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authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2010-03-30 12:36:28 +0000
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2010-03-30 12:36:28 +0000
commitff48c0d9098080b51ea12710029135916d117806 (patch)
tree96e6af9caf170ba21a1027b24e306a07e27d7b75 /openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
parentbb731f5ac92655c4860a41fa818a7a63005f8369 (diff)
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svn merge -r514:HEAD ^/branches/released .
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c304
1 files changed, 304 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00759bcab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * gost_keyx.c *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Cryptocom LTD *
+ * This file is distributed under the same license as OpenSSL *
+ * *
+ * VK0 34.10-2001 key exchange and GOST R 34.10-2001 *
+ * based PKCS7/SMIME support *
+ * Requires OpenSSL 0.9.9 for compilation *
+ **********************************************************************/
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "gost89.h"
+#include "gosthash.h"
+#include "e_gost_err.h"
+#include "gost_keywrap.h"
+#include "gost_lcl.h"
+#include "gost2001_keyx.h"
+
+
+
+/* Implementation of CryptoPro VKO 34.10-2001 algorithm */
+static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,const EC_POINT *pub_key,EC_KEY *priv_key,const unsigned char *ukm)
+ {
+ unsigned char ukm_be[8],databuf[64],hashbuf[64];
+ BIGNUM *UKM=NULL,*p=NULL,*order=NULL,*X=NULL,*Y=NULL;
+ const BIGNUM* key=EC_KEY_get0_private_key(priv_key);
+ EC_POINT *pnt=EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key));
+ int i;
+ gost_hash_ctx hash_ctx;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+
+ for (i=0;i<8;i++)
+ {
+ ukm_be[7-i]=ukm[i];
+ }
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ UKM=getbnfrombuf(ukm_be,8);
+ p=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ X=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ Y=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key),order,ctx);
+ BN_mod_mul(p,key,UKM,order,ctx);
+ EC_POINT_mul(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key),pnt,NULL,pub_key,p,ctx);
+ EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key),
+ pnt,X,Y,ctx);
+ /*Serialize elliptic curve point same way as we do it when saving
+ * key */
+ store_bignum(Y,databuf,32);
+ store_bignum(X,databuf+32,32);
+ /* And reverse byte order of whole buffer */
+ for (i=0;i<64;i++)
+ {
+ hashbuf[63-i]=databuf[i];
+ }
+ init_gost_hash_ctx(&hash_ctx,&GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet);
+ start_hash(&hash_ctx);
+ hash_block(&hash_ctx,hashbuf,64);
+ finish_hash(&hash_ctx,shared_key);
+ done_gost_hash_ctx(&hash_ctx);
+ BN_free(UKM);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(pnt);
+ return 32;
+ }
+
+
+/*
+ * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback derive. Implements VKO R 34.10-2001
+ * algorithm
+ */
+int pkey_gost2001_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
+{
+ /* Public key of peer in the ctx field peerkey
+ * Our private key in the ctx pkey
+ * ukm is in the algorithm specific context data
+ */
+ EVP_PKEY *my_key = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_key = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(ctx);
+ struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
+
+ if (!data->shared_ukm) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST2001_DERIVE, GOST_R_UKM_NOT_SET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ *keylen = 32;
+ return 32;
+ }
+
+ *keylen=VKO_compute_key(key, 32, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(peer_key)),
+ (EC_KEY *)EVP_PKEY_get0(my_key),data->shared_ukm);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*
+ * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback encrypt
+ * Implementation of GOST2001 key transport, cryptocom variation
+ */
+/* Generates ephemeral key based on pubk algorithm
+ * computes shared key using VKO and returns filled up
+ * GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT structure
+ */
+
+/*
+ * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback encrypt
+ * Implementation of GOST2001 key transport, cryptopo variation
+ */
+
+int pkey_GOST01cp_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, const unsigned char *key,size_t key_len)
+ {
+ GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pubk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+ struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(pctx);
+ const struct gost_cipher_info *param=get_encryption_params(NULL);
+ unsigned char ukm[8], shared_key[32], crypted_key[44];
+ int ret=0;
+ int key_is_ephemeral=1;
+ gost_ctx cctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *sec_key=EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx);
+ if (data->shared_ukm)
+ {
+ memcpy(ukm, data->shared_ukm,8);
+ }
+ else if (out)
+ {
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(ukm,8)<=0)
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_ENCRYPT,
