle, unsigned char const *blk, int len)
+{
+ struct MD5Context *keys = (struct MD5Context *)handle;
+ MD5Update(&keys[2], blk, len);
+}
+
+static void hmacmd5_genresult(void *handle, unsigned char *hmac)
+{
+ struct MD5Context *keys = (struct MD5Context *)handle;
+ struct MD5Context s;
+ unsigned char intermediate[16];
+
+ s = keys[2]; /* structure copy */
+ MD5Final(intermediate, &s);
+ s = keys[1]; /* structure copy */
+ MD5Update(&s, intermediate, 16);
+ MD5Final(hmac, &s);
+}
+
+static int hmacmd5_verresult(void *handle, unsigned char const *hmac)
+{
+ unsigned char correct[16];
+ hmacmd5_genresult(handle, correct);
+ return !memcmp(correct, hmac, 16);
+}
+
+static void hmacmd5_do_hmac_internal(void *handle,
+ unsigned char const *blk, int len,
+ unsigned char const *blk2, int len2,
+ unsigned char *hmac)
+{
+ hmacmd5_start(handle);
+ hmacmd5_bytes(handle, blk, len);
+ if (blk2) hmacmd5_bytes(handle, blk2, len2);
+ hmacmd5_genresult(handle, hmac);
+}
+
+void hmacmd5_do_hmac(void *handle, unsigned char const *blk, int len,
+ unsigned char *hmac)
+{
+ hmacmd5_do_hmac_internal(handle, blk, len, NULL, 0, hmac);
+}
+
+static void hmacmd5_do_hmac_ssh(void *handle, unsigned char const *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq, unsigned char *hmac)
+{
+ unsigned char seqbuf[16];
+
+ seqbuf[0] = (unsigned char) ((seq >> 24) & 0xFF);
+ seqbuf[1] = (unsigned char) ((seq >> 16) & 0xFF);
+ seqbuf[2] = (unsigned char) ((seq >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ seqbuf[3] = (unsigned char) ((seq) & 0xFF);
+
+ hmacmd5_do_hmac_internal(handle, seqbuf, 4, blk, len, hmac);
+}
+
+static void hmacmd5_generate(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq)
+{
+ hmacmd5_do_hmac_ssh(handle, blk, len, seq, blk + len);
+}
+
+static int hmacmd5_verify(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq)
+{
+ unsigned char correct[16];
+ hmacmd5_do_hmac_ssh(handle, blk, len, seq, correct);
+ return !memcmp(correct, blk + len, 16);
+}
+
+const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_md5 = {
+ hmacmd5_make_context, hmacmd5_free_context, hmacmd5_key_16,
+ hmacmd5_generate, hmacmd5_verify,
+ hmacmd5_start, hmacmd5_bytes, hmacmd5_genresult, hmacmd5_verresult,
+ "hmac-md5",
+ 16,
+ "HMAC-MD5"
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshpubk.c b/tools/plink/sshpubk.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7b5a69071 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshpubk.c @@ -0,0 +1,1217 @@ +/*
+ * Generic SSH public-key handling operations. In particular,
+ * reading of SSH public-key files, and also the generic `sign'
+ * operation for SSH-2 (which checks the type of the key and
+ * dispatches to the appropriate key-type specific function).
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#define rsa_signature "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"
+
+#define BASE64_TOINT(x) ( (x)-'A'<26 ? (x)-'A'+0 :\
+ (x)-'a'<26 ? (x)-'a'+26 :\
+ (x)-'0'<10 ? (x)-'0'+52 :\
+ (x)=='+' ? 62 : \
+ (x)=='/' ? 63 : 0 )
+
+static int loadrsakey_main(FILE * fp, struct RSAKey *key, int pub_only,
+ char **commentptr, char *passphrase,
+ const char **error)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[16384];
+ unsigned char keybuf[16];
+ int len;
+ int i, j, ciphertype;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct MD5Context md5c;
+ char *comment;
+
+ *error = NULL;
+
+ /* Slurp the whole file (minus the header) into a buffer. */
+ len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), fp);
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (len < 0 || len == sizeof(buf)) {
+ *error = "error reading file";
+ goto end; /* file too big or not read */
+ }
+
+ i = 0;
+ *error = "file format error";
+
+ /*
+ * A zero byte. (The signature includes a terminating NUL.)
+ */
+ if (len - i < 1 || buf[i] != 0)
+ goto end;
+ i++;
+
+ /* One byte giving encryption type, and one reserved uint32. */
+ if (len - i < 1)
+ goto end;
+ ciphertype = buf[i];
+ if (ciphertype != 0 && ciphertype != SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
+ goto end;
+ i++;
+ if (len - i < 4)
+ goto end; /* reserved field not present */
+ if (buf[i] != 0 || buf[i + 1] != 0 || buf[i + 2] != 0
+ || buf[i + 3] != 0) goto end; /* reserved field nonzero, panic! */
+ i += 4;
+
+ /* Now the serious stuff. An ordinary SSH-1 public key. */
+ i += makekey(buf + i, len, key, NULL, 1);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto end; /* overran */
+
+ /* Next, the comment field. */
+ j = GET_32BIT(buf + i);
+ i += 4;
+ if (len - i < j)
+ goto end;
+ comment = snewn(j + 1, char);
+ if (comment) {
+ memcpy(comment, buf + i, j);
+ comment[j] = '\0';
+ }
+ i += j;
+ if (commentptr)
+ *commentptr = dupstr(comment);
+ if (key)
+ key->comment = comment;
+ else
+ sfree(comment);
+
+ if (pub_only) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!key) {
+ ret = ciphertype != 0;
+ *error = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt remainder of buffer.
+ */
+ if (ciphertype) {
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, (unsigned char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ MD5Final(keybuf, &md5c);
+ des3_decrypt_pubkey(keybuf, buf + i, (len - i + 7) & ~7);
+ memset(keybuf, 0, sizeof(keybuf)); /* burn the evidence */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We are now in the secret part of the key. The first four
+ * bytes should be of the form a, b, a, b.
+ */
+ if (len - i < 4)
+ goto end;
+ if (buf[i] != buf[i + 2] || buf[i + 1] != buf[i + 3]) {
+ *error = "wrong passphrase";
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ i += 4;
+
+ /*
+ * After that, we have one further bignum which is our
+ * decryption exponent, and then the three auxiliary values
+ * (iqmp, q, p).
+ */
+ j = makeprivate(buf + i, len - i, key);
+ if (j < 0) goto end;
+ i += j;
+ j = ssh1_read_bignum(buf + i, len - i, &key->iqmp);
+ if (j < 0) goto end;
+ i += j;
+ j = ssh1_read_bignum(buf + i, len - i, &key->q);
+ if (j < 0) goto end;
+ i += j;
+ j = ssh1_read_bignum(buf + i, len - i, &key->p);
+ if (j < 0) goto end;
+ i += j;
+
+ if (!rsa_verify(key)) {
+ *error = "rsa_verify failed";
+ freersakey(key);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); /* burn the evidence */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int loadrsakey(const Filename *filename, struct RSAKey *key, char *passphrase,
+ const char **errorstr)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char buf[64];
+ int ret = 0;
+ const char *error = NULL;
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "rb", FALSE);
+ if (!fp) {
+ error = "can't open file";
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read the first line of the file and see if it's a v1 private
+ * key file.
+ */
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) && !strcmp(buf, rsa_signature)) {
+ /*
+ * This routine will take care of calling fclose() for us.
+ */
+ ret = loadrsakey_main(fp, key, FALSE, NULL, passphrase, &error);
+ fp = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, we have nothing. Return empty-handed.
+ */
+ error = "not an SSH-1 RSA file";
+
+ end:
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+ if ((ret != 1) && errorstr)
+ *errorstr = error;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * See whether an RSA key is encrypted. Return its comment field as
+ * well.
+ */
+int rsakey_encrypted(const Filename *filename, char **comment)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char buf[64];
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "rb", FALSE);
+ if (!fp)
+ return 0; /* doesn't even exist */
+
+ /*
+ * Read the first line of the file and see if it's a v1 private
+ * key file.
+ */
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) && !strcmp(buf, rsa_signature)) {
+ const char *dummy;
+ /*
+ * This routine will take care of calling fclose() for us.
+ */
+ return loadrsakey_main(fp, NULL, FALSE, comment, NULL, &dummy);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0; /* wasn't the right kind of file */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a malloc'ed chunk of memory containing the public blob of
+ * an RSA key, as given in the agent protocol (modulus bits,
+ * exponent, modulus).
+ */
+int rsakey_pubblob(const Filename *filename, void **blob, int *bloblen,
+ char **commentptr, const char **errorstr)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char buf[64];
+ struct RSAKey key;
+ int ret;
+ const char *error = NULL;
+
+ /* Default return if we fail. */
+ *blob = NULL;
+ *bloblen = 0;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "rb", FALSE);
+ if (!fp) {
+ error = "can't open file";
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read the first line of the file and see if it's a v1 private
+ * key file.
+ */
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) && !strcmp(buf, rsa_signature)) {
+ memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ if (loadrsakey_main(fp, &key, TRUE, commentptr, NULL, &error)) {
+ *blob = rsa_public_blob(&key, bloblen);
+ freersakey(&key);
+ ret = 1;
+ fp = NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ error = "not an SSH-1 RSA file";
+ }
+
+ end:
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+ if ((ret != 1) && errorstr)
+ *errorstr = error;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save an RSA key file. Return nonzero on success.
+ */
+int saversakey(const Filename *filename, struct RSAKey *key, char *passphrase)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[16384];
+ unsigned char keybuf[16];
+ struct MD5Context md5c;
+ unsigned char *p, *estart;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ /*
+ * Write the initial signature.
+ */
+ p = buf;
+ memcpy(p, rsa_signature, sizeof(rsa_signature));
+ p += sizeof(rsa_signature);
+
+ /*
+ * One byte giving encryption type, and one reserved (zero)
+ * uint32.
+ */
+ *p++ = (passphrase ? SSH_CIPHER_3DES : 0);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, 0);
+ p += 4;
+
+ /*
+ * An ordinary SSH-1 public key consists of: a uint32
+ * containing the bit count, then two bignums containing the
+ * modulus and exponent respectively.
+ */
+ PUT_32BIT(p, bignum_bitcount(key->modulus));
+ p += 4;
+ p += ssh1_write_bignum(p, key->modulus);
+ p += ssh1_write_bignum(p, key->exponent);
+
+ /*
+ * A string containing the comment field.
+ */
+ if (key->comment) {
+ PUT_32BIT(p, strlen(key->comment));
+ p += 4;
+ memcpy(p, key->comment, strlen(key->comment));
+ p += strlen(key->comment);
+ } else {
+ PUT_32BIT(p, 0);
+ p += 4;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The encrypted portion starts here.
+ */
+ estart = p;
+
+ /*
+ * Two bytes, then the same two bytes repeated.
+ */
+ *p++ = random_byte();
+ *p++ = random_byte();
+ p[0] = p[-2];
+ p[1] = p[-1];
+ p += 2;
+
+ /*
+ * Four more bignums: the decryption exponent, then iqmp, then
+ * q, then p.
+ */
+ p += ssh1_write_bignum(p, key->private_exponent);
+ p += ssh1_write_bignum(p, key->iqmp);
+ p += ssh1_write_bignum(p, key->q);
+ p += ssh1_write_bignum(p, key->p);
+
+ /*
+ * Now write zeros until the encrypted portion is a multiple of
+ * 8 bytes.
+ */
+ while ((p - estart) % 8)
+ *p++ = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Now encrypt the encrypted portion.
+ */
+ if (passphrase) {
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, (unsigned char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ MD5Final(keybuf, &md5c);
+ des3_encrypt_pubkey(keybuf, estart, p - estart);
+ memset(keybuf, 0, sizeof(keybuf)); /* burn the evidence */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Done. Write the result to the file.
+ */
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "wb", TRUE);
+ if (fp) {
+ int ret = (fwrite(buf, 1, p - buf, fp) == (size_t) (p - buf));
+ if (fclose(fp))
+ ret = 0;
+ return ret;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SSH-2 private key load/store functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * PuTTY's own format for SSH-2 keys is as follows:
+ *
+ * The file is text. Lines are terminated by CRLF, although CR-only
+ * and LF-only are tolerated on input.
+ *
+ * The first line says "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2: " plus the name of the
+ * algorithm ("ssh-dss", "ssh-rsa" etc).
+ *
+ * The next line says "Encryption: " plus an encryption type.
+ * Currently the only supported encryption types are "aes256-cbc"
+ * and "none".
+ *
+ * The next line says "Comment: " plus the comment string.
+ *
+ * Next there is a line saying "Public-Lines: " plus a number N.
+ * The following N lines contain a base64 encoding of the public
+ * part of the key. This is encoded as the standard SSH-2 public key
+ * blob (with no initial length): so for RSA, for example, it will
+ * read
+ *
+ * string "ssh-rsa"
+ * mpint exponent
+ * mpint modulus
+ *
+ * Next, there is a line saying "Private-Lines: " plus a number N,
+ * and then N lines containing the (potentially encrypted) private
+ * part of the key. For the key type "ssh-rsa", this will be
+ * composed of
+ *
+ * mpint private_exponent
+ * mpint p (the larger of the two primes)
+ * mpint q (the smaller prime)
+ * mpint iqmp (the inverse of q modulo p)
+ * data padding (to reach a multiple of the cipher block size)
+ *
+ * And for "ssh-dss", it will be composed of
+ *
+ * mpint x (the private key parameter)
+ * [ string hash 20-byte hash of mpints p || q || g only in old format ]
+ *
+ * Finally, there is a line saying "Private-MAC: " plus a hex
+ * representation of a HMAC-SHA-1 of:
+ *
+ * string name of algorithm ("ssh-dss", "ssh-rsa")
+ * string encryption type
+ * string comment
+ * string public-blob
+ * string private-plaintext (the plaintext version of the
+ * private part, including the final
+ * padding)
+ *
+ * The key to the MAC is itself a SHA-1 hash of:
+ *
+ * data "putty-private-key-file-mac-key"
+ * data passphrase
+ *
+ * (An empty passphrase is used for unencrypted keys.)
+ *
+ * If the key is encrypted, the encryption key is derived from the
+ * passphrase by means of a succession of SHA-1 hashes. Each hash
+ * is the hash of:
+ *
+ * uint32 sequence-number
+ * data passphrase
+ *
+ * where the sequence-number increases from zero. As many of these
+ * hashes are used as necessary.
+ *
+ * For backwards compatibility with snapshots between 0.51 and
+ * 0.52, we also support the older key file format, which begins
+ * with "PuTTY-User-Key-File-1" (version number differs). In this
+ * format the Private-MAC: field only covers the private-plaintext
+ * field and nothing else (and without the 4-byte string length on
+ * the front too). Moreover, the Private-MAC: field can be replaced
+ * with a Private-Hash: field which is a plain SHA-1 hash instead of
+ * an HMAC (this was generated for unencrypted keys).
+ */
+
+static int read_header(FILE * fp, char *header)
+{
+ int len = 39;
+ int c;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ c = fgetc(fp);
+ if (c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == EOF)
+ return 0; /* failure */
+ if (c == ':') {
+ c = fgetc(fp);
+ if (c != ' ')
+ return 0;
+ *header = '\0';
+ return 1; /* success! */
+ }
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0; /* failure */
+ *header++ = c;
+ len--;
+ }
+ return 0; /* failure */
+}
+
+static char *read_body(FILE * fp)
+{
+ char *text;
+ int len;
+ int size;
+ int c;
+
+ size = 128;
+ text = snewn(size, char);
+ len = 0;
+ text[len] = '\0';
+
+ while (1) {
+ c = fgetc(fp);
+ if (c == '\r' || c == '\n' || c == EOF) {
+ if (c != EOF) {
+ c = fgetc(fp);
+ if (c != '\r' && c != '\n')
+ ungetc(c, fp);
+ }
+ return text;
+ }
+ if (len + 1 >= size) {
+ size += 128;
+ text = sresize(text, size, char);
+ }
+ text[len++] = c;
+ text[len] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
+int base64_decode_atom(char *atom, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ int vals[4];
+ int i, v, len;
+ unsigned word;
+ char c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ c = atom[i];
+ if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
+ v = c - 'A';
+ else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
+ v = c - 'a' + 26;
+ else if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
+ v = c - '0' + 52;
+ else if (c == '+')
+ v = 62;
+ else if (c == '/')
+ v = 63;
+ else if (c == '=')
+ v = -1;
+ else
+ return 0; /* invalid atom */
+ vals[i] = v;
+ }
+
+ if (vals[0] == -1 || vals[1] == -1)
+ return 0;
+ if (vals[2] == -1 && vals[3] != -1)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (vals[3] != -1)
+ len = 3;
+ else if (vals[2] != -1)
+ len = 2;
+ else
+ len = 1;
+
+ word = ((vals[0] << 18) |
+ (vals[1] << 12) | ((vals[2] & 0x3F) << 6) | (vals[3] & 0x3F));
+ out[0] = (word >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ if (len > 1)
+ out[1] = (word >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ if (len > 2)
+ out[2] = word & 0xFF;
+ return len;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *read_blob(FILE * fp, int nlines, int *bloblen)
+{
+ unsigned char *blob;
+ char *line;
+ int linelen, len;
+ int i, j, k;
+
+ /* We expect at most 64 base64 characters, ie 48 real bytes, per line. */
+ blob = snewn(48 * nlines, unsigned char);
+ len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nlines; i++) {
+ line = read_body(fp);
+ if (!line) {
+ sfree(blob);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ linelen = strlen(line);
+ if (linelen % 4 != 0 || linelen > 64) {
+ sfree(blob);
+ sfree(line);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < linelen; j += 4) {
+ k = base64_decode_atom(line + j, blob + len);
+ if (!k) {
+ sfree(line);
+ sfree(blob);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ len += k;
+ }
+ sfree(line);
+ }
+ *bloblen = len;
+ return blob;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Magic error return value for when the passphrase is wrong.
+ */
+struct ssh2_userkey ssh2_wrong_passphrase = {
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+const struct ssh_signkey *find_pubkey_alg(const char *name)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa"))
+ return &ssh_rsa;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "ssh-dss"))
+ return &ssh_dss;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct ssh2_userkey *ssh2_load_userkey(const Filename *filename,
+ char *passphrase, const char **errorstr)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char header[40], *b, *encryption, *comment, *mac;
+ const struct ssh_signkey *alg;
+ struct ssh2_userkey *ret;
+ int cipher, cipherblk;
+ unsigned char *public_blob, *private_blob;
+ int public_blob_len, private_blob_len;
+ int i, is_mac, old_fmt;
+ int passlen = passphrase ? strlen(passphrase) : 0;
+ const char *error = NULL;
+
+ ret = NULL; /* return NULL for most errors */
+ encryption = comment = mac = NULL;
+ public_blob = private_blob = NULL;
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "rb", FALSE);
+ if (!fp) {
+ error = "can't open file";
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the first header line which contains the key type. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header))
+ goto error;
+ if (0 == strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2")) {
+ old_fmt = 0;
+ } else if (0 == strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-1")) {
+ /* this is an old key file; warn and then continue */
+ old_keyfile_warning();
+ old_fmt = 1;
+ } else {
+ error = "not a PuTTY SSH-2 private key";
+ goto error;
+ }
+ error = "file format error";
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ /* Select key algorithm structure. */
+ alg = find_pubkey_alg(b);
+ if (!alg) {
+ sfree(b);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ sfree(b);
+
+ /* Read the Encryption header line. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Encryption"))
+ goto error;
+ if ((encryption = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ if (!strcmp(encryption, "aes256-cbc")) {
+ cipher = 1;
+ cipherblk = 16;
+ } else if (!strcmp(encryption, "none")) {
+ cipher = 0;
+ cipherblk = 1;
+ } else {
+ sfree(encryption);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the Comment header line. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Comment"))
+ goto error;
+ if ((comment = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Read the Public-Lines header line and the public blob. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Public-Lines"))
+ goto error;
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ i = atoi(b);
+ sfree(b);
+ if ((public_blob = read_blob(fp, i, &public_blob_len)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Read the Private-Lines header line and the Private blob. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Private-Lines"))
+ goto error;
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ i = atoi(b);
+ sfree(b);
+ if ((private_blob = read_blob(fp, i, &private_blob_len)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* Read the Private-MAC or Private-Hash header line. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header))
+ goto error;
+ if (0 == strcmp(header, "Private-MAC")) {
+ if ((mac = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ is_mac = 1;
+ } else if (0 == strcmp(header, "Private-Hash") && old_fmt) {
+ if ((mac = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ is_mac = 0;
+ } else
+ goto error;
+
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the private blob.
+ */
+ if (cipher) {
+ unsigned char key[40];
+ SHA_State s;
+
+ if (!passphrase)
+ goto error;
+ if (private_blob_len % cipherblk)
+ goto error;
+
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, "\0\0\0\0", 4);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, passphrase, passlen);
+ SHA_Final(&s, key + 0);
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, "\0\0\0\1", 4);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, passphrase, passlen);
+ SHA_Final(&s, key + 20);
+ aes256_decrypt_pubkey(key, private_blob, private_blob_len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify the MAC.
+ */
+ {
+ char realmac[41];
+ unsigned char binary[20];
+ unsigned char *macdata;
+ int maclen;
+ int free_macdata;
+
+ if (old_fmt) {
+ /* MAC (or hash) only covers the private blob. */
+ macdata = private_blob;
+ maclen = private_blob_len;
+ free_macdata = 0;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int namelen = strlen(alg->name);
+ int enclen = strlen(encryption);
+ int commlen = strlen(comment);
+ maclen = (4 + namelen +
+ 4 + enclen +
+ 4 + commlen +
+ 4 + public_blob_len +
+ 4 + private_blob_len);
+ macdata = snewn(maclen, unsigned char);
+ p = macdata;
+#define DO_STR(s,len) PUT_32BIT(p,(len));memcpy(p+4,(s),(len));p+=4+(len)
+ DO_STR(alg->name, namelen);
+ DO_STR(encryption, enclen);
+ DO_STR(comment, commlen);
+ DO_STR(public_blob, public_blob_len);
+ DO_STR(private_blob, private_blob_len);
+
+ free_macdata = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (is_mac) {
+ SHA_State s;
+ unsigned char mackey[20];
+ char header[] = "putty-private-key-file-mac-key";
+
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, header, sizeof(header)-1);
+ if (cipher && passphrase)
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, passphrase, passlen);
+ SHA_Final(&s, mackey);
+
+ hmac_sha1_simple(mackey, 20, macdata, maclen, binary);
+
+ memset(mackey, 0, sizeof(mackey));
+ memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s));
+ } else {
+ SHA_Simple(macdata, maclen, binary);
+ }
+
+ if (free_macdata) {
+ memset(macdata, 0, maclen);
+ sfree(macdata);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
+ sprintf(realmac + 2 * i, "%02x", binary[i]);
+
+ if (strcmp(mac, realmac)) {
+ /* An incorrect MAC is an unconditional Error if the key is
+ * unencrypted. Otherwise, it means Wrong Passphrase. */
+ if (cipher) {
+ error = "wrong passphrase";
+ ret = SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ } else {
+ error = "MAC failed";
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ sfree(mac);
+
+ /*
+ * Create and return the key.
+ */
+ ret = snew(struct ssh2_userkey);
+ ret->alg = alg;
+ ret->comment = comment;
+ ret->data = alg->createkey(public_blob, public_blob_len,
+ private_blob, private_blob_len);
+ if (!ret->data) {
+ sfree(ret->comment);
+ sfree(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ error = "createkey failed";
+ goto error;
+ }
+ sfree(public_blob);
+ sfree(private_blob);
+ sfree(encryption);
+ if (errorstr)
+ *errorstr = NULL;
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Error processing.
+ */
+ error:
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (comment)
+ sfree(comment);
+ if (encryption)
+ sfree(encryption);
+ if (mac)
+ sfree(mac);
+ if (public_blob)
+ sfree(public_blob);
+ if (private_blob)
+ sfree(private_blob);
+ if (errorstr)
+ *errorstr = error;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+unsigned char *ssh2_userkey_loadpub(const Filename *filename, char **algorithm,
+ int *pub_blob_len, char **commentptr,
+ const char **errorstr)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char header[40], *b;
+ const struct ssh_signkey *alg;
+ unsigned char *public_blob;
+ int public_blob_len;
+ int i;
+ const char *error = NULL;
+ char *comment;
+
+ public_blob = NULL;
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "rb", FALSE);
+ if (!fp) {
+ error = "can't open file";
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the first header line which contains the key type. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header)
+ || (0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2") &&
+ 0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-1"))) {
+ error = "not a PuTTY SSH-2 private key";
+ goto error;
+ }
+ error = "file format error";
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ /* Select key algorithm structure. */
+ alg = find_pubkey_alg(b);
+ if (!alg) {
+ sfree(b);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ sfree(b);
+
+ /* Read the Encryption header line. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Encryption"))
+ goto error;
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ sfree(b); /* we don't care */
+
+ /* Read the Comment header line. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Comment"))
+ goto error;
+ if ((comment = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (commentptr)
+ *commentptr = comment;
+ else
+ sfree(comment);
+
+ /* Read the Public-Lines header line and the public blob. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Public-Lines"))
+ goto error;
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ i = atoi(b);
+ sfree(b);
+ if ((public_blob = read_blob(fp, i, &public_blob_len)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (pub_blob_len)
+ *pub_blob_len = public_blob_len;
+ if (algorithm)
+ *algorithm = alg->name;
+ return public_blob;
+
+ /*
+ * Error processing.
+ */
+ error:
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (public_blob)
+ sfree(public_blob);
+ if (errorstr)
+ *errorstr = error;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int ssh2_userkey_encrypted(const Filename *filename, char **commentptr)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char header[40], *b, *comment;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (commentptr)
+ *commentptr = NULL;
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "rb", FALSE);
+ if (!fp)
+ return 0;
+ if (!read_header(fp, header)
+ || (0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2") &&
+ 0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-1"))) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sfree(b); /* we don't care about key type here */
+ /* Read the Encryption header line. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Encryption")) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((b = read_body(fp)) == NULL) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the Comment header line. */
+ if (!read_header(fp, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Comment")) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ sfree(b);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ((comment = read_body(fp)) == NULL) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ sfree(b);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (commentptr)
+ *commentptr = comment;
+
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (!strcmp(b, "aes256-cbc"))
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+ sfree(b);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int base64_lines(int datalen)
+{
+ /* When encoding, we use 64 chars/line, which equals 48 real chars. */
+ return (datalen + 47) / 48;
+}
+
+void base64_encode(FILE * fp, unsigned char *data, int datalen, int cpl)
+{
+ int linelen = 0;
+ char out[4];
+ int n, i;
+
+ while (datalen > 0) {
+ n = (datalen < 3 ? datalen : 3);
+ base64_encode_atom(data, n, out);
+ data += n;
+ datalen -= n;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ if (linelen >= cpl) {
+ linelen = 0;
+ fputc('\n', fp);
+ }
+ fputc(out[i], fp);
+ linelen++;
+ }
+ }
+ fputc('\n', fp);
+}
+
+int ssh2_save_userkey(const Filename *filename, struct ssh2_userkey *key,
+ char *passphrase)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ unsigned char *pub_blob, *priv_blob, *priv_blob_encrypted;
+ int pub_blob_len, priv_blob_len, priv_encrypted_len;
+ int passlen;
+ int cipherblk;
+ int i;
+ char *cipherstr;
+ unsigned char priv_mac[20];
+
+ /*
+ * Fetch the key component blobs.
+ */
+ pub_blob = key->alg->public_blob(key->data, &pub_blob_len);
+ priv_blob = key->alg->private_blob(key->data, &priv_blob_len);
+ if (!pub_blob || !priv_blob) {
+ sfree(pub_blob);
+ sfree(priv_blob);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Determine encryption details, and encrypt the private blob.
+ */
+ if (passphrase) {
+ cipherstr = "aes256-cbc";
+ cipherblk = 16;
+ } else {
+ cipherstr = "none";
+ cipherblk = 1;
+ }
+ priv_encrypted_len = priv_blob_len + cipherblk - 1;
+ priv_encrypted_len -= priv_encrypted_len % cipherblk;
+ priv_blob_encrypted = snewn(priv_encrypted_len, unsigned char);
+ memset(priv_blob_encrypted, 0, priv_encrypted_len);
+ memcpy(priv_blob_encrypted, priv_blob, priv_blob_len);
+ /* Create padding based on the SHA hash of the unpadded blob. This prevents
+ * too easy a known-plaintext attack on the last block. */
+ SHA_Simple(priv_blob, priv_blob_len, priv_mac);
+ assert(priv_encrypted_len - priv_blob_len < 20);
+ memcpy(priv_blob_encrypted + priv_blob_len, priv_mac,
+ priv_encrypted_len - priv_blob_len);
+
+ /* Now create the MAC. */
+ {
+ unsigned char *macdata;
+ int maclen;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int namelen = strlen(key->alg->name);
+ int enclen = strlen(cipherstr);
+ int commlen = strlen(key->comment);
+ SHA_State s;
+ unsigned char mackey[20];
+ char header[] = "putty-private-key-file-mac-key";
+
+ maclen = (4 + namelen +
+ 4 + enclen +
+ 4 + commlen +
+ 4 + pub_blob_len +
+ 4 + priv_encrypted_len);
+ macdata = snewn(maclen, unsigned char);
+ p = macdata;
+#define DO_STR(s,len) PUT_32BIT(p,(len));memcpy(p+4,(s),(len));p+=4+(len)
+ DO_STR(key->alg->name, namelen);
+ DO_STR(cipherstr, enclen);
+ DO_STR(key->comment, commlen);
+ DO_STR(pub_blob, pub_blob_len);
+ DO_STR(priv_blob_encrypted, priv_encrypted_len);
+
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, header, sizeof(header)-1);
+ if (passphrase)
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ SHA_Final(&s, mackey);
+ hmac_sha1_simple(mackey, 20, macdata, maclen, priv_mac);
+ memset(macdata, 0, maclen);
+ sfree(macdata);
+ memset(mackey, 0, sizeof(mackey));
+ memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s));
+ }
+
+ if (passphrase) {
+ unsigned char key[40];
+ SHA_State s;
+
+ passlen = strlen(passphrase);
+
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, "\0\0\0\0", 4);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, passphrase, passlen);
+ SHA_Final(&s, key + 0);
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, "\0\0\0\1", 4);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, passphrase, passlen);
+ SHA_Final(&s, key + 20);
+ aes256_encrypt_pubkey(key, priv_blob_encrypted,
+ priv_encrypted_len);
+
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s));
+ }
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "w", TRUE);
+ if (!fp)
+ return 0;
+ fprintf(fp, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2: %s\n", key->alg->name);
+ fprintf(fp, "Encryption: %s\n", cipherstr);
+ fprintf(fp, "Comment: %s\n", key->comment);
+ fprintf(fp, "Public-Lines: %d\n", base64_lines(pub_blob_len));
+ base64_encode(fp, pub_blob, pub_blob_len, 64);
+ fprintf(fp, "Private-Lines: %d\n", base64_lines(priv_encrypted_len));
+ base64_encode(fp, priv_blob_encrypted, priv_encrypted_len, 64);
+ fprintf(fp, "Private-MAC: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
+ fprintf(fp, "%02x", priv_mac[i]);
+ fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ sfree(pub_blob);
+ memset(priv_blob, 0, priv_blob_len);
+ sfree(priv_blob);
+ sfree(priv_blob_encrypted);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * A function to determine the type of a private key file. Returns
+ * 0 on failure, 1 or 2 on success.
+ */
+int key_type(const Filename *filename)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ char buf[32];
+ const char putty2_sig[] = "PuTTY-User-Key-File-";
+ const char sshcom_sig[] = "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVAT";
+ const char openssh_sig[] = "-----BEGIN ";
+ int i;
+
+ fp = f_open(*filename, "r", FALSE);
+ if (!fp)
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_UNOPENABLE;
+ i = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), fp);
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_UNOPENABLE;
+ if (i < 32)
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ if (!memcmp(buf, rsa_signature, sizeof(rsa_signature)-1))
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1;
+ if (!memcmp(buf, putty2_sig, sizeof(putty2_sig)-1))
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2;
+ if (!memcmp(buf, openssh_sig, sizeof(openssh_sig)-1))
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH;
+ if (!memcmp(buf, sshcom_sig, sizeof(sshcom_sig)-1))
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSHCOM;
+ return SSH_KEYTYPE_UNKNOWN; /* unrecognised or EOF */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the type word to a string, for `wrong type' error
+ * messages.
+ */
+char *key_type_to_str(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_UNOPENABLE: return "unable to open file"; break;
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_UNKNOWN: return "not a private key"; break;
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1: return "SSH-1 private key"; break;
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2: return "PuTTY SSH-2 private key"; break;
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH: return "OpenSSH SSH-2 private key"; break;
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSHCOM: return "ssh.com SSH-2 private key"; break;
+ default: return "INTERNAL ERROR"; break;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshrand.c b/tools/plink/sshrand.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..57ccc1393 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshrand.c @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +/*
+ * cryptographic random number generator for PuTTY's ssh client
+ */
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+/* Collect environmental noise every 5 minutes */
+#define NOISE_REGULAR_INTERVAL (5*60*TICKSPERSEC)
+
+void noise_get_heavy(void (*func) (void *, int));
+void noise_get_light(void (*func) (void *, int));
+
+/*
+ * `pool' itself is a pool of random data which we actually use: we
+ * return bytes from `pool', at position `poolpos', until `poolpos'
+ * reaches the end of the pool. At this point we generate more
+ * random data, by adding noise, stirring well, and resetting
+ * `poolpos' to point to just past the beginning of the pool (not
+ * _the_ beginning, since otherwise we'd give away the whole
+ * contents of our pool, and attackers would just have to guess the
+ * next lot of noise).
+ *
+ * `incomingb' buffers acquired noise data, until it gets full, at
+ * which point the acquired noise is SHA'ed into `incoming' and
+ * `incomingb' is cleared. The noise in `incoming' is used as part
+ * of the noise for each stirring of the pool, in addition to local
+ * time, process listings, and other such stuff.
+ */
+
+#define HASHINPUT 64 /* 64 bytes SHA input */
+#define HASHSIZE 20 /* 160 bits SHA output */
+#define POOLSIZE 1200 /* size of random pool */
+
+struct RandPool {
+ unsigned char pool[POOLSIZE];
+ int poolpos;
+
+ unsigned char incoming[HASHSIZE];
+
+ unsigned char incomingb[HASHINPUT];
+ int incomingpos;
+
+ int stir_pending;
+};
+
+static struct RandPool pool;
+int random_active = 0;
+long next_noise_collection;
+
+static void random_stir(void)
+{
+ word32 block[HASHINPUT / sizeof(word32)];
+ word32 digest[HASHSIZE / sizeof(word32)];
+ int i, j, k;
+
+ /*
+ * noise_get_light will call random_add_noise, which may call
+ * back to here. Prevent recursive stirs.
+ */
+ if (pool.stir_pending)
+ return;
+ pool.stir_pending = TRUE;
+
+ noise_get_light(random_add_noise);
+
+ SHATransform((word32 *) pool.incoming, (word32 *) pool.incomingb);
+ pool.incomingpos = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Chunks of this code are blatantly endianness-dependent, but
+ * as it's all random bits anyway, WHO CARES?
+ */
+ memcpy(digest, pool.incoming, sizeof(digest));
+
+ /*
+ * Make two passes over the pool.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+
+ /*
+ * We operate SHA in CFB mode, repeatedly adding the same
+ * block of data to the digest. But we're also fiddling
+ * with the digest-so-far, so this shouldn't be Bad or
+ * anything.
+ */
+ memcpy(block, pool.pool, sizeof(block));
+
+ /*
+ * Each pass processes the pool backwards in blocks of
+ * HASHSIZE, just so that in general we get the output of
+ * SHA before the corresponding input, in the hope that
+ * things will be that much less predictable that way
+ * round, when we subsequently return bytes ...
+ */
+ for (j = POOLSIZE; (j -= HASHSIZE) >= 0;) {
+ /*
+ * XOR the bit of the pool we're processing into the
+ * digest.
+ */
+
+ for (k = 0; k < sizeof(digest) / sizeof(*digest); k++)
+ digest[k] ^= ((word32 *) (pool.pool + j))[k];
+
+ /*
+ * Munge our unrevealed first block of the pool into
+ * it.
+ */
+ SHATransform(digest, block);
+
+ /*
+ * Stick the result back into the pool.
+ */
+
+ for (k = 0; k < sizeof(digest) / sizeof(*digest); k++)
+ ((word32 *) (pool.pool + j))[k] = digest[k];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Might as well save this value back into `incoming', just so
+ * there'll be some extra bizarreness there.
+ */
+ SHATransform(digest, block);
+ memcpy(pool.incoming, digest, sizeof(digest));
+
+ pool.poolpos = sizeof(pool.incoming);
+
+ pool.stir_pending = FALSE;
+}
+
+void random_add_noise(void *noise, int length)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = noise;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!random_active)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * This function processes HASHINPUT bytes into only HASHSIZE
+ * bytes, so _if_ we were getting incredibly high entropy
+ * sources then we would be throwing away valuable stuff.
+ */
+ while (length >= (HASHINPUT - pool.incomingpos)) {
+ memcpy(pool.incomingb + pool.incomingpos, p,
+ HASHINPUT - pool.incomingpos);
+ p += HASHINPUT - pool.incomingpos;
+ length -= HASHINPUT - pool.incomingpos;
+ SHATransform((word32 *) pool.incoming, (word32 *) pool.incomingb);
+ for (i = 0; i < HASHSIZE; i++) {
+ pool.pool[pool.poolpos++] ^= pool.incomingb[i];
+ if (pool.poolpos >= POOLSIZE)
+ pool.poolpos = 0;
+ }
+ if (pool.poolpos < HASHSIZE)
+ random_stir();
+
+ pool.incomingpos = 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(pool.incomingb + pool.incomingpos, p, length);
+ pool.incomingpos += length;
+}
+
+void random_add_heavynoise(void *noise, int length)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = noise;
+ int i;
+
+ while (length >= POOLSIZE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < POOLSIZE; i++)
+ pool.pool[i] ^= *p++;
+ random_stir();
+ length -= POOLSIZE;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+ pool.pool[i] ^= *p++;
+ random_stir();
+}
+
+static void random_add_heavynoise_bitbybit(void *noise, int length)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = noise;
+ int i;
+
+ while (length >= POOLSIZE - pool.poolpos) {
+ for (i = 0; i < POOLSIZE - pool.poolpos; i++)
+ pool.pool[pool.poolpos + i] ^= *p++;
+ random_stir();
+ length -= POOLSIZE - pool.poolpos;
+ pool.poolpos = 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+ pool.pool[i] ^= *p++;
+ pool.poolpos = i;
+}
+
+static void random_timer(void *ctx, long now)
+{
+ if (random_active > 0 && now - next_noise_collection >= 0) {
+ noise_regular();
+ next_noise_collection =
+ schedule_timer(NOISE_REGULAR_INTERVAL, random_timer, &pool);
+ }
+}
+
+void random_ref(void)
+{
+ if (!random_active) {
+ memset(&pool, 0, sizeof(pool)); /* just to start with */
+
+ noise_get_heavy(random_add_heavynoise_bitbybit);
+ random_stir();
+
+ next_noise_collection =
+ schedule_timer(NOISE_REGULAR_INTERVAL, random_timer, &pool);
+ }
+
+ random_active++;
+}
+
+void random_unref(void)
+{
+ random_active--;
+}
+
+int random_byte(void)
+{
+ if (pool.poolpos >= POOLSIZE)
+ random_stir();
+
+ return pool.pool[pool.poolpos++];
+}
+
+void random_get_savedata(void **data, int *len)
+{
+ void *buf = snewn(POOLSIZE / 2, char);
+ random_stir();
+ memcpy(buf, pool.pool + pool.poolpos, POOLSIZE / 2);
+ *len = POOLSIZE / 2;
+ *data = buf;
+ random_stir();
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshrsa.c b/tools/plink/sshrsa.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d06e9d6f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshrsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,1010 @@ +/*
+ * RSA implementation for PuTTY.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+int makekey(unsigned char *data, int len, struct RSAKey *result,
+ unsigned char **keystr, int order)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = data;
+ int i, n;
+
+ if (len < 4)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (result) {
+ result->bits = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ result->bits = (result->bits << 8) + *p++;
+ } else
+ p += 4;
+
+ len -= 4;
+
+ /*
+ * order=0 means exponent then modulus (the keys sent by the
+ * server). order=1 means modulus then exponent (the keys
+ * stored in a keyfile).
+ */
+
+ if (order == 0) {
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, len, result ? &result->exponent : NULL);
+ if (n < 0) return -1;
+ p += n;
+ len -= n;
+ }
+
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, len, result ? &result->modulus : NULL);
+ if (n < 0 || (result && bignum_bitcount(result->modulus) == 0)) return -1;
+ if (result)
+ result->bytes = n - 2;
+ if (keystr)
+ *keystr = p + 2;
+ p += n;
+ len -= n;
+
+ if (order == 1) {
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, len, result ? &result->exponent : NULL);
+ if (n < 0) return -1;
+ p += n;
+ len -= n;
+ }
+ return p - data;
+}
+
+int makeprivate(unsigned char *data, int len, struct RSAKey *result)
+{
+ return ssh1_read_bignum(data, len, &result->private_exponent);
+}
+
+int rsaencrypt(unsigned char *data, int length, struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ Bignum b1, b2;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (key->bytes < length + 4)
+ return 0; /* RSA key too short! */
+
+ memmove(data + key->bytes - length, data, length);
+ data[0] = 0;
+ data[1] = 2;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < key->bytes - length - 1; i++) {
+ do {
+ data[i] = random_byte();
+ } while (data[i] == 0);
+ }
+ data[key->bytes - length - 1] = 0;
+
+ b1 = bignum_from_bytes(data, key->bytes);
+
+ b2 = modpow(b1, key->exponent, key->modulus);
+
+ p = data;
+ for (i = key->bytes; i--;) {
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(b2, i);
+ }
+
+ freebn(b1);
+ freebn(b2);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void sha512_mpint(SHA512_State * s, Bignum b)
+{
+ unsigned char lenbuf[4];
+ int len;
+ len = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 8) / 8;
+ PUT_32BIT(lenbuf, len);
+ SHA512_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 4);
+ while (len-- > 0) {
+ lenbuf[0] = bignum_byte(b, len);
+ SHA512_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 1);
+ }
+ memset(lenbuf, 0, sizeof(lenbuf));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is a wrapper on modpow(). It has the same effect
+ * as modpow(), but employs RSA blinding to protect against timing
+ * attacks.
+ */
+static Bignum rsa_privkey_op(Bignum input, struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ Bignum random, random_encrypted, random_inverse;
+ Bignum input_blinded, ret_blinded;
+ Bignum ret;
+
+ SHA512_State ss;
+ unsigned char digest512[64];
+ int digestused = lenof(digest512);
+ int hashseq = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Start by inventing a random number chosen uniformly from the
+ * range 2..modulus-1. (We do this by preparing a random number
+ * of the right length and retrying if it's greater than the
+ * modulus, to prevent any potential Bleichenbacher-like
+ * attacks making use of the uneven distribution within the
+ * range that would arise from just reducing our number mod n.
+ * There are timing implications to the potential retries, of
+ * course, but all they tell you is the modulus, which you
+ * already knew.)
+ *
+ * To preserve determinism and avoid Pageant needing to share
+ * the random number pool, we actually generate this `random'
+ * number by hashing stuff with the private key.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ int bits, byte, bitsleft, v;
+ random = copybn(key->modulus);
+ /*
+ * Find the topmost set bit. (This function will return its
+ * index plus one.) Then we'll set all bits from that one
+ * downwards randomly.
+ */
+ bits = bignum_bitcount(random);
+ byte = 0;
+ bitsleft = 0;
+ while (bits--) {
+ if (bitsleft <= 0) {
+ bitsleft = 8;
+ /*
+ * Conceptually the following few lines are equivalent to
+ * byte = random_byte();
+ */
+ if (digestused >= lenof(digest512)) {
+ unsigned char seqbuf[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(seqbuf, hashseq);
+ SHA512_Init(&ss);
+ SHA512_Bytes(&ss, "RSA deterministic blinding", 26);
+ SHA512_Bytes(&ss, seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
+ sha512_mpint(&ss, key->private_exponent);
+ SHA512_Final(&ss, digest512);
+ hashseq++;
+
+ /*
+ * Now hash that digest plus the signature
+ * input.
+ */
+ SHA512_Init(&ss);
+ SHA512_Bytes(&ss, digest512, sizeof(digest512));
+ sha512_mpint(&ss, input);
+ SHA512_Final(&ss, digest512);
+
+ digestused = 0;
+ }
+ byte = digest512[digestused++];
+ }
+ v = byte & 1;
+ byte >>= 1;
+ bitsleft--;
+ bignum_set_bit(random, bits, v);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now check that this number is strictly greater than
+ * zero, and strictly less than modulus.
+ */
+ if (bignum_cmp(random, Zero) <= 0 ||
+ bignum_cmp(random, key->modulus) >= 0) {
+ freebn(random);
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RSA blinding relies on the fact that (xy)^d mod n is equal
+ * to (x^d mod n) * (y^d mod n) mod n. We invent a random pair
+ * y and y^d; then we multiply x by y, raise to the power d mod
+ * n as usual, and divide by y^d to recover x^d. Thus an
+ * attacker can't correlate the timing of the modpow with the
+ * input, because they don't know anything about the number
+ * that was input to the actual modpow.
+ *
+ * The clever bit is that we don't have to do a huge modpow to
+ * get y and y^d; we will use the number we just invented as
+ * _y^d_, and use the _public_ exponent to compute (y^d)^e = y
+ * from it, which is much faster to do.
+ */
+ random_encrypted = modpow(random, key->exponent, key->modulus);
+ random_inverse = modinv(random, key->modulus);
+ input_blinded = modmul(input, random_encrypted, key->modulus);
+ ret_blinded = modpow(input_blinded, key->private_exponent, key->modulus);
+ ret = modmul(ret_blinded, random_inverse, key->modulus);
+
+ freebn(ret_blinded);
+ freebn(input_blinded);
+ freebn(random_inverse);
+ freebn(random_encrypted);
+ freebn(random);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+Bignum rsadecrypt(Bignum input, struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ return rsa_privkey_op(input, key);
+}
+
+int rsastr_len(struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ Bignum md, ex;
+ int mdlen, exlen;
+
+ md = key->modulus;
+ ex = key->exponent;
+ mdlen = (bignum_bitcount(md) + 15) / 16;
+ exlen = (bignum_bitcount(ex) + 15) / 16;
+ return 4 * (mdlen + exlen) + 20;
+}
+
+void rsastr_fmt(char *str, struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ Bignum md, ex;
+ int len = 0, i, nibbles;
+ static const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+ md = key->modulus;
+ ex = key->exponent;
+
+ len += sprintf(str + len, "0x");
+
+ nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(ex)) / 4;
+ if (nibbles < 1)
+ nibbles = 1;
+ for (i = nibbles; i--;)
+ str[len++] = hex[(bignum_byte(ex, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];
+
+ len += sprintf(str + len, ",0x");
+
+ nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(md)) / 4;
+ if (nibbles < 1)
+ nibbles = 1;
+ for (i = nibbles; i--;)
+ str[len++] = hex[(bignum_byte(md, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];
+
+ str[len] = '\0';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a fingerprint string for the key. Compatible with the
+ * OpenSSH fingerprint code.
+ */
+void rsa_fingerprint(char *str, int len, struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ struct MD5Context md5c;
+ unsigned char digest[16];
+ char buffer[16 * 3 + 40];
+ int numlen, slen, i;
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ numlen = ssh1_bignum_length(key->modulus) - 2;
+ for (i = numlen; i--;) {
+ unsigned char c = bignum_byte(key->modulus, i);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, &c, 1);
+ }
+ numlen = ssh1_bignum_length(key->exponent) - 2;
+ for (i = numlen; i--;) {
+ unsigned char c = bignum_byte(key->exponent, i);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, &c, 1);
+ }
+ MD5Final(digest, &md5c);
+
+ sprintf(buffer, "%d ", bignum_bitcount(key->modulus));
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ sprintf(buffer + strlen(buffer), "%s%02x", i ? ":" : "",
+ digest[i]);
+ strncpy(str, buffer, len);
+ str[len - 1] = '\0';
+ slen = strlen(str);
+ if (key->comment && slen < len - 1) {
+ str[slen] = ' ';
+ strncpy(str + slen + 1, key->comment, len - slen - 1);
+ str[len - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that the public data in an RSA key matches the private
+ * data. We also check the private data itself: we ensure that p >
+ * q and that iqmp really is the inverse of q mod p.
+ */
+int rsa_verify(struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ Bignum n, ed, pm1, qm1;
+ int cmp;
+
+ /* n must equal pq. */
+ n = bigmul(key->p, key->q);
+ cmp = bignum_cmp(n, key->modulus);
+ freebn(n);
+ if (cmp != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* e * d must be congruent to 1, modulo (p-1) and modulo (q-1). */
+ pm1 = copybn(key->p);
+ decbn(pm1);
+ ed = modmul(key->exponent, key->private_exponent, pm1);
+ cmp = bignum_cmp(ed, One);
+ sfree(ed);
+ if (cmp != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ qm1 = copybn(key->q);
+ decbn(qm1);
+ ed = modmul(key->exponent, key->private_exponent, qm1);
+ cmp = bignum_cmp(ed, One);
+ sfree(ed);
+ if (cmp != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure p > q.
+ *
+ * I have seen key blobs in the wild which were generated with
+ * p < q, so instead of rejecting the key in this case we
+ * should instead flip them round into the canonical order of
+ * p > q. This also involves regenerating iqmp.
+ */
+ if (bignum_cmp(key->p, key->q) <= 0) {
+ Bignum tmp = key->p;
+ key->p = key->q;
+ key->q = tmp;
+
+ freebn(key->iqmp);
+ key->iqmp = modinv(key->q, key->p);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure iqmp * q is congruent to 1, modulo p.
+ */
+ n = modmul(key->iqmp, key->q, key->p);
+ cmp = bignum_cmp(n, One);
+ sfree(n);
+ if (cmp != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Public key blob as used by Pageant: exponent before modulus. */
+unsigned char *rsa_public_blob(struct RSAKey *key, int *len)
+{
+ int length, pos;
+ unsigned char *ret;
+
+ length = (ssh1_bignum_length(key->modulus) +
+ ssh1_bignum_length(key->exponent) + 4);
+ ret = snewn(length, unsigned char);
+
+ PUT_32BIT(ret, bignum_bitcount(key->modulus));
+ pos = 4;
+ pos += ssh1_write_bignum(ret + pos, key->exponent);
+ pos += ssh1_write_bignum(ret + pos, key->modulus);
+
+ *len = length;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Given a public blob, determine its length. */
+int rsa_public_blob_len(void *data, int maxlen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)data;
+ int n;
+
+ if (maxlen < 4)
+ return -1;
+ p += 4; /* length word */
+ maxlen -= 4;
+
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, maxlen, NULL); /* exponent */
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -1;
+ p += n;
+
+ n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, maxlen, NULL); /* modulus */
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -1;
+ p += n;
+
+ return p - (unsigned char *)data;
+}
+
+void freersakey(struct RSAKey *key)
+{
+ if (key->modulus)
+ freebn(key->modulus);
+ if (key->exponent)
+ freebn(key->exponent);
+ if (key->private_exponent)
+ freebn(key->private_exponent);
+ if (key->p)
+ freebn(key->p);
+ if (key->q)
+ freebn(key->q);
+ if (key->iqmp)
+ freebn(key->iqmp);
+ if (key->comment)
+ sfree(key->comment);
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Implementation of the ssh-rsa signing key type.
+ */
+
+static void getstring(char **data, int *datalen, char **p, int *length)
+{
+ *p = NULL;
+ if (*datalen < 4)
+ return;
+ *length = GET_32BIT(*data);
+ *datalen -= 4;
+ *data += 4;
+ if (*datalen < *length)
+ return;
+ *p = *data;
+ *data += *length;
+ *datalen -= *length;
+}
+static Bignum getmp(char **data, int *datalen)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int length;
+ Bignum b;
+
+ getstring(data, datalen, &p, &length);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+ b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
+ return b;
+}
+
+static void *rsa2_newkey(char *data, int len)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int slen;
+ struct RSAKey *rsa;
+
+ rsa = snew(struct RSAKey);
+ if (!rsa)
+ return NULL;
+ getstring(&data, &len, &p, &slen);
+
+ if (!p || slen != 7 || memcmp(p, "ssh-rsa", 7)) {
+ sfree(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ rsa->exponent = getmp(&data, &len);
+ rsa->modulus = getmp(&data, &len);
+ rsa->private_exponent = NULL;
+ rsa->p = rsa->q = rsa->iqmp = NULL;
+ rsa->comment = NULL;
+
+ return rsa;
+}
+
+static void rsa2_freekey(void *key)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ freersakey(rsa);
+ sfree(rsa);
+}
+
+static char *rsa2_fmtkey(void *key)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ char *p;
+ int len;
+
+ len = rsastr_len(rsa);
+ p = snewn(len, char);
+ rsastr_fmt(p, rsa);
+ return p;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *rsa2_public_blob(void *key, int *len)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ int elen, mlen, bloblen;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *blob, *p;
+
+ elen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->exponent) + 8) / 8;
+ mlen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus) + 8) / 8;
+
+ /*
+ * string "ssh-rsa", mpint exp, mpint mod. Total 19+elen+mlen.
+ * (three length fields, 12+7=19).
+ */
+ bloblen = 19 + elen + mlen;
+ blob = snewn(bloblen, unsigned char);
+ p = blob;
+ PUT_32BIT(p, 7);
+ p += 4;
+ memcpy(p, "ssh-rsa", 7);
+ p += 7;
+ PUT_32BIT(p, elen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = elen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->exponent, i);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, mlen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = mlen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->modulus, i);
+ assert(p == blob + bloblen);
+ *len = bloblen;
+ return blob;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *rsa2_private_blob(void *key, int *len)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ int dlen, plen, qlen, ulen, bloblen;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *blob, *p;
+
+ dlen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->private_exponent) + 8) / 8;
+ plen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->p) + 8) / 8;
+ qlen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->q) + 8) / 8;
+ ulen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->iqmp) + 8) / 8;
+
+ /*
+ * mpint private_exp, mpint p, mpint q, mpint iqmp. Total 16 +
+ * sum of lengths.
