Merged origin/release (checked in because wanted to merge new stuff)

1 files changed, 1014 insertions, 610 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 5123a8918..93a1eb941 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -1,25 +1,27 @@
-/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
+/*
+ * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c
+ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -34,10 +36,10 @@
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -110,7 +112,7 @@
  */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
  */
 
@@ -127,541 +129,739 @@
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
-	{
-	static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
-
-	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
-	if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
-		
-		if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
-			{
-			ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
-				0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	
-	return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
-	}
-
-static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
-	{
-	/* Set digest values to defaults */
+{
+    static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+    int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+    if (((size_t)&ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx &
+         (sizeof(ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) - 1))
+        == 0) {                 /* check alignment, practically always true */
+        int ret;
+
+        if ((ret = ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0) {
+            CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+            if ((ret = ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0) {
+                ret = ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
+                    X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                    "SSL for verify callback",
+                                                    NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            }
+            CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        }
+
+        return ret;
+    } else {                    /* commonly eliminated */
+
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+        if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+            CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+            CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+            got_write_lock = 1;
+
+            if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+                ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
+                    X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                    "SSL for verify callback",
+                                                    NULL, NULL, NULL);
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (got_write_lock)
+            CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        else
+            CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+        return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+    }
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+{
+    /* Set digest values to defaults */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+    cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+    cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+    cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+    cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
-	}
+}
 
 CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
-	{
-	CERT *ret;
-
-	ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-	memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
-
-	ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
-	ret->references=1;
-	ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
+{
+    CERT *ret;
+
+    ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+    ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
 
 CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
-	{
-	CERT *ret;
-	int i;
-
-	ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-
-	memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
-
-	ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
-	/* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
-	 * if you find that more readable */
-
-	ret->valid = cert->valid;
-	ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
-	ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
-	ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
-	ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+{
+    CERT *ret;
+    int i;
+
+    ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+    ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+    /*
+     * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
+     * more readable
+     */
+
+    ret->valid = cert->valid;
+    ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+    ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+    ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+    ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		{
-		RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
-		ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
-		}
-	ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+    if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+        RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+        ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+    }
+    ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
-		{
-		ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
-		if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
-			{
-			BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
-			if (!b)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
-			}
-		if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
-			{
-			BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
-			if (!b)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
-			}
-		}
-	ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+    if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+        ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+        if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
+            BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+            if (!b) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+        }
+        if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
+            BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+            if (!b) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+        }
+    }
+    ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
-		{
-		ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
-		if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			{
-			ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
-			CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
-				CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-			}
-		
-		if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			{
-			ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
-			CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
-				CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
-			switch(i) 
-				{
-				/* If there was anything special to do for
-				 * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
-				 * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have an RSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have a DSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
-				/* We have a DH key. */
-				break;
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
-				/* We have an ECC key */
-				break;
-
-			default:
-				/* Can't happen. */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	
-	/* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
-	 * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
-
-	ret->references=1;
-	/* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
-	 * will be set during handshake.
-	 */
-	ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
-
-	return(ret);
-	
+    if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
+        ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+        if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+    ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
+#endif
+
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+        CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
+            rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
+            CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+        }
+
+        if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+            rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
+            CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+        }
+
+        if (cpk->chain) {
+            rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
+            if (!rpk->chain) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        rpk->valid_flags = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) {
+            /* Just copy everything. */
+            ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
+                OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+            if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
+                cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+            memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+                   cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+                   cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    /*
+     * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
+     * will be set during handshake.
+     */
+    ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+    /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
+    ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+    ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+    /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
+
+    if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+        ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+        if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+        ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+    } else
+        ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+    if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
+        ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+        if (!ret->client_sigalgs)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
+               cert->client_sigalgslen);
+        ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+    } else
+        ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+    /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+    ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+    /* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+    if (cert->ctypes) {
+        ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
+        if (!ret->ctypes)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
+        ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
+    }
+
+    ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+    ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+    ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+    if (cert->verify_store) {
+        CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1,
+                   CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+        ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+    }
+
+    if (cert->chain_store) {
+        CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+        ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+    }
+
+    ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
+        goto err;
+    if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
+        goto err;
+#endif
+
+    return (ret);
+
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
-err:
+ err:
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+    if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+        RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
-		DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+    if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+        DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-		EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+    if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+        EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
 #endif
 
