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authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 21:39:56 +0100
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 21:39:56 +0100
commit462f18c7b25fe3e467f837647d07ab0a78aa8d2b (patch)
treefc8013c0a1bac05a1945846c1697e973f4c35013 /openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
parent36f711ee12b6dd5184198abed3aa551efb585587 (diff)
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Merged origin/release (checked in because wanted to merge new stuff)
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c5665
1 files changed, 2941 insertions, 2724 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 3f66fc061..e9ad2bc81 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
- * \brief Version independent SSL functions.
+/*
+ * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions.
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
@@ -7,21 +7,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
*/
#ifdef REF_CHECK
-# include <assert.h>
+# include <assert.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
@@ -154,1383 +154,1437 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
- /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
- (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
- 0, /* finish_mac_length */
- (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
- NULL, /* client_finished_label */
- 0, /* client_finished_label_len */
- NULL, /* server_finished_label */
- 0, /* server_finished_label_len */
- (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
- size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
- int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function,
- };
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
+ /*
+ * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
+ * bug
+ */
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *))
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ 0, /* finish_mac_length */
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+ NULL, /* client_finished_label */
+ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */
+ NULL, /* server_finished_label */
+ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */
+ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
+ size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
+ int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
+};
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
- {
-
- if (s->method == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
- return(0);
- }
-
- if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=NULL;
- }
-
- s->error=0;
- s->hit=0;
- s->shutdown=0;
-
-#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
- * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
- /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
- * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
- if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
+{
+
+ if (s->method == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ s->error = 0;
+ s->hit = 0;
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+ * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation)
+ */
+ /*
+ * This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
+ * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-)
+ */
+ if (s->renegotiate)
+ return (1);
#else
- if (s->renegotiate)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
#endif
- s->type=0;
+ s->type = 0;
- s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT);
- s->version=s->method->version;
- s->client_version=s->version;
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ s->version = s->method->version;
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
#if 0
- s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
+ s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead;
#endif
- if (s->init_buf != NULL)
- {
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf=NULL;
- }
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
- s->first_packet=0;
+ s->first_packet = 0;
#if 1
- /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
- * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
- if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
- {
- s->method->ssl_free(s);
- s->method=s->ctx->method;
- if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
- return(0);
- }
- else
-#endif
- s->method->ssl_clear(s);
- return(1);
- }
+ /*
+ * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
+ * back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
+ */
+ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL)
+ && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) {
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ s->method = s->ctx->method;
+ if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+ return (0);
+ } else
+#endif
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return (1);
+}
/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
-int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
- {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- ctx->method=meth;
-
- sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
- &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
- meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
- return(0);
- }
- return(1);
- }
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ ctx->method = meth;
+
+ sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list),
+ &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+ meth->version ==
+ SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" :
+ SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- SSL *s;
-
- if (ctx == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
- return(NULL);
- }
- if (ctx->method == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
- return(NULL);
- }
-
- s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
- if (s == NULL) goto err;
- memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- s->options=ctx->options;
- s->mode=ctx->mode;
- s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
-
- if (ctx->cert != NULL)
- {
- /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
- * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
- * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
- * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
- * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
- * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
- * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
- * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
- * duplicated it once. */
-
- s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
- if (s->cert == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
-
- s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
- s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
- s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
- s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
+{
+ SSL *s;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (ctx->method == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ s->options = ctx->options;
+ s->mode = ctx->mode;
+ s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+
+ if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
+ * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
+ * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
+ * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
+ * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
+ * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
+ * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
+ */
+
+ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
+
+ s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead;
+ s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
+ s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+ s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
#if 0
- s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
-#endif
- s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
- memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
- s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
- s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
-
- s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
- if (!s->param)
- goto err;
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+ s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
+#endif
+ s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+ memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+ s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
+ s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+ s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!s->param)
+ goto err;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
#if 0
- s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
- s->trust = ctx->trust;
+ s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
+ s->trust = ctx->trust;
#endif
- s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
- s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+ s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+ s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s->ctx=ctx;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s->ctx = ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
- s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s->initial_ctx=ctx;
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s->initial_ctx = ctx;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ goto err;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+ ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ }
+ if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ goto err;
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+ ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ }
+# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
# endif
+
+ if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+ s->alpn_client_proto_list =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
+ s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+ s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ }
#endif
- s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+ s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- s->method=ctx->method;
+ s->method = ctx->method;
- if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
- goto err;
+ if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+ goto err;
- s->references=1;
- s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
+ s->references = 1;
+ s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
- SSL_clear(s);
+ SSL_clear(s);
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
- s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
-#endif
-
- return(s);
-err:
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
- if (s->ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(NULL);
- }
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
- {
- if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
- memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+ s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
+ s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
- return 1;
- }
+ return (s);
+ err:
+ if (s != NULL)
+ SSL_free(s);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+}
-int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
- {
- if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
- memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+ if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+ if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
+ ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return 1;
+}
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ return 1;
+}
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int id_len)
- {
- /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
- * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
- * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
- * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
- * use by this SSL. */
- SSL_SESSION r, *p;
-
- if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
- return 0;
-
- r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
- r.session_id_length = id_len;
- memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
- /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
- * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
- * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
- * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
- if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
- (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
- {
- memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
- SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
- r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- return (p != NULL);
- }
+ unsigned int id_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+ * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
+ * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+ * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
+ * by this SSL.
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+ if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+ return 0;
+
+ r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+ r.session_id_length = id_len;
+ memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+ /*
+ * NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
+ * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
+ * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
+ * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it.