+ */
+ bloblen = 16 + dlen + plen + qlen + ulen;
+ blob = snewn(bloblen, unsigned char);
+ p = blob;
+ PUT_32BIT(p, dlen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = dlen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->private_exponent, i);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, plen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = plen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->p, i);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, qlen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = qlen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->q, i);
+ PUT_32BIT(p, ulen);
+ p += 4;
+ for (i = ulen; i--;)
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->iqmp, i);
+ assert(p == blob + bloblen);
+ *len = bloblen;
+ return blob;
+}
+
+static void *rsa2_createkey(unsigned char *pub_blob, int pub_len,
+ unsigned char *priv_blob, int priv_len)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa;
+ char *pb = (char *) priv_blob;
+
+ rsa = rsa2_newkey((char *) pub_blob, pub_len);
+ rsa->private_exponent = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);
+ rsa->p = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);
+ rsa->q = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);
+ rsa->iqmp = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);
+
+ if (!rsa_verify(rsa)) {
+ rsa2_freekey(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return rsa;
+}
+
+static void *rsa2_openssh_createkey(unsigned char **blob, int *len)
+{
+ char **b = (char **) blob;
+ struct RSAKey *rsa;
+
+ rsa = snew(struct RSAKey);
+ if (!rsa)
+ return NULL;
+ rsa->comment = NULL;
+
+ rsa->modulus = getmp(b, len);
+ rsa->exponent = getmp(b, len);
+ rsa->private_exponent = getmp(b, len);
+ rsa->iqmp = getmp(b, len);
+ rsa->p = getmp(b, len);
+ rsa->q = getmp(b, len);
+
+ if (!rsa->modulus || !rsa->exponent || !rsa->private_exponent ||
+ !rsa->iqmp || !rsa->p || !rsa->q) {
+ sfree(rsa->modulus);
+ sfree(rsa->exponent);
+ sfree(rsa->private_exponent);
+ sfree(rsa->iqmp);
+ sfree(rsa->p);
+ sfree(rsa->q);
+ sfree(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return rsa;
+}
+
+static int rsa2_openssh_fmtkey(void *key, unsigned char *blob, int len)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ int bloblen, i;
+
+ bloblen =
+ ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->modulus) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->exponent) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->private_exponent) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->iqmp) +
+ ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->p) + ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->q);
+
+ if (bloblen > len)
+ return bloblen;
+
+ bloblen = 0;
+#define ENC(x) \
+ PUT_32BIT(blob+bloblen, ssh2_bignum_length((x))-4); bloblen += 4; \
+ for (i = ssh2_bignum_length((x))-4; i-- ;) blob[bloblen++]=bignum_byte((x),i);
+ ENC(rsa->modulus);
+ ENC(rsa->exponent);
+ ENC(rsa->private_exponent);
+ ENC(rsa->iqmp);
+ ENC(rsa->p);
+ ENC(rsa->q);
+
+ return bloblen;
+}
+
+static int rsa2_pubkey_bits(void *blob, int len)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa;
+ int ret;
+
+ rsa = rsa2_newkey((char *) blob, len);
+ ret = bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus);
+ rsa2_freekey(rsa);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static char *rsa2_fingerprint(void *key)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ struct MD5Context md5c;
+ unsigned char digest[16], lenbuf[4];
+ char buffer[16 * 3 + 40];
+ char *ret;
+ int numlen, i;
+
+ MD5Init(&md5c);
+ MD5Update(&md5c, (unsigned char *)"\0\0\0\7ssh-rsa", 11);
+
+#define ADD_BIGNUM(bignum) \
+ numlen = (bignum_bitcount(bignum)+8)/8; \
+ PUT_32BIT(lenbuf, numlen); MD5Update(&md5c, lenbuf, 4); \
+ for (i = numlen; i-- ;) { \
+ unsigned char c = bignum_byte(bignum, i); \
+ MD5Update(&md5c, &c, 1); \
+ }
+ ADD_BIGNUM(rsa->exponent);
+ ADD_BIGNUM(rsa->modulus);
+#undef ADD_BIGNUM
+
+ MD5Final(digest, &md5c);
+
+ sprintf(buffer, "ssh-rsa %d ", bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus));
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ sprintf(buffer + strlen(buffer), "%s%02x", i ? ":" : "",
+ digest[i]);
+ ret = snewn(strlen(buffer) + 1, char);
+ if (ret)
+ strcpy(ret, buffer);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the magic ASN.1/DER prefix that goes in the decoded
+ * signature, between the string of FFs and the actual SHA hash
+ * value. The meaning of it is:
+ *
+ * 00 -- this marks the end of the FFs; not part of the ASN.1 bit itself
+ *
+ * 30 21 -- a constructed SEQUENCE of length 0x21
+ * 30 09 -- a constructed sub-SEQUENCE of length 9
+ * 06 05 -- an object identifier, length 5
+ * 2B 0E 03 02 1A -- object id { 1 3 14 3 2 26 }
+ * (the 1,3 comes from 0x2B = 43 = 40*1+3)
+ * 05 00 -- NULL
+ * 04 14 -- a primitive OCTET STRING of length 0x14
+ * [0x14 bytes of hash data follows]
+ *
+ * The object id in the middle there is listed as `id-sha1' in
+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1d2.asn (the
+ * ASN module for PKCS #1) and its expanded form is as follows:
+ *
+ * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
+ * algorithms(2) 26 }
+ */
+static const unsigned char asn1_weird_stuff[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2B,
+ 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14,
+};
+
+#define ASN1_LEN ( (int) sizeof(asn1_weird_stuff) )
+
+static int rsa2_verifysig(void *key, char *sig, int siglen,
+ char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ Bignum in, out;
+ char *p;
+ int slen;
+ int bytes, i, j, ret;
+ unsigned char hash[20];
+
+ getstring(&sig, &siglen, &p, &slen);
+ if (!p || slen != 7 || memcmp(p, "ssh-rsa", 7)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ in = getmp(&sig, &siglen);
+ out = modpow(in, rsa->exponent, rsa->modulus);
+ freebn(in);
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ bytes = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus)+7) / 8;
+ /* Top (partial) byte should be zero. */
+ if (bignum_byte(out, bytes - 1) != 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ /* First whole byte should be 1. */
+ if (bignum_byte(out, bytes - 2) != 1)
+ ret = 0;
+ /* Most of the rest should be FF. */
+ for (i = bytes - 3; i >= 20 + ASN1_LEN; i--) {
+ if (bignum_byte(out, i) != 0xFF)
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ /* Then we expect to see the asn1_weird_stuff. */
+ for (i = 20 + ASN1_LEN - 1, j = 0; i >= 20; i--, j++) {
+ if (bignum_byte(out, i) != asn1_weird_stuff[j])
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ /* Finally, we expect to see the SHA-1 hash of the signed data. */
+ SHA_Simple(data, datalen, hash);
+ for (i = 19, j = 0; i >= 0; i--, j++) {
+ if (bignum_byte(out, i) != hash[j])
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ freebn(out);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *rsa2_sign(void *key, char *data, int datalen,
+ int *siglen)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ unsigned char *bytes;
+ int nbytes;
+ unsigned char hash[20];
+ Bignum in, out;
+ int i, j;
+
+ SHA_Simple(data, datalen, hash);
+
+ nbytes = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus) - 1) / 8;
+ assert(1 <= nbytes - 20 - ASN1_LEN);
+ bytes = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);
+
+ bytes[0] = 1;
+ for (i = 1; i < nbytes - 20 - ASN1_LEN; i++)
+ bytes[i] = 0xFF;
+ for (i = nbytes - 20 - ASN1_LEN, j = 0; i < nbytes - 20; i++, j++)
+ bytes[i] = asn1_weird_stuff[j];
+ for (i = nbytes - 20, j = 0; i < nbytes; i++, j++)
+ bytes[i] = hash[j];
+
+ in = bignum_from_bytes(bytes, nbytes);
+ sfree(bytes);
+
+ out = rsa_privkey_op(in, rsa);
+ freebn(in);
+
+ nbytes = (bignum_bitcount(out) + 7) / 8;
+ bytes = snewn(4 + 7 + 4 + nbytes, unsigned char);
+ PUT_32BIT(bytes, 7);
+ memcpy(bytes + 4, "ssh-rsa", 7);
+ PUT_32BIT(bytes + 4 + 7, nbytes);
+ for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++)
+ bytes[4 + 7 + 4 + i] = bignum_byte(out, nbytes - 1 - i);
+ freebn(out);
+
+ *siglen = 4 + 7 + 4 + nbytes;
+ return bytes;
+}
+
+const struct ssh_signkey ssh_rsa = {
+ rsa2_newkey,
+ rsa2_freekey,
+ rsa2_fmtkey,
+ rsa2_public_blob,
+ rsa2_private_blob,
+ rsa2_createkey,
+ rsa2_openssh_createkey,
+ rsa2_openssh_fmtkey,
+ rsa2_pubkey_bits,
+ rsa2_fingerprint,
+ rsa2_verifysig,
+ rsa2_sign,
+ "ssh-rsa",
+ "rsa2"
+};
+
+void *ssh_rsakex_newkey(char *data, int len)
+{
+ return rsa2_newkey(data, len);
+}
+
+void ssh_rsakex_freekey(void *key)
+{
+ rsa2_freekey(key);
+}
+
+int ssh_rsakex_klen(void *key)
+{
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+
+ return bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus);
+}
+
+static void oaep_mask(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *seed, int seedlen,
+ void *vdata, int datalen)
+{
+ unsigned char *data = (unsigned char *)vdata;
+ unsigned count = 0;
+
+ while (datalen > 0) {
+ int i, max = (datalen > h->hlen ? h->hlen : datalen);
+ void *s;
+ unsigned char counter[4], hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+
+ assert(h->hlen <= SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN);
+ PUT_32BIT(counter, count);
+ s = h->init();
+ h->bytes(s, seed, seedlen);
+ h->bytes(s, counter, 4);
+ h->final(s, hash);
+ count++;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
+ data[i] ^= hash[i];
+
+ data += max;
+ datalen -= max;
+ }
+}
+
+void ssh_rsakex_encrypt(const struct ssh_hash *h, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ unsigned char *out, int outlen,
+ void *key)
+{
+ Bignum b1, b2;
+ struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;
+ int k, i;
+ char *p;
+ const int HLEN = h->hlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Here we encrypt using RSAES-OAEP. Essentially this means:
+ *
+ * - we have a SHA-based `mask generation function' which
+ * creates a pseudo-random stream of mask data
+ * deterministically from an input chunk of data.
+ *
+ * - we have a random chunk of data called a seed.
+ *
+ * - we use the seed to generate a mask which we XOR with our
+ * plaintext.
+ *
+ * - then we use _the masked plaintext_ to generate a mask
+ * which we XOR with the seed.
+ *
+ * - then we concatenate the masked seed and the masked
+ * plaintext, and RSA-encrypt that lot.
+ *
+ * The result is that the data input to the encryption function
+ * is random-looking and (hopefully) contains no exploitable
+ * structure such as PKCS1-v1_5 does.
+ *
+ * For a precise specification, see RFC 3447, section 7.1.1.
+ * Some of the variable names below are derived from that, so
+ * it'd probably help to read it anyway.
+ */
+
+ /* k denotes the length in octets of the RSA modulus. */
+ k = (7 + bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus)) / 8;
+
+ /* The length of the input data must be at most k - 2hLen - 2. */
+ assert(inlen > 0 && inlen <= k - 2*HLEN - 2);
+
+ /* The length of the output data wants to be precisely k. */
+ assert(outlen == k);
+
+ /*
+ * Now perform EME-OAEP encoding. First set up all the unmasked
+ * output data.
+ */
+ /* Leading byte zero. */
+ out[0] = 0;
+ /* At position 1, the seed: HLEN bytes of random data. */
+ for (i = 0; i < HLEN; i++)
+ out[i + 1] = random_byte();
+ /* At position 1+HLEN, the data block DB, consisting of: */
+ /* The hash of the label (we only support an empty label here) */
+ h->final(h->init(), out + HLEN + 1);
+ /* A bunch of zero octets */
+ memset(out + 2*HLEN + 1, 0, outlen - (2*HLEN + 1));
+ /* A single 1 octet, followed by the input message data. */
+ out[outlen - inlen - 1] = 1;
+ memcpy(out + outlen - inlen, in, inlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Now use the seed data to mask the block DB.
+ */
+ oaep_mask(h, out+1, HLEN, out+HLEN+1, outlen-HLEN-1);
+
+ /*
+ * And now use the masked DB to mask the seed itself.
+ */
+ oaep_mask(h, out+HLEN+1, outlen-HLEN-1, out+1, HLEN);
+
+ /*
+ * Now `out' contains precisely the data we want to
+ * RSA-encrypt.
+ */
+ b1 = bignum_from_bytes(out, outlen);
+ b2 = modpow(b1, rsa->exponent, rsa->modulus);
+ p = (char *)out;
+ for (i = outlen; i--;) {
+ *p++ = bignum_byte(b2, i);
+ }
+ freebn(b1);
+ freebn(b2);
+
+ /*
+ * And we're done.
+ */
+}
+
+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_rsa_kex_sha1 = {
+ "rsa1024-sha1", NULL, KEXTYPE_RSA, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha1
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_rsa_kex_sha256 = {
+ "rsa2048-sha256", NULL, KEXTYPE_RSA, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha256
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_kex *const rsa_kex_list[] = {
+ &ssh_rsa_kex_sha256,
+ &ssh_rsa_kex_sha1
+};
+
+const struct ssh_kexes ssh_rsa_kex = {
+ sizeof(rsa_kex_list) / sizeof(*rsa_kex_list),
+ rsa_kex_list
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshsh256.c b/tools/plink/sshsh256.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..538982a89 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshsh256.c @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +/*
+ * SHA-256 algorithm as described at
+ *
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs.html
+ */
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Core SHA256 algorithm: processes 16-word blocks into a message digest.
+ */
+
+#define ror(x,y) ( ((x) << (32-y)) | (((uint32)(x)) >> (y)) )
+#define shr(x,y) ( (((uint32)(x)) >> (y)) )
+#define Ch(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (y)) ^ (~(x) & (z)) )
+#define Maj(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)) )
+#define bigsigma0(x) ( ror((x),2) ^ ror((x),13) ^ ror((x),22) )
+#define bigsigma1(x) ( ror((x),6) ^ ror((x),11) ^ ror((x),25) )
+#define smallsigma0(x) ( ror((x),7) ^ ror((x),18) ^ shr((x),3) )
+#define smallsigma1(x) ( ror((x),17) ^ ror((x),19) ^ shr((x),10) )
+
+void SHA256_Core_Init(SHA256_State *s) {
+ s->h[0] = 0x6a09e667;
+ s->h[1] = 0xbb67ae85;
+ s->h[2] = 0x3c6ef372;
+ s->h[3] = 0xa54ff53a;
+ s->h[4] = 0x510e527f;
+ s->h[5] = 0x9b05688c;
+ s->h[6] = 0x1f83d9ab;
+ s->h[7] = 0x5be0cd19;
+}
+
+void SHA256_Block(SHA256_State *s, uint32 *block) {
+ uint32 w[80];
+ uint32 a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h;
+ static const int k[] = {
+ 0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5,
+ 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,
+ 0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3,
+ 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,
+ 0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc,
+ 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,
+ 0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7,
+ 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,
+ 0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13,
+ 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,
+ 0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3,
+ 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,
+ 0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5,
+ 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,
+ 0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208,
+ 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2,
+ };
+
+ int t;
+
+ for (t = 0; t < 16; t++)
+ w[t] = block[t];
+
+ for (t = 16; t < 64; t++)
+ w[t] = smallsigma1(w[t-2]) + w[t-7] + smallsigma0(w[t-15]) + w[t-16];
+
+ a = s->h[0]; b = s->h[1]; c = s->h[2]; d = s->h[3];
+ e = s->h[4]; f = s->h[5]; g = s->h[6]; h = s->h[7];
+
+ for (t = 0; t < 64; t+=8) {
+ uint32 t1, t2;
+
+#define ROUND(j,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) \
+ t1 = h + bigsigma1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + k[j] + w[j]; \
+ t2 = bigsigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); \
+ d = d + t1; h = t1 + t2;
+
+ ROUND(t+0, a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+ ROUND(t+1, h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+ ROUND(t+2, g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+ ROUND(t+3, f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+ ROUND(t+4, e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+ ROUND(t+5, d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+ ROUND(t+6, c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+ ROUND(t+7, b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+ }
+
+ s->h[0] += a; s->h[1] += b; s->h[2] += c; s->h[3] += d;
+ s->h[4] += e; s->h[5] += f; s->h[6] += g; s->h[7] += h;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Outer SHA256 algorithm: take an arbitrary length byte string,
+ * convert it into 16-word blocks with the prescribed padding at
+ * the end, and pass those blocks to the core SHA256 algorithm.
+ */
+
+#define BLKSIZE 64
+
+void SHA256_Init(SHA256_State *s) {
+ SHA256_Core_Init(s);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ s->lenhi = s->lenlo = 0;
+}
+
+void SHA256_Bytes(SHA256_State *s, const void *p, int len) {
+ unsigned char *q = (unsigned char *)p;
+ uint32 wordblock[16];
+ uint32 lenw = len;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Update the length field.
+ */
+ s->lenlo += lenw;
+ s->lenhi += (s->lenlo < lenw);
+
+ if (s->blkused && s->blkused+len < BLKSIZE) {
+ /*
+ * Trivial case: just add to the block.
+ */
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, len);
+ s->blkused += len;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We must complete and process at least one block.
+ */
+ while (s->blkused + len >= BLKSIZE) {
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, BLKSIZE - s->blkused);
+ q += BLKSIZE - s->blkused;
+ len -= BLKSIZE - s->blkused;
+ /* Now process the block. Gather bytes big-endian into words */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ wordblock[i] =
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*4+0]) << 24 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*4+1]) << 16 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*4+2]) << 8 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*4+3]) << 0 );
+ }
+ SHA256_Block(s, wordblock);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->block, q, len);
+ s->blkused = len;
+ }
+}
+
+void SHA256_Final(SHA256_State *s, unsigned char *digest) {
+ int i;
+ int pad;
+ unsigned char c[64];
+ uint32 lenhi, lenlo;
+
+ if (s->blkused >= 56)
+ pad = 56 + 64 - s->blkused;
+ else
+ pad = 56 - s->blkused;
+
+ lenhi = (s->lenhi << 3) | (s->lenlo >> (32-3));
+ lenlo = (s->lenlo << 3);
+
+ memset(c, 0, pad);
+ c[0] = 0x80;
+ SHA256_Bytes(s, &c, pad);
+
+ c[0] = (lenhi >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ c[1] = (lenhi >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c[2] = (lenhi >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c[3] = (lenhi >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ c[4] = (lenlo >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ c[5] = (lenlo >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c[6] = (lenlo >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c[7] = (lenlo >> 0) & 0xFF;
+
+ SHA256_Bytes(s, &c, 8);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ digest[i*4+0] = (s->h[i] >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*4+1] = (s->h[i] >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*4+2] = (s->h[i] >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*4+3] = (s->h[i] >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ }
+}
+
+void SHA256_Simple(const void *p, int len, unsigned char *output) {
+ SHA256_State s;
+
+ SHA256_Init(&s);
+ SHA256_Bytes(&s, p, len);
+ SHA256_Final(&s, output);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Thin abstraction for things where hashes are pluggable.
+ */
+
+static void *sha256_init(void)
+{
+ SHA256_State *s;
+
+ s = snew(SHA256_State);
+ SHA256_Init(s);
+ return s;
+}
+
+static void sha256_bytes(void *handle, void *p, int len)
+{
+ SHA256_State *s = handle;
+
+ SHA256_Bytes(s, p, len);
+}
+
+static void sha256_final(void *handle, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ SHA256_State *s = handle;
+
+ SHA256_Final(s, output);
+ sfree(s);
+}
+
+const struct ssh_hash ssh_sha256 = {
+ sha256_init, sha256_bytes, sha256_final, 32, "SHA-256"
+};
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+int main(void) {
+ unsigned char digest[32];
+ int i, j, errors;
+
+ struct {
+ const char *teststring;
+ unsigned char digest[32];
+ } tests[] = {
+ { "abc", {
+ 0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea,
+ 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23,
+ 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c,
+ 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad,
+ } },
+ { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq", {
+ 0x24, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0x61, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xb8,
+ 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x39,
+ 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xff, 0x21, 0x67,
+ 0xf6, 0xec, 0xed, 0xd4, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xc1,
+ } },
+ };
+
+ errors = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
+ SHA256_Simple(tests[i].teststring,
+ strlen(tests[i].teststring), digest);
+ for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) {
+ if (digest[j] != tests[i].digest[j]) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "\"%s\" digest byte %d should be 0x%02x, is 0x%02x\n",
+ tests[i].teststring, j, tests[i].digest[j], digest[j]);
+ errors++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ printf("%d errors\n", errors);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshsh512.c b/tools/plink/sshsh512.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c025ffd17 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshsh512.c @@ -0,0 +1,358 @@ +/*
+ * SHA-512 algorithm as described at
+ *
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs.html
+ */
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+#define BLKSIZE 128
+
+/*
+ * Arithmetic implementations. Note that AND, XOR and NOT can
+ * overlap destination with one source, but the others can't.
+ */
+#define add(r,x,y) ( r.lo = y.lo + x.lo, \
+ r.hi = y.hi + x.hi + (r.lo < y.lo) )
+#define rorB(r,x,y) ( r.lo = (x.hi >> ((y)-32)) | (x.lo << (64-(y))), \
+ r.hi = (x.lo >> ((y)-32)) | (x.hi << (64-(y))) )
+#define rorL(r,x,y) ( r.lo = (x.lo >> (y)) | (x.hi << (32-(y))), \
+ r.hi = (x.hi >> (y)) | (x.lo << (32-(y))) )
+#define shrB(r,x,y) ( r.lo = x.hi >> ((y)-32), r.hi = 0 )
+#define shrL(r,x,y) ( r.lo = (x.lo >> (y)) | (x.hi << (32-(y))), \
+ r.hi = x.hi >> (y) )
+#define and(r,x,y) ( r.lo = x.lo & y.lo, r.hi = x.hi & y.hi )
+#define xor(r,x,y) ( r.lo = x.lo ^ y.lo, r.hi = x.hi ^ y.hi )
+#define not(r,x) ( r.lo = ~x.lo, r.hi = ~x.hi )
+#define INIT(h,l) { h, l }
+#define BUILD(r,h,l) ( r.hi = h, r.lo = l )
+#define EXTRACT(h,l,r) ( h = r.hi, l = r.lo )
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Core SHA512 algorithm: processes 16-doubleword blocks into a
+ * message digest.
+ */
+
+#define Ch(r,t,x,y,z) ( not(t,x), and(r,t,z), and(t,x,y), xor(r,r,t) )
+#define Maj(r,t,x,y,z) ( and(r,x,y), and(t,x,z), xor(r,r,t), \
+ and(t,y,z), xor(r,r,t) )
+#define bigsigma0(r,t,x) ( rorL(r,x,28), rorB(t,x,34), xor(r,r,t), \
+ rorB(t,x,39), xor(r,r,t) )
+#define bigsigma1(r,t,x) ( rorL(r,x,14), rorL(t,x,18), xor(r,r,t), \
+ rorB(t,x,41), xor(r,r,t) )
+#define smallsigma0(r,t,x) ( rorL(r,x,1), rorL(t,x,8), xor(r,r,t), \
+ shrL(t,x,7), xor(r,r,t) )
+#define smallsigma1(r,t,x) ( rorL(r,x,19), rorB(t,x,61), xor(r,r,t), \
+ shrL(t,x,6), xor(r,r,t) )
+
+static void SHA512_Core_Init(SHA512_State *s) {
+ static const uint64 iv[] = {
+ INIT(0x6a09e667, 0xf3bcc908),
+ INIT(0xbb67ae85, 0x84caa73b),
+ INIT(0x3c6ef372, 0xfe94f82b),
+ INIT(0xa54ff53a, 0x5f1d36f1),
+ INIT(0x510e527f, 0xade682d1),
+ INIT(0x9b05688c, 0x2b3e6c1f),
+ INIT(0x1f83d9ab, 0xfb41bd6b),
+ INIT(0x5be0cd19, 0x137e2179),
+ };
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ s->h[i] = iv[i];
+}
+
+static void SHA512_Block(SHA512_State *s, uint64 *block) {
+ uint64 w[80];
+ uint64 a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h;
+ static const uint64 k[] = {
+ INIT(0x428a2f98, 0xd728ae22), INIT(0x71374491, 0x23ef65cd),
+ INIT(0xb5c0fbcf, 0xec4d3b2f), INIT(0xe9b5dba5, 0x8189dbbc),
+ INIT(0x3956c25b, 0xf348b538), INIT(0x59f111f1, 0xb605d019),
+ INIT(0x923f82a4, 0xaf194f9b), INIT(0xab1c5ed5, 0xda6d8118),
+ INIT(0xd807aa98, 0xa3030242), INIT(0x12835b01, 0x45706fbe),
+ INIT(0x243185be, 0x4ee4b28c), INIT(0x550c7dc3, 0xd5ffb4e2),
+ INIT(0x72be5d74, 0xf27b896f), INIT(0x80deb1fe, 0x3b1696b1),
+ INIT(0x9bdc06a7, 0x25c71235), INIT(0xc19bf174, 0xcf692694),
+ INIT(0xe49b69c1, 0x9ef14ad2), INIT(0xefbe4786, 0x384f25e3),
+ INIT(0x0fc19dc6, 0x8b8cd5b5), INIT(0x240ca1cc, 0x77ac9c65),
+ INIT(0x2de92c6f, 0x592b0275), INIT(0x4a7484aa, 0x6ea6e483),
+ INIT(0x5cb0a9dc, 0xbd41fbd4), INIT(0x76f988da, 0x831153b5),
+ INIT(0x983e5152, 0xee66dfab), INIT(0xa831c66d, 0x2db43210),
+ INIT(0xb00327c8, 0x98fb213f), INIT(0xbf597fc7, 0xbeef0ee4),
+ INIT(0xc6e00bf3, 0x3da88fc2), INIT(0xd5a79147, 0x930aa725),
+ INIT(0x06ca6351, 0xe003826f), INIT(0x14292967, 0x0a0e6e70),
+ INIT(0x27b70a85, 0x46d22ffc), INIT(0x2e1b2138, 0x5c26c926),
+ INIT(0x4d2c6dfc, 0x5ac42aed), INIT(0x53380d13, 0x9d95b3df),
+ INIT(0x650a7354, 0x8baf63de), INIT(0x766a0abb, 0x3c77b2a8),
+ INIT(0x81c2c92e, 0x47edaee6), INIT(0x92722c85, 0x1482353b),
+ INIT(0xa2bfe8a1, 0x4cf10364), INIT(0xa81a664b, 0xbc423001),
+ INIT(0xc24b8b70, 0xd0f89791), INIT(0xc76c51a3, 0x0654be30),
+ INIT(0xd192e819, 0xd6ef5218), INIT(0xd6990624, 0x5565a910),
+ INIT(0xf40e3585, 0x5771202a), INIT(0x106aa070, 0x32bbd1b8),
+ INIT(0x19a4c116, 0xb8d2d0c8), INIT(0x1e376c08, 0x5141ab53),
+ INIT(0x2748774c, 0xdf8eeb99), INIT(0x34b0bcb5, 0xe19b48a8),
+ INIT(0x391c0cb3, 0xc5c95a63), INIT(0x4ed8aa4a, 0xe3418acb),
+ INIT(0x5b9cca4f, 0x7763e373), INIT(0x682e6ff3, 0xd6b2b8a3),
+ INIT(0x748f82ee, 0x5defb2fc), INIT(0x78a5636f, 0x43172f60),
+ INIT(0x84c87814, 0xa1f0ab72), INIT(0x8cc70208, 0x1a6439ec),
+ INIT(0x90befffa, 0x23631e28), INIT(0xa4506ceb, 0xde82bde9),
+ INIT(0xbef9a3f7, 0xb2c67915), INIT(0xc67178f2, 0xe372532b),
+ INIT(0xca273ece, 0xea26619c), INIT(0xd186b8c7, 0x21c0c207),
+ INIT(0xeada7dd6, 0xcde0eb1e), INIT(0xf57d4f7f, 0xee6ed178),
+ INIT(0x06f067aa, 0x72176fba), INIT(0x0a637dc5, 0xa2c898a6),
+ INIT(0x113f9804, 0xbef90dae), INIT(0x1b710b35, 0x131c471b),
+ INIT(0x28db77f5, 0x23047d84), INIT(0x32caab7b, 0x40c72493),
+ INIT(0x3c9ebe0a, 0x15c9bebc), INIT(0x431d67c4, 0x9c100d4c),
+ INIT(0x4cc5d4be, 0xcb3e42b6), INIT(0x597f299c, 0xfc657e2a),
+ INIT(0x5fcb6fab, 0x3ad6faec), INIT(0x6c44198c, 0x4a475817),
+ };
+
+ int t;
+
+ for (t = 0; t < 16; t++)
+ w[t] = block[t];
+
+ for (t = 16; t < 80; t++) {
+ uint64 p, q, r, tmp;
+ smallsigma1(p, tmp, w[t-2]);
+ smallsigma0(q, tmp, w[t-15]);
+ add(r, p, q);
+ add(p, r, w[t-7]);
+ add(w[t], p, w[t-16]);
+ }
+
+ a = s->h[0]; b = s->h[1]; c = s->h[2]; d = s->h[3];
+ e = s->h[4]; f = s->h[5]; g = s->h[6]; h = s->h[7];
+
+ for (t = 0; t < 80; t+=8) {
+ uint64 tmp, p, q, r;
+
+#define ROUND(j,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) \
+ bigsigma1(p, tmp, e); \
+ Ch(q, tmp, e, f, g); \
+ add(r, p, q); \
+ add(p, r, k[j]) ; \
+ add(q, p, w[j]); \
+ add(r, q, h); \
+ bigsigma0(p, tmp, a); \
+ Maj(tmp, q, a, b, c); \
+ add(q, tmp, p); \
+ add(p, r, d); \
+ d = p; \
+ add(h, q, r);
+
+ ROUND(t+0, a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+ ROUND(t+1, h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+ ROUND(t+2, g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+ ROUND(t+3, f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+ ROUND(t+4, e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+ ROUND(t+5, d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+ ROUND(t+6, c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+ ROUND(t+7, b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+ }
+
+ {
+ uint64 tmp;
+#define UPDATE(state, local) ( tmp = state, add(state, tmp, local) )
+ UPDATE(s->h[0], a); UPDATE(s->h[1], b);
+ UPDATE(s->h[2], c); UPDATE(s->h[3], d);
+ UPDATE(s->h[4], e); UPDATE(s->h[5], f);
+ UPDATE(s->h[6], g); UPDATE(s->h[7], h);
+ }
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Outer SHA512 algorithm: take an arbitrary length byte string,
+ * convert it into 16-doubleword blocks with the prescribed padding
+ * at the end, and pass those blocks to the core SHA512 algorithm.
+ */
+
+void SHA512_Init(SHA512_State *s) {
+ int i;
+ SHA512_Core_Init(s);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ s->len[i] = 0;
+}
+
+void SHA512_Bytes(SHA512_State *s, const void *p, int len) {
+ unsigned char *q = (unsigned char *)p;
+ uint64 wordblock[16];
+ uint32 lenw = len;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Update the length field.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ s->len[i] += lenw;
+ lenw = (s->len[i] < lenw);
+ }
+
+ if (s->blkused && s->blkused+len < BLKSIZE) {
+ /*
+ * Trivial case: just add to the block.
+ */
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, len);
+ s->blkused += len;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We must complete and process at least one block.
+ */
+ while (s->blkused + len >= BLKSIZE) {
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, BLKSIZE - s->blkused);
+ q += BLKSIZE - s->blkused;
+ len -= BLKSIZE - s->blkused;
+ /* Now process the block. Gather bytes big-endian into words */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ uint32 h, l;
+ h = ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+0]) << 24 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+1]) << 16 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+2]) << 8 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+3]) << 0 );
+ l = ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+4]) << 24 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+5]) << 16 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+6]) << 8 ) |
+ ( ((uint32)s->block[i*8+7]) << 0 );
+ BUILD(wordblock[i], h, l);
+ }
+ SHA512_Block(s, wordblock);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->block, q, len);
+ s->blkused = len;
+ }
+}
+
+void SHA512_Final(SHA512_State *s, unsigned char *digest) {
+ int i;
+ int pad;
+ unsigned char c[BLKSIZE];
+ uint32 len[4];
+
+ if (s->blkused >= BLKSIZE-16)
+ pad = (BLKSIZE-16) + BLKSIZE - s->blkused;
+ else
+ pad = (BLKSIZE-16) - s->blkused;
+
+ for (i = 4; i-- ;) {
+ uint32 lenhi = s->len[i];
+ uint32 lenlo = i > 0 ? s->len[i-1] : 0;
+ len[i] = (lenhi << 3) | (lenlo >> (32-3));
+ }
+
+ memset(c, 0, pad);
+ c[0] = 0x80;
+ SHA512_Bytes(s, &c, pad);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ c[i*4+0] = (len[3-i] >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ c[i*4+1] = (len[3-i] >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c[i*4+2] = (len[3-i] >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c[i*4+3] = (len[3-i] >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ }
+
+ SHA512_Bytes(s, &c, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ uint32 h, l;
+ EXTRACT(h, l, s->h[i]);
+ digest[i*8+0] = (h >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*8+1] = (h >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*8+2] = (h >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*8+3] = (h >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*8+4] = (l >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*8+5] = (l >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*8+6] = (l >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ digest[i*8+7] = (l >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ }
+}
+
+void SHA512_Simple(const void *p, int len, unsigned char *output) {
+ SHA512_State s;
+
+ SHA512_Init(&s);
+ SHA512_Bytes(&s, p, len);
+ SHA512_Final(&s, output);
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+int main(void) {
+ unsigned char digest[64];
+ int i, j, errors;
+
+ struct {
+ const char *teststring;
+ unsigned char digest512[64];
+ } tests[] = {
+ { "abc", {
+ 0xdd, 0xaf, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xba,
+ 0xcc, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xae, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31,
+ 0x12, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0x89, 0xa9, 0x7e, 0xa2,
+ 0x0a, 0x9e, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x4b, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x9a,
+ 0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x4f, 0xc1, 0xa8,
+ 0x36, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x23, 0xa3, 0xfe, 0xeb, 0xbd,
+ 0x45, 0x4d, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3c, 0xe8, 0x0e,
+ 0x2a, 0x9a, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xa5, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x9f,
+ } },
+ { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmn"
+ "hijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu", {
+ 0x8e, 0x95, 0x9b, 0x75, 0xda, 0xe3, 0x13, 0xda,
+ 0x8c, 0xf4, 0xf7, 0x28, 0x14, 0xfc, 0x14, 0x3f,
+ 0x8f, 0x77, 0x79, 0xc6, 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x7f, 0xa1,
+ 0x72, 0x99, 0xae, 0xad, 0xb6, 0x88, 0x90, 0x18,
+ 0x50, 0x1d, 0x28, 0x9e, 0x49, 0x00, 0xf7, 0xe4,
+ 0x33, 0x1b, 0x99, 0xde, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x3a,
+ 0xc7, 0xd3, 0x29, 0xee, 0xb6, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x54,
+ 0x5e, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x5b, 0x87, 0x4b, 0xe9, 0x09,
+ } },
+ { NULL, {
+ 0xe7, 0x18, 0x48, 0x3d, 0x0c, 0xe7, 0x69, 0x64,
+ 0x4e, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xbc, 0x15, 0xb4, 0x63,
+ 0x8e, 0x1f, 0x98, 0xb1, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x44, 0x28,
+ 0x56, 0x32, 0xa8, 0x03, 0xaf, 0xa9, 0x73, 0xeb,
+ 0xde, 0x0f, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x87, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0x0a,
+ 0x4c, 0xb0, 0x43, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x77, 0xc3, 0x1b,
+ 0xeb, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x2c, 0x49, 0xaa, 0x2e,
+ 0x4e, 0xad, 0xb2, 0x17, 0xad, 0x8c, 0xc0, 0x9b,
+ } },
+ };
+
+ errors = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
+ if (tests[i].teststring) {
+ SHA512_Simple(tests[i].teststring,
+ strlen(tests[i].teststring), digest);
+ } else {
+ SHA512_State s;
+ int n;
+ SHA512_Init(&s);
+ for (n = 0; n < 1000000 / 40; n++)
+ SHA512_Bytes(&s, "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
+ 40);
+ SHA512_Final(&s, digest);
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) {
+ if (digest[j] != tests[i].digest512[j]) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "\"%s\" digest512 byte %d should be 0x%02x, is 0x%02x\n",
+ tests[i].teststring, j, tests[i].digest512[j],
+ digest[j]);
+ errors++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ printf("%d errors\n", errors);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshsha.c b/tools/plink/sshsha.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d1c798126 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshsha.c @@ -0,0 +1,411 @@ +/*
+ * SHA1 hash algorithm. Used in SSH-2 as a MAC, and the transform is
+ * also used as a `stirring' function for the PuTTY random number
+ * pool. Implemented directly from the specification by Simon
+ * Tatham.
+ */
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Core SHA algorithm: processes 16-word blocks into a message digest.
+ */
+
+#define rol(x,y) ( ((x) << (y)) | (((uint32)x) >> (32-y)) )
+
+static void SHA_Core_Init(uint32 h[5])
+{
+ h[0] = 0x67452301;
+ h[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+ h[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+ h[3] = 0x10325476;
+ h[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0;
+}
+
+void SHATransform(word32 * digest, word32 * block)
+{
+ word32 w[80];
+ word32 a, b, c, d, e;
+ int t;
+
+ for (t = 0; t < 16; t++)
+ w[t] = block[t];
+
+ for (t = 16; t < 80; t++) {
+ word32 tmp = w[t - 3] ^ w[t - 8] ^ w[t - 14] ^ w[t - 16];
+ w[t] = rol(tmp, 1);
+ }
+
+ a = digest[0];
+ b = digest[1];
+ c = digest[2];
+ d = digest[3];
+ e = digest[4];
+
+ for (t = 0; t < 20; t++) {
+ word32 tmp =
+ rol(a, 5) + ((b & c) | (d & ~b)) + e + w[t] + 0x5a827999;
+ e = d;
+ d = c;
+ c = rol(b, 30);
+ b = a;
+ a = tmp;
+ }
+ for (t = 20; t < 40; t++) {
+ word32 tmp = rol(a, 5) + (b ^ c ^ d) + e + w[t] + 0x6ed9eba1;
+ e = d;
+ d = c;
+ c = rol(b, 30);
+ b = a;
+ a = tmp;
+ }
+ for (t = 40; t < 60; t++) {
+ word32 tmp = rol(a,
+ 5) + ((b & c) | (b & d) | (c & d)) + e + w[t] +
+ 0x8f1bbcdc;
+ e = d;
+ d = c;
+ c = rol(b, 30);
+ b = a;
+ a = tmp;
+ }
+ for (t = 60; t < 80; t++) {
+ word32 tmp = rol(a, 5) + (b ^ c ^ d) + e + w[t] + 0xca62c1d6;
+ e = d;
+ d = c;
+ c = rol(b, 30);
+ b = a;
+ a = tmp;
+ }
+
+ digest[0] += a;
+ digest[1] += b;
+ digest[2] += c;
+ digest[3] += d;
+ digest[4] += e;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Outer SHA algorithm: take an arbitrary length byte string,
+ * convert it into 16-word blocks with the prescribed padding at
+ * the end, and pass those blocks to the core SHA algorithm.
+ */
+
+void SHA_Init(SHA_State * s)
+{
+ SHA_Core_Init(s->h);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ s->lenhi = s->lenlo = 0;
+}
+
+void SHA_Bytes(SHA_State * s, void *p, int len)
+{
+ unsigned char *q = (unsigned char *) p;
+ uint32 wordblock[16];
+ uint32 lenw = len;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Update the length field.
+ */
+ s->lenlo += lenw;
+ s->lenhi += (s->lenlo < lenw);
+
+ if (s->blkused && s->blkused + len < 64) {
+ /*
+ * Trivial case: just add to the block.
+ */
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, len);
+ s->blkused += len;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We must complete and process at least one block.
+ */
+ while (s->blkused + len >= 64) {
+ memcpy(s->block + s->blkused, q, 64 - s->blkused);
+ q += 64 - s->blkused;
+ len -= 64 - s->blkused;
+ /* Now process the block. Gather bytes big-endian into words */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ wordblock[i] =
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 0]) << 24) |
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 1]) << 16) |
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 2]) << 8) |
+ (((uint32) s->block[i * 4 + 3]) << 0);
+ }
+ SHATransform(s->h, wordblock);
+ s->blkused = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->block, q, len);
+ s->blkused = len;
+ }
+}
+
+void SHA_Final(SHA_State * s, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int i;
+ int pad;
+ unsigned char c[64];
+ uint32 lenhi, lenlo;
+
+ if (s->blkused >= 56)
+ pad = 56 + 64 - s->blkused;
+ else
+ pad = 56 - s->blkused;
+
+ lenhi = (s->lenhi << 3) | (s->lenlo >> (32 - 3));
+ lenlo = (s->lenlo << 3);
+
+ memset(c, 0, pad);
+ c[0] = 0x80;
+ SHA_Bytes(s, &c, pad);
+
+ c[0] = (lenhi >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ c[1] = (lenhi >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c[2] = (lenhi >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c[3] = (lenhi >> 0) & 0xFF;
+ c[4] = (lenlo >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ c[5] = (lenlo >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ c[6] = (lenlo >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ c[7] = (lenlo >> 0) & 0xFF;
+
+ SHA_Bytes(s, &c, 8);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+ output[i * 4] = (s->h[i] >> 24) & 0xFF;
+ output[i * 4 + 1] = (s->h[i] >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ output[i * 4 + 2] = (s->h[i] >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ output[i * 4 + 3] = (s->h[i]) & 0xFF;
+ }
+}
+
+void SHA_Simple(void *p, int len, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ SHA_State s;
+
+ SHA_Init(&s);
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, p, len);
+ SHA_Final(&s, output);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Thin abstraction for things where hashes are pluggable.
+ */
+
+static void *sha1_init(void)
+{
+ SHA_State *s;
+
+ s = snew(SHA_State);
+ SHA_Init(s);
+ return s;
+}
+
+static void sha1_bytes(void *handle, void *p, int len)
+{
+ SHA_State *s = handle;
+
+ SHA_Bytes(s, p, len);
+}
+
+static void sha1_final(void *handle, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ SHA_State *s = handle;
+
+ SHA_Final(s, output);
+ sfree(s);
+}
+
+const struct ssh_hash ssh_sha1 = {
+ sha1_init, sha1_bytes, sha1_final, 20, "SHA-1"
+};
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * The above is the SHA-1 algorithm itself. Now we implement the
+ * HMAC wrapper on it.
+ */
+
+static void *sha1_make_context(void)
+{
+ return snewn(3, SHA_State);
+}
+
+static void sha1_free_context(void *handle)
+{
+ sfree(handle);
+}
+
+static void sha1_key_internal(void *handle, unsigned char *key, int len)
+{
+ SHA_State *keys = (SHA_State *)handle;
+ unsigned char foo[64];
+ int i;
+
+ memset(foo, 0x36, 64);
+ for (i = 0; i < len && i < 64; i++)
+ foo[i] ^= key[i];
+ SHA_Init(&keys[0]);
+ SHA_Bytes(&keys[0], foo, 64);
+
+ memset(foo, 0x5C, 64);
+ for (i = 0; i < len && i < 64; i++)
+ foo[i] ^= key[i];
+ SHA_Init(&keys[1]);
+ SHA_Bytes(&keys[1], foo, 64);
+
+ memset(foo, 0, 64); /* burn the evidence */
+}
+
+static void sha1_key(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ sha1_key_internal(handle, key, 20);
+}
+
+static void sha1_key_buggy(void *handle, unsigned char *key)
+{
+ sha1_key_internal(handle, key, 16);
+}
+
+static void hmacsha1_start(void *handle)
+{
+ SHA_State *keys = (SHA_State *)handle;
+
+ keys[2] = keys[0]; /* structure copy */
+}
+
+static void hmacsha1_bytes(void *handle, unsigned char const *blk, int len)
+{
+ SHA_State *keys = (SHA_State *)handle;
+ SHA_Bytes(&keys[2], (void *)blk, len);
+}
+
+static void hmacsha1_genresult(void *handle, unsigned char *hmac)
+{
+ SHA_State *keys = (SHA_State *)handle;
+ SHA_State s;
+ unsigned char intermediate[20];
+
+ s = keys[2]; /* structure copy */
+ SHA_Final(&s, intermediate);
+ s = keys[1]; /* structure copy */
+ SHA_Bytes(&s, intermediate, 20);
+ SHA_Final(&s, hmac);
+}
+
+static void sha1_do_hmac(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq, unsigned char *hmac)
+{
+ unsigned char seqbuf[4];
+
+ seqbuf[0] = (unsigned char) ((seq >> 24) & 0xFF);
+ seqbuf[1] = (unsigned char) ((seq >> 16) & 0xFF);
+ seqbuf[2] = (unsigned char) ((seq >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ seqbuf[3] = (unsigned char) ((seq) & 0xFF);
+
+ hmacsha1_start(handle);
+ hmacsha1_bytes(handle, seqbuf, 4);
+ hmacsha1_bytes(handle, blk, len);
+ hmacsha1_genresult(handle, hmac);
+}
+
+static void sha1_generate(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq)
+{
+ sha1_do_hmac(handle, blk, len, seq, blk + len);
+}
+
+static int hmacsha1_verresult(void *handle, unsigned char const *hmac)
+{
+ unsigned char correct[20];
+ hmacsha1_genresult(handle, correct);
+ return !memcmp(correct, hmac, 20);
+}
+
+static int sha1_verify(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq)
+{
+ unsigned char correct[20];
+ sha1_do_hmac(handle, blk, len, seq, correct);
+ return !memcmp(correct, blk + len, 20);
+}
+
+static void hmacsha1_96_genresult(void *handle, unsigned char *hmac)
+{
+ unsigned char full[20];
+ hmacsha1_genresult(handle, full);
+ memcpy(hmac, full, 12);
+}
+
+static void sha1_96_generate(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq)
+{
+ unsigned char full[20];
+ sha1_do_hmac(handle, blk, len, seq, full);
+ memcpy(blk + len, full, 12);
+}
+
+static int hmacsha1_96_verresult(void *handle, unsigned char const *hmac)
+{
+ unsigned char correct[20];
+ hmacsha1_genresult(handle, correct);
+ return !memcmp(correct, hmac, 12);
+}
+
+static int sha1_96_verify(void *handle, unsigned char *blk, int len,
+ unsigned long seq)
+{
+ unsigned char correct[20];
+ sha1_do_hmac(handle, blk, len, seq, correct);
+ return !memcmp(correct, blk + len, 12);
+}
+
+void hmac_sha1_simple(void *key, int keylen, void *data, int datalen,
+ unsigned char *output) {
+ SHA_State states[2];
+ unsigned char intermediate[20];
+
+ sha1_key_internal(states, key, keylen);
+ SHA_Bytes(&states[0], data, datalen);
+ SHA_Final(&states[0], intermediate);
+
+ SHA_Bytes(&states[1], intermediate, 20);
+ SHA_Final(&states[1], output);
+}
+
+const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1 = {
+ sha1_make_context, sha1_free_context, sha1_key,
+ sha1_generate, sha1_verify,
+ hmacsha1_start, hmacsha1_bytes, hmacsha1_genresult, hmacsha1_verresult,
+ "hmac-sha1",
+ 20,
+ "HMAC-SHA1"
+};
+
+const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1_96 = {
+ sha1_make_context, sha1_free_context, sha1_key,
+ sha1_96_generate, sha1_96_verify,
+ hmacsha1_start, hmacsha1_bytes,
+ hmacsha1_96_genresult, hmacsha1_96_verresult,
+ "hmac-sha1-96",
+ 12,
+ "HMAC-SHA1-96"
+};
+
+const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy = {
+ sha1_make_context, sha1_free_context, sha1_key_buggy,
+ sha1_generate, sha1_verify,
+ hmacsha1_start, hmacsha1_bytes, hmacsha1_genresult, hmacsha1_verresult,
+ "hmac-sha1",
+ 20,
+ "bug-compatible HMAC-SHA1"
+};
+
+const struct ssh_mac ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy = {
+ sha1_make_context, sha1_free_context, sha1_key_buggy,
+ sha1_96_generate, sha1_96_verify,
+ hmacsha1_start, hmacsha1_bytes,
+ hmacsha1_96_genresult, hmacsha1_96_verresult,
+ "hmac-sha1-96",
+ 12,
+ "bug-compatible HMAC-SHA1-96"
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/sshzlib.c b/tools/plink/sshzlib.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7d37141c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/sshzlib.c @@ -0,0 +1,1382 @@ +/*
+ * Zlib (RFC1950 / RFC1951) compression for PuTTY.
+ *
+ * There will no doubt be criticism of my decision to reimplement
+ * Zlib compression from scratch instead of using the existing zlib
+ * code. People will cry `reinventing the wheel'; they'll claim
+ * that the `fundamental basis of OSS' is code reuse; they'll want
+ * to see a really good reason for me having chosen not to use the
+ * existing code.
+ *
+ * Well, here are my reasons. Firstly, I don't want to link the
+ * whole of zlib into the PuTTY binary; PuTTY is justifiably proud
+ * of its small size and I think zlib contains a lot of unnecessary
+ * baggage for the kind of compression that SSH requires.
+ *
+ * Secondly, I also don't like the alternative of using zlib.dll.
+ * Another thing PuTTY is justifiably proud of is its ease of
+ * installation, and the last thing I want to do is to start
+ * mandating DLLs. Not only that, but there are two _kinds_ of
+ * zlib.dll kicking around, one with C calling conventions on the
+ * exported functions and another with WINAPI conventions, and
+ * there would be a significant danger of getting the wrong one.
+ *
+ * Thirdly, there seems to be a difference of opinion on the IETF
+ * secsh mailing list about the correct way to round off a
+ * compressed packet and start the next. In particular, there's
+ * some talk of switching to a mechanism zlib isn't currently
+ * capable of supporting (see below for an explanation). Given that
+ * sort of uncertainty, I thought it might be better to have code
+ * that will support even the zlib-incompatible worst case.
+ *
+ * Fourthly, it's a _second implementation_. Second implementations
+ * are fundamentally a Good Thing in standardisation efforts. The
+ * difference of opinion mentioned above has arisen _precisely_
+ * because there has been only one zlib implementation and
+ * everybody has used it. I don't intend that this should happen
+ * again.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#ifdef ZLIB_STANDALONE
+
+/*
+ * This module also makes a handy zlib decoding tool for when
+ * you're picking apart Zip files or PDFs or PNGs. If you compile
+ * it with ZLIB_STANDALONE defined, it builds on its own and
+ * becomes a command-line utility.
+ *
+ * Therefore, here I provide a self-contained implementation of the
+ * macros required from the rest of the PuTTY sources.
+ */
+#define snew(type) ( (type *) malloc(sizeof(type)) )
+#define snewn(n, type) ( (type *) malloc((n) * sizeof(type)) )
+#define sresize(x, n, type) ( (type *) realloc((x), (n) * sizeof(type)) )
+#define sfree(x) ( free((x)) )
+
+#else
+#include "ssh.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#define TRUE (!FALSE)
+#endif
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Basic LZ77 code. This bit is designed modularly, so it could be
+ * ripped out and used in a different LZ77 compressor. Go to it,
+ * and good luck :-)
+ */
+
+struct LZ77InternalContext;
+struct LZ77Context {
+ struct LZ77InternalContext *ictx;
+ void *userdata;
+ void (*literal) (struct LZ77Context * ctx, unsigned char c);
+ void (*match) (struct LZ77Context * ctx, int distance, int len);
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialise the private fields of an LZ77Context. It's up to the
+ * user to initialise the public fields.
+ */
+static int lz77_init(struct LZ77Context *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Supply data to be compressed. Will update the private fields of
+ * the LZ77Context, and will call literal() and match() to output.
+ * If `compress' is FALSE, it will never emit a match, but will
+ * instead call literal() for everything.
+ */
+static void lz77_compress(struct LZ77Context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *data, int len, int compress);
+
+/*
+ * Modifiable parameters.
+ */
+#define WINSIZE 32768 /* window size. Must be power of 2! */
+#define HASHMAX 2039 /* one more than max hash value */
+#define MAXMATCH 32 /* how many matches we track */
+#define HASHCHARS 3 /* how many chars make a hash */
+
+/*
+ * This compressor takes a less slapdash approach than the
+ * gzip/zlib one. Rather than allowing our hash chains to fall into
+ * disuse near the far end, we keep them doubly linked so we can
+ * _find_ the far end, and then every time we add a new byte to the
+ * window (thus rolling round by one and removing the previous
+ * byte), we can carefully remove the hash chain entry.
+ */
+
+#define INVALID -1 /* invalid hash _and_ invalid offset */
+struct WindowEntry {
+ short next, prev; /* array indices within the window */
+ short hashval;
+};
+
+struct HashEntry {
+ short first; /* window index of first in chain */
+};
+
+struct Match {
+ int distance, len;
+};
+
+struct LZ77InternalContext {
+ struct WindowEntry win[WINSIZE];
+ unsigned char data[WINSIZE];
+ int winpos;
+ struct HashEntry hashtab[HASHMAX];
+ unsigned char pending[HASHCHARS];
+ int npending;
+};
+
+static int lz77_hash(unsigned char *data)
+{
+ return (257 * data[0] + 263 * data[1] + 269 * data[2]) % HASHMAX;
+}
+
+static int lz77_init(struct LZ77Context *ctx)
+{
+ struct LZ77InternalContext *st;
+ int i;
+
+ st = snew(struct LZ77InternalContext);
+ if (!st)
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->ictx = st;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < WINSIZE; i++)
+ st->win[i].next = st->win[i].prev = st->win[i].hashval = INVALID;
+ for (i = 0; i < HASHMAX; i++)
+ st->hashtab[i].first = INVALID;
+ st->winpos = 0;
+
+ st->npending = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void lz77_advance(struct LZ77InternalContext *st,
+ unsigned char c, int hash)
+{
+ int off;
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the hash entry at winpos from the tail of its chain,
+ * or empty the chain if it's the only thing on the chain.
+ */
+ if (st->win[st->winpos].prev != INVALID) {
+ st->win[st->win[st->winpos].prev].next = INVALID;
+ } else if (st->win[st->winpos].hashval != INVALID) {
+ st->hashtab[st->win[st->winpos].hashval].first = INVALID;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new entry at winpos and add it to the head of its
+ * hash chain.
+ */
+ st->win[st->winpos].hashval = hash;
+ st->win[st->winpos].prev = INVALID;
+ off = st->win[st->winpos].next = st->hashtab[hash].first;
+ st->hashtab[hash].first = st->winpos;
+ if (off != INVALID)
+ st->win[off].prev = st->winpos;
+ st->data[st->winpos] = c;
+
+ /*
+ * Advance the window pointer.
+ */
+ st->winpos = (st->winpos + 1) & (WINSIZE - 1);
+}
+
+#define CHARAT(k) ( (k)<0 ? st->data[(st->winpos+k)&(WINSIZE-1)] : data[k] )
+
+static void lz77_compress(struct LZ77Context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *data, int len, int compress)
+{
+ struct LZ77InternalContext *st = ctx->ictx;
+ int i, hash, distance, off, nmatch, matchlen, advance;
+ struct Match defermatch, matches[MAXMATCH];
+ int deferchr;
+
+ /*
+ * Add any pending characters from last time to the window. (We
+ * might not be able to.)
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < st->npending; i++) {
+ unsigned char foo[HASHCHARS];
+ int j;
+ if (len + st->npending - i < HASHCHARS) {
+ /* Update the pending array. */
+ for (j = i; j < st->npending; j++)
+ st->pending[j - i] = st->pending[j];
+ break;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < HASHCHARS; j++)
+ foo[j] = (i + j < st->npending ? st->pending[i + j] :
+ data[i + j - st->npending]);
+ lz77_advance(st, foo[0], lz77_hash(foo));
+ }
+ st->npending -= i;
+
+ defermatch.distance = 0; /* appease compiler */
+ defermatch.len = 0;
+ deferchr = '\0';
+ while (len > 0) {
+
+ /* Don't even look for a match, if we're not compressing. */
+ if (compress && len >= HASHCHARS) {
+ /*
+ * Hash the next few characters.
+ */
+ hash = lz77_hash(data);
+
+ /*
+ * Look the hash up in the corresponding hash chain and see
+ * what we can find.
+ */
+ nmatch = 0;
+ for (off = st->hashtab[hash].first;
+ off != INVALID; off = st->win[off].next) {
+ /* distance = 1 if off == st->winpos-1 */
+ /* distance = WINSIZE if off == st->winpos */
+ distance =
+ WINSIZE - (off + WINSIZE - st->winpos) % WINSIZE;
+ for (i = 0; i < HASHCHARS; i++)
+ if (CHARAT(i) != CHARAT(i - distance))
+ break;
+ if (i == HASHCHARS) {
+ matches[nmatch].distance = distance;
+ matches[nmatch].len = 3;
+ if (++nmatch >= MAXMATCH)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ nmatch = 0;
+ hash = INVALID;
+ }
+
+ if (nmatch > 0) {
+ /*
+ * We've now filled up matches[] with nmatch potential
+ * matches. Follow them down to find the longest. (We
+ * assume here that it's always worth favouring a
+ * longer match over a shorter one.)
+ */
+ matchlen = HASHCHARS;
+ while (matchlen < len) {
+ int j;
+ for (i = j = 0; i < nmatch; i++) {
+ if (CHARAT(matchlen) ==
+ CHARAT(matchlen - matches[i].distance)) {
+ matches[j++] = matches[i];
+ }
+ }
+ if (j == 0)
+ break;
+ matchlen++;
+ nmatch = j;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We've now got all the longest matches. We favour the
+ * shorter distances, which means we go with matches[0].
+ * So see if we want to defer it or throw it away.
+ */
+ matches[0].len = matchlen;
+ if (defermatch.len > 0) {
+ if (matches[0].len > defermatch.len + 1) {
+ /* We have a better match. Emit the deferred char,
+ * and defer this match. */
+ ctx->literal(ctx, (unsigned char) deferchr);
+ defermatch = matches[0];
+ deferchr = data[0];
+ advance = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* We don't have a better match. Do the deferred one. */
+ ctx->match(ctx, defermatch.distance, defermatch.len);
+ advance = defermatch.len - 1;
+ defermatch.len = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* There was no deferred match. Defer this one. */
+ defermatch = matches[0];
+ deferchr = data[0];
+ advance = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We found no matches. Emit the deferred match, if
+ * any; otherwise emit a literal.
+ */
+ if (defermatch.len > 0) {
+ ctx->match(ctx, defermatch.distance, defermatch.len);
+ advance = defermatch.len - 1;
+ defermatch.len = 0;
+ } else {
+ ctx->literal(ctx, data[0]);
+ advance = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now advance the position by `advance' characters,
+ * keeping the window and hash chains consistent.
+ */
+ while (advance > 0) {
+ if (len >= HASHCHARS) {
+ lz77_advance(st, *data, lz77_hash(data));
+ } else {
+ st->pending[st->npending++] = *data;
+ }
+ data++;
+ len--;
+ advance--;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Zlib compression. We always use the static Huffman tree option.
+ * Mostly this is because it's hard to scan a block in advance to
+ * work out better trees; dynamic trees are great when you're
+ * compressing a large file under no significant time constraint,
+ * but when you're compressing little bits in real time, things get
+ * hairier.
+ *
+ * I suppose it's possible that I could compute Huffman trees based
+ * on the frequencies in the _previous_ block, as a sort of
+ * heuristic, but I'm not confident that the gain would balance out
+ * having to transmit the trees.
