Update openssl to version openssl-1.0.1k

Conflicts:
	openssl/Makefile

30 files changed, 646 insertions, 446 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 2e4250fcf..1b9d64bf6 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -156,9 +156,8 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe
 static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
 
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
-static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
+static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500, 512, 256};
 
-static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
 	unsigned long frag_len);
 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
@@ -211,8 +210,7 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
 	return frag;
 	}
 
-static void
-dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
 	{
 
 	if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
@@ -225,53 +223,50 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
 	OPENSSL_free(frag);
 	}
 
-/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	int curr_mtu;
-	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
+static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
+{
+	if(s->d1->link_mtu)
+		{
+		s->d1->mtu = s->d1->link_mtu-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+		s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
+		}
 
 	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
-	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
 		{
-		s->d1->mtu = 
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-
-		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
-		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+		if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
 			{
-			s->d1->mtu = 0;
-			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, 
-				s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+			s->d1->mtu =
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+			/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+			 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
+			if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
+				{
+				/* Set to min mtu */
+				s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+					s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+				}
 			}
+		else
+			return 0;
 		}
-#if 0 
-	mtu = s->d1->mtu;
-
-	fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
-
-	mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-	curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+	return 1;
+}
 
-	if ( curr_mtu > 0)
-		mtu = curr_mtu;
-	else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
-		return ret;
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+	{
+	int ret;
+	unsigned int curr_mtu;
+	int retry = 1;
+	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
 
-	if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
-		{
-		ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-		if ( ret <= 0)
-			return ret;
-		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-		}
-#endif
+	if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+		return -1;
 
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s));  /* should have something reasonable now */
 
 	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
@@ -289,10 +284,15 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 		blocksize = 0;
 
 	frag_off = 0;
-	while( s->init_num)
+	/* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
+	while(s->init_num > 0)
 		{
-		curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - 
-			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
+		used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) +  DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+			+ mac_size + blocksize;
+		if(s->d1->mtu > used_len)
+			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+		else
+			curr_mtu = 0;
 
 		if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
 			{
@@ -300,15 +300,27 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
 			if ( ret <= 0)
 				return ret;
-			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
-				mac_size - blocksize;
+			used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
+			if(s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+				{
+				curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Shouldn't happen */
+				return -1;
+				}
 			}
 
-		if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+		/* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
+		if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
 			len = curr_mtu;
 		else
 			len = s->init_num;
 
+		/* Shouldn't ever happen */
+		if(len > INT_MAX)
+			len = INT_MAX;
 
 		/* XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part */
 		if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
@@ -319,18 +331,29 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
-				if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+				/* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
+				if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
 					len = curr_mtu;
 				else
 					len = s->init_num;
 				}
 
+			/* Shouldn't ever happen */
+			if(len > INT_MAX)
+				len = INT_MAX;
+
+			if ( len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH )
+				{
+				/*
+				 * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
+				 * so fail
+				 */
+				return -1;
+				}
 			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 
 				len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
 
 			dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
-
-			OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
 			}
 
 		ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
@@ -343,12 +366,23 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
 			 * retransmit 
 			 */
-			if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+			if ( retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
 				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
-				s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
-					BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+				{
+				if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+					{
+					if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+						return -1;
+					/* Have one more go */
+					retry = 0;
+					}
+				else
+					return -1;
+				}
 			else
+				{
 				return(-1);
+				}
 			}
 		else
 			{
@@ -1412,28 +1446,20 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	return p;
 	}
 
-unsigned int 
-dtls1_min_mtu(void)
+unsigned int
+dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
 	{
 	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / 
 		sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
 	}
 
-static unsigned int 
-dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
+unsigned int
+dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
 	{
-	unsigned int i;
-
-	if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
-		return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
-
-	for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
-		if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
-			return g_probable_mtu[i];
-
-	return curr_mtu;
+	return dtls1_link_min_mtu()-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
 	}
 
+
 void
 dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
 	{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index fd6562c11..9045fb990 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
 			s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
 			s->hit = 0;
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 			break;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -370,20 +373,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				s->hit = 1;
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				break;
-				}
-#endif
 			/* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
 			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
 			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -506,7 +495,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 				else
 #endif
 					s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -527,7 +515,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 #endif
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
@@ -1730,6 +1717,12 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
 		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
 			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return 0;
+			}
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
index 712c4647f..3da2b4c8c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 				return 0;
 			}
 		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		if(EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l) < 1)
+			return -1;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 82ca65392..14337b31a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
 		d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
 		}
 
+	d1->link_mtu = 0;
+	d1->mtu = 0;
+
 	if( ! d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || ! d1->processed_rcds.q 
         || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages || ! d1->buffered_app_data.q)
 		{
@@ -161,16 +164,14 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
     while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL)
         {
         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-        OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-        OPENSSL_free(frag);
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
         pitem_free(item);
         }
 
     while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL)
         {
         frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-        OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-        OPENSSL_free(frag);
+        dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
         pitem_free(item);
         }
 
