Update OpenSSL from 1.0.1h to 1.0.1i

23 files changed, 430 insertions, 142 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
index 0045d8983..bffd928f5 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ LIBSRC=	\
 	ssl_lib.c ssl_err2.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \
 	ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
 	ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \
-	bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c
+	bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c ssl_utst.c
 LIBOBJ= \
 	s2_meth.o  s2_srvr.o  s2_clnt.o  s2_lib.o  s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \
 	s3_meth.o  s3_srvr.o  s3_clnt.o  s3_lib.o  s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o s3_cbc.o \
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ LIBOBJ= \
 	ssl_lib.o ssl_err2.o ssl_cert.o ssl_sess.o \
 	ssl_ciph.o ssl_stat.o ssl_rsa.o \
 	ssl_asn1.o ssl_txt.o ssl_algs.o \
-	bio_ssl.o ssl_err.o kssl.o tls_srp.o t1_reneg.o
+	bio_ssl.o ssl_err.o kssl.o tls_srp.o t1_reneg.o ssl_utst.o
 
 SRC= $(LIBSRC)
 
@@ -915,6 +915,26 @@ ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
 ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
 ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
 ssl_txt.o: ssl_txt.c
+ssl_utst.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+ssl_utst.o: ssl_utst.c
 t1_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
 t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 04aa23107..89cdca806 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -587,29 +587,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+		return s->max_cert_list;
+	return max_len;
+	}
 
 static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	{
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
 	pitem *item = NULL;
 	int i = -1, is_complete;
 	unsigned char seq64be[8];
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
 
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
 		goto err;
 
-	/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
-	 * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
-	 */
-	if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
-		max_len = s->max_cert_list;
-	else
-		max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
-		goto err;
+	if (frag_len == 0)
+		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 	/* Try to find item in queue */
 	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
@@ -639,7 +642,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 
 
 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
-	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
+	 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+	 * does not need to be freed.
 	 */
 	if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
 		{
@@ -659,7 +663,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
 	i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 		frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
-	if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+	if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+		i=-1;
+	if (i<=0)
 		goto err;
 
 	RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -676,10 +682,6 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 
 	if (item == NULL)
 		{
-		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
 		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 		if (item == NULL)
 			{
@@ -687,21 +689,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 			goto err;
 			}
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+		 * would never have reached this branch. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
 
 
 static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 {
 	int i=-1;
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -721,7 +727,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
 	 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
 	 */
-	if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 		item = NULL;
 
 	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -746,9 +752,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+		if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
 
+		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+			goto err;
+
 		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
 		if ( frag == NULL)
 			goto err;
@@ -760,26 +769,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 			/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
 			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 				frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
-			if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+			if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+				i = -1;
+			if (i<=0)
 				goto err;
 			}
 
-		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
 		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 		if ( item == NULL)
 			goto err;
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+		 * been discarded. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
@@ -1180,6 +1194,8 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
 	OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
 
 	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+	if (!frag)
+		return 0;
 
 	memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 48e5e06bd..fd6562c11 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -876,12 +876,18 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		/* TLS extensions*/
+		if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			goto err;
+			}
 		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			goto err;
 			}
-#endif		
+#endif
 
 		l=(p-d);
 		d=buf;
@@ -990,6 +996,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
@@ -1180,6 +1193,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			{
 			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
 				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
 			else
@@ -1239,6 +1259,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
 			int field_size = 0;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			/* Did we send out the client's
 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
 			 * computation as part of client certificate?
@@ -1714,5 +1741,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
-
-
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index 1384ab0cb..4b8ba3e45 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -598,10 +598,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
 				}
 			else {
-				/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
-				 * have not asked for it :-) */
-				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+				if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+					{
+					ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+					if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+					}
 				s->init_num=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 			}
@@ -980,6 +981,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			return -1;
+			}
 		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/heartbeat_test.c b/openssl/ssl/heartbeat_test.c
index d8cc55998..de9d39761 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/heartbeat_test.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/heartbeat_test.c
@@ -38,13 +38,17 @@
  * http://mike-bland.com/tags/heartbleed.html
  */
 
+#define OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
+
+#include "../test/testutil.h"
+
 #include "../ssl/ssl_locl.h"
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST)
 
 /* As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#section-4 */
 #define MIN_PADDING_SIZE	16
@@ -263,13 +267,10 @@ static int honest_payload_size(unsigned char payload_buf[])
 	}
 
 #define SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(type)\
-	HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up_##type(__func__);\
-	int result = 0
+  SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up_##type)
 
 #define EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST()\
-	if (execute_heartbeat(fixture) != 0) result = 1;\
-	tear_down(fixture);\
-	return result
+  EXECUTE_TEST(execute_heartbeat, tear_down)
 
 static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding()
 	{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
index 3bf728318..f3c29d1dd 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
@@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
 	long l;
 