+ */
+
+struct Outbuf {
+ unsigned char *outbuf;
+ int outlen, outsize;
+ unsigned long outbits;
+ int noutbits;
+ int firstblock;
+ int comp_disabled;
+};
+
+static void outbits(struct Outbuf *out, unsigned long bits, int nbits)
+{
+ assert(out->noutbits + nbits <= 32);
+ out->outbits |= bits << out->noutbits;
+ out->noutbits += nbits;
+ while (out->noutbits >= 8) {
+ if (out->outlen >= out->outsize) {
+ out->outsize = out->outlen + 64;
+ out->outbuf = sresize(out->outbuf, out->outsize, unsigned char);
+ }
+ out->outbuf[out->outlen++] = (unsigned char) (out->outbits & 0xFF);
+ out->outbits >>= 8;
+ out->noutbits -= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+static const unsigned char mirrorbytes[256] = {
+ 0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0,
+ 0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0,
+ 0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8,
+ 0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8,
+ 0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4,
+ 0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4,
+ 0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec,
+ 0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc,
+ 0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2,
+ 0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2,
+ 0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea,
+ 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa,
+ 0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6,
+ 0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6,
+ 0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee,
+ 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe,
+ 0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1,
+ 0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1,
+ 0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9,
+ 0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9,
+ 0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5,
+ 0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5,
+ 0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed,
+ 0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd,
+ 0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3,
+ 0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3,
+ 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb,
+ 0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb,
+ 0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7,
+ 0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7,
+ 0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef,
+ 0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff,
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ short code, extrabits;
+ int min, max;
+} coderecord;
+
+static const coderecord lencodes[] = {
+ {257, 0, 3, 3},
+ {258, 0, 4, 4},
+ {259, 0, 5, 5},
+ {260, 0, 6, 6},
+ {261, 0, 7, 7},
+ {262, 0, 8, 8},
+ {263, 0, 9, 9},
+ {264, 0, 10, 10},
+ {265, 1, 11, 12},
+ {266, 1, 13, 14},
+ {267, 1, 15, 16},
+ {268, 1, 17, 18},
+ {269, 2, 19, 22},
+ {270, 2, 23, 26},
+ {271, 2, 27, 30},
+ {272, 2, 31, 34},
+ {273, 3, 35, 42},
+ {274, 3, 43, 50},
+ {275, 3, 51, 58},
+ {276, 3, 59, 66},
+ {277, 4, 67, 82},
+ {278, 4, 83, 98},
+ {279, 4, 99, 114},
+ {280, 4, 115, 130},
+ {281, 5, 131, 162},
+ {282, 5, 163, 194},
+ {283, 5, 195, 226},
+ {284, 5, 227, 257},
+ {285, 0, 258, 258},
+};
+
+static const coderecord distcodes[] = {
+ {0, 0, 1, 1},
+ {1, 0, 2, 2},
+ {2, 0, 3, 3},
+ {3, 0, 4, 4},
+ {4, 1, 5, 6},
+ {5, 1, 7, 8},
+ {6, 2, 9, 12},
+ {7, 2, 13, 16},
+ {8, 3, 17, 24},
+ {9, 3, 25, 32},
+ {10, 4, 33, 48},
+ {11, 4, 49, 64},
+ {12, 5, 65, 96},
+ {13, 5, 97, 128},
+ {14, 6, 129, 192},
+ {15, 6, 193, 256},
+ {16, 7, 257, 384},
+ {17, 7, 385, 512},
+ {18, 8, 513, 768},
+ {19, 8, 769, 1024},
+ {20, 9, 1025, 1536},
+ {21, 9, 1537, 2048},
+ {22, 10, 2049, 3072},
+ {23, 10, 3073, 4096},
+ {24, 11, 4097, 6144},
+ {25, 11, 6145, 8192},
+ {26, 12, 8193, 12288},
+ {27, 12, 12289, 16384},
+ {28, 13, 16385, 24576},
+ {29, 13, 24577, 32768},
+};
+
+static void zlib_literal(struct LZ77Context *ectx, unsigned char c)
+{
+ struct Outbuf *out = (struct Outbuf *) ectx->userdata;
+
+ if (out->comp_disabled) {
+ /*
+ * We're in an uncompressed block, so just output the byte.
+ */
+ outbits(out, c, 8);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (c <= 143) {
+ /* 0 through 143 are 8 bits long starting at 00110000. */
+ outbits(out, mirrorbytes[0x30 + c], 8);
+ } else {
+ /* 144 through 255 are 9 bits long starting at 110010000. */
+ outbits(out, 1 + 2 * mirrorbytes[0x90 - 144 + c], 9);
+ }
+}
+
+static void zlib_match(struct LZ77Context *ectx, int distance, int len)
+{
+ const coderecord *d, *l;
+ int i, j, k;
+ struct Outbuf *out = (struct Outbuf *) ectx->userdata;
+
+ assert(!out->comp_disabled);
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int thislen;
+
+ /*
+ * We can transmit matches of lengths 3 through 258
+ * inclusive. So if len exceeds 258, we must transmit in
+ * several steps, with 258 or less in each step.
+ *
+ * Specifically: if len >= 261, we can transmit 258 and be
+ * sure of having at least 3 left for the next step. And if
+ * len <= 258, we can just transmit len. But if len == 259
+ * or 260, we must transmit len-3.
+ */
+ thislen = (len > 260 ? 258 : len <= 258 ? len : len - 3);
+ len -= thislen;
+
+ /*
+ * Binary-search to find which length code we're
+ * transmitting.
+ */
+ i = -1;
+ j = sizeof(lencodes) / sizeof(*lencodes);
+ while (1) {
+ assert(j - i >= 2);
+ k = (j + i) / 2;
+ if (thislen < lencodes[k].min)
+ j = k;
+ else if (thislen > lencodes[k].max)
+ i = k;
+ else {
+ l = &lencodes[k];
+ break; /* found it! */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit the length code. 256-279 are seven bits
+ * starting at 0000000; 280-287 are eight bits starting at
+ * 11000000.
+ */
+ if (l->code <= 279) {
+ outbits(out, mirrorbytes[(l->code - 256) * 2], 7);
+ } else {
+ outbits(out, mirrorbytes[0xc0 - 280 + l->code], 8);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit the extra bits.
+ */
+ if (l->extrabits)
+ outbits(out, thislen - l->min, l->extrabits);
+
+ /*
+ * Binary-search to find which distance code we're
+ * transmitting.
+ */
+ i = -1;
+ j = sizeof(distcodes) / sizeof(*distcodes);
+ while (1) {
+ assert(j - i >= 2);
+ k = (j + i) / 2;
+ if (distance < distcodes[k].min)
+ j = k;
+ else if (distance > distcodes[k].max)
+ i = k;
+ else {
+ d = &distcodes[k];
+ break; /* found it! */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit the distance code. Five bits starting at 00000.
+ */
+ outbits(out, mirrorbytes[d->code * 8], 5);
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit the extra bits.
+ */
+ if (d->extrabits)
+ outbits(out, distance - d->min, d->extrabits);
+ }
+}
+
+void *zlib_compress_init(void)
+{
+ struct Outbuf *out;
+ struct LZ77Context *ectx = snew(struct LZ77Context);
+
+ lz77_init(ectx);
+ ectx->literal = zlib_literal;
+ ectx->match = zlib_match;
+
+ out = snew(struct Outbuf);
+ out->outbits = out->noutbits = 0;
+ out->firstblock = 1;
+ out->comp_disabled = FALSE;
+ ectx->userdata = out;
+
+ return ectx;
+}
+
+void zlib_compress_cleanup(void *handle)
+{
+ struct LZ77Context *ectx = (struct LZ77Context *)handle;
+ sfree(ectx->userdata);
+ sfree(ectx->ictx);
+ sfree(ectx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Turn off actual LZ77 analysis for one block, to facilitate
+ * construction of a precise-length IGNORE packet. Returns the
+ * length adjustment (which is only valid for packets < 65536
+ * bytes, but that seems reasonable enough).
+ */
+static int zlib_disable_compression(void *handle)
+{
+ struct LZ77Context *ectx = (struct LZ77Context *)handle;
+ struct Outbuf *out = (struct Outbuf *) ectx->userdata;
+ int n;
+
+ out->comp_disabled = TRUE;
+
+ n = 0;
+ /*
+ * If this is the first block, we will start by outputting two
+ * header bytes, and then three bits to begin an uncompressed
+ * block. This will cost three bytes (because we will start on
+ * a byte boundary, this is certain).
+ */
+ if (out->firstblock) {
+ n = 3;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, we will output seven bits to close the
+ * previous static block, and _then_ three bits to begin an
+ * uncompressed block, and then flush the current byte.
+ * This may cost two bytes or three, depending on noutbits.
+ */
+ n += (out->noutbits + 10) / 8;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we output four bytes for the length / ~length pair in
+ * the uncompressed block.
+ */
+ n += 4;
+
+ return n;
+}
+
+int zlib_compress_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
+{
+ struct LZ77Context *ectx = (struct LZ77Context *)handle;
+ struct Outbuf *out = (struct Outbuf *) ectx->userdata;
+ int in_block;
+
+ out->outbuf = NULL;
+ out->outlen = out->outsize = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is the first block, output the Zlib (RFC1950) header
+ * bytes 78 9C. (Deflate compression, 32K window size, default
+ * algorithm.)
+ */
+ if (out->firstblock) {
+ outbits(out, 0x9C78, 16);
+ out->firstblock = 0;
+
+ in_block = FALSE;
+ } else
+ in_block = TRUE;
+
+ if (out->comp_disabled) {
+ if (in_block)
+ outbits(out, 0, 7); /* close static block */
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int blen = (len < 65535 ? len : 65535);
+
+ /*
+ * Start a Deflate (RFC1951) uncompressed block. We
+ * transmit a zero bit (BFINAL=0), followed by two more
+ * zero bits (BTYPE=00). Of course these are in the
+ * wrong order (00 0), not that it matters.
+ */
+ outbits(out, 0, 3);
+
+ /*
+ * Output zero bits to align to a byte boundary.
+ */
+ if (out->noutbits)
+ outbits(out, 0, 8 - out->noutbits);
+
+ /*
+ * Output the block length, and then its one's
+ * complement. They're little-endian, so all we need to
+ * do is pass them straight to outbits() with bit count
+ * 16.
+ */
+ outbits(out, blen, 16);
+ outbits(out, blen ^ 0xFFFF, 16);
+
+ /*
+ * Do the `compression': we need to pass the data to
+ * lz77_compress so that it will be taken into account
+ * for subsequent (distance,length) pairs. But
+ * lz77_compress is passed FALSE, which means it won't
+ * actually find (or even look for) any matches; so
+ * every character will be passed straight to
+ * zlib_literal which will spot out->comp_disabled and
+ * emit in the uncompressed format.
+ */
+ lz77_compress(ectx, block, blen, FALSE);
+
+ len -= blen;
+ block += blen;
+ }
+ outbits(out, 2, 3); /* open new block */
+ } else {
+ if (!in_block) {
+ /*
+ * Start a Deflate (RFC1951) fixed-trees block. We
+ * transmit a zero bit (BFINAL=0), followed by a zero
+ * bit and a one bit (BTYPE=01). Of course these are in
+ * the wrong order (01 0).
+ */
+ outbits(out, 2, 3);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do the compression.
+ */
+ lz77_compress(ectx, block, len, TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * End the block (by transmitting code 256, which is
+ * 0000000 in fixed-tree mode), and transmit some empty
+ * blocks to ensure we have emitted the byte containing the
+ * last piece of genuine data. There are three ways we can
+ * do this:
+ *
+ * - Minimal flush. Output end-of-block and then open a
+ * new static block. This takes 9 bits, which is
+ * guaranteed to flush out the last genuine code in the
+ * closed block; but allegedly zlib can't handle it.
+ *
+ * - Zlib partial flush. Output EOB, open and close an
+ * empty static block, and _then_ open the new block.
+ * This is the best zlib can handle.
+ *
+ * - Zlib sync flush. Output EOB, then an empty
+ * _uncompressed_ block (000, then sync to byte
+ * boundary, then send bytes 00 00 FF FF). Then open the
+ * new block.
+ *
+ * For the moment, we will use Zlib partial flush.
+ */
+ outbits(out, 0, 7); /* close block */
+ outbits(out, 2, 3 + 7); /* empty static block */
+ outbits(out, 2, 3); /* open new block */
+ }
+
+ out->comp_disabled = FALSE;
+
+ *outblock = out->outbuf;
+ *outlen = out->outlen;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Zlib decompression. Of course, even though our compressor always
+ * uses static trees, our _decompressor_ has to be capable of
+ * handling dynamic trees if it sees them.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The way we work the Huffman decode is to have a table lookup on
+ * the first N bits of the input stream (in the order they arrive,
+ * of course, i.e. the first bit of the Huffman code is in bit 0).
+ * Each table entry lists the number of bits to consume, plus
+ * either an output code or a pointer to a secondary table.
+ */
+struct zlib_table;
+struct zlib_tableentry;
+
+struct zlib_tableentry {
+ unsigned char nbits;
+ short code;
+ struct zlib_table *nexttable;
+};
+
+struct zlib_table {
+ int mask; /* mask applied to input bit stream */
+ struct zlib_tableentry *table;
+};
+
+#define MAXCODELEN 16
+#define MAXSYMS 288
+
+/*
+ * Build a single-level decode table for elements
+ * [minlength,maxlength) of the provided code/length tables, and
+ * recurse to build subtables.
+ */
+static struct zlib_table *zlib_mkonetab(int *codes, unsigned char *lengths,
+ int nsyms,
+ int pfx, int pfxbits, int bits)
+{
+ struct zlib_table *tab = snew(struct zlib_table);
+ int pfxmask = (1 << pfxbits) - 1;
+ int nbits, i, j, code;
+
+ tab->table = snewn(1 << bits, struct zlib_tableentry);
+ tab->mask = (1 << bits) - 1;
+
+ for (code = 0; code <= tab->mask; code++) {
+ tab->table[code].code = -1;
+ tab->table[code].nbits = 0;
+ tab->table[code].nexttable = NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nsyms; i++) {
+ if (lengths[i] <= pfxbits || (codes[i] & pfxmask) != pfx)
+ continue;
+ code = (codes[i] >> pfxbits) & tab->mask;
+ for (j = code; j <= tab->mask; j += 1 << (lengths[i] - pfxbits)) {
+ tab->table[j].code = i;
+ nbits = lengths[i] - pfxbits;
+ if (tab->table[j].nbits < nbits)
+ tab->table[j].nbits = nbits;
+ }
+ }
+ for (code = 0; code <= tab->mask; code++) {
+ if (tab->table[code].nbits <= bits)
+ continue;
+ /* Generate a subtable. */
+ tab->table[code].code = -1;
+ nbits = tab->table[code].nbits - bits;
+ if (nbits > 7)
+ nbits = 7;
+ tab->table[code].nbits = bits;
+ tab->table[code].nexttable = zlib_mkonetab(codes, lengths, nsyms,
+ pfx | (code << pfxbits),
+ pfxbits + bits, nbits);
+ }
+
+ return tab;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build a decode table, given a set of Huffman tree lengths.
+ */
+static struct zlib_table *zlib_mktable(unsigned char *lengths,
+ int nlengths)
+{
+ int count[MAXCODELEN], startcode[MAXCODELEN], codes[MAXSYMS];
+ int code, maxlen;
+ int i, j;
+
+ /* Count the codes of each length. */
+ maxlen = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i < MAXCODELEN; i++)
+ count[i] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nlengths; i++) {
+ count[lengths[i]]++;
+ if (maxlen < lengths[i])
+ maxlen = lengths[i];
+ }
+ /* Determine the starting code for each length block. */
+ code = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i < MAXCODELEN; i++) {
+ startcode[i] = code;
+ code += count[i];
+ code <<= 1;
+ }
+ /* Determine the code for each symbol. Mirrored, of course. */
+ for (i = 0; i < nlengths; i++) {
+ code = startcode[lengths[i]]++;
+ codes[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < lengths[i]; j++) {
+ codes[i] = (codes[i] << 1) | (code & 1);
+ code >>= 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have the complete list of Huffman codes. Build a
+ * table.
+ */
+ return zlib_mkonetab(codes, lengths, nlengths, 0, 0,
+ maxlen < 9 ? maxlen : 9);
+}
+
+static int zlib_freetable(struct zlib_table **ztab)
+{
+ struct zlib_table *tab;
+ int code;
+
+ if (ztab == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (*ztab == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ tab = *ztab;
+
+ for (code = 0; code <= tab->mask; code++)
+ if (tab->table[code].nexttable != NULL)
+ zlib_freetable(&tab->table[code].nexttable);
+
+ sfree(tab->table);
+ tab->table = NULL;
+
+ sfree(tab);
+ *ztab = NULL;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+struct zlib_decompress_ctx {
+ struct zlib_table *staticlentable, *staticdisttable;
+ struct zlib_table *currlentable, *currdisttable, *lenlentable;
+ enum {
+ START, OUTSIDEBLK,
+ TREES_HDR, TREES_LENLEN, TREES_LEN, TREES_LENREP,
+ INBLK, GOTLENSYM, GOTLEN, GOTDISTSYM,
+ UNCOMP_LEN, UNCOMP_NLEN, UNCOMP_DATA
+ } state;
+ int sym, hlit, hdist, hclen, lenptr, lenextrabits, lenaddon, len,
+ lenrep;
+ int uncomplen;
+ unsigned char lenlen[19];
+ unsigned char lengths[286 + 32];
+ unsigned long bits;
+ int nbits;
+ unsigned char window[WINSIZE];
+ int winpos;
+ unsigned char *outblk;
+ int outlen, outsize;
+};
+
+void *zlib_decompress_init(void)
+{
+ struct zlib_decompress_ctx *dctx = snew(struct zlib_decompress_ctx);
+ unsigned char lengths[288];
+
+ memset(lengths, 8, 144);
+ memset(lengths + 144, 9, 256 - 144);
+ memset(lengths + 256, 7, 280 - 256);
+ memset(lengths + 280, 8, 288 - 280);
+ dctx->staticlentable = zlib_mktable(lengths, 288);
+ memset(lengths, 5, 32);
+ dctx->staticdisttable = zlib_mktable(lengths, 32);
+ dctx->state = START; /* even before header */
+ dctx->currlentable = dctx->currdisttable = dctx->lenlentable = NULL;
+ dctx->bits = 0;
+ dctx->nbits = 0;
+ dctx->winpos = 0;
+
+ return dctx;
+}
+
+void zlib_decompress_cleanup(void *handle)
+{
+ struct zlib_decompress_ctx *dctx = (struct zlib_decompress_ctx *)handle;
+
+ if (dctx->currlentable && dctx->currlentable != dctx->staticlentable)
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->currlentable);
+ if (dctx->currdisttable && dctx->currdisttable != dctx->staticdisttable)
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->currdisttable);
+ if (dctx->lenlentable)
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->lenlentable);
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->staticlentable);
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->staticdisttable);
+ sfree(dctx);
+}
+
+static int zlib_huflookup(unsigned long *bitsp, int *nbitsp,
+ struct zlib_table *tab)
+{
+ unsigned long bits = *bitsp;
+ int nbits = *nbitsp;
+ while (1) {
+ struct zlib_tableentry *ent;
+ ent = &tab->table[bits & tab->mask];
+ if (ent->nbits > nbits)
+ return -1; /* not enough data */
+ bits >>= ent->nbits;
+ nbits -= ent->nbits;
+ if (ent->code == -1)
+ tab = ent->nexttable;
+ else {
+ *bitsp = bits;
+ *nbitsp = nbits;
+ return ent->code;
+ }
+
+ if (!tab) {
+ /*
+ * There was a missing entry in the table, presumably
+ * due to an invalid Huffman table description, and the
+ * subsequent data has attempted to use the missing
+ * entry. Return a decoding failure.
+ */
+ return -2;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void zlib_emit_char(struct zlib_decompress_ctx *dctx, int c)
+{
+ dctx->window[dctx->winpos] = c;
+ dctx->winpos = (dctx->winpos + 1) & (WINSIZE - 1);
+ if (dctx->outlen >= dctx->outsize) {
+ dctx->outsize = dctx->outlen + 512;
+ dctx->outblk = sresize(dctx->outblk, dctx->outsize, unsigned char);
+ }
+ dctx->outblk[dctx->outlen++] = c;
+}
+
+#define EATBITS(n) ( dctx->nbits -= (n), dctx->bits >>= (n) )
+
+int zlib_decompress_block(void *handle, unsigned char *block, int len,
+ unsigned char **outblock, int *outlen)
+{
+ struct zlib_decompress_ctx *dctx = (struct zlib_decompress_ctx *)handle;
+ const coderecord *rec;
+ int code, blktype, rep, dist, nlen, header;
+ static const unsigned char lenlenmap[] = {
+ 16, 17, 18, 0, 8, 7, 9, 6, 10, 5, 11, 4, 12, 3, 13, 2, 14, 1, 15
+ };
+
+ dctx->outblk = snewn(256, unsigned char);
+ dctx->outsize = 256;
+ dctx->outlen = 0;
+
+ while (len > 0 || dctx->nbits > 0) {
+ while (dctx->nbits < 24 && len > 0) {
+ dctx->bits |= (*block++) << dctx->nbits;
+ dctx->nbits += 8;
+ len--;
+ }
+ switch (dctx->state) {
+ case START:
+ /* Expect 16-bit zlib header. */
+ if (dctx->nbits < 16)
+ goto finished; /* done all we can */
+
+ /*
+ * The header is stored as a big-endian 16-bit integer,
+ * in contrast to the general little-endian policy in
+ * the rest of the format :-(
+ */
+ header = (((dctx->bits & 0xFF00) >> 8) |
+ ((dctx->bits & 0x00FF) << 8));
+ EATBITS(16);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the header:
+ *
+ * - bits 8-11 should be 1000 (Deflate/RFC1951)
+ * - bits 12-15 should be at most 0111 (window size)
+ * - bit 5 should be zero (no dictionary present)
+ * - we don't care about bits 6-7 (compression rate)
+ * - bits 0-4 should be set up to make the whole thing
+ * a multiple of 31 (checksum).
+ */
+ if ((header & 0x0F00) != 0x0800 ||
+ (header & 0xF000) > 0x7000 ||
+ (header & 0x0020) != 0x0000 ||
+ (header % 31) != 0)
+ goto decode_error;
+
+ dctx->state = OUTSIDEBLK;
+ break;
+ case OUTSIDEBLK:
+ /* Expect 3-bit block header. */
+ if (dctx->nbits < 3)
+ goto finished; /* done all we can */
+ EATBITS(1);
+ blktype = dctx->bits & 3;
+ EATBITS(2);
+ if (blktype == 0) {
+ int to_eat = dctx->nbits & 7;
+ dctx->state = UNCOMP_LEN;
+ EATBITS(to_eat); /* align to byte boundary */
+ } else if (blktype == 1) {
+ dctx->currlentable = dctx->staticlentable;
+ dctx->currdisttable = dctx->staticdisttable;
+ dctx->state = INBLK;
+ } else if (blktype == 2) {
+ dctx->state = TREES_HDR;
+ }
+ break;
+ case TREES_HDR:
+ /*
+ * Dynamic block header. Five bits of HLIT, five of
+ * HDIST, four of HCLEN.
+ */
+ if (dctx->nbits < 5 + 5 + 4)
+ goto finished; /* done all we can */
+ dctx->hlit = 257 + (dctx->bits & 31);
+ EATBITS(5);
+ dctx->hdist = 1 + (dctx->bits & 31);
+ EATBITS(5);
+ dctx->hclen = 4 + (dctx->bits & 15);
+ EATBITS(4);
+ dctx->lenptr = 0;
+ dctx->state = TREES_LENLEN;
+ memset(dctx->lenlen, 0, sizeof(dctx->lenlen));
+ break;
+ case TREES_LENLEN:
+ if (dctx->nbits < 3)
+ goto finished;
+ while (dctx->lenptr < dctx->hclen && dctx->nbits >= 3) {
+ dctx->lenlen[lenlenmap[dctx->lenptr++]] =
+ (unsigned char) (dctx->bits & 7);
+ EATBITS(3);
+ }
+ if (dctx->lenptr == dctx->hclen) {
+ dctx->lenlentable = zlib_mktable(dctx->lenlen, 19);
+ dctx->state = TREES_LEN;
+ dctx->lenptr = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case TREES_LEN:
+ if (dctx->lenptr >= dctx->hlit + dctx->hdist) {
+ dctx->currlentable = zlib_mktable(dctx->lengths, dctx->hlit);
+ dctx->currdisttable = zlib_mktable(dctx->lengths + dctx->hlit,
+ dctx->hdist);
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->lenlentable);
+ dctx->lenlentable = NULL;
+ dctx->state = INBLK;
+ break;
+ }
+ code =
+ zlib_huflookup(&dctx->bits, &dctx->nbits, dctx->lenlentable);
+ if (code == -1)
+ goto finished;
+ if (code == -2)
+ goto decode_error;
+ if (code < 16)
+ dctx->lengths[dctx->lenptr++] = code;
+ else {
+ dctx->lenextrabits = (code == 16 ? 2 : code == 17 ? 3 : 7);
+ dctx->lenaddon = (code == 18 ? 11 : 3);
+ dctx->lenrep = (code == 16 && dctx->lenptr > 0 ?
+ dctx->lengths[dctx->lenptr - 1] : 0);
+ dctx->state = TREES_LENREP;
+ }
+ break;
+ case TREES_LENREP:
+ if (dctx->nbits < dctx->lenextrabits)
+ goto finished;
+ rep =
+ dctx->lenaddon +
+ (dctx->bits & ((1 << dctx->lenextrabits) - 1));
+ EATBITS(dctx->lenextrabits);
+ while (rep > 0 && dctx->lenptr < dctx->hlit + dctx->hdist) {
+ dctx->lengths[dctx->lenptr] = dctx->lenrep;
+ dctx->lenptr++;
+ rep--;
+ }
+ dctx->state = TREES_LEN;
+ break;
+ case INBLK:
+ code =
+ zlib_huflookup(&dctx->bits, &dctx->nbits, dctx->currlentable);
+ if (code == -1)
+ goto finished;
+ if (code == -2)
+ goto decode_error;
+ if (code < 256)
+ zlib_emit_char(dctx, code);
+ else if (code == 256) {
+ dctx->state = OUTSIDEBLK;
+ if (dctx->currlentable != dctx->staticlentable) {
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->currlentable);
+ dctx->currlentable = NULL;
+ }
+ if (dctx->currdisttable != dctx->staticdisttable) {
+ zlib_freetable(&dctx->currdisttable);
+ dctx->currdisttable = NULL;
+ }
+ } else if (code < 286) { /* static tree can give >285; ignore */
+ dctx->state = GOTLENSYM;
+ dctx->sym = code;
+ }
+ break;
+ case GOTLENSYM:
+ rec = &lencodes[dctx->sym - 257];
+ if (dctx->nbits < rec->extrabits)
+ goto finished;
+ dctx->len =
+ rec->min + (dctx->bits & ((1 << rec->extrabits) - 1));
+ EATBITS(rec->extrabits);
+ dctx->state = GOTLEN;
+ break;
+ case GOTLEN:
+ code =
+ zlib_huflookup(&dctx->bits, &dctx->nbits,
+ dctx->currdisttable);
+ if (code == -1)
+ goto finished;
+ if (code == -2)
+ goto decode_error;
+ dctx->state = GOTDISTSYM;
+ dctx->sym = code;
+ break;
+ case GOTDISTSYM:
+ rec = &distcodes[dctx->sym];
+ if (dctx->nbits < rec->extrabits)
+ goto finished;
+ dist = rec->min + (dctx->bits & ((1 << rec->extrabits) - 1));
+ EATBITS(rec->extrabits);
+ dctx->state = INBLK;
+ while (dctx->len--)
+ zlib_emit_char(dctx, dctx->window[(dctx->winpos - dist) &
+ (WINSIZE - 1)]);
+ break;
+ case UNCOMP_LEN:
+ /*
+ * Uncompressed block. We expect to see a 16-bit LEN.
+ */
+ if (dctx->nbits < 16)
+ goto finished;
+ dctx->uncomplen = dctx->bits & 0xFFFF;
+ EATBITS(16);
+ dctx->state = UNCOMP_NLEN;
+ break;
+ case UNCOMP_NLEN:
+ /*
+ * Uncompressed block. We expect to see a 16-bit NLEN,
+ * which should be the one's complement of the previous
+ * LEN.
+ */
+ if (dctx->nbits < 16)
+ goto finished;
+ nlen = dctx->bits & 0xFFFF;
+ EATBITS(16);
+ if (dctx->uncomplen == 0)
+ dctx->state = OUTSIDEBLK; /* block is empty */
+ else
+ dctx->state = UNCOMP_DATA;
+ break;
+ case UNCOMP_DATA:
+ if (dctx->nbits < 8)
+ goto finished;
+ zlib_emit_char(dctx, dctx->bits & 0xFF);
+ EATBITS(8);
+ if (--dctx->uncomplen == 0)
+ dctx->state = OUTSIDEBLK; /* end of uncompressed block */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ finished:
+ *outblock = dctx->outblk;
+ *outlen = dctx->outlen;
+ return 1;
+
+ decode_error:
+ sfree(dctx->outblk);
+ *outblock = dctx->outblk = NULL;
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef ZLIB_STANDALONE
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[16], *outbuf;
+ int ret, outlen;
+ void *handle;
+ int noheader = FALSE, opts = TRUE;
+ char *filename = NULL;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ while (--argc) {
+ char *p = *++argv;
+
+ if (p[0] == '-' && opts) {
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-d"))
+ noheader = TRUE;
+ else if (!strcmp(p, "--"))
+ opts = FALSE; /* next thing is filename */
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "unknown command line option '%s'\n", p);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (!filename) {
+ filename = p;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "can only handle one filename\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ handle = zlib_decompress_init();
+
+ if (noheader) {
+ /*
+ * Provide missing zlib header if -d was specified.
+ */
+ zlib_decompress_block(handle, "\x78\x9C", 2, &outbuf, &outlen);
+ assert(outlen == 0);
+ }
+
+ if (filename)
+ fp = fopen(filename, "rb");
+ else
+ fp = stdin;
+
+ if (!fp) {
+ assert(filename);
+ fprintf(stderr, "unable to open '%s'\n", filename);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ ret = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), fp);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ break;
+ zlib_decompress_block(handle, buf, ret, &outbuf, &outlen);
+ if (outbuf) {
+ if (outlen)
+ fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, stdout);
+ sfree(outbuf);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "decoding error\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ zlib_decompress_cleanup(handle);
+
+ if (filename)
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+const struct ssh_compress ssh_zlib = {
+ "zlib",
+ zlib_compress_init,
+ zlib_compress_cleanup,
+ zlib_compress_block,
+ zlib_decompress_init,
+ zlib_decompress_cleanup,
+ zlib_decompress_block,
+ zlib_disable_compression,
+ "zlib (RFC1950)"
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/storage.h b/tools/plink/storage.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0e0a7c0bd --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/storage.h @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/*
+ * storage.h: interface defining functions for storage and recovery
+ * of PuTTY's persistent data.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_STORAGE_H
+#define PUTTY_STORAGE_H
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Functions to save and restore PuTTY sessions. Note that this is
+ * only the low-level code to do the reading and writing. The
+ * higher-level code that translates a Config structure into a set
+ * of (key,value) pairs is elsewhere, since it doesn't (mostly)
+ * change between platforms.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Write a saved session. The caller is expected to call
+ * open_setting_w() to get a `void *' handle, then pass that to a
+ * number of calls to write_setting_s() and write_setting_i(), and
+ * then close it using close_settings_w(). At the end of this call
+ * sequence the settings should have been written to the PuTTY
+ * persistent storage area.
+ *
+ * A given key will be written at most once while saving a session.
+ * Keys may be up to 255 characters long. String values have no length
+ * limit.
+ *
+ * Any returned error message must be freed after use.
+ */
+void *open_settings_w(const char *sessionname, char **errmsg);
+void write_setting_s(void *handle, const char *key, const char *value);
+void write_setting_i(void *handle, const char *key, int value);
+void write_setting_filename(void *handle, const char *key, Filename value);
+void write_setting_fontspec(void *handle, const char *key, FontSpec font);
+void close_settings_w(void *handle);
+
+/*
+ * Read a saved session. The caller is expected to call
+ * open_setting_r() to get a `void *' handle, then pass that to a
+ * number of calls to read_setting_s() and read_setting_i(), and
+ * then close it using close_settings_r().
+ *
+ * read_setting_s() writes into the provided buffer and returns a
+ * pointer to the same buffer.
+ *
+ * If a particular string setting is not present in the session,
+ * read_setting_s() can return NULL, in which case the caller
+ * should invent a sensible default. If an integer setting is not
+ * present, read_setting_i() returns its provided default.
+ *
+ * read_setting_filename() and read_setting_fontspec() each read into
+ * the provided buffer, and return zero if they failed to.
+ */
+void *open_settings_r(const char *sessionname);
+char *read_setting_s(void *handle, const char *key, char *buffer, int buflen);
+int read_setting_i(void *handle, const char *key, int defvalue);
+int read_setting_filename(void *handle, const char *key, Filename *value);
+int read_setting_fontspec(void *handle, const char *key, FontSpec *font);
+void close_settings_r(void *handle);
+
+/*
+ * Delete a whole saved session.
+ */
+void del_settings(const char *sessionname);
+
+/*
+ * Enumerate all saved sessions.
+ */
+void *enum_settings_start(void);
+char *enum_settings_next(void *handle, char *buffer, int buflen);
+void enum_settings_finish(void *handle);
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Functions to access PuTTY's host key database.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * See if a host key matches the database entry. Return values can
+ * be 0 (entry matches database), 1 (entry is absent in database),
+ * or 2 (entry exists in database and is different).
+ */
+int verify_host_key(const char *hostname, int port,
+ const char *keytype, const char *key);
+
+/*
+ * Write a host key into the database, overwriting any previous
+ * entry that might have been there.
+ */
+void store_host_key(const char *hostname, int port,
+ const char *keytype, const char *key);
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Functions to access PuTTY's random number seed file.
+ */
+
+typedef void (*noise_consumer_t) (void *data, int len);
+
+/*
+ * Read PuTTY's random seed file and pass its contents to a noise
+ * consumer function.
+ */
+void read_random_seed(noise_consumer_t consumer);
+
+/*
+ * Write PuTTY's random seed file from a given chunk of noise.
+ */
+void write_random_seed(void *data, int len);
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Cleanup function: remove all of PuTTY's persistent state.
+ */
+void cleanup_all(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/telnet.c b/tools/plink/telnet.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8fbe88679 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/telnet.c @@ -0,0 +1,1091 @@ +/*
+ * Telnet backend.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+
+#define IAC 255 /* interpret as command: */
+#define DONT 254 /* you are not to use option */
+#define DO 253 /* please, you use option */
+#define WONT 252 /* I won't use option */
+#define WILL 251 /* I will use option */
+#define SB 250 /* interpret as subnegotiation */
+#define SE 240 /* end sub negotiation */
+
+#define GA 249 /* you may reverse the line */
+#define EL 248 /* erase the current line */
+#define EC 247 /* erase the current character */
+#define AYT 246 /* are you there */
+#define AO 245 /* abort output--but let prog finish */
+#define IP 244 /* interrupt process--permanently */
+#define BREAK 243 /* break */
+#define DM 242 /* data mark--for connect. cleaning */
+#define NOP 241 /* nop */
+#define EOR 239 /* end of record (transparent mode) */
+#define ABORT 238 /* Abort process */
+#define SUSP 237 /* Suspend process */
+#define xEOF 236 /* End of file: EOF is already used... */
+
+#define TELOPTS(X) \
+ X(BINARY, 0) /* 8-bit data path */ \
+ X(ECHO, 1) /* echo */ \
+ X(RCP, 2) /* prepare to reconnect */ \
+ X(SGA, 3) /* suppress go ahead */ \
+ X(NAMS, 4) /* approximate message size */ \
+ X(STATUS, 5) /* give status */ \
+ X(TM, 6) /* timing mark */ \
+ X(RCTE, 7) /* remote controlled transmission and echo */ \
+ X(NAOL, 8) /* negotiate about output line width */ \
+ X(NAOP, 9) /* negotiate about output page size */ \
+ X(NAOCRD, 10) /* negotiate about CR disposition */ \
+ X(NAOHTS, 11) /* negotiate about horizontal tabstops */ \
+ X(NAOHTD, 12) /* negotiate about horizontal tab disposition */ \
+ X(NAOFFD, 13) /* negotiate about formfeed disposition */ \
+ X(NAOVTS, 14) /* negotiate about vertical tab stops */ \
+ X(NAOVTD, 15) /* negotiate about vertical tab disposition */ \
+ X(NAOLFD, 16) /* negotiate about output LF disposition */ \
+ X(XASCII, 17) /* extended ascic character set */ \
+ X(LOGOUT, 18) /* force logout */ \
+ X(BM, 19) /* byte macro */ \
+ X(DET, 20) /* data entry terminal */ \
+ X(SUPDUP, 21) /* supdup protocol */ \
+ X(SUPDUPOUTPUT, 22) /* supdup output */ \
+ X(SNDLOC, 23) /* send location */ \
+ X(TTYPE, 24) /* terminal type */ \
+ X(EOR, 25) /* end or record */ \
+ X(TUID, 26) /* TACACS user identification */ \
+ X(OUTMRK, 27) /* output marking */ \
+ X(TTYLOC, 28) /* terminal location number */ \
+ X(3270REGIME, 29) /* 3270 regime */ \
+ X(X3PAD, 30) /* X.3 PAD */ \
+ X(NAWS, 31) /* window size */ \
+ X(TSPEED, 32) /* terminal speed */ \
+ X(LFLOW, 33) /* remote flow control */ \
+ X(LINEMODE, 34) /* Linemode option */ \
+ X(XDISPLOC, 35) /* X Display Location */ \
+ X(OLD_ENVIRON, 36) /* Old - Environment variables */ \
+ X(AUTHENTICATION, 37) /* Authenticate */ \
+ X(ENCRYPT, 38) /* Encryption option */ \
+ X(NEW_ENVIRON, 39) /* New - Environment variables */ \
+ X(TN3270E, 40) /* TN3270 enhancements */ \
+ X(XAUTH, 41) \
+ X(CHARSET, 42) /* Character set */ \
+ X(RSP, 43) /* Remote serial port */ \
+ X(COM_PORT_OPTION, 44) /* Com port control */ \
+ X(SLE, 45) /* Suppress local echo */ \
+ X(STARTTLS, 46) /* Start TLS */ \
+ X(KERMIT, 47) /* Automatic Kermit file transfer */ \
+ X(SEND_URL, 48) \
+ X(FORWARD_X, 49) \
+ X(PRAGMA_LOGON, 138) \
+ X(SSPI_LOGON, 139) \
+ X(PRAGMA_HEARTBEAT, 140) \
+ X(EXOPL, 255) /* extended-options-list */
+
+#define telnet_enum(x,y) TELOPT_##x = y,
+enum { TELOPTS(telnet_enum) dummy=0 };
+#undef telnet_enum
+
+#define TELQUAL_IS 0 /* option is... */
+#define TELQUAL_SEND 1 /* send option */
+#define TELQUAL_INFO 2 /* ENVIRON: informational version of IS */
+#define BSD_VAR 1
+#define BSD_VALUE 0
+#define RFC_VAR 0
+#define RFC_VALUE 1
+
+#define CR 13
+#define LF 10
+#define NUL 0
+
+#define iswritable(x) \
+ ( (x) != IAC && \
+ (telnet->opt_states[o_we_bin.index] == ACTIVE || (x) != CR))
+
+static char *telopt(int opt)
+{
+#define telnet_str(x,y) case TELOPT_##x: return #x;
+ switch (opt) {
+ TELOPTS(telnet_str)
+ default:
+ return "<unknown>";
+ }
+#undef telnet_str
+}
+
+static void telnet_size(void *handle, int width, int height);
+
+struct Opt {
+ int send; /* what we initially send */
+ int nsend; /* -ve send if requested to stop it */
+ int ack, nak; /* +ve and -ve acknowledgements */
+ int option; /* the option code */
+ int index; /* index into telnet->opt_states[] */
+ enum {
+ REQUESTED, ACTIVE, INACTIVE, REALLY_INACTIVE
+ } initial_state;
+};
+
+enum {
+ OPTINDEX_NAWS,
+ OPTINDEX_TSPEED,
+ OPTINDEX_TTYPE,
+ OPTINDEX_OENV,
+ OPTINDEX_NENV,
+ OPTINDEX_ECHO,
+ OPTINDEX_WE_SGA,
+ OPTINDEX_THEY_SGA,
+ OPTINDEX_WE_BIN,
+ OPTINDEX_THEY_BIN,
+ NUM_OPTS
+};
+
+static const struct Opt o_naws =
+ { WILL, WONT, DO, DONT, TELOPT_NAWS, OPTINDEX_NAWS, REQUESTED };
+static const struct Opt o_tspeed =
+ { WILL, WONT, DO, DONT, TELOPT_TSPEED, OPTINDEX_TSPEED, REQUESTED };
+static const struct Opt o_ttype =
+ { WILL, WONT, DO, DONT, TELOPT_TTYPE, OPTINDEX_TTYPE, REQUESTED };
+static const struct Opt o_oenv =
+ { WILL, WONT, DO, DONT, TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON, OPTINDEX_OENV, INACTIVE };
+static const struct Opt o_nenv =
+ { WILL, WONT, DO, DONT, TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, OPTINDEX_NENV, REQUESTED };
+static const struct Opt o_echo =
+ { DO, DONT, WILL, WONT, TELOPT_ECHO, OPTINDEX_ECHO, REQUESTED };
+static const struct Opt o_we_sga =
+ { WILL, WONT, DO, DONT, TELOPT_SGA, OPTINDEX_WE_SGA, REQUESTED };
+static const struct Opt o_they_sga =
+ { DO, DONT, WILL, WONT, TELOPT_SGA, OPTINDEX_THEY_SGA, REQUESTED };
+static const struct Opt o_we_bin =
+ { WILL, WONT, DO, DONT, TELOPT_BINARY, OPTINDEX_WE_BIN, INACTIVE };
+static const struct Opt o_they_bin =
+ { DO, DONT, WILL, WONT, TELOPT_BINARY, OPTINDEX_THEY_BIN, INACTIVE };
+
+static const struct Opt *const opts[] = {
+ &o_naws, &o_tspeed, &o_ttype, &o_oenv, &o_nenv, &o_echo,
+ &o_we_sga, &o_they_sga, &o_we_bin, &o_they_bin, NULL
+};
+
+typedef struct telnet_tag {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above field _must_ be first in the structure */
+
+ Socket s;
+
+ void *frontend;
+ void *ldisc;
+ int term_width, term_height;
+
+ int opt_states[NUM_OPTS];
+
+ int echoing, editing;
+ int activated;
+ int bufsize;
+ int in_synch;
+ int sb_opt, sb_len;
+ unsigned char *sb_buf;
+ int sb_size;
+
+ enum {
+ TOP_LEVEL, SEENIAC, SEENWILL, SEENWONT, SEENDO, SEENDONT,
+ SEENSB, SUBNEGOT, SUBNEG_IAC, SEENCR
+ } state;
+
+ Config cfg;
+
+ Pinger pinger;
+} *Telnet;
+
+#define TELNET_MAX_BACKLOG 4096
+
+#define SB_DELTA 1024
+
+static void c_write(Telnet telnet, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int backlog;
+ backlog = from_backend(telnet->frontend, 0, buf, len);
+ sk_set_frozen(telnet->s, backlog > TELNET_MAX_BACKLOG);
+}
+
+static void log_option(Telnet telnet, char *sender, int cmd, int option)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ /*
+ * The strange-looking "<?""?>" below is there to avoid a
+ * trigraph - a double question mark followed by > maps to a
+ * closing brace character!
+ */
+ buf = dupprintf("%s:\t%s %s", sender,
+ (cmd == WILL ? "WILL" : cmd == WONT ? "WONT" :
+ cmd == DO ? "DO" : cmd == DONT ? "DONT" : "<?""?>"),
+ telopt(option));
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+}
+
+static void send_opt(Telnet telnet, int cmd, int option)
+{
+ unsigned char b[3];
+
+ b[0] = IAC;
+ b[1] = cmd;
+ b[2] = option;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 3);
+ log_option(telnet, "client", cmd, option);
+}
+
+static void deactivate_option(Telnet telnet, const struct Opt *o)
+{
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o->index] == REQUESTED ||
+ telnet->opt_states[o->index] == ACTIVE)
+ send_opt(telnet, o->nsend, o->option);
+ telnet->opt_states[o->index] = REALLY_INACTIVE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate side effects of enabling or disabling an option.
+ */
+static void option_side_effects(Telnet telnet, const struct Opt *o, int enabled)
+{
+ if (o->option == TELOPT_ECHO && o->send == DO)
+ telnet->echoing = !enabled;
+ else if (o->option == TELOPT_SGA && o->send == DO)
+ telnet->editing = !enabled;
+ if (telnet->ldisc) /* cause ldisc to notice the change */
+ ldisc_send(telnet->ldisc, NULL, 0, 0);
+
+ /* Ensure we get the minimum options */
+ if (!telnet->activated) {
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o_echo.index] == INACTIVE) {
+ telnet->opt_states[o_echo.index] = REQUESTED;
+ send_opt(telnet, o_echo.send, o_echo.option);
+ }
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o_we_sga.index] == INACTIVE) {
+ telnet->opt_states[o_we_sga.index] = REQUESTED;
+ send_opt(telnet, o_we_sga.send, o_we_sga.option);
+ }
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o_they_sga.index] == INACTIVE) {
+ telnet->opt_states[o_they_sga.index] = REQUESTED;
+ send_opt(telnet, o_they_sga.send, o_they_sga.option);
+ }
+ telnet->activated = TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+static void activate_option(Telnet telnet, const struct Opt *o)
+{
+ if (o->send == WILL && o->option == TELOPT_NAWS)
+ telnet_size(telnet, telnet->term_width, telnet->term_height);
+ if (o->send == WILL &&
+ (o->option == TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON ||
+ o->option == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON)) {
+ /*
+ * We may only have one kind of ENVIRON going at a time.
+ * This is a hack, but who cares.
+ */
+ deactivate_option(telnet, o->option ==
+ TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON ? &o_oenv : &o_nenv);
+ }
+ option_side_effects(telnet, o, 1);
+}
+
+static void refused_option(Telnet telnet, const struct Opt *o)
+{
+ if (o->send == WILL && o->option == TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON &&
+ telnet->opt_states[o_oenv.index] == INACTIVE) {
+ send_opt(telnet, WILL, TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON);
+ telnet->opt_states[o_oenv.index] = REQUESTED;
+ }
+ option_side_effects(telnet, o, 0);
+}
+
+static void proc_rec_opt(Telnet telnet, int cmd, int option)
+{
+ const struct Opt *const *o;
+
+ log_option(telnet, "server", cmd, option);
+ for (o = opts; *o; o++) {
+ if ((*o)->option == option && (*o)->ack == cmd) {
+ switch (telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index]) {
+ case REQUESTED:
+ telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index] = ACTIVE;
+ activate_option(telnet, *o);
+ break;
+ case ACTIVE:
+ break;
+ case INACTIVE:
+ telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index] = ACTIVE;
+ send_opt(telnet, (*o)->send, option);
+ activate_option(telnet, *o);
+ break;
+ case REALLY_INACTIVE:
+ send_opt(telnet, (*o)->nsend, option);
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+ } else if ((*o)->option == option && (*o)->nak == cmd) {
+ switch (telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index]) {
+ case REQUESTED:
+ telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index] = INACTIVE;
+ refused_option(telnet, *o);
+ break;
+ case ACTIVE:
+ telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index] = INACTIVE;
+ send_opt(telnet, (*o)->nsend, option);
+ option_side_effects(telnet, *o, 0);
+ break;
+ case INACTIVE:
+ case REALLY_INACTIVE:
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we reach here, the option was one we weren't prepared to
+ * cope with. If the request was positive (WILL or DO), we send
+ * a negative ack to indicate refusal. If the request was
+ * negative (WONT / DONT), we must do nothing.
+ */
+ if (cmd == WILL || cmd == DO)
+ send_opt(telnet, (cmd == WILL ? DONT : WONT), option);
+}
+
+static void process_subneg(Telnet telnet)
+{
+ unsigned char b[2048], *p, *q;
+ int var, value, n;
+ char *e;
+
+ switch (telnet->sb_opt) {
+ case TELOPT_TSPEED:
+ if (telnet->sb_len == 1 && telnet->sb_buf[0] == TELQUAL_SEND) {
+ char *logbuf;
+ b[0] = IAC;
+ b[1] = SB;
+ b[2] = TELOPT_TSPEED;
+ b[3] = TELQUAL_IS;
+ strcpy((char *)(b + 4), telnet->cfg.termspeed);
+ n = 4 + strlen(telnet->cfg.termspeed);
+ b[n] = IAC;
+ b[n + 1] = SE;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, n + 2);
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, "server:\tSB TSPEED SEND");
+ logbuf = dupprintf("client:\tSB TSPEED IS %s", telnet->cfg.termspeed);
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, logbuf);
+ sfree(logbuf);
+ } else
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, "server:\tSB TSPEED <something weird>");
+ break;
+ case TELOPT_TTYPE:
+ if (telnet->sb_len == 1 && telnet->sb_buf[0] == TELQUAL_SEND) {
+ char *logbuf;
+ b[0] = IAC;
+ b[1] = SB;
+ b[2] = TELOPT_TTYPE;
+ b[3] = TELQUAL_IS;
+ for (n = 0; telnet->cfg.termtype[n]; n++)
+ b[n + 4] = (telnet->cfg.termtype[n] >= 'a'
+ && telnet->cfg.termtype[n] <=
+ 'z' ? telnet->cfg.termtype[n] + 'A' -
+ 'a' : telnet->cfg.termtype[n]);
+ b[n + 4] = IAC;
+ b[n + 5] = SE;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, n + 6);
+ b[n + 4] = 0;
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, "server:\tSB TTYPE SEND");
+ logbuf = dupprintf("client:\tSB TTYPE IS %s", b + 4);
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, logbuf);
+ sfree(logbuf);
+ } else
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, "server:\tSB TTYPE <something weird>\r\n");
+ break;
+ case TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON:
+ case TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON:
+ p = telnet->sb_buf;
+ q = p + telnet->sb_len;
+ if (p < q && *p == TELQUAL_SEND) {
+ char *logbuf;
+ p++;
+ logbuf = dupprintf("server:\tSB %s SEND", telopt(telnet->sb_opt));
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, logbuf);
+ sfree(logbuf);
+ if (telnet->sb_opt == TELOPT_OLD_ENVIRON) {
+ if (telnet->cfg.rfc_environ) {
+ value = RFC_VALUE;
+ var = RFC_VAR;
+ } else {
+ value = BSD_VALUE;
+ var = BSD_VAR;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Try to guess the sense of VAR and VALUE.
+ */
+ while (p < q) {
+ if (*p == RFC_VAR) {
+ value = RFC_VALUE;
+ var = RFC_VAR;
+ } else if (*p == BSD_VAR) {
+ value = BSD_VALUE;
+ var = BSD_VAR;
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * With NEW_ENVIRON, the sense of VAR and VALUE
+ * isn't in doubt.
+ */
+ value = RFC_VALUE;
+ var = RFC_VAR;
+ }
+ b[0] = IAC;
+ b[1] = SB;
+ b[2] = telnet->sb_opt;
+ b[3] = TELQUAL_IS;
+ n = 4;
+ e = telnet->cfg.environmt;
+ while (*e) {
+ b[n++] = var;
+ while (*e && *e != '\t')
+ b[n++] = *e++;
+ if (*e == '\t')
+ e++;
+ b[n++] = value;
+ while (*e)
+ b[n++] = *e++;
+ e++;
+ }
+ {
+ char user[sizeof(telnet->cfg.username)];
+ (void) get_remote_username(&telnet->cfg, user, sizeof(user));
+ if (*user) {
+ b[n++] = var;
+ b[n++] = 'U';
+ b[n++] = 'S';
+ b[n++] = 'E';
+ b[n++] = 'R';
+ b[n++] = value;
+ e = user;
+ while (*e)
+ b[n++] = *e++;
+ }
+ b[n++] = IAC;
+ b[n++] = SE;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, n);
+ logbuf = dupprintf("client:\tSB %s IS %s%s%s%s",
+ telopt(telnet->sb_opt),
+ *user ? "USER=" : "",
+ user,
+ *user ? " " : "",
+ n == 6 ? "<nothing>" :
+ (*telnet->cfg.environmt ? "<stuff>" : ""));
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, logbuf);
+ sfree(logbuf);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void do_telnet_read(Telnet telnet, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ char *outbuf = NULL;
+ int outbuflen = 0, outbufsize = 0;
+
+#define ADDTOBUF(c) do { \
+ if (outbuflen >= outbufsize) { \
+ outbufsize = outbuflen + 256; \
+ outbuf = sresize(outbuf, outbufsize, char); \
+ } \
+ outbuf[outbuflen++] = (c); \
+} while (0)
+
+ while (len--) {
+ int c = (unsigned char) *buf++;
+
+ switch (telnet->state) {
+ case TOP_LEVEL:
+ case SEENCR:
+ if (c == NUL && telnet->state == SEENCR)
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ else if (c == IAC)
+ telnet->state = SEENIAC;
+ else {
+ if (!telnet->in_synch)
+ ADDTOBUF(c);
+
+#if 1
+ /* I can't get the F***ing winsock to insert the urgent IAC
+ * into the right position! Even with SO_OOBINLINE it gives
+ * it to recv too soon. And of course the DM byte (that
+ * arrives in the same packet!) appears several K later!!
+ *
+ * Oh well, we do get the DM in the right place so I'll
+ * just stop hiding on the next 0xf2 and hope for the best.
+ */
+ else if (c == DM)
+ telnet->in_synch = 0;
+#endif
+ if (c == CR && telnet->opt_states[o_they_bin.index] != ACTIVE)
+ telnet->state = SEENCR;
+ else
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SEENIAC:
+ if (c == DO)
+ telnet->state = SEENDO;
+ else if (c == DONT)
+ telnet->state = SEENDONT;
+ else if (c == WILL)
+ telnet->state = SEENWILL;
+ else if (c == WONT)
+ telnet->state = SEENWONT;
+ else if (c == SB)
+ telnet->state = SEENSB;
+ else if (c == DM) {
+ telnet->in_synch = 0;
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ } else {
+ /* ignore everything else; print it if it's IAC */
+ if (c == IAC) {
+ ADDTOBUF(c);
+ }
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SEENWILL:
+ proc_rec_opt(telnet, WILL, c);
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ break;
+ case SEENWONT:
+ proc_rec_opt(telnet, WONT, c);
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ break;
+ case SEENDO:
+ proc_rec_opt(telnet, DO, c);
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ break;
+ case SEENDONT:
+ proc_rec_opt(telnet, DONT, c);
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ break;
+ case SEENSB:
+ telnet->sb_opt = c;
+ telnet->sb_len = 0;
+ telnet->state = SUBNEGOT;
+ break;
+ case SUBNEGOT:
+ if (c == IAC)
+ telnet->state = SUBNEG_IAC;
+ else {
+ subneg_addchar:
+ if (telnet->sb_len >= telnet->sb_size) {
+ telnet->sb_size += SB_DELTA;
+ telnet->sb_buf = sresize(telnet->sb_buf, telnet->sb_size,
+ unsigned char);
+ }
+ telnet->sb_buf[telnet->sb_len++] = c;
+ telnet->state = SUBNEGOT; /* in case we came here by goto */
+ }
+ break;
+ case SUBNEG_IAC:
+ if (c != SE)
+ goto subneg_addchar; /* yes, it's a hack, I know, but... */
+ else {
+ process_subneg(telnet);
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (outbuflen)
+ c_write(telnet, outbuf, outbuflen);
+ sfree(outbuf);
+}
+
+static void telnet_log(Plug plug, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) plug;
+ char addrbuf[256], *msg;
+
+ sk_getaddr(addr, addrbuf, lenof(addrbuf));
+
+ if (type == 0)
+ msg = dupprintf("Connecting to %s port %d", addrbuf, port);
+ else
+ msg = dupprintf("Failed to connect to %s: %s", addrbuf, error_msg);
+
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, msg);
+}
+
+static int telnet_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
+ int calling_back)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) plug;
+
+ if (telnet->s) {
+ sk_close(telnet->s);
+ telnet->s = NULL;
+ notify_remote_exit(telnet->frontend);
+ }
+ if (error_msg) {
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, error_msg);
+ connection_fatal(telnet->frontend, "%s", error_msg);
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, the remote side closed the connection normally. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int telnet_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) plug;
+ if (urgent)
+ telnet->in_synch = TRUE;
+ do_telnet_read(telnet, data, len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void telnet_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) plug;
+ telnet->bufsize = bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set up the Telnet connection.
+ *
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ *
+ * Also places the canonical host name into `realhost'. It must be
+ * freed by the caller.
+ */
+static const char *telnet_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
+ Config *cfg,
+ char *host, int port, char **realhost,
+ int nodelay, int keepalive)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ telnet_log,
+ telnet_closing,
+ telnet_receive,
+ telnet_sent
+ };
+ SockAddr addr;
+ const char *err;
+ Telnet telnet;
+
+ telnet = snew(struct telnet_tag);
+ telnet->fn = &fn_table;
+ telnet->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
+ telnet->s = NULL;
+ telnet->echoing = TRUE;
+ telnet->editing = TRUE;
+ telnet->activated = FALSE;
+ telnet->sb_buf = NULL;
+ telnet->sb_size = 0;
+ telnet->frontend = frontend_handle;
+ telnet->term_width = telnet->cfg.width;
+ telnet->term_height = telnet->cfg.height;
+ telnet->state = TOP_LEVEL;
+ telnet->ldisc = NULL;
+ telnet->pinger = NULL;
+ *backend_handle = telnet;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to find host.
+ */
+ {
+ char *buf;
+ buf = dupprintf("Looking up host \"%s\"%s", host,
+ (cfg->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? " (IPv4)" :
+ (cfg->addressfamily == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? " (IPv6)" :
+ "")));
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, buf);
+ sfree(buf);
+ }
+ addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, &telnet->cfg, cfg->addressfamily);
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (port < 0)
+ port = 23; /* default telnet port */
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ telnet->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port, 0, 1,
+ nodelay, keepalive, (Plug) telnet, &telnet->cfg);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(telnet->s)) != NULL)
+ return err;
+
+ telnet->pinger = pinger_new(&telnet->cfg, &telnet_backend, telnet);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise option states.
+ */
+ if (telnet->cfg.passive_telnet) {
+ const struct Opt *const *o;
+
+ for (o = opts; *o; o++)
+ telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index] = INACTIVE;
+ } else {
+ const struct Opt *const *o;
+
+ for (o = opts; *o; o++) {
+ telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index] = (*o)->initial_state;
+ if (telnet->opt_states[(*o)->index] == REQUESTED)
+ send_opt(telnet, (*o)->send, (*o)->option);
+ }
+ telnet->activated = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up SYNCH state.
+ */
+ telnet->in_synch = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * We can send special commands from the start.
