Update openssl to version openssl-1.0.1m

Conflicts:
	openssl/Makefile
	openssl/Makefile.bak
	openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c

1 files changed, 507 insertions, 520 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 3178815ec..50f98dced 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -116,545 +116,532 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
 int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
-	{
+{
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv2_server_method());
+    if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+        return (SSLv2_server_method());
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_server_method());
+    if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+        return (SSLv3_server_method());
 #endif
-	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_server_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_2_server_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
+    if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+        return (TLSv1_server_method());
+    else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+        return (TLSv1_1_server_method());
+    else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return (TLSv1_2_server_method());
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
 
 IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_server_method,
-			ssl23_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl23_get_server_method)
+                          ssl23_accept,
+                          ssl_undefined_function, ssl23_get_server_method)
 
 int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state;
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-	
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch(s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
-			s->server=1;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
-			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				}
-
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
-			s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl23_get_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret >= 0) cb=NULL;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-
-		if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-			{
-			new_state=s->state;
-			s->state=state;
-			cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
-			s->state=new_state;
-			}
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
+{
+    BUF_MEM *buf;
+    unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+    void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+    int ret = -1;
+    int new_state, state;
+
+    RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    clear_sys_error();
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+        cb = s->info_callback;
+    else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+        cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+    s->in_handshake++;
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+        SSL_clear(s);
+
+    for (;;) {
+        state = s->state;
+
+        switch (s->state) {
+        case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+        case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+        case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+        case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+            s->server = 1;
+            if (cb != NULL)
+                cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+            /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+            s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+            if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+                if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+                    ret = -1;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+                    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+                    ret = -1;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                s->init_buf = buf;
+            }
+
+            ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+            s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+            s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+            s->init_num = 0;
+            break;
+
+        case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+        case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+            s->shutdown = 0;
+            ret = ssl23_get_client_hello(s);
+            if (ret >= 0)
+                cb = NULL;
+            goto end;
+            /* break; */
+
+        default:
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+            ret = -1;
+            goto end;
+            /* break; */
+        }
+
+        if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+            new_state = s->state;
+            s->state = state;
+            cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+            s->state = new_state;
+        }
+    }
+ end:
+    s->in_handshake--;
+    if (cb != NULL)
+        cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
-	                     * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
-	                     * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
-	                     * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
-	                     * the protocol specification:
-	                     * Byte  Content
-	                     *  0     type            \
-	                     *  1/2   version          > record header
-	                     *  3/4   length          /
-	                     *  5     msg_type        \
-	                     *  6-8   length           > Client Hello message
-	                     *  9/10  client_version  /
-	                     */
-	char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
-	unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
-	unsigned int i;
-	unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
-	int n=0,j;
-	int type=0;
-	int v[2];
-
-	if (s->state ==	SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		/* read the initial header */
-		v[0]=v[1]=0;
-
-		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
-
-		n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
-		if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
-
-		p=s->packet;
-
-		memcpy(buf,p,n);
-
-		if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
-			{
-			/*
-			 * SSLv2 header
-			 */
-			if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
-				{
-				v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
-				/* SSLv2 */
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-					type=1;
-				}
-			else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-				{
-				v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
-				/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
-				if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
-					{
-					if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					   !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
-						{
-						s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					   !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
-						{
-						s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
-						/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-						{
-						s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-						/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-						{
-						s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-						/* type=2; */
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-						{
-						type=1;
-						}
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-					{
-					s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-					/* type=2; */
-					s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-					type=1;
-
-				}
-			}
-		else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
-			 (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
-			 (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-			 ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
-				|| (p[9] >= p[1])))
-			{
-			/*
-			 * SSLv3 or tls1 header
-			 */
-			
-			v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
-			/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
-			 * to get the correct minor version.
-			 * However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
-			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
-			 * to read more records to find out.
-			 * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
-			 * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
-			 * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
-			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
-			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
-			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