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 	pqueue sent_messages;
 	pqueue buffered_app_data;
 	unsigned int mtu;
+	unsigned int link_mtu;
 
 	if (s->d1)
 		{
@@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 		sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
 		buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
 		mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+		link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
 
 		dtls1_clear_queues(s);
 
@@ -232,6 +235,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 		if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)
 			{
 			s->d1->mtu = mtu;
+			s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
 			}
 
 		s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
@@ -276,7 +280,22 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 		/* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
 		 * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
 		return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
-
+	case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
+		if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
+			return 0;
+		s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
+		return 1;
+	case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
+		return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+		/*
+		 *  We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
+		 *  We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
+		 */
+		if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
+			return 0;
+		s->d1->mtu = larg;
+		return larg;
 	default:
 		ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
 		break;
@@ -415,12 +434,17 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 
 int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
 	{
+	unsigned int mtu;
+
 	s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
 
 	/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
-	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
+			&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
 		{
-		s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);		
+		mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
+		if(mtu < s->d1->mtu)
+			s->d1->mtu = mtu;
 		}
 
 	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 438c0913d..0059fe2f1 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
 	/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
 	if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
 		return 0;
-		
+
 	rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
 	item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
 	if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
@@ -247,18 +247,22 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
 	if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
 		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
 		pitem_free(item);
-		return(0);
+		return(-1);
 		}
 
 	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
 	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
 		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
 		pitem_free(item);
-		return(0);
+		return(-1);
 		}
 
 	return(1);
@@ -314,8 +318,9 @@ dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
             dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
             if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
                 return(0);
-            dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), 
-                s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
+            if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
+                s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
+                return -1;
             }
         }
 
@@ -530,7 +535,6 @@ printf("\n");
 
 	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
 	s->packet_length=0;
-	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
 	return(1);
 
 f_err:
@@ -563,7 +567,8 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 
 	/* The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the
 	 * pending records.  This is a non-blocking operation. */
-	dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
+	if(dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)<0)
+		return -1;
 
 	/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
 	if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
@@ -642,8 +647,6 @@ again:
 		/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
 		i=rr->length;
 		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
-
 		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
 		if ( n != i)
 			{
@@ -678,7 +681,8 @@ again:
 		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
 		 */
 		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-		    *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+		    s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+		    s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
 		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
 			{
 			rr->length = 0;
@@ -701,7 +705,9 @@ again:
 		{
 		if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
 			{
-			dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
+			if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num)<0)
+				return -1;
+			dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
 			}
 		rr->length = 0;
 		s->packet_length = 0;
@@ -714,6 +720,7 @@ again:
 		s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
 		goto again;   /* get another record */
 		}
+	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
 
 	return(1);
 
@@ -865,7 +872,11 @@ start:
 		 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
 		 * than dropping the connection.
 		 */
-		dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
+		if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num)<0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
 		rr->length = 0;
 		goto start;
 		}
@@ -1619,7 +1630,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		wr->length += bs;
 		}
 
-	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+	if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1) < 1) goto err;
 
 	/* record length after mac and block padding */
 /*	if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index 4b8ba3e45..da4c21e06 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 					}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
 					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
 					ret= -1;
 					goto end;
 					}
@@ -246,6 +247,9 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 
 			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
 				{
@@ -450,24 +454,15 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+			/*
+			 * clear this, it may get reset by
+			 * send_server_key_exchange
+			 */
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
 			/* only send if a DH key exchange or
 			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			if (0
 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
 			 * hint if provided */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -658,8 +653,14 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
-			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+			/*
+			 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+			 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+			 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+			 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -675,7 +676,18 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+			/*
+			 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
+			 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+			 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
+			 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+			 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+			 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+			 * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
+			 * the client's Finished message is read.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -1604,6 +1616,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 			}
 
 		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return(0);
+			}
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
index 192c5deff..338575268 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ extern "C" {
 #define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL	"EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP"
 #endif
 
+/* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */
+#define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD                   48
+
 typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st
 	{
 	unsigned long map;		/* track 32 packets on 32-bit systems
@@ -231,6 +234,7 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
 	/* Is set when listening for new connections with dtls1_listen() */
 	unsigned int listen;
 
+	unsigned int link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */
 	unsigned int mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */
 
 	struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
@@ -252,6 +256,10 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
 	unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
 
 	unsigned int retransmitting;
+	/*
+	 * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
+	 * Cleared after the message has been processed.
+	 */
 	unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/kssl.c b/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
index fd7c67bb1..950a0c56f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -954,15 +954,15 @@ print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
         {
 	int i;
 
-	printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++)
                 {
 		if (0 &&  isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
-                        printf(	"%c ",  kdata->data[i]);
+                        fprintf(stderr,	"%c ",  kdata->data[i]);
 		else
-                        printf(	"%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
+                        fprintf(stderr,	"%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
         }
 
