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authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2010-03-30 12:36:28 +0000
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2010-03-30 12:36:28 +0000
commitff48c0d9098080b51ea12710029135916d117806 (patch)
tree96e6af9caf170ba21a1027b24e306a07e27d7b75 /openssl/apps/s_cb.c
parentbb731f5ac92655c4860a41fa818a7a63005f8369 (diff)
downloadvcxsrv-ff48c0d9098080b51ea12710029135916d117806.tar.gz
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svn merge -r514:HEAD ^/branches/released .
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/apps/s_cb.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/apps/s_cb.c258
1 files changed, 242 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
index a512589e8..c4f551224 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -117,16 +117,21 @@
#undef NON_MAIN
#undef USE_SOCKETS
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include "s_apps.h"
+#define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16
+
int verify_depth=0;
int verify_error=X509_V_OK;
+int verify_return_error=0;
+unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
+int cookie_initialized=0;
int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- char buf[256];
X509 *err_cert;
int err,depth;
@@ -134,15 +139,23 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
err= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),buf,sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d %s\n",depth,buf);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d ",depth);
+ if (err_cert)
+ {
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
+ 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+ }
+ else
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "<no cert>\n");
if (!ok)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
if (verify_depth >= depth)
{
- ok=1;
+ if (!verify_return_error)
+ ok=1;
verify_error=X509_V_OK;
}
else
@@ -151,25 +164,33 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
verify_error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
}
}
- switch (ctx->error)
+ switch (err)
{
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),buf,sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"issuer= %s\n",buf);
+ BIO_puts(bio_err,"issuer= ");
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert),
+ 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"notBefore=");
- ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
+ ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notBefore(err_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"notAfter=");
- ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
+ ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notAfter(err_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+ policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
+ break;
}
+ if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2)
+ policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
+
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify return:%d\n",ok);
return(ok);
}
@@ -258,7 +279,7 @@ int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key)
}
long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
- int argi, long argl, long ret)
+ int argi, long argl, long ret)
{
BIO *out;
@@ -267,15 +288,15 @@ long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ|BIO_CB_RETURN))
{
- BIO_printf(out,"read from %p [%p] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
- (void *)bio,argp,argi,ret,ret);
+ BIO_printf(out,"read from %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+ (void *)bio,argp,(unsigned long)argi,ret,ret);
BIO_dump(out,argp,(int)ret);
return(ret);
}
else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN))
{
- BIO_printf(out,"write to %p [%p] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
- (void *)bio,argp,argi,ret,ret);
+ BIO_printf(out,"write to %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+ (void *)bio,argp,(unsigned long)argi,ret,ret);
BIO_dump(out,argp,(int)ret);
}
return(ret);
@@ -336,6 +357,12 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
case TLS1_VERSION:
str_version = "TLS 1.0 ";
break;
+ case DTLS1_VERSION:
+ str_version = "DTLS 1.0 ";
+ break;
+ case DTLS1_BAD_VER:
+ str_version = "DTLS 1.0 (bad) ";
+ break;
default:
str_version = "???";
}
@@ -401,7 +428,10 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
}
}
- if (version == SSL3_VERSION || version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
+ version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+ version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+ version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
switch (content_type)
{
@@ -504,6 +534,21 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
case 100:
str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
break;
+ case 110:
+ str_details2 = " unsupported_extension";
+ break;
+ case 111:
+ str_details2 = " certificate_unobtainable";
+ break;
+ case 112:
+ str_details2 = " unrecognized_name";
+ break;
+ case 113:
+ str_details2 = " bad_certificate_status_response";
+ break;
+ case 114:
+ str_details2 = " bad_certificate_hash_value";
+ break;
}
}
}
@@ -525,6 +570,9 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
case 2:
str_details1 = ", ServerHello";
break;
+ case 3:
+ str_details1 = ", HelloVerifyRequest";
+ break;
case 11:
str_details1 = ", Certificate";
break;
@@ -621,6 +669,15 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
extname = "server ticket";
break;
+ case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate:
+ extname = "renegotiate";
+ break;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ case TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input:
+ extname = "opaque PRF input";
+ break;
+#endif
default:
extname = "unknown";
@@ -634,3 +691,172 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
BIO_dump(bio, (char *)data, len);
(void)BIO_flush(bio);
}
+
+int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int length, resultlength;
+ union {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+ } peer;
+
+ /* Initialize a random secret */
+ if (!cookie_initialized)
+ {
+ if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting random cookie secret\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cookie_initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Read peer information */
+ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+ /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+ length = 0;
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s4.sin_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+ &peer.s4.sin_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s6.sin6_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+ &peer.s6.sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+ buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
+ *cookie_len = resultlength;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int length, resultlength;
+ union {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+ } peer;
+
+ /* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
+ if (!cookie_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Read peer information */
+ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+ /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+ length = 0;
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s4.sin_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+ &peer.s4.sin_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s6.sin6_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+ &peer.s6.sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+ buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+ }