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author | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2012-04-10 11:54:31 +0200 |
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committer | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2012-04-10 11:54:31 +0200 |
commit | 5564e91e3cf4ba5cb2fbebbc2d63d18f588016b8 (patch) | |
tree | c800a66664ea3af61eb13928db45a26275930b0b /openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | |
parent | d79e641dea89c0d5d651b11971c4c9e14df34629 (diff) | |
parent | 67326634496ef21b4acbf4cef2f05040d34aef9b (diff) | |
download | vcxsrv-5564e91e3cf4ba5cb2fbebbc2d63d18f588016b8.tar.gz vcxsrv-5564e91e3cf4ba5cb2fbebbc2d63d18f588016b8.tar.bz2 vcxsrv-5564e91e3cf4ba5cb2fbebbc2d63d18f588016b8.zip |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/released'
Conflicts:
openssl/Configure
openssl/Makefile
openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 351 |
1 files changed, 350 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index 8c3209885..2460910ab 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -265,6 +265,147 @@ static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1); } +static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, + X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) + { + const unsigned char *p; + int plen; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; + + *pmaskHash = NULL; + + if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) + return NULL; + p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; + plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; + pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen); + + if (!pss) + return NULL; + + if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) + { + ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter; + if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1 + && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) + { + p = param->value.sequence->data; + plen = param->value.sequence->length; + *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); + } + } + + return pss; + } + +static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, + X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent) + { + int rv = 0; + if (!pss) + { + if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0) + return 0; + return 1; + } + if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) + goto err; + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0) + goto err; + + if (pss->hashAlgorithm) + { + if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) + goto err; + } + else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + + if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) + goto err; + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0) + goto err; + if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) + { + if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0) + goto err; + if (maskHash) + { + if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0) + goto err; + } + else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) + goto err; + } + else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: ") <= 0) + goto err; + if (pss->saltLength) + { + if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0) + goto err; + } + else if (BIO_puts(bp, "20 (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); + + if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) + goto err; + if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: ") <= 0) + goto err; + if (pss->trailerField) + { + if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0) + goto err; + } + else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0xbc (default)") <= 0) + goto err; + BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); + + rv = 1; + + err: + return rv; + + } + +static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, + const ASN1_STRING *sig, + int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) + { + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) + { + int rv; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; + X509_ALGOR *maskHash; + pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); + rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent); + if (pss) + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + if (maskHash) + X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); + if (!rv) + return 0; + } + else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) + return 0; + if (sig) + return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent); + return 1; + } static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { @@ -310,6 +451,211 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) } +/* Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called + * when a signature is encountered requiring special handling. We + * currently only handle PSS. + */ + + +static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, + X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, + EVP_PKEY *pkey) + { + int rv = -1; + int saltlen; + const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; + X509_ALGOR *maskHash; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx; + /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */ + if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + return -1; + } + /* Decode PSS parameters */ + pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); + + if (pss == NULL) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */ + if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) + { + if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + if (!maskHash) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER); + goto err; + } + mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm); + if (mgf1md == NULL) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST); + goto err; + } + } + else + mgf1md = EVP_sha1(); + + if (pss->hashAlgorithm) + { + md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm); + if (md == NULL) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST); + goto err; + } + } + else + md = EVP_sha1(); + + if (pss->saltLength) + { + saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); + + /* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main + * RSA routines will trap other invalid values anyway. + */ + if (saltlen < 0) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + } + else + saltlen = 20; + + /* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) + * and PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway. + */ + if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER); + goto err; + } + + /* We have all parameters now set up context */ + + if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey)) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0) + goto err; + /* Carry on */ + rv = 2; + + err: + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + if (maskHash) + X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); + return rv; + } + +static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, + X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, + ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig) + { + int pad_mode; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) + return 0; + if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + return 2; + if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) + { + const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md; + RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL; + X509_ALGOR *mgf1alg = NULL; + ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL, *os2 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx); + int saltlen, rv = 0; + sigmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0) + goto err; + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen)) + goto err; + if (saltlen == -1) + saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd); + else if (saltlen == -2) + { + saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2; + if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0) + saltlen--; + } + pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new(); + if (!pss) + goto err; + if (saltlen != 20) + { + pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); + if (!pss->saltLength) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen)) + goto err; + } + if (EVP_MD_type(sigmd) != NID_sha1) + { + pss->hashAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new(); + if (!pss->hashAlgorithm) + goto err; + X509_ALGOR_set_md(pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd); + } + if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != NID_sha1) + { + ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL; + /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */ + mgf1alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); + X509_ALGOR_set_md(mgf1alg, mgf1md); + if (!ASN1_item_pack(mgf1alg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), + &stmp)) + goto err; + pss->maskGenAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new(); + if (!pss->maskGenAlgorithm) + goto err; + X509_ALGOR_set0(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, + OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), + V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp); + } + /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */ + if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os1)) + goto err; + if (alg2) + { + os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1); + if (!os2) + goto err; + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), + V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2); + } + X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), + V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1); + os1 = os2 = NULL; + rv = 3; + err: + if (mgf1alg) + X509_ALGOR_free(mgf1alg); + if (pss) + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); + if (os1) + ASN1_STRING_free(os1); + return rv; + + } + return 2; + } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = { @@ -335,10 +681,13 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = 0,0,0,0,0,0, + rsa_sig_print, int_rsa_free, rsa_pkey_ctrl, old_rsa_priv_decode, - old_rsa_priv_encode + old_rsa_priv_encode, + rsa_item_verify, + rsa_item_sign }, { |