Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/released'

Conflicts:
	openssl/Makefile

17 files changed, 347 insertions, 146 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
index c57b3a2d6..403c4d129 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
@@ -1176,6 +1176,7 @@ ___
 # As UltraSPARC T1, a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU, FP nops can have
 # undesired effect, so just omit them and sacrifice some portion of
 # percent in performance...
-$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gem;
+$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gm;
 
 print $code;
+close STDOUT;	# ensure flush
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index 3348b8762..ad0d2506f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
 	
 	if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
 		{
-		/* hmm... a bit ugly */
-		return(0xffffffffL);
+		/* hmm... a bit ugly, return all ones */
+		return -1;
 		}
 	if (a->data == NULL)
 		return 0;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
index c1d1b1229..bbc495291 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value)
 	if(name) {
 		if(!(tmpname = BUF_strdup(name))) return NULL;
 		for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) {
-			c = *p;
+			c = (unsigned char)*p;
 			if(isupper(c)) {
 				c = tolower(c);
 				*p = c;
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value)
 	if(value) {
 		if(!(tmpval = BUF_strdup(value))) return NULL;
 		for(p = tmpval ; *p; p++) {
-			c = *p;
+			c = (unsigned char)*p;
 			if(isupper(c)) {
 				c = tolower(c);
 				*p = c;
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
 		tmpname = BUF_strdup(name);
 		if(!tmpname) return 0;
 		for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) {
-			c = *p;
+			c = (unsigned char)*p;
 			if(isupper(c)) {
 				c = tolower(c);
 				*p = c;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
index e061f2ffa..89e7a7f54 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags, unsigned long cflag)
 		if (bs->length <= 4)
 			{
 			l=ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
-			if (l < 0)
+			if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
 				{
 				l= -l;
 				neg="-";
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
index c1fd75aaa..4b5a132d8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start:
 	/* add to buffer and return */
 	if (i >= inl)
 		{
-		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
+		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
 		ctx->obuf_len+=inl;
 		return(num+inl);
 		}
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start:
 		{
 		if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */
 			{
-			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
+			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
 			in+=i;
 			inl-=i;
 			num+=i;
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
 		ret=0;
 		p1=ctx->ibuf;
-		for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
+		for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
 			{
-			if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++;
+			if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++;
 			}
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		for (;;)
 			{
 			BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-			if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off)
+			if (ctx->obuf_len > 0)
 				{
 				r=BIO_write(b->next_bio,
 					&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
-					ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off);
+					ctx->obuf_len);
 #if 0
-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r);
+fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r);
 #endif
 				BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
 				if (r <= 0) return((long)r);
 				ctx->obuf_off+=r;
+				ctx->obuf_len-=r;
 				}
 			else
 				{
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 152802fbd..ab47abcf1 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
 
 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct
 	{
+	/* Buffers are setup like this:
+	 *
+	 * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+	 */
+
 	/* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */
 	int ibuf_size;	/* how big is the input buffer */
 	int obuf_size;	/* how big is the output buffer */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
index 37c65d351..f4093177e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl
@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ $data=<<EOF;
 	addze	r11,r0
 					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
 	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
-	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
 	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
 	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
 	addc	r12,r8,r12
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
index 5cd3cd2ed..e8f6b0508 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
@@ -527,8 +527,10 @@ $sbit=$num;
 	&jle	(&label("sqradd"));
 
 	&mov	($carry,"edx");
-	&lea	("edx",&DWP(0,$sbit,"edx",2));
+	&add	("edx","edx");
 	&shr	($carry,31);
+	&add	("edx",$sbit);
+	&adc	($carry,0);
 &set_label("sqrlast");
 	&mov	($word,$_n0);
 	&mov	($inp,$_np);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
index e060592fd..9ed8bc2b4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
 				  * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */
 #endif
 	CRYPTO_THREADID tid;
-	unsigned int  counter;
+	int counter;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
 	int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
 	if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
 		BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
-	ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	/* Set the counter to the special value -1
+	 * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding
+	 * that does not need updating before first use. */
+	ret->counter = -1;
 	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&ret->tid);
 	return(ret);
 err:
@@ -190,7 +193,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL &&
+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		b->counter = 0;
+
+	if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
 		!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE))
 		{
 		/* re-create blinding parameters */
@@ -205,8 +211,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 
 	ret=1;
 err:
-	if (b->counter == 0)
-		b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+		b->counter = 0;
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
@@ -227,6 +233,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		return(0);
 		}
 
