Update to following packages:

openssl-1.0.1e
freetype-2.4.11

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 44 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
index 07a5e97ce..712c4647f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -126,20 +126,28 @@
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
 
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured. */
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+	int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-			if (n < 0)
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+			if (mac_size < 0)
 				return -1;
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -164,9 +172,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			if (n < 0)
-				return -1;
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+			OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
 		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -231,7 +238,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return -1;
+				return 0;
 			}
 		
 		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -246,43 +253,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-				 */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length-=i;
-
-			rec->data += bs;    /* skip the implicit IV */
-			rec->input += bs;
-			rec->length -= bs;
-			}
+			return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		}
 	return(1);
 	}