+ */
+ update_specials_menu(telnet->frontend);
+
+ /*
+ * loghost overrides realhost, if specified.
+ */
+ if (*telnet->cfg.loghost) {
+ char *colon;
+
+ sfree(*realhost);
+ *realhost = dupstr(telnet->cfg.loghost);
+ colon = strrchr(*realhost, ':');
+ if (colon) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: if we ever update this aspect of ssh.c for
+ * IPv6 literal management, this should change in line
+ * with it.
+ */
+ *colon++ = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void telnet_free(void *handle)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+
+ sfree(telnet->sb_buf);
+ if (telnet->s)
+ sk_close(telnet->s);
+ if (telnet->pinger)
+ pinger_free(telnet->pinger);
+ sfree(telnet);
+}
+/*
+ * Reconfigure the Telnet backend. There's no immediate action
+ * necessary, in this backend: we just save the fresh config for
+ * any subsequent negotiations.
+ */
+static void telnet_reconfig(void *handle, Config *cfg)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ pinger_reconfig(telnet->pinger, &telnet->cfg, cfg);
+ telnet->cfg = *cfg; /* STRUCTURE COPY */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to send data down the Telnet connection.
+ */
+static int telnet_send(void *handle, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ unsigned char *p, *end;
+ static const unsigned char iac[2] = { IAC, IAC };
+ static const unsigned char cr[2] = { CR, NUL };
+#if 0
+ static const unsigned char nl[2] = { CR, LF };
+#endif
+
+ if (telnet->s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)buf;
+ end = (unsigned char *)(buf + len);
+ while (p < end) {
+ unsigned char *q = p;
+
+ while (p < end && iswritable(*p))
+ p++;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)q, p - q);
+
+ while (p < end && !iswritable(*p)) {
+ telnet->bufsize =
+ sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)(*p == IAC ? iac : cr), 2);
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return telnet->bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to query the current socket sendability status.
+ */
+static int telnet_sendbuffer(void *handle)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ return telnet->bufsize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set the size of the window from Telnet's POV.
+ */
+static void telnet_size(void *handle, int width, int height)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ unsigned char b[24];
+ int n;
+ char *logbuf;
+
+ telnet->term_width = width;
+ telnet->term_height = height;
+
+ if (telnet->s == NULL || telnet->opt_states[o_naws.index] != ACTIVE)
+ return;
+ n = 0;
+ b[n++] = IAC;
+ b[n++] = SB;
+ b[n++] = TELOPT_NAWS;
+ b[n++] = telnet->term_width >> 8;
+ if (b[n-1] == IAC) b[n++] = IAC; /* duplicate any IAC byte occurs */
+ b[n++] = telnet->term_width & 0xFF;
+ if (b[n-1] == IAC) b[n++] = IAC; /* duplicate any IAC byte occurs */
+ b[n++] = telnet->term_height >> 8;
+ if (b[n-1] == IAC) b[n++] = IAC; /* duplicate any IAC byte occurs */
+ b[n++] = telnet->term_height & 0xFF;
+ if (b[n-1] == IAC) b[n++] = IAC; /* duplicate any IAC byte occurs */
+ b[n++] = IAC;
+ b[n++] = SE;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, n);
+ logbuf = dupprintf("client:\tSB NAWS %d,%d",
+ telnet->term_width, telnet->term_height);
+ logevent(telnet->frontend, logbuf);
+ sfree(logbuf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send Telnet special codes.
+ */
+static void telnet_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ unsigned char b[2];
+
+ if (telnet->s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ b[0] = IAC;
+ switch (code) {
+ case TS_AYT:
+ b[1] = AYT;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_BRK:
+ b[1] = BREAK;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_EC:
+ b[1] = EC;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_EL:
+ b[1] = EL;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_GA:
+ b[1] = GA;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_NOP:
+ b[1] = NOP;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_ABORT:
+ b[1] = ABORT;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_AO:
+ b[1] = AO;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_IP:
+ b[1] = IP;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_SUSP:
+ b[1] = SUSP;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_EOR:
+ b[1] = EOR;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_EOF:
+ b[1] = xEOF;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_EOL:
+ /* In BINARY mode, CR-LF becomes just CR -
+ * and without the NUL suffix too. */
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o_we_bin.index] == ACTIVE)
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, "\r", 1);
+ else
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, "\r\n", 2);
+ break;
+ case TS_SYNCH:
+ b[1] = DM;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 1);
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write_oob(telnet->s, (char *)(b + 1), 1);
+ break;
+ case TS_RECHO:
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o_echo.index] == INACTIVE ||
+ telnet->opt_states[o_echo.index] == REALLY_INACTIVE) {
+ telnet->opt_states[o_echo.index] = REQUESTED;
+ send_opt(telnet, o_echo.send, o_echo.option);
+ }
+ break;
+ case TS_LECHO:
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o_echo.index] == ACTIVE) {
+ telnet->opt_states[o_echo.index] = REQUESTED;
+ send_opt(telnet, o_echo.nsend, o_echo.option);
+ }
+ break;
+ case TS_PING:
+ if (telnet->opt_states[o_they_sga.index] == ACTIVE) {
+ b[1] = NOP;
+ telnet->bufsize = sk_write(telnet->s, (char *)b, 2);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break; /* never heard of it */
+ }
+}
+
+static const struct telnet_special *telnet_get_specials(void *handle)
+{
+ static const struct telnet_special specials[] = {
+ {"Are You There", TS_AYT},
+ {"Break", TS_BRK},
+ {"Synch", TS_SYNCH},
+ {"Erase Character", TS_EC},
+ {"Erase Line", TS_EL},
+ {"Go Ahead", TS_GA},
+ {"No Operation", TS_NOP},
+ {NULL, TS_SEP},
+ {"Abort Process", TS_ABORT},
+ {"Abort Output", TS_AO},
+ {"Interrupt Process", TS_IP},
+ {"Suspend Process", TS_SUSP},
+ {NULL, TS_SEP},
+ {"End Of Record", TS_EOR},
+ {"End Of File", TS_EOF},
+ {NULL, TS_EXITMENU}
+ };
+ return specials;
+}
+
+static int telnet_connected(void *handle)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ return telnet->s != NULL;
+}
+
+static int telnet_sendok(void *handle)
+{
+ /* Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle; */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void telnet_unthrottle(void *handle, int backlog)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ sk_set_frozen(telnet->s, backlog > TELNET_MAX_BACKLOG);
+}
+
+static int telnet_ldisc(void *handle, int option)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ if (option == LD_ECHO)
+ return telnet->echoing;
+ if (option == LD_EDIT)
+ return telnet->editing;
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static void telnet_provide_ldisc(void *handle, void *ldisc)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ telnet->ldisc = ldisc;
+}
+
+static void telnet_provide_logctx(void *handle, void *logctx)
+{
+ /* This is a stub. */
+}
+
+static int telnet_exitcode(void *handle)
+{
+ Telnet telnet = (Telnet) handle;
+ if (telnet->s != NULL)
+ return -1; /* still connected */
+ else
+ /* Telnet doesn't transmit exit codes back to the client */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cfg_info for Telnet does nothing at all.
+ */
+static int telnet_cfg_info(void *handle)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+Backend telnet_backend = {
+ telnet_init,
+ telnet_free,
+ telnet_reconfig,
+ telnet_send,
+ telnet_sendbuffer,
+ telnet_size,
+ telnet_special,
+ telnet_get_specials,
+ telnet_connected,
+ telnet_exitcode,
+ telnet_sendok,
+ telnet_ldisc,
+ telnet_provide_ldisc,
+ telnet_provide_logctx,
+ telnet_unthrottle,
+ telnet_cfg_info,
+ "telnet",
+ PROT_TELNET,
+ 23
+};
diff --git a/tools/plink/terminal.h b/tools/plink/terminal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6d3b1c544 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/terminal.h @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +/*
+ * Internals of the Terminal structure, for those other modules
+ * which need to look inside it. It would be nice if this could be
+ * folded back into terminal.c in future, with an abstraction layer
+ * to handle everything that other modules need to know about it;
+ * but for the moment, this will do.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_TERMINAL_H
+#define PUTTY_TERMINAL_H
+
+#include "tree234.h"
+
+struct beeptime {
+ struct beeptime *next;
+ unsigned long ticks;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ int y, x;
+} pos;
+
+#ifdef OPTIMISE_SCROLL
+struct scrollregion {
+ struct scrollregion *next;
+ int topline; /* Top line of scroll region. */
+ int botline; /* Bottom line of scroll region. */
+ int lines; /* Number of lines to scroll by - +ve is forwards. */
+};
+#endif /* OPTIMISE_SCROLL */
+
+typedef struct termchar termchar;
+typedef struct termline termline;
+
+struct termchar {
+ /*
+ * Any code in terminal.c which definitely needs to be changed
+ * when extra fields are added here is labelled with a comment
+ * saying FULL-TERMCHAR.
+ */
+ unsigned long chr;
+ unsigned long attr;
+
+ /*
+ * The cc_next field is used to link multiple termchars
+ * together into a list, so as to fit more than one character
+ * into a character cell (Unicode combining characters).
+ *
+ * cc_next is a relative offset into the current array of
+ * termchars. I.e. to advance to the next character in a list,
+ * one does `tc += tc->next'.
+ *
+ * Zero means end of list.
+ */
+ int cc_next;
+};
+
+struct termline {
+ unsigned short lattr;
+ int cols; /* number of real columns on the line */
+ int size; /* number of allocated termchars
+ * (cc-lists may make this > cols) */
+ int temporary; /* TRUE if decompressed from scrollback */
+ int cc_free; /* offset to first cc in free list */
+ struct termchar *chars;
+};
+
+struct bidi_cache_entry {
+ int width;
+ struct termchar *chars;
+ int *forward, *backward; /* the permutations of line positions */
+};
+
+struct terminal_tag {
+
+ int compatibility_level;
+
+ tree234 *scrollback; /* lines scrolled off top of screen */
+ tree234 *screen; /* lines on primary screen */
+ tree234 *alt_screen; /* lines on alternate screen */
+ int disptop; /* distance scrolled back (0 or -ve) */
+ int tempsblines; /* number of lines of .scrollback that
+ can be retrieved onto the terminal
+ ("temporary scrollback") */
+
+ termline **disptext; /* buffer of text on real screen */
+ int dispcursx, dispcursy; /* location of cursor on real screen */
+ int curstype; /* type of cursor on real screen */
+
+#define VBELL_TIMEOUT (TICKSPERSEC/10) /* visual bell lasts 1/10 sec */
+
+ struct beeptime *beephead, *beeptail;
+ int nbeeps;
+ int beep_overloaded;
+ long lastbeep;
+
+#define TTYPE termchar
+#define TSIZE (sizeof(TTYPE))
+
+#ifdef OPTIMISE_SCROLL
+ struct scrollregion *scrollhead, *scrolltail;
+#endif /* OPTIMISE_SCROLL */
+
+ int default_attr, curr_attr, save_attr;
+ termchar basic_erase_char, erase_char;
+
+ bufchain inbuf; /* terminal input buffer */
+ pos curs; /* cursor */
+ pos savecurs; /* saved cursor position */
+ int marg_t, marg_b; /* scroll margins */
+ int dec_om; /* DEC origin mode flag */
+ int wrap, wrapnext; /* wrap flags */
+ int insert; /* insert-mode flag */
+ int cset; /* 0 or 1: which char set */
+ int save_cset, save_csattr; /* saved with cursor position */
+ int save_utf, save_wnext; /* saved with cursor position */
+ int rvideo; /* global reverse video flag */
+ unsigned long rvbell_startpoint; /* for ESC[?5hESC[?5l vbell */
+ int cursor_on; /* cursor enabled flag */
+ int reset_132; /* Flag ESC c resets to 80 cols */
+ int use_bce; /* Use Background coloured erase */
+ int cblinker; /* When blinking is the cursor on ? */
+ int tblinker; /* When the blinking text is on */
+ int blink_is_real; /* Actually blink blinking text */
+ int term_echoing; /* Does terminal want local echo? */
+ int term_editing; /* Does terminal want local edit? */
+ int sco_acs, save_sco_acs; /* CSI 10,11,12m -> OEM charset */
+ int vt52_bold; /* Force bold on non-bold colours */
+ int utf; /* Are we in toggleable UTF-8 mode? */
+ int utf_state; /* Is there a pending UTF-8 character */
+ int utf_char; /* and what is it so far. */
+ int utf_size; /* The size of the UTF character. */
+ int printing, only_printing; /* Are we doing ANSI printing? */
+ int print_state; /* state of print-end-sequence scan */
+ bufchain printer_buf; /* buffered data for printer */
+ printer_job *print_job;
+
+ /* ESC 7 saved state for the alternate screen */
+ pos alt_savecurs;
+ int alt_save_attr;
+ int alt_save_cset, alt_save_csattr;
+ int alt_save_utf, alt_save_wnext;
+ int alt_save_sco_acs;
+
+ int rows, cols, savelines;
+ int has_focus;
+ int in_vbell;
+ long vbell_end;
+ int app_cursor_keys, app_keypad_keys, vt52_mode;
+ int repeat_off, cr_lf_return;
+ int seen_disp_event;
+ int big_cursor;
+
+ int xterm_mouse; /* send mouse messages to host */
+ int mouse_is_down; /* used while tracking mouse buttons */
+
+ int cset_attr[2];
+
+/*
+ * Saved settings on the alternate screen.
+ */
+ int alt_x, alt_y, alt_om, alt_wrap, alt_wnext, alt_ins;
+ int alt_cset, alt_sco_acs, alt_utf;
+ int alt_t, alt_b;
+ int alt_which;
+ int alt_sblines; /* # of lines on alternate screen that should be used for scrollback. */
+
+#define ARGS_MAX 32 /* max # of esc sequence arguments */
+#define ARG_DEFAULT 0 /* if an arg isn't specified */
+#define def(a,d) ( (a) == ARG_DEFAULT ? (d) : (a) )
+ int esc_args[ARGS_MAX];
+ int esc_nargs;
+ int esc_query;
+#define ANSI(x,y) ((x)+((y)<<8))
+#define ANSI_QUE(x) ANSI(x,TRUE)
+
+#define OSC_STR_MAX 2048
+ int osc_strlen;
+ char osc_string[OSC_STR_MAX + 1];
+ int osc_w;
+
+ char id_string[1024];
+
+ unsigned char *tabs;
+
+ enum {
+ TOPLEVEL,
+ SEEN_ESC,
+ SEEN_CSI,
+ SEEN_OSC,
+ SEEN_OSC_W,
+
+ DO_CTRLS,
+
+ SEEN_OSC_P,
+ OSC_STRING, OSC_MAYBE_ST,
+ VT52_ESC,
+ VT52_Y1,
+ VT52_Y2,
+ VT52_FG,
+ VT52_BG
+ } termstate;
+
+ enum {
+ NO_SELECTION, ABOUT_TO, DRAGGING, SELECTED
+ } selstate;
+ enum {
+ LEXICOGRAPHIC, RECTANGULAR
+ } seltype;
+ enum {
+ SM_CHAR, SM_WORD, SM_LINE
+ } selmode;
+ pos selstart, selend, selanchor;
+
+ short wordness[256];
+
+ /* Mask of attributes to pay attention to when painting. */
+ int attr_mask;
+
+ wchar_t *paste_buffer;
+ int paste_len, paste_pos, paste_hold;
+ long last_paste;
+
+ void (*resize_fn)(void *, int, int);
+ void *resize_ctx;
+
+ void *ldisc;
+
+ void *frontend;
+
+ void *logctx;
+
+ struct unicode_data *ucsdata;
+
+ /*
+ * We maintain a full _copy_ of a Config structure here, not
+ * merely a pointer to it. That way, when we're passed a new
+ * one for reconfiguration, we can check the differences and
+ * adjust the _current_ setting of (e.g.) auto wrap mode rather
+ * than only the default.
+ */
+ Config cfg;
+
+ /*
+ * from_backend calls term_out, but it can also be called from
+ * the ldisc if the ldisc is called _within_ term_out. So we
+ * have to guard against re-entrancy - if from_backend is
+ * called recursively like this, it will simply add data to the
+ * end of the buffer term_out is in the process of working
+ * through.
+ */
+ int in_term_out;
+
+ /*
+ * We schedule a window update shortly after receiving terminal
+ * data. This tracks whether one is currently pending.
+ */
+ int window_update_pending;
+ long next_update;
+
+ /*
+ * Track pending blinks and tblinks.
+ */
+ int tblink_pending, cblink_pending;
+ long next_tblink, next_cblink;
+
+ /*
+ * These are buffers used by the bidi and Arabic shaping code.
+ */
+ termchar *ltemp;
+ int ltemp_size;
+ bidi_char *wcFrom, *wcTo;
+ int wcFromTo_size;
+ struct bidi_cache_entry *pre_bidi_cache, *post_bidi_cache;
+ int bidi_cache_size;
+};
+
+#define in_utf(term) ((term)->utf || (term)->ucsdata->line_codepage==CP_UTF8)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/time.c b/tools/plink/time.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d873d44cc --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/time.c @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/*
+ * Portable implementation of ltime() for any ISO-C platform where
+ * time_t behaves. (In practice, we've found that platforms such as
+ * Windows and Mac have needed their own specialised implementations.)
+ */
+
+#include <time.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+struct tm ltime(void)
+{
+ time_t t;
+ time(&t);
+ assert (t != ((time_t)-1));
+ return *localtime(&t);
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/timing.c b/tools/plink/timing.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2b7b70cb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/timing.c @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/*
+ * timing.c
+ *
+ * This module tracks any timers set up by schedule_timer(). It
+ * keeps all the currently active timers in a list; it informs the
+ * front end of when the next timer is due to go off if that
+ * changes; and, very importantly, it tracks the context pointers
+ * passed to schedule_timer(), so that if a context is freed all
+ * the timers associated with it can be immediately annulled.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+
+struct timer {
+ timer_fn_t fn;
+ void *ctx;
+ long now;
+};
+
+static tree234 *timers = NULL;
+static tree234 *timer_contexts = NULL;
+static long now = 0L;
+
+static int compare_timers(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct timer *a = (struct timer *)av;
+ struct timer *b = (struct timer *)bv;
+ long at = a->now - now;
+ long bt = b->now - now;
+
+ if (at < bt)
+ return -1;
+ else if (at > bt)
+ return +1;
+
+ /*
+ * Failing that, compare on the other two fields, just so that
+ * we don't get unwanted equality.
+ */
+#ifdef __LCC__
+ /* lcc won't let us compare function pointers. Legal, but annoying. */
+ {
+ int c = memcmp(&a->fn, &b->fn, sizeof(a->fn));
+ if (c < 0)
+ return -1;
+ else if (c > 0)
+ return +1;
+ }
+#else
+ if (a->fn < b->fn)
+ return -1;
+ else if (a->fn > b->fn)
+ return +1;
+#endif
+
+ if (a->ctx < b->ctx)
+ return -1;
+ else if (a->ctx > b->ctx)
+ return +1;
+
+ /*
+ * Failing _that_, the two entries genuinely are equal, and we
+ * never have a need to store them separately in the tree.
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int compare_timer_contexts(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ char *a = (char *)av;
+ char *b = (char *)bv;
+ if (a < b)
+ return -1;
+ else if (a > b)
+ return +1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void init_timers(void)
+{
+ if (!timers) {
+ timers = newtree234(compare_timers);
+ timer_contexts = newtree234(compare_timer_contexts);
+ now = GETTICKCOUNT();
+ }
+}
+
+long schedule_timer(int ticks, timer_fn_t fn, void *ctx)
+{
+ long when;
+ struct timer *t, *first;
+
+ init_timers();
+
+ when = ticks + GETTICKCOUNT();
+
+ /*
+ * Just in case our various defences against timing skew fail
+ * us: if we try to schedule a timer that's already in the
+ * past, we instead schedule it for the immediate future.
+ */
+ if (when - now <= 0)
+ when = now + 1;
+
+ t = snew(struct timer);
+ t->fn = fn;
+ t->ctx = ctx;
+ t->now = when;
+
+ if (t != add234(timers, t)) {
+ sfree(t); /* identical timer already exists */
+ } else {
+ add234(timer_contexts, t->ctx);/* don't care if this fails */
+ }
+
+ first = (struct timer *)index234(timers, 0);
+ if (first == t) {
+ /*
+ * This timer is the very first on the list, so we must
+ * notify the front end.
+ */
+ timer_change_notify(first->now);
+ }
+
+ return when;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call to run any timers whose time has reached the present.
+ * Returns the time (in ticks) expected until the next timer after
+ * that triggers.
+ */
+int run_timers(long anow, long *next)
+{
+ struct timer *first;
+
+ init_timers();
+
+#ifdef TIMING_SYNC
+ /*
+ * In this ifdef I put some code which deals with the
+ * possibility that `anow' disagrees with GETTICKCOUNT by a
+ * significant margin. Our strategy for dealing with it differs
+ * depending on platform, because on some platforms
+ * GETTICKCOUNT is more likely to be right whereas on others
+ * `anow' is a better gold standard.
+ */
+ {
+ long tnow = GETTICKCOUNT();
+
+ if (tnow + TICKSPERSEC/50 - anow < 0 ||
+ anow + TICKSPERSEC/50 - tnow < 0
+ ) {
+#if defined TIMING_SYNC_ANOW
+ /*
+ * If anow is accurate and the tick count is wrong,
+ * this is likely to be because the tick count is
+ * derived from the system clock which has changed (as
+ * can occur on Unix). Therefore, we resolve this by
+ * inventing an offset which is used to adjust all
+ * future output from GETTICKCOUNT.
+ *
+ * A platform which defines TIMING_SYNC_ANOW is
+ * expected to have also defined this offset variable
+ * in (its platform-specific adjunct to) putty.h.
+ * Therefore we can simply reference it here and assume
+ * that it will exist.
+ */
+ tickcount_offset += anow - tnow;
+#elif defined TIMING_SYNC_TICKCOUNT
+ /*
+ * If the tick count is more likely to be accurate, we
+ * simply use that as our time value, which may mean we
+ * run no timers in this call (because we got called
+ * early), or alternatively it may mean we run lots of
+ * timers in a hurry because we were called late.
+ */
+ anow = tnow;
+#else
+/*
+ * Any platform which defines TIMING_SYNC must also define one of the two
+ * auxiliary symbols TIMING_SYNC_ANOW and TIMING_SYNC_TICKCOUNT, to
+ * indicate which measurement to trust when the two disagree.
+ */
+#error TIMING_SYNC definition incomplete
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ now = anow;
+
+ while (1) {
+ first = (struct timer *)index234(timers, 0);
+
+ if (!first)
+ return FALSE; /* no timers remaining */
+
+ if (find234(timer_contexts, first->ctx, NULL) == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This timer belongs to a context that has been
+ * expired. Delete it without running.
+ */
+ delpos234(timers, 0);
+ sfree(first);
+ } else if (first->now - now <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * This timer is active and has reached its running
+ * time. Run it.
+ */
+ delpos234(timers, 0);
+ first->fn(first->ctx, first->now);
+ sfree(first);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * This is the first still-active timer that is in the
+ * future. Return how long it has yet to go.
+ */
+ *next = first->now;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call to expire all timers associated with a given context.
+ */
+void expire_timer_context(void *ctx)
+{
+ init_timers();
+
+ /*
+ * We don't bother to check the return value; if the context
+ * already wasn't in the tree (presumably because no timers
+ * ever actually got scheduled for it) then that's fine and we
+ * simply don't need to do anything.
+ */
+ del234(timer_contexts, ctx);
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/tree234.c b/tools/plink/tree234.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e2da9dd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/tree234.c @@ -0,0 +1,1479 @@ +/*
+ * tree234.c: reasonably generic counted 2-3-4 tree routines.
+ *
+ * This file is copyright 1999-2001 Simon Tatham.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
+ * obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
+ * files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
+ * restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
+ * copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+ * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
+ * Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
+ * conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL SIMON TATHAM BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF
+ * CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "puttymem.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+
+#ifdef TEST
+#define LOG(x) (printf x)
+#else
+#define LOG(x)
+#endif
+
+typedef struct node234_Tag node234;
+
+struct tree234_Tag {
+ node234 *root;
+ cmpfn234 cmp;
+};
+
+struct node234_Tag {
+ node234 *parent;
+ node234 *kids[4];
+ int counts[4];
+ void *elems[3];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Create a 2-3-4 tree.
+ */
+tree234 *newtree234(cmpfn234 cmp)
+{
+ tree234 *ret = snew(tree234);
+ LOG(("created tree %p\n", ret));
+ ret->root = NULL;
+ ret->cmp = cmp;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a 2-3-4 tree (not including freeing the elements).
+ */
+static void freenode234(node234 * n)
+{
+ if (!n)
+ return;
+ freenode234(n->kids[0]);
+ freenode234(n->kids[1]);
+ freenode234(n->kids[2]);
+ freenode234(n->kids[3]);
+ sfree(n);
+}
+
+void freetree234(tree234 * t)
+{
+ freenode234(t->root);
+ sfree(t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Internal function to count a node.
+ */
+static int countnode234(node234 * n)
+{
+ int count = 0;
+ int i;
+ if (!n)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ count += n->counts[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ if (n->elems[i])
+ count++;
+ return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Count the elements in a tree.
+ */
+int count234(tree234 * t)
+{
+ if (t->root)
+ return countnode234(t->root);
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add an element e to a 2-3-4 tree t. Returns e on success, or if
+ * an existing element compares equal, returns that.
+ */
+static void *add234_internal(tree234 * t, void *e, int index)
+{
+ node234 *n, **np, *left, *right;
+ void *orig_e = e;
+ int c, lcount, rcount;
+
+ LOG(("adding node %p to tree %p\n", e, t));
+ if (t->root == NULL) {
+ t->root = snew(node234);
+ t->root->elems[1] = t->root->elems[2] = NULL;
+ t->root->kids[0] = t->root->kids[1] = NULL;
+ t->root->kids[2] = t->root->kids[3] = NULL;
+ t->root->counts[0] = t->root->counts[1] = 0;
+ t->root->counts[2] = t->root->counts[3] = 0;
+ t->root->parent = NULL;
+ t->root->elems[0] = e;
+ LOG((" created root %p\n", t->root));
+ return orig_e;
+ }
+
+ n = NULL; /* placate gcc; will always be set below since t->root != NULL */
+ np = &t->root;
+ while (*np) {
+ int childnum;
+ n = *np;
+ LOG((" node %p: %p/%d [%p] %p/%d [%p] %p/%d [%p] %p/%d\n",
+ n,
+ n->kids[0], n->counts[0], n->elems[0],
+ n->kids[1], n->counts[1], n->elems[1],
+ n->kids[2], n->counts[2], n->elems[2],
+ n->kids[3], n->counts[3]));
+ if (index >= 0) {
+ if (!n->kids[0]) {
+ /*
+ * Leaf node. We want to insert at kid position
+ * equal to the index:
+ *
+ * 0 A 1 B 2 C 3
+ */
+ childnum = index;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Internal node. We always descend through it (add
+ * always starts at the bottom, never in the
+ * middle).
+ */
+ do { /* this is a do ... while (0) to allow `break' */
+ if (index <= n->counts[0]) {
+ childnum = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ index -= n->counts[0] + 1;
+ if (index <= n->counts[1]) {
+ childnum = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ index -= n->counts[1] + 1;
+ if (index <= n->counts[2]) {
+ childnum = 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ index -= n->counts[2] + 1;
+ if (index <= n->counts[3]) {
+ childnum = 3;
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL; /* error: index out of range */
+ } while (0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((c = t->cmp(e, n->elems[0])) < 0)
+ childnum = 0;
+ else if (c == 0)
+ return n->elems[0]; /* already exists */
+ else if (n->elems[1] == NULL
+ || (c = t->cmp(e, n->elems[1])) < 0) childnum = 1;
+ else if (c == 0)
+ return n->elems[1]; /* already exists */
+ else if (n->elems[2] == NULL
+ || (c = t->cmp(e, n->elems[2])) < 0) childnum = 2;
+ else if (c == 0)
+ return n->elems[2]; /* already exists */
+ else
+ childnum = 3;
+ }
+ np = &n->kids[childnum];
+ LOG((" moving to child %d (%p)\n", childnum, *np));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to insert the new element in n at position np.
+ */
+ left = NULL;
+ lcount = 0;
+ right = NULL;
+ rcount = 0;
+ while (n) {
+ LOG((" at %p: %p/%d [%p] %p/%d [%p] %p/%d [%p] %p/%d\n",
+ n,
+ n->kids[0], n->counts[0], n->elems[0],
+ n->kids[1], n->counts[1], n->elems[1],
+ n->kids[2], n->counts[2], n->elems[2],
+ n->kids[3], n->counts[3]));
+ LOG((" need to insert %p/%d [%p] %p/%d at position %d\n",
+ left, lcount, e, right, rcount, np - n->kids));
+ if (n->elems[1] == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Insert in a 2-node; simple.
+ */
+ if (np == &n->kids[0]) {
+ LOG((" inserting on left of 2-node\n"));
+ n->kids[2] = n->kids[1];
+ n->counts[2] = n->counts[1];
+ n->elems[1] = n->elems[0];
+ n->kids[1] = right;
+ n->counts[1] = rcount;
+ n->elems[0] = e;
+ n->kids[0] = left;
+ n->counts[0] = lcount;
+ } else { /* np == &n->kids[1] */
+ LOG((" inserting on right of 2-node\n"));
+ n->kids[2] = right;
+ n->counts[2] = rcount;
+ n->elems[1] = e;
+ n->kids[1] = left;
+ n->counts[1] = lcount;
+ }
+ if (n->kids[0])
+ n->kids[0]->parent = n;
+ if (n->kids[1])
+ n->kids[1]->parent = n;
+ if (n->kids[2])
+ n->kids[2]->parent = n;
+ LOG((" done\n"));
+ break;
+ } else if (n->elems[2] == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Insert in a 3-node; simple.
+ */
+ if (np == &n->kids[0]) {
+ LOG((" inserting on left of 3-node\n"));
+ n->kids[3] = n->kids[2];
+ n->counts[3] = n->counts[2];
+ n->elems[2] = n->elems[1];
+ n->kids[2] = n->kids[1];
+ n->counts[2] = n->counts[1];
+ n->elems[1] = n->elems[0];
+ n->kids[1] = right;
+ n->counts[1] = rcount;
+ n->elems[0] = e;
+ n->kids[0] = left;
+ n->counts[0] = lcount;
+ } else if (np == &n->kids[1]) {
+ LOG((" inserting in middle of 3-node\n"));
+ n->kids[3] = n->kids[2];
+ n->counts[3] = n->counts[2];
+ n->elems[2] = n->elems[1];
+ n->kids[2] = right;
+ n->counts[2] = rcount;
+ n->elems[1] = e;
+ n->kids[1] = left;
+ n->counts[1] = lcount;
+ } else { /* np == &n->kids[2] */
+ LOG((" inserting on right of 3-node\n"));
+ n->kids[3] = right;
+ n->counts[3] = rcount;
+ n->elems[2] = e;
+ n->kids[2] = left;
+ n->counts[2] = lcount;
+ }
+ if (n->kids[0])
+ n->kids[0]->parent = n;
+ if (n->kids[1])
+ n->kids[1]->parent = n;
+ if (n->kids[2])
+ n->kids[2]->parent = n;
+ if (n->kids[3])
+ n->kids[3]->parent = n;
+ LOG((" done\n"));
+ break;
+ } else {
+ node234 *m = snew(node234);
+ m->parent = n->parent;
+ LOG((" splitting a 4-node; created new node %p\n", m));
+ /*
+ * Insert in a 4-node; split into a 2-node and a
+ * 3-node, and move focus up a level.
+ *
+ * I don't think it matters which way round we put the
+ * 2 and the 3. For simplicity, we'll put the 3 first
+ * always.
+ */
+ if (np == &n->kids[0]) {
+ m->kids[0] = left;
+ m->counts[0] = lcount;
+ m->elems[0] = e;
+ m->kids[1] = right;
+ m->counts[1] = rcount;
+ m->elems[1] = n->elems[0];
+ m->kids[2] = n->kids[1];
+ m->counts[2] = n->counts[1];
+ e = n->elems[1];
+ n->kids[0] = n->kids[2];
+ n->counts[0] = n->counts[2];
+ n->elems[0] = n->elems[2];
+ n->kids[1] = n->kids[3];
+ n->counts[1] = n->counts[3];
+ } else if (np == &n->kids[1]) {
+ m->kids[0] = n->kids[0];
+ m->counts[0] = n->counts[0];
+ m->elems[0] = n->elems[0];
+ m->kids[1] = left;
+ m->counts[1] = lcount;
+ m->elems[1] = e;
+ m->kids[2] = right;
+ m->counts[2] = rcount;
+ e = n->elems[1];
+ n->kids[0] = n->kids[2];
+ n->counts[0] = n->counts[2];
+ n->elems[0] = n->elems[2];
+ n->kids[1] = n->kids[3];
+ n->counts[1] = n->counts[3];
+ } else if (np == &n->kids[2]) {
+ m->kids[0] = n->kids[0];
+ m->counts[0] = n->counts[0];
+ m->elems[0] = n->elems[0];
+ m->kids[1] = n->kids[1];
+ m->counts[1] = n->counts[1];
+ m->elems[1] = n->elems[1];
+ m->kids[2] = left;
+ m->counts[2] = lcount;
+ /* e = e; */
+ n->kids[0] = right;
+ n->counts[0] = rcount;
+ n->elems[0] = n->elems[2];
+ n->kids[1] = n->kids[3];
+ n->counts[1] = n->counts[3];
+ } else { /* np == &n->kids[3] */
+ m->kids[0] = n->kids[0];
+ m->counts[0] = n->counts[0];
+ m->elems[0] = n->elems[0];
+ m->kids[1] = n->kids[1];
+ m->counts[1] = n->counts[1];
+ m->elems[1] = n->elems[1];
+ m->kids[2] = n->kids[2];
+ m->counts[2] = n->counts[2];
+ n->kids[0] = left;
+ n->counts[0] = lcount;
+ n->elems[0] = e;
+ n->kids[1] = right;
+ n->counts[1] = rcount;
+ e = n->elems[2];
+ }
+ m->kids[3] = n->kids[3] = n->kids[2] = NULL;
+ m->counts[3] = n->counts[3] = n->counts[2] = 0;
+ m->elems[2] = n->elems[2] = n->elems[1] = NULL;
+ if (m->kids[0])
+ m->kids[0]->parent = m;
+ if (m->kids[1])
+ m->kids[1]->parent = m;
+ if (m->kids[2])
+ m->kids[2]->parent = m;
+ if (n->kids[0])
+ n->kids[0]->parent = n;
+ if (n->kids[1])
+ n->kids[1]->parent = n;
+ LOG((" left (%p): %p/%d [%p] %p/%d [%p] %p/%d\n", m,
+ m->kids[0], m->counts[0], m->elems[0],
+ m->kids[1], m->counts[1], m->elems[1],
+ m->kids[2], m->counts[2]));
+ LOG((" right (%p): %p/%d [%p] %p/%d\n", n,
+ n->kids[0], n->counts[0], n->elems[0],
+ n->kids[1], n->counts[1]));
+ left = m;
+ lcount = countnode234(left);
+ right = n;
+ rcount = countnode234(right);
+ }
+ if (n->parent)
+ np = (n->parent->kids[0] == n ? &n->parent->kids[0] :
+ n->parent->kids[1] == n ? &n->parent->kids[1] :
+ n->parent->kids[2] == n ? &n->parent->kids[2] :
+ &n->parent->kids[3]);
+ n = n->parent;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we've come out of here by `break', n will still be
+ * non-NULL and all we need to do is go back up the tree
+ * updating counts. If we've come here because n is NULL, we
+ * need to create a new root for the tree because the old one
+ * has just split into two. */
+ if (n) {
+ while (n->parent) {
+ int count = countnode234(n);
+ int childnum;
+ childnum = (n->parent->kids[0] == n ? 0 :
+ n->parent->kids[1] == n ? 1 :
+ n->parent->kids[2] == n ? 2 : 3);
+ n->parent->counts[childnum] = count;
+ n = n->parent;
+ }
+ } else {
+ LOG((" root is overloaded, split into two\n"));
+ t->root = snew(node234);
+ t->root->kids[0] = left;
+ t->root->counts[0] = lcount;
+ t->root->elems[0] = e;
+ t->root->kids[1] = right;
+ t->root->counts[1] = rcount;
+ t->root->elems[1] = NULL;
+ t->root->kids[2] = NULL;
+ t->root->counts[2] = 0;
+ t->root->elems[2] = NULL;
+ t->root->kids[3] = NULL;
+ t->root->counts[3] = 0;
+ t->root->parent = NULL;
+ if (t->root->kids[0])
+ t->root->kids[0]->parent = t->root;
+ if (t->root->kids[1])
+ t->root->kids[1]->parent = t->root;
+ LOG((" new root is %p/%d [%p] %p/%d\n",
+ t->root->kids[0], t->root->counts[0],
+ t->root->elems[0], t->root->kids[1], t->root->counts[1]));
+ }
+
+ return orig_e;
+}
+
+void *add234(tree234 * t, void *e)
+{
+ if (!t->cmp) /* tree is unsorted */
+ return NULL;
+
+ return add234_internal(t, e, -1);
+}
+void *addpos234(tree234 * t, void *e, int index)
+{
+ if (index < 0 || /* index out of range */
+ t->cmp) /* tree is sorted */
+ return NULL; /* return failure */
+
+ return add234_internal(t, e, index); /* this checks the upper bound */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look up the element at a given numeric index in a 2-3-4 tree.
+ * Returns NULL if the index is out of range.
+ */
+void *index234(tree234 * t, int index)
+{
+ node234 *n;
+
+ if (!t->root)
+ return NULL; /* tree is empty */
+
+ if (index < 0 || index >= countnode234(t->root))
+ return NULL; /* out of range */
+
+ n = t->root;
+
+ while (n) {
+ if (index < n->counts[0])
+ n = n->kids[0];
+ else if (index -= n->counts[0] + 1, index < 0)
+ return n->elems[0];
+ else if (index < n->counts[1])
+ n = n->kids[1];
+ else if (index -= n->counts[1] + 1, index < 0)
+ return n->elems[1];
+ else if (index < n->counts[2])
+ n = n->kids[2];
+ else if (index -= n->counts[2] + 1, index < 0)
+ return n->elems[2];
+ else
+ n = n->kids[3];
+ }
+
+ /* We shouldn't ever get here. I wonder how we did. */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find an element e in a sorted 2-3-4 tree t. Returns NULL if not
+ * found. e is always passed as the first argument to cmp, so cmp
+ * can be an asymmetric function if desired. cmp can also be passed
+ * as NULL, in which case the compare function from the tree proper
+ * will be used.
+ */
+void *findrelpos234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp,
+ int relation, int *index)
+{
+ node234 *n;
+ void *ret;
+ int c;
+ int idx, ecount, kcount, cmpret;
+
+ if (t->root == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (cmp == NULL)
+ cmp = t->cmp;
+
+ n = t->root;
+ /*
+ * Attempt to find the element itself.
+ */
+ idx = 0;
+ ecount = -1;
+ /*
+ * Prepare a fake `cmp' result if e is NULL.
+ */
+ cmpret = 0;
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ assert(relation == REL234_LT || relation == REL234_GT);
+ if (relation == REL234_LT)
+ cmpret = +1; /* e is a max: always greater */
+ else if (relation == REL234_GT)
+ cmpret = -1; /* e is a min: always smaller */
+ }
+ while (1) {
+ for (kcount = 0; kcount < 4; kcount++) {
+ if (kcount >= 3 || n->elems[kcount] == NULL ||
+ (c = cmpret ? cmpret : cmp(e, n->elems[kcount])) < 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (n->kids[kcount])
+ idx += n->counts[kcount];
+ if (c == 0) {
+ ecount = kcount;
+ break;
+ }
+ idx++;
+ }
+ if (ecount >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (n->kids[kcount])
+ n = n->kids[kcount];
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ecount >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * We have found the element we're looking for. It's
+ * n->elems[ecount], at tree index idx. If our search
+ * relation is EQ, LE or GE we can now go home.
+ */
+ if (relation != REL234_LT && relation != REL234_GT) {
+ if (index)
+ *index = idx;
+ return n->elems[ecount];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, we'll do an indexed lookup for the previous
+ * or next element. (It would be perfectly possible to
+ * implement these search types in a non-counted tree by
+ * going back up from where we are, but far more fiddly.)
+ */
+ if (relation == REL234_LT)
+ idx--;
+ else
+ idx++;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We've found our way to the bottom of the tree and we
+ * know where we would insert this node if we wanted to:
+ * we'd put it in in place of the (empty) subtree
+ * n->kids[kcount], and it would have index idx
+ *
+ * But the actual element isn't there. So if our search
+ * relation is EQ, we're doomed.
+ */
+ if (relation == REL234_EQ)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, we must do an index lookup for index idx-1
+ * (if we're going left - LE or LT) or index idx (if we're
+ * going right - GE or GT).
+ */
+ if (relation == REL234_LT || relation == REL234_LE) {
+ idx--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We know the index of the element we want; just call index234
+ * to do the rest. This will return NULL if the index is out of
+ * bounds, which is exactly what we want.
+ */
+ ret = index234(t, idx);
+ if (ret && index)
+ *index = idx;
+ return ret;
+}
+void *find234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp)
+{
+ return findrelpos234(t, e, cmp, REL234_EQ, NULL);
+}
+void *findrel234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp, int relation)
+{
+ return findrelpos234(t, e, cmp, relation, NULL);
+}
+void *findpos234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp, int *index)
+{
+ return findrelpos234(t, e, cmp, REL234_EQ, index);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delete an element e in a 2-3-4 tree. Does not free the element,
+ * merely removes all links to it from the tree nodes.
+ */
+static void *delpos234_internal(tree234 * t, int index)
+{
+ node234 *n;
+ void *retval;
+ int ei = -1;
+
+ retval = 0;
+
+ n = t->root;
+ LOG(("deleting item %d from tree %p\n", index, t));
+ while (1) {
+ while (n) {
+ int ki;
+ node234 *sub;
+
+ LOG(
+ (" node %p: %p/%d [%p] %p/%d [%p] %p/%d [%p] %p/%d index=%d\n",
+ n, n->kids[0], n->counts[0], n->elems[0], n->kids[1],
+ n->counts[1], n->elems[1], n->kids[2], n->counts[2],
+ n->elems[2], n->kids[3], n->counts[3], index));
+ if (index < n->counts[0]) {
+ ki = 0;
+ } else if (index -= n->counts[0] + 1, index < 0) {
+ ei = 0;
+ break;
+ } else if (index < n->counts[1]) {
+ ki = 1;
+ } else if (index -= n->counts[1] + 1, index < 0) {
+ ei = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (index < n->counts[2]) {
+ ki = 2;
+ } else if (index -= n->counts[2] + 1, index < 0) {
+ ei = 2;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ ki = 3;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Recurse down to subtree ki. If it has only one element,
+ * we have to do some transformation to start with.
+ */
+ LOG((" moving to subtree %d\n", ki));
+ sub = n->kids[ki];
+ if (!sub->elems[1]) {
+ LOG((" subtree has only one element!\n", ki));
+ if (ki > 0 && n->kids[ki - 1]->elems[1]) {
+ /*
+ * Case 3a, left-handed variant. Child ki has
+ * only one element, but child ki-1 has two or
+ * more. So we need to move a subtree from ki-1
+ * to ki.
+ *
+ * . C . . B .
+ * / \ -> / \
+ * [more] a A b B c d D e [more] a A b c C d D e
+ */
+ node234 *sib = n->kids[ki - 1];
+ int lastelem = (sib->elems[2] ? 2 :
+ sib->elems[1] ? 1 : 0);
+ sub->kids[2] = sub->kids[1];
+ sub->counts[2] = sub->counts[1];
+ sub->elems[1] = sub->elems[0];
+ sub->kids[1] = sub->kids[0];
+ sub->counts[1] = sub->counts[0];
+ sub->elems[0] = n->elems[ki - 1];
+ sub->kids[0] = sib->kids[lastelem + 1];
+ sub->counts[0] = sib->counts[lastelem + 1];
+ if (sub->kids[0])
+ sub->kids[0]->parent = sub;
+ n->elems[ki - 1] = sib->elems[lastelem];
+ sib->kids[lastelem + 1] = NULL;
+ sib->counts[lastelem + 1] = 0;
+ sib->elems[lastelem] = NULL;
+ n->counts[ki] = countnode234(sub);
+ LOG((" case 3a left\n"));
+ LOG(
+ (" index and left subtree count before adjustment: %d, %d\n",
+ index, n->counts[ki - 1]));
+ index += n->counts[ki - 1];
+ n->counts[ki - 1] = countnode234(sib);
+ index -= n->counts[ki - 1];
+ LOG(
+ (" index and left subtree count after adjustment: %d, %d\n",
+ index, n->counts[ki - 1]));
+ } else if (ki < 3 && n->kids[ki + 1]
+ && n->kids[ki + 1]->elems[1]) {
+ /*
+ * Case 3a, right-handed variant. ki has only
+ * one element but ki+1 has two or more. Move a
+ * subtree from ki+1 to ki.
+ *
+ * . B . . C .
+ * / \ -> / \
+ * a A b c C d D e [more] a A b B c d D e [more]
+ */
+ node234 *sib = n->kids[ki + 1];
+ int j;
+ sub->elems[1] = n->elems[ki];
+ sub->kids[2] = sib->kids[0];
+ sub->counts[2] = sib->counts[0];
+ if (sub->kids[2])
+ sub->kids[2]->parent = sub;
+ n->elems[ki] = sib->elems[0];
+ sib->kids[0] = sib->kids[1];
+ sib->counts[0] = sib->counts[1];
+ for (j = 0; j < 2 && sib->elems[j + 1]; j++) {
+ sib->kids[j + 1] = sib->kids[j + 2];
+ sib->counts[j + 1] = sib->counts[j + 2];
+ sib->elems[j] = sib->elems[j + 1];
+ }
+ sib->kids[j + 1] = NULL;
+ sib->counts[j + 1] = 0;
+ sib->elems[j] = NULL;
+ n->counts[ki] = countnode234(sub);
+ n->counts[ki + 1] = countnode234(sib);
+ LOG((" case 3a right\n"));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Case 3b. ki has only one element, and has no
+ * neighbour with more than one. So pick a
+ * neighbour and merge it with ki, taking an
+ * element down from n to go in the middle.
+ *
+ * . B . .
+ * / \ -> |
+ * a A b c C d a A b B c C d
+ *
+ * (Since at all points we have avoided
+ * descending to a node with only one element,
+ * we can be sure that n is not reduced to
+ * nothingness by this move, _unless_ it was
+ * the very first node, ie the root of the
+ * tree. In that case we remove the now-empty
+ * root and replace it with its single large
+ * child as shown.)
+ */
+ node234 *sib;
+ int j;
+
+ if (ki > 0) {
+ ki--;
+ index += n->counts[ki] + 1;
+ }
+ sib = n->kids[ki];
+ sub = n->kids[ki + 1];
+
+ sub->kids[3] = sub->kids[1];
+ sub->counts[3] = sub->counts[1];
+ sub->elems[2] = sub->elems[0];
+ sub->kids[2] = sub->kids[0];
+ sub->counts[2] = sub->counts[0];
+ sub->elems[1] = n->elems[ki];
+ sub->kids[1] = sib->kids[1];
+ sub->counts[1] = sib->counts[1];
+ if (sub->kids[1])
+ sub->kids[1]->parent = sub;
+ sub->elems[0] = sib->elems[0];
+ sub->kids[0] = sib->kids[0];
+ sub->counts[0] = sib->counts[0];
+ if (sub->kids[0])
+ sub->kids[0]->parent = sub;
+
+ n->counts[ki + 1] = countnode234(sub);
+
+ sfree(sib);
+
+ /*
+ * That's built the big node in sub. Now we
+ * need to remove the reference to sib in n.
+ */
+ for (j = ki; j < 3 && n->kids[j + 1]; j++) {
+ n->kids[j] = n->kids[j + 1];
+ n->counts[j] = n->counts[j + 1];
+ n->elems[j] = j < 2 ? n->elems[j + 1] : NULL;
+ }
+ n->kids[j] = NULL;
+ n->counts[j] = 0;
+ if (j < 3)
+ n->elems[j] = NULL;
+ LOG((" case 3b ki=%d\n", ki));
+
+ if (!n->elems[0]) {
+ /*
+ * The root is empty and needs to be
+ * removed.
+ */
+ LOG((" shifting root!\n"));
+ t->root = sub;
+ sub->parent = NULL;
+ sfree(n);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ n = sub;
+ }
+ if (!retval)
+ retval = n->elems[ei];
+
+ if (ei == -1)
+ return NULL; /* although this shouldn't happen */
+
+ /*
+ * Treat special case: this is the one remaining item in
+ * the tree. n is the tree root (no parent), has one
+ * element (no elems[1]), and has no kids (no kids[0]).
+ */
+ if (!n->parent && !n->elems[1] && !n->kids[0]) {
+ LOG((" removed last element in tree\n"));
+ sfree(n);
+ t->root = NULL;
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have the element we want, as n->elems[ei], and we
+ * have also arranged for that element not to be the only
+ * one in its node. So...
+ */
+
+ if (!n->kids[0] && n->elems[1]) {
+ /*
+ * Case 1. n is a leaf node with more than one element,
+ * so it's _really easy_. Just delete the thing and
+ * we're done.
+ */
+ int i;
+ LOG((" case 1\n"));
+ for (i = ei; i < 2 && n->elems[i + 1]; i++)
+ n->elems[i] = n->elems[i + 1];
+ n->elems[i] = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Having done that to the leaf node, we now go back up
+ * the tree fixing the counts.
+ */
+ while (n->parent) {
+ int childnum;
+ childnum = (n->parent->kids[0] == n ? 0 :
+ n->parent->kids[1] == n ? 1 :
+ n->parent->kids[2] == n ? 2 : 3);
+ n->parent->counts[childnum]--;
+ n = n->parent;
+ }
+ return retval; /* finished! */
+ } else if (n->kids[ei]->elems[1]) {
+ /*
+ * Case 2a. n is an internal node, and the root of the
+ * subtree to the left of e has more than one element.
+ * So find the predecessor p to e (ie the largest node
+ * in that subtree), place it where e currently is, and
+ * then start the deletion process over again on the
+ * subtree with p as target.
+ */
+ node234 *m = n->kids[ei];
+ void *target;
+ LOG((" case 2a\n"));
+ while (m->kids[0]) {
+ m = (m->kids[3] ? m->kids[3] :
+ m->kids[2] ? m->kids[2] :
+ m->kids[1] ? m->kids[1] : m->kids[0]);
+ }
+ target = (m->elems[2] ? m->elems[2] :
+ m->elems[1] ? m->elems[1] : m->elems[0]);
+ n->elems[ei] = target;
+ index = n->counts[ei] - 1;
+ n = n->kids[ei];
+ } else if (n->kids[ei + 1]->elems[1]) {
+ /*
+ * Case 2b, symmetric to 2a but s/left/right/ and
+ * s/predecessor/successor/. (And s/largest/smallest/).
+ */
+ node234 *m = n->kids[ei + 1];
+ void *target;
+ LOG((" case 2b\n"));
+ while (m->kids[0]) {
+ m = m->kids[0];
+ }
+ target = m->elems[0];
+ n->elems[ei] = target;
+ n = n->kids[ei + 1];
+ index = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Case 2c. n is an internal node, and the subtrees to
+ * the left and right of e both have only one element.
+ * So combine the two subnodes into a single big node
+ * with their own elements on the left and right and e
+ * in the middle, then restart the deletion process on
+ * that subtree, with e still as target.
+ */
+ node234 *a = n->kids[ei], *b = n->kids[ei + 1];
+ int j;
+
+ LOG((" case 2c\n"));
+ a->elems[1] = n->elems[ei];
+ a->kids[2] = b->kids[0];
+ a->counts[2] = b->counts[0];
+ if (a->kids[2])
+ a->kids[2]->parent = a;
+ a->elems[2] = b->elems[0];
+ a->kids[3] = b->kids[1];
+ a->counts[3] = b->counts[1];
+ if (a->kids[3])
+ a->kids[3]->parent = a;
+ sfree(b);
+ n->counts[ei] = countnode234(a);
+ /*
+ * That's built the big node in a, and destroyed b. Now
+ * remove the reference to b (and e) in n.
+ */
+ for (j = ei; j < 2 && n->elems[j + 1]; j++) {
+ n->elems[j] = n->elems[j + 1];
+ n->kids[j + 1] = n->kids[j + 2];
+ n->counts[j + 1] = n->counts[j + 2];
+ }
+ n->elems[j] = NULL;
+ n->kids[j + 1] = NULL;
+ n->counts[j + 1] = 0;
+ /*
+ * It's possible, in this case, that we've just removed
+ * the only element in the root of the tree. If so,
+ * shift the root.
+ */
+ if (n->elems[0] == NULL) {
+ LOG((" shifting root!\n"));
+ t->root = a;
+ a->parent = NULL;
+ sfree(n);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now go round the deletion process again, with n
+ * pointing at the new big node and e still the same.
+ */
+ n = a;
+ index = a->counts[0] + a->counts[1] + 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+void *delpos234(tree234 * t, int index)
+{
+ if (index < 0 || index >= countnode234(t->root))
+ return NULL;
+ return delpos234_internal(t, index);
+}
+void *del234(tree234 * t, void *e)
+{
+ int index;
+ if (!findrelpos234(t, e, NULL, REL234_EQ, &index))
+ return NULL; /* it wasn't in there anyway */
+ return delpos234_internal(t, index); /* it's there; delete it. */
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+/*
+ * Test code for the 2-3-4 tree. This code maintains an alternative
+ * representation of the data in the tree, in an array (using the
+ * obvious and slow insert and delete functions). After each tree
+ * operation, the verify() function is called, which ensures all
+ * the tree properties are preserved:
+ * - node->child->parent always equals node
+ * - tree->root->parent always equals NULL
+ * - number of kids == 0 or number of elements + 1;
+ * - tree has the same depth everywhere
+ * - every node has at least one element
+ * - subtree element counts are accurate
+ * - any NULL kid pointer is accompanied by a zero count
+ * - in a sorted tree: ordering property between elements of a
+ * node and elements of its children is preserved
+ * and also ensures the list represented by the tree is the same
+ * list it should be. (This last check also doubly verifies the
+ * ordering properties, because the `same list it should be' is by
+ * definition correctly ordered. It also ensures all nodes are
+ * distinct, because the enum functions would get caught in a loop
+ * if not.)
+ */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+/*
+ * Error reporting function.
+ */
+void error(char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ printf("ERROR: ");
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vfprintf(stdout, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+/* The array representation of the data. */
+void **array;
+int arraylen, arraysize;
+cmpfn234 cmp;
+
+/* The tree representation of the same data. */
+tree234 *tree;
+
+typedef struct {
+ int treedepth;
+ int elemcount;
+} chkctx;
+
+int chknode(chkctx * ctx, int level, node234 * node,
+ void *lowbound, void *highbound)
+{
+ int nkids, nelems;
+ int i;
+ int count;
+
+ /* Count the non-NULL kids. */
+ for (nkids = 0; nkids < 4 && node->kids[nkids]; nkids++);
+ /* Ensure no kids beyond the first NULL are non-NULL. */
+ for (i = nkids; i < 4; i++)
+ if (node->kids[i]) {
+ error("node %p: nkids=%d but kids[%d] non-NULL",
+ node, nkids, i);
+ } else if (node->counts[i]) {
+ error("node %p: kids[%d] NULL but count[%d]=%d nonzero",
+ node, i, i, node->counts[i]);
+ }
+
+ /* Count the non-NULL elements. */
+ for (nelems = 0; nelems < 3 && node->elems[nelems]; nelems++);
+ /* Ensure no elements beyond the first NULL are non-NULL. */
+ for (i = nelems; i < 3; i++)
+ if (node->elems[i]) {
+ error("node %p: nelems=%d but elems[%d] non-NULL",
+ node, nelems, i);
+ }
+
+ if (nkids == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If nkids==0, this is a leaf node; verify that the tree
+ * depth is the same everywhere.
+ */
+ if (ctx->treedepth < 0)
+ ctx->treedepth = level; /* we didn't know the depth yet */
+ else if (ctx->treedepth != level)
+ error("node %p: leaf at depth %d, previously seen depth %d",
+ node, level, ctx->treedepth);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If nkids != 0, then it should be nelems+1, unless nelems
+ * is 0 in which case nkids should also be 0 (and so we
+ * shouldn't be in this condition at all).
+ */
+ int shouldkids = (nelems ? nelems + 1 : 0);
+ if (nkids != shouldkids) {
+ error("node %p: %d elems should mean %d kids but has %d",
+ node, nelems, shouldkids, nkids);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * nelems should be at least 1.
+ */
+ if (nelems == 0) {
+ error("node %p: no elems", node, nkids);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add nelems to the running element count of the whole tree.
+ */
+ ctx->elemcount += nelems;
+
+ /*
+ * Check ordering property: all elements should be strictly >
+ * lowbound, strictly < highbound, and strictly < each other in
+ * sequence. (lowbound and highbound are NULL at edges of tree
+ * - both NULL at root node - and NULL is considered to be <
+ * everything and > everything. IYSWIM.)
+ */
+ if (cmp) {
+ for (i = -1; i < nelems; i++) {
+ void *lower = (i == -1 ? lowbound : node->elems[i]);
+ void *higher =
+ (i + 1 == nelems ? highbound : node->elems[i + 1]);
+ if (lower && higher && cmp(lower, higher) >= 0) {
+ error("node %p: kid comparison [%d=%s,%d=%s] failed",
+ node, i, lower, i + 1, higher);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check parent pointers: all non-NULL kids should have a
+ * parent pointer coming back to this node.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < nkids; i++)
+ if (node->kids[i]->parent != node) {
+ error("node %p kid %d: parent ptr is %p not %p",
+ node, i, node->kids[i]->parent, node);
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Now (finally!) recurse into subtrees.