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
-		if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-		}
-
-	return NULL;
-	}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    custom_exts_free(&ret->cli_ext);
+    custom_exts_free(&ret->srv_ext);
+#endif
 
+    ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->x509) {
+            X509_free(cpk->x509);
+            cpk->x509 = NULL;
+        }
+        if (cpk->privatekey) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+            cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+        }
+        if (cpk->chain) {
+            sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+            cpk->chain = NULL;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        if (cpk->serverinfo) {
+            OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+            cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+            cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+        }
+#endif
+        /* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */
+        cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+    }
+}
 
 void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
-	{
-	int i;
+{
+    int i;
 
-	if(c == NULL)
-	    return;
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return;
 
-	i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+    i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
 #ifdef REF_PRINT
-	REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
+    REF_PRINT("CERT", c);
 #endif
-	if (i > 0) return;
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
 #ifdef REF_CHECK
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
-		abort(); /* ok */
-		}
+    if (i < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+        abort();                /* ok */
+    }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
+    if (c->rsa_tmp)
+        RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+    if (c->dh_tmp)
+        DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+    if (c->ecdh_tmp)
+        EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
 #endif
 
-	for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
-		if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#if 0
-		if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
+    ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+    if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+        OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+    if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+        OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+    if (c->client_sigalgs)
+        OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+    if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+        OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+    if (c->ctypes)
+        OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+    if (c->verify_store)
+        X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+    if (c->chain_store)
+        X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+    if (c->ciphers_raw)
+        OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
+    custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
 #endif
-		}
-	OPENSSL_free(c);
-	}
+    OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
 
 int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
-	{
-	/* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
-	 * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
-	 * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
-	 * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
-	 * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
-	 * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
-	 * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
-	 * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
-	 */
-	
-	if (o == NULL) 
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (*o == NULL)
-		{
-		if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
+{
+    /*
+     * Create a CERT if there isn't already one (which cannot really happen,
+     * as it is initially created in SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code
+     * usually allows for that one being non-existant, so we follow that
+     * behaviour, as it might turn out that there actually is a reason for it
+     * -- but I'm not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+     * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the initialization
+     * in SSL_CTX_new).
+     */
+
+    if (o == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (*o == NULL) {
+        if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return (0);
+        }
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+    if (!cpk)
+        return 0;
+    if (cpk->chain)
+        sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+    cpk->chain = chain;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+    if (!chain)
+        return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
+    dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+    if (!dchain)
+        return 0;
+    if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain)) {
+        sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+    if (!cpk)
+        return 0;
+    if (!cpk->chain)
+        cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+    if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x))
+        return 0;
+    CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) {
+            c->key = cpk;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) {
+            c->key = cpk;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
+{
+    int i, idx;
+    if (!c)
+        return 0;
+    if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
+        idx = 0;
+    else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) {
+        idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
+        if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+    for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+        if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) {
+            c->key = cpk;
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    c->cert_cb = cb;
+    c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
 
 SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
-	{
-	SESS_CERT *ret;
+{
+    SESS_CERT *ret;
 
-	ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return NULL;
-		}
+    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
 
-	memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
-	ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
-	ret->references = 1;
+    memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
+    ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+    ret->references = 1;
 
-	return ret;
-	}
+    return ret;
+}
 
 void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
-	{
-	int i;
+{
+    int i;
 
-	if (sc == NULL)
-		return;
+    if (sc == NULL)
+        return;
 
-	i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+    i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
 #ifdef REF_PRINT
-	REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+    REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
 #endif
-	if (i > 0)
-		return;
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
 #ifdef REF_CHECK
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
-		abort(); /* ok */
-		}
-#endif
-
-	/* i == 0 */
-	if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
-		sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.  These lines are just
-	   * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
-	   * data structure. */
-		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#endif
-		}
+    if (i < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+        abort();                /* ok */
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* i == 0 */
+    if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+        sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+    for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+        if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+            X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0                           /* We don't have the peer's private key.
+                                 * These lines are just * here as a reminder
+                                 * that we're still using a
+                                 * not-quite-appropriate * data structure. */
+        if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+            EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+    }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+    if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+        RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
-		DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+    if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+        DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-		EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
-	OPENSSL_free(sc);
-	}
-
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
-	{
-	sc->peer_cert_type = type;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-	{
-	X509 *x;
-	int i;
-	X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
-	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
-		return(0);
-
-	x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
-	if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-#if 0
-	if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
-		X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+    if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+        EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
 #endif
-	X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
-
-	/* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
-	 * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
-	 * or vice versa.
-	 */
 
