Update openssl to version openssl-1.0.1k

Conflicts:
	openssl/Makefile

11 files changed, 189 insertions, 180 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt b/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
index a8a34c7ab..65f8fc829 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
+++ b/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt
@@ -3,22 +3,22 @@
 
 1. Introduction
 
-How you handle certificates depend a great deal on what your role is.
+How you handle certificates depends a great deal on what your role is.
 Your role can be one or several of:
 
-  - User of some client software
-  - User of some server software
+  - User of some client application
+  - User of some server application
   - Certificate authority
 
 This file is for users who wish to get a certificate of their own.
-Certificate authorities should read ca.txt.
+Certificate authorities should read https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ca.html.
 
 In all the cases shown below, the standard configuration file, as
 compiled into openssl, will be used.  You may find it in /etc/,
-/usr/local/ssl/ or somewhere else.  The name is openssl.cnf, and
-is better described in another HOWTO <config.txt?>.  If you want to
-use a different configuration file, use the argument '-config {file}'
-with the command shown below.
+/usr/local/ssl/ or somewhere else.  By default the file is named
+openssl.cnf and is described at https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/config.html.
+You can specify a different configuration file using the
+'-config {file}' argument with the commands shown below.
 
 
 2. Relationship with keys
@@ -29,24 +29,26 @@ somewhere.  With OpenSSL, public keys are easily derived from private
 keys, so before you create a certificate or a certificate request, you
 need to create a private key.
 
-Private keys are generated with 'openssl genrsa' if you want a RSA
-private key, or 'openssl gendsa' if you want a DSA private key.
-Further information on how to create private keys can be found in
-another HOWTO <keys.txt?>.  The rest of this text assumes you have
-a private key in the file privkey.pem.
+Private keys are generated with 'openssl genrsa -out privkey.pem' if
+you want a RSA private key, or if you want a DSA private key:
+'openssl dsaparam -out dsaparam.pem 2048; openssl gendsa -out privkey.pem dsaparam.pem'.
+
+The private keys created by these commands are not passphrase protected;
+it might or might not be the desirable thing.  Further information on how to
+create private keys can be found at https://www.openssl.org/docs/HOWTO/keys.txt.
+The rest of this text assumes you have a private key in the file privkey.pem.
 
 
 3. Creating a certificate request
 
-To create a certificate, you need to start with a certificate
-request (or, as some certificate authorities like to put
-it, "certificate signing request", since that's exactly what they do,
-they sign it and give you the result back, thus making it authentic
-according to their policies).  A certificate request can then be sent
-to a certificate authority to get it signed into a certificate, or if
-you have your own certificate authority, you may sign it yourself, or
-if you need a self-signed certificate (because you just want a test
-certificate or because you are setting up your own CA).
+To create a certificate, you need to start with a certificate request
+(or, as some certificate authorities like to put it, "certificate
+signing request", since that's exactly what they do, they sign it and
+give you the result back, thus making it authentic according to their
+policies).  A certificate request is sent to a certificate authority
+to get it signed into a certificate. You can also sign the certificate
+yourself if you have your own certificate authority or create a
+self-signed certificate (typically for testing purpose).
 
 The certificate request is created like this:
 
@@ -55,12 +57,14 @@ The certificate request is created like this:
 Now, cert.csr can be sent to the certificate authority, if they can
 handle files in PEM format.  If not, use the extra argument '-outform'
 followed by the keyword for the format to use (see another HOWTO
-<formats.txt?>).  In some cases, that isn't sufficient and you will
-have to be more creative.
+<formats.txt?>).  In some cases, -outform does not let you output the
+certificate request in the right format and you will have to use one
+of the various other commands that are exposed by openssl (or get
+creative and use a combination of tools).
 
-When the certificate authority has then done the checks the need to
-do (and probably gotten payment from you), they will hand over your
-new certificate to you.
+The certificate authority performs various checks (according to their
+policies) and usually waits for payment from you. Once that is
+complete, they send you your new certificate.
 
 Section 5 will tell you more on how to handle the certificate you
 received.
@@ -68,11 +72,12 @@ received.
 
 4. Creating a self-signed test certificate
 
-If you don't want to deal with another certificate authority, or just
-want to create a test certificate for yourself.  This is similar to
-creating a certificate request, but creates a certificate instead of
-a certificate request.  This is NOT the recommended way to create a
-CA certificate, see ca.txt.
+You can create a self-signed certificate if you don't want to deal
+with a certificate authority, or if you just want to create a test
+certificate for yourself.  This is similar to creating a certificate
+request, but creates a certificate instead of a certificate request.
+This is NOT the recommended way to create a CA certificate, see
+https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ca.html.
 
   openssl req -new -x509 -key privkey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 1095
 
@@ -93,13 +98,13 @@ certificate and your key to various formats, most often also putting
 them together into one file.  The ways to do this is described in
 another HOWTO <formats.txt?>, I will just mention the simplest case.
 In the case of a raw DER thing in PEM format, and assuming that's all
-right for yor applications, simply concatenating the certificate and
+right for your applications, simply concatenating the certificate and
 the key into a new file and using that one should be enough.  With
 some applications, you don't even have to do that.
 
 
-By now, you have your cetificate and your private key and can start
-using the software that depend on it.
+By now, you have your certificate and your private key and can start
+using applications that depend on it.
 
 -- 
 Richard Levitte
diff --git a/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt b/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
index f98ec3607..d78be2f14 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
+++ b/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt
@@ -1,74 +1,69 @@
-<DRAFT!>
 			HOWTO proxy certificates
 
 0. WARNING
 
-NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAVE BEEN CHECKED!  They are just an
-example to show you how things can be done.  There may be typos or
-type conflicts, and you will have to resolve them.
+NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAS BEEN CHECKED!  The code is just examples to
+show you how things could be done.  There might be typos or type conflicts, and
+you will have to resolve them.
 
 1. Introduction
 
-Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820.  They are really usual
-certificates with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
+Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820.  They are really usual certificates
+with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
 
-Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user),
-either directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by
-extension through an already issued proxy certificate..  They are used
-to extend rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically,
-or sometimes to the user itself), so it can perform operations in the
-name of the owner of the EE certificate.
+Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), either
+directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by extension through
+an already issued proxy certificate.  Proxy certificates are used to extend
+rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, or sometimes to the
+user itself).  This allows the entity to perform operations on behalf of the
+owner of the EE certificate.
 
 See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information.
 
 
 2. A warning about proxy certificates
 
-Noone seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind.
-Basically, to this date, it seems that proxy certificates have only
-been used in a world that's highly aware of them.  What would happen
-if an unsuspecting application is to validate a chain of certificates
-that contains proxy certificates?  It would usually consider the leaf
-to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, and since proxy
-certificates are controlled by the EE certificate owner alone, it's
-would be normal to consider what the EE certificate owner could do
-with them.
+No one seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind.  To this
+date, it seems that proxy certificates have only been used in a context highly
+aware of them.
 
-subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates,
-and this is enforced in OpenSSL.  The subject must be the same as the
-issuer, with one commonName added on.
+Existing applications might misbehave when trying to validate a chain of
+certificates which use a proxy certificate.  They might incorrectly consider the
+leaf to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, which is controlled
+by the EE certificate owner.
 
-Possible threats are, as far as has been imagined so far:
+subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, and this
+is enforced in OpenSSL.  The subject must be the same as the issuer, with one
+commonName added on.
+
+Possible threats we can think of at this time include:
 
  - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates).
- - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in
-   certain environments, that would grant extra or different
-   authorisation rights.
+ - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in certain
+   environments, that would grant extra or different authorisation rights.
+
+For these reasons, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates be
+explicitly allowed.  Currently, this can be done using the following methods:
 
-For this reason, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates
-be explicitely allowed.  Currently, this can be done using the
-following methods:
+ - if the application directly calls X509_verify_cert(), it can first call:
 
- - if the application calls X509_verify_cert() itself, it can do the
-   following prior to that call (ctx is the pointer passed in the call
-   to X509_verify_cert()):
+   X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 
-	X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+   Where ctx is the pointer which then gets passed to X509_verify_cert().
 
- - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled
-   before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable
-   OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS with some non-empty value.
+ - proxy certificate validation can be enabled before starting the application
+   by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS.
 
-There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the
-default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future.
+In the future, it might be possible to enable proxy certificates by editing
+openssl.cnf.
 
 
-3. How to create proxy cerificates
+3. How to create proxy certificates
 
-It's quite easy to create proxy certificates, by taking advantage of
-the lack of checks of the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*).  But
-first, you need to create a configuration section that contains a
-definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this:
+Creating proxy certificates is quite easy, by taking advantage of a lack of
+checks in the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*).  You must first create a
+configuration section that contains a definition of the proxyCertInfo extension,
+for example:
 
   [ v3_proxy ]
   # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate.
@@ -77,10 +72,10 @@ definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this:
   # Usual authority key ID
   authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
 
-  # Now, for the extension that marks this certificate as a proxy one
+  # The extension which marks this certificate as a proxy
   proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
 
-It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section:
+It's also possible to specify the proxy extension in a separate section:
 
   proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
 
@@ -89,96 +84,85 @@ It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section:
   pathlen=0
   policy=text:BC
 
-The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the
-syntag determines what will be done with the string.  The recognised
-syntags are as follows:
-
-  text	indicates that the string is simply the bytes, not
-	encoded in any kind of way:
+The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the syntag
+determines what will be done with the string.  The following syntags are
+recognised:
 
-		policy=text:räksmörgås
+  text  indicates that the string is simply bytes, without any encoding:
 
-	Previous versions of this design had a specific tag
-	for UTF-8 text.  However, since the bytes are copied
-	as-is anyway, there's no need for it.  Instead, use
-	the text: tag, like this:
+          policy=text:räksmörgås
 
-		policy=text:räksmörgås
+        Previous versions of this design had a specific tag for UTF-8 text.
+        However, since the bytes are copied as-is anyway, there is no need for
+        such a specific tag.
 
-  hex	indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons
-	between each byte (every second hex digit):
+  hex   indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons between each byte
+        (every second hex digit):
 
-		policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
+          policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
 
-	Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a
-	complete DER blob.  However, the only legal use for
-	this would be to surround the bytes that would go with
-	the hex: tag with what's needed to construct a correct
-	OCTET STRING.  Since hex: does that, the DER tag felt
-	superfluous, and was therefore removed.
+        Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a complete DER
+        blob.  However, the only legal use for this would be to surround the
+        bytes that would go with the hex: tag with whatever is needed to
+        construct a correct OCTET STRING.  The DER tag therefore felt
+        superfluous, and was removed.
 
-  file	indicates that the text of the policy should really be
-	taken from a file.  The string is then really a file
-	name.  This is useful for policies that are large
-	(more than a few of lines) XML documents, for example.
+  file  indicates that the text of the policy should really be taken from a
+        file.  The string is then really a file name.  This is useful for
+        policies that are large (more than a few lines, e.g. XML documents).
 
 The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this:
 
   0.policy=This is
-  1.polisy= a multi-
+  1.policy= a multi-
   2.policy=line policy.
 
-NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part that determines the rights
-granted to the process using the proxy certificate.  The value is
-completely dependent on the application reading and interpretting it!
+NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part which determines the rights granted to
+the process using the proxy certificate.  The value is completely dependent on
+the application reading and interpreting it!
 
-Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy
-certificate, you can now easily create a proxy certificate like this:
+Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy certificate, you
+can easily create a proxy certificate by doing:
 
-  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \
-	  -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
-  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 \
-	  -out proxy.crt -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key \
-	  -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
+  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
+  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 -out proxy.crt \
+    -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
 
-It's just as easy to create a proxy certificate using another proxy
-certificate as issuer (note that I'm using a different configuration
-section for it):
+You can also create a proxy certificate using another proxy certificate as
+issuer (note: I'm using a different configuration section for it):
 
-  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \
-	  -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
-  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 \
-	  -out proxy2.crt -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key \
-	  -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
+  openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
+  openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 -out proxy2.crt \
+    -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
 
 
 4. How to have your application interpret the policy?
 
-The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to prepare some default
-rights, then do a check of the proxy certificate against the a chain
-of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates, and see
-what rights came out by the end.  Sounds easy, huh?  It almost is.
+The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to start with some default rights,
+then compute the resulting rights by checking the proxy certificate against
+the chain of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates. You then
+use the final computed rights.  Sounds easy, huh?  It almost is.
 
-The slightly complicated part is how to pass data between your
+The slightly complicated part is figuring out how to pass data between your
 application and the certificate validation procedure.
 
 You need the following ingredients:
 
- - a callback routing that will be called for every certificate that's
-   validated.  It will be called several times for each certificates,
-   so you must be attentive to when it's a good time to do the proxy
-   policy interpretation and check, as well as to fill in the defaults
-   when the EE certificate is checked.
+ - a callback function that will be called for every certificate being
+   validated.  The callback be called several times for each certificate,
+   so you must be careful to do the proxy policy interpretation at the right
+   time.  You also need to fill in the defaults when the EE certificate is
+   checked.
 
- - a structure of data that's shared between your application code and
-   the callback.
+ - a data structure that is shared between your application code and the
+   callback.
 
  - a wrapper function that sets it all up.
 
- - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic
-   ex_data store that's attached to an X509 validation context.
+ - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic ex_data
+   store that is attached to an X509 validation context.
 
-This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
+Here is some skeleton code you can fill in:
 
   /* In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit
      array, one bit for each possible right.  */
@@ -210,7 +194,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
   static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
   {
     if (ok == 1) /* It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy
-                    check within this secion.  It's important to know
+                    check within this section.  It's important to know
                     that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked
                     from top to bottom.  You get the CA root first,
                     followed by the possible chain of intermediate
@@ -221,7 +205,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
 
         if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
           {
-	    YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
+            YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
               (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
                 get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
             PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
@@ -250,12 +234,12 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
                    bit array and fill it with the rights granted by
                    the current proxy certificate, then use it as a
                    mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and
-                   voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
+                   voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
                    array.  */
                 {
                   int i;
                   YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights;
-		  memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights));
+                  memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights));
 
                   /* process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure
                      that takes a string and it's length, interprets
@@ -276,7 +260,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
           {
             /* We have a EE certificate, let's use it to set default!
             */
-	    YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
+            YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
               (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
                 get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod
index 2414c5337..9e15798d8 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ B<openssl> B<dgst>
 [B<-hex>]
 [B<-binary>]
 [B<-r>]
+[B<-hmac arg>]
+[B<-non-fips-allow>]
 [B<-out filename>]
 [B<-sign filename>]
 [B<-keyform arg>]
@@ -62,6 +64,15 @@ output the digest or signature in binary form.
 
 output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>.
 
