diff options
| author | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2009-06-28 22:07:26 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | marha <marha@users.sourceforge.net> | 2009-06-28 22:07:26 +0000 |
| commit | 3562e78743202e43aec8727005182a2558117eca (patch) | |
| tree | 8f9113a77d12470c5c851a2a8e4cb02e89df7d43 /openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c | |
| download | vcxsrv-3562e78743202e43aec8727005182a2558117eca.tar.gz vcxsrv-3562e78743202e43aec8727005182a2558117eca.tar.bz2 vcxsrv-3562e78743202e43aec8727005182a2558117eca.zip | |
Checked in the following released items:
xkeyboard-config-1.4.tar.gz
ttf-bitstream-vera-1.10.tar.gz
font-alias-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-sun-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-sun-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-sony-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-schumacher-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-mutt-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-misc-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-misc-meltho-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-micro-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-jis-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-isas-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-dec-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-daewoo-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-cursor-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-arabic-misc-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-winitzki-cyrillic-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-misc-cyrillic-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-cronyx-cyrillic-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-screen-cyrillic-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-xfree86-type1-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-adobe-utopia-type1-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-ibm-type1-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bitstream-type1-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bitstream-speedo-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-ttf-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-type1-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bitstream-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-lucidatypewriter-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-adobe-utopia-100dpi-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-adobe-100dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-util-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-bitstream-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-bh-lucidatypewriter-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
font-adobe-utopia-75dpi-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-bh-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
bdftopcf-1.0.1.tar.gz
font-adobe-75dpi-1.0.0.tar.gz
mkfontscale-1.0.6.tar.gz
openssl-0.9.8k.tar.gz
bigreqsproto-1.0.2.tar.gz
xtrans-1.2.2.tar.gz
resourceproto-1.0.2.tar.gz
inputproto-1.4.4.tar.gz
compositeproto-0.4.tar.gz
damageproto-1.1.0.tar.gz
zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
xkbcomp-1.0.5.tar.gz
freetype-2.3.9.tar.gz
pthreads-w32-2-8-0-release.tar.gz
pixman-0.12.0.tar.gz
kbproto-1.0.3.tar.gz
evieext-1.0.2.tar.gz
fixesproto-4.0.tar.gz
recordproto-1.13.2.tar.gz
randrproto-1.2.2.tar.gz
scrnsaverproto-1.1.0.tar.gz
renderproto-0.9.3.tar.gz
xcmiscproto-1.1.2.tar.gz
fontsproto-2.0.2.tar.gz
xextproto-7.0.3.tar.gz
xproto-7.0.14.tar.gz
libXdmcp-1.0.2.tar.gz
libxkbfile-1.0.5.tar.gz
libfontenc-1.0.4.tar.gz
libXfont-1.3.4.tar.gz
libX11-1.1.5.tar.gz
libXau-1.0.4.tar.gz
libxcb-1.1.tar.gz
xorg-server-1.5.3.tar.gz
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c | 2706 |
1 files changed, 2706 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..893abff1f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -0,0 +1,2706 @@ +/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c + * \brief Version independent SSL functions. + */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ + +#ifdef REF_CHECK +# include <assert.h> +#endif +#include <stdio.h> +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "kssl_lcl.h" +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/lhash.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/ocsp.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#endif + +const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; + +SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ + /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ + (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, + ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, + 0, /* finish_mac_length */ + (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, + NULL, /* client_finished_label */ + 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ + NULL, /* server_finished_label */ + 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ + (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function + }; + +int SSL_clear(SSL *s) + { + + if (s->method == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); + return(0); + } + + if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) + { + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session=NULL; + } + + s->error=0; + s->hit=0; + s->shutdown=0; + +#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not + * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ + /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep + * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ + if (s->new_session) return(1); +#else + if (s->new_session) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } +#endif + + s->type=0; + + s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); + + s->version=s->method->version; + s->client_version=s->version; + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; +#if 0 + s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead; +#endif + + if (s->init_buf != NULL) + { + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf=NULL; + } + + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + + s->first_packet=0; + +#if 1 + /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if + * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ + if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) + { + s->method->ssl_free(s); + s->method=s->ctx->method; + if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) + return(0); + } + else +#endif + s->method->ssl_clear(s); + return(1); + } + +/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ +int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_METHOD *meth) + { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + ctx->method=meth; + + sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list), + &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); + return(0); + } + return(1); + } + +SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + SSL *s; + + if (ctx == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); + return(NULL); + } + if (ctx->method == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); + return(NULL); + } + + s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); + if (s == NULL) goto err; + memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + s->options=ctx->options; + s->mode=ctx->mode; + s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; + + if (ctx->cert != NULL) + { + /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to + * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new + * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be + * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX + * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly + * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they + * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). + * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having + * duplicated it once. */ + + s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); + if (s->cert == NULL) + goto err; + } + else + s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ + + s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; + s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; + s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; + s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; +#if 0 + s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; +#endif + s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; + OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); + memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); + s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; + s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; + + s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); + if (!s->param) + goto err; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); +#if 0 + s->purpose = ctx->purpose; + s->trust = ctx->trust; +#endif + s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; + + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s->ctx=ctx; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; + s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s->initial_ctx=ctx; +#endif + s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; + + s->method=ctx->method; + + if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) + goto