-			 * this....
-			 */
-			if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-				v[1]=0xff;
-			else
-				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
-			if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
-				{
-				if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
-					{
-					s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
-					{
-					s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-					{
-					s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-					{
-					s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* client requests SSL 3.0 */
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-					{
-					s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-					{
-					/* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
-					 * but this will send an appropriate alert */
-					s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
-			 (strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
-			 (strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
-			 (strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+{
+    /*-
+     * Request this many bytes in initial read.
+     * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
+     * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
+     * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
+     * the protocol specification:
+     * Byte  Content
+     *  0     type            \
+     *  1/2   version          > record header
+     *  3/4   length          /
+     *  5     msg_type        \
+     *  6-8   length           > Client Hello message
+     *  9/10  client_version  /
+     */
+    char buf_space[11];
+    char *buf = &(buf_space[0]);
+    unsigned char *p, *d, *d_len, *dd;
+    unsigned int i;
+    unsigned int csl, sil, cl;
+    int n = 0, j;
+    int type = 0;
+    int v[2];
+
+    if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+        /* read the initial header */
+        v[0] = v[1] = 0;
+
+        if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+            goto err;
+
+        n = ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
+        if (n != sizeof buf_space)
+            return (n);         /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
+
+        p = s->packet;
+
+        memcpy(buf, p, n);
+
+        if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+            /*
+             * SSLv2 header
+             */
+            if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02)) {
+                v[0] = p[3];
+                v[1] = p[4];
+                /* SSLv2 */
+                if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+                    type = 1;
+            } else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+                v[0] = p[3];
+                v[1] = p[4];
+                /* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
+                if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) {
+                    if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+                        !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+                        s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+                        s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+                    } else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+                               !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+                        s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+                        /*
+                         * type=2;
+                         *//*
+                         * done later to survive restarts
+                         */
+                        s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+                    } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+                        s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+                        /*
+                         * type=2;
+                         *//*
+                         * done later to survive restarts
+                         */
+                        s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+                    } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+                        s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+                        /* type=2; */
+                        s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+                    } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) {
+                        type = 1;
+                    }
+                } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+                    s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+                    /* type=2; */
+                    s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+                } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+                    type = 1;
+
+            }
+        }
+        /* p[4] < 5 ... silly record length? */
+        else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
+                 (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
+                 (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5)
+                                                    || (p[9] >= p[1]))) {
+            /*
+             * SSLv3 or tls1 header
+             */
+
+            v[0] = p[1];        /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
+            /*
+             * We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
+             * to get the correct minor version. However if we have only a
+             * pathologically small fragment of the Client Hello message, this
+             * would be difficult, and we'd have to read more records to find
+             * out. No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+             * so we simply reject such connections to avoid protocol version
+             * downgrade attacks.
+             */
+            if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            /*
+             * if major version number > 3 set minor to a value which will
+             * use the highest version 3 we support. If TLS 2.0 ever appears
+             * we will need to revise this....
+             */
+            if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+                v[1] = 0xff;
+            else
+                v[1] = p[10];   /* minor version according to client_version */
+            if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) {
+                if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+                    !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+                    s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+                    type = 3;
+                } else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+                           !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+                    s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+                    type = 3;
+                } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+                    s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+                    type = 3;
+                } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+                    s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+                    type = 3;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* client requests SSL 3.0 */
+                if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+                    s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+                    type = 3;
+                } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+                    /*
+                     * we won't be able to use TLS of course, but this will
+                     * send an appropriate alert
+                     */
+                    s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+                    type = 3;
+                }
+            }
+        } else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p, 4) == 0) ||
+                   (strncmp("POST ", (char *)p, 5) == 0) ||
+                   (strncmp("HEAD ", (char *)p, 5) == 0) ||
+                   (strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p, 4) == 0)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+            goto err;
+        } else if (strncmp("CONNECT", (char *)p, 7) == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+    OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
-					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
-		goto err;
-		}
+    if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+               SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+        goto err;
+    }
 #endif
 