-	X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
-				s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
-	/* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
-	 * ctx.
-	 */
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
-
-	if (s->verify_callback)
-		X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
-
-	if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
-#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
-		i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); 
+    OPENSSL_free(sc);
+}
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type)
+{
+    sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    int i;
+    X509_STORE *verify_store;
+    X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+    if (s->cert->verify_store)
+        verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+    else
+        verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+    if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+        return (0);
+
+    x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+#if 0
+    if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+#endif
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+
+    /*
+     * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+     * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
+     * vice versa.
+     */
+
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+    /*
+     * Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+     */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+
+    if (s->verify_callback)
+        X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+    if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1                           /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+        i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
 #else
-		i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+        i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
 #endif
-	else
-		{
+    else {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
-		i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+        i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
 #else
-		i=0;
-		ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+        i = 0;
+        ctx.error = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
 #endif
-		}
+    }
 
-	s->verify_result=ctx.error;
-	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    s->verify_result = ctx.error;
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
-	return(i);
-	}
+    return (i);
+}
 
-static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-	{
-	if (*ca_list != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+                               STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+    if (*ca_list != NULL)
+        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
 
-	*ca_list=name_list;
-	}
+    *ca_list = name_list;
+}
 
 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
-	{
-	int i;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
-	X509_NAME *name;
-
-	ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
-	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
-		{
-		name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
-		if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
-			{
-			sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
-			return(NULL);
-			}
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-	{
-	set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-	{
-	set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
-	}
+{
+    int i;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+    X509_NAME *name;
+
+    ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+        name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+        if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+            sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+            return (NULL);
+        }
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+    set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+    set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+}
 
 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return(ctx->client_CA);
-	}
+{
+    return (ctx->client_CA);
+}
 
 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-		{ /* we are in the client */
-		if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
-			(s->s3 != NULL))
-			return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
-		else
-			return(NULL);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->client_CA != NULL)
-			return(s->client_CA);
-		else
-			return(s->ctx->client_CA);
-		}
-	}
-
-static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
-	{
-	X509_NAME *name;
-
-	if (x == NULL) return(0);
-	if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
-		return(0);
-		
-	if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
-		return(0);
-
-	if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
-		{
-		X509_NAME_free(name);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
-	{
-	return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
-	{
-	return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
-	}
-
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
-	{
-	return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
-	}
+{
+    if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */
+        if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
+            return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+        else
+            return (NULL);
+    } else {
+        if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+            return (s->client_CA);
+        else
+            return (s->ctx->client_CA);
+    }
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_NAME *name;
+
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+        return (0);
+
+    if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+        return (0);
+
+    if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+        X509_NAME_free(name);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+    return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-/*!
+/**
  * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
  * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
  * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
@@ -670,67 +870,67 @@ static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
  * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
  */
 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
-	{
-	BIO *in;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
-
-	sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
-	if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	
-	if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
-		goto err;
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
-			break;
-		if (ret == NULL)
-			{
-			ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
-			if (ret == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
-		/* check for duplicates */
-		xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
-		if (xn == NULL) goto err;
-		if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
-			X509_NAME_free(xn);
-		else
-			{
-			sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
-			sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-err:
-		if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
-		ret=NULL;
-		}
-	if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
-	if (ret != NULL)
-		ERR_clear_error();
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-/*!
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
+
+    sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+    if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+            break;
+        if (ret == NULL) {
+            ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+            if (ret == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        /* check for duplicates */
+        xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+        if (xn == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0)
+            X509_NAME_free(xn);
+        else {
+            sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
+            sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (0) {
+ err:
+        if (ret != NULL)
+            sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+    if (sk != NULL)
+        sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+    if (in != NULL)
+        BIO_free(in);
+    if (x != NULL)
+        X509_free(x);
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
  * Add a file of certs to a stack.
  * \param stack the stack to add to.
  * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
@@ -740,58 +940,58 @@ err:
  */
 