+ */
+ count = nelems;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nkids; i++) {
+ void *lower = (i == 0 ? lowbound : node->elems[i - 1]);
+ void *higher = (i >= nelems ? highbound : node->elems[i]);
+ int subcount =
+ chknode(ctx, level + 1, node->kids[i], lower, higher);
+ if (node->counts[i] != subcount) {
+ error("node %p kid %d: count says %d, subtree really has %d",
+ node, i, node->counts[i], subcount);
+ }
+ count += subcount;
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+void verify(void)
+{
+ chkctx ctx;
+ int i;
+ void *p;
+
+ ctx.treedepth = -1; /* depth unknown yet */
+ ctx.elemcount = 0; /* no elements seen yet */
+ /*
+ * Verify validity of tree properties.
+ */
+ if (tree->root) {
+ if (tree->root->parent != NULL)
+ error("root->parent is %p should be null", tree->root->parent);
+ chknode(&ctx, 0, tree->root, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ printf("tree depth: %d\n", ctx.treedepth);
+ /*
+ * Enumerate the tree and ensure it matches up to the array.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; NULL != (p = index234(tree, i)); i++) {
+ if (i >= arraylen)
+ error("tree contains more than %d elements", arraylen);
+ if (array[i] != p)
+ error("enum at position %d: array says %s, tree says %s",
+ i, array[i], p);
+ }
+ if (ctx.elemcount != i) {
+ error("tree really contains %d elements, enum gave %d",
+ ctx.elemcount, i);
+ }
+ if (i < arraylen) {
+ error("enum gave only %d elements, array has %d", i, arraylen);
+ }
+ i = count234(tree);
+ if (ctx.elemcount != i) {
+ error("tree really contains %d elements, count234 gave %d",
+ ctx.elemcount, i);
+ }
+}
+
+void internal_addtest(void *elem, int index, void *realret)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ void *retval;
+
+ if (arraysize < arraylen + 1) {
+ arraysize = arraylen + 1 + 256;
+ array = sresize(array, arraysize, void *);
+ }
+
+ i = index;
+ /* now i points to the first element >= elem */
+ retval = elem; /* expect elem returned (success) */
+ for (j = arraylen; j > i; j--)
+ array[j] = array[j - 1];
+ array[i] = elem; /* add elem to array */
+ arraylen++;
+
+ if (realret != retval) {
+ error("add: retval was %p expected %p", realret, retval);
+ }
+
+ verify();
+}
+
+void addtest(void *elem)
+{
+ int i;
+ void *realret;
+
+ realret = add234(tree, elem);
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < arraylen && cmp(elem, array[i]) > 0)
+ i++;
+ if (i < arraylen && !cmp(elem, array[i])) {
+ void *retval = array[i]; /* expect that returned not elem */
+ if (realret != retval) {
+ error("add: retval was %p expected %p", realret, retval);
+ }
+ } else
+ internal_addtest(elem, i, realret);
+}
+
+void addpostest(void *elem, int i)
+{
+ void *realret;
+
+ realret = addpos234(tree, elem, i);
+
+ internal_addtest(elem, i, realret);
+}
+
+void delpostest(int i)
+{
+ int index = i;
+ void *elem = array[i], *ret;
+
+ /* i points to the right element */
+ while (i < arraylen - 1) {
+ array[i] = array[i + 1];
+ i++;
+ }
+ arraylen--; /* delete elem from array */
+
+ if (tree->cmp)
+ ret = del234(tree, elem);
+ else
+ ret = delpos234(tree, index);
+
+ if (ret != elem) {
+ error("del returned %p, expected %p", ret, elem);
+ }
+
+ verify();
+}
+
+void deltest(void *elem)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < arraylen && cmp(elem, array[i]) > 0)
+ i++;
+ if (i >= arraylen || cmp(elem, array[i]) != 0)
+ return; /* don't do it! */
+ delpostest(i);
+}
+
+/* A sample data set and test utility. Designed for pseudo-randomness,
+ * and yet repeatability. */
+
+/*
+ * This random number generator uses the `portable implementation'
+ * given in ANSI C99 draft N869. It assumes `unsigned' is 32 bits;
+ * change it if not.
+ */
+int randomnumber(unsigned *seed)
+{
+ *seed *= 1103515245;
+ *seed += 12345;
+ return ((*seed) / 65536) % 32768;
+}
+
+int mycmp(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ char const *a = (char const *) av;
+ char const *b = (char const *) bv;
+ return strcmp(a, b);
+}
+
+#define lenof(x) ( sizeof((x)) / sizeof(*(x)) )
+
+char *strings[] = {
+ "a", "ab", "absque", "coram", "de",
+ "palam", "clam", "cum", "ex", "e",
+ "sine", "tenus", "pro", "prae",
+ "banana", "carrot", "cabbage", "broccoli", "onion", "zebra",
+ "penguin", "blancmange", "pangolin", "whale", "hedgehog",
+ "giraffe", "peanut", "bungee", "foo", "bar", "baz", "quux",
+ "murfl", "spoo", "breen", "flarn", "octothorpe",
+ "snail", "tiger", "elephant", "octopus", "warthog", "armadillo",
+ "aardvark", "wyvern", "dragon", "elf", "dwarf", "orc", "goblin",
+ "pixie", "basilisk", "warg", "ape", "lizard", "newt", "shopkeeper",
+ "wand", "ring", "amulet"
+};
+
+#define NSTR lenof(strings)
+
+int findtest(void)
+{
+ const static int rels[] = {
+ REL234_EQ, REL234_GE, REL234_LE, REL234_LT, REL234_GT
+ };
+ const static char *const relnames[] = {
+ "EQ", "GE", "LE", "LT", "GT"
+ };
+ int i, j, rel, index;
+ char *p, *ret, *realret, *realret2;
+ int lo, hi, mid, c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NSTR; i++) {
+ p = strings[i];
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rels) / sizeof(*rels); j++) {
+ rel = rels[j];
+
+ lo = 0;
+ hi = arraylen - 1;
+ while (lo <= hi) {
+ mid = (lo + hi) / 2;
+ c = strcmp(p, array[mid]);
+ if (c < 0)
+ hi = mid - 1;
+ else if (c > 0)
+ lo = mid + 1;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (c == 0) {
+ if (rel == REL234_LT)
+ ret = (mid > 0 ? array[--mid] : NULL);
+ else if (rel == REL234_GT)
+ ret = (mid < arraylen - 1 ? array[++mid] : NULL);
+ else
+ ret = array[mid];
+ } else {
+ assert(lo == hi + 1);
+ if (rel == REL234_LT || rel == REL234_LE) {
+ mid = hi;
+ ret = (hi >= 0 ? array[hi] : NULL);
+ } else if (rel == REL234_GT || rel == REL234_GE) {
+ mid = lo;
+ ret = (lo < arraylen ? array[lo] : NULL);
+ } else
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+
+ realret = findrelpos234(tree, p, NULL, rel, &index);
+ if (realret != ret) {
+ error("find(\"%s\",%s) gave %s should be %s",
+ p, relnames[j], realret, ret);
+ }
+ if (realret && index != mid) {
+ error("find(\"%s\",%s) gave %d should be %d",
+ p, relnames[j], index, mid);
+ }
+ if (realret && rel == REL234_EQ) {
+ realret2 = index234(tree, index);
+ if (realret2 != realret) {
+ error("find(\"%s\",%s) gave %s(%d) but %d -> %s",
+ p, relnames[j], realret, index, index, realret2);
+ }
+ }
+#if 0
+ printf("find(\"%s\",%s) gave %s(%d)\n", p, relnames[j],
+ realret, index);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ realret = findrelpos234(tree, NULL, NULL, REL234_GT, &index);
+ if (arraylen && (realret != array[0] || index != 0)) {
+ error("find(NULL,GT) gave %s(%d) should be %s(0)",
+ realret, index, array[0]);
+ } else if (!arraylen && (realret != NULL)) {
+ error("find(NULL,GT) gave %s(%d) should be NULL", realret, index);
+ }
+
+ realret = findrelpos234(tree, NULL, NULL, REL234_LT, &index);
+ if (arraylen
+ && (realret != array[arraylen - 1] || index != arraylen - 1)) {
+ error("find(NULL,LT) gave %s(%d) should be %s(0)", realret, index,
+ array[arraylen - 1]);
+ } else if (!arraylen && (realret != NULL)) {
+ error("find(NULL,LT) gave %s(%d) should be NULL", realret, index);
+ }
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ int in[NSTR];
+ int i, j, k;
+ unsigned seed = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NSTR; i++)
+ in[i] = 0;
+ array = NULL;
+ arraylen = arraysize = 0;
+ tree = newtree234(mycmp);
+ cmp = mycmp;
+
+ verify();
+ for (i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
+ j = randomnumber(&seed);
+ j %= NSTR;
+ printf("trial: %d\n", i);
+ if (in[j]) {
+ printf("deleting %s (%d)\n", strings[j], j);
+ deltest(strings[j]);
+ in[j] = 0;
+ } else {
+ printf("adding %s (%d)\n", strings[j], j);
+ addtest(strings[j]);
+ in[j] = 1;
+ }
+ findtest();
+ }
+
+ while (arraylen > 0) {
+ j = randomnumber(&seed);
+ j %= arraylen;
+ deltest(array[j]);
+ }
+
+ freetree234(tree);
+
+ /*
+ * Now try an unsorted tree. We don't really need to test
+ * delpos234 because we know del234 is based on it, so it's
+ * already been tested in the above sorted-tree code; but for
+ * completeness we'll use it to tear down our unsorted tree
+ * once we've built it.
+ */
+ tree = newtree234(NULL);
+ cmp = NULL;
+ verify();
+ for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+ printf("trial: %d\n", i);
+ j = randomnumber(&seed);
+ j %= NSTR;
+ k = randomnumber(&seed);
+ k %= count234(tree) + 1;
+ printf("adding string %s at index %d\n", strings[j], k);
+ addpostest(strings[j], k);
+ }
+ while (count234(tree) > 0) {
+ printf("cleanup: tree size %d\n", count234(tree));
+ j = randomnumber(&seed);
+ j %= count234(tree);
+ printf("deleting string %s from index %d\n", array[j], j);
+ delpostest(j);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/tree234.h b/tools/plink/tree234.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a043f1f07 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/tree234.h @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +/*
+ * tree234.h: header defining functions in tree234.c.
+ *
+ * This file is copyright 1999-2001 Simon Tatham.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
+ * obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
+ * files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
+ * restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
+ * copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+ * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
+ * Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following
+ * conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL SIMON TATHAM BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF
+ * CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TREE234_H
+#define TREE234_H
+
+/*
+ * This typedef is opaque outside tree234.c itself.
+ */
+typedef struct tree234_Tag tree234;
+
+typedef int (*cmpfn234) (void *, void *);
+
+/*
+ * Create a 2-3-4 tree. If `cmp' is NULL, the tree is unsorted, and
+ * lookups by key will fail: you can only look things up by numeric
+ * index, and you have to use addpos234() and delpos234().
+ */
+tree234 *newtree234(cmpfn234 cmp);
+
+/*
+ * Free a 2-3-4 tree (not including freeing the elements).
+ */
+void freetree234(tree234 * t);
+
+/*
+ * Add an element e to a sorted 2-3-4 tree t. Returns e on success,
+ * or if an existing element compares equal, returns that.
+ */
+void *add234(tree234 * t, void *e);
+
+/*
+ * Add an element e to an unsorted 2-3-4 tree t. Returns e on
+ * success, NULL on failure. (Failure should only occur if the
+ * index is out of range or the tree is sorted.)
+ *
+ * Index range can be from 0 to the tree's current element count,
+ * inclusive.
+ */
+void *addpos234(tree234 * t, void *e, int index);
+
+/*
+ * Look up the element at a given numeric index in a 2-3-4 tree.
+ * Returns NULL if the index is out of range.
+ *
+ * One obvious use for this function is in iterating over the whole
+ * of a tree (sorted or unsorted):
+ *
+ * for (i = 0; (p = index234(tree, i)) != NULL; i++) consume(p);
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * int maxcount = count234(tree);
+ * for (i = 0; i < maxcount; i++) {
+ * p = index234(tree, i);
+ * assert(p != NULL);
+ * consume(p);
+ * }
+ */
+void *index234(tree234 * t, int index);
+
+/*
+ * Find an element e in a sorted 2-3-4 tree t. Returns NULL if not
+ * found. e is always passed as the first argument to cmp, so cmp
+ * can be an asymmetric function if desired. cmp can also be passed
+ * as NULL, in which case the compare function from the tree proper
+ * will be used.
+ *
+ * Three of these functions are special cases of findrelpos234. The
+ * non-`pos' variants lack the `index' parameter: if the parameter
+ * is present and non-NULL, it must point to an integer variable
+ * which will be filled with the numeric index of the returned
+ * element.
+ *
+ * The non-`rel' variants lack the `relation' parameter. This
+ * parameter allows you to specify what relation the element you
+ * provide has to the element you're looking for. This parameter
+ * can be:
+ *
+ * REL234_EQ - find only an element that compares equal to e
+ * REL234_LT - find the greatest element that compares < e
+ * REL234_LE - find the greatest element that compares <= e
+ * REL234_GT - find the smallest element that compares > e
+ * REL234_GE - find the smallest element that compares >= e
+ *
+ * Non-`rel' variants assume REL234_EQ.
+ *
+ * If `rel' is REL234_GT or REL234_LT, the `e' parameter may be
+ * NULL. In this case, REL234_GT will return the smallest element
+ * in the tree, and REL234_LT will return the greatest. This gives
+ * an alternative means of iterating over a sorted tree, instead of
+ * using index234:
+ *
+ * // to loop forwards
+ * for (p = NULL; (p = findrel234(tree, p, NULL, REL234_GT)) != NULL ;)
+ * consume(p);
+ *
+ * // to loop backwards
+ * for (p = NULL; (p = findrel234(tree, p, NULL, REL234_LT)) != NULL ;)
+ * consume(p);
+ */
+enum {
+ REL234_EQ, REL234_LT, REL234_LE, REL234_GT, REL234_GE
+};
+void *find234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp);
+void *findrel234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp, int relation);
+void *findpos234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp, int *index);
+void *findrelpos234(tree234 * t, void *e, cmpfn234 cmp, int relation,
+ int *index);
+
+/*
+ * Delete an element e in a 2-3-4 tree. Does not free the element,
+ * merely removes all links to it from the tree nodes.
+ *
+ * delpos234 deletes the element at a particular tree index: it
+ * works on both sorted and unsorted trees.
+ *
+ * del234 deletes the element passed to it, so it only works on
+ * sorted trees. (It's equivalent to using findpos234 to determine
+ * the index of an element, and then passing that index to
+ * delpos234.)
+ *
+ * Both functions return a pointer to the element they delete, for
+ * the user to free or pass on elsewhere or whatever. If the index
+ * is out of range (delpos234) or the element is already not in the
+ * tree (del234) then they return NULL.
+ */
+void *del234(tree234 * t, void *e);
+void *delpos234(tree234 * t, int index);
+
+/*
+ * Return the total element count of a tree234.
+ */
+int count234(tree234 * t);
+
+#endif /* TREE234_H */
diff --git a/tools/plink/version.c b/tools/plink/version.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c0d28b884 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/version.c @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/*
+ * PuTTY version numbering
+ */
+
+#define STR1(x) #x
+#define STR(x) STR1(x)
+
+#if defined SNAPSHOT
+
+#if defined SVN_REV
+#define SNAPSHOT_TEXT STR(SNAPSHOT) ":r" STR(SVN_REV)
+#else
+#define SNAPSHOT_TEXT STR(SNAPSHOT)
+#endif
+
+char ver[] = "Development snapshot " SNAPSHOT_TEXT;
+char sshver[] = "PuTTY-Snapshot-" SNAPSHOT_TEXT;
+
+#undef SNAPSHOT_TEXT
+
+#elif defined RELEASE
+
+char ver[] = "Release " STR(RELEASE);
+char sshver[] = "PuTTY-Release-" STR(RELEASE);
+
+#elif defined SVN_REV
+
+char ver[] = "Custom build r" STR(SVN_REV);
+char sshver[] = "PuTTY-Custom-r" STR(SVN_REV);
+
+#else
+
+char ver[] = "Unidentified build, " __DATE__ " " __TIME__;
+char sshver[] = "PuTTY-Local: " __DATE__ " " __TIME__;
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * SSH local version string MUST be under 40 characters. Here's a
+ * compile time assertion to verify this.
+ */
+enum { vorpal_sword = 1 / (sizeof(sshver) <= 40) };
diff --git a/tools/plink/wildcard.c b/tools/plink/wildcard.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..75a7573b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/wildcard.c @@ -0,0 +1,472 @@ +/*
+ * Wildcard matching engine for use with SFTP-based file transfer
+ * programs (PSFTP, new-look PSCP): since SFTP has no notion of
+ * getting the remote side to do globbing (and rightly so) we have
+ * to do it locally, by retrieving all the filenames in a directory
+ * and checking each against the wildcard pattern.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+/*
+ * Definition of wildcard syntax:
+ *
+ * - * matches any sequence of characters, including zero.
+ * - ? matches exactly one character which can be anything.
+ * - [abc] matches exactly one character which is a, b or c.
+ * - [a-f] matches anything from a through f.
+ * - [^a-f] matches anything _except_ a through f.
+ * - [-_] matches - or _; [^-_] matches anything else. (The - is
+ * non-special if it occurs immediately after the opening
+ * bracket or ^.)
+ * - [a^] matches an a or a ^. (The ^ is non-special if it does
+ * _not_ occur immediately after the opening bracket.)
+ * - \*, \?, \[, \], \\ match the single characters *, ?, [, ], \.
+ * - All other characters are non-special and match themselves.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some notes on differences from POSIX globs (IEEE Std 1003.1, 2003 ed.):
+ * - backslashes act as escapes even within [] bracket expressions
+ * - does not support [!...] for non-matching list (POSIX are weird);
+ * NB POSIX allows [^...] as well via "A bracket expression starting
+ * with an unquoted circumflex character produces unspecified
+ * results". If we wanted to allow [!...] we might want to define
+ * [^!] as having its literal meaning (match '^' or '!').
+ * - none of the scary [[:class:]] stuff, etc
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The wildcard matching technique we use is very simple and
+ * potentially O(N^2) in running time, but I don't anticipate it
+ * being that bad in reality (particularly since N will be the size
+ * of a filename, which isn't all that much). Perhaps one day, once
+ * PuTTY has grown a regexp matcher for some other reason, I might
+ * come back and reimplement wildcards by translating them into
+ * regexps or directly into NFAs; but for the moment, in the
+ * absence of any other need for the NFA->DFA translation engine,
+ * anything more than the simplest possible wildcard matcher is
+ * vast code-size overkill.
+ *
+ * Essentially, these wildcards are much simpler than regexps in
+ * that they consist of a sequence of rigid fragments (? and [...]
+ * can never match more or less than one character) separated by
+ * asterisks. It is therefore extremely simple to look at a rigid
+ * fragment and determine whether or not it begins at a particular
+ * point in the test string; so we can search along the string
+ * until we find each fragment, then search for the next. As long
+ * as we find each fragment in the _first_ place it occurs, there
+ * will never be a danger of having to backpedal and try to find it
+ * again somewhere else.
+ */
+
+enum {
+ WC_TRAILINGBACKSLASH = 1,
+ WC_UNCLOSEDCLASS,
+ WC_INVALIDRANGE
+};
+
+/*
+ * Error reporting is done by returning various negative values
+ * from the wildcard routines. Passing any such value to wc_error
+ * will give a human-readable message.
+ */
+const char *wc_error(int value)
+{
+ value = abs(value);
+ switch (value) {
+ case WC_TRAILINGBACKSLASH:
+ return "'\' occurred at end of string (expected another character)";
+ case WC_UNCLOSEDCLASS:
+ return "expected ']' to close character class";
+ case WC_INVALIDRANGE:
+ return "character range was not terminated (']' just after '-')";
+ }
+ return "INTERNAL ERROR: unrecognised wildcard error number";
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the routine that tests a target string to see if an
+ * initial substring of it matches a fragment. If successful, it
+ * returns 1, and advances both `fragment' and `target' past the
+ * fragment and matching substring respectively. If unsuccessful it
+ * returns zero. If the wildcard fragment suffers a syntax error,
+ * it returns <0 and the precise value indexes into wc_error.
+ */
+static int wc_match_fragment(const char **fragment, const char **target)
+{
+ const char *f, *t;
+
+ f = *fragment;
+ t = *target;
+ /*
+ * The fragment terminates at either the end of the string, or
+ * the first (unescaped) *.
+ */
+ while (*f && *f != '*' && *t) {
+ /*
+ * Extract one character from t, and one character's worth
+ * of pattern from f, and step along both. Return 0 if they
+ * fail to match.
+ */
+ if (*f == '\\') {
+ /*
+ * Backslash, which means f[1] is to be treated as a
+ * literal character no matter what it is. It may not
+ * be the end of the string.
+ */
+ if (!f[1])
+ return -WC_TRAILINGBACKSLASH; /* error */
+ if (f[1] != *t)
+ return 0; /* failed to match */
+ f += 2;
+ } else if (*f == '?') {
+ /*
+ * Question mark matches anything.
+ */
+ f++;
+ } else if (*f == '[') {
+ int invert = 0;
+ int matched = 0;
+ /*
+ * Open bracket introduces a character class.
+ */
+ f++;
+ if (*f == '^') {
+ invert = 1;
+ f++;
+ }
+ while (*f != ']') {
+ if (*f == '\\')
+ f++; /* backslashes still work */
+ if (!*f)
+ return -WC_UNCLOSEDCLASS; /* error again */
+ if (f[1] == '-') {
+ int lower, upper, ourchr;
+ lower = (unsigned char) *f++;
+ f++; /* eat the minus */
+ if (*f == ']')
+ return -WC_INVALIDRANGE; /* different error! */
+ if (*f == '\\')
+ f++; /* backslashes _still_ work */
+ if (!*f)
+ return -WC_UNCLOSEDCLASS; /* error again */
+ upper = (unsigned char) *f++;
+ ourchr = (unsigned char) *t;
+ if (lower > upper) {
+ int t = lower; lower = upper; upper = t;
+ }
+ if (ourchr >= lower && ourchr <= upper)
+ matched = 1;
+ } else {
+ matched |= (*t == *f++);
+ }
+ }
+ if (invert == matched)
+ return 0; /* failed to match character class */
+ f++; /* eat the ] */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Non-special character matches itself.
+ */
+ if (*f != *t)
+ return 0;
+ f++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we've done that, increment t past the character we
+ * matched.
+ */
+ t++;
+ }
+ if (!*f || *f == '*') {
+ /*
+ * We have reached the end of f without finding a mismatch;
+ * so we're done. Update the caller pointers and return 1.
+ */
+ *fragment = f;
+ *target = t;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, we must have reached the end of t before we
+ * reached the end of f; so we've failed. Return 0.
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the real wildcard matching routine. It returns 1 for a
+ * successful match, 0 for an unsuccessful match, and <0 for a
+ * syntax error in the wildcard.
+ */
+int wc_match(const char *wildcard, const char *target)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Every time we see a '*' _followed_ by a fragment, we just
+ * search along the string for a location at which the fragment
+ * matches. The only special case is when we see a fragment
+ * right at the start, in which case we just call the matching
+ * routine once and give up if it fails.
+ */
+ if (*wildcard != '*') {
+ ret = wc_match_fragment(&wildcard, &target);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret; /* pass back failure or error alike */
+ }
+
+ while (*wildcard) {
+ assert(*wildcard == '*');
+ while (*wildcard == '*')
+ wildcard++;
+
+ /*
+ * It's possible we've just hit the end of the wildcard
+ * after seeing a *, in which case there's no need to
+ * bother searching any more because we've won.
+ */
+ if (!*wildcard)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now `wildcard' points at the next fragment. So we
+ * attempt to match it against `target', and if that fails
+ * we increment `target' and try again, and so on. When we
+ * find we're about to try matching against the empty
+ * string, we give up and return 0.
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+ while (*target) {
+ const char *save_w = wildcard, *save_t = target;
+
+ ret = wc_match_fragment(&wildcard, &target);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret; /* syntax error */
+
+ if (ret > 0 && !*wildcard && *target) {
+ /*
+ * Final special case - literally.
+ *
+ * This situation arises when we are matching a
+ * _terminal_ fragment of the wildcard (that is,
+ * there is nothing after it, e.g. "*a"), and it
+ * has matched _too early_. For example, matching
+ * "*a" against "parka" will match the "a" fragment
+ * against the _first_ a, and then (if it weren't
+ * for this special case) matching would fail
+ * because we're at the end of the wildcard but not
+ * at the end of the target string.
+ *
+ * In this case what we must do is measure the
+ * length of the fragment in the target (which is
+ * why we saved `target'), jump straight to that
+ * distance from the end of the string using
+ * strlen, and match the same fragment again there
+ * (which is why we saved `wildcard'). Then we
+ * return whatever that operation returns.
+ */
+ target = save_t + strlen(save_t) - (target - save_t);
+ wildcard = save_w;
+ return wc_match_fragment(&wildcard, &target);
+ }
+
+ if (ret > 0)
+ break;
+ target++;
+ }
+ if (ret > 0)
+ continue;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we reach here, it must be because we successfully matched
+ * a fragment and then found ourselves right at the end of the
+ * wildcard. Hence, we return 1 if and only if we are also
+ * right at the end of the target.
+ */
+ return (*target ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Another utility routine that translates a non-wildcard string
+ * into its raw equivalent by removing any escaping backslashes.
+ * Expects a target string buffer of anything up to the length of
+ * the original wildcard. You can also pass NULL as the output
+ * buffer if you're only interested in the return value.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, or 0 if a wildcard character was
+ * encountered. In the latter case the output string MAY not be
+ * zero-terminated and you should not use it for anything!
+ */
+int wc_unescape(char *output, const char *wildcard)
+{
+ while (*wildcard) {
+ if (*wildcard == '\\') {
+ wildcard++;
+ /* We are lenient about trailing backslashes in non-wildcards. */
+ if (*wildcard) {
+ if (output)
+ *output++ = *wildcard;
+ wildcard++;
+ }
+ } else if (*wildcard == '*' || *wildcard == '?' ||
+ *wildcard == '[' || *wildcard == ']') {
+ return 0; /* it's a wildcard! */
+ } else {
+ if (output)
+ *output++ = *wildcard;
+ wildcard++;
+ }
+ }
+ *output = '\0';
+ return 1; /* it's clean */
+}
+
+#ifdef TESTMODE
+
+struct test {
+ const char *wildcard;
+ const char *target;
+ int expected_result;
+};
+
+const struct test fragment_tests[] = {
+ /*
+ * We exhaustively unit-test the fragment matching routine
+ * itself, which should save us the need to test all its
+ * intricacies during the full wildcard tests.
+ */
+ {"abc", "abc", 1},
+ {"abc", "abd", 0},
+ {"abc", "abcd", 1},
+ {"abcd", "abc", 0},
+ {"ab[cd]", "abc", 1},
+ {"ab[cd]", "abd", 1},
+ {"ab[cd]", "abe", 0},
+ {"ab[^cd]", "abc", 0},
+ {"ab[^cd]", "abd", 0},
+ {"ab[^cd]", "abe", 1},
+ {"ab\\", "abc", -WC_TRAILINGBACKSLASH},
+ {"ab\\*", "ab*", 1},
+ {"ab\\?", "ab*", 0},
+ {"ab?", "abc", 1},
+ {"ab?", "ab", 0},
+ {"ab[", "abc", -WC_UNCLOSEDCLASS},
+ {"ab[c-", "abb", -WC_UNCLOSEDCLASS},
+ {"ab[c-]", "abb", -WC_INVALIDRANGE},
+ {"ab[c-e]", "abb", 0},
+ {"ab[c-e]", "abc", 1},
+ {"ab[c-e]", "abd", 1},
+ {"ab[c-e]", "abe", 1},
+ {"ab[c-e]", "abf", 0},
+ {"ab[e-c]", "abb", 0},
+ {"ab[e-c]", "abc", 1},
+ {"ab[e-c]", "abd", 1},
+ {"ab[e-c]", "abe", 1},
+ {"ab[e-c]", "abf", 0},
+ {"ab[^c-e]", "abb", 1},
+ {"ab[^c-e]", "abc", 0},
+ {"ab[^c-e]", "abd", 0},
+ {"ab[^c-e]", "abe", 0},
+ {"ab[^c-e]", "abf", 1},
+ {"ab[^e-c]", "abb", 1},
+ {"ab[^e-c]", "abc", 0},
+ {"ab[^e-c]", "abd", 0},
+ {"ab[^e-c]", "abe", 0},
+ {"ab[^e-c]", "abf", 1},
+ {"ab[a^]", "aba", 1},
+ {"ab[a^]", "ab^", 1},
+ {"ab[a^]", "abb", 0},
+ {"ab[^a^]", "aba", 0},
+ {"ab[^a^]", "ab^", 0},
+ {"ab[^a^]", "abb", 1},
+ {"ab[-c]", "ab-", 1},
+ {"ab[-c]", "abc", 1},
+ {"ab[-c]", "abd", 0},
+ {"ab[^-c]", "ab-", 0},
+ {"ab[^-c]", "abc", 0},
+ {"ab[^-c]", "abd", 1},
+ {"ab[\\[-\\]]", "abZ", 0},
+ {"ab[\\[-\\]]", "ab[", 1},
+ {"ab[\\[-\\]]", "ab\\", 1},
+ {"ab[\\[-\\]]", "ab]", 1},
+ {"ab[\\[-\\]]", "ab^", 0},
+ {"ab[^\\[-\\]]", "abZ", 1},
+ {"ab[^\\[-\\]]", "ab[", 0},
+ {"ab[^\\[-\\]]", "ab\\", 0},
+ {"ab[^\\[-\\]]", "ab]", 0},
+ {"ab[^\\[-\\]]", "ab^", 1},
+ {"ab[a-fA-F]", "aba", 1},
+ {"ab[a-fA-F]", "abF", 1},
+ {"ab[a-fA-F]", "abZ", 0},
+};
+
+const struct test full_tests[] = {
+ {"a", "argh", 0},
+ {"a", "ba", 0},
+ {"a", "a", 1},
+ {"a*", "aardvark", 1},
+ {"a*", "badger", 0},
+ {"*a", "park", 0},
+ {"*a", "pArka", 1},
+ {"*a", "parka", 1},
+ {"*a*", "park", 1},
+ {"*a*", "perk", 0},
+ {"?b*r?", "abracadabra", 1},
+ {"?b*r?", "abracadabr", 0},
+ {"?b*r?", "abracadabzr", 0},
+};
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ int fails, passes;
+
+ fails = passes = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(fragment_tests)/sizeof(*fragment_tests); i++) {
+ const char *f, *t;
+ int eret, aret;
+ f = fragment_tests[i].wildcard;
+ t = fragment_tests[i].target;
+ eret = fragment_tests[i].expected_result;
+ aret = wc_match_fragment(&f, &t);
+ if (aret != eret) {
+ printf("failed test: /%s/ against /%s/ returned %d not %d\n",
+ fragment_tests[i].wildcard, fragment_tests[i].target,
+ aret, eret);
+ fails++;
+ } else
+ passes++;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(full_tests)/sizeof(*full_tests); i++) {
+ const char *f, *t;
+ int eret, aret;
+ f = full_tests[i].wildcard;
+ t = full_tests[i].target;
+ eret = full_tests[i].expected_result;
+ aret = wc_match(f, t);
+ if (aret != eret) {
+ printf("failed test: /%s/ against /%s/ returned %d not %d\n",
+ full_tests[i].wildcard, full_tests[i].target,
+ aret, eret);
+ fails++;
+ } else
+ passes++;
+ }
+
+ printf("passed %d, failed %d\n", passes, fails);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/wincons.c b/tools/plink/wincons.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4f984d958 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/wincons.c @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +/*
+ * wincons.c - various interactive-prompt routines shared between
+ * the Windows console PuTTY tools
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "storage.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+int console_batch_mode = FALSE;
+
+static void *console_logctx = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Clean up and exit.
+ */
+void cleanup_exit(int code)
+{
+ /*
+ * Clean up.
+ */
+ sk_cleanup();
+
+ random_save_seed();
+#ifdef MSCRYPTOAPI
+ crypto_wrapup();
+#endif
+
+ exit(code);
+}
+
+void set_busy_status(void *frontend, int status)
+{
+}
+
+void notify_remote_exit(void *frontend)
+{
+}
+
+void timer_change_notify(long next)
+{
+}
+
+int verify_ssh_host_key(void *frontend, char *host, int port, char *keytype,
+ char *keystr, char *fingerprint,
+ void (*callback)(void *ctx, int result), void *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+ HANDLE hin;
+ DWORD savemode, i;
+
+ static const char absentmsg_batch[] =
+ "The server's host key is not cached in the registry. You\n"
+ "have no guarantee that the server is the computer you\n"
+ "think it is.\n"
+ "The server's %s key fingerprint is:\n"
+ "%s\n"
+ "Connection abandoned.\n";
+ static const char absentmsg[] =
+ "The server's host key is not cached in the registry. You\n"
+ "have no guarantee that the server is the computer you\n"
+ "think it is.\n"
+ "The server's %s key fingerprint is:\n"
+ "%s\n"
+ "If you trust this host, enter \"y\" to add the key to\n"
+ "PuTTY's cache and carry on connecting.\n"
+ "If you want to carry on connecting just once, without\n"
+ "adding the key to the cache, enter \"n\".\n"
+ "If you do not trust this host, press Return to abandon the\n"
+ "connection.\n"
+ "Store key in cache? (y/n) ";
+
+ static const char wrongmsg_batch[] =
+ "WARNING - POTENTIAL SECURITY BREACH!\n"
+ "The server's host key does not match the one PuTTY has\n"
+ "cached in the registry. This means that either the\n"
+ "server administrator has changed the host key, or you\n"
+ "have actually connected to another computer pretending\n"
+ "to be the server.\n"
+ "The new %s key fingerprint is:\n"
+ "%s\n"
+ "Connection abandoned.\n";
+ static const char wrongmsg[] =
+ "WARNING - POTENTIAL SECURITY BREACH!\n"
+ "The server's host key does not match the one PuTTY has\n"
+ "cached in the registry. This means that either the\n"
+ "server administrator has changed the host key, or you\n"
+ "have actually connected to another computer pretending\n"
+ "to be the server.\n"
+ "The new %s key fingerprint is:\n"
+ "%s\n"
+ "If you were expecting this change and trust the new key,\n"
+ "enter \"y\" to update PuTTY's cache and continue connecting.\n"
+ "If you want to carry on connecting but without updating\n"
+ "the cache, enter \"n\".\n"
+ "If you want to abandon the connection completely, press\n"
+ "Return to cancel. Pressing Return is the ONLY guaranteed\n"
+ "safe choice.\n"
+ "Update cached key? (y/n, Return cancels connection) ";
+
+ static const char abandoned[] = "Connection abandoned.\n";
+
+ char line[32];
+
+ /*
+ * Verify the key against the registry.
+ */
+ ret = verify_host_key(host, port, keytype, keystr);
+
+ if (ret == 0) /* success - key matched OK */
+ return 1;
+
+ if (ret == 2) { /* key was different */
+ if (console_batch_mode) {
+ fprintf(stderr, wrongmsg_batch, keytype, fingerprint);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, wrongmsg, keytype, fingerprint);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ }
+ if (ret == 1) { /* key was absent */
+ if (console_batch_mode) {
+ fprintf(stderr, absentmsg_batch, keytype, fingerprint);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, absentmsg, keytype, fingerprint);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ }
+
+ hin = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+ GetConsoleMode(hin, &savemode);
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, (savemode | ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT |
+ ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT));
+ ReadFile(hin, line, sizeof(line) - 1, &i, NULL);
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, savemode);
+
+ if (line[0] != '\0' && line[0] != '\r' && line[0] != '\n') {
+ if (line[0] == 'y' || line[0] == 'Y')
+ store_host_key(host, port, keytype, keystr);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, abandoned);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+void update_specials_menu(void *frontend)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ask whether the selected algorithm is acceptable (since it was
+ * below the configured 'warn' threshold).
+ */
+int askalg(void *frontend, const char *algtype, const char *algname,
+ void (*callback)(void *ctx, int result), void *ctx)
+{
+ HANDLE hin;
+ DWORD savemode, i;
+
+ static const char msg[] =
+ "The first %s supported by the server is\n"
+ "%s, which is below the configured warning threshold.\n"
+ "Continue with connection? (y/n) ";
+ static const char msg_batch[] =
+ "The first %s supported by the server is\n"
+ "%s, which is below the configured warning threshold.\n"
+ "Connection abandoned.\n";
+ static const char abandoned[] = "Connection abandoned.\n";
+
+ char line[32];
+
+ if (console_batch_mode) {
+ fprintf(stderr, msg_batch, algtype, algname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr, msg, algtype, algname);
+ fflush(stderr);
+
+ hin = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+ GetConsoleMode(hin, &savemode);
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, (savemode | ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT |
+ ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT));
+ ReadFile(hin, line, sizeof(line) - 1, &i, NULL);
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, savemode);
+
+ if (line[0] == 'y' || line[0] == 'Y') {
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, abandoned);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ask whether to wipe a session log file before writing to it.
+ * Returns 2 for wipe, 1 for append, 0 for cancel (don't log).
+ */
+int askappend(void *frontend, Filename filename,
+ void (*callback)(void *ctx, int result), void *ctx)
+{
+ HANDLE hin;
+ DWORD savemode, i;
+
+ static const char msgtemplate[] =
+ "The session log file \"%.*s\" already exists.\n"
+ "You can overwrite it with a new session log,\n"
+ "append your session log to the end of it,\n"
+ "or disable session logging for this session.\n"
+ "Enter \"y\" to wipe the file, \"n\" to append to it,\n"
+ "or just press Return to disable logging.\n"
+ "Wipe the log file? (y/n, Return cancels logging) ";
+
+ static const char msgtemplate_batch[] =
+ "The session log file \"%.*s\" already exists.\n"
+ "Logging will not be enabled.\n";
+
+ char line[32];
+
+ if (console_batch_mode) {
+ fprintf(stderr, msgtemplate_batch, FILENAME_MAX, filename.path);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, msgtemplate, FILENAME_MAX, filename.path);
+ fflush(stderr);
+
+ hin = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+ GetConsoleMode(hin, &savemode);
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, (savemode | ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT |
+ ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT));
+ ReadFile(hin, line, sizeof(line) - 1, &i, NULL);
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, savemode);
+
+ if (line[0] == 'y' || line[0] == 'Y')
+ return 2;
+ else if (line[0] == 'n' || line[0] == 'N')
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Warn about the obsolescent key file format.
+ *
+ * Uniquely among these functions, this one does _not_ expect a
+ * frontend handle. This means that if PuTTY is ported to a
+ * platform which requires frontend handles, this function will be
+ * an anomaly. Fortunately, the problem it addresses will not have
+ * been present on that platform, so it can plausibly be
+ * implemented as an empty function.
+ */
+void old_keyfile_warning(void)
+{
+ static const char message[] =
+ "You are loading an SSH-2 private key which has an\n"
+ "old version of the file format. This means your key\n"
+ "file is not fully tamperproof. Future versions of\n"
+ "PuTTY may stop supporting this private key format,\n"
+ "so we recommend you convert your key to the new\n"
+ "format.\n"
+ "\n"
+ "Once the key is loaded into PuTTYgen, you can perform\n"
+ "this conversion simply by saving it again.\n";
+
+ fputs(message, stderr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the fingerprints of the PGP Master Keys to the user.
+ */
+void pgp_fingerprints(void)
+{
+ fputs("These are the fingerprints of the PuTTY PGP Master Keys. They can\n"
+ "be used to establish a trust path from this executable to another\n"
+ "one. See the manual for more information.\n"
+ "(Note: these fingerprints have nothing to do with SSH!)\n"
+ "\n"
+ "PuTTY Master Key (RSA), 1024-bit:\n"
+ " " PGP_RSA_MASTER_KEY_FP "\n"
+ "PuTTY Master Key (DSA), 1024-bit:\n"
+ " " PGP_DSA_MASTER_KEY_FP "\n", stdout);
+}
+
+void console_provide_logctx(void *logctx)
+{
+ console_logctx = logctx;
+}
+
+void logevent(void *frontend, const char *string)
+{
+ log_eventlog(console_logctx, string);
+}
+
+static void console_data_untrusted(HANDLE hout, const char *data, int len)
+{
+ DWORD dummy;
+ /* FIXME: control-character filtering */
+ WriteFile(hout, data, len, &dummy, NULL);
+}
+
+int console_get_userpass_input(prompts_t *p, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ HANDLE hin, hout;
+ size_t curr_prompt;
+
+ /*
+ * Zero all the results, in case we abort half-way through.
+ */
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)p->n_prompts; i++)
+ memset(p->prompts[i]->result, 0, p->prompts[i]->result_len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The prompts_t might contain a message to be displayed but no
+ * actual prompt. More usually, though, it will contain
+ * questions that the user needs to answer, in which case we
+ * need to ensure that we're able to get the answers.
+ */
+ if (p->n_prompts) {
+ if (console_batch_mode)
+ return 0;
+ hin = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+ if (hin == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Cannot get standard input handle\n");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * And if we have anything to print, we need standard output.
+ */
+ if ((p->name_reqd && p->name) || p->instruction || p->n_prompts) {
+ hout = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
+ if (hout == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Cannot get standard output handle\n");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Preamble.
+ */
+ /* We only print the `name' caption if we have to... */
+ if (p->name_reqd && p->name) {
+ size_t l = strlen(p->name);
+ console_data_untrusted(hout, p->name, l);
+ if (p->name[l-1] != '\n')
+ console_data_untrusted(hout, "\n", 1);
+ }
+ /* ...but we always print any `instruction'. */
+ if (p->instruction) {
+ size_t l = strlen(p->instruction);
+ console_data_untrusted(hout, p->instruction, l);
+ if (p->instruction[l-1] != '\n')
+ console_data_untrusted(hout, "\n", 1);
+ }
+
+ for (curr_prompt = 0; curr_prompt < p->n_prompts; curr_prompt++) {
+
+ DWORD savemode, newmode, i = 0;
+ prompt_t *pr = p->prompts[curr_prompt];
+ BOOL r;
+
+ GetConsoleMode(hin, &savemode);
+ newmode = savemode | ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT;
+ if (!pr->echo)
+ newmode &= ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
+ else
+ newmode |= ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, newmode);
+
+ console_data_untrusted(hout, pr->prompt, strlen(pr->prompt));
+
+ r = ReadFile(hin, pr->result, pr->result_len - 1, &i, NULL);
+
+ SetConsoleMode(hin, savemode);
+
+ if ((int) i > pr->result_len)
+ i = pr->result_len - 1;
+ else
+ i = i - 2;
+ pr->result[i] = '\0';
+
+ if (!pr->echo) {
+ DWORD dummy;
+ WriteFile(hout, "\r\n", 2, &dummy, NULL);
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ return 1; /* success */
+
+}
+
+void frontend_keypress(void *handle)
+{
+ /*
+ * This is nothing but a stub, in console code.
+ */
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/windefs.c b/tools/plink/windefs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..de01dafaa --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/windefs.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/*
+ * windefs.c: default settings that are specific to Windows.
+ */
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+#include <commctrl.h>
+
+FontSpec platform_default_fontspec(const char *name)
+{
+ FontSpec ret;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "Font")) {
+ strcpy(ret.name, "Courier New");
+ ret.isbold = 0;
+ ret.charset = ANSI_CHARSET;
+ ret.height = 10;
+ } else {
+ ret.name[0] = '\0';
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+Filename platform_default_filename(const char *name)
+{
+ Filename ret;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "LogFileName"))
+ strcpy(ret.path, "putty.log");
+ else
+ *ret.path = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+char *platform_default_s(const char *name)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(name, "SerialLine"))
+ return dupstr("COM1");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int platform_default_i(const char *name, int def)
+{
+ return def;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/wingss.c b/tools/plink/wingss.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..742106e88 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/wingss.c @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +#ifndef NO_GSSAPI + +#include "putty.h" + +#define SECURITY_WIN32 +#include <security.h> + +#include "sshgss.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#define NOTHING +#define DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(linkage, rettype, name, params) \ + typedef rettype (WINAPI *t_##name) params; \ + linkage t_##name p_##name +#define GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(module, name) \ + p_##name = module ? (t_##name) GetProcAddress(module, #name) : NULL + +DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(static, SECURITY_STATUS, + AcquireCredentialsHandleA, + (SEC_CHAR *, SEC_CHAR *, ULONG, PLUID, + PVOID, SEC_GET_KEY_FN, PVOID, PCredHandle, PTimeStamp)); +DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(static, SECURITY_STATUS, + InitializeSecurityContextA, + (PCredHandle, PCtxtHandle, SEC_CHAR *, ULONG, ULONG, + ULONG, PSecBufferDesc, ULONG, PCtxtHandle, + PSecBufferDesc, PULONG, PTimeStamp)); +DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(static, SECURITY_STATUS, + FreeContextBuffer, + (PVOID)); +DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(static, SECURITY_STATUS, + FreeCredentialsHandle, + (PCredHandle)); +DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(static, SECURITY_STATUS, + DeleteSecurityContext, + (PCtxtHandle)); +DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(static, SECURITY_STATUS, + QueryContextAttributesA, + (PCtxtHandle, ULONG, PVOID)); +DECL_SSPI_FUNCTION(static, SECURITY_STATUS, + MakeSignature, + (PCtxtHandle, ULONG, PSecBufferDesc, ULONG)); + +static HMODULE security_module = NULL; + +typedef struct winSsh_gss_ctx { + unsigned long maj_stat; + unsigned long min_stat; + CredHandle cred_handle; + CtxtHandle context; + PCtxtHandle context_handle; + TimeStamp expiry; +} winSsh_gss_ctx; + + +const Ssh_gss_buf gss_mech_krb5={9,"\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}; + +int ssh_gss_init(void) +{ + if (security_module) + return 1; /* already initialised */ + + security_module = LoadLibrary("secur32.dll"); + if (security_module) { + GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(security_module, AcquireCredentialsHandleA); + GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(security_module, InitializeSecurityContextA); + GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(security_module, FreeContextBuffer); + GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(security_module, FreeCredentialsHandle); + GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(security_module, DeleteSecurityContext); + GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(security_module, QueryContextAttributesA); + GET_SSPI_FUNCTION(security_module, MakeSignature); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_indicate_mech(Ssh_gss_buf *mech) +{ + *mech = gss_mech_krb5; + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_import_name(char *host, Ssh_gss_name *srv_name) +{ + char *pStr; + + /* Check hostname */ + if (host == NULL) return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; + + /* copy it into form host/FQDN */ + pStr = dupcat("host/", host, NULL); + + *srv_name = (Ssh_gss_name) pStr; + + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_acquire_cred(Ssh_gss_ctx *ctx) +{ + winSsh_gss_ctx *winctx = snew(winSsh_gss_ctx); + memset(winctx, 0, sizeof(winSsh_gss_ctx)); + + /* prepare our "wrapper" structure */ + winctx->maj_stat = winctx->min_stat = SEC_E_OK; + winctx->context_handle = NULL; + + /* Specifying no principal name here means use the credentials of + the current logged-in user */ + + winctx->maj_stat = p_AcquireCredentialsHandleA(NULL, + "Kerberos", + SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + &winctx->cred_handle, + &winctx->expiry); + + if (winctx->maj_stat != SEC_E_OK) return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; + + *ctx = (Ssh_gss_ctx) winctx; + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_init_sec_context(Ssh_gss_ctx *ctx, + Ssh_gss_name srv_name, + int to_deleg, + Ssh_gss_buf *recv_tok, + Ssh_gss_buf *send_tok) +{ + winSsh_gss_ctx *winctx = (winSsh_gss_ctx *) *ctx; + SecBuffer wsend_tok = {send_tok->length,SECBUFFER_TOKEN,send_tok->value}; + SecBuffer wrecv_tok = {recv_tok->length,SECBUFFER_TOKEN,recv_tok->value}; + SecBufferDesc output_desc={SECBUFFER_VERSION,1,&wsend_tok}; + SecBufferDesc input_desc ={SECBUFFER_VERSION,1,&wrecv_tok}; + unsigned long flags=ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH|ISC_REQ_REPLAY_DETECT| + ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY|ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY; + unsigned long ret_flags=0; + + /* check if we have to delegate ... */ + if (to_deleg) flags |= ISC_REQ_DELEGATE; + winctx->maj_stat = p_InitializeSecurityContextA(&winctx->cred_handle, + winctx->context_handle, + (char*) srv_name, + flags, + 0, /* reserved */ + SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, + &input_desc, + 0, /* reserved */ + &winctx->context, + &output_desc, + &ret_flags, + &winctx->expiry); + + /* prepare for the next round */ + winctx->context_handle = &winctx->context; + send_tok->value = wsend_tok.pvBuffer; + send_tok->length = wsend_tok.cbBuffer; + + /* check & return our status */ + if (winctx->maj_stat==SEC_E_OK) return SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE; + if (winctx->maj_stat==SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) return SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + + return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; +} + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_free_tok(Ssh_gss_buf *send_tok) +{ + /* check input */ + if (send_tok == NULL) return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; + + /* free Windows buffer */ + p_FreeContextBuffer(send_tok->value); + SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(send_tok); + + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_release_cred(Ssh_gss_ctx *ctx) +{ + winSsh_gss_ctx *winctx= (winSsh_gss_ctx *) *ctx; + + /* check input */ + if (winctx == NULL) return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; + + /* free Windows data */ + p_FreeCredentialsHandle(&winctx->cred_handle); + p_DeleteSecurityContext(&winctx->context); + + /* delete our "wrapper" structure */ + sfree(winctx); + *ctx = (Ssh_gss_ctx) NULL; + + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_release_name(Ssh_gss_name *srv_name) +{ + char *pStr= (char *) *srv_name; + + if (pStr == NULL) return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; + sfree(pStr); + *srv_name = (Ssh_gss_name) NULL; + + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_display_status(Ssh_gss_ctx ctx, Ssh_gss_buf *buf) +{ + winSsh_gss_ctx *winctx = (winSsh_gss_ctx *) ctx; + char *msg; + + if (winctx == NULL) return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; + + /* decode the error code */ + switch (winctx->maj_stat) { + case SEC_E_OK: msg="SSPI status OK"; break; + case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE: msg="The handle passed to the function" + " is invalid."; + break; + case SEC_E_TARGET_UNKNOWN: msg="The target was not recognized."; break; + case SEC_E_LOGON_DENIED: msg="The logon failed."; break; + case SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR: msg="The Local Security Authority cannot" + " be contacted."; + break; + case SEC_E_NO_CREDENTIALS: msg="No credentials are available in the" + " security package."; + break; + case SEC_E_NO_AUTHENTICATING_AUTHORITY: + msg="No authority could be contacted for authentication." + "The domain name of the authenticating party could be wrong," + " the domain could be unreachable, or there might have been" + " a trust relationship failure."; + break; + case SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + msg="One or more of the SecBufferDesc structures passed as" + " an OUT parameter has a buffer that is too small."; + break; + case SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN: + msg="The error is due to a malformed input token, such as a" + " token corrupted in transit, a token" + " of incorrect size, or a token passed into the wrong" + " security package. Passing a token to" + " the wrong package can happen if client and server did not" + " negotiate the proper security package."; + break; + default: + msg = "Internal SSPI error"; + break; + } + + buf->value = dupstr(msg); + buf->length = strlen(buf->value); + + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_get_mic(Ssh_gss_ctx ctx, Ssh_gss_buf *buf, + Ssh_gss_buf *hash) +{ + winSsh_gss_ctx *winctx= (winSsh_gss_ctx *) ctx; + SecPkgContext_Sizes ContextSizes; + SecBufferDesc InputBufferDescriptor; + SecBuffer InputSecurityToken[2]; + + if (winctx == NULL) return SSH_GSS_FAILURE; + + winctx->maj_stat = 0; + + memset(&ContextSizes, 0, sizeof(ContextSizes)); + + winctx->maj_stat = p_QueryContextAttributesA(&winctx->context, + SECPKG_ATTR_SIZES, + &ContextSizes); + + if (winctx->maj_stat != SEC_E_OK || + ContextSizes.cbMaxSignature == 0) + return winctx->maj_stat; + + InputBufferDescriptor.cBuffers = 2; + InputBufferDescriptor.pBuffers = InputSecurityToken; + InputBufferDescriptor.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; + InputSecurityToken[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA; + InputSecurityToken[0].cbBuffer = buf->length; + InputSecurityToken[0].pvBuffer = buf->value; + InputSecurityToken[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; + InputSecurityToken[1].cbBuffer = ContextSizes.cbMaxSignature; + InputSecurityToken[1].pvBuffer = snewn(ContextSizes.cbMaxSignature, char); + + winctx->maj_stat = p_MakeSignature(&winctx->context, + 0, + &InputBufferDescriptor, + 0); + + if (winctx->maj_stat == SEC_E_OK) { + hash->length = InputSecurityToken[1].cbBuffer; + hash->value = InputSecurityToken[1].pvBuffer; + } + + return winctx->maj_stat; +} + +Ssh_gss_stat ssh_gss_free_mic(Ssh_gss_buf *hash) +{ + sfree(hash->value); + return SSH_GSS_OK; +} + +#else + +/* Dummy function so this source file defines something if NO_GSSAPI + is defined. */ + +int ssh_gss_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif diff --git a/tools/plink/winhandl.c b/tools/plink/winhandl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dbcab2b2a --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winhandl.c @@ -0,0 +1,596 @@ +/*
+ * winhandl.c: Module to give Windows front ends the general
+ * ability to deal with consoles, pipes, serial ports, or any other
+ * type of data stream accessed through a Windows API HANDLE rather
+ * than a WinSock SOCKET.
+ *
+ * We do this by spawning a subthread to continuously try to read
+ * from the handle. Every time a read successfully returns some
+ * data, the subthread sets an event object which is picked up by
+ * the main thread, and the main thread then sets an event in
+ * return to instruct the subthread to resume reading.
+ *
+ * Output works precisely the other way round, in a second
+ * subthread. The output subthread should not be attempting to
+ * write all the time, because it hasn't always got data _to_
+ * write; so the output thread waits for an event object notifying
+ * it to _attempt_ a write, and then it sets an event in return
+ * when one completes.
+ *
+ * (It's terribly annoying having to spawn a subthread for each
+ * direction of each handle. Technically it isn't necessary for
+ * serial ports, since we could use overlapped I/O within the main
+ * thread and wait directly on the event objects in the OVERLAPPED
+ * structures. However, we can't use this trick for some types of
+ * file handle at all - for some reason Windows restricts use of
+ * OVERLAPPED to files which were opened with the overlapped flag -
+ * and so we must use threads for those. This being the case, it's
+ * simplest just to use threads for everything rather than trying
+ * to keep track of multiple completely separate mechanisms.)
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Generic definitions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Maximum amount of backlog we will allow to build up on an input
+ * handle before we stop reading from it.
+ */
+#define MAX_BACKLOG 32768
+
+struct handle_generic {
+ /*
+ * Initial fields common to both handle_input and handle_output
+ * structures.
+ *
+ * The three HANDLEs are set up at initialisation time and are
+ * thereafter read-only to both main thread and subthread.
+ * `moribund' is only used by the main thread; `done' is
+ * written by the main thread before signalling to the
+ * subthread. `defunct' and `busy' are used only by the main
+ * thread.
+ */
+ HANDLE h; /* the handle itself */
+ HANDLE ev_to_main; /* event used to signal main thread */
+ HANDLE ev_from_main; /* event used to signal back to us */
+ int moribund; /* are we going to kill this soon? */
+ int done; /* request subthread to terminate */
+ int defunct; /* has the subthread already gone? */
+ int busy; /* operation currently in progress? */
+ void *privdata; /* for client to remember who they are */
+};
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Input threads.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Data required by an input thread.
+ */
+struct handle_input {
+ /*
+ * Copy of the handle_generic structure.
+ */
+ HANDLE h; /* the handle itself */
+ HANDLE ev_to_main; /* event used to signal main thread */
+ HANDLE ev_from_main; /* event used to signal back to us */
+ int moribund; /* are we going to kill this soon? */
+ int done; /* request subthread to terminate */
+ int defunct; /* has the subthread already gone? */
+ int busy; /* operation currently in progress? */
+ void *privdata; /* for client to remember who they are */
+
+ /*
+ * Data set at initialisation and then read-only.
+ */
+ int flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Data set by the input thread before signalling ev_to_main,
+ * and read by the main thread after receiving that signal.
+ */
+ char buffer[4096]; /* the data read from the handle */
+ DWORD len; /* how much data that was */
+ int readerr; /* lets us know about read errors */
+
+ /*
+ * Callback function called by this module when data arrives on
+ * an input handle.
+ */
+ handle_inputfn_t gotdata;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The actual thread procedure for an input thread.
+ */
+static DWORD WINAPI handle_input_threadfunc(void *param)
+{
+ struct handle_input *ctx = (struct handle_input *) param;
+ OVERLAPPED ovl, *povl;
+ HANDLE oev;
+ int readret, readlen;
+
+ if (ctx->flags & HANDLE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED) {
+ povl = &ovl;
+ oev = CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL);
+ } else {
+ povl = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->flags & HANDLE_FLAG_UNITBUFFER)
+ readlen = 1;
+ else
+ readlen = sizeof(ctx->buffer);
+
+ while (1) {
+ if (povl) {
+ memset(povl, 0, sizeof(OVERLAPPED));
+ povl->hEvent = oev;
+ }
+ readret = ReadFile(ctx->h, ctx->buffer,readlen, &ctx->len, povl);
+ if (!readret)
+ ctx->readerr = GetLastError();
+ else
+ ctx->readerr = 0;
+ if (povl && !readret && ctx->readerr == ERROR_IO_PENDING) {
+ WaitForSingleObject(povl->hEvent, INFINITE);
+ readret = GetOverlappedResult(ctx->h, povl, &ctx->len, FALSE);
+ if (!readret)
+ ctx->readerr = GetLastError();
+ else
+ ctx->readerr = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!readret) {
+ /*
+ * Windows apparently sends ERROR_BROKEN_PIPE when a
+ * pipe we're reading from is closed normally from the
+ * writing end. This is ludicrous; if that situation
+ * isn't a natural EOF, _nothing_ is. So if we get that
+ * particular error, we pretend it's EOF.
