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authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 14:43:31 +0100
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2015-02-22 14:43:31 +0100
commitc9aad1ae6227c434d480d1d3aa8eae3c3c910c18 (patch)
tree94b917df998c3d547e191b3b9c58bbffc616470e /openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
parentf1c2db43dcf35d2cf4715390bd2391c28e42a8c2 (diff)
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Upgraded to openssl-1.0.2
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c6531
1 files changed, 4074 insertions, 2457 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index d6aff4b68..72be01dd6 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -113,785 +113,1664 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess);
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess);
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
#endif
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- };
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ 0,
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+ | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
long tls1_default_timeout(void)
- {
- /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
- * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
- return(60*60*2);
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
+ * http, the cache would over fill
+ */
+ return (60 * 60 * 2);
+}
int tls1_new(SSL *s)
- {
- if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
- s->method->ssl_clear(s);
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ if (!ssl3_new(s))
+ return (0);
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return (1);
+}
void tls1_free(SSL *s)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
- ssl3_free(s);
- }
+ if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ ssl3_free(s);
+}
void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
- {
- ssl3_clear(s);
- s->version = s->method->version;
- }
+{
+ ssl3_clear(s);
+ s->version = s->method->version;
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static int nid_list[] =
- {
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
- };
-
-static int pref_list[] =
- {
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- };
+static int nid_list[] = {
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
+};
+
+static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+# endif
+ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+# endif
+ 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+# endif
+ 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+# endif
+ 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+# endif
+ 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+# endif
+ 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
+ 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+ 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+};
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+/* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
+static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+# endif
+ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+# endif
+ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+# endif
+ 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+# endif
+ 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+# endif
+ 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+# endif
+ 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+};
+# endif
int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
- {
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
- if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
- sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
- return 0;
- return nid_list[curve_id-1];
- }
+{
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
+ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
+ sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
+ return 0;
+ return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
+}
int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
- {
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
- switch (nid)
- {
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
- return 1;
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
- return 2;
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
- return 3;
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
- return 4;
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
- return 5;
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
- return 6;
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
- return 7;
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
- return 8;
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
- return 9;
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
- return 10;
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
- return 11;
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
- return 12;
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
- return 13;
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
- return 14;
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
- return 15;
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
- return 16;
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
- return 17;
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
- return 18;
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
- return 19;
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
- return 20;
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
- return 21;
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
- return 22;
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
- return 23;
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
- return 24;
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
- return 25;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+{
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ return 1;
+ case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ return 2;
+ case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ return 3;
+ case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ return 4;
+ case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ return 5;
+ case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ return 6;
+ case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ return 7;
+ case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ return 8;
+ case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ return 9;
+ case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ return 10;
+ case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ return 11;
+ case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ return 12;
+ case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ return 13;
+ case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ return 14;
+ case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ return 15;
+ case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ return 16;
+ case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ return 17;
+ case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ return 18;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ return 19;
+ case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ return 20;
+ case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ return 21;
+ case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ return 22;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ return 23;
+ case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ return 24;
+ case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ return 25;
+ case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ return 26;
+ case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ return 27;
+ case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+ return 28;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/*
+ * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
+ * preferred list.
+ * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
+ * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
+ * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
+ * lists in the first place.
+ * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
+ * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
+ * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
+ */
+static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
+ const unsigned char **pcurves,
+ size_t *num_curves)
+{
+ size_t pcurveslen = 0;
+ if (sess) {
+ *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ } else {
+ /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+ pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+ pcurveslen = 2;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+ pcurveslen = 2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ }
+ if (!*pcurves) {
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
+ *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
+ } else
+# endif
+ {
+ *pcurves = eccurves_default;
+ pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
+ if (pcurveslen & 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *num_curves = 0;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
-/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
+/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *curves;
+ size_t num_curves, i;
+ unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+ if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+ return 0;
+ /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+ if (suiteb_flags) {
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+ if (p[1])
+ return 0;
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
+ if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
+ if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ return 0;
+ } else /* Should never happen */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
+ if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
+ * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
+ * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
*/
+int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
+{
+ const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
+ size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
+ int k;
+ /* Can't do anything on client side */
+ if (s->server == 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (nmatch == -2) {
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ /*
+ * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
+ * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
+ */
+ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+ return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return NID_undef;
+ }
+ /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+ nmatch = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
+ * but s->options is a long...