 int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
-					const char *file)
-	{
-	BIO *in;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
-	int ret=1;
-	int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
-	
-	oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
-	
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	
-	if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
-		goto err;
-	
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
-			break;
-		if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
-		xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
-		if (xn == NULL) goto err;
-		if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
-			X509_NAME_free(xn);
-		else
-			sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
-		}
-
-	ERR_clear_error();
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-err:
-		ret=0;
-		}
-	if(in != NULL)
-		BIO_free(in);
-	if(x != NULL)
-		X509_free(x);
-	
-	(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/*!
+                                        const char *file)
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+    int ret = 1;
+    int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+
+    oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
+
+    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+               ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+        goto err;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+            break;
+        if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+        if (xn == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
+            X509_NAME_free(xn);
+        else
+            sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    if (0) {
+ err:
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+    if (in != NULL)
+        BIO_free(in);
+    if (x != NULL)
+        X509_free(x);
+
+    (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/**
  * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
  * \param stack the stack to append to.
  * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
@@ -803,51 +1003,255 @@ err:
  */
 
 int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
-				       const char *dir)
-	{
-	OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
-	const char *filename;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+                                       const char *dir)
+{
+    OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+    const char *filename;
+    int ret = 0;
 
-	/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
 
-	while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
-		{
-		char buf[1024];
-		int r;
+    /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
 
-		if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
+    while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+        char buf[1024];
+        int r;
 
+        if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+                   SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto err;
+        }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-		r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
+        r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
 #else
-		r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
-#endif
-		if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
-			goto err;
-		if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (errno)
-		{
-		SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
-		ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	ret = 1;
-
-err:
-	if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
+        r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+#endif
+        if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+            goto err;
+        if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (errno) {
+        SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+        ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    if (d)
+        OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
+
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+{
+    int n;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+    l2n3(n, p);
+    i2d_X509(x, &p);
+    *l += n + 3;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
+{
+    BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
+    int no_chain;
+    int i;
+
+    X509 *x;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+    X509_STORE *chain_store;
+
+    if (cpk)
+        x = cpk->x509;
+    else
+        x = NULL;
+
+    if (s->cert->chain_store)
+        chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+    else
+        chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+    /*
+     * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
+     */
+    if (cpk && cpk->chain)
+        extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+    else
+        extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+        no_chain = 1;
+    else
+        no_chain = 0;
+
+    /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (x != NULL) {
+        if (no_chain) {
+            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+            X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+            if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+                return (0);
+            }
+            X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+            /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
+                x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+                if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
+                    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+            X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+        }
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
+        if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags)
+{
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+    X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    int i, rv = 0;
+    unsigned long error;
+
+    if (!cpk->x509) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
+        chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
+        if (!chain_store)
+            goto err;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
+            if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
+                error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+                if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+                    ERR_GET_REASON(error) !=
+                    X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+                    goto err;
+                ERR_clear_error();
+            }
+        }
+        /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+        if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
+            error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+            if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+                ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+                goto err;
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (c->chain_store)
+            chain_store = c->chain_store;
+
+        if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
+            untrusted = cpk->chain;
+    }
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx,
+                             c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+
+    i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+    if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
+        if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
+            ERR_clear_error();
+        i = 1;
+        rv = 2;
+    }
+    if (i > 0)
+        chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+        i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
+        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+                           X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+
+        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+    if (cpk->chain)
+        sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+    /* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+    x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+    X509_free(x);
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
+        if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
+            /* See if last cert is self signed */
+            x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+            X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+            if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) {
+                x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+                X509_free(x);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    cpk->chain = chain;
+    if (rv == 0)
+        rv = 1;
+ err:
+    if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
+        X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
+{
+    X509_STORE **pstore;
+    if (chain)
+        pstore = &c->chain_store;
+    else
+        pstore = &c->verify_store;
+    if (*pstore)
+        X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+    *pstore = store;
+    if (ref && store)
+        CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+    return 1;
+}