+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		/* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+		b->counter = 0;
+	else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		return(0);
+
 	if (r != NULL)
 		{
 		if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0;
@@ -247,22 +259,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct
 	int ret;
 
 	bn_check_top(n);
-	if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL))
-		{
-		BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-		return(0);
-		}
 
 	if (r != NULL)
 		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
 	else
-		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
-
-	if (ret >= 0)
 		{
-		if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		if (b->Ai == NULL)
+			{
+			BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
 			return(0);
+			}
+		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
 		}
+
 	bn_check_top(n);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index af94458ca..03deae667 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_
 	field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;	
 
 	/* only support affine coordinates */
-	if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err;
+	if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1;
 
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		{
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
index 26a4a9ee7..c3c20c38b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
@@ -286,9 +286,13 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 	size_t		crv_len = 0, n = 0;
 	EC_KEY		*eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
 	EC_GROUP	*group;
+	ECDSA_SIG	*ecdsa_sig = NULL;
 	unsigned char	digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
-	unsigned char	*signature = NULL; 
-	unsigned int	sig_len;
+	unsigned char	*signature = NULL;
+	const unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	unsigned char	*sig_ptr2;
+	unsigned char	*raw_buf = NULL;
+	unsigned int	sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
 	int		nid, ret =  0;
 	
 	/* fill digest values with some random data */
@@ -338,7 +342,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 		if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
 			goto builtin_err;
 		EC_GROUP_free(group);
-		if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) < 160)
+		degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+		if (degree < 160)
 			/* drop the curve */ 
 			{
 			EC_KEY_free(eckey);
@@ -414,26 +419,89 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
-		/* modify a single byte of the signature */
-		offset = signature[10] % sig_len;
-		dirt   = signature[11];
-		signature[offset] ^= dirt ? dirt : 1; 
+		/* wrong length */
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1,
+			eckey) == 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		BIO_printf(out, ".");
+		(void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
+		 * garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
+		 * modify a byte in one of the bignums directly. */
+		sig_ptr = signature;
+		if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+
+		/* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
+		r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
+		s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
+		bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
+		if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
+		if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL)
+			goto builtin_err;
+		/* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */
+		memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
+		offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
+		dirt   = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		/* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
 			goto builtin_err;
 			}
+		/* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
 		
 		BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
 		/* cleanup */
+		/* clean bogus errors */
+		ERR_clear_error();
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
 		signature = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 		eckey = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
 		wrong_eckey = NULL;
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
+		ecdsa_sig = NULL;
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
+		raw_buf = NULL;
 		}
 
 	ret = 1;	
@@ -442,8 +510,12 @@ builtin_err:
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 	if (wrong_eckey)
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
+	if (ecdsa_sig)
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
 	if (signature)
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
+	if (raw_buf)
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
 	if (curves)
 		OPENSSL_free(curves);
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index 310a3387b..a368f6fc7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000005fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000007fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0e-fips 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0g-fips 18 Jan 2012"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0g 18 Jan 2012"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index e9ead3a52..e3a65571c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -133,47 +133,87 @@
 # define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set))
 #endif
 
