xkbcomp xkeyboard-config libxcb libxtrans fontconfig libX11 libxcb mesa xserver git update 7 Feb 2014

Update to openssl1.0.1f

xserver          commit 83e38eb73fd8c852513aac2da2975b4c01070ec2
libxcb           commit d7eb0bdf3b5b11ee9f40ee5e73df8fc0bdfa59f3
xkeyboard-config commit 7596672b96315465df8d8d691e3a567a52f70743
libX11           commit aacf95dacc7c598e7297894580d4d655593813b2
xkbcomp          commit 31b90ee4ffc774e0da540277907fc5540c0b012c
libxtrans        commit 3f0de269abe59353acbd7a5587d68ce0da91db67
fontconfig       commit e310d2fac2d874d5aa76c609df70cc7b871c0b6d
mesa             commit dd2229d4c68ed78a50104637aef904f8ab6d7dd3

4 files changed, 27 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 1e3bcb9bc..dd2916372 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -380,8 +380,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 	 * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
 	 * global 'md'.
 	 */
-
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	/* NB: in FIPS mode we are already under a lock */
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
@@ -460,7 +463,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 
 	/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
 	crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	while (num > 0)
 		{
@@ -512,10 +518,16 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 	MD_Init(&m);
 	MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
 	MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 	MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 	MD_Final(&m,md);
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (!FIPS_mode())
+#endif
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
 	if (ok)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h
index dc8fcf94c..bb5520e80 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
 #define RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES			 100
 
 /* Reason codes. */
+#define RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED			 104
 #define RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG			 102
 #define RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG			 103
 #define RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET		 101
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_err.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
index b8586c8f4..c4c80fc8c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[]=
 
 static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[]=
 	{
+{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED),"dual ec drbg disabled"},
 {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG),"error initialising drbg"},
 {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG),"error instantiating drbg"},
 {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NO_FIPS_RANDOM_METHOD_SET),"no fips random method set"},
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 476a0cd18..5ac0e14ca 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ int RAND_init_fips(void)
 	DRBG_CTX *dctx;
 	size_t plen;
 	unsigned char pers[32], *p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_ALLOW_DUAL_EC_DRBG
+	if (fips_drbg_type >> 16)
+		{
+		RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_INIT_FIPS, RAND_R_DUAL_EC_DRBG_DISABLED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+#endif
+		
 	dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg();
         if (FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, fips_drbg_type, fips_drbg_flags) <= 0)
 		{