-	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
-		{
-		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
-		 * (other cases skip this state) */
-
-		type=2;
-		p=s->packet;
-		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
-		v[1] = p[4];
-
-		/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
-		 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
-		 * record. It's format is:
-		 * Byte  Content
-		 * 0-1   msg_length
-		 * 2     msg_type
-		 * 3-4   version
-		 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
-		 * 7-8   session_id_length
-		 * 9-10  challenge_length
-		 * ...   ...
-		 */
-		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
-		if (n > (1024*4))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (n < 9)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
-		/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
-		 * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
-		 * packet bytes. */
-		if (j <= 0) return(j);
-
-		ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
-
-		p=s->packet;
-		p+=5;
-		n2s(p,csl);
-		n2s(p,sil);
-		n2s(p,cl);
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
-		                                          * Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
-		                                          * '>' otherweise */
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* record header: msg_type ... */
-		*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-		/* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
-		d_len = d;
-		d += 3;
-
-		/* client_version */
-		*(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
-		*(d++) = v[1];
-
-		/* lets populate the random area */
-		/* get the challenge_length */
-		i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
-		memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
-		d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* no session-id reuse */
-		*(d++)=0;
-
-		/* ciphers */
-		j=0;
-		dd=d;
-		d+=2;
-		for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
-			{
-			if (p[i] != 0) continue;
-			*(d++)=p[i+1];
-			*(d++)=p[i+2];
-			j+=2;
-			}
-		s2n(j,dd);
-
-		/* COMPRESSION */
-		*(d++)=1;
-		*(d++)=0;
-		
+    if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B) {
+        /*
+         * we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header (other cases skip this
+         * state)
+         */
+
+        type = 2;
+        p = s->packet;
+        v[0] = p[3];            /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
+        v[1] = p[4];
+
+        /*-
+         * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+         * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+         * record. It's format is:
+         * Byte  Content
+         * 0-1   msg_length
+         * 2     msg_type
+         * 3-4   version
+         * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+         * 7-8   session_id_length
+         * 9-10  challenge_length
+         * ...   ...
+         */
+        n = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+        if (n > (1024 * 4)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (n < 9) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        j = ssl23_read_bytes(s, n + 2);
+        /*
+         * We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have j == n+2 ==
+         * s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid packet bytes.
+         */
+        if (j <= 0)
+            return (j);
+
+        ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet + 2, s->packet_length - 2);
+
+        /* CLIENT-HELLO */
+        if (s->msg_callback)
+            s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet + 2,
+                            s->packet_length - 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+        p = s->packet;
+        p += 5;
+        n2s(p, csl);
+        n2s(p, sil);
+        n2s(p, cl);
+        d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+        if ((csl + sil + cl + 11) != s->packet_length) { /* We can't have TLS
+                                                          * extensions in SSL
+                                                          * 2.0 format *
+                                                          * Client Hello, can
+                                                          * we? Error
+                                                          * condition should
+                                                          * be * '>'
+                                                          * otherweise */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+                   SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* record header: msg_type ... */
+        *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+        /* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
+        d_len = d;
+        d += 3;
+
+        /* client_version */
+        *(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
+        *(d++) = v[1];
+
+        /* lets populate the random area */
+        /* get the challenge_length */
+        i = (cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : cl;
+        memset(d, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), &(p[csl + sil]), i);
+        d += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+        /* no session-id reuse */
+        *(d++) = 0;
+
+        /* ciphers */
+        j = 0;
+        dd = d;
+        d += 2;
+        for (i = 0; i < csl; i += 3) {
+            if (p[i] != 0)
+                continue;
+            *(d++) = p[i + 1];
+            *(d++) = p[i + 2];
+            j += 2;
+        }
+        s2n(j, dd);
+
+        /* COMPRESSION */
+        *(d++) = 1;
+        *(d++) = 0;
+
 #if 0
-                /* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
-	        p = p+csl+sil+cl;
-		while (p <  s->packet+s->packet_length)
-			{
-			*(d++)=*(p++);
-			}
+        /* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
+        p = p + csl + sil + cl;
+        while (p < s->packet + s->packet_length) {
+            *(d++) = *(p++);
+        }
 #endif
 