err; + + s->references=1; + s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; + + SSL_clear(s); + + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); + + return(s); +err: + if (s != NULL) + { + if (s->cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(s->cert); + if (s->ctx != NULL) + SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(NULL); + } + +int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) + { + if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; + memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); + + return 1; + } + +int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len) + { + if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; + memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); + + return 1; + } + +int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + ctx->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return 1; + } + +int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + ssl->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + return 1; + } + +int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, + unsigned int id_len) + { + /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how + * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to + * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with + * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in + * use by this SSL. */ + SSL_SESSION r, *p; + + if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) + return 0; + + r.ssl_version = ssl->version; + r.session_id_length = id_len; + memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); + /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a + * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it + * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be + * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ + if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && + (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) + { + memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); + r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return (p != NULL); + } + +int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); + } + +int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); + } + +int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); + } + +int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); + } + +void SSL_free(SSL *s) + { + int i; + + if(s == NULL) + return; + + i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); +#ifdef REF_PRINT + REF_PRINT("SSL",s); +#endif + if (i > 0) return; +#ifdef REF_CHECK + if (i < 0) + { + fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); + abort(); /* ok */ + } +#endif + + if (s->param) + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); + + if (s->bbio != NULL) + { + /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ + if (s->bbio == s->wbio) + { + s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); + } + BIO_free(s->bbio); + s->bbio=NULL; + } + if (s->rbio != NULL) + BIO_free_all(s->rbio); + if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) + BIO_free_all(s->wbio); + + if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + + /* add extra stuff */ + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); + + /* Make the next call work :-) */ + if (s->session != NULL) + { + ssl_clear_bad_session(s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + } + + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + + if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); + /* Free up if allocated */ + + if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_hostname) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) + sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, + X509_EXTENSION_free); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) + sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); +#endif + if (s->client_CA != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); + + if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) + kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + +void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) + { + /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it + */ + if (s->bbio != NULL) + { + if (s->wbio == s->bbio) + { + s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio; + s->bbio->next_bio=NULL; + } + } + if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) + BIO_free_all(s->rbio); + if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) + BIO_free_all(s->wbio); + s->rbio=rbio; + s->wbio=wbio; + } + +BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) + { return(s->rbio); } + +BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) + { return(s->wbio); } + +int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) + { + return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); + } + +int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) + { + int ret= -1; + BIO *b,*r; + + b=SSL_get_rbio(s); + r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); + if (r != NULL) + BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); + return(ret); + } + +int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) + { + int ret= -1; + BIO *b,*r; + + b=SSL_get_wbio(s); + r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); + if (r != NULL) + BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); + return(ret); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) + { + int ret=0; + BIO *bio=NULL; + + bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + + if (bio == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); + SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio); + ret=1; +err: + return(ret); + } + +int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd) + { + int ret=0; + BIO *bio=NULL; + + if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) + || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd)) + { + bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + + if (bio == NULL) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } + BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); + SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio); + } + else + SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s)); + ret=1; +err: + return(ret); + } + +int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd) + { + int ret=0; + BIO *bio=NULL; + + if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) + || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd)) + { + bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + + if (bio == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); + SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s)); + } + else + SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s)); + ret=1; +err: + return(ret); + } +#endif + + +/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ +size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) + { + size_t ret = 0; + + if (s->s3 != NULL) + { + ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; + if (count > ret) + count = ret; + memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); + } + return ret; + } + +/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ +size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) + { + size_t ret = 0; + + if (s->s3 != NULL) + { + ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + if (count > ret) + count = ret; + memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); + } + return ret; + } + + +int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) + { + return(s->verify_mode); + } + +int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); + } + +int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) + { + return(s->verify_callback); + } + +int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return(ctx->verify_mode); + } + +int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); + } + +int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) + { + return(ctx->default_verify_callback); + } + +void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode, + int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) + { + s->verify_mode=mode; + if (callback != NULL) + s->verify_callback=callback; + } + +void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth) + { + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); + } + +void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) + { + s->read_ahead=yes; + } + +int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) + { + return(s->read_ahead); + } + +int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) + { + /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled + * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), + * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report + * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. + * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, + * so we'd better not return -1.) + */ + return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); + } + +X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) + { + X509 *r; + + if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) + r=NULL; + else + r=s->session->peer; + + if (r == NULL) return(r); + + CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + + return(r); + } + +STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) + { + STACK_OF(X509) *r; + + if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) + r=NULL; + else + r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; + + /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own + * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */ + + return(r); + } + +/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to + * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ +void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f) + { + CERT *tmp; + + /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ + SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f)); + + /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or + * vice-versa */ + if (t->method != f->method) + { + t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ + t->method=f->method; /* change method */ + t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ + } + + tmp=t->cert; + if (f->cert != NULL) + { + CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); + t->cert=f->cert; + } + else + t->cert=NULL; + if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp); + SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length); + } + +/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ +int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + if ( (ctx == NULL) || + (ctx->cert == NULL) || + (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return(0); + } + if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + return(0); + } + return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); + } + +/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ +int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) + { + if (ssl == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return(0); + } + if (ssl->cert == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return 0; + } + if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + return(0); + } + if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + return(0); + } + return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, + ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); + } + +int SSL_accept(SSL *s) + { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + /* Not properly initialized yet */ + SSL_set_accept_state(s); + + return(s->method->ssl_accept(s)); + } + +int SSL_connect(SSL *s) + { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + /* Not properly initialized yet */ + SSL_set_connect_state(s); + + return(s->method->ssl_connect(s)); + } + +long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) + { + return(s->method->get_timeout()); + } + +int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) + { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) + { + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + return(0); + } + return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); + } + +int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) + { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) + { + return(0); + } + return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); + } + +int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) + { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) + { + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); + return(-1); + } + return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num)); + } + +int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) + { + /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might + * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), + * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough, + * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown). + */ + + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + + if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) + return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); + else + return(1); + } + +int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) + { + if (s->new_session == 0) + { + s->new_session=1; + } + return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); + } + +int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) + { + /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; + * false again once a handshake has finished */ + return (s->new_session != 0); + } + +long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) + { + long l; + + switch (cmd) + { + case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: + return(s->read_ahead); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: + l=s->read_ahead; + s->read_ahead=larg; + return(l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + s->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + + case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: + return(s->options|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_MODE: + return(s->mode|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return(s->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l=s->max_cert_list; + s->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) + { + s->d1->mtu = larg; + return larg; + } + return 0; + default: + return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); + } + } + +long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) + { + switch(cmd) + { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + + default: + return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); + } + } + +struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return ctx->sessions; + } + +long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) + { + long l; + + switch (cmd) + { + case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: + return(ctx->read_ahead); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: + l=ctx->read_ahead; + ctx->read_ahead=larg; + return(l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: + ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; + return 1; + + case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + return(ctx->max_cert_list); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: + l=ctx->max_cert_list; + ctx->max_cert_list=larg; + return(l); + + case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: + l=ctx->session_cache_size; + ctx->session_cache_size=larg; + return(l); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: + return(ctx->session_cache_size); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: + l=ctx->session_cache_mode; + ctx->session_cache_mode=larg; + return(l); + case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: + return(ctx->session_cache_mode); + + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: + return(ctx->sessions->num_items); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: + return(ctx->stats.sess_connect); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: + return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: + return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: + return(ctx->stats.sess_accept); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: + return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: + return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: + return(ctx->stats.sess_hit); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: + return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: + return(ctx->stats.sess_miss); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: + return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout); + case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: + return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); + case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: + return(ctx->options|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_MODE: + return(ctx->mode|=larg); + default: + return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); + } + } + +long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) + { + switch(cmd) + { + case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: + ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); + return 1; + + default: + return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); + } + } + +int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) + { + long l; + + l=a->id-b->id; + if (l == 0L) + return(0); + else + return((l > 0)?1:-1); + } + +int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, + const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp) + { + long l; + + l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id; + if (l == 0L) + return(0); + else + return((l > 0)?1:-1); + } + +/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of + * preference */ +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) + { + if (s != NULL) + { + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) + { + return(s->cipher_list); + } + else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && + (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) + { + return(s->ctx->cipher_list); + } + } + return(NULL); + } + +/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of + * algorithm id */ +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) + { + if (s != NULL) + { + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + { + return(s->cipher_list_by_id); + } + else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && + (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) + { + return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); + } + } + return(NULL); + } + +/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ +const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n) + { + SSL_CIPHER *c; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + if (s == NULL) return(NULL); + sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s); + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) + return(NULL); + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n); + if (c == NULL) return(NULL); + return(c->name); + } + +/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ +int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) + { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list, + &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str); + /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it + * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string + * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which + * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as + * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence + * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been + * updated. */ + if (sk == NULL) + return 0; + else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } + +/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ +int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) + { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + + sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list, + &s->cipher_list_by_id,str); + /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ + if (sk == NULL) + return 0; + else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } + +/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ +char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) + { + char *p; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + SSL_CIPHER *c; + int i; + + if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || + (len < 2)) + return(NULL); + + p=buf; + sk=s->session->ciphers; + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) + { + int n; + + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); + n=strlen(c->name); + if (n+1 > len) + { + if (p != buf) + --p; + *p='\0'; + return buf; + } + strcpy(p,c->name); + p+=n; + *(p++)=':'; + len-=n+1; + } + p[-1]='\0'; + return(buf); + } + +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p, + int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)) + { + int i,j=0; + SSL_CIPHER *c; + unsigned char *q; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + if (sk == NULL) return(0); + q=p; + + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) + { + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if ((c->algorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); + p+=j; + } + return(p-q); + } + +STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) + { + SSL_CIPHER *c; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + int i,n; + + n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); + if ((num%n) != 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); + return(NULL); + } + if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) + sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ + else + { + sk= *skp; + sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); + } + + for (i=0; i<num; i+=n) + { + c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); + p+=n; + if (c != NULL) + { + if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + } + + if (skp != NULL) + *skp=sk; + return(sk); +err: + if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); + return(NULL); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. + * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). + */ + +const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) + { + if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + return NULL; + + return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? + s->session->tlsext_hostname : + s->tlsext_hostname; + } + +int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) + { + if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) + return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; + return -1; + } +#endif + +unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) + { + unsigned long l; + + l=(unsigned long) + ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )| + ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)| + ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)| + ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L); + return(l); + } + +/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of + * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure + * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being + * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session + * with a matching session ID. */ +int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b) + { + if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) + return(1); + if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) + return(1); + return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); + } + +/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring + * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each + * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via + * ssl.h. */ +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *) +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *) + +SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) + { + SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; + + if (meth == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); + return(NULL); + } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); + return NULL; + } +#endif + + if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); + goto err; + } + ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; + + memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX)); + + ret->method=meth; + + ret->cert_store=NULL; + ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; + ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; + ret->session_cache_head=NULL; + ret->session_cache_tail=NULL; + + /* We take the system default */ + ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout(); + + ret->new_session_cb=0; + ret->remove_session_cb=0; + ret->get_session_cb=0; + ret->generate_session_id=0; + + memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); + + ret->references=1; + ret->quiet_shutdown=0; + +/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ +/* ret->s2->challenge=NULL; + ret->master_key=NULL; + ret->key_arg=NULL; + ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ + + ret->info_callback=NULL; + + ret->app_verify_callback=0; + ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; + + ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; + ret->read_ahead=0; + ret->msg_callback=0; + ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; + ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; +#if 0 + ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ +#endif + ret->sid_ctx_length=0; + ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; + if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + ret->default_passwd_callback=0; + ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; + ret->client_cert_cb=0; + ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0; + ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0; + + ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash), + LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp)); + if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; + ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); + if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; + + ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, + &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id, + SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); + if (ret->cipher_list == NULL + || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); + goto err2; + } + + ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); + if (!ret->param) + goto err; + + if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); + goto err2; + } + if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); + goto err2; + } + if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); + goto err2; + } + + if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) + goto err; + + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); + + ret->extra_certs=NULL; + ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; + ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; + /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ + if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) + ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; + + ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; + ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; + +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO +#define eng_strx(x) #x +#define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) + /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ + { + ENGINE *eng; + eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); + if (!eng) + { + ERR_clear_error(); + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); + eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); + } + if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#endif +#endif + + return(ret); +err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +err2: + if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret); + return(NULL); + } + +#if 0 +static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) + { OPENSSL_free(comp); } +#endif + +void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) + { + int i; + + if (a == NULL) return; + + i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); +#ifdef REF_PRINT + REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a); +#endif + if (i > 0) return; +#ifdef REF_CHECK + if (i < 0) + { + fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); + abort(); /* ok */ + } +#endif + + if (a->param) + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); + + /* + * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference + * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed + * after the sessions were flushed. + * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, + * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then + * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. + * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) + */ + if (a->sessions != NULL) + SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); + + if (a->sessions != NULL) + lh_free(a->sessions); + + if (a->cert_store != NULL) + X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); + if (a->cipher_list != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); + if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); + if (a->cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(a->cert); + if (a->client_CA != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); + if (a->extra_certs != NULL) + sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); +#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */ + if (a->comp_methods != NULL) + sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free); +#else + a->comp_methods = NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + if (a->client_cert_engine) + ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); +#endif + OPENSSL_free(a); + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) + { + ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) + { + ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) + { + ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; + ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) + { + ctx->verify_mode=mode; + ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) + { + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); + } + +void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) + { + CERT_PKEY *cpk; + int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign; + int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export; + int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl; + unsigned long mask,emask; + int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + int have_ecdh_tmp; +#endif + X509 *x = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; + int signature_nid = 0; + + if (c == NULL) return; + + kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); + rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || + (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl)); +#else + rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); + dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || + (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl)); +#else + dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); +#endif + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); + rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); + rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); + dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); + dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); +/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ + dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); + cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); + have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); + mask=0; + emask=0; + +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG + printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", + rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp, + rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa); +#endif + + if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) + mask|=SSL_kRSA; + if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) + emask|=SSL_kRSA; + +#if 0 + /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */ + if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && + (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) + mask|=SSL_kEDH; + if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) && + (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) + emask|=SSL_kEDH; +#endif + + if (dh_tmp_export) + emask|=SSL_kEDH; + + if (dh_tmp) + mask|=SSL_kEDH; + + if (dh_rsa) mask|=SSL_kDHr; + if (dh_rsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHr; + + if (dh_dsa) mask|=SSL_kDHd; + if (dh_dsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHd; + + if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) + { + mask|=SSL_aRSA; + emask|=SSL_aRSA; + } + + if (dsa_sign) + { + mask|=SSL_aDSS; + emask|=SSL_aDSS; + } + + mask|=SSL_aNULL; + emask|=SSL_aNULL; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; + emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; +#endif + + /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or + * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension. + */ + if (have_ecc_cert) + { + /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ + x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; + ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? + (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; + ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? + EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; + EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (ecdh_ok) + { + if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) || + (signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) || + (signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) + emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; + } + if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; + if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) + emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; + } + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + if (ecdsa_ok) + { + mask|=SSL_aECDSA; + emask|=SSL_aECDSA; + } +#endif + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (have_ecdh_tmp) + { + mask|=SSL_kECDHE; + emask|=SSL_kECDHE; + } +#endif + c->mask=mask; + c->export_mask=emask; + c->valid=1; + } + +/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ +#define ku_reject(x, usage) \ + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) + +int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs) + { + unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int keysize = 0; + int signature_nid = 0; + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) + { + /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + if (pkey == NULL) return 0; + keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (keysize > 163) return 0; + } + + /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); + if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) + signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); + if (alg & SSL_kECDH) + { + /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) + { + return 0; + } + if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ + if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) + { + return 0; + } + } + if (alg & SSL_aRSA) + { + /* signature alg must be RSA */ + if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) && + (signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) && + (signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) + { + return 0; + } + } + } + else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ + if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) + { + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; /* all checks are ok */ + } + +/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ +X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) + { + unsigned long alg,mask,kalg; + CERT *c; + int i,is_export; + + c=s->cert; + ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; + is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask; + kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK); + + if (kalg & SSL_kECDH) + { + /* we don't need to look at SSL_kECDHE + * since no certificate is needed for + * anon ECDH and for authenticated + * ECDHE, the check for the auth + * algorithm will set i correctly + * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC + * not an RSA cert but for ECDHE-RSA + * we need an RSA cert. Placing the + * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA + * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen. + */ + i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } + else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA) + { + i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; + } + else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr) + i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; + else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd) + i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; + else