+ */
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist
+ (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
+ &num_supp))
+ /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
+ return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist
+ (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
+ &num_pref))
+ return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
+ k = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
+ const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
+ for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
+ if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
+ if (nmatch == k) {
+ int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
+ return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
+ }
+ k++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (nmatch == -1)
+ return k;
+ /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
+ return NID_undef;
+}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
-#else
-#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
-#endif
+int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+ int *curves, size_t ncurves)
+{
+ unsigned char *clist, *p;
+ size_t i;
+ /*
+ * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
+ * ids < 32
+ */
+ unsigned long dup_list = 0;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ EC_GROUP *curve;
+# endif
+
+ clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
+ if (!clist)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
+ unsigned long idmask;
+ int id;
+ id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
+ if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
+ OPENSSL_free(clist);
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
+ if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
+ == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+ if (curve)
+ EC_GROUP_free(curve);
+ OPENSSL_free(clist);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ EC_GROUP_free(curve);
+# endif
+ idmask = 1L << id;
+ if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(clist);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dup_list |= idmask;
+ s2n(id, p);
+ }
+ if (*pext)
+ OPENSSL_free(*pext);
+ *pext = clist;
+ *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
+ return 1;
+}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
-#else
-#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
-#endif
+# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
+
+typedef struct {
+ size_t nidcnt;
+ int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
+} nid_cb_st;
+
+static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+ nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
+ size_t i;
+ int nid;
+ char etmp[20];
+ if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
+ return 0;
+ if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+ etmp[len] = 0;
+ nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
+ if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
+ return 0;
+ narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
+int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+ const char *str)
+{
+ nid_cb_st ncb;
+ ncb.nidcnt = 0;
+ if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
+ return 0;
+ if (pext == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
+}
+
+/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
+static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
+ EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+ int is_prime, id;
+ const EC_GROUP *grp;
+ const EC_METHOD *meth;
+ if (!ec)
+ return 0;
+ /* Determine if it is a prime field */
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+ if (!grp)
+ return 0;
+ meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
+ if (!meth)
+ return 0;
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ is_prime = 1;
+ else
+ is_prime = 0;
+ /* Determine curve ID */
+ id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+ id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
+ /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
+ if (id) {
+ curve_id[0] = 0;
+ curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
+ } else {
+ curve_id[0] = 0xff;
+ if (is_prime)
+ curve_id[1] = 0x01;
+ else
+ curve_id[1] = 0x02;
+ }
+ if (comp_id) {
+ if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
+ if (is_prime)
+ *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ else
+ *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+ } else
+ *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
+static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
+ unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
+{
+ const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
+ size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
+ int j;
+ /*
+ * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
+ * supported (see RFC4492).
+ */
+ if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
+ if (*comp_id == *pformats)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == num_formats)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!curve_id)
+ return 1;
+ /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
+ for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+ if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == num_curves)
+ return 0;
+ /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+ if (!s->server)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+ size_t *num_formats)
+{
+ /*
+ * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ } else {
+ *pformats = ecformats_default;
+ /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
+ else
+ *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
+ * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+{
+ unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ int rv;
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return 0;
+ /* If not EC nothing to do */
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (!rv)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
+ * curves extension.
+ */
+ rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+ if (!rv)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+ * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+ */
+ if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ int check_md;
+ size_t i;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ if (curve_id[0])
+ return 0;
+ /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+ if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+ else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+ else
+ return 0; /* Should never happen */
+ for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+ if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+ break;
+ if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+ return 0;
+ if (set_ee_md == 2) {
+ if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
+ else
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
+{
+ unsigned char curve_id[2];
+ EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+ return 1;
+# endif
+ /*
+ * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
+ * curves permitted.
+ */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+ curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+ else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+ curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ curve_id[0] = 0;
+ /* Check this curve is acceptable */
+ if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+ return 1;
+ /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
+ else {
+ unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
+ if (!ec)
+ return 0;
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
+ return 0;
+ if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+ /* Need a shared curve */
+ if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ec) {
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
+ return 0;
+/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
+# if 0
+ return 1;
+# else
+ return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
+# endif
+}
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
#else
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
-#endif
-#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+/*
+ * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
+ * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
+ */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
+# else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
+# else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+ /* */
+# else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+# endif
+
+# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
-#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+# endif
};
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
- {
- size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
- if (p)
- memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
- return (int)slen;
- }
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
-
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
-
- ret+=2;
-
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
-
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the servername type and entension length
- 2 for servernamelist length
- 1 for the hostname type
- 2 for hostname length
- + hostname length
- */
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
- || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
-
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
- s2n(size_str+5,ret);
-
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str+3,ret);
-
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str,ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret+=size_str;
- }
-
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate)
- {
- int el;
-
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
-
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Add SRP username if there is one */
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
-
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the srp type type and entension length
- 1 for the srp user identity
- + srp user identity length
- */
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
-
- /* fill in the extension */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
- s2n(login_len+1,ret);
- (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
- memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
- ret+=login_len;
- }
-#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
+# endif
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
+{
+ /*
+ * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+ * preferences.
+ */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+ return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+ return 2;
+
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+ return 2;
+ }
+# endif
+ /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+ if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+ return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ }
+}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
- long lenmax;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
- s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
- long lenmax;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
- s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
-
- /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
- * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
- * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
- * resolves this to two bytes.
- */
- s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
- ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
- {
- int ticklen;
- if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
- else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
- {
- ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
- s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
- ticklen);
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
- }
- else
- ticklen = 0;
- if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
- goto skip_ext;
- /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
- * rest for ticket
- */
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
- s2n(ticklen,ret);
- if (ticklen)
- {
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
- ret += ticklen;
- }
- }
- skip_ext:
-
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
- s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
- s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
- memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
- ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
- }
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
- size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
- return NULL;
- if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
- s2n(col + 2, ret);
- s2n(col, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
- ret += col;
- }
-#endif
+/*
+ * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+ const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+ size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+ int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (sigalg == -1)
+ return -1;
+ /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+ if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+ /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+ return 0;
+ if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ if (curve_id[0])
+ return 0;
+ if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
+ if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
+ if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ return 0;
+# endif
+
+ /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
+ if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+ if (i == sent_sigslen
+ && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
+ || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
+ if (*pmd == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
+ */
+ if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
+ return 1;
+}
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
- int i;
- long extlen, idlen, itmp;
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
-
- idlen = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
- {
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
- if (itmp <= 0)
- return NULL;
- idlen += itmp + 2;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
- {
- extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
- if (extlen < 0)
- return NULL;
- }
- else
- extlen = 0;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
- s2n(idlen, ret);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
- {
- /* save position of id len */
- unsigned char *q = ret;
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- /* skip over id len */
- ret += 2;
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
- /* write id len */
- s2n(itmp, q);
- }
- s2n(extlen, ret);
- if (extlen > 0)
- i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* Add Heartbeat extension */
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
- s2n(1,ret);
- /* Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-#endif
+/*
+ * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
+ * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
+ * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
+ * settings.