-#ifdef __VOS__
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+
+/* The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock
+   (RTC) to generate a sequence of unpredictable data.  The algorithm
+   relies upon the uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors
+   such as cache misses, interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and
+   upon the rather large relative difference between the speed of the
+   clock and the rate at which it can be read.
+
+   If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is
+   more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
+   clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the
+   results would be far more predictable.
+
+   As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of
+   seed data.  */
+
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
-	unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+	short int code;
+	gid_t curr_gid;
 	pid_t curr_pid;
 	uid_t curr_uid;
-	static int first=1;
-	int i;
-	long rnd = 0;
+	int i, k;
 	struct timespec ts;
-	unsigned seed;
-
-/* The VOS random() function starts from a static seed so its
-   initial value is predictable.  If random() returns the
-   initial value, reseed it with dynamic data.  The VOS
-   real-time clock has a granularity of 1 nsec so it should be
-   reasonably difficult to predict its exact value.  Do not
-   gratuitously reseed the PRNG because other code in this
-   process or thread may be using it.  */
-
-	if (first) {
-		first = 0;
-		rnd = random ();
-		if (rnd == 1804289383) {
-			clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-			curr_pid = getpid();
-			curr_uid = getuid();
-			seed = ts.tv_sec ^ ts.tv_nsec ^ curr_pid ^ curr_uid;
-			srandom (seed);
-		}
-	}
+	unsigned char v;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
-		if (i % 4 == 0)
-			rnd = random();
-		buf[i] = rnd;
-		rnd >>= 8;
-	}
-	RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+	long duration;
+	extern void s$sleep (long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+	long long duration;
+	extern void s$sleep2 (long long *_duration, short int *_code);
+#else
+#error "Unsupported Platform."
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+	/* Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some*
+	   variation between different processes.  */
+
+	curr_gid = getgid();
+	RAND_add (&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1);
+	curr_gid = 0;
+
+	curr_pid = getpid();
+	RAND_add (&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1);
+	curr_pid = 0;
+
+	curr_uid = getuid();
+	RAND_add (&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
+	curr_uid = 0;
 
+	for (i=0; i<(ENTROPY_NEEDED*4); i++)
+	{
+		/* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache
+		   collisions, bus interference, etc.  */
+		for (k=0; k<99; k++)
+			ts.tv_nsec = random ();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+		/* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us).  */
+		duration = 1;
+		s$sleep (&duration, &code);
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+		/* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us).  */
+		duration = 1;
+		s$sleep2 (&duration, &code);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+		/* get wall clock time.  */
+		clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+
+		/* take 8 bits */
+		v = (unsigned char) (ts.tv_nsec % 256);
+		RAND_add (&v, sizeof v, 1);
+		v = 0;
+	}
 	return 1;
 }
 #elif defined __OpenBSD__
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index bc7d9c580..030e07f41 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
 	in=fopen(file,"rb");
 #endif
 	if (in == NULL) goto err;
-#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
 	if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) {
 	  /* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number
 	   * of bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 7c941885f..2e1ddd48d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -314,51 +314,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+	BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	if (unblind == NULL)
+		/* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+		 * in BN_BLINDING. */
 		return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
 	else
 		{
-		int ret;
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		return ret;
-		}
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
-	BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	if (local)
-		return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-	else
-		{
+		/* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+		 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
 		int ret;
 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
 		return ret;
 		}
-}
+	}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+	BN_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	/* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+	 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+	 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+	 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+	 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+	 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+	 */
+	return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+	}
 
 /* signing */
 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
 	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 	int local_blinding = 0;
+	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -406,8 +411,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+		{
+		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;
+		}
 
 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
 		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
@@ -441,7 +453,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 
 	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;
 
 	if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
@@ -480,18 +492,21 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
 	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+	BIGNUM *f, *ret;
 	int j,num=0,r= -1;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 	int local_blinding = 0;
+	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
 	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
 
 	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	br  = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
 	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -529,8 +544,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+		{
+		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+			goto err;
+		}
 
 	/* do the decrypt */
 	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
@@ -564,7 +586,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		}
 
 	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
 			goto err;
 
 	p=buf;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5a0b0249b..701ec565e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
 	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
 	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
 
