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author | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2010-03-30 12:36:28 +0000 |
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committer | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2010-03-30 12:36:28 +0000 |
commit | ff48c0d9098080b51ea12710029135916d117806 (patch) | |
tree | 96e6af9caf170ba21a1027b24e306a07e27d7b75 /openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c | |
parent | bb731f5ac92655c4860a41fa818a7a63005f8369 (diff) | |
download | vcxsrv-ff48c0d9098080b51ea12710029135916d117806.tar.gz vcxsrv-ff48c0d9098080b51ea12710029135916d117806.tar.bz2 vcxsrv-ff48c0d9098080b51ea12710029135916d117806.zip |
svn merge -r514:HEAD ^/branches/released .
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c | 86 |
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c index 6bec77baf..334379f31 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * project 1999. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -71,28 +71,38 @@ #endif /* This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key - * derivation function PBKDF2 using the only currently defined function HMAC - * with SHA1. Verified against test vectors posted by Peter Gutmann + * derivation function PBKDF2. + * SHA1 version verified against test vectors posted by Peter Gutmann * <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to the PKCS-TNG <pkcs-tng@rsa.com> mailing list. */ -int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, +int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, + const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out) -{ - unsigned char digtmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *p, itmp[4]; - int cplen, j, k, tkeylen; + { + unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4]; + int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen; unsigned long i = 1; HMAC_CTX hctx; + mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest); + if (mdlen < 0) + return 0; + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); p = out; tkeylen = keylen; - if(!pass) passlen = 0; - else if(passlen == -1) passlen = strlen(pass); - while(tkeylen) { - if(tkeylen > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) cplen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; - else cplen = tkeylen; + if(!pass) + passlen = 0; + else if(passlen == -1) + passlen = strlen(pass); + while(tkeylen) + { + if(tkeylen > mdlen) + cplen = mdlen; + else + cplen = tkeylen; /* We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) * but just in case... */ @@ -100,20 +110,22 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff); itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff); itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff); - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, pass, passlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, pass, passlen, digest, NULL); HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen); HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4); HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL); memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen); - for(j = 1; j < iter; j++) { - HMAC(EVP_sha1(), pass, passlen, - digtmp, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, digtmp, NULL); - for(k = 0; k < cplen; k++) p[k] ^= digtmp[k]; - } + for(j = 1; j < iter; j++) + { + HMAC(digest, pass, passlen, + digtmp, mdlen, digtmp, NULL); + for(k = 0; k < cplen; k++) + p[k] ^= digtmp[k]; + } tkeylen-= cplen; i++; p+= cplen; - } + } HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); #ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2 fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n"); @@ -125,7 +137,15 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, h__dump (out, keylen); #endif return 1; -} + } + +int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, + const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, + int keylen, unsigned char *out) + { + return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, EVP_sha1(), + keylen, out); + } #ifdef DO_TEST main() @@ -155,6 +175,8 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; + const EVP_MD *prfmd; + int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid; if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || param->value.sequence == NULL) { @@ -180,8 +202,7 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, /* lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm. */ - cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname( - OBJ_nid2sn(OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->encryption->algorithm))); + cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm); if(!cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, @@ -226,10 +247,23 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, goto err; } - if(kdf->prf && (OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm) != NID_hmacWithSHA1)) { + if (kdf->prf) + prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm); + else + prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1; + + if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) + { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); goto err; - } + } + + prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid); + if (prfmd == NULL) + { + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); + goto err; + } if(kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, @@ -241,7 +275,9 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data; saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length; iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter); - PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, keylen, key); + if(!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd, + keylen, key)) + goto err; EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de); OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); |