+ GOST_R_RANDOM_GENERATOR_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check for private key in the peer_key of context */
+ if (sec_key)
+ {
+ key_is_ephemeral=0;
+ if (!gost_get0_priv_key(sec_key))
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_ENCRYPT,
+ GOST_R_NO_PRIVATE_PART_OF_NON_EPHEMERAL_KEYPAIR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ key_is_ephemeral=1;
+ if (out)
+ {
+ sec_key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ EVP_PKEY_assign(sec_key,EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubk),EC_KEY_new());
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(sec_key,pubk);
+ if (!gost2001_keygen(EVP_PKEY_get0(sec_key)))
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!get_gost_engine_param(GOST_PARAM_CRYPT_PARAMS) && param == gost_cipher_list)
+ {
+ param= gost_cipher_list+1;
+ }
+ if (out)
+ {
+ VKO_compute_key(shared_key,32,EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(pubk)),EVP_PKEY_get0(sec_key),ukm);
+ gost_init(&cctx,param->sblock);
+ keyWrapCryptoPro(&cctx,shared_key,ukm,key,crypted_key);
+ }
+ gkt = GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_new();
+ if (!gkt)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if(!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv,
+ ukm,8))
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->imit,crypted_key+40,4))
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key,crypted_key+8,32))
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (key_is_ephemeral) {
+ if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,out?sec_key:pubk))
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_ENCRYPT,
+ GOST_R_CANNOT_PACK_EPHEMERAL_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
+ gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher = OBJ_nid2obj(param->nid);
+ if (key_is_ephemeral && sec_key) EVP_PKEY_free(sec_key);
+ if (!key_is_ephemeral)
+ {
+ /* Set control "public key from client certificate used" */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 3, NULL) <= 0)
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_ENCRYPT,
+ GOST_R_CTRL_CALL_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((*out_len = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt,out?&out:NULL))>0) ret =1;
+ GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ if (key_is_ephemeral && sec_key) EVP_PKEY_free(sec_key);
+ GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+/*
+ * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback decrypt
+ * Implementation of GOST2001 key transport, cryptopo variation
+ */
+int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *p = in;
+ EVP_PKEY *priv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+ GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL;
+ int ret=0;
+ unsigned char wrappedKey[44];
+ unsigned char sharedKey[32];
+ gost_ctx ctx;
+ const struct gost_cipher_info *param=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *eph_key=NULL, *peerkey=NULL;
+
+ if (!key)
+ {
+ *key_len = 32;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ gkt = d2i_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(NULL,(const unsigned char **)&p,
+ in_len);
+ if (!gkt)
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_PARSING_KEY_TRANSPORT_INFO);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If key transport structure contains public key, use it */
+ eph_key = X509_PUBKEY_get(gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key);
+ if (eph_key)
+ {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, eph_key) <= 0)
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT,
+ GOST_R_INCOMPATIBLE_PEER_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Set control "public key from client certificate used" */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 3, NULL) <= 0)
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT,
+ GOST_R_CTRL_CALL_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ peerkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx);
+ if (!peerkey)
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT,
+ GOST_R_NO_PEER_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ param = get_encryption_params(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
+ gost_init(&ctx,param->sblock);
+ OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8);
+ memcpy(wrappedKey,gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->data,8);
+ OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key->length==32);
+ memcpy(wrappedKey+8,gkt->key_info->encrypted_key->data,32);
+ OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_info->imit->length==4);
+ memcpy(wrappedKey+40,gkt->key_info->imit->data,4);
+ VKO_compute_key(sharedKey,32,EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(peerkey)),
+ EVP_PKEY_get0(priv),wrappedKey);
+ if (!keyUnwrapCryptoPro(&ctx,sharedKey,wrappedKey,key))
+ {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT,
+ GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ if (eph_key) EVP_PKEY_free(eph_key);
+ if (gkt) GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
+ return ret;
+ }