+ */
+ if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
+ (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
+ memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
+ r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return (p != NULL);
+}
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+}
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->param;
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->param;
+}
+
+void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert);
+}
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
- {
- int i;
+{
+ int i;
- if(s == NULL)
- return;
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
- i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
+ REF_PRINT("SSL", s);
#endif
- if (i > 0) return;
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->param)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
-
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
-
- if (s->bbio != NULL)
- {
- /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
- if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
- {
- s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- }
- BIO_free(s->bbio);
- s->bbio=NULL;
- }
- if (s->rbio != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
- if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
- BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
-
- if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-
- /* add extra stuff */
- if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-
- /* Make the next call work :-) */
- if (s->session != NULL)
- {
- ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- }
-
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-
- if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
- /* Free up if allocated */
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+ if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+ /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+ }
+ BIO_free(s->bbio);
+ s->bbio = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->rbio != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+ if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+
+ /* add extra stuff */
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ /* Make the next call work :-) */
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ }
+
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+ /* Free up if allocated */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_hostname)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
- X509_EXTENSION_free);
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (s->initial_ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
#endif
- if (s->client_CA != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
- if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ if (s->method != NULL)
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
- if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
+ if (s->ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
- kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
+ kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
- OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (s->srtp_profiles)
- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
-
-void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
- {
- /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
- */
- if (s->bbio != NULL)
- {
- if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
- {
- s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
- s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
- }
- }
- if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
- BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
- if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
- BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
- s->rbio=rbio;
- s->wbio=wbio;
- }
+ if (s->srtp_profiles)
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
+ */
+ if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+ if (s->wbio == s->bbio) {
+ s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio;
+ s->bbio->next_bio = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+ if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+ s->rbio = rbio;
+ s->wbio = wbio;
+}
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
- { return(s->rbio); }
+{
+ return (s->rbio);
+}
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
- { return(s->wbio); }
+{
+ return (s->wbio);
+}
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
- }
+{
+ return (SSL_get_rfd(s));
+}
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
- {
- int ret= -1;
- BIO *b,*r;
-
- b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
- r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
- if (r != NULL)
- BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *b, *r;
+
+ b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
- {
- int ret= -1;
- BIO *b,*r;
-
- b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
- r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
- if (r != NULL)
- BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *b, *r;
+
+ b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
- {
- int ret=0;
- BIO *bio=NULL;
-
- bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
- if (bio == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
- SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
- ret=1;
-err:
- return(ret);
- }
-
-int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
- {
- int ret=0;
- BIO *bio=NULL;
-
- if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
- || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
- {
- bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
- if (bio == NULL)
- { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; }
- BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
- SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
- }
- else
- SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ret=1;
-err:
- return(ret);
- }
-
-int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
- {
- int ret=0;
- BIO *bio=NULL;
-
- if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
- || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
- {
- bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
- if (bio == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
- SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
- }
- else
- SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
- ret=1;
-err:
- return(ret);
- }
-#endif
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+ || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio);
+ } else
+ SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+ || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ } else
+ SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
- {
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (s->s3 != NULL)
- {
- ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
- if (count > ret)
- count = ret;
- memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
- }
- return ret;
- }
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
- {
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (s->s3 != NULL)
- {
- ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
- if (count > ret)
- count = ret;
- memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
- }
- return ret;
- }
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+ if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->verify_mode);
- }
+{
+ return (s->verify_mode);
+}
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
+}
-int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
- {
- return(s->verify_callback);
- }
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+ return (s->verify_callback);
+}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return(ctx->verify_mode);
- }
+{
+ return (ctx->verify_mode);
+}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
- }
-
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
- {
- return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
- }
-
-void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
- int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
- {
- s->verify_mode=mode;
- if (callback != NULL)
- s->verify_callback=callback;
- }
-
-void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
- {
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
- }
-
-void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
- {
- s->read_ahead=yes;
- }
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+ return (ctx->default_verify_callback);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
+ int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
+{
+ s->verify_mode = mode;
+ if (callback != NULL)
+ s->verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
+{
+ s->read_ahead = yes;
+}
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->read_ahead);
- }
+{
+ return (s->read_ahead);
+}
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
- {
- /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
- * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
- * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
- * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
- * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
- * so we'd better not return -1.)
- */
- return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+ * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
+ * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
+ * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
+ * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
+ */
+ return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
+}
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
- {
- X509 *r;
-
- if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
- r=NULL;
- else
- r=s->session->peer;
+{
+ X509 *r;
- if (r == NULL) return(r);
+ if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+ r = NULL;
+ else
+ r = s->session->peer;
- CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return (r);
- return(r);
- }
+ CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+ return (r);
+}
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
- {
- STACK_OF(X509) *r;
-
- if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
- r=NULL;
- else
- r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
-
- /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
- * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
-
- return(r);
- }
-
-/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
- * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
-void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
- {
- CERT *tmp;
-
- /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
- SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
-
- /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
- * vice-versa */
- if (t->method != f->method)
- {
- t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
- t->method=f->method; /* change method */
- t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
- }
-
- tmp=t->cert;
- if (f->cert != NULL)
- {
- CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
- t->cert=f->cert;
- }
- else
- t->cert=NULL;
- if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
- SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
- }
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *r;
+
+ if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)
+ || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
+ r = NULL;
+ else
+ r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
+ * we are a server, it does not.
+ */
+
+ return (r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
+ * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled
+ */
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
+{
+ CERT *tmp;
+
+ /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
+ SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f));
+
+ /*
+ * what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa
+ */
+ if (t->method != f->method) {
+ t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
+ t->method = f->method; /* change method */
+ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
+ }
+
+ tmp = t->cert;
+ if (f->cert != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+ t->cert = f->cert;
+ } else
+ t->cert = NULL;
+ if (tmp != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(tmp);
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length);
+}
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if ( (ctx == NULL) ||
- (ctx->cert == NULL) ||
- (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
- return(0);
- }
- if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
- return(0);
- }
- return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
- }
+{
+ if ((ctx == NULL) ||
+ (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (X509_check_private_key
+ (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
- {
- if (ssl == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return(0);
- }
- if (ssl->cert == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
- return(0);
- }
- if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
- return(0);
- }
- return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
- ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
- }
+{
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
+ ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- /* Not properly initialized yet */
- SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ /* Not properly initialized yet */
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s);
- return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
- }
+ return (s->method->ssl_accept(s));
+}
int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- /* Not properly initialized yet */
- SSL_set_connect_state(s);
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ /* Not properly initialized yet */
+ SSL_set_connect_state(s);
- return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
- }
+ return (s->method->ssl_connect(s));
+}
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->method->get_timeout());
- }
-
-int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
- {
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- return(0);
- }
- return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
- }
-
-int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
- {
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
- {
- return(0);
- }
- return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
- }
-
-int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
- {
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
- return(-1);
- }
- return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
- }
+{
+ return (s->method->get_timeout());
+}
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num));
+}
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
- {
- /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
- * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
- * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
- * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
- */
-
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
- return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
- else
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
+ * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
+ * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
+ * (see ssl3_shutdown).