-	if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+	if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index 0d70e8696..df46a4983 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
  * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
  * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
  */
-static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
+static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
 			const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
 			const int length,
 			const unsigned char fill)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length);
+  if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
+    return 0;
   if (bs->length > 0) {
     memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
     if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
     }
   }
   memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
+  return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -181,15 +183,13 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
     return 0;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    if (bs->length > 4)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill);
     BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    if (bs->length > 16)
+    if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
       return 0;
-    addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill);
     for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2)
       ;
     for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
@@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
 /*
  * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
  * elements.
+ *
+ * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
+ * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
+ * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
+ * function returns -1.  If this messes up your preferred sort order
+ * for garbage input, tough noogies.
  */
 static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
 				const IPAddressOrRange *b,
@@ -326,22 +332,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
 
   switch (a->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_a = length * 8;
     break;
   }
 
   switch (b->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
     break;
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
+    if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
+      return -1;
     prefixlen_b = length * 8;
     break;
   }
@@ -383,6 +393,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min,
   unsigned char mask;
   int i, j;
 
+  OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0);
   for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++)
     ;
   for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--)
@@ -601,10 +612,10 @@ static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
     return NULL;
   switch (afi) {
   case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
-    sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
     break;
   }
   f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges;
@@ -656,22 +667,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
 /*
  * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
  */
-static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
+static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
 			    unsigned char *min,
 			    unsigned char *max,
 			    int length)
 {
-  OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
+  if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
+    return 0;
   switch (aor->type) {
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
+	    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
   case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
-    addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
-    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF);
-    return;
+    return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
+	    addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
   }
+  return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -687,9 +698,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
   if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
       afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
       (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
-       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange))
+       aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
+      !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
     return 0;
-  extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length);
+
   return afi_length;
 }
 
@@ -771,8 +783,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
       IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
 
-      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-      extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+	  !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+	return 0;
 
       /*
        * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
@@ -800,14 +813,17 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
     }
 
     /*
-     * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix.
+     * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a
+     * prefix.
      */
     j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
     {
       IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
-      if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
-	extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-	if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
+      if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+	if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
+	  return 0;
+	if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+	    range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
 	  return 0;
       }
     }
@@ -841,8 +857,16 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
     unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
 
-    extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
-    extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
+	!extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
+      return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
+	memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0)
+      return 0;
 
     /*
      * Punt overlaps.
@@ -860,8 +884,8 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
       IPAddressOrRange *merged;
       if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length))
 	return 0;
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
-      sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
+      (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(a);
       IPAddressOrRange_free(b);
       --i;
@@ -869,6 +893,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
     }
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for inverted final range.
+   */
+  j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1;
+  {
+    IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
+      unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
+      extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
+      if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0)
+	return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -885,7 +923,7 @@ int v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
 				    v3_addr_get_afi(f)))
       return 0;
   }
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr);
   OPENSSL_assert(v3_addr_is_canonical(addr));
   return 1;
@@ -1017,6 +1055,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
 	X509V3_conf_err(val);
 	goto err;
       }
+      if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) {
+	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+	X509V3_conf_err(val);
+	goto err;
+      }
       if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) {
 	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	goto err;
@@ -1102,13 +1145,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
 
   p = 0;
   for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
-    extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
-		    c_min, c_max, length);
+    if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
+			 c_min, c_max, length))
+      return -1;
     for (;; p++) {
       if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
 	return 0;
-      extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
-		      p_min, p_max, length);
+      if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
+			   p_min, p_max, length))
+	return 0;
       if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
 	continue;
       if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
@@ -1130,7 +1175,7 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b)
     return 1;
   if (b == NULL || v3_addr_inherits(a) || v3_addr_inherits(b))
     return 0;
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) {
     IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i);
     int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa);
@@ -1195,7 +1240,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
   }
   if (!v3_addr_is_canonical(ext))
     validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
-  sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+  (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
   if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
     X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     ret = 0;
@@ -1221,7 +1266,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
       }
       continue;
     }
-    sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
+    (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
     for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
       IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
       int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc);