xkbcomp xkeyboard-config libxcb libxtrans fontconfig libX11 libxcb mesa xserver git update 7 Feb 2014

Update to openssl1.0.1f

xserver          commit 83e38eb73fd8c852513aac2da2975b4c01070ec2
libxcb           commit d7eb0bdf3b5b11ee9f40ee5e73df8fc0bdfa59f3
xkeyboard-config commit 7596672b96315465df8d8d691e3a567a52f70743
libX11           commit aacf95dacc7c598e7297894580d4d655593813b2
xkbcomp          commit 31b90ee4ffc774e0da540277907fc5540c0b012c
libxtrans        commit 3f0de269abe59353acbd7a5587d68ce0da91db67
fontconfig       commit e310d2fac2d874d5aa76c609df70cc7b871c0b6d
mesa             commit dd2229d4c68ed78a50104637aef904f8ab6d7dd3

1 files changed, 88 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index e08088c57..33afdeba3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -342,19 +342,11 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-	tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
 };
 
 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	{
 	size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
-	if (FIPS_mode())
-		slen -= 2;
-#endif
 	if (p)
 		memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
 	return (int)slen;
@@ -866,6 +858,89 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 	return ret;
 	}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+	unsigned short type, size;
+	static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+		0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
+		0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
+		0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+		0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
+		0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
+		0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
+
+		0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
+		0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
+		0x01,        /* 1 point format */
+		0x00,        /* uncompressed */
+	};
+
+	/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+	static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+		0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
+		0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
+		0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
+		0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
+		0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
+		0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
+		0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+		0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+	};
+
+	if (data >= (d+n-2))
+		return;
+	data += 2;
+
+	if (data > (d+n-4))
+		return;
+	n2s(data,type);
+	n2s(data,size);
+
+	if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+		return;
+
+	if (data+size > d+n)
+		return;
+	data += size;
+
+	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+		const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+		if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+			return;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+		if (data + len != d+n)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+			return;
+		}
+
+	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
 	{
 	unsigned short type;
@@ -886,6 +961,11 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
 	n2s(data,len);
@@ -2364,14 +2444,6 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
 	{
 	switch(hash_alg)
 		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-		case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		if (FIPS_mode())
-			return NULL;
-#endif
-		return EVP_md5();
-#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 		case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
 		return EVP_sha1();