Checked in the following released items:

xkeyboard-config-1.4.tar.gz
ttf-bitstream-vera-1.10.tar.gz
font-alias-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-sun-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-sun-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-sony-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-schumacher-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-mutt-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-misc-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-misc-meltho-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-micro-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-jis-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-isas-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-dec-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-daewoo-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-cursor-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-arabic-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-winitzki-cyrillic-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-misc-cyrillic-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-cronyx-cyrillic-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-screen-cyrillic-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-xfree86-type1-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-adobe-utopia-type1-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-ibm-type1-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bitstream-type1-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bitstream-speedo-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-ttf-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-type1-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bitstream-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-lucidatypewriter-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-adobe-utopia-100dpi-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-adobe-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-util-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-bitstream-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-lucidatypewriter-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-adobe-utopia-75dpi-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-bh-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
bdftopcf-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-adobe-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
mkfontscale-1.0.6.tar.gz
openssl-0.9.8k.tar.gz
bigreqsproto-1.0.2.tar.gz
xtrans-1.2.2.tar.gz
resourceproto-1.0.2.tar.gz
inputproto-1.4.4.tar.gz
compositeproto-0.4.tar.gz
damageproto-1.1.0.tar.gz
zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
xkbcomp-1.0.5.tar.gz
freetype-2.3.9.tar.gz
pthreads-w32-2-8-0-release.tar.gz
pixman-0.12.0.tar.gz
kbproto-1.0.3.tar.gz
evieext-1.0.2.tar.gz
fixesproto-4.0.tar.gz
recordproto-1.13.2.tar.gz
randrproto-1.2.2.tar.gz
scrnsaverproto-1.1.0.tar.gz
renderproto-0.9.3.tar.gz
xcmiscproto-1.1.2.tar.gz
fontsproto-2.0.2.tar.gz
xextproto-7.0.3.tar.gz
xproto-7.0.14.tar.gz
libXdmcp-1.0.2.tar.gz
libxkbfile-1.0.5.tar.gz
libfontenc-1.0.4.tar.gz
libXfont-1.3.4.tar.gz
libX11-1.1.5.tar.gz
libXau-1.0.4.tar.gz
libxcb-1.1.tar.gz
xorg-server-1.5.3.tar.gz

1 files changed, 1193 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..15a201a25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1193 @@
+/* ssl/d1_both.c */
+/* 
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+
+/* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
+static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
+
+static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
+static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
+static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
+	unsigned long frag_len);
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
+	unsigned char *p);
+static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+	unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, 
+	unsigned long frag_len);
+static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
+static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, 
+	long max, int *ok);
+
+static hm_fragment *
+dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
+	{
+	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
+	if ( frag == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (frag_len)
+		{
+		buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+		if ( buf == NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(frag);
+			return NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
+	frag->fragment = buf;
+
+	return frag;
+	}
+
+static void
+dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+	{
+	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+	OPENSSL_free(frag);
+	}
+
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+	{
+	int ret;
+	int curr_mtu;
+	unsigned int len, frag_off;
+
+	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+	if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+		{
+		s->d1->mtu = 
+			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
+		if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+			{
+			s->d1->mtu = 0;
+			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
+			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, 
+				s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+			}
+		}
+#if 0 
+	mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
+
+	mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+	curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+
+	if ( curr_mtu > 0)
+		mtu = curr_mtu;
+	else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
+		{
+		ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+		if ( ret <= 0)
+			return ret;
+		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0);  /* should have something reasonable now */
+
+#endif
+
+	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
+			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+	frag_off = 0;
+	while( s->init_num)
+		{
+		curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - 
+			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+		if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+			{
+			/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
+			ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+			if ( ret <= 0)
+				return ret;
+			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+			}
+
+		if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+			len = curr_mtu;
+		else
+			len = s->init_num;
+
+
+		/* XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part */
+		if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+			{
+			if ( s->init_off != 0)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+				/* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
+				if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)  
+					len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+				}
+
+			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 
+				len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+			dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
+
+			OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+			}
+
+		ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+			len);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			{
+			/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
+			 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
+			 * really retransmit anything.  continue as if everything
+			 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
+			 * retransmit 
+			 */
+			if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL))
+				s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+					BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+			else
+				return(-1);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+
+			/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
+			 * message got sent.  but why would this happen? */
+			OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+
+			if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
+				{
+				/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+				 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
+				unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+				const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+				int xlen;
+
+				if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+					{
+					/* reconstruct message header is if it
+					 * is being sent in single fragment */
+					*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+					s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+					l2n3(0,p);
+					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+					p  -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+					xlen = ret;
+					}
+				else
+					{
+					p  += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+					xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+					}
+
+				ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
+				}
+
+			if (ret == s->init_num)
+				{
+				if (s->msg_callback)
+					s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, 
+						(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, 
+						s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+				s->init_off = 0;  /* done writing this message */
+				s->init_num = 0;
+
+				return(1);
+				}
+			s->init_off+=ret;
+			s->init_num-=ret;
+			frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+			}
+		}
+	return(0);
+	}
+
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * Read an entire handshake message.  Handshake messages arrive in
+ * fragments.