 	/* We can write SSLv2 and SSLv3 ciphers */
+	/* but no ECC ciphers */
+	if (c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHr ||
+		c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHe ||
+		c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEECDH ||
+		c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDH ||
+		c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDSA)
+		return 0;
 	if (p != NULL)
 		{
 		l=c->id;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 487784901..2901a6bd0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
 			 * to read more records to find out.
 			 * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
-			 * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
-			 * attacks. */
+			 * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+			 * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
 			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
 				{
-#if 0
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
 				goto err;
-#else
-				v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
 				}
 			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
 			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
 			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
 			 * this....
 			 */
-			else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+			if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 				v[1]=0xff;
 			else
 				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
 		v[1] = p[4];
 
+		/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+		 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+		 * record. It's format is:
+		 * Byte  Content
+		 * 0-1   msg_length
+		 * 2     msg_type
+		 * 3-4   version
+		 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+		 * 7-8   session_id_length
+		 * 9-10  challenge_length
+		 * ...   ...
+		 */
 		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
 		if (n > (1024*4))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
 			goto err;
 			}
+		if (n < 9)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto err;
+			}
 
 		j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+		/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+		 * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+		 * packet bytes. */
 		if (j <= 0) return(j);
 
 		ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
index 991460410..c0bdae549 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	0,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 0457af878..ea0c82de4 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
 
 			/* clear flags */
@@ -901,6 +902,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			{
 			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
 				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
+	    		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			}
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
@@ -952,6 +954,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 	p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
 
 	sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
@@ -1458,6 +1469,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		p+=i;
 		n-=param_len;
 
+		if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
@@ -2251,6 +2268,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index e3cd4f062..996267725 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -642,10 +642,18 @@ int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
 int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, 
 	     const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
 	{
-	int ret;
+	int ret, sha1len;
 	ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p);
+	if(ret == 0)
+		return 0;
+
 	p+=ret;
-	ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+
+	sha1len=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+	if(sha1len == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret+=sha1len;
 	return(ret);
 	}
 static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index c4ef2738d..4835bef1a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2302,7 +2302,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2382,7 +2382,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2426,13 +2426,13 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2464,7 +2464,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
@@ -2522,7 +2522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 59011e39c..eff7356a3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 		if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
 			return(-1);
 
-	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
 	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 503bed3fe..286750128 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2795,6 +2795,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
 				goto err;
 				}
+			if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
+				|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
 			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
 				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
 			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
@@ -2918,7 +2925,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
 		-1,
-		516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
+		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
 		&ok);
 
 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index 4c1242c9d..b73da5ee1 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST94	"aGOST94"
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST  "aGOST"
+#define SSL_TXT_aSRP            "aSRP"
 
 #define	SSL_TXT_DSS		"DSS"
 #define SSL_TXT_DH		"DH"
@@ -2055,6 +2056,10 @@ int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secre
 void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
 int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void);
+#endif
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -2320,6 +2325,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH				 348
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH				 349
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH				 350
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS			 371
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH				 351
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE			 352
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST		 353
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 0aba8e048..8188ff5d9 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aSRP,0,    0,SSL_aSRP,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 
 	/* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
 	{0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0,     SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
@@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 		break;
 		}
 
-	if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
+	if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
 		*enc=NULL;
 	else
 		{
@@ -596,7 +597,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 		i= -1;
 		break;
 		}
-	if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
+	if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
 	{
 		*md=NULL; 
 		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
@@ -925,7 +926,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 		int rule, int strength_bits,
 		CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
 	{
-	CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *curr2, *last;
+	CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
 	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
 	int reverse = 0;
 
@@ -942,21 +943,25 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 
 	if (reverse)
 		{
-		curr = tail;
+		next = tail;
 		last = head;
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		curr = head;
+		next = head;
 		last = tail;
 		}
 
-	curr2 = curr;
+	curr = NULL;
 	for (;;)
 		{
-		if ((curr == NULL) || (curr == last)) break;
-		curr = curr2;
-		curr2 = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+		if (curr == last) break;
+
+		curr = next;
+
+		if (curr == NULL) break;
+
+		next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
 
 		cp = curr->cipher;
 
@@ -1598,6 +1603,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_kSRP:
 		kx="SRP";
 		break;
+	case SSL_kGOST:
+		kx="GOST";
+		break;
 	default:
 		kx="unknown";
 		}
@@ -1628,6 +1636,15 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_aPSK:
 		au="PSK";
 		break;
+	case SSL_aSRP:
+		au="SRP";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aGOST94:
+		au="GOST94";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aGOST01:
+		au="GOST01";
+		break;
 	default:
 		au="unknown";
 		break;
@@ -1675,6 +1692,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_SEED:
 		enc="SEED(128)";
 		break;
+	case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+		enc="GOST89(256)";
+		break;
 	default:
 		enc="unknown";
 		break;
@@ -1697,6 +1717,12 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_AEAD:
 		mac="AEAD";
 		break;
+	case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+		mac="GOST89";
+		break;
+	case SSL_GOST94:
+		mac="GOST94";
+		break;
 	default:
 		mac="unknown";
 		break;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 49ab43e0e..d2f0dec71 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp b length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp g length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp n length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS)    ,"bad srp parameters"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp s length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE)    ,"bad srtp mki value"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index ef6258ca9..82a2c8012 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1406,6 +1406,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 		    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
 			continue;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+		    continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 		j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
 		p+=j;
 		}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index e48590774..98888d2df 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
 #define SSL_aPSK                0x00000080L /* PSK auth */
 #define SSL_aGOST94				0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
 #define SSL_aGOST01 			0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
+#define SSL_aSRP 		0x00000400L /* SRP auth */
 