+ */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+{
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+ size_t i, sigalgslen;
+ int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+ c->mask_a = 0;
+ c->mask_k = 0;
+ /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
+ if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
+ c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+ else
+ c->mask_ssl = 0;
+ /*
+ * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
+ * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
+ */
+ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
+ switch (sigalgs[1]) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ have_rsa = 1;
+ break;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ have_dsa = 1;
+ break;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ have_ecdsa = 1;
+ break;
+# endif
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
+ * signature algorithms.
+ */
+ if (!have_rsa) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
+ }
+ if (!have_dsa) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+ }
+ if (!have_ecdsa) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+ if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ }
+# endif
+ c->valid = 1;
+}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
- {
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
- * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-#endif
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+{
+ int extdatalen = 0;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+ int using_ecc = 0;
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ int i;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ using_ecc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return orig;
+
+ ret += 2;
+
+ if (ret >= limit)
+ return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+ unsigned long size_str;
+ long lenmax;
+
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ * 2 for servernamelist length
+ * 1 for the hostname type
+ * 2 for hostname length
+ * + hostname length
+ */
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
+ || (size_str =
+ strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* extension type and length */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+ s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
+
+ /* length of servername list */
+ s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
+
+ /* hostname type, length and hostname */
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ s2n(size_str, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
+ ret += size_str;
+ }
+
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ int el;
+
+ if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
- {
- int el;
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
- ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
+ if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-#endif
- /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
- * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
- *
- * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
- * extensions it MUST always appear last.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
- {
- int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
- * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
- * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
- */
- if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
- hlen -= 5;
- if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
- {
- hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
- if (hlen >= 4)
- hlen -= 4;
- else
- hlen = 0;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
- s2n(hlen, ret);
- memset(ret, 0, hlen);
- ret += hlen;
- }
- }
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Add SRP username if there is one */
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
+ * Client Hello message */
+
+ int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
-
- ret+=2;
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- {
- int el;
-
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
-
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
+ * 1 for the srp user identity
+ * + srp user identity length
+ */
+ if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* fill in the extension */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
+ s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
+ (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
+ memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
+ ret += login_len;
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (using_ecc) {
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
+ */
+ long lenmax;
+ const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
+ size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
+
+ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+ if (num_formats > 255) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
- long lenmax;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
- s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-
- }
- /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
- && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
- size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
- s2n(sol + 2, ret);
- s2n(sol, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
- ret += sol;
- }
-#endif
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+ /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
+ s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
+ memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
+ ret += num_formats;
+
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
+ */
+ pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
+ return NULL;
+ if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
+ s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
+ s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
+ ret += curves_list_len;
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
+ int ticklen;
+ if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+ else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
+ ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ } else
+ ticklen = 0;
+ if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
+ goto skip_ext;
+ /*
+ * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
+ * ticket
+ */
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+ s2n(ticklen, ret);
+ if (ticklen) {
+ memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
+ ret += ticklen;
+ }
+ }
+ skip_ext:
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ size_t salglen;
+ const unsigned char *salg;
+ salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
+ if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
+ s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
+ s2n(salglen, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
+ ret += salglen;
+ }
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
+ return NULL;
+ if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(col + 2, ret);
+ s2n(col, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
+ ret += col;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ int i;
+ long extlen, idlen, itmp;
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+
+ idlen = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+ if (itmp <= 0)
+ return NULL;
+ idlen += itmp + 2;
+ }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
- {
- int el;
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
+ extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
+ if (extlen < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ } else
+ extlen = 0;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
+ *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+ s2n(idlen, ret);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
+ /* save position of id len */
+ unsigned char *q = ret;
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ /* skip over id len */
+ ret += 2;
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
+ /* write id len */
+ s2n(itmp, q);
+ }
+ s2n(extlen, ret);
+ if (extlen > 0)
+ i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* Add Heartbeat extension */
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
+ s2n(1, ret);
+ /*-
+ * Set mode:
+ * 1: peer may send requests
+ * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+ /*
+ * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
+ * for Next Protocol Negotiation
+ */
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+ if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
+ s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
+ s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+ ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
+ int el;
+
+ ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
+
+ if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# endif
+ custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
+ /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
+ if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
+ * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
+ * appear last.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
+ int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /*
+ * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+ * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
+ * does not.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ hlen -= 5;
+ if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
+ hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+ if (hlen >= 4)
+ hlen -= 4;
+ else
+ hlen = 0;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+ s2n(hlen, ret);
+ memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+ ret += hlen;
+ }
+ }
- ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
+ return orig;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+ return ret;
+}
- if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret+=el;
- }
-#endif
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+{
+ int extdatalen = 0;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+# endif
+ /*
+ * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
+ */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return orig;
+
+ ret += 2;
+ if (ret >= limit)
+ return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
+ && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+ int el;
+
+ if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
- { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
- 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
- 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
- 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
- 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
- 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
- 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
- if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
- memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
- ret+=36;
-
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
- {
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
- s2n(1,ret);
- /* Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-
- }
-#endif
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
- {
- const unsigned char *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
-
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
- s2n(npalen,ret);
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
- ret += npalen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
-#endif
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
- return orig;
+ if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (using_ecc) {
+ const unsigned char *plist;
+ size_t plistlen;
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
+ */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+ if (plistlen > 255) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+ s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
+ memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+ ret += plistlen;
+
+ }
+ /*
+ * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
+ * extension
+ */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(sol + 2, ret);
+ s2n(sol, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
+ ret += sol;
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
+ int el;
+
+ ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
+
+ if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
+ && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
+ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
+ 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
+ 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
+ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
+ 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
+ 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
+ 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
+ };
+ if (limit - ret < 36)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
+ ret += 36;
+
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
+ s2n(1, ret);
+ /*-
+ * Set mode:
+ * 1: peer may send requests
+ * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
+ const unsigned char *npa;
+ unsigned int npalen;
+ int r;
+
+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
+ s->
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+ s2n(npalen, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
+ ret += npalen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+ unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
+ s2n(3 + len, ret);
+ s2n(1 + len, ret);
+ *ret++ = len;
+ memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+ ret += len;
+ }
+
+ if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
+ return orig;
+
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*-
+ * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
@@ -903,1262 +1782,1419 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
- unsigned short type, size;
- static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
- 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
- 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
- 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
- 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
-
- 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
- 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
- 0x01, /* 1 point format */
- 0x00, /* uncompressed */
- };
-
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
- 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
- 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
- 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
- if (data >= (d+n-2))
- return;
- data += 2;
-
- if (data > (d+n-4))
- return;
- n2s(data,type);
- n2s(data,size);
-
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
- if (data+size > d+n)
- return;
- data += size;
-
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
- if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
- return;
- }
- else
- {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (data + len != d+n)
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
- }
-
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ const unsigned char *d, int n)
+{
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
+ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
+ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
+ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
+
+ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
+ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
+ 0x01, /* 1 point format */
+ 0x00, /* uncompressed */
+ };
+
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+ static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
+ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
+ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
+ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+ if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+ if (data > (d + n - 4))
+ return;
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+ if (data + size > d + n)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len != d + n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+/*
+ * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
+ * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
+ * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
+ * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
+ * success.
+ */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned data_len, int *al)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ unsigned proto_len;
+ const unsigned char *selected;
+ unsigned char selected_len;
+ int r;
+
+ if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (data_len < 2)
+ goto parse_error;
+
+ /*
+ * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
+ * length-prefixed strings.
+ */
+ i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
+ data_len -= 2;
+ data += 2;
+ if (data_len != i)
+ goto parse_error;
+
+ if (data_len < 2)
+ goto parse_error;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
+ proto_len = data[i];
+ i++;
+
+ if (proto_len == 0)
+ goto parse_error;
+
+ if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
+ goto parse_error;
+
+ i += proto_len;
+ }
+
+ r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
+ s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+ if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ parse_error:
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return -1;
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
- {
- unsigned short type;
- unsigned short size;
- unsigned short len;
- unsigned char *data = *p;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- int sigalg_seen = 0;
-
- s->servername_done = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-#endif
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+{
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned short len;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+# endif
+
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
+ s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+
+ if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ goto ri_check;
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+ if (data > (d + n - len))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+ if (data + size > (d + n))
+ goto ri_check;
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
+# endif
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+/*-
+ * The servername extension is treated as follows:
+ *
+ * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+ * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
+ * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
+ * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+ * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+ * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+ * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+ * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+ * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
+ * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+ * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+ * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+ * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+ * the value of the Host: field.
+ * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
+ * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
+ * extension.
+ * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
+ *
+ */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (data >= (d+n-2))
- goto ri_check;
- n2s(data,len);
-
- if (data > (d+n-len))
- goto ri_check;
-
- while (data <= (d+n-4))
- {
- n2s(data,type);
- n2s(data,size);
-
- if (data+size > (d+n))
- goto ri_check;
-#if 0
- fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
-#endif
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
- s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-
- - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- the value of the Host: field.
- - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
- i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
-
-*/
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- {
- unsigned char *sdata;
- int servname_type;
- int dsize;
-
- if (size < 2)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(data,dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size )
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- sdata = data;
- while (dsize > 3)
- {
- servname_type = *(sdata++);
- n2s(sdata,len);
- dsize -= 3;
-
- if (len > dsize)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->servername_done == 0)
- switch (servname_type)
- {
- case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
- if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = 1;
-
- }
- else
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
- && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
-
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- dsize -= len;
- }
- if (dsize != 0)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
- {
- if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
- s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
-
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+ unsigned char *sdata;
+ int servname_type;
+ int dsize;
+
+ if (size < 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sdata = data;
+ while (dsize > 3) {
+ servname_type = *(sdata++);
+ n2s(sdata, len);
+ dsize -= 3;
+
+ if (len > dsize) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->servername_done == 0)
+ switch (servname_type) {
+ case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
+ if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->servername_done = 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
- }
-#if 0
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
- fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-#endif
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
- {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
- ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
-
- if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
- ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
- }
-#if 0
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
- fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-#endif
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
-
- if (size < 2)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- else
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
- {
- int dsize;
- if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- sigalg_seen = 1;
- n2s(data,dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
-
- if (size < 5)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
- size--;
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
- {
- const unsigned char *sdata;
- int dsize;
- /* Read in responder_id_list */
- n2s(data,dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size )
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- while (dsize > 0)
- {
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
- int idsize;
- if (dsize < 4)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(data, idsize);
- dsize -= 2 + idsize;
- size -= 2 + idsize;
- if (dsize < 0)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- sdata = data;
- data += idsize;
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
- &sdata, idsize);
- if (!id)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (data != sdata)
- {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
- {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
- {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Read in request_extensions */
- if (size < 2)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(data,dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize != size)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- sdata = data;
- if (dsize > 0)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
- {
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
- X509_EXTENSION_free);
- }
-
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
- &sdata, dsize);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
- || (data + dsize != sdata))
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- /* We don't know what to do with any other type
- * so ignore it.
- */
- else
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
- {
- switch(data[0])
- {
- case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
- {
- /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
-
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.) */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-#endif
+ } else
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
+ && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
+ (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
- && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
- if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
- al))
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
+ break;
- data+=size;
- }
-
- *p = data;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
- ri_check:
+ dsize -= len;
+ }
+ if (dsize != 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
+ if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
+ s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
+
+ if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
+ ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+ ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
+ ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+# endif
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
+ ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
+
+ if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+ ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
+ /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
+ ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+ ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
+ ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ }
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+# endif
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ else
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
+ int dsize;
+ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+
+ if (size < 5) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
+ size--;
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ const unsigned char *sdata;
+ int dsize;
+ /* Read in responder_id_list */
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (dsize > 0) {
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+ int idsize;
+ if (dsize < 4) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data, idsize);
+ dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+ size -= 2 + idsize;
+ if (dsize < 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sdata = data;
+ data += idsize;
+ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
+ if (!id) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (data != sdata) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
+ && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Read in request_extensions */
+ if (size < 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize != size) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sdata = data;
+ if (dsize > 0) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+ X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+ d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
+ */
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+ switch (data[0]) {
+ case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ break;
+ case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
+ s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ /*-
+ * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
+ * renegotiation.
+ *
+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
+ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
+ * anything like that, but this might change).
+ *
+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
+ * Finished message could have been computed.)
+ */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+ s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
+ return 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+# endif
+ }
- return 1;
- }
+ /* session ticket processed earlier */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+ if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
- * the length of the block. */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
- {
- unsigned int off = 0;
-
- while (off < len)
- {
- if (d[off] == 0)
- return 0;
- off += d[off];
- off++;
- }
-
- return off == len;
- }
-#endif
+ data += size;
+ }
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
- {
- unsigned short length;
- unsigned short type;
- unsigned short size;
- unsigned char *data = *p;
- int tlsext_servername = 0;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
+ *p = data;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-#endif
+ ri_check:
- if (data >= (d+n-2))
- goto ri_check;
-
- n2s(data,length);
- if (data+length != d+n)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while(data <= (d+n-4))
- {
- n2s(data,type);
- n2s(data,size);
-
- if (data+size > (d+n))
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
- s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- tlsext_servername = 1;
- }
+ /* Need RI if renegotiating */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
- ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
- }
-#if 0
- fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
- fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-#endif
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- || (size > 0))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
-
- if (size < 2)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- else
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- {
- /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
- * a status request message.
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
- {
- unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
-
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* The data must be valid */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
- {
- switch(data[0])
- {
- case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
- if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
- al))
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
+ * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
+ */
+
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ const unsigned char *limit,
+ int *al)
+{
+ unsigned short type, size, len;
+ /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
+ if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (data >= limit - 2)
+ return 1;
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+ if (data > limit - len)
+ return 1;
+
+ while (data <= limit - 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+ if (data + size > limit)
+ return 1;
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ data += size;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
+ int n)
+{
+ int al = -1;
+ unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
+ /*
+ * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
+ * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
+ * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
+ * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
+ */
+ if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
+ if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
- data+=size;
- }
-
- if (data != d+n)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
- {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- *p = data;
-
- ri_check:
-
- /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
- * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
- * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
- * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
- * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
- * absence on initial connect only.
- */
- if (!renegotiate_seen
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
+ * fill the length of the block.
+ */
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+{
+ unsigned int off = 0;
+ while (off < len) {
+ if (d[off] == 0)
+ return 0;
+ off += d[off];
+ off++;
+ }
+
+ return off == len;
+}
+# endif
+
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+{
+ unsigned short length;
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int tlsext_servername = 0;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+# endif
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+# endif
+
+ if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data, length);
+ if (data + length != d + n) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+ if (data + size > (d + n))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tlsext_servername = 1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+ ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
+ ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+# endif
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ || (size > 0)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+ /*
+ * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
+ * request message.
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ unsigned char *selected;
+ unsigned char selected_len;
+
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The data must be valid */
+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
+ size,
+ s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
+ SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
+ unsigned len;
+
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (size < 4) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*-
+ * The extension data consists of:
+ * uint16 list_length
+ * uint8 proto_length;
+ * uint8 proto[proto_length];
+ */
+ len = data[0];
+ len <<= 8;
+ len |= data[1];
+ if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = data[2];
+ if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+ }
+
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+ switch (data[0]) {
+ case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ break;
+ case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+ if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+ /*
+ * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
+ * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
+ */
+ else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ data += size;
+ }
+
+ if (data != d + n) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /*
+ * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
+ * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
+ * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
+ * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
+ * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
+ * initial connect only.
+ */
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
- * and elliptic curves we support.
- */
- int using_ecc = 0;
- int i;
- unsigned char *j;
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
- {
- SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
- {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
- if (using_ecc)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-
- /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
- if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
- {
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
- sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
- {
- int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
- s2n(id,j);
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- {
- int r = 1;
-
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
- {
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
- if (!r)
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- {
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- else
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
- }
-
- if (r == 2)
- /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
- }
-#endif
+{
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
+ s->
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
- return 1;
- }
+ if (r == 2)
+ /*
+ * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
+ * server opaque PRF input
+ */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
- * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
- * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
- */
-
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-
- if (using_ecc)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- return 1;
- }
-
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+{
+ return 1;
+}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
- /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
-#endif
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
+ * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+ /*
+ * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
+ * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+# endif
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
+ && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->
+ initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ /*
+ * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
+ * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
+ * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
+ */
+
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
+ s->
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- {
- /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
- * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
- * so this has to happen here in
- * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
-
- int r = 1;
-
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
- {
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
- if (!r)
- {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- {
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
- {
- /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
- * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- else
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
- {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
- }
- }
-
- if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
- {
- /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
- * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
- * abort the handshake.
- */
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- }
- }
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
+ /*
+ * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
+ * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
+ */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+ }
- err:
-#endif
- switch (ret)
- {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done=0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
+ if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
+ * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
+ * handshake.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- int al;
-
- /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
- * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
- * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
- {
- int r;
- CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
- certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (certpkey == NULL)
- {
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- return 1;
- }
- /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
- * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
- */
- s->cert->key = certpkey;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (r)
- {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ err:
+# endif
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+ int al;
+ size_t i;
+ /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
+ if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
+ s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If sigalgs received process it. */
+ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
+ if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
+ SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
+ return 1;
err:
- switch (ret)
- {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return -1;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+}
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
- return 1;
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ int al;
+
+ /*
+ * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
+ * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
+ * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
+ * influence which certificate is sent
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ int r;
+ CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+ certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+ if (certpkey == NULL) {
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
+ * et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = certpkey;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ switch (r) {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
+ err:
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+{
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+ * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
+ * must contain uncompressed.
+ */
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+ && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ /* we are using an ECC cipher */
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *list;
+ int found_uncompressed = 0;
+ list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
+ if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
+ found_uncompressed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found_uncompressed) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
+ && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->
+ initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
+ * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
+ * value from the server too.
+ */
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
- * it must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
- (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
- ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
- {
- /* we are using an ECC cipher */
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *list;
- int found_uncompressed = 0;
- list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
- {
- if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
- {
- found_uncompressed = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found_uncompressed)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
- {
- /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
- * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
- {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- }
-
- /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
- * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
- {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
- }
-#endif
+ /*
+ * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
+ * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
+ * callback
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ int r;
+ /*
+ * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
+ * response.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ if (r < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
+ int n)
+{
+ int al = -1;
+ if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
+ return 1;
+ if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
- /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
- * tell the callback
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
- && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
- {
- int r;
- /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
- * there is no response.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- }
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- if (r == 0)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- }
- }
-
- switch (ret)
- {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done=0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
+/*-
+ * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
* ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
* any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
*
@@ -2192,93 +3228,92 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
* Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
*/
int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
- {
- /* Point after session ID in client hello */
- const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
- unsigned short i;
-
- *ret = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
- /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
- * to permit stateful resumption.
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- return 0;
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
- return 0;
- if (p >= limit)
- return -1;
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- i = *(p++);
- p+= i;
- if (p >= limit)
- return -1;
- }
- /* Skip past cipher list */
- n2s(p, i);
- p+= i;
- if (p >= limit)
- return -1;
- /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
- i = *(p++);
- p += i;
- if (p > limit)
- return -1;
- /* Now at start of extensions */
- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
- return 0;
- n2s(p, i);
- while ((p + 4) <= limit)
- {
- unsigned short type, size;
- n2s(p, type);
- n2s(p, size);
- if (p + size > limit)
- return 0;
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- {
- int r;
- if (size == 0)
- {
- /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
- * currently have one. */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 1;
- }
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
- {
- /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
- * decrypted rather than generating the session
- * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
- * handshake based on external mechanism to
- * calculate the master secret later. */
- return 2;
- }
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
- switch (r)
- {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 2;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- return r;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 3;
- default: /* fatal error */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- p += size;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
-/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+{
+ /* Point after session ID in client hello */
+ const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
+ unsigned short i;
+
+ *ret = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+ * resumption.
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ return 0;
+ if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
+ return 0;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ i = *(p++);
+ p += i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Skip past cipher list */
+ n2s(p, i);
+ p += i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+ i = *(p++);
+ p += i;
+ if (p > limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Now at start of extensions */
+ if ((p + 2) >= limit)
+ return 0;
+ n2s(p, i);
+ while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ n2s(p, type);
+ n2s(p, size);
+ if (p + size > limit)
+ return 0;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ int r;
+ if (size == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+ * one.
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ /*
+ * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+ * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+ * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later.
+ */
+ return 2;
+ }
+ r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
+ switch (r) {
+ case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 2;
+ case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+ return r;
+ case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 3;
+ default: /* fatal error */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ p += size;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
* eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
@@ -2293,447 +3328,1029 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
* 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
*/
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess)
- {
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned char *sdec;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
- unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
- if (eticklen < 48)
- return 2;
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
- {
- unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
- &ctx, &hctx, 0);
- if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
- return 2;
- if (rv == 2)
- renew_ticket = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- return 2;
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
- }
- /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
- * integrity checks on ticket.
- */
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
- if (mlen < 0)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- eticklen -= mlen;
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return 2;
- }
- /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
- /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return 2;
- }
- slen += mlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- p = sdec;
-
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- if (sess)
- {
- /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
- * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
- * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
- * as required by standard.
- */
- if (sesslen)
- memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
- sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
- *psess = sess;
- if (renew_ticket)
- return 4;
- else
- return 3;
- }
- ERR_clear_error();
- /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
- * ticket. */
- return 2;
- }
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+ int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+ int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *sdec;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+ if (eticklen < 48)
+ return 2;
+ /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+ int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+ &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ return 2;
+ if (rv == 2)
+ renew_ticket = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Check key name matches */
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
+ return 2;
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
+ * checks on ticket.
+ */
+ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ if (mlen < 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ eticklen -= mlen;
+ /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
+ if (!sdec) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ slen += mlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ p = sdec;
+
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ if (sess) {
+ /*
+ * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
+ * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
+ * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
+ * standard.
+ */
+ if (sesslen)
+ memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
+ sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
+ *psess = sess;
+ if (renew_ticket)
+ return 4;
+ else
+ return 3;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ /*
+ * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
+ */
+ return 2;
+}
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
-typedef struct
- {
- int nid;
- int id;
- } tls12_lookup;
+typedef struct {
+ int nid;
+ int id;
+} tls12_lookup;
static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
-#endif
+ {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+ {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+ {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+ {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+ {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+ {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
};
static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
-#endif
+ {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
+ {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
+ {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
};
static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
- {
- if (table[i].nid == nid)
- return table[i].id;
- }
- return -1;
- }
-#if 0
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ if (table[i].nid == nid)
+ return table[i].id;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
- {
- if (table[i].id == id)
- return table[i].nid;
- }
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ if ((table[i].id) == id)
+ return table[i].nid;
+ }
+ return NID_undef;
+}
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
- {
- int sig_id, md_id;
- if (!md)
- return 0;
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (md_id == -1)
- return 0;
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1)
- return 0;
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
- return 1;
- }
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
+ const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ int sig_id, md_id;
+ if (!md)
+ return 0;
+ md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (md_id == -1)
+ return 0;
+ sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+ if (sig_id == -1)
+ return 0;
+ p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
+ p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
+ return 1;
+}
int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
- {
- return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- }
+{
+ return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+}
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
- {
- switch(hash_alg)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
- return EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
- return EVP_sha224();
+{
+ switch (hash_alg) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return NULL;
+# endif
+ return EVP_md5();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
+ return EVP_sha224();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+# endif
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+
+ }
+}
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
- return EVP_sha256();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
- return EVP_sha384();
+static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
+{
+ switch (sig_alg) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+# endif
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
- return EVP_sha512();
-#endif
- default:
- return NULL;
+/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
+static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
+ int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
+{
+ int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+ if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
+ return;
+ if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
+ hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (phash_nid)
+ *phash_nid = hash_nid;
+ }
+ if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
+ sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (psign_nid)
+ *psign_nid = sign_nid;
+ }
+ if (psignhash_nid) {
+ if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
+ OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
+ else
+ *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
+ }
+}
- }
- }
+/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
+static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+ const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
+ const unsigned char *allow,
+ size_t allowlen)
+{
+ const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
+ size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
+ for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
+ /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
+ if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
+ if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
+ nmatch++;
+ if (shsig) {
+ shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
+ shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
+ tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
+ &shsig->sign_nid,
+ &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
+ shsig++;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return nmatch;
+}
+
+/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+ const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
+ size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
+ size_t nmatch;
+ TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+ if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+ c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ }
+ /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
+ conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+ conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
+ conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
+ pref = conf;
+ preflen = conflen;
+ allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
+ allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ allow = conf;
+ allowlen = conflen;
+ pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
+ preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+ if (!nmatch)
+ return 1;
+ salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+ if (!salgs)
+ return 0;
+ nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+ c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+ c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+ return 1;
+}
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
- {
- int i, idx;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
- return 1;
- /* Should never happen */
- if (!c)
- return 0;
-
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
- {
- unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
-
- switch(sig_alg)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- continue;
- }
-
- if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
- {
- md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
- if (md)
- {
- c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
- }
- }
-
- }
-
-
- /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
- * supported it stays as NULL.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
- {
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
- return 1;
- }
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+{
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ return 1;
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+ c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
+ if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
+ return 0;
+ c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
+ memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
+ return 1;
+}
-#endif
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+{
+ int idx;
+ size_t i;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
+ if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
+ return 0;
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
+ /*
+ * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
+ * ignoring any peer preferences.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
+ if (s->server)
+ sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ else
+ sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
+ if (sigs) {
+ idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
+ md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
+ c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+ c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
+ CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
+ for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
+ i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
+ idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+ if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
+ md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
+ c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+ c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
+ CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ /*
+ * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
+ * the certificate for signing.
+ */
+ if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
+ /*
+ * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
+ * supported it stays as NULL.