+ */
+ if (ctx->readerr == ERROR_BROKEN_PIPE)
+ ctx->readerr = 0;
+ ctx->len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (readret && ctx->len == 0 &&
+ (ctx->flags & HANDLE_FLAG_IGNOREEOF))
+ continue;
+
+ SetEvent(ctx->ev_to_main);
+
+ if (!ctx->len)
+ break;
+
+ WaitForSingleObject(ctx->ev_from_main, INFINITE);
+ if (ctx->done)
+ break; /* main thread told us to shut down */
+ }
+
+ if (povl)
+ CloseHandle(oev);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called after a succcessful read, or from the
+ * `unthrottle' function. It decides whether or not to begin a new
+ * read operation.
+ */
+static void handle_throttle(struct handle_input *ctx, int backlog)
+{
+ if (ctx->defunct)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If there's a read operation already in progress, do nothing:
+ * when that completes, we'll come back here and be in a
+ * position to make a better decision.
+ */
+ if (ctx->busy)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, we must decide whether to start a new read based
+ * on the size of the backlog.
+ */
+ if (backlog < MAX_BACKLOG) {
+ SetEvent(ctx->ev_from_main);
+ ctx->busy = TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Output threads.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Data required by an output thread.
+ */
+struct handle_output {
+ /*
+ * Copy of the handle_generic structure.
+ */
+ HANDLE h; /* the handle itself */
+ HANDLE ev_to_main; /* event used to signal main thread */
+ HANDLE ev_from_main; /* event used to signal back to us */
+ int moribund; /* are we going to kill this soon? */
+ int done; /* request subthread to terminate */
+ int defunct; /* has the subthread already gone? */
+ int busy; /* operation currently in progress? */
+ void *privdata; /* for client to remember who they are */
+
+ /*
+ * Data set at initialisation and then read-only.
+ */
+ int flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Data set by the main thread before signalling ev_from_main,
+ * and read by the input thread after receiving that signal.
+ */
+ char *buffer; /* the data to write */
+ DWORD len; /* how much data there is */
+
+ /*
+ * Data set by the input thread before signalling ev_to_main,
+ * and read by the main thread after receiving that signal.
+ */
+ DWORD lenwritten; /* how much data we actually wrote */
+ int writeerr; /* return value from WriteFile */
+
+ /*
+ * Data only ever read or written by the main thread.
+ */
+ bufchain queued_data; /* data still waiting to be written */
+
+ /*
+ * Callback function called when the backlog in the bufchain
+ * drops.
+ */
+ handle_outputfn_t sentdata;
+};
+
+static DWORD WINAPI handle_output_threadfunc(void *param)
+{
+ struct handle_output *ctx = (struct handle_output *) param;
+ OVERLAPPED ovl, *povl;
+ HANDLE oev;
+ int writeret;
+
+ if (ctx->flags & HANDLE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED) {
+ povl = &ovl;
+ oev = CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL);
+ } else {
+ povl = NULL;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ WaitForSingleObject(ctx->ev_from_main, INFINITE);
+ if (ctx->done) {
+ SetEvent(ctx->ev_to_main);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (povl) {
+ memset(povl, 0, sizeof(OVERLAPPED));
+ povl->hEvent = oev;
+ }
+
+ writeret = WriteFile(ctx->h, ctx->buffer, ctx->len,
+ &ctx->lenwritten, povl);
+ if (!writeret)
+ ctx->writeerr = GetLastError();
+ else
+ ctx->writeerr = 0;
+ if (povl && !writeret && GetLastError() == ERROR_IO_PENDING) {
+ writeret = GetOverlappedResult(ctx->h, povl,
+ &ctx->lenwritten, TRUE);
+ if (!writeret)
+ ctx->writeerr = GetLastError();
+ else
+ ctx->writeerr = 0;
+ }
+
+ SetEvent(ctx->ev_to_main);
+ if (!writeret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (povl)
+ CloseHandle(oev);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void handle_try_output(struct handle_output *ctx)
+{
+ void *senddata;
+ int sendlen;
+
+ if (!ctx->busy && bufchain_size(&ctx->queued_data)) {
+ bufchain_prefix(&ctx->queued_data, &senddata, &sendlen);
+ ctx->buffer = senddata;
+ ctx->len = sendlen;
+ SetEvent(ctx->ev_from_main);
+ ctx->busy = TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Unified code handling both input and output threads.
+ */
+
+struct handle {
+ int output;
+ union {
+ struct handle_generic g;
+ struct handle_input i;
+ struct handle_output o;
+ } u;
+};
+
+static tree234 *handles_by_evtomain;
+
+static int handle_cmp_evtomain(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ struct handle *a = (struct handle *)av;
+ struct handle *b = (struct handle *)bv;
+
+ if ((unsigned)a->u.g.ev_to_main < (unsigned)b->u.g.ev_to_main)
+ return -1;
+ else if ((unsigned)a->u.g.ev_to_main > (unsigned)b->u.g.ev_to_main)
+ return +1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_find_evtomain(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ HANDLE *a = (HANDLE *)av;
+ struct handle *b = (struct handle *)bv;
+
+ if ((unsigned)*a < (unsigned)b->u.g.ev_to_main)
+ return -1;
+ else if ((unsigned)*a > (unsigned)b->u.g.ev_to_main)
+ return +1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct handle *handle_input_new(HANDLE handle, handle_inputfn_t gotdata,
+ void *privdata, int flags)
+{
+ struct handle *h = snew(struct handle);
+ DWORD in_threadid; /* required for Win9x */
+
+ h->output = FALSE;
+ h->u.i.h = handle;
+ h->u.i.ev_to_main = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
+ h->u.i.ev_from_main = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
+ h->u.i.gotdata = gotdata;
+ h->u.i.defunct = FALSE;
+ h->u.i.moribund = FALSE;
+ h->u.i.done = FALSE;
+ h->u.i.privdata = privdata;
+ h->u.i.flags = flags;
+
+ if (!handles_by_evtomain)
+ handles_by_evtomain = newtree234(handle_cmp_evtomain);
+ add234(handles_by_evtomain, h);
+
+ CreateThread(NULL, 0, handle_input_threadfunc,
+ &h->u.i, 0, &in_threadid);
+ h->u.i.busy = TRUE;
+
+ return h;
+}
+
+struct handle *handle_output_new(HANDLE handle, handle_outputfn_t sentdata,
+ void *privdata, int flags)
+{
+ struct handle *h = snew(struct handle);
+ DWORD out_threadid; /* required for Win9x */
+
+ h->output = TRUE;
+ h->u.o.h = handle;
+ h->u.o.ev_to_main = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
+ h->u.o.ev_from_main = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
+ h->u.o.busy = FALSE;
+ h->u.o.defunct = FALSE;
+ h->u.o.moribund = FALSE;
+ h->u.o.done = FALSE;
+ h->u.o.privdata = privdata;
+ bufchain_init(&h->u.o.queued_data);
+ h->u.o.sentdata = sentdata;
+ h->u.o.flags = flags;
+
+ if (!handles_by_evtomain)
+ handles_by_evtomain = newtree234(handle_cmp_evtomain);
+ add234(handles_by_evtomain, h);
+
+ CreateThread(NULL, 0, handle_output_threadfunc,
+ &h->u.o, 0, &out_threadid);
+
+ return h;
+}
+
+int handle_write(struct handle *h, const void *data, int len)
+{
+ assert(h->output);
+ bufchain_add(&h->u.o.queued_data, data, len);
+ handle_try_output(&h->u.o);
+ return bufchain_size(&h->u.o.queued_data);
+}
+
+HANDLE *handle_get_events(int *nevents)
+{
+ HANDLE *ret;
+ struct handle *h;
+ int i, n, size;
+
+ /*
+ * Go through our tree counting the handle objects currently
+ * engaged in useful activity.
+ */
+ ret = NULL;
+ n = size = 0;
+ if (handles_by_evtomain) {
+ for (i = 0; (h = index234(handles_by_evtomain, i)) != NULL; i++) {
+ if (h->u.g.busy) {
+ if (n >= size) {
+ size += 32;
+ ret = sresize(ret, size, HANDLE);
+ }
+ ret[n++] = h->u.g.ev_to_main;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *nevents = n;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void handle_destroy(struct handle *h)
+{
+ if (h->output)
+ bufchain_clear(&h->u.o.queued_data);
+ CloseHandle(h->u.g.ev_from_main);
+ CloseHandle(h->u.g.ev_to_main);
+ del234(handles_by_evtomain, h);
+ sfree(h);
+}
+
+void handle_free(struct handle *h)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the handle is currently busy, we cannot immediately free
+ * it. Instead we must wait until it's finished its current
+ * operation, because otherwise the subthread will write to
+ * invalid memory after we free its context from under it.
+ */
+ assert(h && !h->u.g.moribund);
+ if (h->u.g.busy) {
+ /*
+ * Just set the moribund flag, which will be noticed next
+ * time an operation completes.
+ */
+ h->u.g.moribund = TRUE;
+ } else if (h->u.g.defunct) {
+ /*
+ * There isn't even a subthread; we can go straight to
+ * handle_destroy.
+ */
+ handle_destroy(h);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The subthread is alive but not busy, so we now signal it
+ * to die. Set the moribund flag to indicate that it will
+ * want destroying after that.
+ */
+ h->u.g.moribund = TRUE;
+ h->u.g.done = TRUE;
+ h->u.g.busy = TRUE;
+ SetEvent(h->u.g.ev_from_main);
+ }
+}
+
+void handle_got_event(HANDLE event)
+{
+ struct handle *h;
+
+ assert(handles_by_evtomain);
+ h = find234(handles_by_evtomain, &event, handle_find_evtomain);
+ if (!h) {
+ /*
+ * This isn't an error condition. If two or more event
+ * objects were signalled during the same select operation,
+ * and processing of the first caused the second handle to
+ * be closed, then it will sometimes happen that we receive
+ * an event notification here for a handle which is already
+ * deceased. In that situation we simply do nothing.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (h->u.g.moribund) {
+ /*
+ * A moribund handle is already treated as dead from the
+ * external user's point of view, so do nothing with the
+ * actual event. Just signal the thread to die if
+ * necessary, or destroy the handle if not.
+ */
+ if (h->u.g.done) {
+ handle_destroy(h);
+ } else {
+ h->u.g.done = TRUE;
+ h->u.g.busy = TRUE;
+ SetEvent(h->u.g.ev_from_main);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!h->output) {
+ int backlog;
+
+ h->u.i.busy = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * A signal on an input handle means data has arrived.
+ */
+ if (h->u.i.len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * EOF, or (nearly equivalently) read error.
+ */
+ h->u.i.gotdata(h, NULL, -h->u.i.readerr);
+ h->u.i.defunct = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ backlog = h->u.i.gotdata(h, h->u.i.buffer, h->u.i.len);
+ handle_throttle(&h->u.i, backlog);
+ }
+ } else {
+ h->u.o.busy = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * A signal on an output handle means we have completed a
+ * write. Call the callback to indicate that the output
+ * buffer size has decreased, or to indicate an error.
+ */
+ if (h->u.o.writeerr) {
+ /*
+ * Write error. Send a negative value to the callback,
+ * and mark the thread as defunct (because the output
+ * thread is terminating by now).
+ */
+ h->u.o.sentdata(h, -h->u.o.writeerr);
+ h->u.o.defunct = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ bufchain_consume(&h->u.o.queued_data, h->u.o.lenwritten);
+ h->u.o.sentdata(h, bufchain_size(&h->u.o.queued_data));
+ handle_try_output(&h->u.o);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void handle_unthrottle(struct handle *h, int backlog)
+{
+ assert(!h->output);
+ handle_throttle(&h->u.i, backlog);
+}
+
+int handle_backlog(struct handle *h)
+{
+ assert(h->output);
+ return bufchain_size(&h->u.o.queued_data);
+}
+
+void *handle_get_privdata(struct handle *h)
+{
+ return h->u.g.privdata;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/winhelp.h b/tools/plink/winhelp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..95cfaba15 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winhelp.h @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +/*
+ * winhelp.h - define Windows Help context names.
+ * Each definition has the form "winhelp-topic:halibut-topic", where:
+ * - "winhelp-topic" matches up with the \cfg{winhelp-topic} directives
+ * in the Halibut source, and is used for WinHelp;
+ * - "halibut-topic" matches up with the Halibut keywords in the source,
+ * and is used for HTML Help.
+ */
+
+/* Maximum length for WINHELP_CTX_foo strings */
+#define WINHELP_CTX_MAXLEN 80
+
+/* These are used in the cross-platform configuration dialog code. */
+
+#define HELPCTX(x) P(WINHELP_CTX_ ## x)
+
+#define WINHELP_CTX_no_help NULL
+
+#define WINHELP_CTX_session_hostname "session.hostname:config-hostname"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_session_saved "session.saved:config-saving"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_session_coe "session.coe:config-closeonexit"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_logging_main "logging.main:config-logging"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_logging_filename "logging.filename:config-logfilename"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_logging_exists "logging.exists:config-logfileexists"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_logging_flush "logging.flush:config-logflush"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_logging_ssh_omit_password "logging.ssh.omitpassword:config-logssh"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_logging_ssh_omit_data "logging.ssh.omitdata:config-logssh"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_backspace "keyboard.backspace:config-backspace"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_homeend "keyboard.homeend:config-homeend"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_funkeys "keyboard.funkeys:config-funkeys"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_appkeypad "keyboard.appkeypad:config-appkeypad"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_appcursor "keyboard.appcursor:config-appcursor"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_nethack "keyboard.nethack:config-nethack"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_compose "keyboard.compose:config-compose"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_keyboard_ctrlalt "keyboard.ctrlalt:config-ctrlalt"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_application "features.application:config-features-application"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_mouse "features.mouse:config-features-mouse"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_resize "features.resize:config-features-resize"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_altscreen "features.altscreen:config-features-altscreen"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_retitle "features.retitle:config-features-retitle"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_qtitle "features.qtitle:config-features-qtitle"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_dbackspace "features.dbackspace:config-features-dbackspace"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_charset "features.charset:config-features-charset"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_arabicshaping "features.arabicshaping:config-features-shaping"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_features_bidi "features.bidi:config-features-bidi"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_autowrap "terminal.autowrap:config-autowrap"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_decom "terminal.decom:config-decom"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_lfhascr "terminal.lfhascr:config-crlf"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_crhaslf "terminal.crhaslf:config-lfcr"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_bce "terminal.bce:config-erase"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_blink "terminal.blink:config-blink"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_answerback "terminal.answerback:config-answerback"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_localecho "terminal.localecho:config-localecho"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_localedit "terminal.localedit:config-localedit"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_terminal_printing "terminal.printing:config-printing"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_bell_style "bell.style:config-bellstyle"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_bell_taskbar "bell.taskbar:config-belltaskbar"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_bell_overload "bell.overload:config-bellovl"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_window_size "window.size:config-winsize"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_window_resize "window.resize:config-winsizelock"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_window_scrollback "window.scrollback:config-scrollback"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_window_erased "window.erased:config-erasetoscrollback"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_behaviour_closewarn "behaviour.closewarn:config-warnonclose"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_behaviour_altf4 "behaviour.altf4:config-altf4"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_behaviour_altspace "behaviour.altspace:config-altspace"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_behaviour_altonly "behaviour.altonly:config-altonly"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_behaviour_alwaysontop "behaviour.alwaysontop:config-alwaysontop"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_behaviour_altenter "behaviour.altenter:config-fullscreen"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_appearance_cursor "appearance.cursor:config-cursor"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_appearance_font "appearance.font:config-font"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_appearance_title "appearance.title:config-title"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_appearance_hidemouse "appearance.hidemouse:config-mouseptr"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_appearance_border "appearance.border:config-winborder"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_termtype "connection.termtype:config-termtype"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_termspeed "connection.termspeed:config-termspeed"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_username "connection.username:config-username"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_username_from_env "connection.usernamefromenv:config-username-from-env"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_keepalive "connection.keepalive:config-keepalive"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_nodelay "connection.nodelay:config-nodelay"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_ipversion "connection.ipversion:config-address-family"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_tcpkeepalive "connection.tcpkeepalive:config-tcp-keepalives"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_connection_loghost "connection.loghost:config-loghost"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_proxy_type "proxy.type:config-proxy-type"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_proxy_main "proxy.main:config-proxy"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_proxy_exclude "proxy.exclude:config-proxy-exclude"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_proxy_dns "proxy.dns:config-proxy-dns"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_proxy_auth "proxy.auth:config-proxy-auth"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_proxy_command "proxy.command:config-proxy-command"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_telnet_environ "telnet.environ:config-environ"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_telnet_oldenviron "telnet.oldenviron:config-oldenviron"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_telnet_passive "telnet.passive:config-ptelnet"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_telnet_specialkeys "telnet.specialkeys:config-telnetkey"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_telnet_newline "telnet.newline:config-telnetnl"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_rlogin_localuser "rlogin.localuser:config-rlogin-localuser"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_nopty "ssh.nopty:config-ssh-pty"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_ttymodes "ssh.ttymodes:config-ttymodes"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_noshell "ssh.noshell:config-ssh-noshell"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_ciphers "ssh.ciphers:config-ssh-encryption"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_protocol "ssh.protocol:config-ssh-prot"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_command "ssh.command:config-command"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_compress "ssh.compress:config-ssh-comp"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_kexlist "ssh.kex.order:config-ssh-kex-order"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_kex_repeat "ssh.kex.repeat:config-ssh-kex-rekey"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_bypass "ssh.auth.bypass:config-ssh-noauth"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_privkey "ssh.auth.privkey:config-ssh-privkey"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_agentfwd "ssh.auth.agentfwd:config-ssh-agentfwd"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_changeuser "ssh.auth.changeuser:config-ssh-changeuser"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_pageant "ssh.auth.pageant:config-ssh-tryagent"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_tis "ssh.auth.tis:config-ssh-tis"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_ki "ssh.auth.ki:config-ssh-ki"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_selection_buttons "selection.buttons:config-mouse"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_selection_shiftdrag "selection.shiftdrag:config-mouseshift"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_selection_rect "selection.rect:config-rectselect"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_selection_charclasses "selection.charclasses:config-charclasses"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_selection_linedraw "selection.linedraw:config-linedrawpaste"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_selection_rtf "selection.rtf:config-rtfpaste"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_colours_ansi "colours.ansi:config-ansicolour"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_colours_xterm256 "colours.xterm256:config-xtermcolour"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_colours_bold "colours.bold:config-boldcolour"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_colours_system "colours.system:config-syscolour"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_colours_logpal "colours.logpal:config-logpalette"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_colours_config "colours.config:config-colourcfg"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_translation_codepage "translation.codepage:config-charset"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_translation_cjk_ambig_wide "translation.cjkambigwide:config-cjk-ambig-wide"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_translation_cyrillic "translation.cyrillic:config-cyr"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_translation_linedraw "translation.linedraw:config-linedraw"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_tunnels_x11 "ssh.tunnels.x11:config-ssh-x11"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_tunnels_x11auth "ssh.tunnels.x11auth:config-ssh-x11auth"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_tunnels_xauthority "ssh.tunnels.xauthority:config-ssh-xauthority"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_tunnels_portfwd "ssh.tunnels.portfwd:config-ssh-portfwd"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_tunnels_portfwd_localhost "ssh.tunnels.portfwd.localhost:config-ssh-portfwd-localhost"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_tunnels_portfwd_ipversion "ssh.tunnels.portfwd.ipversion:config-ssh-portfwd-address-family"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_ignore1 "ssh.bugs.ignore1:config-ssh-bug-ignore1"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_plainpw1 "ssh.bugs.plainpw1:config-ssh-bug-plainpw1"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_rsa1 "ssh.bugs.rsa1:config-ssh-bug-rsa1"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_hmac2 "ssh.bugs.hmac2:config-ssh-bug-hmac2"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_derivekey2 "ssh.bugs.derivekey2:config-ssh-bug-derivekey2"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_rsapad2 "ssh.bugs.rsapad2:config-ssh-bug-sig"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_pksessid2 "ssh.bugs.pksessid2:config-ssh-bug-pksessid2"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_rekey2 "ssh.bugs.rekey2:config-ssh-bug-rekey"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_bugs_maxpkt2 "ssh.bugs.maxpkt2:config-ssh-bug-maxpkt2"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_serial_line "serial.line:config-serial-line"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_serial_speed "serial.speed:config-serial-speed"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_serial_databits "serial.databits:config-serial-databits"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_serial_stopbits "serial.stopbits:config-serial-stopbits"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_serial_parity "serial.parity:config-serial-parity"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_serial_flow "serial.flow:config-serial-flow"
+
+#define WINHELP_CTX_pageant_general "pageant.general:pageant"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_pageant_keylist "pageant.keylist:pageant-mainwin-keylist"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_pageant_addkey "pageant.addkey:pageant-mainwin-addkey"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_pageant_remkey "pageant.remkey:pageant-mainwin-remkey"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_pgpfingerprints "pgpfingerprints:pgpkeys"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_general "puttygen.general:pubkey-puttygen"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_keytype "puttygen.keytype:puttygen-keytype"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_bits "puttygen.bits:puttygen-strength"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_generate "puttygen.generate:puttygen-generate"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_fingerprint "puttygen.fingerprint:puttygen-fingerprint"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_comment "puttygen.comment:puttygen-comment"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_passphrase "puttygen.passphrase:puttygen-passphrase"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_savepriv "puttygen.savepriv:puttygen-savepriv"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_savepub "puttygen.savepub:puttygen-savepub"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_pastekey "puttygen.pastekey:puttygen-pastekey"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_load "puttygen.load:puttygen-load"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_puttygen_conversions "puttygen.conversions:puttygen-conversions"
+
+/* These are used in Windows-specific bits of the frontend.
+ * We (ab)use "help context identifiers" (dwContextId) to identify them. */
+
+#define HELPCTXID(x) WINHELP_CTXID_ ## x
+
+#define WINHELP_CTXID_no_help 0
+#define WINHELP_CTX_errors_hostkey_absent "errors.hostkey.absent:errors-hostkey-absent"
+#define WINHELP_CTXID_errors_hostkey_absent 1
+#define WINHELP_CTX_errors_hostkey_changed "errors.hostkey.changed:errors-hostkey-wrong"
+#define WINHELP_CTXID_errors_hostkey_changed 2
+#define WINHELP_CTX_errors_cantloadkey "errors.cantloadkey:errors-cant-load-key"
+#define WINHELP_CTXID_errors_cantloadkey 3
+#define WINHELP_CTX_option_cleanup "options.cleanup:using-cleanup"
+#define WINHELP_CTXID_option_cleanup 4
+#define WINHELP_CTX_pgp_fingerprints "pgpfingerprints:pgpkeys"
+#define WINHELP_CTXID_pgp_fingerprints 5
diff --git a/tools/plink/winmisc.c b/tools/plink/winmisc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8ffbe77a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winmisc.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +/*
+ * winmisc.c: miscellaneous Windows-specific things
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "putty.h"
+
+OSVERSIONINFO osVersion;
+
+char *platform_get_x_display(void) {
+ /* We may as well check for DISPLAY in case it's useful. */
+ return dupstr(getenv("DISPLAY"));
+}
+
+Filename filename_from_str(const char *str)
+{
+ Filename ret;
+ strncpy(ret.path, str, sizeof(ret.path));
+ ret.path[sizeof(ret.path)-1] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const char *filename_to_str(const Filename *fn)
+{
+ return fn->path;
+}
+
+int filename_equal(Filename f1, Filename f2)
+{
+ return !strcmp(f1.path, f2.path);
+}
+
+int filename_is_null(Filename fn)
+{
+ return !*fn.path;
+}
+
+char *get_username(void)
+{
+ DWORD namelen;
+ char *user;
+
+ namelen = 0;
+ if (GetUserName(NULL, &namelen) == FALSE) {
+ /*
+ * Apparently this doesn't work at least on Windows XP SP2.
+ * Thus assume a maximum of 256. It will fail again if it
+ * doesn't fit.
+ */
+ namelen = 256;
+ }
+
+ user = snewn(namelen, char);
+ GetUserName(user, &namelen);
+
+ return user;
+}
+
+BOOL init_winver(void)
+{
+ ZeroMemory(&osVersion, sizeof(osVersion));
+ osVersion.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof (OSVERSIONINFO);
+ return GetVersionEx ( (OSVERSIONINFO *) &osVersion);
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static FILE *debug_fp = NULL;
+static HANDLE debug_hdl = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+static int debug_got_console = 0;
+
+void dputs(char *buf)
+{
+ DWORD dw;
+
+ if (!debug_got_console) {
+ if (AllocConsole()) {
+ debug_got_console = 1;
+ debug_hdl = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!debug_fp) {
+ debug_fp = fopen("debug.log", "w");
+ }
+
+ if (debug_hdl != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ WriteFile(debug_hdl, buf, strlen(buf), &dw, NULL);
+ }
+ fputs(buf, debug_fp);
+ fflush(debug_fp);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MINEFIELD
+/*
+ * Minefield - a Windows equivalent for Electric Fence
+ */
+
+#define PAGESIZE 4096
+
+/*
+ * Design:
+ *
+ * We start by reserving as much virtual address space as Windows
+ * will sensibly (or not sensibly) let us have. We flag it all as
+ * invalid memory.
+ *
+ * Any allocation attempt is satisfied by committing one or more
+ * pages, with an uncommitted page on either side. The returned
+ * memory region is jammed up against the _end_ of the pages.
+ *
+ * Freeing anything causes instantaneous decommitment of the pages
+ * involved, so stale pointers are caught as soon as possible.
+ */
+
+static int minefield_initialised = 0;
+static void *minefield_region = NULL;
+static long minefield_size = 0;
+static long minefield_npages = 0;
+static long minefield_curpos = 0;
+static unsigned short *minefield_admin = NULL;
+static void *minefield_pages = NULL;
+
+static void minefield_admin_hide(int hide)
+{
+ int access = hide ? PAGE_NOACCESS : PAGE_READWRITE;
+ VirtualProtect(minefield_admin, minefield_npages * 2, access, NULL);
+}
+
+static void minefield_init(void)
+{
+ int size;
+ int admin_size;
+ int i;
+
+ for (size = 0x40000000; size > 0; size = ((size >> 3) * 7) & ~0xFFF) {
+ minefield_region = VirtualAlloc(NULL, size,
+ MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_NOACCESS);
+ if (minefield_region)
+ break;
+ }
+ minefield_size = size;
+
+ /*
+ * Firstly, allocate a section of that to be the admin block.
+ * We'll need a two-byte field for each page.
+ */
+ minefield_admin = minefield_region;
+ minefield_npages = minefield_size / PAGESIZE;
+ admin_size = (minefield_npages * 2 + PAGESIZE - 1) & ~(PAGESIZE - 1);
+ minefield_npages = (minefield_size - admin_size) / PAGESIZE;
+ minefield_pages = (char *) minefield_region + admin_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Commit the admin region.
+ */
+ VirtualAlloc(minefield_admin, minefield_npages * 2,
+ MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
+
+ /*
+ * Mark all pages as unused (0xFFFF).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < minefield_npages; i++)
+ minefield_admin[i] = 0xFFFF;
+
+ /*
+ * Hide the admin region.
+ */
+ minefield_admin_hide(1);
+
+ minefield_initialised = 1;
+}
+
+static void minefield_bomb(void)
+{
+ div(1, *(int *) minefield_pages);
+}
+
+static void *minefield_alloc(int size)
+{
+ int npages;
+ int pos, lim, region_end, region_start;
+ int start;
+ int i;
+
+ npages = (size + PAGESIZE - 1) / PAGESIZE;
+
+ minefield_admin_hide(0);
+
+ /*
+ * Search from current position until we find a contiguous
+ * bunch of npages+2 unused pages.
+ */
+ pos = minefield_curpos;
+ lim = minefield_npages;
+ while (1) {
+ /* Skip over used pages. */
+ while (pos < lim && minefield_admin[pos] != 0xFFFF)
+ pos++;
+ /* Count unused pages. */
+ start = pos;
+ while (pos < lim && pos - start < npages + 2 &&
+ minefield_admin[pos] == 0xFFFF)
+ pos++;
+ if (pos - start == npages + 2)
+ break;
+ /* If we've reached the limit, reset the limit or stop. */
+ if (pos >= lim) {
+ if (lim == minefield_npages) {
+ /* go round and start again at zero */
+ lim = minefield_curpos;
+ pos = 0;
+ } else {
+ minefield_admin_hide(1);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ minefield_curpos = pos - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * We have npages+2 unused pages starting at start. We leave
+ * the first and last of these alone and use the rest.
+ */
+ region_end = (start + npages + 1) * PAGESIZE;
+ region_start = region_end - size;
+ /* FIXME: could align here if we wanted */
+
+ /*
+ * Update the admin region.
+ */
+ for (i = start + 2; i < start + npages + 1; i++)
+ minefield_admin[i] = 0xFFFE; /* used but no region starts here */
+ minefield_admin[start + 1] = region_start % PAGESIZE;
+
+ minefield_admin_hide(1);
+
+ VirtualAlloc((char *) minefield_pages + region_start, size,
+ MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
+ return (char *) minefield_pages + region_start;
+}
+
+static void minefield_free(void *ptr)
+{
+ int region_start, i, j;
+
+ minefield_admin_hide(0);
+
+ region_start = (char *) ptr - (char *) minefield_pages;
+ i = region_start / PAGESIZE;
+ if (i < 0 || i >= minefield_npages ||
+ minefield_admin[i] != region_start % PAGESIZE)
+ minefield_bomb();
+ for (j = i; j < minefield_npages && minefield_admin[j] != 0xFFFF; j++) {
+ minefield_admin[j] = 0xFFFF;
+ }
+
+ VirtualFree(ptr, j * PAGESIZE - region_start, MEM_DECOMMIT);
+
+ minefield_admin_hide(1);
+}
+
+static int minefield_get_size(void *ptr)
+{
+ int region_start, i, j;
+
+ minefield_admin_hide(0);
+
+ region_start = (char *) ptr - (char *) minefield_pages;
+ i = region_start / PAGESIZE;
+ if (i < 0 || i >= minefield_npages ||
+ minefield_admin[i] != region_start % PAGESIZE)
+ minefield_bomb();
+ for (j = i; j < minefield_npages && minefield_admin[j] != 0xFFFF; j++);
+
+ minefield_admin_hide(1);
+
+ return j * PAGESIZE - region_start;
+}
+
+void *minefield_c_malloc(size_t size)
+{
+ if (!minefield_initialised)
+ minefield_init();
+ return minefield_alloc(size);
+}
+
+void minefield_c_free(void *p)
+{
+ if (!minefield_initialised)
+ minefield_init();
+ minefield_free(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * realloc _always_ moves the chunk, for rapid detection of code
+ * that assumes it won't.
+ */
+void *minefield_c_realloc(void *p, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t oldsize;
+ void *q;
+ if (!minefield_initialised)
+ minefield_init();
+ q = minefield_alloc(size);
+ oldsize = minefield_get_size(p);
+ memcpy(q, p, (oldsize < size ? oldsize : size));
+ minefield_free(p);
+ return q;
+}
+
+#endif /* MINEFIELD */
diff --git a/tools/plink/winnet.c b/tools/plink/winnet.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..59f3774e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winnet.c @@ -0,0 +1,1713 @@ +/*
+ * Windows networking abstraction.
+ *
+ * For the IPv6 code in here I am indebted to Jeroen Massar and
+ * unfix.org.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define DEFINE_PLUG_METHOD_MACROS
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "network.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+
+#include <ws2tcpip.h>
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+const struct in6_addr in6addr_any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
+const struct in6_addr in6addr_loopback = IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT;
+#endif
+
+#define ipv4_is_loopback(addr) \
+ ((p_ntohl(addr.s_addr) & 0xFF000000L) == 0x7F000000L)
+
+/*
+ * We used to typedef struct Socket_tag *Socket.
+ *
+ * Since we have made the networking abstraction slightly more
+ * abstract, Socket no longer means a tcp socket (it could mean
+ * an ssl socket). So now we must use Actual_Socket when we know
+ * we are talking about a tcp socket.
+ */
+typedef struct Socket_tag *Actual_Socket;
+
+/*
+ * Mutable state that goes with a SockAddr: stores information
+ * about where in the list of candidate IP(v*) addresses we've
+ * currently got to.
+ */
+typedef struct SockAddrStep_tag SockAddrStep;
+struct SockAddrStep_tag {
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ struct addrinfo *ai; /* steps along addr->ais */
+#endif
+ int curraddr;
+};
+
+struct Socket_tag {
+ const struct socket_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */
+ char *error;
+ SOCKET s;
+ Plug plug;
+ void *private_ptr;
+ bufchain output_data;
+ int connected;
+ int writable;
+ int frozen; /* this causes readability notifications to be ignored */
+ int frozen_readable; /* this means we missed at least one readability
+ * notification while we were frozen */
+ int localhost_only; /* for listening sockets */
+ char oobdata[1];
+ int sending_oob;
+ int oobinline, nodelay, keepalive, privport;
+ SockAddr addr;
+ SockAddrStep step;
+ int port;
+ int pending_error; /* in case send() returns error */
+ /*
+ * We sometimes need pairs of Socket structures to be linked:
+ * if we are listening on the same IPv6 and v4 port, for
+ * example. So here we define `parent' and `child' pointers to
+ * track this link.
+ */
+ Actual_Socket parent, child;
+};
+
+struct SockAddr_tag {
+ int refcount;
+ char *error;
+ int resolved;
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ struct addrinfo *ais; /* Addresses IPv6 style. */
+#endif
+ unsigned long *addresses; /* Addresses IPv4 style. */
+ int naddresses;
+ char hostname[512]; /* Store an unresolved host name. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Which address family this address belongs to. AF_INET for IPv4;
+ * AF_INET6 for IPv6; AF_UNSPEC indicates that name resolution has
+ * not been done and a simple host name is held in this SockAddr
+ * structure.
+ */
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+#define SOCKADDR_FAMILY(addr, step) \
+ (!(addr)->resolved ? AF_UNSPEC : \
+ (step).ai ? (step).ai->ai_family : AF_INET)
+#else
+#define SOCKADDR_FAMILY(addr, step) \
+ (!(addr)->resolved ? AF_UNSPEC : AF_INET)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Start a SockAddrStep structure to step through multiple
+ * addresses.
+ */
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+#define START_STEP(addr, step) \
+ ((step).ai = (addr)->ais, (step).curraddr = 0)
+#else
+#define START_STEP(addr, step) \
+ ((step).curraddr = 0)
+#endif
+
+static tree234 *sktree;
+
+static int cmpfortree(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ Actual_Socket a = (Actual_Socket) av, b = (Actual_Socket) bv;
+ unsigned long as = (unsigned long) a->s, bs = (unsigned long) b->s;
+ if (as < bs)
+ return -1;
+ if (as > bs)
+ return +1;
+ if (a < b)
+ return -1;
+ if (a > b)
+ return +1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cmpforsearch(void *av, void *bv)
+{
+ Actual_Socket b = (Actual_Socket) bv;
+ unsigned long as = (unsigned long) av, bs = (unsigned long) b->s;
+ if (as < bs)
+ return -1;
+ if (as > bs)
+ return +1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define NOTHING
+#define DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(linkage, rettype, name, params) \
+ typedef rettype (WINAPI *t_##name) params; \
+ linkage t_##name p_##name
+#define GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(module, name) \
+ p_##name = module ? (t_##name) GetProcAddress(module, #name) : NULL
+
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(NOTHING, int, WSAAsyncSelect,
+ (SOCKET, HWND, u_int, long));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(NOTHING, int, WSAEventSelect, (SOCKET, WSAEVENT, long));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(NOTHING, int, select,
+ (int, fd_set FAR *, fd_set FAR *,
+ fd_set FAR *, const struct timeval FAR *));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(NOTHING, int, WSAGetLastError, (void));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(NOTHING, int, WSAEnumNetworkEvents,
+ (SOCKET, WSAEVENT, LPWSANETWORKEVENTS));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, WSAStartup, (WORD, LPWSADATA));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, WSACleanup, (void));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, closesocket, (SOCKET));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, u_long, ntohl, (u_long));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, u_long, htonl, (u_long));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, u_short, htons, (u_short));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, u_short, ntohs, (u_short));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, gethostname, (char *, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, struct hostent FAR *, gethostbyname,
+ (const char FAR *));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, struct servent FAR *, getservbyname,
+ (const char FAR *, const char FAR *));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, unsigned long, inet_addr, (const char FAR *));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, char FAR *, inet_ntoa, (struct in_addr));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, connect,
+ (SOCKET, const struct sockaddr FAR *, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, bind,
+ (SOCKET, const struct sockaddr FAR *, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, setsockopt,
+ (SOCKET, int, int, const char FAR *, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, SOCKET, socket, (int, int, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, listen, (SOCKET, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, send, (SOCKET, const char FAR *, int, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, ioctlsocket,
+ (SOCKET, long, u_long FAR *));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, SOCKET, accept,
+ (SOCKET, struct sockaddr FAR *, int FAR *));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, recv, (SOCKET, char FAR *, int, int));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, WSAIoctl,
+ (SOCKET, DWORD, LPVOID, DWORD, LPVOID, DWORD,
+ LPDWORD, LPWSAOVERLAPPED,
+ LPWSAOVERLAPPED_COMPLETION_ROUTINE));
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, getaddrinfo,
+ (const char *nodename, const char *servname,
+ const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, void, freeaddrinfo, (struct addrinfo *res));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, getnameinfo,
+ (const struct sockaddr FAR * sa, socklen_t salen,
+ char FAR * host, size_t hostlen, char FAR * serv,
+ size_t servlen, int flags));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, char *, gai_strerror, (int ecode));
+DECL_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(static, int, WSAAddressToStringA,
+ (LPSOCKADDR, DWORD, LPWSAPROTOCOL_INFO,
+ LPTSTR, LPDWORD));
+#endif
+
+static HMODULE winsock_module = NULL;
+static WSADATA wsadata;
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+static HMODULE winsock2_module = NULL;
+static HMODULE wship6_module = NULL;
+#endif
+
+int sk_startup(int hi, int lo)
+{
+ WORD winsock_ver;
+
+ winsock_ver = MAKEWORD(hi, lo);
+
+ if (p_WSAStartup(winsock_ver, &wsadata)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (LOBYTE(wsadata.wVersion) != LOBYTE(winsock_ver)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+#ifdef NET_SETUP_DIAGNOSTICS
+ {
+ char buf[80];
+ sprintf(buf, "Using WinSock %d.%d", hi, lo);
+ logevent(NULL, buf);
+ }
+#endif
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+void sk_init(void)
+{
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ winsock2_module =
+#endif
+ winsock_module = LoadLibrary("WS2_32.DLL");
+ if (!winsock_module) {
+ winsock_module = LoadLibrary("WSOCK32.DLL");
+ }
+ if (!winsock_module)
+ fatalbox("Unable to load any WinSock library");
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ /* Check if we have getaddrinfo in Winsock */
+ if (GetProcAddress(winsock_module, "getaddrinfo") != NULL) {
+#ifdef NET_SETUP_DIAGNOSTICS
+ logevent(NULL, "Native WinSock IPv6 support detected");
+#endif
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, getaddrinfo);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, freeaddrinfo);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, getnameinfo);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, gai_strerror);
+ } else {
+ /* Fall back to wship6.dll for Windows 2000 */
+ wship6_module = LoadLibrary("wship6.dll");
+ if (wship6_module) {
+#ifdef NET_SETUP_DIAGNOSTICS
+ logevent(NULL, "WSH IPv6 support detected");
+#endif
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(wship6_module, getaddrinfo);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(wship6_module, freeaddrinfo);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(wship6_module, getnameinfo);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(wship6_module, gai_strerror);
+ } else {
+#ifdef NET_SETUP_DIAGNOSTICS
+ logevent(NULL, "No IPv6 support detected");
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock2_module, WSAAddressToStringA);
+#else
+#ifdef NET_SETUP_DIAGNOSTICS
+ logevent(NULL, "PuTTY was built without IPv6 support");
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, WSAAsyncSelect);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, WSAEventSelect);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, select);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, WSAGetLastError);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, WSAEnumNetworkEvents);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, WSAStartup);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, WSACleanup);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, closesocket);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, ntohl);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, htonl);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, htons);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, ntohs);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, gethostname);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, gethostbyname);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, getservbyname);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, inet_addr);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, inet_ntoa);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, connect);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, bind);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, setsockopt);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, socket);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, listen);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, send);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, ioctlsocket);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, accept);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, recv);
+ GET_WINSOCK_FUNCTION(winsock_module, WSAIoctl);
+
+ /* Try to get the best WinSock version we can get */
+ if (!sk_startup(2,2) &&
+ !sk_startup(2,0) &&
+ !sk_startup(1,1)) {
+ fatalbox("Unable to initialise WinSock");
+ }
+
+ sktree = newtree234(cmpfortree);
+}
+
+void sk_cleanup(void)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s;
+ int i;
+
+ if (sktree) {
+ for (i = 0; (s = index234(sktree, i)) != NULL; i++) {
+ p_closesocket(s->s);
+ }
+ freetree234(sktree);
+ sktree = NULL;
+ }
+
+ p_WSACleanup();
+ if (winsock_module)
+ FreeLibrary(winsock_module);
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (wship6_module)
+ FreeLibrary(wship6_module);
+#endif
+}
+
+char *winsock_error_string(int error)
+{
+ switch (error) {
+ case WSAEACCES:
+ return "Network error: Permission denied";
+ case WSAEADDRINUSE:
+ return "Network error: Address already in use";
+ case WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL:
+ return "Network error: Cannot assign requested address";
+ case WSAEAFNOSUPPORT:
+ return
+ "Network error: Address family not supported by protocol family";
+ case WSAEALREADY:
+ return "Network error: Operation already in progress";
+ case WSAECONNABORTED:
+ return "Network error: Software caused connection abort";
+ case WSAECONNREFUSED:
+ return "Network error: Connection refused";
+ case WSAECONNRESET:
+ return "Network error: Connection reset by peer";
+ case WSAEDESTADDRREQ:
+ return "Network error: Destination address required";
+ case WSAEFAULT:
+ return "Network error: Bad address";
+ case WSAEHOSTDOWN:
+ return "Network error: Host is down";
+ case WSAEHOSTUNREACH:
+ return "Network error: No route to host";
+ case WSAEINPROGRESS:
+ return "Network error: Operation now in progress";
+ case WSAEINTR:
+ return "Network error: Interrupted function call";
+ case WSAEINVAL:
+ return "Network error: Invalid argument";
+ case WSAEISCONN:
+ return "Network error: Socket is already connected";
+ case WSAEMFILE:
+ return "Network error: Too many open files";
+ case WSAEMSGSIZE:
+ return "Network error: Message too long";
+ case WSAENETDOWN:
+ return "Network error: Network is down";
+ case WSAENETRESET:
+ return "Network error: Network dropped connection on reset";
+ case WSAENETUNREACH:
+ return "Network error: Network is unreachable";
+ case WSAENOBUFS:
+ return "Network error: No buffer space available";
+ case WSAENOPROTOOPT:
+ return "Network error: Bad protocol option";
+ case WSAENOTCONN:
+ return "Network error: Socket is not connected";
+ case WSAENOTSOCK:
+ return "Network error: Socket operation on non-socket";
+ case WSAEOPNOTSUPP:
+ return "Network error: Operation not supported";
+ case WSAEPFNOSUPPORT:
+ return "Network error: Protocol family not supported";
+ case WSAEPROCLIM:
+ return "Network error: Too many processes";
+ case WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT:
+ return "Network error: Protocol not supported";
+ case WSAEPROTOTYPE:
+ return "Network error: Protocol wrong type for socket";
+ case WSAESHUTDOWN:
+ return "Network error: Cannot send after socket shutdown";
+ case WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT:
+ return "Network error: Socket type not supported";
+ case WSAETIMEDOUT:
+ return "Network error: Connection timed out";
+ case WSAEWOULDBLOCK:
+ return "Network error: Resource temporarily unavailable";
+ case WSAEDISCON:
+ return "Network error: Graceful shutdown in progress";
+ default:
+ return "Unknown network error";
+ }
+}
+
+SockAddr sk_namelookup(const char *host, char **canonicalname,
+ int address_family)
+{
+ SockAddr ret = snew(struct SockAddr_tag);
+ unsigned long a;
+ struct hostent *h = NULL;
+ char realhost[8192];
+ int hint_family;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Default to IPv4. */
+ hint_family = (address_family == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? AF_INET :
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ address_family == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? AF_INET6 :
+#endif
+ AF_UNSPEC);
+
+ /* Clear the structure and default to IPv4. */
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(struct SockAddr_tag));
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ ret->ais = NULL;
+#endif
+ ret->addresses = NULL;
+ ret->resolved = FALSE;
+ ret->refcount = 1;
+ *realhost = '\0';
+
+ if ((a = p_inet_addr(host)) == (unsigned long) INADDR_NONE) {
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ /*
+ * Use getaddrinfo when it's available
+ */
+ if (p_getaddrinfo) {
+ struct addrinfo hints;
+#ifdef NET_SETUP_DIAGNOSTICS
+ logevent(NULL, "Using getaddrinfo() for resolving");
+#endif
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = hint_family;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+ if ((err = p_getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ret->ais)) == 0)
+ ret->resolved = TRUE;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+#ifdef NET_SETUP_DIAGNOSTICS
+ logevent(NULL, "Using gethostbyname() for resolving");
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Otherwise use the IPv4-only gethostbyname...
+ * (NOTE: we don't use gethostbyname as a fallback!)
+ */
+ if ( (h = p_gethostbyname(host)) )
+ ret->resolved = TRUE;
+ else
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ }
+
+ if (!ret->resolved) {
+ ret->error = (err == WSAENETDOWN ? "Network is down" :
+ err == WSAHOST_NOT_FOUND ? "Host does not exist" :
+ err == WSATRY_AGAIN ? "Host not found" :
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ p_getaddrinfo&&p_gai_strerror ? p_gai_strerror(err) :
+#endif
+ "gethostbyname: unknown error");
+ } else {
+ ret->error = NULL;
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ /* If we got an address info use that... */
+ if (ret->ais) {
+ /* Are we in IPv4 fallback mode? */
+ /* We put the IPv4 address into the a variable so we can further-on use the IPv4 code... */
+ if (ret->ais->ai_family == AF_INET)
+ memcpy(&a,
+ (char *) &((SOCKADDR_IN *) ret->ais->
+ ai_addr)->sin_addr, sizeof(a));
+
+ if (ret->ais->ai_canonname)
+ strncpy(realhost, ret->ais->ai_canonname, lenof(realhost));
+ else
+ strncpy(realhost, host, lenof(realhost));
+ }
+ /* We used the IPv4-only gethostbyname()... */
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ int n;
+ for (n = 0; h->h_addr_list[n]; n++);
+ ret->addresses = snewn(n, unsigned long);
+ ret->naddresses = n;
+ for (n = 0; n < ret->naddresses; n++) {
+ memcpy(&a, h->h_addr_list[n], sizeof(a));
+ ret->addresses[n] = p_ntohl(a);
+ }
+ memcpy(&a, h->h_addr, sizeof(a));
+ /* This way we are always sure the h->h_name is valid :) */
+ strncpy(realhost, h->h_name, sizeof(realhost));
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * This must be a numeric IPv4 address because it caused a
+ * success return from inet_addr.
+ */
+ ret->addresses = snewn(1, unsigned long);
+ ret->naddresses = 1;
+ ret->addresses[0] = p_ntohl(a);
+ ret->resolved = TRUE;
+ strncpy(realhost, host, sizeof(realhost));
+ }
+ realhost[lenof(realhost)-1] = '\0';
+ *canonicalname = snewn(1+strlen(realhost), char);
+ strcpy(*canonicalname, realhost);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SockAddr sk_nonamelookup(const char *host)
+{
+ SockAddr ret = snew(struct SockAddr_tag);
+ ret->error = NULL;
+ ret->resolved = FALSE;
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ ret->ais = NULL;
+#endif
+ ret->addresses = NULL;
+ ret->naddresses = 0;
+ ret->refcount = 1;
+ strncpy(ret->hostname, host, lenof(ret->hostname));
+ ret->hostname[lenof(ret->hostname)-1] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int sk_nextaddr(SockAddr addr, SockAddrStep *step)
+{
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (step->ai) {
+ if (step->ai->ai_next) {
+ step->ai = step->ai->ai_next;
+ return TRUE;
+ } else
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (step->curraddr+1 < addr->naddresses) {
+ step->curraddr++;
+ return TRUE;
+ } else {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+}
+
+void sk_getaddr(SockAddr addr, char *buf, int buflen)
+{
+ SockAddrStep step;
+ START_STEP(addr, step);
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (step.ai) {
+ if (p_WSAAddressToStringA) {
+ p_WSAAddressToStringA(step.ai->ai_addr, step.ai->ai_addrlen,
+ NULL, buf, &buflen);
+ } else
+ strncpy(buf, "IPv6", buflen);
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (SOCKADDR_FAMILY(addr, step) == AF_INET) {
+ struct in_addr a;
+ assert(addr->addresses && step.curraddr < addr->naddresses);
+ a.s_addr = p_htonl(addr->addresses[step.curraddr]);
+ strncpy(buf, p_inet_ntoa(a), buflen);
+ buf[buflen-1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ strncpy(buf, addr->hostname, buflen);
+ buf[buflen-1] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
+int sk_hostname_is_local(char *name)
+{
+ return !strcmp(name, "localhost") ||
+ !strcmp(name, "::1") ||
+ !strncmp(name, "127.", 4);
+}
+
+static INTERFACE_INFO local_interfaces[16];
+static int n_local_interfaces; /* 0=not yet, -1=failed, >0=number */
+
+static int ipv4_is_local_addr(struct in_addr addr)
+{
+ if (ipv4_is_loopback(addr))
+ return 1; /* loopback addresses are local */
+ if (!n_local_interfaces) {
+ SOCKET s = p_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ DWORD retbytes;
+
+ if (p_WSAIoctl &&
+ p_WSAIoctl(s, SIO_GET_INTERFACE_LIST, NULL, 0,
+ local_interfaces, sizeof(local_interfaces),
+ &retbytes, NULL, NULL) == 0)
+ n_local_interfaces = retbytes / sizeof(INTERFACE_INFO);
+ else
+ logevent(NULL, "Unable to get list of local IP addresses");
+ }
+ if (n_local_interfaces > 0) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < n_local_interfaces; i++) {
+ SOCKADDR_IN *address =
+ (SOCKADDR_IN *)&local_interfaces[i].iiAddress;
+ if (address->sin_addr.s_addr == addr.s_addr)
+ return 1; /* this address is local */
+ }
+ }
+ return 0; /* this address is not local */
+}
+
+int sk_address_is_local(SockAddr addr)
+{
+ SockAddrStep step;
+ int family;
+ START_STEP(addr, step);
+ family = SOCKADDR_FAMILY(addr, step);
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (family == AF_INET6) {
+ return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK((const struct in6_addr *)step.ai->ai_addr);
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (family == AF_INET) {
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (step.ai) {
+ return ipv4_is_local_addr(((struct sockaddr_in *)step.ai->ai_addr)
+ ->sin_addr);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ struct in_addr a;
+ assert(addr->addresses && step.curraddr < addr->naddresses);
+ a.s_addr = p_htonl(addr->addresses[step.curraddr]);
+ return ipv4_is_local_addr(a);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert(family == AF_UNSPEC);
+ return 0; /* we don't know; assume not */
+ }
+}
+
+int sk_addrtype(SockAddr addr)
+{
+ SockAddrStep step;
+ int family;
+ START_STEP(addr, step);
+ family = SOCKADDR_FAMILY(addr, step);
+
+ return (family == AF_INET ? ADDRTYPE_IPV4 :
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ family == AF_INET6 ? ADDRTYPE_IPV6 :
+#endif
+ ADDRTYPE_NAME);
+}
+
+void sk_addrcopy(SockAddr addr, char *buf)
+{
+ SockAddrStep step;
+ int family;
+ START_STEP(addr, step);
+ family = SOCKADDR_FAMILY(addr, step);
+
+ assert(family != AF_UNSPEC);
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (step.ai) {
+ if (family == AF_INET)
+ memcpy(buf, &((struct sockaddr_in *)step.ai->ai_addr)->sin_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ else if (family == AF_INET6)
+ memcpy(buf, &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)step.ai->ai_addr)->sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ else
+ assert(FALSE);
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (family == AF_INET) {
+ struct in_addr a;
+ assert(addr->addresses && step.curraddr < addr->naddresses);
+ a.s_addr = p_htonl(addr->addresses[step.curraddr]);
+ memcpy(buf, (char*) &a.s_addr, 4);
+ }
+}
+
+void sk_addr_free(SockAddr addr)
+{
+ if (--addr->refcount > 0)
+ return;
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (addr->ais && p_freeaddrinfo)
+ p_freeaddrinfo(addr->ais);
+#endif
+ if (addr->addresses)
+ sfree(addr->addresses);
+ sfree(addr);
+}
+
+SockAddr sk_addr_dup(SockAddr addr)
+{
+ addr->refcount++;
+ return addr;
+}
+
+static Plug sk_tcp_plug(Socket sock, Plug p)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+ Plug ret = s->plug;
+ if (p)
+ s->plug = p;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void sk_tcp_flush(Socket s)
+{
+ /*
+ * We send data to the socket as soon as we can anyway,
+ * so we don't need to do anything here. :-)
+ */
+}
+
+static void sk_tcp_close(Socket s);
+static int sk_tcp_write(Socket s, const char *data, int len);
+static int sk_tcp_write_oob(Socket s, const char *data, int len);
+static void sk_tcp_set_private_ptr(Socket s, void *ptr);
+static void *sk_tcp_get_private_ptr(Socket s);
+static void sk_tcp_set_frozen(Socket s, int is_frozen);
+static const char *sk_tcp_socket_error(Socket s);
+
+extern char *do_select(SOCKET skt, int startup);
+
+Socket sk_register(void *sock, Plug plug)
+{
+ static const struct socket_function_table fn_table = {
+ sk_tcp_plug,
+ sk_tcp_close,
+ sk_tcp_write,
+ sk_tcp_write_oob,
+ sk_tcp_flush,
+ sk_tcp_set_private_ptr,
+ sk_tcp_get_private_ptr,
+ sk_tcp_set_frozen,
+ sk_tcp_socket_error
+ };
+
+ DWORD err;
+ char *errstr;
+ Actual_Socket ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Create Socket structure.
+ */
+ ret = snew(struct Socket_tag);
+ ret->fn = &fn_table;
+ ret->error = NULL;
+ ret->plug = plug;
+ bufchain_init(&ret->output_data);
+ ret->writable = 1; /* to start with */
+ ret->sending_oob = 0;
+ ret->frozen = 1;
+ ret->frozen_readable = 0;
+ ret->localhost_only = 0; /* unused, but best init anyway */
+ ret->pending_error = 0;
+ ret->parent = ret->child = NULL;
+ ret->addr = NULL;
+
+ ret->s = (SOCKET)sock;
+
+ if (ret->s == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ ret->error = winsock_error_string(err);
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+ ret->oobinline = 0;
+
+ /* Set up a select mechanism. This could be an AsyncSelect on a
+ * window, or an EventSelect on an event object. */
+ errstr = do_select(ret->s, 1);
+ if (errstr) {
+ ret->error = errstr;
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+ add234(sktree, ret);
+
+ return (Socket) ret;
+}
+
+static DWORD try_connect(Actual_Socket sock)
+{
+ SOCKET s;
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ SOCKADDR_IN6 a6;
+#endif
+ SOCKADDR_IN a;
+ DWORD err;
+ char *errstr;
+ short localport;
+ int family;
+
+ if (sock->s != INVALID_SOCKET) {
+ do_select(sock->s, 0);
+ p_closesocket(sock->s);
+ }
+
+ plug_log(sock->plug, 0, sock->addr, sock->port, NULL, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ family = SOCKADDR_FAMILY(sock->addr, sock->step);
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the socket from the tree before we overwrite its
+ * internal socket id, because that forms part of the tree's
+ * sorting criterion. We'll add it back before exiting this
+ * function, whether we changed anything or not.
+ */
+ del234(sktree, sock);
+
+ s = p_socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ sock->s = s;
+
+ if (s == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ sock->error = winsock_error_string(err);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if (sock->oobinline) {
+ BOOL b = TRUE;
+ p_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE, (void *) &b, sizeof(b));
+ }
+
+ if (sock->nodelay) {
+ BOOL b = TRUE;
+ p_setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *) &b, sizeof(b));
+ }
+
+ if (sock->keepalive) {
+ BOOL b = TRUE;
+ p_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *) &b, sizeof(b));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Bind to local address.
+ */
+ if (sock->privport)
+ localport = 1023; /* count from 1023 downwards */
+ else
+ localport = 0; /* just use port 0 (ie winsock picks) */
+
+ /* Loop round trying to bind */
+ while (1) {
+ int sockcode;
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (family == AF_INET6) {
+ memset(&a6, 0, sizeof(a6));
+ a6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ /*a6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; */ /* == 0 done by memset() */
+ a6.sin6_port = p_htons(localport);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ a.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ a.sin_addr.s_addr = p_htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+ a.sin_port = p_htons(localport);
+ }
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ sockcode = p_bind(s, (family == AF_INET6 ?