 
 /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
@@ -809,6 +810,16 @@ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
 	return &func_name##_data; \
 	}
 
+struct openssl_ssl_test_functions
+	{
+	int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer)(SSL *s, int push);
+	int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers)(SSL *s);
+	int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
+	int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
+	};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
+
 void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
 int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
 CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
@@ -1095,8 +1106,8 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); 
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); 
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); 
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
@@ -1174,4 +1185,14 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(
 	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
 	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
 
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
+
+#else
+
+#define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
+#define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
+#define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat
+#define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat
+
+#endif
 #endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
index 144b81e55..c5a15ce54 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
@@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:	str="SSLv3 read certificate verify A"; break;
 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:	str="SSLv3 read certificate verify B"; break;
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 /* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
 /* client */
 case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv2/v3 write client hello A"; break;
@@ -222,7 +221,6 @@ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv2/v3 read server hello B"; break;
 /* server */
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello A"; break;
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello B"; break;
-#endif
 
 /* DTLS */
 case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request A"; break;
@@ -366,7 +364,6 @@ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:			str="3RCV_A"; break;
 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:			str="3RCV_B"; break;
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 /* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
 /* client */
 case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="23WCHA"; break;
@@ -376,7 +373,7 @@ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:			str="23RSHA"; break;
 /* server */
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="23RCHA"; break;
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:			str="23RCHB"; break;
-#endif
+
 /* DTLS */
 case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DRCHVA"; break;
 case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DRCHVB"; break;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_utst.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_utst.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3679bc3c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_utst.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* ssl_utst.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+
+
+static const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions ssl_test_functions =
+	{
+	ssl_init_wbio_buffer,
+	ssl3_setup_buffers,
+	tls1_process_heartbeat,
+	dtls1_process_heartbeat
+	};
+
+const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void)
+	{
+	return &ssl_test_functions;
+	}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index ac8c15399..1427484a3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 	int rv;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 3b8d5153e..022a4fb28 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -352,15 +352,16 @@ int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	return (int)slen;
 	}
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *ret = p;
+	unsigned char *orig = buf;
+	unsigned char *ret = buf;
 
 	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
 	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
 					&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-		return p;
+		return orig;
 
 	ret+=2;
 
@@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
               return NULL;
               }
 
-          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
           
           s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
           s2n(el,ret);
@@ -452,8 +453,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -472,8 +472,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
 		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
 		}
-	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -650,7 +649,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
                 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                 
-                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
 
                 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                 s2n(el,ret);
@@ -693,24 +692,25 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 			}
 		}
 
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
-		return p;
+	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
+		return orig;
 
-	s2n(extdatalen,p);
+	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
 	return ret;
 	}
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *ret = p;
+	unsigned char *orig = buf;
+	unsigned char *ret = buf;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
 
 	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-		return p;
+		return orig;
 	
 	ret+=2;
 	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
               return NULL;
               }
 
-          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
           
           s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
           s2n(el,ret);
@@ -748,8 +748,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -813,7 +812,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
                 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                 
-                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
 
                 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                 s2n(el,ret);
@@ -884,10 +883,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
-		return p;
+	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
+		return orig;
 
-	s2n(extdatalen,p);
+	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
 	return ret;
 	}
 
@@ -1152,8 +1151,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1187,8 +1185,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
 			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
@@ -1547,8 +1544,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1559,15 +1555,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
 				}
-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-			if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-			if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+			if (!s->hit)
 				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
+				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+				if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+					{
+					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
+				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
 				}
-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
-			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
 #if 0
 			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
 			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
@@ -2361,7 +2360,11 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		}
 	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
 	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+		OPENSSL_free(sdec);
 		return 2;
+		}
 	slen += mlen;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	p = sdec;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
index 2315a7c0a..e7368a8f6 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -408,16 +408,46 @@ err:
 	return ret;
 	}
 
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al)
 	{
-	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+	SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
+	/* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0
+	 * by checking B != 0 since B < N
+	 */
+	if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >=0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
+		|| BN_is_zero(srp->B))
+		{
+		*al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		return 0;
+		}
 
-	if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
-		return -1;
+	if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength)
+		{
+		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+		return 0;
+		}
 
-	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL && 
-		!SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N))
-		return -1 ;
+	if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback)
+		{
+		if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0)
+			{
+			*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if(!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N))
+		{
+		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+	
+
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
 	RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 	s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
@@ -426,10 +456,6 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
 	if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
 		return -1;
 
-	/* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */
-	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL) 
-		return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg);
-
 	return 1;
 	}