+=item B<-hmac arg>
+
+set the HMAC key to "arg".
+
+=item B<-non-fips-allow>
+
+Allow use of non FIPS digest when in FIPS mode.  This has no effect when not in
+FIPS mode.
+
 =item B<-out filename>
 
 filename to output to, or standard output by default.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
index af2e12e41..38f026afc 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ if the B<host> option is present then the OCSP request is sent to the host
 B<hostname> on port B<port>. B<path> specifies the HTTP path name to use
 or "/" by default.
 
+=item B<-timeout seconds>
+
+connection timeout to the OCSP responder in seconds
+
 =item B<-CAfile file>, B<-CApath pathname>
 
 file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index 4e22edcd6..ed027b387 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ writes the encrypted version to B<out>. This function can be called
 multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount
 of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data:
 as a result the amount of data written may be anything from zero bytes
-to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B<outl> should contain sufficient
+to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B<out> should contain sufficient
 room. The actual number of bytes written is placed in B<outl>.
 
 If padding is enabled (the default) then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() encrypts
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
index e495a8124..6799ce101 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
@@ -43,19 +43,23 @@ indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
 
 =head1 EXAMPLE
 
-Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
+Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys). See also L<PEM_read_PUBKEY(3)|pem(3)> or
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> for means to load a public key. You may also simply
+set 'eng = NULL;' to start with the default OpenSSL RSA implementation:
 
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/engine.h>
 
  EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
+ ENGINE *eng;
  unsigned char *out, *in;
  size_t outlen, inlen; 
  EVP_PKEY *key;
- /* NB: assumes key in, inlen are already set up
+ /* NB: assumes eng, key, in, inlen are already set up,
   * and that key is an RSA public key
   */
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key);
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key,eng);
  if (!ctx)
 	/* Error occurred */
  if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0)
@@ -79,6 +83,8 @@ Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>,
+L<engine(3)|engine(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod
index 1afd008cb..043766cc4 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod
@@ -81,14 +81,14 @@ Create an B<X509_NAME> structure:
  nm = X509_NAME_new();
  if (nm == NULL)
 	/* Some error */
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
-			"C", "UK", -1, -1, 0))
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "C", MBSTRING_ASC, 
+			"UK", -1, -1, 0))
 	/* Error */
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
-			"O", "Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0))
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "O", MBSTRING_ASC,
+			"Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0))
 	/* Error */
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
-			"CN", "Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0))
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
+			"Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0))
 	/* Error */
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
index 3b1f9ff43..c8a812879 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
 X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
 various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
 
+The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
+the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
+E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
+
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
 Process all entries:
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
index 8cb669dae..2a5aaa555 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
@@ -71,6 +71,16 @@ SSL_CTX->freelist_max_len, which defaults to 32.  Using this flag can
 save around 34k per idle SSL connection.
 This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections.
 
+=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
+
+Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
+
+DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake.
+Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance
+in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
index 6e6b5e6d8..e80a72cd4 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
@@ -158,15 +158,7 @@ temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used.
 
 =item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
 
-Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations
-(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>).
-According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key
-can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers
-with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral
-RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the
-SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with
-clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral
-Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead.
+This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op.
 
 =item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod
index 534643cd9..8794eb7ac 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod
@@ -74,21 +74,14 @@ exchange and use EDH (Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) key exchange instead
 in order to achieve forward secrecy (see
 L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
 
-On OpenSSL servers ephemeral RSA key exchange is therefore disabled by default
-and must be explicitly enabled  using the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA option of
-L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, violating the TLS/SSL
-standard. When ephemeral RSA key exchange is required for export ciphers,
-it will automatically be used without this option!
-
-An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via
-a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the
-callback may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the
-generation of a RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant
-delay in the handshake procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function
-is that it can supply keys of different size (e.g. for SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
-usage) while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for key size of
-512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give away key length
-if a longer key would be allowed.
+An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via a
+callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the callback
+may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the generation of a
+RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant delay in the handshake
+procedure.  Another advantage of the callback function is that it can supply
+keys of different size while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for
+key size of 512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give
+away key length if a longer key would be allowed.
 
 The B<tmp_rsa_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
 the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the