+ (struct sockaddr *) &a6 :
+ (struct sockaddr *) &a),
+ (family == AF_INET6 ? sizeof(a6) : sizeof(a)));
+#else
+ sockcode = p_bind(s, (struct sockaddr *) &a, sizeof(a));
+#endif
+ if (sockcode != SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ err = 0;
+ break; /* done */
+ } else {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ if (err != WSAEADDRINUSE) /* failed, for a bad reason */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (localport == 0)
+ break; /* we're only looping once */
+ localport--;
+ if (localport == 0)
+ break; /* we might have got to the end */
+ }
+
+ if (err) {
+ sock->error = winsock_error_string(err);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Connect to remote address.
+ */
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (sock->step.ai) {
+ if (family == AF_INET6) {
+ a6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ a6.sin6_port = p_htons((short) sock->port);
+ a6.sin6_addr =
+ ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) sock->step.ai->ai_addr)->sin6_addr;
+ a6.sin6_flowinfo = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) sock->step.ai->ai_addr)->sin6_flowinfo;
+ a6.sin6_scope_id = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) sock->step.ai->ai_addr)->sin6_scope_id;
+ } else {
+ a.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ a.sin_addr =
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *) sock->step.ai->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
+ a.sin_port = p_htons((short) sock->port);
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ assert(sock->addr->addresses && sock->step.curraddr < sock->addr->naddresses);
+ a.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ a.sin_addr.s_addr = p_htonl(sock->addr->addresses[sock->step.curraddr]);
+ a.sin_port = p_htons((short) sock->port);
+ }
+
+ /* Set up a select mechanism. This could be an AsyncSelect on a
+ * window, or an EventSelect on an event object. */
+ errstr = do_select(s, 1);
+ if (errstr) {
+ sock->error = errstr;
+ err = 1;
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ p_connect(s,
+ ((family == AF_INET6) ? (struct sockaddr *) &a6 :
+ (struct sockaddr *) &a),
+ (family == AF_INET6) ? sizeof(a6) : sizeof(a))
+#else
+ p_connect(s, (struct sockaddr *) &a, sizeof(a))
+#endif
+ ) == SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ /*
+ * We expect a potential EWOULDBLOCK here, because the
+ * chances are the front end has done a select for
+ * FD_CONNECT, so that connect() will complete
+ * asynchronously.
+ */
+ if ( err != WSAEWOULDBLOCK ) {
+ sock->error = winsock_error_string(err);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we _don't_ get EWOULDBLOCK, the connect has completed
+ * and we should set the socket as writable.
+ */
+ sock->writable = 1;
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+
+ ret:
+
+ /*
+ * No matter what happened, put the socket back in the tree.
+ */
+ add234(sktree, sock);
+
+ if (err)
+ plug_log(sock->plug, 1, sock->addr, sock->port, sock->error, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+Socket sk_new(SockAddr addr, int port, int privport, int oobinline,
+ int nodelay, int keepalive, Plug plug)
+{
+ static const struct socket_function_table fn_table = {
+ sk_tcp_plug,
+ sk_tcp_close,
+ sk_tcp_write,
+ sk_tcp_write_oob,
+ sk_tcp_flush,
+ sk_tcp_set_private_ptr,
+ sk_tcp_get_private_ptr,
+ sk_tcp_set_frozen,
+ sk_tcp_socket_error
+ };
+
+ Actual_Socket ret;
+ DWORD err;
+
+ /*
+ * Create Socket structure.
+ */
+ ret = snew(struct Socket_tag);
+ ret->fn = &fn_table;
+ ret->error = NULL;
+ ret->plug = plug;
+ bufchain_init(&ret->output_data);
+ ret->connected = 0; /* to start with */
+ ret->writable = 0; /* to start with */
+ ret->sending_oob = 0;
+ ret->frozen = 0;
+ ret->frozen_readable = 0;
+ ret->localhost_only = 0; /* unused, but best init anyway */
+ ret->pending_error = 0;
+ ret->parent = ret->child = NULL;
+ ret->oobinline = oobinline;
+ ret->nodelay = nodelay;
+ ret->keepalive = keepalive;
+ ret->privport = privport;
+ ret->port = port;
+ ret->addr = addr;
+ START_STEP(ret->addr, ret->step);
+ ret->s = INVALID_SOCKET;
+
+ err = 0;
+ do {
+ err = try_connect(ret);
+ } while (err && sk_nextaddr(ret->addr, &ret->step));
+
+ return (Socket) ret;
+}
+
+Socket sk_newlistener(char *srcaddr, int port, Plug plug, int local_host_only,
+ int orig_address_family)
+{
+ static const struct socket_function_table fn_table = {
+ sk_tcp_plug,
+ sk_tcp_close,
+ sk_tcp_write,
+ sk_tcp_write_oob,
+ sk_tcp_flush,
+ sk_tcp_set_private_ptr,
+ sk_tcp_get_private_ptr,
+ sk_tcp_set_frozen,
+ sk_tcp_socket_error
+ };
+
+ SOCKET s;
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ SOCKADDR_IN6 a6;
+#endif
+ SOCKADDR_IN a;
+
+ DWORD err;
+ char *errstr;
+ Actual_Socket ret;
+ int retcode;
+ int on = 1;
+
+ int address_family;
+
+ /*
+ * Create Socket structure.
+ */
+ ret = snew(struct Socket_tag);
+ ret->fn = &fn_table;
+ ret->error = NULL;
+ ret->plug = plug;
+ bufchain_init(&ret->output_data);
+ ret->writable = 0; /* to start with */
+ ret->sending_oob = 0;
+ ret->frozen = 0;
+ ret->frozen_readable = 0;
+ ret->localhost_only = local_host_only;
+ ret->pending_error = 0;
+ ret->parent = ret->child = NULL;
+ ret->addr = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Translate address_family from platform-independent constants
+ * into local reality.
+ */
+ address_family = (orig_address_family == ADDRTYPE_IPV4 ? AF_INET :
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ orig_address_family == ADDRTYPE_IPV6 ? AF_INET6 :
+#endif
+ AF_UNSPEC);
+
+ /*
+ * Our default, if passed the `don't care' value
+ * ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC, is to listen on IPv4. If IPv6 is supported,
+ * we will also set up a second socket listening on IPv6, but
+ * the v4 one is primary since that ought to work even on
+ * non-v6-supporting systems.
+ */
+ if (address_family == AF_UNSPEC) address_family = AF_INET;
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ s = p_socket(address_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ ret->s = s;
+
+ if (s == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ ret->error = winsock_error_string(err);
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+ ret->oobinline = 0;
+
+ p_setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (const char *)&on, sizeof(on));
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (address_family == AF_INET6) {
+ memset(&a6, 0, sizeof(a6));
+ a6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ /* FIXME: srcaddr is ignored for IPv6, because I (SGT) don't
+ * know how to do it. :-)
+ * (jeroen:) saddr is specified as an address.. eg 2001:db8::1
+ * Thus we need either a parser that understands [2001:db8::1]:80
+ * style addresses and/or enhance this to understand hostnames too. */
+ if (local_host_only)
+ a6.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;
+ else
+ a6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any;
+ a6.sin6_port = p_htons(port);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ int got_addr = 0;
+ a.sin_family = AF_INET;
+
+ /*
+ * Bind to source address. First try an explicitly
+ * specified one...
+ */
+ if (srcaddr) {
+ a.sin_addr.s_addr = p_inet_addr(srcaddr);
+ if (a.sin_addr.s_addr != INADDR_NONE) {
+ /* Override localhost_only with specified listen addr. */
+ ret->localhost_only = ipv4_is_loopback(a.sin_addr);
+ got_addr = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ... and failing that, go with one of the standard ones.
+ */
+ if (!got_addr) {
+ if (local_host_only)
+ a.sin_addr.s_addr = p_htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+ else
+ a.sin_addr.s_addr = p_htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+ }
+
+ a.sin_port = p_htons((short)port);
+ }
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ retcode = p_bind(s, (address_family == AF_INET6 ?
+ (struct sockaddr *) &a6 :
+ (struct sockaddr *) &a),
+ (address_family ==
+ AF_INET6 ? sizeof(a6) : sizeof(a)));
+#else
+ retcode = p_bind(s, (struct sockaddr *) &a, sizeof(a));
+#endif
+ if (retcode != SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ err = 0;
+ } else {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ }
+
+ if (err) {
+ p_closesocket(s);
+ ret->error = winsock_error_string(err);
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+
+ if (p_listen(s, SOMAXCONN) == SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ p_closesocket(s);
+ ret->error = winsock_error_string(err);
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Set up a select mechanism. This could be an AsyncSelect on a
+ * window, or an EventSelect on an event object. */
+ errstr = do_select(s, 1);
+ if (errstr) {
+ p_closesocket(s);
+ ret->error = errstr;
+ return (Socket) ret;
+ }
+
+ add234(sktree, ret);
+
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ /*
+ * If we were given ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC, we must also create an
+ * IPv6 listening socket and link it to this one.
+ */
+ if (address_family == AF_INET && orig_address_family == ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC) {
+ Actual_Socket other;
+
+ other = (Actual_Socket) sk_newlistener(srcaddr, port, plug,
+ local_host_only, ADDRTYPE_IPV6);
+
+ if (other) {
+ if (!other->error) {
+ other->parent = ret;
+ ret->child = other;
+ } else {
+ sfree(other);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return (Socket) ret;
+}
+
+static void sk_tcp_close(Socket sock)
+{
+ extern char *do_select(SOCKET skt, int startup);
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+
+ if (s->child)
+ sk_tcp_close((Socket)s->child);
+
+ del234(sktree, s);
+ do_select(s->s, 0);
+ p_closesocket(s->s);
+ if (s->addr)
+ sk_addr_free(s->addr);
+ sfree(s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The function which tries to send on a socket once it's deemed
+ * writable.
+ */
+void try_send(Actual_Socket s)
+{
+ while (s->sending_oob || bufchain_size(&s->output_data) > 0) {
+ int nsent;
+ DWORD err;
+ void *data;
+ int len, urgentflag;
+
+ if (s->sending_oob) {
+ urgentflag = MSG_OOB;
+ len = s->sending_oob;
+ data = &s->oobdata;
+ } else {
+ urgentflag = 0;
+ bufchain_prefix(&s->output_data, &data, &len);
+ }
+ nsent = p_send(s->s, data, len, urgentflag);
+ noise_ultralight(nsent);
+ if (nsent <= 0) {
+ err = (nsent < 0 ? p_WSAGetLastError() : 0);
+ if ((err < WSABASEERR && nsent < 0) || err == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) {
+ /*
+ * Perfectly normal: we've sent all we can for the moment.
+ *
+ * (Some WinSock send() implementations can return
+ * <0 but leave no sensible error indication -
+ * WSAGetLastError() is called but returns zero or
+ * a small number - so we check that case and treat
+ * it just like WSAEWOULDBLOCK.)
+ */
+ s->writable = FALSE;
+ return;
+ } else if (nsent == 0 ||
+ err == WSAECONNABORTED || err == WSAECONNRESET) {
+ /*
+ * If send() returns CONNABORTED or CONNRESET, we
+ * unfortunately can't just call plug_closing(),
+ * because it's quite likely that we're currently
+ * _in_ a call from the code we'd be calling back
+ * to, so we'd have to make half the SSH code
+ * reentrant. Instead we flag a pending error on
+ * the socket, to be dealt with (by calling
+ * plug_closing()) at some suitable future moment.
+ */
+ s->pending_error = err;
+ return;
+ } else {
+ /* We're inside the Windows frontend here, so we know
+ * that the frontend handle is unnecessary. */
+ logevent(NULL, winsock_error_string(err));
+ fatalbox("%s", winsock_error_string(err));
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (s->sending_oob) {
+ if (nsent < len) {
+ memmove(s->oobdata, s->oobdata+nsent, len-nsent);
+ s->sending_oob = len - nsent;
+ } else {
+ s->sending_oob = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ bufchain_consume(&s->output_data, nsent);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int sk_tcp_write(Socket sock, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+
+ /*
+ * Add the data to the buffer list on the socket.
+ */
+ bufchain_add(&s->output_data, buf, len);
+
+ /*
+ * Now try sending from the start of the buffer list.
+ */
+ if (s->writable)
+ try_send(s);
+
+ return bufchain_size(&s->output_data);
+}
+
+static int sk_tcp_write_oob(Socket sock, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+
+ /*
+ * Replace the buffer list on the socket with the data.
+ */
+ bufchain_clear(&s->output_data);
+ assert(len <= sizeof(s->oobdata));
+ memcpy(s->oobdata, buf, len);
+ s->sending_oob = len;
+
+ /*
+ * Now try sending from the start of the buffer list.
+ */
+ if (s->writable)
+ try_send(s);
+
+ return s->sending_oob;
+}
+
+int select_result(WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
+{
+ int ret, open;
+ DWORD err;
+ char buf[20480]; /* nice big buffer for plenty of speed */
+ Actual_Socket s;
+ u_long atmark;
+
+ /* wParam is the socket itself */
+
+ if (wParam == 0)
+ return 1; /* boggle */
+
+ s = find234(sktree, (void *) wParam, cmpforsearch);
+ if (!s)
+ return 1; /* boggle */
+
+ if ((err = WSAGETSELECTERROR(lParam)) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * An error has occurred on this socket. Pass it to the
+ * plug.
+ */
+ if (s->addr) {
+ plug_log(s->plug, 1, s->addr, s->port,
+ winsock_error_string(err), err);
+ while (s->addr && sk_nextaddr(s->addr, &s->step)) {
+ err = try_connect(s);
+ }
+ }
+ if (err != 0)
+ return plug_closing(s->plug, winsock_error_string(err), err, 0);
+ else
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ noise_ultralight(lParam);
+
+ switch (WSAGETSELECTEVENT(lParam)) {
+ case FD_CONNECT:
+ s->connected = s->writable = 1;
+ /*
+ * Once a socket is connected, we can stop falling
+ * back through the candidate addresses to connect
+ * to.
+ */
+ if (s->addr) {
+ sk_addr_free(s->addr);
+ s->addr = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ case FD_READ:
+ /* In the case the socket is still frozen, we don't even bother */
+ if (s->frozen) {
+ s->frozen_readable = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have received data on the socket. For an oobinline
+ * socket, this might be data _before_ an urgent pointer,
+ * in which case we send it to the back end with type==1
+ * (data prior to urgent).
+ */
+ if (s->oobinline) {
+ atmark = 1;
+ p_ioctlsocket(s->s, SIOCATMARK, &atmark);
+ /*
+ * Avoid checking the return value from ioctlsocket(),
+ * on the grounds that some WinSock wrappers don't
+ * support it. If it does nothing, we get atmark==1,
+ * which is equivalent to `no OOB pending', so the
+ * effect will be to non-OOB-ify any OOB data.
+ */
+ } else
+ atmark = 1;
+
+ ret = p_recv(s->s, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
+ noise_ultralight(ret);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ if (err == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return plug_closing(s->plug, winsock_error_string(err), err,
+ 0);
+ } else if (0 == ret) {
+ return plug_closing(s->plug, NULL, 0, 0);
+ } else {
+ return plug_receive(s->plug, atmark ? 0 : 1, buf, ret);
+ }
+ break;
+ case FD_OOB:
+ /*
+ * This will only happen on a non-oobinline socket. It
+ * indicates that we can immediately perform an OOB read
+ * and get back OOB data, which we will send to the back
+ * end with type==2 (urgent data).
+ */
+ ret = p_recv(s->s, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_OOB);
+ noise_ultralight(ret);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ char *str = (ret == 0 ? "Internal networking trouble" :
+ winsock_error_string(p_WSAGetLastError()));
+ /* We're inside the Windows frontend here, so we know
+ * that the frontend handle is unnecessary. */
+ logevent(NULL, str);
+ fatalbox("%s", str);
+ } else {
+ return plug_receive(s->plug, 2, buf, ret);
+ }
+ break;
+ case FD_WRITE:
+ {
+ int bufsize_before, bufsize_after;
+ s->writable = 1;
+ bufsize_before = s->sending_oob + bufchain_size(&s->output_data);
+ try_send(s);
+ bufsize_after = s->sending_oob + bufchain_size(&s->output_data);
+ if (bufsize_after < bufsize_before)
+ plug_sent(s->plug, bufsize_after);
+ }
+ break;
+ case FD_CLOSE:
+ /* Signal a close on the socket. First read any outstanding data. */
+ open = 1;
+ do {
+ ret = p_recv(s->s, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ if (err == WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
+ break;
+ return plug_closing(s->plug, winsock_error_string(err),
+ err, 0);
+ } else {
+ if (ret)
+ open &= plug_receive(s->plug, 0, buf, ret);
+ else
+ open &= plug_closing(s->plug, NULL, 0, 0);
+ }
+ } while (ret > 0);
+ return open;
+ case FD_ACCEPT:
+ {
+#ifdef NO_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in isa;
+#else
+ struct sockaddr_storage isa;
+#endif
+ int addrlen = sizeof(isa);
+ SOCKET t; /* socket of connection */
+
+ memset(&isa, 0, sizeof(isa));
+ err = 0;
+ t = p_accept(s->s,(struct sockaddr *)&isa,&addrlen);
+ if (t == INVALID_SOCKET)
+ {
+ err = p_WSAGetLastError();
+ if (err == WSATRY_AGAIN)
+ break;
+ }
+#ifndef NO_IPV6
+ if (isa.ss_family == AF_INET &&
+ s->localhost_only &&
+ !ipv4_is_local_addr(((struct sockaddr_in *)&isa)->sin_addr))
+#else
+ if (s->localhost_only && !ipv4_is_local_addr(isa.sin_addr))
+#endif
+ {
+ p_closesocket(t); /* dodgy WinSock let nonlocal through */
+ } else if (plug_accepting(s->plug, (void*)t)) {
+ p_closesocket(t); /* denied or error */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deal with socket errors detected in try_send().
+ */
+void net_pending_errors(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ Actual_Socket s;
+
+ /*
+ * This might be a fiddly business, because it's just possible
+ * that handling a pending error on one socket might cause
+ * others to be closed. (I can't think of any reason this might
+ * happen in current SSH implementation, but to maintain
+ * generality of this network layer I'll assume the worst.)
+ *
+ * So what we'll do is search the socket list for _one_ socket
+ * with a pending error, and then handle it, and then search
+ * the list again _from the beginning_. Repeat until we make a
+ * pass with no socket errors present. That way we are
+ * protected against the socket list changing under our feet.
+ */
+
+ do {
+ for (i = 0; (s = index234(sktree, i)) != NULL; i++) {
+ if (s->pending_error) {
+ /*
+ * An error has occurred on this socket. Pass it to the
+ * plug.
+ */
+ plug_closing(s->plug,
+ winsock_error_string(s->pending_error),
+ s->pending_error, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Each socket abstraction contains a `void *' private field in
+ * which the client can keep state.
+ */
+static void sk_tcp_set_private_ptr(Socket sock, void *ptr)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+ s->private_ptr = ptr;
+}
+
+static void *sk_tcp_get_private_ptr(Socket sock)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+ return s->private_ptr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Special error values are returned from sk_namelookup and sk_new
+ * if there's a problem. These functions extract an error message,
+ * or return NULL if there's no problem.
+ */
+const char *sk_addr_error(SockAddr addr)
+{
+ return addr->error;
+}
+static const char *sk_tcp_socket_error(Socket sock)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+ return s->error;
+}
+
+static void sk_tcp_set_frozen(Socket sock, int is_frozen)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = (Actual_Socket) sock;
+ if (s->frozen == is_frozen)
+ return;
+ s->frozen = is_frozen;
+ if (!is_frozen) {
+ do_select(s->s, 1);
+ if (s->frozen_readable) {
+ char c;
+ p_recv(s->s, &c, 1, MSG_PEEK);
+ }
+ }
+ s->frozen_readable = 0;
+}
+
+void socket_reselect_all(void)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; (s = index234(sktree, i)) != NULL; i++) {
+ if (!s->frozen)
+ do_select(s->s, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * For Plink: enumerate all sockets currently active.
+ */
+SOCKET first_socket(int *state)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s;
+ *state = 0;
+ s = index234(sktree, (*state)++);
+ return s ? s->s : INVALID_SOCKET;
+}
+
+SOCKET next_socket(int *state)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = index234(sktree, (*state)++);
+ return s ? s->s : INVALID_SOCKET;
+}
+
+extern int socket_writable(SOCKET skt)
+{
+ Actual_Socket s = find234(sktree, (void *)skt, cmpforsearch);
+
+ if (s)
+ return bufchain_size(&s->output_data) > 0;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int net_service_lookup(char *service)
+{
+ struct servent *se;
+ se = p_getservbyname(service, NULL);
+ if (se != NULL)
+ return p_ntohs(se->s_port);
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char *get_hostname(void)
+{
+ int len = 128;
+ char *hostname = NULL;
+ do {
+ len *= 2;
+ hostname = sresize(hostname, len, char);
+ if (p_gethostname(hostname, len) < 0) {
+ sfree(hostname);
+ hostname = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (strlen(hostname) >= len-1);
+ return hostname;
+}
+
+SockAddr platform_get_x11_unix_address(const char *display, int displaynum,
+ char **canonicalname)
+{
+ SockAddr ret = snew(struct SockAddr_tag);
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(struct SockAddr_tag));
+ ret->error = "unix sockets not supported on this platform";
+ ret->refcount = 1;
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/winnoise.c b/tools/plink/winnoise.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bdf869719 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winnoise.c @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/*
+ * Noise generation for PuTTY's cryptographic random number
+ * generator.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "storage.h"
+
+/*
+ * This function is called once, at PuTTY startup, and will do some
+ * seriously silly things like listing directories and getting disk
+ * free space and a process snapshot.
+ */
+
+void noise_get_heavy(void (*func) (void *, int))
+{
+ HANDLE srch;
+ WIN32_FIND_DATA finddata;
+ DWORD pid;
+ char winpath[MAX_PATH + 3];
+
+ GetWindowsDirectory(winpath, sizeof(winpath));
+ strcat(winpath, "\\*");
+ srch = FindFirstFile(winpath, &finddata);
+ if (srch != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ do {
+ func(&finddata, sizeof(finddata));
+ } while (FindNextFile(srch, &finddata));
+ FindClose(srch);
+ }
+
+ pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
+ func(&pid, sizeof(pid));
+
+ read_random_seed(func);
+ /* Update the seed immediately, in case another instance uses it. */
+ random_save_seed();
+}
+
+void random_save_seed(void)
+{
+ int len;
+ void *data;
+
+ if (random_active) {
+ random_get_savedata(&data, &len);
+ write_random_seed(data, len);
+ sfree(data);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called every time the random pool needs
+ * stirring, and will acquire the system time in all available
+ * forms.
+ */
+void noise_get_light(void (*func) (void *, int))
+{
+ SYSTEMTIME systime;
+ DWORD adjust[2];
+ BOOL rubbish;
+
+ GetSystemTime(&systime);
+ func(&systime, sizeof(systime));
+
+ GetSystemTimeAdjustment(&adjust[0], &adjust[1], &rubbish);
+ func(&adjust, sizeof(adjust));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called on a timer, and it will monitor
+ * frequently changing quantities such as the state of physical and
+ * virtual memory, the state of the process's message queue, which
+ * window is in the foreground, which owns the clipboard, etc.
+ */
+void noise_regular(void)
+{
+ HWND w;
+ DWORD z;
+ POINT pt;
+ MEMORYSTATUS memstat;
+ FILETIME times[4];
+
+ w = GetForegroundWindow();
+ random_add_noise(&w, sizeof(w));
+ w = GetCapture();
+ random_add_noise(&w, sizeof(w));
+ w = GetClipboardOwner();
+ random_add_noise(&w, sizeof(w));
+ z = GetQueueStatus(QS_ALLEVENTS);
+ random_add_noise(&z, sizeof(z));
+
+ GetCursorPos(&pt);
+ random_add_noise(&pt, sizeof(pt));
+
+ GlobalMemoryStatus(&memstat);
+ random_add_noise(&memstat, sizeof(memstat));
+
+ GetThreadTimes(GetCurrentThread(), times, times + 1, times + 2,
+ times + 3);
+ random_add_noise(×, sizeof(times));
+ GetProcessTimes(GetCurrentProcess(), times, times + 1, times + 2,
+ times + 3);
+ random_add_noise(×, sizeof(times));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called on every keypress or mouse move, and
+ * will add the current Windows time and performance monitor
+ * counter to the noise pool. It gets the scan code or mouse
+ * position passed in.
+ */
+void noise_ultralight(unsigned long data)
+{
+ DWORD wintime;
+ LARGE_INTEGER perftime;
+
+ random_add_noise(&data, sizeof(DWORD));
+
+ wintime = GetTickCount();
+ random_add_noise(&wintime, sizeof(DWORD));
+
+ if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&perftime))
+ random_add_noise(&perftime, sizeof(perftime));
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/winpgntc.c b/tools/plink/winpgntc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3bfafc972 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winpgntc.c @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/*
+ * Pageant client code.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+
+#define AGENT_COPYDATA_ID 0x804e50ba /* random goop */
+#define AGENT_MAX_MSGLEN 8192
+
+int agent_exists(void)
+{
+ HWND hwnd;
+ hwnd = FindWindow("Pageant", "Pageant");
+ if (!hwnd)
+ return FALSE;
+ else
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unfortunately, this asynchronous agent request mechanism doesn't
+ * appear to work terribly well. I'm going to comment it out for
+ * the moment, and see if I can come up with a better one :-/
+ */
+#ifdef WINDOWS_ASYNC_AGENT
+
+struct agent_query_data {
+ COPYDATASTRUCT cds;
+ unsigned char *mapping;
+ HANDLE handle;
+ char *mapname;
+ HWND hwnd;
+ void (*callback)(void *, void *, int);
+ void *callback_ctx;
+};
+
+DWORD WINAPI agent_query_thread(LPVOID param)
+{
+ struct agent_query_data *data = (struct agent_query_data *)param;
+ unsigned char *ret;
+ int id, retlen;
+
+ id = SendMessage(data->hwnd, WM_COPYDATA, (WPARAM) NULL,
+ (LPARAM) &data->cds);
+ ret = NULL;
+ if (id > 0) {
+ retlen = 4 + GET_32BIT(data->mapping);
+ ret = snewn(retlen, unsigned char);
+ if (ret) {
+ memcpy(ret, data->mapping, retlen);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ret)
+ retlen = 0;
+ UnmapViewOfFile(data->mapping);
+ CloseHandle(data->handle);
+ sfree(data->mapname);
+
+ agent_schedule_callback(data->callback, data->callback_ctx, ret, retlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int agent_query(void *in, int inlen, void **out, int *outlen,
+ void (*callback)(void *, void *, int), void *callback_ctx)
+{
+ HWND hwnd;
+ char *mapname;
+ HANDLE filemap;
+ unsigned char *p, *ret;
+ int id, retlen;
+ COPYDATASTRUCT cds;
+
+ *out = NULL;
+ *outlen = 0;
+
+ hwnd = FindWindow("Pageant", "Pageant");
+ if (!hwnd)
+ return 1; /* *out == NULL, so failure */
+ mapname = dupprintf("PageantRequest%08x", (unsigned)GetCurrentThreadId());
+ filemap = CreateFileMapping(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL, PAGE_READWRITE,
+ 0, AGENT_MAX_MSGLEN, mapname);
+ if (filemap == NULL || filemap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ return 1; /* *out == NULL, so failure */
+ p = MapViewOfFile(filemap, FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0, 0, 0);
+ memcpy(p, in, inlen);
+ cds.dwData = AGENT_COPYDATA_ID;
+ cds.cbData = 1 + strlen(mapname);
+ cds.lpData = mapname;
+#ifdef WINDOWS_ASYNC_AGENT
+ if (callback != NULL && !(flags & FLAG_SYNCAGENT)) {
+ /*
+ * We need an asynchronous Pageant request. Since I know of
+ * no way to stop SendMessage from blocking the thread it's
+ * called in, I see no option but to start a fresh thread.
+ * When we're done we'll PostMessage the result back to our
+ * main window, so that the callback is done in the primary
+ * thread to avoid concurrency.
+ */
+ struct agent_query_data *data = snew(struct agent_query_data);
+ DWORD threadid;
+ data->mapping = p;
+ data->handle = filemap;
+ data->mapname = mapname;
+ data->callback = callback;
+ data->callback_ctx = callback_ctx;
+ data->cds = cds; /* structure copy */
+ data->hwnd = hwnd;
+ if (CreateThread(NULL, 0, agent_query_thread, data, 0, &threadid))
+ return 0;
+ sfree(data);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * The user either passed a null callback (indicating that the
+ * query is required to be synchronous) or CreateThread failed.
+ * Either way, we need a synchronous request.
+ */
+ id = SendMessage(hwnd, WM_COPYDATA, (WPARAM) NULL, (LPARAM) &cds);
+ if (id > 0) {
+ retlen = 4 + GET_32BIT(p);
+ ret = snewn(retlen, unsigned char);
+ if (ret) {
+ memcpy(ret, p, retlen);
+ *out = ret;
+ *outlen = retlen;
+ }
+ }
+ UnmapViewOfFile(p);
+ CloseHandle(filemap);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/winplink.c b/tools/plink/winplink.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..525b1a212 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winplink.c @@ -0,0 +1,719 @@ +/*
+ * PLink - a Windows command-line (stdin/stdout) variant of PuTTY.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#define PUTTY_DO_GLOBALS /* actually _define_ globals */
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "storage.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+
+#define WM_AGENT_CALLBACK (WM_APP + 4)
+
+struct agent_callback {
+ void (*callback)(void *, void *, int);
+ void *callback_ctx;
+ void *data;
+ int len;
+};
+
+void fatalbox(char *p, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: ");
+ va_start(ap, p);
+ vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ if (logctx) {
+ log_free(logctx);
+ logctx = NULL;
+ }
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+}
+void modalfatalbox(char *p, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: ");
+ va_start(ap, p);
+ vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ if (logctx) {
+ log_free(logctx);
+ logctx = NULL;
+ }
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+}
+void connection_fatal(void *frontend, char *p, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: ");
+ va_start(ap, p);
+ vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ if (logctx) {
+ log_free(logctx);
+ logctx = NULL;
+ }
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+}
+void cmdline_error(char *p, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ fprintf(stderr, "plink: ");
+ va_start(ap, p);
+ vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+HANDLE inhandle, outhandle, errhandle;
+struct handle *stdin_handle, *stdout_handle, *stderr_handle;
+DWORD orig_console_mode;
+int connopen;
+
+WSAEVENT netevent;
+
+static Backend *back;
+static void *backhandle;
+static Config cfg;
+
+int term_ldisc(Terminal *term, int mode)
+{
+ return FALSE;
+}
+void ldisc_update(void *frontend, int echo, int edit)
+{
+ /* Update stdin read mode to reflect changes in line discipline. */
+ DWORD mode;
+
+ mode = ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT;
+ if (echo)
+ mode = mode | ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
+ else
+ mode = mode & ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
+ if (edit)
+ mode = mode | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT;
+ else
+ mode = mode & ~ENABLE_LINE_INPUT;
+ SetConsoleMode(inhandle, mode);
+}
+
+char *get_ttymode(void *frontend, const char *mode) { return NULL; }
+
+int from_backend(void *frontend_handle, int is_stderr,
+ const char *data, int len)
+{
+ if (is_stderr) {
+ handle_write(stderr_handle, data, len);
+ } else {
+ handle_write(stdout_handle, data, len);
+ }
+
+ return handle_backlog(stdout_handle) + handle_backlog(stderr_handle);
+}
+
+int from_backend_untrusted(void *frontend_handle, const char *data, int len)
+{
+ /*
+ * No "untrusted" output should get here (the way the code is
+ * currently, it's all diverted by FLAG_STDERR).
+ */
+ assert(!"Unexpected call to from_backend_untrusted()");
+ return 0; /* not reached */
+}
+
+int get_userpass_input(prompts_t *p, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = cmdline_get_passwd_input(p, in, inlen);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ ret = console_get_userpass_input(p, in, inlen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static DWORD main_thread_id;
+
+void agent_schedule_callback(void (*callback)(void *, void *, int),
+ void *callback_ctx, void *data, int len)
+{
+ struct agent_callback *c = snew(struct agent_callback);
+ c->callback = callback;
+ c->callback_ctx = callback_ctx;
+ c->data = data;
+ c->len = len;
+ PostThreadMessage(main_thread_id, WM_AGENT_CALLBACK, 0, (LPARAM)c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Short description of parameters.
+ */
+static void usage(void)
+{
+ printf("PuTTY Link: command-line connection utility\n");
+ printf("%s\n", ver);
+ printf("Usage: plink [options] [user@]host [command]\n");
+ printf(" (\"host\" can also be a PuTTY saved session name)\n");
+ printf("Options:\n");
+ printf(" -V print version information and exit\n");
+ printf(" -pgpfp print PGP key fingerprints and exit\n");
+ printf(" -v show verbose messages\n");
+ printf(" -load sessname Load settings from saved session\n");
+ printf(" -ssh -telnet -rlogin -raw\n");
+ printf(" force use of a particular protocol\n");
+ printf(" -P port connect to specified port\n");
+ printf(" -l user connect with specified username\n");
+ printf(" -batch disable all interactive prompts\n");
+ printf("The following options only apply to SSH connections:\n");
+ printf(" -pw passw login with specified password\n");
+ printf(" -D [listen-IP:]listen-port\n");
+ printf(" Dynamic SOCKS-based port forwarding\n");
+ printf(" -L [listen-IP:]listen-port:host:port\n");
+ printf(" Forward local port to remote address\n");
+ printf(" -R [listen-IP:]listen-port:host:port\n");
+ printf(" Forward remote port to local address\n");
+ printf(" -X -x enable / disable X11 forwarding\n");
+ printf(" -A -a enable / disable agent forwarding\n");
+ printf(" -t -T enable / disable pty allocation\n");
+ printf(" -1 -2 force use of particular protocol version\n");
+ printf(" -4 -6 force use of IPv4 or IPv6\n");
+ printf(" -C enable compression\n");
+ printf(" -i key private key file for authentication\n");
+ printf(" -noagent disable use of Pageant\n");
+ printf(" -agent enable use of Pageant\n");
+ printf(" -m file read remote command(s) from file\n");
+ printf(" -s remote command is an SSH subsystem (SSH-2 only)\n");
+ printf(" -N don't start a shell/command (SSH-2 only)\n");
+ printf(" -nc host:port\n");
+ printf(" open tunnel in place of session (SSH-2 only)\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void version(void)
+{
+ printf("plink: %s\n", ver);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+char *do_select(SOCKET skt, int startup)
+{
+ int events;
+ if (startup) {
+ events = (FD_CONNECT | FD_READ | FD_WRITE |
+ FD_OOB | FD_CLOSE | FD_ACCEPT);
+ } else {
+ events = 0;
+ }
+ if (p_WSAEventSelect(skt, netevent, events) == SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ switch (p_WSAGetLastError()) {
+ case WSAENETDOWN:
+ return "Network is down";
+ default:
+ return "WSAEventSelect(): unknown error";
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int stdin_gotdata(struct handle *h, void *data, int len)
+{
+ if (len < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Special case: report read error.
+ */
+ char buf[4096];
+ FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, -len, 0,
+ buf, lenof(buf), NULL);
+ buf[lenof(buf)-1] = '\0';
+ if (buf[strlen(buf)-1] == '\n')
+ buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read from standard input: %s\n", buf);
+ cleanup_exit(0);
+ }
+ noise_ultralight(len);
+ if (connopen && back->connected(backhandle)) {
+ if (len > 0) {
+ return back->send(backhandle, data, len);
+ } else {
+ back->special(backhandle, TS_EOF);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void stdouterr_sent(struct handle *h, int new_backlog)
+{
+ if (new_backlog < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Special case: report write error.
+ */
+ char buf[4096];
+ FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, -new_backlog, 0,
+ buf, lenof(buf), NULL);
+ buf[lenof(buf)-1] = '\0';
+ if (buf[strlen(buf)-1] == '\n')
+ buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to write to standard %s: %s\n",
+ (h == stdout_handle ? "output" : "error"), buf);
+ cleanup_exit(0);
+ }
+ if (connopen && back->connected(backhandle)) {
+ back->unthrottle(backhandle, (handle_backlog(stdout_handle) +
+ handle_backlog(stderr_handle)));
+ }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int sending;
+ int portnumber = -1;
+ SOCKET *sklist;
+ int skcount, sksize;
+ int exitcode;
+ int errors;
+ int use_subsystem = 0;
+ long now, next;
+
+ sklist = NULL;
+ skcount = sksize = 0;
+ /*
+ * Initialise port and protocol to sensible defaults. (These
+ * will be overridden by more or less anything.)
+ */
+ default_protocol = PROT_SSH;
+ default_port = 22;
+
+ flags = FLAG_STDERR;
+ /*
+ * Process the command line.
+ */
+ do_defaults(NULL, &cfg);
+ loaded_session = FALSE;
+ default_protocol = cfg.protocol;
+ default_port = cfg.port;
+ errors = 0;
+ {
+ /*
+ * Override the default protocol if PLINK_PROTOCOL is set.
+ */
+ char *p = getenv("PLINK_PROTOCOL");
+ if (p) {
+ const Backend *b = backend_from_name(p);
+ if (b) {
+ default_protocol = cfg.protocol = b->protocol;
+ default_port = cfg.port = b->default_port;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ while (--argc) {
+ char *p = *++argv;
+ if (*p == '-') {
+ int ret = cmdline_process_param(p, (argc > 1 ? argv[1] : NULL),
+ 1, &cfg);
+ if (ret == -2) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "plink: option \"%s\" requires an argument\n", p);
+ errors = 1;
+ } else if (ret == 2) {
+ --argc, ++argv;
+ } else if (ret == 1) {
+ continue;
+ } else if (!strcmp(p, "-batch")) {
+ console_batch_mode = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(p, "-s")) {
+ /* Save status to write to cfg later. */
+ use_subsystem = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(p, "-V")) {
+ version();
+ } else if (!strcmp(p, "-pgpfp")) {
+ pgp_fingerprints();
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "plink: unknown option \"%s\"\n", p);
+ errors = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (*p) {
+ if (!cfg_launchable(&cfg)) {
+ char *q = p;
+ /*
+ * If the hostname starts with "telnet:", set the
+ * protocol to Telnet and process the string as a
+ * Telnet URL.
+ */
+ if (!strncmp(q, "telnet:", 7)) {
+ char c;
+
+ q += 7;
+ if (q[0] == '/' && q[1] == '/')
+ q += 2;
+ cfg.protocol = PROT_TELNET;
+ p = q;
+ while (*p && *p != ':' && *p != '/')
+ p++;
+ c = *p;
+ if (*p)
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ if (c == ':')
+ cfg.port = atoi(p);
+ else
+ cfg.port = -1;
+ strncpy(cfg.host, q, sizeof(cfg.host) - 1);
+ cfg.host[sizeof(cfg.host) - 1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ char *r, *user, *host;
+ /*
+ * Before we process the [user@]host string, we
+ * first check for the presence of a protocol
+ * prefix (a protocol name followed by ",").
+ */
+ r = strchr(p, ',');
+ if (r) {
+ const Backend *b;
+ *r = '\0';
+ b = backend_from_name(p);
+ if (b) {
+ default_protocol = cfg.protocol = b->protocol;
+ portnumber = b->default_port;
+ }
+ p = r + 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A nonzero length string followed by an @ is treated
+ * as a username. (We discount an _initial_ @.) The
+ * rest of the string (or the whole string if no @)
+ * is treated as a session name and/or hostname.
+ */
+ r = strrchr(p, '@');
+ if (r == p)
+ p++, r = NULL; /* discount initial @ */
+ if (r) {
+ *r++ = '\0';
+ user = p, host = r;
+ } else {
+ user = NULL, host = p;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now attempt to load a saved session with the
+ * same name as the hostname.
+ */
+ {
+ Config cfg2;
+ do_defaults(host, &cfg2);
+ if (loaded_session || !cfg_launchable(&cfg2)) {
+ /* No settings for this host; use defaults */
+ /* (or session was already loaded with -load) */
+ strncpy(cfg.host, host, sizeof(cfg.host) - 1);
+ cfg.host[sizeof(cfg.host) - 1] = '\0';
+ cfg.port = default_port;
+ } else {
+ cfg = cfg2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (user) {
+ /* Patch in specified username. */
+ strncpy(cfg.username, user,
+ sizeof(cfg.username) - 1);
+ cfg.username[sizeof(cfg.username) - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ }
+ } else {
+ char *command;
+ int cmdlen, cmdsize;
+ cmdlen = cmdsize = 0;
+ command = NULL;
+
+ while (argc) {
+ while (*p) {
+ if (cmdlen >= cmdsize) {
+ cmdsize = cmdlen + 512;
+ command = sresize(command, cmdsize, char);
+ }
+ command[cmdlen++]=*p++;
+ }
+ if (cmdlen >= cmdsize) {
+ cmdsize = cmdlen + 512;
+ command = sresize(command, cmdsize, char);
+ }
+ command[cmdlen++]=' '; /* always add trailing space */
+ if (--argc) p = *++argv;
+ }
+ if (cmdlen) command[--cmdlen]='\0';
+ /* change trailing blank to NUL */
+ cfg.remote_cmd_ptr = command;
+ cfg.remote_cmd_ptr2 = NULL;
+ cfg.nopty = TRUE; /* command => no terminal */
+
+ break; /* done with cmdline */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (errors)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!cfg_launchable(&cfg)) {
+ usage();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Trim leading whitespace off the hostname if it's there.
+ */
+ {
+ int space = strspn(cfg.host, " \t");
+ memmove(cfg.host, cfg.host+space, 1+strlen(cfg.host)-space);
+ }
+
+ /* See if host is of the form user@host */
+ if (cfg_launchable(&cfg)) {
+ char *atsign = strrchr(cfg.host, '@');
+ /* Make sure we're not overflowing the user field */
+ if (atsign) {
+ if (atsign - cfg.host < sizeof cfg.username) {
+ strncpy(cfg.username, cfg.host, atsign - cfg.host);
+ cfg.username[atsign - cfg.host] = '\0';
+ }
+ memmove(cfg.host, atsign + 1, 1 + strlen(atsign + 1));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Perform command-line overrides on session configuration.
+ */
+ cmdline_run_saved(&cfg);
+
+ /*
+ * Apply subsystem status.
+ */
+ if (use_subsystem)
+ cfg.ssh_subsys = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Trim a colon suffix off the hostname if it's there.
+ */
+ cfg.host[strcspn(cfg.host, ":")] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Remove any remaining whitespace from the hostname.
+ */
+ {
+ int p1 = 0, p2 = 0;
+ while (cfg.host[p2] != '\0') {
+ if (cfg.host[p2] != ' ' && cfg.host[p2] != '\t') {
+ cfg.host[p1] = cfg.host[p2];
+ p1++;
+ }
+ p2++;
+ }
+ cfg.host[p1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (!cfg.remote_cmd_ptr && !*cfg.remote_cmd && !*cfg.ssh_nc_host)
+ flags |= FLAG_INTERACTIVE;
+
+ /*
+ * Select protocol. This is farmed out into a table in a
+ * separate file to enable an ssh-free variant.
+ */
+ back = backend_from_proto(cfg.protocol);
+ if (back == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Internal fault: Unsupported protocol found\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Select port.
+ */
+ if (portnumber != -1)
+ cfg.port = portnumber;
+
+ sk_init();
+ if (p_WSAEventSelect == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Plink requires WinSock 2\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ logctx = log_init(NULL, &cfg);
+ console_provide_logctx(logctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Start up the connection.
+ */
+ netevent = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
+ {
+ const char *error;
+ char *realhost;
+ /* nodelay is only useful if stdin is a character device (console) */
+ int nodelay = cfg.tcp_nodelay &&
+ (GetFileType(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE)) == FILE_TYPE_CHAR);
+
+ error = back->init(NULL, &backhandle, &cfg, cfg.host, cfg.port,
+ &realhost, nodelay, cfg.tcp_keepalives);
+ if (error) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open connection:\n%s", error);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ back->provide_logctx(backhandle, logctx);
+ sfree(realhost);
+ }
+ connopen = 1;
+
+ inhandle = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+ outhandle = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
+ errhandle = GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE);
+
+ /*
+ * Turn off ECHO and LINE input modes. We don't care if this
+ * call fails, because we know we aren't necessarily running in
+ * a console.
+ */
+ GetConsoleMode(inhandle, &orig_console_mode);
+ SetConsoleMode(inhandle, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
+
+ /*
+ * Pass the output handles to the handle-handling subsystem.
+ * (The input one we leave until we're through the
+ * authentication process.)
+ */
+ stdout_handle = handle_output_new(outhandle, stdouterr_sent, NULL, 0);
+ stderr_handle = handle_output_new(errhandle, stdouterr_sent, NULL, 0);
+
+ main_thread_id = GetCurrentThreadId();
+
+ sending = FALSE;
+
+ now = GETTICKCOUNT();
+
+ while (1) {
+ int nhandles;
+ HANDLE *handles;
+ int n;
+ DWORD ticks;
+
+ if (!sending && back->sendok(backhandle)) {
+ stdin_handle = handle_input_new(inhandle, stdin_gotdata, NULL,
+ 0);
+ sending = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (run_timers(now, &next)) {
+ ticks = next - GETTICKCOUNT();
+ if (ticks < 0) ticks = 0; /* just in case */
+ } else {
+ ticks = INFINITE;
+ }
+
+ handles = handle_get_events(&nhandles);
+ handles = sresize(handles, nhandles+1, HANDLE);
+ handles[nhandles] = netevent;
+ n = MsgWaitForMultipleObjects(nhandles+1, handles, FALSE, ticks,
+ QS_POSTMESSAGE);
+ if ((unsigned)(n - WAIT_OBJECT_0) < (unsigned)nhandles) {
+ handle_got_event(handles[n - WAIT_OBJECT_0]);
+ } else if (n == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + nhandles) {
+ WSANETWORKEVENTS things;
+ SOCKET socket;
+ extern SOCKET first_socket(int *), next_socket(int *);
+ extern int select_result(WPARAM, LPARAM);
+ int i, socketstate;
+
+ /*
+ * We must not call select_result() for any socket
+ * until we have finished enumerating within the tree.
+ * This is because select_result() may close the socket
+ * and modify the tree.
+ */
+ /* Count the active sockets. */
+ i = 0;
+ for (socket = first_socket(&socketstate);
+ socket != INVALID_SOCKET;
+ socket = next_socket(&socketstate)) i++;
+
+ /* Expand the buffer if necessary. */
+ if (i > sksize) {
+ sksize = i + 16;
+ sklist = sresize(sklist, sksize, SOCKET);
+ }
+
+ /* Retrieve the sockets into sklist. */
+ skcount = 0;
+ for (socket = first_socket(&socketstate);
+ socket != INVALID_SOCKET;
+ socket = next_socket(&socketstate)) {
+ sklist[skcount++] = socket;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we're done enumerating; go through the list. */
+ for (i = 0; i < skcount; i++) {
+ WPARAM wp;
+ socket = sklist[i];
+ wp = (WPARAM) socket;
+ if (!p_WSAEnumNetworkEvents(socket, NULL, &things)) {
+ static const struct { int bit, mask; } eventtypes[] = {
+ {FD_CONNECT_BIT, FD_CONNECT},
+ {FD_READ_BIT, FD_READ},
+ {FD_CLOSE_BIT, FD_CLOSE},
+ {FD_OOB_BIT, FD_OOB},
+ {FD_WRITE_BIT, FD_WRITE},
+ {FD_ACCEPT_BIT, FD_ACCEPT},
+ };
+ int e;
+
+ noise_ultralight(socket);
+ noise_ultralight(things.lNetworkEvents);
+
+ for (e = 0; e < lenof(eventtypes); e++)
+ if (things.lNetworkEvents & eventtypes[e].mask) {
+ LPARAM lp;
+ int err = things.iErrorCode[eventtypes[e].bit];
+ lp = WSAMAKESELECTREPLY(eventtypes[e].mask, err);
+ connopen &= select_result(wp, lp);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (n == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + nhandles + 1) {
+ MSG msg;
+ while (PeekMessage(&msg, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE,
+ WM_AGENT_CALLBACK, WM_AGENT_CALLBACK,
+ PM_REMOVE)) {
+ struct agent_callback *c = (struct agent_callback *)msg.lParam;
+ c->callback(c->callback_ctx, c->data, c->len);
+ sfree(c);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (n == WAIT_TIMEOUT) {
+ now = next;
+ } else {
+ now = GETTICKCOUNT();
+ }
+
+ sfree(handles);
+
+ if (sending)
+ handle_unthrottle(stdin_handle, back->sendbuffer(backhandle));
+
+ if ((!connopen || !back->connected(backhandle)) &&
+ handle_backlog(stdout_handle) + handle_backlog(stderr_handle) == 0)
+ break; /* we closed the connection */
+ }
+ exitcode = back->exitcode(backhandle);
+ if (exitcode < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Remote process exit code unavailable\n");
+ exitcode = 1; /* this is an error condition */
+ }
+ cleanup_exit(exitcode);
+ return 0; /* placate compiler warning */
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/winproxy.c b/tools/plink/winproxy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..45998e400 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winproxy.c @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +/*
+ * winproxy.c: Windows implementation of platform_new_connection(),
+ * supporting an OpenSSH-like proxy command via the winhandl.c
+ * mechanism.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define DEFINE_PLUG_METHOD_MACROS
+#include "tree234.h"
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "network.h"
+#include "proxy.h"
+
+typedef struct Socket_localproxy_tag *Local_Proxy_Socket;
+
+struct Socket_localproxy_tag {
+ const struct socket_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */
+
+ HANDLE to_cmd_H, from_cmd_H;
+ struct handle *to_cmd_h, *from_cmd_h;
+
+ char *error;
+
+ Plug plug;
+
+ void *privptr;
+};
+
+int localproxy_gotdata(struct handle *h, void *data, int len)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) handle_get_privdata(h);
+
+ if (len < 0) {
+ return plug_closing(ps->plug, "Read error from local proxy command",
+ 0, 0);
+ } else if (len == 0) {
+ return plug_closing(ps->plug, NULL, 0, 0);
+ } else {
+ return plug_receive(ps->plug, 0, data, len);
+ }
+}
+
+void localproxy_sentdata(struct handle *h, int new_backlog)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) handle_get_privdata(h);
+
+ plug_sent(ps->plug, new_backlog);
+}
+
+static Plug sk_localproxy_plug (Socket s, Plug p)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s;
+ Plug ret = ps->plug;
+ if (p)
+ ps->plug = p;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void sk_localproxy_close (Socket s)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ handle_free(ps->to_cmd_h);
+ handle_free(ps->from_cmd_h);
+ CloseHandle(ps->to_cmd_H);
+ CloseHandle(ps->from_cmd_H);
+
+ sfree(ps);
+}
+
+static int sk_localproxy_write (Socket s, const char *data, int len)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ return handle_write(ps->to_cmd_h, data, len);
+}
+
+static int sk_localproxy_write_oob(Socket s, const char *data, int len)
+{
+ /*
+ * oob data is treated as inband; nasty, but nothing really
+ * better we can do
+ */
+ return sk_localproxy_write(s, data, len);
+}
+
+static void sk_localproxy_flush(Socket s)
+{
+ /* Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s; */
+ /* do nothing */
+}
+
+static void sk_localproxy_set_private_ptr(Socket s, void *ptr)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s;
+ ps->privptr = ptr;
+}
+
+static void *sk_localproxy_get_private_ptr(Socket s)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s;
+ return ps->privptr;
+}
+
+static void sk_localproxy_set_frozen(Socket s, int is_frozen)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME
+ */
+}
+
+static const char *sk_localproxy_socket_error(Socket s)
+{
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ps = (Local_Proxy_Socket) s;
+ return ps->error;
+}
+
+Socket platform_new_connection(SockAddr addr, char *hostname,
+ int port, int privport,
+ int oobinline, int nodelay, int keepalive,
+ Plug plug, const Config *cfg)
+{
+ char *cmd;
+
+ static const struct socket_function_table socket_fn_table = {
+ sk_localproxy_plug,
+ sk_localproxy_close,
+ sk_localproxy_write,
+ sk_localproxy_write_oob,
+ sk_localproxy_flush,
+ sk_localproxy_set_private_ptr,
+ sk_localproxy_get_private_ptr,
+ sk_localproxy_set_frozen,
+ sk_localproxy_socket_error
+ };
+
+ Local_Proxy_Socket ret;
+ HANDLE us_to_cmd, us_from_cmd, cmd_to_us, cmd_from_us;
+ SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa;
+ STARTUPINFO si;
+ PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
+
+ if (cfg->proxy_type != PROXY_CMD)
+ return NULL;
+
+ cmd = format_telnet_command(addr, port, cfg);
+
+ {
+ char *msg = dupprintf("Starting local proxy command: %s", cmd);
+ /* We're allowed to pass NULL here, because we're part of the Windows
+ * front end so we know logevent doesn't expect any data. */
+ logevent(NULL, msg);
+ sfree(msg);
+ }
+
+ ret = snew(struct Socket_localproxy_tag);
+ ret->fn = &socket_fn_table;
+ ret->plug = plug;
+ ret->error = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Create the pipes to the proxy command, and spawn the proxy
+ * command process.
+ */
+ sa.nLength = sizeof(sa);
+ sa.lpSecurityDescriptor = NULL; /* default */
+ sa.bInheritHandle = TRUE;
+ if (!CreatePipe(&us_from_cmd, &cmd_to_us, &sa, 0)) {
+ ret->error = dupprintf("Unable to create pipes for proxy command");
+ return (Socket)ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!CreatePipe(&cmd_from_us, &us_to_cmd, &sa, 0)) {
+ CloseHandle(us_from_cmd);
+ CloseHandle(cmd_to_us);
+ ret->error = dupprintf("Unable to create pipes for proxy command");
+ return (Socket)ret;
+ }
+
+ SetHandleInformation(us_to_cmd, HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0);
+ SetHandleInformation(us_from_cmd, HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0);
+
+ si.cb = sizeof(si);
+ si.lpReserved = NULL;
+ si.lpDesktop = NULL;
+ si.lpTitle = NULL;
+ si.dwFlags = STARTF_USESTDHANDLES;
+ si.cbReserved2 = 0;
+ si.lpReserved2 = NULL;
+ si.hStdInput = cmd_from_us;
+ si.hStdOutput = cmd_to_us;
+ si.hStdError = NULL;
+ CreateProcess(NULL, cmd, NULL, NULL, TRUE,
+ CREATE_NO_WINDOW | NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS,
+ NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
+
+ CloseHandle(cmd_from_us);
+ CloseHandle(cmd_to_us);
+
+ ret->to_cmd_H = us_to_cmd;
+ ret->from_cmd_H = us_from_cmd;
+
+ ret->from_cmd_h = handle_input_new(ret->from_cmd_H, localproxy_gotdata,
+ ret, 0);
+ ret->to_cmd_h = handle_output_new(ret->to_cmd_H, localproxy_sentdata,
+ ret, 0);
+
+ /* We are responsible for this and don't need it any more */
+ sk_addr_free(addr);
+
+ return (Socket) ret;
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/winstore.c b/tools/plink/winstore.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b1b3d3a66 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winstore.c @@ -0,0 +1,656 @@ +/*
+ * winstore.c: Windows-specific implementation of the interface
+ * defined in storage.h.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "storage.h"
+
+#include <shlobj.h>
+#ifndef CSIDL_APPDATA
+#define CSIDL_APPDATA 0x001a
+#endif
+#ifndef CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA
+#define CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA 0x001c
+#endif
+
+static const char *const puttystr = PUTTY_REG_POS "\\Sessions";
+
+static const char hex[16] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+static int tried_shgetfolderpath = FALSE;
+static HMODULE shell32_module = NULL;
+typedef HRESULT (WINAPI *p_SHGetFolderPath_t)
+ (HWND, int, HANDLE, DWORD, LPTSTR);
+static p_SHGetFolderPath_t p_SHGetFolderPath = NULL;
+
+static void mungestr(const char *in, char *out)
+{
+ int candot = 0;
+
+ while (*in) {
+ if (*in == ' ' || *in == '\\' || *in == '*' || *in == '?' ||
+ *in == '%' || *in < ' ' || *in > '~' || (*in == '.'
+ && !candot)) {
+ *out++ = '%';
+ *out++ = hex[((unsigned char) *in) >> 4];
+ *out++ = hex[((unsigned char) *in) & 15];
+ } else
+ *out++ = *in;
+ in++;
+ candot = 1;
+ }
+ *out = '\0';
+ return;
+}
+
+static void unmungestr(const char *in, char *out, int outlen)
+{
+ while (*in) {
+ if (*in == '%' && in[1] && in[2]) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ i = in[1] - '0';
+ i -= (i > 9 ? 7 : 0);
+ j = in[2] - '0';
+ j -= (j > 9 ? 7 : 0);
+
+ *out++ = (i << 4) + j;
+ if (!--outlen)
+ return;
+ in += 3;
+ } else {
+ *out++ = *in++;
+ if (!--outlen)
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ *out = '\0';
+ return;
+}
+
+void *open_settings_w(const char *sessionname, char **errmsg)
+{
+ HKEY subkey1, sesskey;
+ int ret;
+ char *p;
+
+ *errmsg = NULL;
+
+ if (!sessionname || !*sessionname)
+ sessionname = "Default Settings";
+
+ p = snewn(3 * strlen(sessionname) + 1, char);
+ mungestr(sessionname, p);
+
+ ret = RegCreateKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, puttystr, &subkey1);
+ if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ sfree(p);
+ *errmsg = dupprintf("Unable to create registry key\n"
+ "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\%s", puttystr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = RegCreateKey(subkey1, p, &sesskey);
+ RegCloseKey(subkey1);
+ if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ *errmsg = dupprintf("Unable to create registry key\n"
+ "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\%s\\%s", puttystr, p);
+ sfree(p);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sfree(p);
+ return (void *) sesskey;
+}
+
+void write_setting_s(void *handle, const char *key, const char *value)
+{
+ if (handle)
+ RegSetValueEx((HKEY) handle, key, 0, REG_SZ, value,
+ 1 + strlen(value));
+}
+
+void write_setting_i(void *handle, const char *key, int value)
+{
+ if (handle)
+ RegSetValueEx((HKEY) handle, key, 0, REG_DWORD,
+ (CONST BYTE *) &value, sizeof(value));
+}
+
+void close_settings_w(void *handle)
+{
+ RegCloseKey((HKEY) handle);
+}
+
+void *open_settings_r(const char *sessionname)
+{
+ HKEY subkey1, sesskey;
+ char *p;
+
+ if (!sessionname || !*sessionname)
+ sessionname = "Default Settings";
+
+ p = snewn(3 * strlen(sessionname) + 1, char);
+ mungestr(sessionname, p);
+
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, puttystr, &subkey1) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ sesskey = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (RegOpenKey(subkey1, p, &sesskey) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ sesskey = NULL;
+ }
+ RegCloseKey(subkey1);
+ }
+
+ sfree(p);
+
+ return (void *) sesskey;
+}
+
+char *read_setting_s(void *handle, const char *key, char *buffer, int buflen)
+{
+ DWORD type, size;
+ size = buflen;
+
+ if (!handle ||
+ RegQueryValueEx((HKEY) handle, key, 0,
+ &type, buffer, &size) != ERROR_SUCCESS ||
+ type != REG_SZ) return NULL;
+ else
+ return buffer;
+}
+
+int read_setting_i(void *handle, const char *key, int defvalue)
+{
+ DWORD type, val, size;
+ size = sizeof(val);
+
+ if (!handle ||
+ RegQueryValueEx((HKEY) handle, key, 0, &type,
+ (BYTE *) &val, &size) != ERROR_SUCCESS ||
+ size != sizeof(val) || type != REG_DWORD)
+ return defvalue;
+ else
+ return val;
+}
+
+int read_setting_fontspec(void *handle, const char *name, FontSpec *result)
+{
+ char *settingname;
+ FontSpec ret;
+
+ if (!read_setting_s(handle, name, ret.name, sizeof(ret.name)))
+ return 0;
+ settingname = dupcat(name, "IsBold", NULL);
+ ret.isbold = read_setting_i(handle, settingname, -1);
+ sfree(settingname);
+ if (ret.isbold == -1) return 0;
+ settingname = dupcat(name, "CharSet", NULL);
+ ret.charset = read_setting_i(handle, settingname, -1);
+ sfree(settingname);
+ if (ret.charset == -1) return 0;
+ settingname = dupcat(name, "Height", NULL);
+ ret.height = read_setting_i(handle, settingname, INT_MIN);
+ sfree(settingname);
+ if (ret.height == INT_MIN) return 0;
+ *result = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void write_setting_fontspec(void *handle, const char *name, FontSpec font)
+{
+ char *settingname;
+
+ write_setting_s(handle, name, font.name);
+ settingname = dupcat(name, "IsBold", NULL);
+ write_setting_i(handle, settingname, font.isbold);
+ sfree(settingname);
+ settingname = dupcat(name, "CharSet", NULL);
+ write_setting_i(handle, settingname, font.charset);
+ sfree(settingname);
+ settingname = dupcat(name, "Height", NULL);
+ write_setting_i(handle, settingname, font.height);
+ sfree(settingname);
+}
+
+int read_setting_filename(void *handle, const char *name, Filename *result)
+{
+ return !!read_setting_s(handle, name, result->path, sizeof(result->path));
+}
+
+void write_setting_filename(void *handle, const char *name, Filename result)
+{
+ write_setting_s(handle, name, result.path);
+}
+
+void close_settings_r(void *handle)
+{
+ RegCloseKey((HKEY) handle);
+}
+
+void del_settings(const char *sessionname)
+{
+ HKEY subkey1;
+ char *p;
+
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, puttystr, &subkey1) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
+ return;
+
+ p = snewn(3 * strlen(sessionname) + 1, char);
+ mungestr(sessionname, p);
+ RegDeleteKey(subkey1, p);
+ sfree(p);
+
+ RegCloseKey(subkey1);
+}
+
+struct enumsettings {
+ HKEY key;
+ int i;
+};
+
+void *enum_settings_start(void)
+{
+ struct enumsettings *ret;
+ HKEY key;
+
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, puttystr, &key) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = snew(struct enumsettings);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret->key = key;
+ ret->i = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+char *enum_settings_next(void *handle, char *buffer, int buflen)
+{
+ struct enumsettings *e = (struct enumsettings *) handle;
+ char *otherbuf;
+ otherbuf = snewn(3 * buflen, char);
+ if (RegEnumKey(e->key, e->i++, otherbuf, 3 * buflen) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ unmungestr(otherbuf, buffer, buflen);
+ sfree(otherbuf);
+ return buffer;
+ } else {
+ sfree(otherbuf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void enum_settings_finish(void *handle)
+{
+ struct enumsettings *e = (struct enumsettings *) handle;
+ RegCloseKey(e->key);
+ sfree(e);
+}
+
+static void hostkey_regname(char *buffer, const char *hostname,
+ int port, const char *keytype)
+{
+ int len;
+ strcpy(buffer, keytype);
+ strcat(buffer, "@");
+ len = strlen(buffer);
+ len += sprintf(buffer + len, "%d:", port);
+ mungestr(hostname, buffer + strlen(buffer));
+}
+
+int verify_host_key(const char *hostname, int port,
+ const char *keytype, const char *key)
+{
+ char *otherstr, *regname;
+ int len;
+ HKEY rkey;
+ DWORD readlen;
+ DWORD type;
+ int ret, compare;
+
+ len = 1 + strlen(key);
+
+ /*
+ * Now read a saved key in from the registry and see what it
+ * says.
+ */
+ otherstr = snewn(len, char);
+ regname = snewn(3 * (strlen(hostname) + strlen(keytype)) + 15, char);
+
+ hostkey_regname(regname, hostname, port, keytype);
+
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, PUTTY_REG_POS "\\SshHostKeys",
+ &rkey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
+ return 1; /* key does not exist in registry */
+
+ readlen = len;
+ ret = RegQueryValueEx(rkey, regname, NULL, &type, otherstr, &readlen);
+
+ if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS && ret != ERROR_MORE_DATA &&
+ !strcmp(keytype, "rsa")) {
+ /*
+ * Key didn't exist. If the key type is RSA, we'll try
+ * another trick, which is to look up the _old_ key format
+ * under just the hostname and translate that.
+ */
+ char *justhost = regname + 1 + strcspn(regname, ":");
+ char *oldstyle = snewn(len + 10, char); /* safety margin */
+ readlen = len;
+ ret = RegQueryValueEx(rkey, justhost, NULL, &type,
+ oldstyle, &readlen);
+
+ if (ret == ERROR_SUCCESS && type == REG_SZ) {
+ /*
+ * The old format is two old-style bignums separated by
+ * a slash. An old-style bignum is made of groups of
+ * four hex digits: digits are ordered in sensible
+ * (most to least significant) order within each group,
+ * but groups are ordered in silly (least to most)
+ * order within the bignum. The new format is two
+ * ordinary C-format hex numbers (0xABCDEFG...XYZ, with
+ * A nonzero except in the special case 0x0, which
+ * doesn't appear anyway in RSA keys) separated by a
+ * comma. All hex digits are lowercase in both formats.
+ */
+ char *p = otherstr;
+ char *q = oldstyle;
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ int ndigits, nwords;
+ *p++ = '0';
+ *p++ = 'x';
+ ndigits = strcspn(q, "/"); /* find / or end of string */
+ nwords = ndigits / 4;
+ /* now trim ndigits to remove leading zeros */
+ while (q[(ndigits - 1) ^ 3] == '0' && ndigits > 1)
+ ndigits--;
+ /* now move digits over to new string */
+ for (j = 0; j < ndigits; j++)
+ p[ndigits - 1 - j] = q[j ^ 3];
+ p += ndigits;
+ q += nwords * 4;
+ if (*q) {
+ q++; /* eat the slash */
+ *p++ = ','; /* add a comma */
+ }
+ *p = '\0'; /* terminate the string */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now _if_ this key matches, we'll enter it in the new
+ * format. If not, we'll assume something odd went
+ * wrong, and hyper-cautiously do nothing.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(otherstr, key))
+ RegSetValueEx(rkey, regname, 0, REG_SZ, otherstr,
+ strlen(otherstr) + 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ RegCloseKey(rkey);
+
+ compare = strcmp(otherstr, key);
+
+ sfree(otherstr);
+ sfree(regname);
+
+ if (ret == ERROR_MORE_DATA ||
+ (ret == ERROR_SUCCESS && type == REG_SZ && compare))
+ return 2; /* key is different in registry */
+ else if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS || type != REG_SZ)
+ return 1; /* key does not exist in registry */
+ else
+ return 0; /* key matched OK in registry */
+}
+
+void store_host_key(const char *hostname, int port,
+ const char *keytype, const char *key)
+{
+ char *regname;
+ HKEY rkey;
+
+ regname = snewn(3 * (strlen(hostname) + strlen(keytype)) + 15, char);
+
+ hostkey_regname(regname, hostname, port, keytype);
+
+ if (RegCreateKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, PUTTY_REG_POS "\\SshHostKeys",
+ &rkey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ RegSetValueEx(rkey, regname, 0, REG_SZ, key, strlen(key) + 1);
+ RegCloseKey(rkey);
+ } /* else key does not exist in registry */
+
+ sfree(regname);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open (or delete) the random seed file.
+ */
+enum { DEL, OPEN_R, OPEN_W };
+static int try_random_seed(char const *path, int action, HANDLE *ret)
+{
+ if (action == DEL) {
+ remove(path);
+ *ret = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+ return FALSE; /* so we'll do the next ones too */
+ }
+
+ *ret = CreateFile(path,
+ action == OPEN_W ? GENERIC_WRITE : GENERIC_READ,
+ action == OPEN_W ? 0 : (FILE_SHARE_READ |
+ FILE_SHARE_WRITE),
+ NULL,
+ action == OPEN_W ? CREATE_ALWAYS : OPEN_EXISTING,
+ action == OPEN_W ? FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL : 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ return (*ret != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+}
+
+static HANDLE access_random_seed(int action)
+{
+ HKEY rkey;
+ DWORD type, size;
+ HANDLE rethandle;
+ char seedpath[2 * MAX_PATH + 10] = "\0";
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate over a selection of possible random seed paths until
+ * we find one that works.
+ *
+ * We do this iteration separately for reading and writing,
+ * meaning that we will automatically migrate random seed files
+ * if a better location becomes available (by reading from the
+ * best location in which we actually find one, and then
+ * writing to the best location in which we can _create_ one).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * First, try the location specified by the user in the
+ * Registry, if any.
+ */
+ size = sizeof(seedpath);
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, PUTTY_REG_POS, &rkey) ==
+ ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ int ret = RegQueryValueEx(rkey, "RandSeedFile",
+ 0, &type, seedpath, &size);
+ if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS || type != REG_SZ)
+ seedpath[0] = '\0';
+ RegCloseKey(rkey);
+
+ if (*seedpath && try_random_seed(seedpath, action, &rethandle))
+ return rethandle;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Next, try the user's local Application Data directory,
+ * followed by their non-local one. This is found using the
+ * SHGetFolderPath function, which won't be present on all
+ * versions of Windows.
+ */
+ if (!tried_shgetfolderpath) {
+ /* This is likely only to bear fruit on systems with IE5+
+ * installed, or WinMe/2K+. There is some faffing with
+ * SHFOLDER.DLL we could do to try to find an equivalent
+ * on older versions of Windows if we cared enough.
+ * However, the invocation below requires IE5+ anyway,
+ * so stuff that. */
+ shell32_module = LoadLibrary("SHELL32.DLL");
+ if (shell32_module) {
+ p_SHGetFolderPath = (p_SHGetFolderPath_t)
+ GetProcAddress(shell32_module, "SHGetFolderPathA");
+ }
+ }
+ if (p_SHGetFolderPath) {
+ if (SUCCEEDED(p_SHGetFolderPath(NULL, CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA,
+ NULL, SHGFP_TYPE_CURRENT, seedpath))) {
+ strcat(seedpath, "\\PUTTY.RND");
+ if (try_random_seed(seedpath, action, &rethandle))
+ return rethandle;
+ }
+
+ if (SUCCEEDED(p_SHGetFolderPath(NULL, CSIDL_APPDATA,
+ NULL, SHGFP_TYPE_CURRENT, seedpath))) {
+ strcat(seedpath, "\\PUTTY.RND");
+ if (try_random_seed(seedpath, action, &rethandle))
+ return rethandle;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Failing that, try %HOMEDRIVE%%HOMEPATH% as a guess at the
+ * user's home directory.
+ */
+ {
+ int len, ret;
+
+ len =
+ GetEnvironmentVariable("HOMEDRIVE", seedpath,
+ sizeof(seedpath));
+ ret =
+ GetEnvironmentVariable("HOMEPATH", seedpath + len,
+ sizeof(seedpath) - len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ strcat(seedpath, "\\PUTTY.RND");
+ if (try_random_seed(seedpath, action, &rethandle))
+ return rethandle;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * And finally, fall back to C:\WINDOWS.
+ */
+ GetWindowsDirectory(seedpath, sizeof(seedpath));
+ strcat(seedpath, "\\PUTTY.RND");
+ if (try_random_seed(seedpath, action, &rethandle))
+ return rethandle;
+
+ /*
+ * If even that failed, give up.
+ */
+ return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+}
+
+void read_random_seed(noise_consumer_t consumer)
+{
+ HANDLE seedf = access_random_seed(OPEN_R);
+
+ if (seedf != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ while (1) {
+ char buf[1024];
+ DWORD len;
+
+ if (ReadFile(seedf, buf, sizeof(buf), &len, NULL) && len)
+ consumer(buf, len);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ CloseHandle(seedf);
+ }
+}
+
+void write_random_seed(void *data, int len)
+{
+ HANDLE seedf = access_random_seed(OPEN_W);
+
+ if (seedf != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ DWORD lenwritten;
+
+ WriteFile(seedf, data, len, &lenwritten, NULL);
+ CloseHandle(seedf);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Recursively delete a registry key and everything under it.
+ */
+static void registry_recursive_remove(HKEY key)
+{
+ DWORD i;
+ char name[MAX_PATH + 1];
+ HKEY subkey;
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (RegEnumKey(key, i, name, sizeof(name)) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ if (RegOpenKey(key, name, &subkey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ registry_recursive_remove(subkey);
+ RegCloseKey(subkey);
+ }
+ RegDeleteKey(key, name);
+ }
+}
+
+void cleanup_all(void)
+{
+ HKEY key;
+ int ret;
+ char name[MAX_PATH + 1];
+
+ /* ------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Wipe out the random seed file, in all of its possible
+ * locations.
+ */
+ access_random_seed(DEL);
+
+ /* ------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Destroy all registry information associated with PuTTY.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Open the main PuTTY registry key and remove everything in it.
+ */
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, PUTTY_REG_POS, &key) ==
+ ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ registry_recursive_remove(key);
+ RegCloseKey(key);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now open the parent key and remove the PuTTY main key. Once
+ * we've done that, see if the parent key has any other
+ * children.
+ */
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, PUTTY_REG_PARENT,
+ &key) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ RegDeleteKey(key, PUTTY_REG_PARENT_CHILD);
+ ret = RegEnumKey(key, 0, name, sizeof(name));
+ RegCloseKey(key);
+ /*
+ * If the parent key had no other children, we must delete
+ * it in its turn. That means opening the _grandparent_
+ * key.
+ */
+ if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ if (RegOpenKey(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, PUTTY_REG_GPARENT,
+ &key) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ RegDeleteKey(key, PUTTY_REG_GPARENT_CHILD);
+ RegCloseKey(key);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we're done.
+ */
+}
diff --git a/tools/plink/winstuff.h b/tools/plink/winstuff.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..09a515a62 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winstuff.h @@ -0,0 +1,467 @@ +/*
+ * winstuff.h: Windows-specific inter-module stuff.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PUTTY_WINSTUFF_H
+#define PUTTY_WINSTUFF_H
+
+#ifndef AUTO_WINSOCK
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#endif
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdio.h> /* for FILENAME_MAX */
+
+#include "tree234.h"
+
+#include "winhelp.h"
+
+struct Filename {
+ char path[FILENAME_MAX];
+};
+#define f_open(filename, mode, isprivate) ( fopen((filename).path, (mode)) )
+
+struct FontSpec {
+ char name[64];
+ int isbold;
+ int height;
+ int charset;
+};
+
+#ifndef CLEARTYPE_QUALITY
+#define CLEARTYPE_QUALITY 5
+#endif
+#define FONT_QUALITY(fq) ( \
+ (fq) == FQ_DEFAULT ? DEFAULT_QUALITY : \
+ (fq) == FQ_ANTIALIASED ? ANTIALIASED_QUALITY : \
+ (fq) == FQ_NONANTIALIASED ? NONANTIALIASED_QUALITY : \
+ CLEARTYPE_QUALITY)
+
+#define PLATFORM_IS_UTF16 /* enable UTF-16 processing when exchanging
+ * wchar_t strings with environment */
+
+/*
+ * Where we can, we use GetWindowLongPtr and friends because they're
+ * more useful on 64-bit platforms, but they're a relatively recent
+ * innovation, missing from VC++ 6 and older MinGW. Degrade nicely.
+ * (NB that on some systems, some of these things are available but
+ * not others...)
+ */
+
+#ifndef GCLP_HCURSOR
+/* GetClassLongPtr and friends */
+#undef GetClassLongPtr
+#define GetClassLongPtr GetClassLong
+#undef SetClassLongPtr
+#define SetClassLongPtr SetClassLong
+#define GCLP_HCURSOR GCL_HCURSOR
+/* GetWindowLongPtr and friends */
+#undef GetWindowLongPtr
+#define GetWindowLongPtr GetWindowLong
+#undef SetWindowLongPtr
+#define SetWindowLongPtr SetWindowLong
+#undef GWLP_USERDATA
+#define GWLP_USERDATA GWL_USERDATA
+#undef DWLP_MSGRESULT
+#define DWLP_MSGRESULT DWL_MSGRESULT
+/* Since we've clobbered the above functions, we should clobber the
+ * associated type regardless of whether it's defined. */
+#undef LONG_PTR
+#define LONG_PTR LONG
+#endif
+
+#define BOXFLAGS DLGWINDOWEXTRA
+#define BOXRESULT (DLGWINDOWEXTRA + sizeof(LONG_PTR))
+#define DF_END 0x0001
+
+/*
+ * Global variables. Most modules declare these `extern', but
+ * window.c will do `#define PUTTY_DO_GLOBALS' before including this
+ * module, and so will get them properly defined.
+*/
+#ifndef GLOBAL
+#ifdef PUTTY_DO_GLOBALS
+#define GLOBAL
+#else
+#define GLOBAL extern
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DONE_TYPEDEFS
+#define DONE_TYPEDEFS
+typedef struct config_tag Config;
+typedef struct backend_tag Backend;
+typedef struct terminal_tag Terminal;
+#endif
+
+#define PUTTY_REG_POS "Software\\SimonTatham\\PuTTY"
+#define PUTTY_REG_PARENT "Software\\SimonTatham"
+#define PUTTY_REG_PARENT_CHILD "PuTTY"
+#define PUTTY_REG_GPARENT "Software"
+#define PUTTY_REG_GPARENT_CHILD "SimonTatham"
+
+#define PUTTY_HELP_FILE "putty.hlp"
+#define PUTTY_CHM_FILE "putty.chm"
+#define PUTTY_HELP_CONTENTS "putty.cnt"
+
+#define GETTICKCOUNT GetTickCount
+#define CURSORBLINK GetCaretBlinkTime()
+#define TICKSPERSEC 1000 /* GetTickCount returns milliseconds */
+
+#define DEFAULT_CODEPAGE CP_ACP
+
+typedef HDC Context;
+
+#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
+/*
+ * GSS-API stuff
+ */
+typedef struct Ssh_gss_buf {
+ int length;
+ char *value;
+} Ssh_gss_buf;
+
+#define SSH_GSS_EMPTY_BUF (Ssh_gss_buf) {0,NULL}
+typedef void *Ssh_gss_name;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Window handles for the windows that can be running during a
+ * PuTTY session.
+ */
+GLOBAL HWND hwnd; /* the main terminal window */
+GLOBAL HWND logbox;
+
+/*
+ * The all-important instance handle.
+ */
+GLOBAL HINSTANCE hinst;
+
+/*
+ * Help file stuff in winhelp.c.
+ */
+void init_help(void);
+void shutdown_help(void);
+int has_help(void);
+void launch_help(HWND hwnd, const char *topic);
+void quit_help(HWND hwnd);
+
+/*
+ * The terminal and logging context are notionally local to the
+ * Windows front end, but they must be shared between window.c and
+ * windlg.c. Likewise the saved-sessions list.
+ */
+GLOBAL Terminal *term;
+GLOBAL void *logctx;
+
+#define WM_NETEVENT (WM_APP + 5)
+
+/*
+ * On Windows, we send MA_2CLK as the only event marking the second
+ * press of a mouse button. Compare unix.h.
+ */
+#define MULTICLICK_ONLY_EVENT 1
+
+/*
+ * On Windows, data written to the clipboard must be NUL-terminated.
+ */
+#define SELECTION_NUL_TERMINATED 1
+
+/*
+ * On Windows, copying to the clipboard terminates lines with CRLF.
+ */
+#define SEL_NL { 13, 10 }
+
+/*
+ * sk_getxdmdata() does not exist under Windows (not that I
+ * couldn't write it if I wanted to, but I haven't bothered), so
+ * it's a macro which always returns NULL. With any luck this will
+ * cause the compiler to notice it can optimise away the
+ * implementation of XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 in x11fwd.c :-)
+ */
+#define sk_getxdmdata(socket, lenp) (NULL)
+
+/*
+ * File-selector filter strings used in the config box. On Windows,
+ * these strings are of exactly the type needed to go in
+ * `lpstrFilter' in an OPENFILENAME structure.
+ */
+#define FILTER_KEY_FILES ("PuTTY Private Key Files (*.ppk)\0*.ppk\0" \
+ "All Files (*.*)\0*\0\0\0")
+#define FILTER_WAVE_FILES ("Wave Files (*.wav)\0*.WAV\0" \
+ "All Files (*.*)\0*\0\0\0")
+
+/*
+ * On some versions of Windows, it has been known for WM_TIMER to
+ * occasionally get its callback time simply wrong, and call us
+ * back several minutes early. Defining these symbols enables
+ * compensation code in timing.c.
+ */
+#define TIMING_SYNC
+#define TIMING_SYNC_TICKCOUNT
+
+/*
+ * winnet.c dynamically loads WinSock 2 or WinSock 1 depending on
+ * what it can get, which means any WinSock routines used outside
+ * that module must be exported from it as function pointers. So
+ * here they are.
+ */
+extern int (WINAPI *p_WSAAsyncSelect)
+ (SOCKET s, HWND hWnd, u_int wMsg, long lEvent);
+extern int (WINAPI *p_WSAEventSelect)
+ (SOCKET s, WSAEVENT hEventObject, long lNetworkEvents);
+extern int (WINAPI *p_select)
+ (int nfds, fd_set FAR * readfds, fd_set FAR * writefds,
+ fd_set FAR *exceptfds, const struct timeval FAR * timeout);
+extern int (WINAPI *p_WSAGetLastError)(void);
+extern int (WINAPI *p_WSAEnumNetworkEvents)
+ (SOCKET s, WSAEVENT hEventObject, LPWSANETWORKEVENTS lpNetworkEvents);
+
+extern int socket_writable(SOCKET skt);
+
+extern void socket_reselect_all(void);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from winctrls.c.
+ */
+
+struct ctlpos {
+ HWND hwnd;
+ WPARAM font;
+ int dlu4inpix;
+ int ypos, width;
+ int xoff;
+ int boxystart, boxid;
+ char *boxtext;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Exports from winutils.c.
+ */
+typedef struct filereq_tag filereq; /* cwd for file requester */
+BOOL request_file(filereq *state, OPENFILENAME *of, int preserve, int save);
+filereq *filereq_new(void);
+void filereq_free(filereq *state);
+int message_box(LPCTSTR text, LPCTSTR caption, DWORD style, DWORD helpctxid);
+void split_into_argv(char *, int *, char ***, char ***);
+
+/*
+ * Private structure for prefslist state. Only in the header file
+ * so that we can delegate allocation to callers.
+ */
+struct prefslist {
+ int listid, upbid, dnbid;
+ int srcitem;
+ int dummyitem;
+ int dragging;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This structure is passed to event handler functions as the `dlg'
+ * parameter, and hence is passed back to winctrls access functions.
+ */
+struct dlgparam {
+ HWND hwnd; /* the hwnd of the dialog box */
+ struct winctrls *controltrees[8]; /* can have several of these */
+ int nctrltrees;
+ char *wintitle; /* title of actual window */
+ char *errtitle; /* title of error sub-messageboxes */
+ void *data; /* data to pass in refresh events */
+ union control *focused, *lastfocused; /* which ctrl has focus now/before */
+ char shortcuts[128]; /* track which shortcuts in use */
+ int coloursel_wanted; /* has an event handler asked for
+ * a colour selector? */
+ struct { unsigned char r, g, b, ok; } coloursel_result; /* 0-255 */
+ tree234 *privdata; /* stores per-control private data */
+ int ended, endresult; /* has the dialog been ended? */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Exports from winctrls.c.
+ */
+void ctlposinit(struct ctlpos *cp, HWND hwnd,
+ int leftborder, int rightborder, int topborder);
+HWND doctl(struct ctlpos *cp, RECT r,
+ char *wclass, int wstyle, int exstyle, char *wtext, int wid);
+void bartitle(struct ctlpos *cp, char *name, int id);
+void beginbox(struct ctlpos *cp, char *name, int idbox);
+void endbox(struct ctlpos *cp);
+void editboxfw(struct ctlpos *cp, int password, char *text,
+ int staticid, int editid);
+void radioline(struct ctlpos *cp, char *text, int id, int nacross, ...);
+void bareradioline(struct ctlpos *cp, int nacross, ...);
+void radiobig(struct ctlpos *cp, char *text, int id, ...);
+void checkbox(struct ctlpos *cp, char *text, int id);
+void statictext(struct ctlpos *cp, char *text, int lines, int id);
+void staticbtn(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext, int sid,
+ char *btext, int bid);
+void static2btn(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext, int sid,
+ char *btext1, int bid1, char *btext2, int bid2);
+void staticedit(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext,
+ int sid, int eid, int percentedit);
+void staticddl(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext,
+ int sid, int lid, int percentlist);
+void combobox(struct ctlpos *cp, char *text, int staticid, int listid);
+void staticpassedit(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext,
+ int sid, int eid, int percentedit);
+void bigeditctrl(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext,
+ int sid, int eid, int lines);
+void ersatztab(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext, int sid, int lid, int s2id);
+void editbutton(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext, int sid,
+ int eid, char *btext, int bid);
+void sesssaver(struct ctlpos *cp, char *text,
+ int staticid, int editid, int listid, ...);
+void envsetter(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext, int sid,
+ char *e1stext, int e1sid, int e1id,
+ char *e2stext, int e2sid, int e2id,
+ int listid, char *b1text, int b1id, char *b2text, int b2id);
+void charclass(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext, int sid, int listid,
+ char *btext, int bid, int eid, char *s2text, int s2id);
+void colouredit(struct ctlpos *cp, char *stext, int sid, int listid,
+ char *btext, int bid, ...);
+void prefslist(struct prefslist *hdl, struct ctlpos *cp, int lines,
+ char *stext, int sid, int listid, int upbid, int dnbid);
+int handle_prefslist(struct prefslist *hdl,
+ int *array, int maxmemb,
+ int is_dlmsg, HWND hwnd,
+ WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
+void progressbar(struct ctlpos *cp, int id);
+void fwdsetter(struct ctlpos *cp, int listid, char *stext, int sid,
+ char *e1stext, int e1sid, int e1id,
+ char *e2stext, int e2sid, int e2id,
+ char *btext, int bid,
+ char *r1text, int r1id, char *r2text, int r2id);
+
+#define MAX_SHORTCUTS_PER_CTRL 16
+
+/*
+ * This structure is what's stored for each `union control' in the
+ * portable-dialog interface.
+ */
+struct winctrl {
+ union control *ctrl;
+ /*
+ * The control may have several components at the Windows
+ * level, with different dialog IDs. To avoid needing N
+ * separate platformsidectrl structures (which could be stored
+ * separately in a tree234 so that lookup by ID worked), we
+ * impose the constraint that those IDs must be in a contiguous
+ * block.
+ */
+ int base_id;
+ int num_ids;
+ /*
+ * Remember what keyboard shortcuts were used by this control,
+ * so that when we remove it again we can take them out of the
+ * list in the dlgparam.
+ */
+ char shortcuts[MAX_SHORTCUTS_PER_CTRL];
+ /*
+ * Some controls need a piece of allocated memory in which to
+ * store temporary data about the control.
+ */
+ void *data;
+};
+/*
+ * And this structure holds a set of the above, in two separate
+ * tree234s so that it can find an item by `union control' or by
+ * dialog ID.
+ */
+struct winctrls {
+ tree234 *byctrl, *byid;
+};
+struct controlset;
+struct controlbox;
+
+void winctrl_init(struct winctrls *);
+void winctrl_cleanup(struct winctrls *);
+void winctrl_add(struct winctrls *, struct winctrl *);
+void winctrl_remove(struct winctrls *, struct winctrl *);
+struct winctrl *winctrl_findbyctrl(struct winctrls *, union control *);
+struct winctrl *winctrl_findbyid(struct winctrls *, int);
+struct winctrl *winctrl_findbyindex(struct winctrls *, int);
+void winctrl_layout(struct dlgparam *dp, struct winctrls *wc,
+ struct ctlpos *cp, struct controlset *s, int *id);
+int winctrl_handle_command(struct dlgparam *dp, UINT msg,
+ WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
+void winctrl_rem_shortcuts(struct dlgparam *dp, struct winctrl *c);
+int winctrl_context_help(struct dlgparam *dp, HWND hwnd, int id);
+
+void dp_init(struct dlgparam *dp);
+void dp_add_tree(struct dlgparam *dp, struct winctrls *tree);
+void dp_cleanup(struct dlgparam *dp);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from wincfg.c.
+ */
+void win_setup_config_box(struct controlbox *b, HWND *hwndp, int has_help,
+ int midsession, int protocol);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from windlg.c.
+ */
+void defuse_showwindow(void);
+int do_config(void);
+int do_reconfig(HWND, int);
+void showeventlog(HWND);
+void showabout(HWND);
+void force_normal(HWND hwnd);
+void modal_about_box(HWND hwnd);
+void show_help(HWND hwnd);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from winmisc.c.
+ */
+extern OSVERSIONINFO osVersion;
+BOOL init_winver(void);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from sizetip.c.
+ */
+void UpdateSizeTip(HWND src, int cx, int cy);
+void EnableSizeTip(int bEnable);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from unicode.c.
+ */
+struct unicode_data;
+void init_ucs(Config *, struct unicode_data *);
+
+/*
+ * Exports from winhandl.c.
+ */
+#define HANDLE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED 1
+#define HANDLE_FLAG_IGNOREEOF 2
+#define HANDLE_FLAG_UNITBUFFER 4
+struct handle;
+typedef int (*handle_inputfn_t)(struct handle *h, void *data, int len);
+typedef void (*handle_outputfn_t)(struct handle *h, int new_backlog);
+struct handle *handle_input_new(HANDLE handle, handle_inputfn_t gotdata,
+ void *privdata, int flags);
+struct handle *handle_output_new(HANDLE handle, handle_outputfn_t sentdata,
+ void *privdata, int flags);
+int handle_write(struct handle *h, const void *data, int len);
+HANDLE *handle_get_events(int *nevents);
+void handle_free(struct handle *h);
+void handle_got_event(HANDLE event);
+void handle_unthrottle(struct handle *h, int backlog);
+int handle_backlog(struct handle *h);
+void *handle_get_privdata(struct handle *h);
+
+/*
+ * pageantc.c needs to schedule callbacks for asynchronous agent
+ * requests. This has to be done differently in GUI and console, so
+ * there's an exported function used for the purpose.
+ *
+ * Also, we supply FLAG_SYNCAGENT to force agent requests to be
+ * synchronous in pscp and psftp.
+ */
+void agent_schedule_callback(void (*callback)(void *, void *, int),
+ void *callback_ctx, void *data, int len);
+#define FLAG_SYNCAGENT 0x1000
+
+/*
+ * Exports from winser.c.
+ */
+extern Backend serial_backend;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/tools/plink/winx11.c b/tools/plink/winx11.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c8951b086 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/winx11.c @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/*
+ * winx11.c: fetch local auth data for X forwarding.
+ */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+void platform_get_x11_auth(struct X11Display *disp, const Config *cfg)
+{
+ if (cfg->xauthfile.path[0])
+ x11_get_auth_from_authfile(disp, cfg->xauthfile.path);
+}
+
+const int platform_uses_x11_unix_by_default = FALSE;
diff --git a/tools/plink/x11fwd.c b/tools/plink/x11fwd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9f22a2364 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/plink/x11fwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,791 @@ +/*
+ * Platform-independent bits of X11 forwarding.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "putty.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "tree234.h"
+
+#define GET_16BIT(endian, cp) \
+ (endian=='B' ? GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp) : GET_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp))
+
+#define PUT_16BIT(endian, cp, val) \
+ (endian=='B' ? PUT_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp, val) : PUT_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp, val))
+
+const char *const x11_authnames[] = {
+ "", "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1"
+};
+
+struct XDMSeen {
+ unsigned int time;
+ unsigned char clientid[6];
+};
+
+struct X11Private {
+ const struct plug_function_table *fn;
+ /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */
+ unsigned char firstpkt[12]; /* first X data packet */
+ struct X11Display *disp;
+ char *auth_protocol;
+ unsigned char *auth_data;
+ int data_read, auth_plen, auth_psize, auth_dlen, auth_dsize;
+ int verified;
+ int throttled, throttle_override;
+ unsigned long peer_ip;
+ int peer_port;
+ void *c; /* data used by ssh.c */
+ Socket s;
+};
+
+static int xdmseen_cmp(void *a, void *b)
+{
+ struct XDMSeen *sa = a, *sb = b;
+ return sa->time > sb->time ? 1 :
+ sa->time < sb->time ? -1 :
+ memcmp(sa->clientid, sb->clientid, sizeof(sa->clientid));
+}
+
+/* Do-nothing "plug" implementation, used by x11_setup_display() when it
+ * creates a trial connection (and then immediately closes it).
+ * XXX: bit out of place here, could in principle live in a platform-
+ * independent network.c or something */
+static void dummy_plug_log(Plug p, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code) { }
+static int dummy_plug_closing
+ (Plug p, const char *error_msg, int error_code, int calling_back)
+{ return 1; }
+static int dummy_plug_receive(Plug p, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{ return 1; }
+static void dummy_plug_sent(Plug p, int bufsize) { }
+static int dummy_plug_accepting(Plug p, OSSocket sock) { return 1; }
+static const struct plug_function_table dummy_plug = {
+ dummy_plug_log, dummy_plug_closing, dummy_plug_receive,
+ dummy_plug_sent, dummy_plug_accepting
+};
+
+struct X11Display *x11_setup_display(char *display, int authtype,
+ const Config *cfg)
+{
+ struct X11Display *disp = snew(struct X11Display);
+ char *localcopy;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!display || !*display) {
+ localcopy = platform_get_x_display();
+ if (!localcopy || !*localcopy) {
+ sfree(localcopy);
+ localcopy = dupstr(":0"); /* plausible default for any platform */
+ }
+ } else
+ localcopy = dupstr(display);
+
+ /*
+ * Parse the display name.
+ *
+ * We expect this to have one of the following forms:
+ *
+ * - the standard X format which looks like
+ * [ [ protocol '/' ] host ] ':' displaynumber [ '.' screennumber ]
+ * (X11 also permits a double colon to indicate DECnet, but
+ * that's not our problem, thankfully!)
+ *
+ * - only seen in the wild on MacOS (so far): a pathname to a
+ * Unix-domain socket, which will typically and confusingly
+ * end in ":0", and which I'm currently distinguishing from
+ * the standard scheme by noting that it starts with '/'.
+ */
+ if (localcopy[0] == '/') {
+ disp->unixsocketpath = localcopy;
+ disp->unixdomain = TRUE;
+ disp->hostname = NULL;
+ disp->displaynum = -1;
+ disp->screennum = 0;
+ disp->addr = NULL;
+ } else {
+ char *colon, *dot, *slash;
+ char *protocol, *hostname;
+
+ colon = strrchr(localcopy, ':');
+ if (!colon) {
+ sfree(disp);
+ sfree(localcopy);
+ return NULL; /* FIXME: report a specific error? */
+ }
+
+ *colon++ = '\0';
+ dot = strchr(colon, '.');
+ if (dot)
+ *dot++ = '\0';
+
+ disp->displaynum = atoi(colon);
+ if (dot)
+ disp->screennum = atoi(dot);
+ else
+ disp->screennum = 0;
+
+ protocol = NULL;
+ hostname = localcopy;
+ if (colon > localcopy) {
+ slash = strchr(localcopy, '/');
+ if (slash) {
+ *slash++ = '\0';
+ protocol = localcopy;
+ hostname = slash;
+ }
+ }
+
+ disp->hostname = *hostname ? dupstr(hostname) : NULL;
+
+ if (protocol)
+ disp->unixdomain = (!strcmp(protocol, "local") ||
+ !strcmp(protocol, "unix"));
+ else if (!*hostname || !strcmp(hostname, "unix"))
+ disp->unixdomain = platform_uses_x11_unix_by_default;
+ else
+ disp->unixdomain = FALSE;
+
+ if (!disp->hostname && !disp->unixdomain)
+ disp->hostname = dupstr("localhost");
+
+ disp->unixsocketpath = NULL;
+ disp->addr = NULL;
+
+ sfree(localcopy);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the display hostname, if we need to.
+ */
+ if (!disp->unixdomain) {
+ const char *err;
+
+ disp->port = 6000 + disp->displaynum;
+ disp->addr = name_lookup(disp->hostname, disp->port,
+ &disp->realhost, cfg, ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
+
+ if ((err = sk_addr_error(disp->addr)) != NULL) {
+ sk_addr_free(disp->addr);
+ sfree(disp->hostname);
+ sfree(disp->unixsocketpath);
+ return NULL; /* FIXME: report an error */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try upgrading an IP-style localhost display to a Unix-socket
+ * display (as the standard X connection libraries do).
+ */
+ if (!disp->unixdomain && sk_address_is_local(disp->addr)) {
+ SockAddr ux = platform_get_x11_unix_address(NULL, disp->displaynum);
+ const char *err = sk_addr_error(ux);
+ if (!err) {
+ /* Create trial connection to see if there is a useful Unix-domain
+ * socket */
+ const struct plug_function_table *dummy = &dummy_plug;
+ Socket s = sk_new(sk_addr_dup(ux), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (Plug)&dummy);
+ err = sk_socket_error(s);
+ sk_close(s);
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ sk_addr_free(ux);
+ } else {
+ sk_addr_free(disp->addr);
+ disp->unixdomain = TRUE;
+ disp->addr = ux;
+ /* Fill in the rest in a moment */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (disp->unixdomain) {
+ if (!disp->addr)
+ disp->addr = platform_get_x11_unix_address(disp->unixsocketpath,
+ disp->displaynum);
+ if (disp->unixsocketpath)
+ disp->realhost = dupstr(disp->unixsocketpath);
+ else
+ disp->realhost = dupprintf("unix:%d", disp->displaynum);
+ disp->port = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invent the remote authorisation details.
+ */
+ if (authtype == X11_MIT) {
+ disp->remoteauthproto = X11_MIT;
+
+ /* MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1. Cookie size is 128 bits (16 bytes). */
+ disp->remoteauthdata = snewn(16, unsigned char);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ disp->remoteauthdata[i] = random_byte();
+ disp->remoteauthdatalen = 16;
+
+ disp->xdmseen = NULL;
+ } else {
+ assert(authtype == X11_XDM);
+ disp->remoteauthproto = X11_XDM;
+
+ /* XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1. Cookie size is 16 bytes; byte 8 is zero. */
+ disp->remoteauthdata = snewn(16, unsigned char);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ disp->remoteauthdata[i] = (i == 8 ? 0 : random_byte());
+ disp->remoteauthdatalen = 16;
+
+ disp->xdmseen = newtree234(xdmseen_cmp);
+ }
+ disp->remoteauthprotoname = dupstr(x11_authnames[disp->remoteauthproto]);
+ disp->remoteauthdatastring = snewn(disp->remoteauthdatalen * 2 + 1, char);
+ for (i = 0; i < disp->remoteauthdatalen; i++)
+ sprintf(disp->remoteauthdatastring + i*2, "%02x",
+ disp->remoteauthdata[i]);
+
+ /*
+ * Fetch the local authorisation details.
+ */
+ disp->localauthproto = X11_NO_AUTH;
+ disp->localauthdata = NULL;
+ disp->localauthdatalen = 0;
+ platform_get_x11_auth(disp, cfg);
+
+ return disp;
+}
+
+void x11_free_display(struct X11Display *disp)
+{
+ if (disp->xdmseen != NULL) {
+ struct XDMSeen *seen;
+ while ((seen = delpos234(disp->xdmseen, 0)) != NULL)
+ sfree(seen);
+ freetree234(disp->xdmseen);
+ }
+ sfree(disp->hostname);
+ sfree(disp->unixsocketpath);
+ if (disp->localauthdata)
+ memset(disp->localauthdata, 0, disp->localauthdatalen);
+ sfree(disp->localauthdata);
+ if (disp->remoteauthdata)
+ memset(disp->remoteauthdata, 0, disp->remoteauthdatalen);
+ sfree(disp->remoteauthdata);
+ sfree(disp->remoteauthprotoname);
+ sfree(disp->remoteauthdatastring);
+ sk_addr_free(disp->addr);
+ sfree(disp);
+}
+
+#define XDM_MAXSKEW 20*60 /* 20 minute clock skew should be OK */
+
+static char *x11_verify(unsigned long peer_ip, int peer_port,
+ struct X11Display *disp, char *proto,
+ unsigned char *data, int dlen)
+{
+ if (strcmp(proto, x11_authnames[disp->remoteauthproto]) != 0)
+ return "wrong authorisation protocol attempted";
+ if (disp->remoteauthproto == X11_MIT) {
+ if (dlen != disp->remoteauthdatalen)
+ return "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 data was wrong length";
+ if (memcmp(disp->remoteauthdata, data, dlen) != 0)
+ return "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 data did not match";
+ }
+ if (disp->remoteauthproto == X11_XDM) {
+ unsigned long t;
+ time_t tim;
+ int i;
+ struct XDMSeen *seen, *ret;
+
+ if (dlen != 24)
+ return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data was wrong length";
+ if (peer_port == -1)
+ return "cannot do XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 without remote address data";
+ des_decrypt_xdmauth(disp->remoteauthdata+9, data, 24);
+ if (memcmp(disp->remoteauthdata, data, 8) != 0)
+ return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* cookie wrong */
+ if (GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+8) != peer_ip)
+ return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* IP wrong */
+ if ((int)GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+12) != peer_port)
+ return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* port wrong */
+ t = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+14);
+ for (i = 18; i < 24; i++)
+ if (data[i] != 0) /* zero padding wrong */
+ return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check";
+ tim = time(NULL);
+ if (abs(t - tim) > XDM_MAXSKEW)
+ return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 time stamp was too far out";
+ seen = snew(struct XDMSeen);
+ seen->time = t;
+ memcpy(seen->clientid, data+8, 6);
+ assert(disp->xdmseen != NULL);
+ ret = add234(disp->xdmseen, seen);
+ if (ret != seen) {
+ sfree(seen);
+ return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data replayed";
+ }
+ /* While we're here, purge entries too old to be replayed. */
+ for (;;) {
+ seen = index234(disp->xdmseen, 0);
+ assert(seen != NULL);
+ if (t - seen->time <= XDM_MAXSKEW)
+ break;
+ sfree(delpos234(disp->xdmseen, 0));
+ }
+ }
+ /* implement other protocols here if ever required */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void x11_get_auth_from_authfile(struct X11Display *disp,
+ const char *authfilename)
+{
+ FILE *authfp;
+ char *buf, *ptr, *str[4];
+ int len[4];
+ int family, protocol;
+ int ideal_match = FALSE;
+ char *ourhostname = get_hostname();
+
+ /*
+ * Normally we should look for precisely the details specified in
+ * `disp'. However, there's an oddity when the display is local:
+ * displays like "localhost:0" usually have their details stored
+ * in a Unix-domain-socket record (even if there isn't actually a
+ * real Unix-domain socket available, as with OpenSSH's proxy X11
+ * server).
+ *
+ * This is apparently a fudge to get round the meaninglessness of
+ * "localhost" in a shared-home-directory context -- xauth entries
+ * for Unix-domain sockets already disambiguate this by storing
+ * the *local* hostname in the conveniently-blank hostname field,
+ * but IP "localhost" records couldn't do this. So, typically, an
+ * IP "localhost" entry in the auth database isn't present and if
+ * it were it would be ignored.
+ *
+ * However, we don't entirely trust that (say) Windows X servers
+ * won't rely on a straight "localhost" entry, bad idea though
+ * that is; so if we can't find a Unix-domain-socket entry we'll
+ * fall back to an IP-based entry if we can find one.
+ */
+ int localhost = !disp->unixdomain && sk_address_is_local(disp->addr);
+
+ authfp = fopen(authfilename, "rb");
+ if (!authfp)
+ return;
+
+ /* Records in .Xauthority contain four strings of up to 64K each */
+ buf = snewn(65537 * 4, char);
+
+ while (!ideal_match) {
+ int c, i, j, match = FALSE;
+
+#define GET do { c = fgetc(authfp); if (c == EOF) goto done; c = (unsigned char)c; } while (0)
+ /* Expect a big-endian 2-byte number giving address family */
+ GET; family = c;
+ GET; family = (family << 8) | c;
+ /* Then expect four strings, each composed of a big-endian 2-byte
+ * length field followed by that many bytes of data */
+ ptr = buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ GET; len[i] = c;
+ GET; len[i] = (len[i] << 8) | c;
+ str[i] = ptr;
+ for (j = 0; j < len[i]; j++) {
+ GET; *ptr++ = c;
+ }
+ *ptr++ = '\0';
+ }
+#undef GET
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have a full X authority record in memory. See
+ * whether it matches the display we're trying to
+ * authenticate to.
+ *
+ * The details we've just read should be interpreted as
+ * follows:
+ *
+ * - 'family' is the network address family used to
+ * connect to the display. 0 means IPv4; 6 means IPv6;
+ * 256 means Unix-domain sockets.
+ *
+ * - str[0] is the network address itself. For IPv4 and
+ * IPv6, this is a string of binary data of the
+ * appropriate length (respectively 4 and 16 bytes)
+ * representing the address in big-endian format, e.g.
+ * 7F 00 00 01 means IPv4 localhost. For Unix-domain
+ * sockets, this is the host name of the machine on
+ * which the Unix-domain display resides (so that an
+ * .Xauthority file on a shared file system can contain
+ * authority entries for Unix-domain displays on
+ * several machines without them clashing).
+ *
+ * - str[1] is the display number. I've no idea why
+ * .Xauthority stores this as a string when it has a
+ * perfectly good integer format, but there we go.
+ *
+ * - str[2] is the authorisation method, encoded as its
+ * canonical string name (i.e. "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1",
+ * "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1" or something we don't
+ * recognise).
+ *
+ * - str[3] is the actual authorisation data, stored in
+ * binary form.
+ */
+
+ if (disp->displaynum < 0 || disp->displaynum != atoi(str[1]))
+ continue; /* not the one */
+
+ for (protocol = 1; protocol < lenof(x11_authnames); protocol++)
+ if (!strcmp(str[2], x11_authnames[protocol]))
+ break;
+ if (protocol == lenof(x11_authnames))
+ continue; /* don't recognise this protocol, look for another */
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case 0: /* IPv4 */
+ if (!disp->unixdomain &&
+ sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV4) {
+ char buf[4];
+ sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf);
+ if (len[0] == 4 && !memcmp(str[0], buf, 4)) {
+ match = TRUE;
+ /* If this is a "localhost" entry, note it down
+ * but carry on looking for a Unix-domain entry. */
+ ideal_match = !localhost;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6: /* IPv6 */
+ if (!disp->unixdomain &&
+ sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV6) {
+ char buf[16];
+ sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf);
+ if (len[0] == 16 && !memcmp(str[0], buf, 16)) {
+ match = TRUE;
+ ideal_match = !localhost;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case 256: /* Unix-domain / localhost */
+ if ((disp->unixdomain || localhost)
+ && ourhostname && !strcmp(ourhostname, str[0]))
+ /* A matching Unix-domain socket is always the best
+ * match. */
+ match = ideal_match = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (match) {
+ /* Current best guess -- may be overridden if !ideal_match */
+ disp->localauthproto = protocol;
+ sfree(disp->localauthdata); /* free previous guess, if any */
+ disp->localauthdata = snewn(len[3], unsigned char);
+ memcpy(disp->localauthdata, str[3], len[3]);
+ disp->localauthdatalen = len[3];
+ }
+ }
+
+ done:
+ fclose(authfp);
+ memset(buf, 0, 65537 * 4);
+ sfree(buf);
+ sfree(ourhostname);
+}
+
+static void x11_log(Plug p, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
+ const char *error_msg, int error_code)
+{
+ /* We have no interface to the logging module here, so we drop these. */
+}
+
+static int x11_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
+ int calling_back)
+{
+ struct X11Private *pr = (struct X11Private *) plug;
+
+ /*
+ * We have no way to communicate down the forwarded connection,
+ * so if an error occurred on the socket, we just ignore it
+ * and treat it like a proper close.
+ */
+ sshfwd_close(pr->c);
+ x11_close(pr->s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int x11_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
+{
+ struct X11Private *pr = (struct X11Private *) plug;
+
+ if (sshfwd_write(pr->c, data, len) > 0) {
+ pr->throttled = 1;
+ sk_set_frozen(pr->s, 1);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void x11_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
+{
+ struct X11Private *pr = (struct X11Private *) plug;
+
+ sshfwd_unthrottle(pr->c, bufsize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When setting up X forwarding, we should send the screen number
+ * from the specified local display. This function extracts it from
+ * the display string.
+ */
+int x11_get_screen_number(char *display)
+{
+ int n;
+
+ n = strcspn(display, ":");
+ if (!display[n])
+ return 0;
+ n = strcspn(display, ".");
+ if (!display[n])
+ return 0;
+ return atoi(display + n + 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to set up the raw connection.
+ *
+ * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
+ * also, fills the SocketsStructure
+ */
+extern const char *x11_init(Socket *s, struct X11Display *disp, void *c,
+ const char *peeraddr, int peerport,
+ const Config *cfg)
+{
+ static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
+ x11_log,
+ x11_closing,
+ x11_receive,
+ x11_sent,
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ const char *err;
+ struct X11Private *pr;
+
+ /*
+ * Open socket.
+ */
+ pr = snew(struct X11Private);
+ pr->fn = &fn_table;
+ pr->auth_protocol = NULL;
+ pr->disp = disp;
+ pr->verified = 0;
+ pr->data_read = 0;
+ pr->throttled = pr->throttle_override = 0;
+ pr->c = c;
+
+ pr->s = *s = new_connection(sk_addr_dup(disp->addr),
+ disp->realhost, disp->port,
+ 0, 1, 0, 0, (Plug) pr, cfg);
+ if ((err = sk_socket_error(*s)) != NULL) {
+ sfree(pr);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if we can make sense of the peer address we were given.
+ */
+ {
+ int i[4];
+ if (peeraddr &&
+ 4 == sscanf(peeraddr, "%d.%d.%d.%d", i+0, i+1, i+2, i+3)) {
+ pr->peer_ip = (i[0] << 24) | (i[1] << 16) | (i[2] << 8) | i[3];
+ pr->peer_port = peerport;
+ } else {
+ pr->peer_ip = 0;
+ pr->peer_port = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sk_set_private_ptr(*s, pr);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void x11_close(Socket s)
+{
+ struct X11Private *pr;
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+ pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+ if (pr->auth_protocol) {
+ sfree(pr->auth_protocol);
+ sfree(pr->auth_data);
+ }
+
+ sfree(pr);
+
+ sk_close(s);
+}
+
+void x11_unthrottle(Socket s)
+{
+ struct X11Private *pr;
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+ pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+
+ pr->throttled = 0;
+ sk_set_frozen(s, pr->throttled || pr->throttle_override);
+}
+
+void x11_override_throttle(Socket s, int enable)
+{
+ struct X11Private *pr;
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+ pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+
+ pr->throttle_override = enable;
+ sk_set_frozen(s, pr->throttled || pr->throttle_override);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to send data down the raw connection.
+ */
+int x11_send(Socket s, char *data, int len)
+{
+ struct X11Private *pr;
+ if (!s)
+ return 0;
+ pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
+
+ /*
+ * Read the first packet.
+ */
+ while (len > 0 && pr->data_read < 12)
+ pr->firstpkt[pr->data_read++] = (unsigned char) (len--, *data++);
+ if (pr->data_read < 12)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have not allocated the auth_protocol and auth_data
+ * strings, do so now.
+ */
+ if (!pr->auth_protocol) {
+ pr->auth_plen = GET_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 6);
+ pr->auth_dlen = GET_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 8);
+ pr->auth_psize = (pr->auth_plen + 3) & ~3;
+ pr->auth_dsize = (pr->auth_dlen + 3) & ~3;
+ /* Leave room for a terminating zero, to make our lives easier. */
+ pr->auth_protocol = snewn(pr->auth_psize + 1, char);
+ pr->auth_data = snewn(pr->auth_dsize, unsigned char);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read the auth_protocol and auth_data strings.
+ */
+ while (len > 0 && pr->data_read < 12 + pr->auth_psize)
+ pr->auth_protocol[pr->data_read++ - 12] = (len--, *data++);
+ while (len > 0 && pr->data_read < 12 + pr->auth_psize + pr->auth_dsize)
+ pr->auth_data[pr->data_read++ - 12 -
+ pr->auth_psize] = (unsigned char) (len--, *data++);
+ if (pr->data_read < 12 + pr->auth_psize + pr->auth_dsize)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If we haven't verified the authorisation, do so now.
+ */
+ if (!pr->verified) {
+ char *err;
+
+ pr->auth_protocol[pr->auth_plen] = '\0'; /* ASCIZ */
+ err = x11_verify(pr->peer_ip, pr->peer_port,
+ pr->disp, pr->auth_protocol,
+ pr->auth_data, pr->auth_dlen);
+
+ /*
+ * If authorisation failed, construct and send an error
+ * packet, then terminate the connection.
+ */
+ if (err) {
+ char *message;
+ int msglen, msgsize;
+ unsigned char *reply;
+
+ message = dupprintf("%s X11 proxy: %s", appname, err);
+ msglen = strlen(message);
+ reply = snewn(8 + msglen+1 + 4, unsigned char); /* include zero */
+ msgsize = (msglen + 3) & ~3;
+ reply[0] = 0; /* failure */
+ reply[1] = msglen; /* length of reason string */
+ memcpy(reply + 2, pr->firstpkt + 2, 4); /* major/minor proto vsn */
+ PUT_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], reply + 6, msgsize >> 2);/* data len */
+ memset(reply + 8, 0, msgsize);
+ memcpy(reply + 8, message, msglen);
+ sshfwd_write(pr->c, (char *)reply, 8 + msgsize);
+ sshfwd_close(pr->c);
+ x11_close(s);
+ sfree(reply);
+ sfree(message);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we know we're going to accept the connection. Strip
+ * the fake auth data, and optionally put real auth data in
+ * instead.
+ */
+ {
+ char realauthdata[64];
+ int realauthlen = 0;
+ int authstrlen = strlen(x11_authnames[pr->disp->localauthproto]);
+ int buflen = 0; /* initialise to placate optimiser */
+ static const char zeroes[4] = { 0,0,0,0 };
+ void *buf;
+
+ if (pr->disp->localauthproto == X11_MIT) {
+ assert(pr->disp->localauthdatalen <= lenof(realauthdata));
+ realauthlen = pr->disp->localauthdatalen;
+ memcpy(realauthdata, pr->disp->localauthdata, realauthlen);
+ } else if (pr->disp->localauthproto == X11_XDM &&
+ pr->disp->localauthdatalen == 16 &&
+ ((buf = sk_getxdmdata(s, &buflen))!=0)) {
+ time_t t;
+ realauthlen = (buflen+12+7) & ~7;
+ assert(realauthlen <= lenof(realauthdata));
+ memset(realauthdata, 0, realauthlen);
+ memcpy(realauthdata, pr->disp->localauthdata, 8);
+ memcpy(realauthdata+8, buf, buflen);
+ t = time(NULL);
+ PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(realauthdata+8+buflen, t);
+ des_encrypt_xdmauth(pr->disp->localauthdata+9,
+ (unsigned char *)realauthdata,
+ realauthlen);
+ sfree(buf);
+ }
+ /* implement other auth methods here if required */
+
+ PUT_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 6, authstrlen);
+ PUT_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 8, realauthlen);
+
+ sk_write(s, (char *)pr->firstpkt, 12);
+
+ if (authstrlen) {
+ sk_write(s, x11_authnames[pr->disp->localauthproto],
+ authstrlen);
+ sk_write(s, zeroes, 3 & (-authstrlen));
+ }
+ if (realauthlen) {
+ sk_write(s, realauthdata, realauthlen);
+ sk_write(s, zeroes, 3 & (-realauthlen));
+ }
+ }
+ pr->verified = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * After initialisation, just copy data simply.
+ */
+
+ return sk_write(s, data, len);
+}
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