aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 14:43:31 +0100
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 14:43:31 +0100
commitc9aad1ae6227c434d480d1d3aa8eae3c3c910c18 (patch)
tree94b917df998c3d547e191b3b9c58bbffc616470e /openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
parentf1c2db43dcf35d2cf4715390bd2391c28e42a8c2 (diff)
downloadvcxsrv-c9aad1ae6227c434d480d1d3aa8eae3c3c910c18.tar.gz
vcxsrv-c9aad1ae6227c434d480d1d3aa8eae3c3c910c18.tar.bz2
vcxsrv-c9aad1ae6227c434d480d1d3aa8eae3c3c910c18.zip
Upgraded to openssl-1.0.2
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c1624
1 files changed, 1014 insertions, 610 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 5123a8918..93a1eb941 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -1,25 +1,27 @@
-/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
+/*
+ * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c
+ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +36,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -110,7 +112,7 @@
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
@@ -127,541 +129,739 @@
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
- {
- static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
- {
- ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
- 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
- }
- }
-
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
- }
-
-static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
- {
- /* Set digest values to defaults */
+{
+ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ if (((size_t)&ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx &
+ (sizeof(ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) - 1))
+ == 0) { /* check alignment, practically always true */
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret = ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((ret = ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0) {
+ ret = ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSL for verify callback",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ } else { /* commonly eliminated */
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSL for verify callback",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+ }
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+{
+ /* Set digest values to defaults */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
- }
+}
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
- {
- CERT *ret;
-
- ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(NULL);
- }
- memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
-
- ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references=1;
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ CERT *ret;
+
+ ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
- {
- CERT *ret;
- int i;
-
- ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(NULL);
- }
-
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
-
- ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
- /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
- * if you find that more readable */
-
- ret->valid = cert->valid;
- ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
- ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
- ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
- ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+{
+ CERT *ret;
+ int i;
+
+ ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+ /*
+ * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
+ * more readable
+ */
+
+ ret->valid = cert->valid;
+ ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+ ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+ ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+ ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- {
- RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
- ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
- }
- ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+ if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+ RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+ ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ }
+ ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
- {
- ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
- if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
- {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
- if (!b)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
- {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
- if (!b)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
- }
- }
- ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+ ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+ if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+ if (!b) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+ if (!b) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
- {
- ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
- if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- {
- ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
-
- if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- {
- ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
- switch(i)
- {
- /* If there was anything special to do for
- * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
- * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- /* We have an RSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
- /* We have a DSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
- /* We have a DH key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
- /* We have an ECC key */
- break;
-
- default:
- /* Can't happen. */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
- * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
-
- ret->references=1;
- /* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
- * will be set during handshake.
- */
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
-
- return(ret);
-
+ if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
+ ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+ ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+ CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
+ rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
+ CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
+ CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ }
+
+ if (cpk->chain) {
+ rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
+ if (!rpk->chain) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ rpk->valid_flags = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) {
+ /* Just copy everything. */
+ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+ memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ ret->references = 1;
+ /*
+ * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
+ * will be set during handshake.
+ */
+ ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+ /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
+ ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
+
+ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+ if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ if (!ret->client_sigalgs)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
+ cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+ ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+ if (cert->ctypes) {
+ ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
+ if (!ret->ctypes)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
+ ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
+ }
+
+ ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+ ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+ ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+ if (cert->verify_store) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->chain_store) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+ }
+
+ ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
+ goto err;
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
+ return (ret);
+
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
-err:
+ err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+ if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+ if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
- if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
- }
-
- return NULL;
- }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ custom_exts_free(&ret->cli_ext);
+ custom_exts_free(&ret->srv_ext);
+#endif
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509) {
+ X509_free(cpk->x509);
+ cpk->x509 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (cpk->privatekey) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+ cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+ }
+ if (cpk->chain) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (cpk->serverinfo) {
+ OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+ cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+ cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */
+ cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ }
+}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
- {
- int i;
+{
+ int i;
- if(c == NULL)
- return;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
- i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
+ REF_PRINT("CERT", c);
#endif
- if (i > 0) return;
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
+ if (c->rsa_tmp)
+ RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+ if (c->dh_tmp)
+ DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+ if (c->ecdh_tmp)
+ EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
- for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
- if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#if 0
- if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+ if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+ if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ if (c->client_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+ if (c->ctypes)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+ if (c->verify_store)
+ X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+ if (c->chain_store)
+ X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+ if (c->ciphers_raw)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
+ custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
#endif
- }
- OPENSSL_free(c);
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
- {
- /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
- * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
- * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
- * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
- * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
- * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
- * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
- * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
- */
-
- if (o == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return(0);
- }
- if (*o == NULL)
- {
- if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- }
- return(1);
- }
-
+{
+ /*
+ * Create a CERT if there isn't already one (which cannot really happen,
+ * as it is initially created in SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code
+ * usually allows for that one being non-existant, so we follow that
+ * behaviour, as it might turn out that there actually is a reason for it
+ * -- but I'm not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+ * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the initialization
+ * in SSL_CTX_new).
+ */
+
+ if (o == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (*o == NULL) {
+ if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+ if (!chain)
+ return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
+ dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+ if (!dchain)
+ return 0;
+ if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain)) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ if (!cpk->chain)
+ cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x))
+ return 0;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
+{
+ int i, idx;
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+ if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
+ idx = 0;
+ else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) {
+ idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
+ if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ c->cert_cb = cb;
+ c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
- {
- SESS_CERT *ret;
+{
+ SESS_CERT *ret;
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
- ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references = 1;
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
+ ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references = 1;
- return ret;
- }
+ return ret;
+}
void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
- {
- int i;
+{
+ int i;
- if (sc == NULL)
- return;
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
- i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+ REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- /* i == 0 */
- if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
- * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
- * data structure. */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#endif
- }
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.