+ */
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+	{
+	int i, al;
+	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
+
+	/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
+	 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
+	if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
+		{
+		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
+		if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		*ok=1;
+		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+		return s->init_num;
+		}
+
+	msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
+	do
+		{
+		if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0)
+			{
+			/* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */
+			memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+			}
+
+		i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
+		if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
+			i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY)  /* bad fragment received */
+			continue;
+		else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
+			return i;
+
+		/* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing
+		 * up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to
+		 * handshake packet length, we assume we have got all
+		 * the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause
+		 * premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps.
+		 * Well, handling overlaps would require something more
+		 * drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to
+		 * tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was
+		 * the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control
+		 * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
+		if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
+			{
+			unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+			unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+			/* reconstruct message header as if it was
+			 * sent in single fragment */
+			*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+			l2n3(msg_len,p);
+			s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+			l2n3(0,p);
+			l2n3(msg_len,p);
+			if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+				msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+			ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+			if (s->msg_callback)
+				s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+					p, msg_len,
+					s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+			memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+			/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
+			 * this means that we don't need to retransmit of the
+			 * buffered messages.  
+			 * XDTLS: may be able clear out this
+			 * buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order
+			 * handshake message/record is received at the record
+			 * layer.  
+			 * XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to
+			 * know that change cipher spec and finished messages
+			 * have been received by the client before clearing this
+			 * buffer.  this can simply be done by waiting for the
+			 * first data  segment, but is there a better way?  */
+			dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+
+			s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+			return s->init_num;
+			}
+		else
+			msg_hdr->frag_off = i;
+		} while(1) ;
+
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+	*ok = 0;
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
+	{
+	size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
+
+	msg_len  = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+	frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+	frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+	/* sanity checking */
+	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+	if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
+		{
+		/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
+		 * against max above */
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+			return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			}
+
+		s->s3->tmp.message_size  = msg_len;
+		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+		s->s3->tmp.message_type  = msg_hdr->type;
+		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type    = msg_hdr->type;
+		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq     = msg_hdr->seq;
+		}
+	else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
+		{
+		/* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
+		 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		}
+
+	return 0; /* no error */
+	}
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+	{
+	/* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
+	 * if so:
+	 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
+	 * (2) update s->init_num
+	 */
+	pitem *item;
+	hm_fragment *frag;
+	int al;
+
+	*ok = 0;
+	item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+	if ( item == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+	if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
+		{
+		pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+
+		al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
+
+		if (al==0) /* no alert */
+			{
+			unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+			memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
+				frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+			}
+
+		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+		pitem_free(item);
+
+		if (al==0)
+			{
+			*ok = 1;
+			return frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+			}
+
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+		s->init_num = 0;
+		*ok = 0;
+		return -1;
+		}
+	else
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+{
+	int i=-1;
+	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+	pitem *item = NULL;
+	PQ_64BIT seq64;
+	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
+		{
+		unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+		while (frag_len)
+			{
+			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+				devnull,
+				frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+			if (i<=0) goto err;
+			frag_len -= i;
+			}
+		}
+
+	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+	if ( frag == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+	if (frag_len)
+		{
+		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+		i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+			frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+		if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
+	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
+
+	item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
+	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+	if ( item == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+err:
+	if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+	if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	*ok = 0;
+	return i;
+	}
+
+
+static long
+dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+	{
+	unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+	unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len;
+	int i,al;
+	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
+	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
+	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+		{
+		if (*ok)	s->init_num += frag_len;
+		return frag_len;
+		}
+
+	/* read handshake message header */
+	i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
+		DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
+	if (i <= 0) 	/* nbio, or an error */
+		{
+		s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+		*ok = 0;
+		return i;
+		}
+	OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+	/* parse the message fragment header */
+	dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
+
+	/* 
+	 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
+	 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time 
+	 */
+	if ( msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
+		return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
+	l = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+	frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+	frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+
+	if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
+		wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+		{
+		/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+		 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
+		 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
+		 * 'Finished' MAC. */
+		if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
+			{
+			if (s->msg_callback)
+				s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 
+					wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 
+					s->msg_callback_arg);
+			
+			s->init_num = 0;
+			return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+				max, ok);
+			}
+		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
+		goto f_err;
+
+	/* XDTLS:  ressurect this when restart is in place */
+	s->state=stn;
+
+	if ( frag_len > 0)
+		{
+		unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+			&p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
+		/* XDTLS:  fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
+		if (i <= 0)
+			{
+			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+			*ok = 0;
+			return i;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		i = 0;
+
+	/* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
+	 * handshake to fail */
+	OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+
+	*ok = 1;
+
+	/* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
+	 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
+	 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
+	 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
+	s->init_num += frag_len;
+	return frag_len;
+
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+	s->init_num = 0;
+
+	*ok=0;
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int i;
+	unsigned long l;
+
+	if (s->state == a)
+		{
+		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+			&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
+			&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
+			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+		p+=i;
+		l=i;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
+		 * I do this.