if (kalg & SSL_aDSS) + i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; + else if (kalg & SSL_aRSA) + { + if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL) + i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; + else + i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + } + else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5) + { + /* VRS something else here? */ + return(NULL); + } + else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return(NULL); + } + if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL); + + return(c->pkeys[i].x509); + } + +EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) + { + unsigned long alg; + CERT *c; + + alg=cipher->algorithms; + c=s->cert; + + if ((alg & SSL_aDSS) && + (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) + return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey); + else if (alg & SSL_aRSA) + { + if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) + return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey); + else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) + return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); + else + return(NULL); + } + else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) && + (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) + return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); + else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */ + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return(NULL); + } + } + +void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) + { + int i; + + /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, + * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ + if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; + + i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode; + if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) + && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) + || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session)) + && (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) + { + CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + if (!s->ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + } + + /* auto flush every 255 connections */ + if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && + ((i & mode) == mode)) + { + if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) + ?s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good + :s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) + { + SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL)); + } + } + } + +SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) + { + return(s->method); + } + +int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *meth) + { + int conn= -1; + int ret=1; + + if (s->method != meth) + { + if (s->handshake_func != NULL) + conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); + + if (s->method->version == meth->version) + s->method=meth; + else + { + s->method->ssl_free(s); + s->method=meth; + ret=s->method->ssl_new(s); + } + + if (conn == 1) + s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect; + else if (conn == 0) + s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept; + } + return(ret); + } + +int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i) + { + int reason; + unsigned long l; + BIO *bio; + + if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE); + + /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake + * etc, where we do encode the error */ + if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0) + { + if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) + return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); + else + return(SSL_ERROR_SSL); + } + + if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) + { + bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); + if (BIO_should_read(bio)) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); + else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) + /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try + * to write to the rbio, and an application program where + * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it + * should wait for. + * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly + * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of + * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, + * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer + * to keep it. */ + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); + else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) + { + reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); + else + return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ + } + } + + if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) + { + bio=SSL_get_wbio(s); + if (BIO_should_write(bio)) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); + else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) + /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); + else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) + { + reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); + else + return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); + } + } + if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) + { + return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); + } + + if (i == 0) + { + if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) + { + /* assume it is the socket being closed */ + return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); + } + else + { + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && + (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) + return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); + } + } + return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); + } + +int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) + { + int ret=1; + + if (s->handshake_func == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); + return(-1); + } + + s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); + + if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) + { + ret=s->handshake_func(s); + } + return(ret); + } + +/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so + * one of these calls will reset it */ +void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) + { + s->server=1; + s->shutdown=0; + s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; + s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; + /* clear the current cipher */ + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + } + +void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) + { + s->server=0; + s->shutdown=0; + s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; + s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect; + /* clear the current cipher */ + ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); + } + +int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return(0); + } + +int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return(0); + } + +int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return(0); + } + +SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return(NULL); + } + +const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) + { + if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) + return("TLSv1"); + else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) + return("SSLv3"); + else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) + return("SSLv2"); + else + return("unknown"); + } + +SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) + { + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; + X509_NAME *xn; + SSL *ret; + int i; + + if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) + return(NULL); + + ret->version = s->version; + ret->type = s->type; + ret->method = s->method; + + if (s->session != NULL) + { + /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ + SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s); + } + else + { + /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect + * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- + * they should not both point to the same object, + * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */ + + ret->method->ssl_free(ret); + ret->method = s->method; + ret->method->ssl_new(ret); + + if (s->cert != NULL) + { + if (ret->cert != NULL) + { + ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); + } + ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); + if (ret->cert == NULL) + goto err; + } + + SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, + s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); + } + + ret->options=s->options; + ret->mode=s->mode; + SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); + SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); + ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; + ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; + SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s), + SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); + SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); + ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; + + SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s)); + + ret->debug=s->debug; + + /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) + goto err; + + /* setup rbio, and wbio */ + if (s->rbio != NULL) + { + if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio)) + goto err; + } + if (s->wbio != NULL) + { + if (s->wbio != s->rbio) + { + if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio)) + goto err; + } + else + ret->wbio=ret->rbio; + } + ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; + ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; + ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; + ret->server = s->server; + ret->new_session = s->new_session; + ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; + ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; + ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */ + ret->rstate=s->rstate; + ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */ + ret->hit=s->hit; + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); + + /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ + if (s->cipher_list != NULL) + { + if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) + goto err; + } + if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) + if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) + == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Dup the client_CA list */ + if (s->client_CA != NULL) + { + if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; + ret->client_CA=sk; + for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) + { + xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); + if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) + { + X509_NAME_free(xn); + goto err; + } + } + } + + if (0) + { +err: + if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret); + ret=NULL; + } + return(ret); + } + +void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) + { + if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) + { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); + s->enc_read_ctx=NULL; + } + if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) + { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); + s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (s->expand != NULL) + { + COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); + s->expand=NULL; + } + if (s->compress != NULL) + { + COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); + s->compress=NULL; + } +#endif + } + +/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ +X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) + { + if (s->cert != NULL) + return(s->cert->key->x509); + else + return(NULL); + } + +/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ +EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s) + { + if (s->cert != NULL) + return(s->cert->key->privatekey); + else + return(NULL); + } + +SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) + { + if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) + return(s->session->cipher); + return(NULL); + } +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) + { + return NULL; + } +const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) + { + return NULL; + } +#else + +const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) + { + if (s->compress != NULL) + return(s->compress->meth); + return(NULL); + } + +const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) + { + if (s->expand != NULL) + return(s->expand->meth); + return(NULL); + } +#endif + +int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) + { + BIO *bbio; + + if (s->bbio == NULL) + { + bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); + if (bbio == NULL) return(0); + s->bbio=bbio; + } + else + { + bbio=s->bbio; + if (s->bbio == s->wbio) + s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); + } + (void)BIO_reset(bbio); +/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ + if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return(0); + } + if (push) + { + if (s->wbio != bbio) + s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio); + } + else + { + if (s->wbio == bbio) + s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio); + } + return(1); + } + +void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) + { + if (s->bbio == NULL) return; + + if (s->bbio == s->wbio) + { + /* remove buffering */ + s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); +#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */ + assert(s->wbio != NULL); +#endif + } + BIO_free(s->bbio); + s->bbio=NULL; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode) + { + ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode; + } + +int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return(ctx->quiet_shutdown); + } + +void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) + { + s->quiet_shutdown=mode; + } + +int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) + { + return(s->quiet_shutdown); + } + +void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) + { + s->shutdown=mode; + } + +int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) + { + return(s->shutdown); + } + +int SSL_version(const SSL *s) + { + return(s->version); + } + +SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) + { + return(ssl->ctx); + } + +SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) + { + if (ssl->ctx == ctx) + return ssl->ctx; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ctx == NULL) + ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; +#endif + if (ssl->cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); + ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if (ssl->ctx != NULL) + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ + ssl->ctx = ctx; + return(ssl->ctx); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO +int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); + } + +int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, + const char *CApath) + { + return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath)); + } +#endif + +void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) + { + ssl->info_callback=cb; + } + +/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned + function pointer. */ +void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) + { + return ssl->info_callback; + } + +int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) + { + return(ssl->state); + } + +void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg) + { + ssl->verify_result=arg; + } + +long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) + { + return(ssl->verify_result); + } + +int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) + { + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); + } + +int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) + { + return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); + } + +void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx) + { + return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); + } + +int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) + { + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); + } + +int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) + { + return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); + } + +void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx) + { + return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); + } + +int ssl_ok(SSL *s) + { + return(1); + } + +X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return(ctx->cert_store); + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store) + { + if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) + X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); + ctx->cert_store=store; + } + +int SSL_want(const SSL *s) + { + return(s->rwstate); + } + +/*! + * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. + * \param ctx the SSL context. + * \param cb the callback + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, + int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); + } + +void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, + int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); + } +#endif + +#ifdef DOXYGEN +/*! + * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. + * \param ssl the SSL session. + * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. + * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size + * of the required key in bits. + * \return the temporary RSA key. + * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback + */ + +RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) + {} +#endif + +/*! + * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. + * \param ctx the SSL context. + * \param dh the callback + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); + } + +void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH +void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); + } + +void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, + int keylength)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); + } +#endif + + +void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) + { + SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); + } +void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) + { + SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); + } + + + +#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) +#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" +#endif + +IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) +IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) |