-		i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
-		l2n3((long)i, d_len);
+        i = (d - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
+        l2n3((long)i, d_len);
 
-		/* get the data reused from the init_buf */
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-		s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
-		}
+        /* get the data reused from the init_buf */
+        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+        s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+        s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
+    }
 
-	/* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
-	/* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
+    /* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
+    /* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
 
-	if (type == 1)
-		{
+    if (type == 1) {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-		goto err;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+        goto err;
 #else
-		/* we are talking sslv2 */
-		/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
-		 * sslv2 stuff. */
-
-		if (s->s2 == NULL)
-			{
-			if (!ssl2_new(s))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			ssl2_clear(s);
-
-		if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
-
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
-			SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
-			{
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
-			s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
-		else
-			/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
-			 * (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
-			s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
-
-		/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
-		 * the sslv2 buffer */
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-		s->packet_length=n;
-		s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
-		memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
-		s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
-		s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
-
-		s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
-		s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+        /* we are talking sslv2 */
+        /*
+         * we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the sslv2
+         * stuff.
+         */
+
+        if (s->s2 == NULL) {
+            if (!ssl2_new(s))
+                goto err;
+        } else
+            ssl2_clear(s);
+
+        if (s->s3 != NULL)
+            ssl3_free(s);
+
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
+                                SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
+        if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
+            s->s2->ssl2_rollback = 0;
+        else
+            /*
+             * reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
+             * (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2)
+             */
+            s->s2->ssl2_rollback = 1;
+
+        /*
+         * setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from the sslv2
+         * buffer
+         */
+        s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+        s->packet_length = n;
+        s->packet = &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
+        memcpy(s->packet, buf, n);
+        s->s2->rbuf_left = n;
+        s->s2->rbuf_offs = 0;
+
+        s->method = SSLv2_server_method();
+        s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
 #endif
-		}
-
-	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
-		{
-		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
-		const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
-		new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
-		if (new_method == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		s->method = new_method;
-
-		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
-
-		/* we are in this state */
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-
-		if (type == 3)
-			{
-			/* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer
-			 * for SSLv3 */
-			s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-			s->packet_length=n;
-			if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
-				if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
-					goto err;
-
-			s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-			memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
-			s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
-			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			s->packet_length=0;
-			s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
-			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
-			}
-#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
-		s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
+    }
+
+    if ((type == 2) || (type == 3)) {
+        /*
+         * we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style)
+         */
+        const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
+        new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+        if (new_method == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        s->method = new_method;
+
+        if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
+            goto err;
+
+        /* we are in this state */
+        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+
+        if (type == 3) {
+            /*
+             * put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer for SSLv3
+             */
+            s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+            s->packet_length = n;
+            if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+                if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+                    goto err;
+
+            s->packet = &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+            memcpy(s->packet, buf, n);
+            s->s3->rbuf.left = n;
+            s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
+        } else {
+            s->packet_length = 0;
+            s->s3->rbuf.left = 0;
+            s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
+        }
+#if 0                           /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
+        s->client_version = (v[0] << 8) | v[1];
 #endif
-		s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
-		}
-	
-	if ((type < 1) || (type > 3))
-		{
-		/* bad, very bad */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	s->init_num=0;
-
-	if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
-	return(SSL_accept(s));
-err:
-	if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
-	return(-1);
-	}
+        s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
+    }
+
+    if ((type < 1) || (type > 3)) {
+        /* bad, very bad */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    s->init_num = 0;
+
+    if (buf != buf_space)
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return (SSL_accept(s));
+ err:
+    if (buf != buf_space)
+        OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    return (-1);
+}