Updated to openssl 1.0.0

1 files changed, 472 insertions, 68 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index 0bbf8ae7f..301ceda7a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -121,14 +121,15 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
 
-static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
 static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
 
-static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
 	{
 	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
 		return(DTLSv1_server_method());
@@ -144,9 +145,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
 int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	long num1;
+	unsigned long alg_k;
 	int ret= -1;
 	int new_state,state,skip=0;
 
@@ -236,17 +237,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
 				}
 
-            if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
-                s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
-            else
-                s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
-
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
 
 			s->shutdown=0;
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
@@ -267,37 +264,58 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			s->shutdown=0;
 			ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->new_session = 2;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 
-			if ( s->d1->send_cookie)
+			if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
 				s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
 			else
 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
 
 			s->init_num=0;
+
+			/* If we're just listening, stop here */
+			if (s->d1->listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+				{
+				ret = 2;
+				s->d1->listen = 0;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			
 			break;
 			
 		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
 		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
 
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
 			if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 
-			/* HelloVerifyRequests resets Finished MAC */
-			if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+			if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
 			break;
 			
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+			s->new_session = 2;
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 			if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+				{
+				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+				}
+#else
+			if (s->hit)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -305,27 +323,43 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
-			/* Check if it is anon DH */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+			/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 				{
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
 				ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				skip = 1;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+#else
 				}
 			else
 				skip=1;
+
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
 			/* clear this, it may get reset by
 			 * send_server_key_exchange */
 			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-				&& !(l & SSL_KRB5)
+				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 				)
 				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
@@ -336,11 +370,17 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			else
 				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
-			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
+			/* only send if a DH key exchange or
 			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
 			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
-			    || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
-			    || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
+			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+			 * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+			    || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+			    || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
 				    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
 					&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
@@ -349,6 +389,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				)
 			    )
 				{
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
 				ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 				}
@@ -370,12 +411,15 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
 				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
 				 * and in RFC 2246): */
-				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
+				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
 				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
 				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
 				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
-                                 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
-                                (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
+				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
+				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 				{
 				/* no cert request */
 				skip=1;
@@ -385,6 +429,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			else
 				{
 				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
 				ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
@@ -399,6 +444,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
@@ -407,16 +453,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			break;
 		
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-			/* number of bytes to be flushed */
-			num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
-			if (num1 > 0)
+			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
 				{
-				s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-				num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-				if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-				s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
 				}
-
+			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
 			break;
 
@@ -426,6 +469,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0)
 				goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (ret == 2)
 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
 			else {
@@ -433,6 +477,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				 * have not asked for it :-) */
 				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				s->init_num=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 			}
@@ -442,26 +487,44 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
-			/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
-			 * a client cert, it can be verified */ 
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-				&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
-				&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-				&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
-				&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+			if (ret == 2)
+				{
+				/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+				 * message is not sent.
+				 */
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+				s->init_num = 0;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				s->init_num=0;
 
+				/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+				 * a client cert, it can be verified */ 
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+					NID_md5,
+					&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+					NID_sha1,
+					&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+				}
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
 
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -469,16 +532,41 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (s->hit)
 				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+			ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+#endif
+
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
 
@@ -554,6 +642,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
 			/* next message is server hello */
 			s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
 			goto end;
 			/* break; */
 
@@ -624,22 +713,16 @@ int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
 		buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 
 		msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-		if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			*(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
-			*(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
-		else
-			*(p++) = s->version >> 8,
-			*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
+		*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+		*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
 
-		if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb != NULL &&
-		    s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, 
-		    &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
+		if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+		     s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
+			 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			return 0;
 			}
-		/* else the cookie is assumed to have 
-		 * been initialized by the application */
 
 		*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
 		memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
@@ -680,12 +763,8 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		/* Do the message type and length last */
 		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 
-		if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			*(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
-			*(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
-		else
-			*(p++)=s->version>>8,
-			*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
+		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 
 		/* Random stuff */
 		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
@@ -713,6 +792,8 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		p+=sl;
 