+		 */
+		l&=0xffff;
+#endif
+
+		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
+		s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+		s->state=b;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx			re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence		zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret		re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc		assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression	assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash		assign
+ */
+int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+	{ 
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->state == a)
+		{
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		*p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
+		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+		s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+		if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			{
+			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+			s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
+			s->init_num+=2;
+			}
+
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, 
+			s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
+
+		s->state=b;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+	}
+
+unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int n,i;
+	unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+	X509_OBJECT obj;
+
+	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+	buf=s->init_buf;
+	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	if (x != NULL)
+		{
+		if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,NULL,NULL))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+			return(0);
+			}
+
+		for (;;)
+			{
+			n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+				return(0);
+				}
+			p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
+			l2n3(n,p);
+			i2d_X509(x,&p);
+			l+=n+3;
+			if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),
+				X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) break;
+
+			i=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&xs_ctx,X509_LU_X509,
+				X509_get_issuer_name(x),&obj);
+			if (i <= 0) break;
+			x=obj.data.x509;
+			/* Count is one too high since the X509_STORE_get uped the
+			 * ref count */
+			X509_free(x);
+			}
+
+		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+		}
+
+	/* Thawte special :-) */
+	if (s->ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
+		{
+		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
+		n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+			return(0);
+			}
+		p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
+		l2n3(n,p);
+		i2d_X509(x,&p);
+		l+=n+3;
+		}
+
+	l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+	l2n3(l,p);
+	l+=3;
+	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
+	p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
+
+	l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	return(l);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
+	{
+	DTLS1_STATE *state;
+	BIO *bio;
+	int send_alert = 0;
+
+	if ( code > 0)
+		{
+		fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+	if ( ! BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(bio))
+		{
+		/* not a timeout, none of our business, 
+		   let higher layers handle this.  in fact it's probably an error */
+		return code;
+		}
+
+	if ( ! SSL_in_init(s))  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+		{
+		BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
+		return code;
+		}
+
+	state = s->d1;
+	state->timeout.num_alerts++;
+	if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
+		{
+		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
+	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+		{
+		send_alert = 1;
+		state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
+		}
+
+
+#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
+	item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
+	if ( item )
+		{
+		/* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+
+#if 0  /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
+		if ( send_alert)
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+				DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
+
+	return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) ;
+	}
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
+	{
+	pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
+	piterator iter;
+	pitem *item;
+	hm_fragment *frag;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
+
+	for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
+		{
+		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+		if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, &found) <= 0 &&
+			found)
+			{
+			fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
+			return -1;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int
+dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
+	{
+	pitem *item;
+	hm_fragment *frag;
+	PQ_64BIT seq64;
+	unsigned int epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+	/* this function is called immediately after a message has 
+	 * been serialized */
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+
+	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num);
+
+	memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
+
+	if ( is_ccs)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 
+			DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH <= (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+		epoch++;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 
+			DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+		}
+
+	frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+	frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
+	frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
+	frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+	frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+	frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
+
+	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
+	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, epoch<<16 | frag->msg_header.seq);
+
+	item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
+	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+	if ( item == NULL)
+		{
+		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+#if 0
+	fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
+	fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
+	fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
+#endif
+
+	pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int
+dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
+	int *found)
+	{
+	int ret;
+	/* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
+	pitem *item;
+	hm_fragment *frag ;
+	unsigned long header_length;
+	PQ_64BIT seq64;
+
+	/*
+	  OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
+	  OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+	 */
+
+	/* XDTLS:  the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
+	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
+	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, seq);
+
+	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64);
+	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+	if ( item == NULL)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "retransmit:  message %d non-existant\n", seq);
+		*found = 0;
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	*found = 1;
+	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+	if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+		header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	else
+		header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+	memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, 
+		frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
+		s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
+
+	dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, 
+		frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, 
+		frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+
+	s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
+	ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? 
+		SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+	s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
+
+	(void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
+void
+dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	pitem *item;
+
+	for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
+		item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
+		{
+		dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
+		pitem_free(item);
+		}
+	}
+
+
+unsigned char *
+dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
+			unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+	{
+	if ( frag_off == 0)
+		{
+		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+		s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+		}
+
+	dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
+		frag_off, frag_len);
+
+	return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	}
+
+
+/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
+static void
+dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+			    unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
+			    unsigned long frag_len)
+	{
+	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+	msg_hdr->type = mt;
+	msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
+	msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
+	msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+	msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+	}
+
+static void
+dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+			unsigned long frag_len)
+	{
+	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+	msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+	msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+	}
+
+static unsigned char *
+dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+	{
+	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+	*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+	l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+
+	s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+	l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
+	l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
+
+	return p;
+	}
+
+static unsigned int 
+dtls1_min_mtu(void)
+	{
+	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / 
+		sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
+	}
+
+static unsigned int 
+dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
+		return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
+
+	for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
+		if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
+			return g_probable_mtu[i];
+
+	return curr_mtu;
+	}
+
+void
+dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+	{
+	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+	msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
+	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
+
+	n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
+	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
+	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
+	}
+
+void
+dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
+	{
+	memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
+
+	ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
+	}