+ */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+# endif
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+ int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+ unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+{
+ const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
+ if (psig == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (idx >= 0) {
+ idx <<= 1;
+ if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
+ return 0;
+ psig += idx;
+ if (rhash)
+ *rhash = psig[0];
+ if (rsig)
+ *rsig = psig[1];
+ tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
+ }
+ return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+ int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+ unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+{
+ TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
+ if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+ return 0;
+ shsigalgs += idx;
+ if (phash)
+ *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
+ if (psign)
+ *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
+ if (psignhash)
+ *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
+ if (rsig)
+ *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
+ if (rhash)
+ *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+ return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+ unsigned short hbtype;
+ unsigned int payload;
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
+ if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
+ unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
+ * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
+ */
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ bp = buffer;
+
+ /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+ s2n(payload, bp);
+ memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+ bp += payload;
+ /* Random padding */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+
+ r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
+ 3 + payload + padding);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
+ unsigned int seq;
+
+ /*
+ * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
+ * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
+ */
+ n2s(pl, seq);
+
+ if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
+ * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+ /*-
+ * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+ * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+ * some random stuff.
+ * - Message Type, 1 byte
+ * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+ * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+ * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+ * - Padding
+ */
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ p = buf;
+ /* Message Type */
+ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+ /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+ s2n(payload, p);
+ /* Sequence number */
+ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+ /* 16 random bytes */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* Random padding */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+
+ ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
+
+typedef struct {
+ size_t sigalgcnt;
+ int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
+} sig_cb_st;
+
+static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+ sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
+ size_t i;
+ char etmp[20], *p;
+ int sig_alg, hash_alg;
+ if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
+ return 0;
+ if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+ etmp[len] = 0;
+ p = strchr(etmp, '+');
+ if (!p)
+ return 0;
+ *p = 0;
+ p++;
+ if (!*p)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
+ sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+ else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
+ sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+ else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
+ sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+ hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
+ if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+ hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
+ if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
+ if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
+ * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
+ */
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+{
+ sig_cb_st sig;
+ sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+ if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
+ return 0;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
+}
+
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
+ int client)
+{
+ unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
+ int rhash, rsign;
+ size_t i;
+ if (salglen & 1)
+ return 0;
+ sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+ if (sigalgs == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
+ rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+
+ if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
+ goto err;
+ *sptr++ = rhash;
+ *sptr++ = rsign;
+ }
+
+ if (client) {
+ if (c->client_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ } else {
+ if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+{
+ int sig_nid;
+ size_t i;
+ if (default_nid == -1)
+ return 1;
+ sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+ if (default_nid)
+ return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+ if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
+static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ int i;
+ nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
+ * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
+ * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
+ * attempting to use them.
+ */
+
+/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
+
+# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
+ (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
+/* Strict mode flags */
+# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
+ (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
+ | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
+
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ int idx)
+{
+ int i;
+ int rv = 0;
+ int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+ /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+ if (idx != -1) {
+ /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+ if (idx == -2) {
+ cpk = c->key;
+ idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+ } else
+ cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+ x = cpk->x509;
+ pk = cpk->privatekey;
+ chain = cpk->chain;
+ strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+ /* If no cert or key, forget it */
+ if (!x || !pk)
+ goto end;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
+ rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
+ CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+ return rv;
+ }
+# endif
+ } else {
+ if (!x || !pk)
+ goto end;
+ idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ goto end;
+ cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+ check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
+ else
+ check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
+ strict_mode = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (suiteb_flags) {
+ int ok;
+ if (check_flags)
+ check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+ ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+ if (ok == X509_V_OK)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+ else if (!check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
+ * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
+ int default_nid;
+ unsigned char rsign = 0;
+ if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+ default_nid = 0;
+ /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
+ else {
+ switch (idx) {
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+ case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+ default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+ case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
+ default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+ default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ default_nid = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
+ * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
+ */
+ if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
+ size_t j;
+ const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
+ if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
+ if (check_flags)
+ goto skip_sigs;
+ else
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
+ if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
+ if (!check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
+ if (check_flags) {
+ rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+ break;
+ } else
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
+ else if (check_flags)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+ skip_sigs:
+ /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+ if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
+ else if (!check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ if (!s->server)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+ /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
+ else if (strict_mode) {
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
+ if (check_flags) {
+ rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+ break;
+ } else
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
+ int check_type = 0;
+ switch (pk->type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+ case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
+ {
+ int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
+ if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
+ check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
+ if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
+ check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
+ }
+ }
+ if (check_type) {
+ const unsigned char *ctypes;
+ int ctypelen;
+ if (c->ctypes) {
+ ctypes = c->ctypes;
+ ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
+ } else {
+ ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+ ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
+ if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+ ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+ if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
+ if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+ }
+ if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+ if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+
+ end:
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ else if (cpk->digest)
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ } else
+ rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+
+ /*
+ * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
+ * chain is invalid.
+ */
+ if (!check_flags) {
+ if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+ cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+ else {
+ /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+ cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
+{
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+}
+
+/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
+int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
+}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int
-tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
- unsigned short hbtype;
- unsigned int payload;
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
- pl = p;
-
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
- {
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- int r;
-
- /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
- * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
- * payload, plus padding
- */
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- bp = buffer;
-
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
- s2n(payload, bp);
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
- bp += payload;
- /* Random padding */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
-
- r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
-
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- }
- else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
- {
- unsigned int seq;
-
- /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
- * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
- * sequence number */
- n2s(pl, seq);
-
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
- {
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
-int
-tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret;
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
- * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
-
- /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
- * some random stuff.
- * - Message Type, 1 byte
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
- * - Padding
- */
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- p = buf;
- /* Message Type */
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
- s2n(payload, p);
- /* Sequence number */
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
- /* 16 random bytes */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* Random padding */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
-
- ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
- if (ret >= 0)
- {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buf, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
- return ret;
- }
#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-10-31 21:57:43 +0000