 		/* put the cipher */
+		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+			return -1;
 		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
 		p+=i;
 
@@ -726,6 +807,14 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+#endif
+
 		/* do the header */
 		l=(p-d);
 		d=buf;
@@ -781,6 +870,13 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+	int encodedlen = 0;
+	int curve_id = 0;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
+#endif
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
 	unsigned char *p,*d;
 	int al,i;
@@ -795,7 +891,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
 		{
-		type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
+		type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 		cert=s->cert;
 
 		buf=s->init_buf;
@@ -889,6 +985,142 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		else 
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+			if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+			{
+			const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+			if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+				{
+				ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+				}
+			if (ecdhp == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+				{
+				EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+			if (ecdhp == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			ecdh = ecdhp;
+
+			s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+				{
+				if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+				    {
+				    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				    goto err;
+				    }
+				}
+
+			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+			    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
+			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+			 */
+			if ((curve_id = 
+			    tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+			    == 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Encode the public key.
+			 * First check the size of encoding and
+			 * allocate memory accordingly.
+			 */
+			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+			    NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+			encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
+			    OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
+			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+
+			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
+			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+			if (encodedlen == 0) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
+			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+			 * structure. 
+			 */
+			n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+			/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+			 */
+			r[0]=NULL;
+			r[1]=NULL;
+			r[2]=NULL;
+			r[3]=NULL;
+			}
+		else 
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+			if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+				{
+				/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+				n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+				}
+			else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
@@ -900,7 +1132,8 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			n+=2+nr[i];
 			}
 
-		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 			{
 			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
 				== NULL)
@@ -931,6 +1164,41 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			p+=nr[i];
 			}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+		if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 
+			{
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+			 * the actual encoded point itself
+			 */
+			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = 0;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = curve_id;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = encodedlen;
+			p += 1;
+			memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
+			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
+			    encodedlen);
+			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+			p += encodedlen;
+			}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+		if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+			{
+			/* copy PSK identity hint */
+			s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 
+			strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+			p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+			}
+#endif
+
 		/* not anonymous */
 		if (pkey != NULL)
 			{
@@ -984,6 +1252,25 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				}
 			else
 #endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+				{
+				/* let's do ECDSA */
+				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				s2n(i,p);
+				n+=i+2;
+				}
+			else
+#endif
 				{
 				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
@@ -1010,6 +1297,10 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 f_err:
 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
 	return(-1);
 	}
@@ -1123,14 +1414,15 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
 		{
 		x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
-		if (x == NULL &&
-                        /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-                        (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
-                                & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
-                        != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
+		if (x == NULL)
 			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return(0);
+			/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+			if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
+			    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				return(0);
+				}
 			}
 
 		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
@@ -1145,3 +1437,115 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+		{
+		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+		int len, slen;
+		unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+		HMAC_CTX hctx;
+		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+		unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+		/* get session encoding length */
+		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+		/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ 		 * too long
+ 		 */
+		if (slen > 0xFF00)
+			return -1;
+		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ 		 * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
+ 		 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ 		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ 		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ 		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ 		 */
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+			DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
+			EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+			return -1;
+		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+		if (!senc)
+			return -1;
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+		/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+		 * from parent ctx.
+		 */
+		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+			{
+			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+							 &hctx, 1) < 0)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_free(senc);
+				return -1;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+					tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+			}
+		l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+		/* Skip ticket length for now */
+		p += 2;
+		/* Output key name */
+		macstart = p;
+		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+		p += 16;
+		/* output IV */
+		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+		/* Encrypt session data */
+		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+		p += hlen;
+		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+		/* Total length */
+		len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
+		/* Ticket length */
+		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
+		s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
+
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num= len;
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		OPENSSL_free(senc);
+
+		/* XDTLS:  set message header ? */
+		msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+			SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+#endif