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authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 21:39:56 +0100
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 21:39:56 +0100
commit462f18c7b25fe3e467f837647d07ab0a78aa8d2b (patch)
treefc8013c0a1bac05a1945846c1697e973f4c35013 /openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
parent36f711ee12b6dd5184198abed3aa551efb585587 (diff)
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Merged origin/release (checked in because wanted to merge new stuff)
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c589
1 files changed, 372 insertions, 217 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 352aa3743..49c71b912 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -65,279 +65,434 @@
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
- {
- int i;
- X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
-
- ai=a->cert_info;
- bi=b->cert_info;
- i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
- if (i) return(i);
- return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
- }
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
+
+ ai = a->cert_info;
+ bi = b->cert_info;
+ i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
+ if (i)
+ return (i);
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
- {
- unsigned long ret=0;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char md[16];
- char *f;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
- goto err;
- OPENSSL_free(f);
- if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
- (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
- goto err;
- ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
- ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
- )&0xffffffffL;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char md[16];
+ char *f;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+ goto err;
+ OPENSSL_free(f);
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
+ (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+ (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
#endif
-
+
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
+}
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
+}
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
- {
- return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
- }
+{
+ return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+}
#endif
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
- {
- return(a->cert_info->issuer);
- }
+{
+ return (a->cert_info->issuer);
+}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
+}
#endif
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
- {
- return(a->cert_info->subject);
- }
+{
+ return (a->cert_info->subject);
+}
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
- {
- return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
- }
+{
+ return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
+}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
+}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
- * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
- * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
- * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
- * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
- * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
- * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
- * with an evil cast.
+/*
+ * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
+ * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
+ * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
+ * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
+ * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
*/
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
- /* ensure hash is valid */
- X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
- X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
-
- return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ int rv;
+ /* ensure hash is valid */
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
+ rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
+ if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
+ rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
+ a->cert_info->enc.len);
+ }
+ return rv;
}
#endif
-
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
- {
- int ret;
+{
+ int ret;
- /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+ /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
- if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
- {
- ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
- if (ret < 0)
- return -2;
- }
+ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
- if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
- {
- ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
- if (ret < 0)
- return -2;
- }
+ if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
- ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
+ ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
- return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+ return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
- }
+}
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
- {
- unsigned long ret=0;
- unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
- i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
- if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
- NULL))
- return 0;
-
- ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
- ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
- )&0xffffffffL;
- return(ret);
- }
-
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+ NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ return (ret);
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
- * this is reasonably efficient. */
+/*
+ * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
+ * this is reasonably efficient.
+ */
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
- {
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- unsigned long ret=0;
- unsigned char md[16];
-
- /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
- i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
- && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
- && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
- ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
- ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
- )&0xffffffffL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned char md[16];
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+ && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
#endif
/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
- {
- int i;
- X509_CINF cinf;
- X509 x,*x509=NULL;
-
- if(!sk) return NULL;
-
- x.cert_info= &cinf;
- cinf.serialNumber=serial;
- cinf.issuer=name;
-
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
- {
- x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
- if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
- return(x509);
- }
- return(NULL);
- }
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_CINF cinf;
+ X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
+
+ if (!sk)
+ return NULL;
+
+ x.cert_info = &cinf;
+ cinf.serialNumber = serial;
+ cinf.issuer = name;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
+ return (x509);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
- {
- X509 *x509;
- int i;
-
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
- {
- x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
- return(x509);
- }
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ X509 *x509;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
+ return (x509);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
- {
- if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
- return(NULL);
- return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
- }
+{
+ if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
+ return (NULL);
+ return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
+}
ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
- {
- if(!x) return NULL;
- return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
- }
+{
+ if (!x)
+ return NULL;
+ return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
+}
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *xk;
- int ret;
-
- xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
- if (xk)
- ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
- else
- ret = -2;
-
- switch (ret)
- {
- case 1:
- break;
- case 0:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
- break;
- case -1:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
- break;
- case -2:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
- }
- if (xk)
- EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
- if (ret > 0)
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *xk;
+ int ret;
+
+ xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+ if (xk)
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+ else
+ ret = -2;
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 1:
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ }
+ if (xk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
+ * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
+ * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+ int curve_nid;
+ if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (!grp)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+ /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
+ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
+ /*
+ * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
+ */
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
+ *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+ } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ } else
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int rv, i, sign_nid;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned long tflags;
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ tflags = flags;
+ /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ i = 1;
+ } else
+ i = 0;
+
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ /* Check EE key only */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Final check: root CA signature */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
+ end:
+ if (pk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
+ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+ || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
+ i--;
+ /*
+ * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
+ * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
+ */
+ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
+ if (perror_depth)
+ *perror_depth = i;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int sign_nid;
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
+}
+
+#else
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+/*
+ * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
+ * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
+ * each X509 structure.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
+ int i;
+ ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}