+ * These lines are just * here as a reminder
+ * that we're still using a
+ * not-quite-appropriate * data structure. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+ if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(sc);
- }
-
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type = type;
- return(1);
- }
-
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
- {
- X509 *x;
- int i;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
- return(0);
-
- x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
- if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
-#if 0
- if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+ if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
#endif
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
-
- /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
- * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
- * or vice versa.
- */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
- s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
- /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
- * ctx.
- */
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
-
- if (s->verify_callback)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
-
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
-#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
- i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+ OPENSSL_free(sc);
+}
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type)
+{
+ sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ X509_STORE *verify_store;
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+ if (s->cert->verify_store)
+ verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+ else
+ verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+ return (0);
+
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+#if 0
+ if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+#endif
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+ * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
+ * vice versa.
+ */
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ /*
+ * Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+
+ if (s->verify_callback)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+ i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
#else
- i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+ i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
#endif
- else
- {
+ else {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
- i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
#else
- i=0;
- ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+ i = 0;
+ ctx.error = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
#endif
- }
+ }
- s->verify_result=ctx.error;
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ s->verify_result = ctx.error;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return(i);
- }
+ return (i);
+}
-static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
- {
- if (*ca_list != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ if (*ca_list != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
- *ca_list=name_list;
- }
+ *ca_list = name_list;
+}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
- {
- int i;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
- X509_NAME *name;
-
- ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
- {
- name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
- if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
- {
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
- return(NULL);
- }
- }
- return(ret);
- }
-
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
- {
- set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
- {
- set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
- }
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+ if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return(ctx->client_CA);
- }
+{
+ return (ctx->client_CA);
+}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- { /* we are in the client */
- if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
- (s->s3 != NULL))
- return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
- else
- return(NULL);
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->client_CA != NULL)
- return(s->client_CA);
- else
- return(s->ctx->client_CA);
- }
- }
-
-static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
- {
- X509_NAME *name;
-
- if (x == NULL) return(0);
- if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
- return(0);
-
- if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
- return(0);
-
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
- {
- X509_NAME_free(name);
- return(0);
- }
- return(1);
- }
-
-int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
- {
- return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
- }
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
- {
- return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
- }
-
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
- {
- return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
- }
+{
+ if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */
+ if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
+ return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ return (s->client_CA);
+ else
+ return (s->ctx->client_CA);
+ }
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+ return (0);
+
+ if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+ return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-/*!
+/**
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
* for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
@@ -670,67 +870,67 @@ static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
* \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
*/
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
- {
- BIO *in;
- X509 *x=NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
-
- sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
-
- in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
- if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
- break;
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
- /* check for duplicates */
- xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
- if (xn == NULL) goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else
- {
- sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
- sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
- }
- }
-
- if (0)
- {
-err:
- if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
- ret=NULL;
- }
- if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
- if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
- if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
- if (ret != NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- return(ret);
- }
-#endif
-
-/*!
+{
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
+
+ sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* check for duplicates */
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else {
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sk != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to add to.
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
@@ -740,58 +940,58 @@ err:
*/
int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
- const char *file)
- {
- BIO *in;
- X509 *x=NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- int ret=1;
- int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
-
- oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
-
- in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
- if (in == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
- break;
- if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
- xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
- if (xn == NULL) goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else
- sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
- }
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- if (0)
- {
-err:
- ret=0;
- }
- if(in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if(x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
-
- (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
-
- return ret;
- }
-
-/*!
+ const char *file)
+{
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+
+ oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+
+ (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to append to.
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
@@ -803,51 +1003,255 @@ err:
*/
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
- const char *dir)
- {
- OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
- const char *filename;
- int ret = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+ const char *dir)
+{
+ OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+ const char *filename;
+ int ret = 0;
- /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
- while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
- {
- char buf[1024];
- int r;
+ /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
- if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
+ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+ char buf[1024];
+ int r;
+ if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+ SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
#else
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
-#endif
- if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
- goto err;
- if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (errno)
- {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
- return ret;
- }
-
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+#endif
+ if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+ goto err;
+ if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (errno) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (d)
+ OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
+
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+{
+ int n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+ l2n3(n, p);
+ i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ *l += n + 3;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
+ int no_chain;
+ int i;
+
+ X509 *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ X509_STORE *chain_store;
+
+ if (cpk)
+ x = cpk->x509;
+ else
+ x = NULL;
+
+ if (s->cert->chain_store)
+ chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+ else
+ chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (cpk && cpk->chain)
+ extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+ else
+ extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+ no_chain = 1;
+ else
+ no_chain = 0;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (x != NULL) {
+ if (no_chain) {
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags)
+{
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int i, rv = 0;
+ unsigned long error;
+
+ if (!cpk->x509) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
+ chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (!chain_store)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) !=
+ X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (c->chain_store)
+ chain_store = c->chain_store;
+
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
+ untrusted = cpk->chain;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx,
+ c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+
+ i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = 1;
+ rv = 2;
+ }
+ if (i > 0)
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ /* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+ x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
+ /* See if last cert is self signed */
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) {
+ x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
+ X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
+{
+ X509_STORE **pstore;
+ if (chain)
+ pstore = &c->chain_store;
+ else
+ pstore = &c->verify_store;
+ if (*pstore)
+ X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+ *pstore = store;
+ if (ref && store)
+ CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ return 1;
+}