+ */
+
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
+ return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
+ else
+ return (1);
+}
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->renegotiate == 0)
- s->renegotiate=1;
+{
+ if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->new_session=1;
+ s->new_session = 1;
- return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
- }
+ return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->renegotiate == 0)
- s->renegotiate=1;
+{
+ if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->new_session=0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
- return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
- }
+ return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
- {
- /* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
- * false again once a handshake has finished */
- return (s->renegotiate != 0);
- }
-
-long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
- {
- long l;
-
- switch (cmd)
- {
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
- return(s->read_ahead);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
- l=s->read_ahead;
- s->read_ahead=larg;
- return(l);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
- s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
- return(s->options|=larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
- return(s->options&=~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
- return(s->mode|=larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
- return(s->mode &=~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- return(s->max_cert_list);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- l=s->max_cert_list;
- s->max_cert_list=larg;
- return(l);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
- return 0;
-#endif
-
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
- SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- s->d1->mtu = larg;
- return larg;
- }
- return 0;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
- if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0;
- s->max_send_fragment = larg;
- return 1;
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
- if (s->s3)
- return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
- else return 0;
- default:
- return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
- }
- }
-
-long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
- {
- switch(cmd)
- {
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
- s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
- }
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
+ * handshake has finished
+ */
+ return (s->renegotiate != 0);
+}
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+ long l;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+ return (s->read_ahead);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+ l = s->read_ahead;
+ s->read_ahead = larg;
+ return (l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+ return (s->options |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+ return (s->options &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+ return (s->mode |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+ return (s->mode &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return (s->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l = s->max_cert_list;
+ s->max_cert_list = larg;
+ return (l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+ if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+ return 1;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
+ if (s->s3)
+ return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
+ return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
+ return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST:
+ if (parg) {
+ if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw;
+ return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen;
+ } else
+ return ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+ default:
+ return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
+ }
+}
+
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ s->msg_callback = (void (*)
+ (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp));
+ }
+}
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->sessions;
- }
-
-long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
- {
- long l;
-
- switch (cmd)
- {
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
- return(ctx->read_ahead);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
- l=ctx->read_ahead;
- ctx->read_ahead=larg;
- return(l);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
- ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- return(ctx->max_cert_list);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- l=ctx->max_cert_list;
- ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
- return(l);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
- l=ctx->session_cache_size;
- ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
- return(l);
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
- return(ctx->session_cache_size);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
- l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
- ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
- return(l);
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
- return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
- return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
- return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
- case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
- return(ctx->options|=larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
- return(ctx->options&=~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
- return(ctx->mode|=larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
- return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
- if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0;
- ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
- return 1;
- default:
- return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
- }
- }
-
-long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
- {
- switch(cmd)
- {
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
- ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
- }
- }
+{
+ return ctx->sessions;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+ long l;
+ /* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST:
+ return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg);
+#endif
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0);
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+ return (ctx->read_ahead);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+ l = ctx->read_ahead;
+ ctx->read_ahead = larg;
+ return (l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return (ctx->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l = ctx->max_cert_list;
+ ctx->max_cert_list = larg;
+ return (l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+ l = ctx->session_cache_size;
+ ctx->session_cache_size = larg;
+ return (l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+ return (ctx->session_cache_size);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+ l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
+ return (l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+ return (ctx->session_cache_mode);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
+ return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_connect);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_hit);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
+ case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+ return (ctx->options |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+ return (ctx->options &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+ return (ctx->mode |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+ return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+ if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+ return 1;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
+ return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
+ return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
+ default:
+ return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
+ }
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
+ (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp));
+ }
+}
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
- {
- long l;
-
- l=a->id-b->id;
- if (l == 0L)
- return(0);
- else
- return((l > 0)?1:-1);
- }
-
-int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
- const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
- {
- long l;
-
- l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id;
- if (l == 0L)
- return(0);
- else
- return((l > 0)?1:-1);
- }
+{
+ long l;
+
+ l = a->id - b->id;
+ if (l == 0L)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
+ const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
+{
+ long l;
+
+ l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id;
+ if (l == 0L)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
+}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* preference */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
- {
- return(s->cipher_list);
- }
- else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
- (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
- {
- return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
- }
- }
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+ return (s->cipher_list);
+ } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
+ return (s->ctx->cipher_list);
+ }
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* algorithm id */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
- {
- return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
- }
- else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
- (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
- {
- return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
- }
- }
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
+ return (s->cipher_list_by_id);
+ } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
+ return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+ }
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
-const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
- {
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
- sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
- return(NULL);
- c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
- if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
- return(c->name);
- }
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
+{
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
+ return (NULL);
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (c->name);
+}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
- {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
- &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
- /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
- * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
- * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
- * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
- * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
- * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
- * updated. */
- if (sk == NULL)
- return 0;
- else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list,
+ &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert);
+ /*
+ * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
+ * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
+ * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
+ * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
+ * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
+ */
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
-int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
- {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
- &s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
- /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
- if (sk == NULL)
- return 0;
- else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list,
+ &s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert);
+ /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
- {
- char *p;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- int i;
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
- (len < 2))
- return(NULL);
-
- p=buf;
- sk=s->session->ciphers;
-
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
- return NULL;
-
- for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
- {
- int n;
-
- c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
- n=strlen(c->name);
- if (n+1 > len)
- {
- if (p != buf)
- --p;
- *p='\0';
- return buf;
- }
- strcpy(p,c->name);
- p+=n;
- *(p++)=':';
- len-=n+1;
- }
- p[-1]='\0';
- return(buf);
- }
-
-int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
- int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
- {
- int i,j=0;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- unsigned char *q;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- if (sk == NULL) return(0);
- q=p;
- if (put_cb == NULL)
- put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
-
- for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
- {
- c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
- /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
- if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
- (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
- continue;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
- nokrb5)
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
- s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
- !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
- j = put_cb(c,p);
- p+=j;
- }
- /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
- * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
- if (p != q)
- {
- if (!s->renegotiate)
- {
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
- {
- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- };
- j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
- p+=j;
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ char *p;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
+ return (NULL);
+
+ p = buf;
+ sk = s->session->ciphers;
+
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ int n;
+
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ n = strlen(c->name);
+ if (n + 1 > len) {
+ if (p != buf)
+ --p;
+ *p = '\0';
+ return buf;
+ }
+ strcpy(p, c->name);
+ p += n;
+ *(p++) = ':';
+ len -= n + 1;
+ }
+ p[-1] = '\0';
+ return (buf);
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+ unsigned char *))
+{
+ int i, j = 0;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ CERT *ct = s->cert;
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+ /* Set disabled masks for this session */
+ ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ q = p;
+ if (put_cb == NULL)
+ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+ if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
+ c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
+ continue;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
+ if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
+ continue;
+ else
+ empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ j = put_cb(c, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
+ * applicable SCSVs.
+ */
+ if (p != q) {
+ if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
-#endif
- }
-
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
- {
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
- {
- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- };
- j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
- p+=j;
- }
- }
-
- return(p-q);
- }
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
- {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- int i,n;
-
- if (s->s3)
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
-
- n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
- if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
- return(NULL);
- }
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
- sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
- else
- {
- sk= *skp;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
- }
-
- for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
- {
- /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
- if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
- (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
- {
- /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
- p += n;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (p - q);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ int num,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i, n;
+
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+ if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+ else {
+ sk = *skp;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+ }
+
+ if (s->cert->ciphers_raw)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ciphers_raw);
+ s->cert->ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
+ if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->cert->ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
+ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ p += n;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
-#endif
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
- if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
- (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
- {
- /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
- * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
- if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- if (s->s3)
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- goto err;
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
- p+=n;
- if (c != NULL)
- {
- if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (skp != NULL)
- *skp=sk;
- return(sk);
-err:
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
- return(NULL);
- }
+ fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
+#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /*
+ * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
+ * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
+ * downgrade.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ if (s->s3)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += n;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+ p += n;
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ *skp = sk;
+ return (sk);
+ err:
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ return (NULL);
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
@@ -1538,1597 +1592,1729 @@ err:
*/
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
- {
- if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
- return NULL;
+{
+ if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ return NULL;
- return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
- s->session->tlsext_hostname :
- s->tlsext_hostname;
- }
+ return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname;
+}
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
- return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- return -1;
- }
+{
+ if (s->session
+ && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->
+ tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
+ return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ return -1;
+}
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+/*
+ * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
* expected that this function is called from the callback set by
- * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
- *
- * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
- * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
- * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
- *
- * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
- *
- * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
- * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
- * or have a default application level protocol.
- *
- * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
- * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
- * API that this fallback case was enacted.
- *
- * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
- * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
- * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
- * a client should use.
- *
- * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
- * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
- *
- * It returns either
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
+ * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
+ * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
+ * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
+ * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
+ * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
+ * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
+ * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
+ * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
+ * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
+ * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
+ * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
+ * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
+ * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
+ * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
+ * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
*/
-int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
- {
- unsigned int i, j;
- const unsigned char *result;
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-
- /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
- for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
- {
- for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
- {
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
- memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
- {
- /* We found a match */
- result = &server[i];
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
- goto found;
- }
- j += client[j];
- j++;
- }
- i += server[i];
- i++;
- }
-
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
- result = client;
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
- *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
- *outlen = result[0];
- return status;
- }
-
-/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
- * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
- * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
- *
- * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
- * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *server,
+ unsigned int server_len,
+ const unsigned char *client,
+ unsigned int client_len)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ const unsigned char *result;
+ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ /*
+ * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+ for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+ if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+ memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+ /* We found a match */
+ result = &server[i];
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ goto found;
+ }
+ j += client[j];
+ j++;
+ }
+ i += server[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+ result = client;
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+ found:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+ *outlen = result[0];
+ return status;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
+ * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
+ * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
+ * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
+ * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
* provided by the callback.
*/
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
- {
- *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
- if (!*data) {
- *len = 0;
- } else {
- *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
- }
-}
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
- * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned
- * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
- * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
- * it.
- *
- * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
- * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
- {
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
- }
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned *len)
+{
+ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+ if (!*data) {
+ *len = 0;
+ } else {
+ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
+ * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is
+ * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
+ * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
+ * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
+ * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
+ * ServerHello.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const unsigned char
+ **out,
+ unsigned int *outlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
* client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
* must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
- * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
- * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
- * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
- *
- * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
- * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
+ * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
+ * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
+ * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+ * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
*/
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
- {
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
- }
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
# endif
-#endif
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
+ unsigned protos_len)
+{
+ if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+ ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
+ if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
+ return 1;
+ memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+ ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
+ unsigned protos_len)
+{
+ if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+ ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
+ if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
+ return 1;
+ memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+ ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is
+ * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol
+ * from the client's list of offered protocols.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
+ ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from
+ * |ssl|. On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name
+ * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't
+ * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned *len)
+{
+ *data = NULL;
+ if (ssl->s3)
+ *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
+ if (*data == NULL)
+ *len = 0;
+ else
+ *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+}
+
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
- int use_context)
- {
- if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
- return -1;
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+ int use_context)
+{
+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
+ return -1;
- return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
- llen, p, plen,
- use_context);
- }
+ return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
+ llen, p, plen,
+ use_context);
+}
static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
- {
- unsigned long l;
-
- l=(unsigned long)
- ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )|
- ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
- ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
- ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
- return(l);
- }
-
-/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ l = (unsigned long)
+ ((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) |
+ ((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) |
+ ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L);
+ return (l);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
- * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
- * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
- * with a matching session ID. */
-static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
- {
- if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
- return(1);
- if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
- return(1);
- return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
- }
-
-/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
+ * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
+ * session with a matching session ID.
+ */
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
+{
+ if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
+ return (1);
+ if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
+ return (1);
+ return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length));
+}
+
+/*
+ * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
* SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
- * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
- * ssl.h. */
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
+ * via ssl.h.
+ */
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
- {
- SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
-
- if (meth == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
+ if (meth == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- return NULL;
- }
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
#endif
- if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
- goto err;
- }
- ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
+ if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
- memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
- ret->method=meth;
+ ret->method = meth;
- ret->cert_store=NULL;
- ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
- ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
- ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
- ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
+ ret->cert_store = NULL;
+ ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+ ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+ ret->session_cache_head = NULL;
+ ret->session_cache_tail = NULL;
- /* We take the system default */
- ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
+ /* We take the system default */
+ ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
- ret->new_session_cb=0;
- ret->remove_session_cb=0;
- ret->get_session_cb=0;
- ret->generate_session_id=0;
+ ret->new_session_cb = 0;
+ ret->remove_session_cb = 0;
+ ret->get_session_cb = 0;
+ ret->generate_session_id = 0;
- memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
+ memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats));
- ret->references=1;
- ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
-/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
-/* ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
- ret->master_key=NULL;
- ret->key_arg=NULL;
- ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
+/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
+/*-
+ ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+ ret->master_key=NULL;
+ ret->key_arg=NULL;
+ ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
- ret->info_callback=NULL;
+ ret->info_callback = NULL;
- ret->app_verify_callback=0;
- ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
+ ret->app_verify_callback = 0;
+ ret->app_verify_arg = NULL;
- ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
- ret->read_ahead=0;
- ret->msg_callback=0;
- ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
- ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+ ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+ ret->read_ahead = 0;
+ ret->msg_callback = 0;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL;
+ ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
#if 0
- ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
-#endif
- ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
- ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
- if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
- ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
- ret->client_cert_cb=0;
- ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
- ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
-
- ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
- if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
- ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
- if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
-
- ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
- &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
- meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
- if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
- || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
- if (!ret->param)
- goto err;
-
- if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
- goto err2;
- }
- if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
- goto err2;
- }
- if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
-
- ret->extra_certs=NULL;
- /* No compression for DTLS */
- if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
-
- ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+#endif
+ ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
+ ret->default_verify_callback = NULL;
+ if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret->default_passwd_callback = 0;
+ ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL;
+ ret->client_cert_cb = 0;
+ ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0;
+ ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0;
+
+ ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (ret->sessions == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+ &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+ meth->version ==
+ SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
+ ret->cert);
+ if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!ret->param)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+
+ ret->extra_certs = NULL;
+ /* No compression for DTLS */
+ if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+ ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
- ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
- /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
- if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
- || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
- || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
- ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+ ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
+ ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
+ /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
+ if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
+ || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
+ || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
+ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
- ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
- ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
+ ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
+ ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
- ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
+ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
+ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
- ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
- ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
+ ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
+ SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
- ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
- ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
- if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
- goto err;
- ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
- ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
- ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
- ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
- if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
- ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
- ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+ ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+ if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+ goto err;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+ if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
-#define eng_strx(x) #x
-#define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
- /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
- {
- ENGINE *eng;
- eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
- if (!eng)
- {
- ERR_clear_error();
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
- eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
- }
- if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
-#endif
-#endif
- /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
- * deployed might change this.
- */
- ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
-
- return(ret);
-err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
- if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
- return(NULL);
- }
+ ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
+# define eng_strx(x) #x
+# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
+ /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
+ {
+ ENGINE *eng;
+ eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+ if (!eng) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+ }
+ if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
+ * deployed might change this.
+ */
+ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+
+ return (ret);
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+ return (NULL);
+}
#if 0
static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
- { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-static void
-ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
- {
- SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
- for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
- {
- next = ent->next;
- OPENSSL_free(ent);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(list);
- }
+static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+{
+ SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+ for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) {
+ next = ent->next;
+ OPENSSL_free(ent);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(list);
+}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
- {
- int i;
+{
+ int i;
- if (a == NULL) return;
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return;
- i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
+ REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a);
#endif
- if (i > 0) return;
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- if (a->param)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
-
- /*
- * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
- * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
- * after the sessions were flushed.
- * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
- * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
- * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
- * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
- */
- if (a->sessions != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
-
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
-
- if (a->sessions != NULL)
- lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
-
- if (a->cert_store != NULL)
- X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
- if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
- if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
- if (a->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
- if (a->client_CA != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
- if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
-#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
- if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
- sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (a->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+
+ /*
+ * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+ * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+ * after the sessions were flushed.
+ * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+ * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+ * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+ * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+ */
+ if (a->sessions != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+ if (a->sessions != NULL)
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
+
+ if (a->cert_store != NULL)
+ X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+ if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
+ if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
+ if (a->cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
+ if (a->client_CA != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+ if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
+#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it
+ * removes a global database */
+ if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free);
#else
- a->comp_methods = NULL;
+ a->comp_methods = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (a->srtp_profiles)
- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
+ if (a->srtp_profiles)
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (a->psk_identity_hint)
- OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
+ SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (a->client_cert_engine)
- ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+ if (a->client_cert_engine)
+ ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
- if (a->wbuf_freelist)
- ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
- if (a->rbuf_freelist)
- ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+ if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+ ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+ if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+ ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
#endif
- OPENSSL_free(a);
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
- {
- ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
- {
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
- {
- ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
- ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
- {
- ctx->verify_mode=mode;
- ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
- {
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
- }
+{
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
+{
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
+ ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+ int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+ ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+ ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
+}
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
- int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
- int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
- int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
- unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
- int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+{
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+ int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
+ int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
+ int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
+ unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- int have_ecdh_tmp;
+ int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
#endif
- X509 *x = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
- int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
-
- if (c == NULL) return;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
+ int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
+#endif
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
- kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+ kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
- rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
- (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+ rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
+ rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+ (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
#else
- rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
+ rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
- dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
- (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+ dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+ dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+ (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
#else
- dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
+ dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
-#endif
- cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
- cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
- rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
- dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
- dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
- cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
+ have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto);
+#endif
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ rsa_enc = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+ rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
+ rsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
+ dsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
+ dh_rsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+ dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
- dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
- cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
- have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- mask_k=0;
- mask_a=0;
- emask_k=0;
- emask_a=0;
-
-
+ dh_dsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+ dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ have_ecc_cert = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+#endif
+ mask_k = 0;
+ mask_a = 0;
+ emask_k = 0;
+ emask_a = 0;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
- rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
- rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
-#endif
-
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
- mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
- }
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
- mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
- }
-
- if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
- mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
- if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
- emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+ rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,
+ rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa);
+#endif
+
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+ }
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
+ mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
+ if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
+ emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
#if 0
- /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
- if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
- (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
- mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
- if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
- (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
- emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+ /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
+ if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+ mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+ if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
+ (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+ emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
#endif
- if (dh_tmp_export)
- emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+ if (dh_tmp_export)
+ emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+
+ if (dh_tmp)
+ mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
- if (dh_tmp)
- mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+ if (dh_rsa)
+ mask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
+ if (dh_rsa_export)
+ emask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
- if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
- if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+ if (dh_dsa)
+ mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+ if (dh_dsa_export)
+ emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
- if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
- if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+ if (emask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
+ mask_a |= SSL_aDH;
- if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
- {
- mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
- emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
- }
+ if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
+ mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+ }
- if (dsa_sign)
- {
- mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
- emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
- }
+ if (dsa_sign) {
+ mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+ }
- mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
- emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
- mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
- emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
- emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
-
- /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
- * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
- */
- if (have_ecc_cert)
- {
- /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
- x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
- (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
- ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
- (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
- ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
- EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
- EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
- if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
- {
- signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
- OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (ecdh_ok)
- {
-
- if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
- {
- mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
- mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
- if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
- {
- emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
- emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
- }
- }
-
- if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
- {
- mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
- mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
- if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
- {
- emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
- emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
- }
- }
- }
+ mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (ecdsa_ok)
- {
- mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
- emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
- }
+
+ /*
+ * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
+ * depending on the key usage extension.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (have_ecc_cert) {
+ cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
+ x = cpk->x509;
+ /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+# endif
+ ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
+ if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
+ ecdsa_ok = 0;
+ ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (ecdh_ok) {
+
+ if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
+ emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
+ emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (ecdsa_ok) {
+ mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ }
+# endif
+ }
#endif
- }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (have_ecdh_tmp)
- {
- mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
- emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
- }
+ if (have_ecdh_tmp) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
#endif
- c->mask_k=mask_k;
- c->mask_a=mask_a;
- c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
- c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
- c->valid=1;
- }
+ c->mask_k = mask_k;
+ c->mask_a = mask_a;
+ c->export_mask_k = emask_k;
+ c->export_mask_a = emask_a;
+ c->valid = 1;
+}
/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int keysize = 0;
- int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
- const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-
- alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
- {
- /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
- keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (keysize > 163) return 0;
- }
-
- /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
- {
- signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
- OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
- }
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
- {
- /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
- if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
- if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- /* signature alg must be RSA */
-
- if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- {
- /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
- if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1; /* all checks are ok */
- }
-
-#endif
-
-/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
+{
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int keysize = 0;
+ int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+
+ alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) {
+ /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (keysize > 163)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
+ if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ /* signature alg must be RSA */
+
+ if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1; /* all checks are ok */
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s)
+{
+ int idx;
+ idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ if (idx == -1)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return idx;
+}
+
CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
- CERT *c;
- int i;
-
- c=s->cert;
- ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
- {
- /* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
- * since no certificate is needed for
- * anon ECDH and for authenticated
- * EECDH, the check for the auth
- * algorithm will set i correctly
- * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
- * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
- * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
- * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
- * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
- */
- i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- }
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- {
- i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- }
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
- i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
- i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
- i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- {
- if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
- i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- else
- i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
- }
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
- {
- /* VRS something else here? */
- return(NULL);
- }
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
- i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
- i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
- else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return(NULL);
- }
-
- return c->pkeys + i;
- }
-
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
- cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- if (!cpk)
- return NULL;
- return cpk->x509;
- }
-
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
- {
- unsigned long alg_a;
- CERT *c;
- int idx = -1;
-
- alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
- c=s->cert;
-
- if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
- (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- {
- if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
- }
- else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
- (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
- idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- if (idx == -1)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return(NULL);
- }
- if (pmd)
- *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
- return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
- }
-
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
- {
- int i;
-
- /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
- * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
-
- i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
- if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
- && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
- || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
- && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
- {
- CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- }
-
- /* auto flush every 255 connections */
- if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
- ((i & mode) == mode))
- {
- if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
- ?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
- :s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
- {
- SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
- }
- }
- }
+{
+ CERT *c;
+ int i;
+
+ c = s->cert;
+ if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ return NULL;
+ ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ /*
+ * Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may mismatch
+ * the one expected.
+ */
+ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+ return c->key;
+#endif
+
+ i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
+
+ /* This may or may not be an error. */
+ if (i < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* May be NULL. */
+ return &c->pkeys[i];
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+ const EVP_MD **pmd)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ CERT *c;
+ int idx = -1;
+
+ alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ c = s->cert;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ /*
+ * Broken protocol test: use last key: which may mismatch the one
+ * expected.
+ */
+ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+ idx = c->key - c->pkeys;
+ else
+#endif
+
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
+ (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
+ if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+ (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (pmd)
+ *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
+ return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo,
+ size_t *serverinfo_length)
+{
+ CERT *c = NULL;
+ int i = 0;
+ *serverinfo_length = 0;
+
+ c = s->cert;
+ i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
+
+ if (i == -1)
+ return 0;
+ if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ *serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo;
+ *serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
+ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
+ */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
+ return;
+
+ i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+ && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+ || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
+ && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ }
+
+ /* auto flush every 255 connections */
+ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
+ if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+ ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+ : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->method;
+}
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->method);
- }
+{
+ return (s->method);
+}
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
- {
- int conn= -1;
- int ret=1;
-
- if (s->method != meth)
- {
- if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
- conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
-
- if (s->method->version == meth->version)
- s->method=meth;
- else
- {
- s->method->ssl_free(s);
- s->method=meth;
- ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
- }
-
- if (conn == 1)
- s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
- else if (conn == 0)
- s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
- }
- return(ret);
- }
-
-int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
- {
- int reason;
- unsigned long l;
- BIO *bio;
-
- if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
-
- /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
- * etc, where we do encode the error */
- if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
- {
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
- return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
- else
- return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
- }
-
- if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
- {
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
- if (BIO_should_read(bio))
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
- else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
- /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
- * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
- * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
- * should wait for.
- * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
- * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
- * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
- * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
- * to keep it. */
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
- else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
- {
- reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
- if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
- else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
- else
- return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
- }
- }
-
- if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
- {
- bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
- if (BIO_should_write(bio))
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
- else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
- /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
- else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
- {
- reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
- if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
- else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
- else
- return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
- }
- }
- if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
- {
- return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
- }
-
- if (i == 0)
- {
- if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
- {
- /* assume it is the socket being closed */
- return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
- }
- else
- {
- if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
- (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
- return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
- }
- }
- return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
- }
+{
+ int conn = -1;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (s->method != meth) {
+ if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
+ conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+
+ if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+ s->method = meth;
+ else {
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ s->method = meth;
+ ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
+ }
+
+ if (conn == 1)
+ s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
+ else if (conn == 0)
+ s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
+{
+ int reason;
+ unsigned long l;
+ BIO *bio;
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+ /*
+ * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
+ * where we do encode the error
+ */
+ if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+ else
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) {
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+ else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+ /*
+ * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
+ * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
+ * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
+ * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
+ * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
+ * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
+ * might be safer to keep it.
+ */
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+ else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+ reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+ if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+ else
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) {
+ bio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+ else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+ /*
+ * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
+ */
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+ else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+ reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+ if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+ else
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+ }
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ /* assume it is the socket being closed */
+ return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+ } else {
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
+ return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+ }
+ }
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+}
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret=1;
-
- if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
-
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- {
- ret=s->handshake_func(s);
- }
- return(ret);
- }
-
-/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
- * one of these calls will reset it */
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+ ret = s->handshake_func(s);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these
+ * calls will reset it
+ */
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
- {
- s->server=1;
- s->shutdown=0;
- s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
- s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
- /* clear the current cipher */
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
- }
+{
+ s->server = 1;
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+ s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
+ /* clear the current cipher */
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+}
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
- {
- s->server=0;
- s->shutdown=0;
- s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
- s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
- /* clear the current cipher */
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
- }
+{
+ s->server = 0;
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+ s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
+ /* clear the current cipher */
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+}
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return(0);
- }
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+}
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return(0);
- }
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
+ ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+}
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return(0);
- }
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,
+ ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+}
SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (NULL);
+}
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
- return("TLSv1.2");
- else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
- return("TLSv1.1");
- else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
- return("TLSv1");
- else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- return("SSLv3");
- else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
- return("SSLv2");
- else
- return("unknown");
- }
+{
+ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return ("TLSv1.2");
+ else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return ("TLSv1.1");
+ else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return ("TLSv1");
+ else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return ("SSLv3");
+ else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return ("SSLv2");
+ else
+ return ("unknown");
+}
SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
- {
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
- X509_NAME *xn;
- SSL *ret;
- int i;
-
- if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
- return(NULL);
-
- ret->version = s->version;
- ret->type = s->type;
- ret->method = s->method;
-
- if (s->session != NULL)
- {
- /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
- SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s);
- }
- else
- {
- /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect
- * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later --
- * they should not both point to the same object,
- * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
-
- ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
- ret->method = s->method;
- ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
-
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- {
- if (ret->cert != NULL)
- {
- ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
- }
- ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
- if (ret->cert == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-
- SSL_set_session_id_context(ret,
- s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
- }
-
- ret->options=s->options;
- ret->mode=s->mode;
- SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
- SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
- ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
- ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
- SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
- SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
- SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
- ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
-
- SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
-
- ret->debug=s->debug;
-
- /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
- if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
- goto err;
-
- /* setup rbio, and wbio */
- if (s->rbio != NULL)
- {
- if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio))
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->wbio != NULL)
- {
- if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
- {
- if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio))
- goto err;
- }
- else
- ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
- }
- ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
- ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
- ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
- ret->server = s->server;
- ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
- ret->new_session = s->new_session;
- ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
- ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
- ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
- ret->rstate=s->rstate;
- ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
- ret->hit=s->hit;
-
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
-
- /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
- if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
- {
- if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
- if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
- == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Dup the client_CA list */
- if (s->client_CA != NULL)
- {
- if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err;
- ret->client_CA=sk;
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
- {
- xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
- if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
- {
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (0)
- {
-err:
- if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret);
- ret=NULL;
- }
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ SSL *ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ ret->version = s->version;
+ ret->type = s->type;
+ ret->method = s->method;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+ SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
+ * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
+ * point to the same object, and thus we can't use
+ * SSL_copy_session_id.
+ */
+
+ ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
+ ret->method = s->method;
+ ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+
+ if (s->cert != NULL) {
+ if (ret->cert != NULL) {
+ ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+ }
+ ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
+ if (ret->cert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ }
+
+ ret->options = s->options;
+ ret->mode = s->mode;
+ SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
+ SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+ ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
+ SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
+ SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+ ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
+
+ SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
+
+ ret->debug = s->debug;
+
+ /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* setup rbio, and wbio */
+ if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+ if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+ if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
+ if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
+ }
+ ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+ ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+ ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+ ret->server = s->server;
+ ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
+ ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+ ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
+ ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
+ * though */
+ ret->rstate = s->rstate;
+ ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
+ * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
+ * ret->init_off */
+ ret->hit = s->hit;
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
+
+ /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+ if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
+ == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Dup the client_CA list */
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret->client_CA = sk;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ SSL_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
- s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
- }
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
- s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
- }
+{
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->expand != NULL)
- {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand=NULL;
- }
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress=NULL;
- }
-#endif
- }
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+}
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- return(s->cert->key->x509);
- else
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ return (s->cert->key->x509);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
-EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
- else
- return(NULL);
- }
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ return (s->cert->key->privatekey);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+ return ctx->cert->key->x509;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+ return ctx->cert->key->privatekey;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
- {
- if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
- return(s->session->cipher);
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+ return (s->session->cipher);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
- {
- return NULL;
- }
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
- {
- return NULL;
- }
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
#else
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- return(s->compress->meth);
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ return (s->compress->meth);
+ return (NULL);
+}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->expand != NULL)
- return(s->expand->meth);
- return(NULL);
- }
-#endif
-
-int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
- {
- BIO *bbio;
-
- if (s->bbio == NULL)
- {
- bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
- s->bbio=bbio;
- }
- else
- {
- bbio=s->bbio;
- if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
- s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- }
- (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
-/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
- if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
- if (push)
- {
- if (s->wbio != bbio)
- s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->wbio == bbio)
- s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
- }
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ return (s->expand->meth);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push)
+{
+ BIO *bbio;
+
+ if (s->bbio == NULL) {
+ bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ if (bbio == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->bbio = bbio;
+ } else {
+ bbio = s->bbio;
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+ }
+ (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
+/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
+ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (push) {
+ if (s->wbio != bbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
+ } else {
+ if (s->wbio == bbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
-
- if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
- {
- /* remove buffering */
- s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
- assert(s->wbio != NULL);
-#endif
- }
- BIO_free(s->bbio);
- s->bbio=NULL;
- }
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
- {
- ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
- }
+{
+ if (s->bbio == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
+ /* remove buffering */
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids
+ * adding one more preprocessor symbol */
+ assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+ BIO_free(s->bbio);
+ s->bbio = NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
+{
+ ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
- }
+{
+ return (ctx->quiet_shutdown);
+}
-void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
- {
- s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
- }
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+ s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->quiet_shutdown);
- }
+{
+ return (s->quiet_shutdown);
+}
-void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
- {
- s->shutdown=mode;
- }
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+ s->shutdown = mode;
+}
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->shutdown);
- }
+{
+ return (s->shutdown);
+}
int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->version);
- }
+{
+ return (s->version);
+}
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
- {
- return(ssl->ctx);
- }
-
-SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
- {
- CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
- if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
- return ssl->ctx;
+{
+ return (ssl->ctx);
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
+ if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
+ return ssl->ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx == NULL)
- ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
-#endif
- ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
- if (ocert != NULL)
- {
- int i;
- /* Copy negotiated digests from original */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i;
- CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i;
- rpk->digest = cpk->digest;
- }
- ssl_cert_free(ocert);
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
- ssl->ctx = ctx;
- return(ssl->ctx);
- }
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+#endif
+ ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (ocert) {
+ /* Preserve any already negotiated parameters */
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = ocert->peer_sigalgs;
+ ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = ocert->peer_sigalgslen;
+ ocert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ ssl->cert->ciphers_raw = ocert->ciphers_raw;
+ ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen = ocert->ciphers_rawlen;
+ ocert->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+ }
+ ssl_cert_free(ocert);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+ * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+ /*
+ * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+ * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+ * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+ * leave it unchanged.
+ */
+ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+ (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
+ ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+ ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
+ return (ssl->ctx);
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
- }
+{
+ return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
+}
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
- const char *CApath)
- {
- return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
- }
+ const char *CApath)
+{
+ return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath));
+}
#endif
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
- {
- ssl->info_callback=cb;
- }
-
-/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
- function pointer. */
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
- {
- return ssl->info_callback;
- }
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+ ssl->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+/*
+ * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
+ * pointer.
+ */
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
+ int /* type */ ,
+ int /* val */ ) {
+ return ssl->info_callback;
+}
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
- {
- return(ssl->state);
- }
+{
+ return (ssl->state);
+}
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
- {
- ssl->state = state;
- }
+{
+ ssl->state = state;
+}
-void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
- {
- ssl->verify_result=arg;
- }
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
+{
+ ssl->verify_result = arg;
+}
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
- {
- return(ssl->verify_result);
- }
-
-int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
- {
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
- }
-
-int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
- }
-
-void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
- }
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
- {
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
- }
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
- }
-
-void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
- {
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
- }
+{
+ return (ssl->verify_result);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
- {
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ return (1);
+}
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return(ctx->cert_store);
- }
+{
+ return (ctx->cert_store);
+}
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
- {
- if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
- X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
- ctx->cert_store=store;
- }
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
+{
+ if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
+ X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+ ctx->cert_store = store;
+}
int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
- {
- return(s->rwstate);
- }
+{
+ return (s->rwstate);
+}
-/*!
+/**
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param cb the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
- int is_export,
- int keylength))
- {
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
- }
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
-void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
- int is_export,
- int keylength))
- {
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
- }
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
#endif
#ifdef DOXYGEN
-/*!
+/**
* \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
* \param ssl the SSL session.
* \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
@@ -3138,180 +3324,211 @@ void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
* \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
*/
-RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
- {}
+RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+}
#endif
-/*!
+/**
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param dh the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
- int keylength))
- {
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
- }
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
-void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
- int keylength))
- {
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
- }
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
- int keylength))
- {
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
- }
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdh);
+}
-void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
- int keylength))
- {
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
- }
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh);
+}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
- {
- if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (identity_hint != NULL)
- {
- ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
- if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
- else
- ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+ ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+ if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
- {
- if (s == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (s->session == NULL)
- return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
-
- if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- if (identity_hint != NULL)
- {
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
- else
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->session == NULL)
+ return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
- return NULL;
- return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return (s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
- {
- if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
- return NULL;
- return(s->session->psk_identity);
- }
+{
+ if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return (s->session->psk_identity);
+}
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
- unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
- char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len))
- {
- s->psk_client_callback = cb;
- }
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int
+ max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
- char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len))
- {
- ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
- }
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int
+ max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
- unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
- {
- s->psk_server_callback = cb;
- }
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
- {
- ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
- }
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
- {
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
- }
-void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
- {
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
- }
-
-/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
- * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
- * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
- * Returns newly allocated ctx;
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
+ * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
+ * allocated ctx;
*/
-EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md)
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
{
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
- *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
- return *hash;
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+ *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (md)
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL);
+ return *hash;
}
-void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
+
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
{
- if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
- *hash=NULL;
+ if (*hash)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+ *hash = NULL;
}
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
- {
- s->debug = debug;
- }
+{
+ s->debug = debug;
+}
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
- {
- return s->hit;
- }
+{
+ return s->hit;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_server(SSL *s)
+{
+ return s->server;
+}
#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
-#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
+# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
#endif
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
-IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
- ssl_cipher_id);
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);