 
@@ -973,20 +973,20 @@ print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata)
         {
 	if (adata == NULL)
                 {
-		printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%s, authdata==0\n", label);
 		return;
 		}
-	printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
 #if 0
 	{
         int 	i;
-	printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
 	for (i=0; i < adata->length; i++)
                 {
-                printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
+                fprintf(stderr,(isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
                         adata->contents[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 	}
 #endif
 	}
@@ -1001,24 +1001,24 @@ print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
 
 	if (keyblk == NULL)
                 {
-		printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
 		return;
 		}
 #ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
 					   keyblk->keyvalue->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
                 {
-		printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #else
-	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++)
                 {
-		printf("%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
+		fprintf(stderr,"%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
 		}
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
         }
 
@@ -1031,17 +1031,17 @@ print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
         {
 	int i, ui, uj;
 
-	printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
+	fprintf(stderr,"%s principal Realm: ", label);
 	if (princ == NULL)  return;
 	for (ui=0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++)  putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
-	printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
+	fprintf(stderr," (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)princ->length; i++)
                 {
-		printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
+		fprintf(stderr,"\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
 		for (uj=0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++)  {
 			putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
 			}
-		printf("\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 		}
 	return;
         }
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
 		}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
+	fprintf(stderr,"in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	if (!krb5context  &&  (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
@@ -1481,18 +1481,18 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
 		int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
-		printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
-		printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
+		fprintf(stderr,"Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
 		print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
 			&(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
-		printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
+		fprintf(stderr,"\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
 		if (paddr)
 			{
-			printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
+			fprintf(stderr,"\tcaddrs:\n");
 			for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
 				{
 				krb5_data d;
@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
 				print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
 				}
 			}
-		printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
+		fprintf(stderr,"\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
 			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
@@ -1976,7 +1976,7 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_validate_times(	krb5_timestamp atime,
 	if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<-  | %d - %d | < %d  ->| %d\n",
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_validate_times: %d |<-  | %d - %d | < %d  ->| %d\n",
 		start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2027,10 +2027,10 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
         {
         unsigned int ui;
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
 	p = authentp->data; 
-	for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++)  printf("%02x ",p[ui]);
-	printf("\n");
+	for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++)  fprintf(stderr,"%02x ",p[ui]);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2095,9 +2095,9 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	{
 	int padl;
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
-	for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
+	for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2132,10 +2132,10 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
  		}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
+	fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
 	if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data)
-		printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
-	else	printf("NULL\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
+	else	fprintf(stderr,"NULL\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
  err:
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 93ca7d53c..3178815ec 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
 					}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
 					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
 					ret= -1;
 					goto end;
 					}
@@ -602,12 +603,14 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
 		{
 		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
-                s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
-		if (s->method == NULL)
+		const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
+		new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+		if (new_method == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
 			goto err;
 			}
+		s->method = new_method;
 
 		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
index ff3395f45..a35968f63 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ err:
 
 /* read/writes from s->s2->mac_data using length for encrypt and 
  * decrypt.  It sets s->s2->padding and s->[rw]length
- * if we are encrypting */
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ * if we are encrypting
+ * Returns 0 on error and 1 on success */
+int ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		}
 
 	/* check for NULL cipher */
-	if (ds == NULL) return;
+	if (ds == NULL) return 1;
 
 
 	bs=ds->cipher->block_size;
@@ -145,7 +146,10 @@ void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	if (bs == 8)
 		l=(l+7)/8*8;
 
-	EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l);
+	if(EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l) < 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
 	}
 
 void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *md, int send)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index 8bb6ab8ba..acd61dc54 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -265,7 +265,11 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
 		if ((!s->s2->clear_text) &&
 			(s->s2->rlength >= (unsigned int)mac_size))
 			{
-			ssl2_enc(s,0);
+			if(!ssl2_enc(s,0))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+				return(-1);
+				}
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
 			ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
@@ -616,7 +620,8 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
 		s->s2->wact_data_length=len+p;
 		ssl2_mac(s,s->s2->mac_data,1);
 		s->s2->wlength+=p+mac_size;
-		ssl2_enc(s,1);
+		if(ssl2_enc(s,1) < 1)
+			return -1;
 		}
 
 	/* package up the header */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 2cba426bb..59ced3f30 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -188,13 +188,21 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
 			s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
 			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
 
-			buf=s->init_buf;
-			if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)
-				SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-			s->init_buf=buf;
+			if(s->init_buf == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+					{
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int) SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				s->init_buf=buf;
+				}
 			s->init_num=0;
 			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
 			s->handshake_func=ssl2_accept;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
index 53b9390fd..3581fbf4f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 			goto f_err;
 			}
 		*ok=1;
+		s->state = stn;
 		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
 		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
 		return s->init_num;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 263e6348c..769271698 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -167,9 +167,9 @@
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
 
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
 	{
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
 			ssl_undefined_function,
 			ssl3_connect,
 			ssl3_get_client_method)
+#endif
 
 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 	{
@@ -272,6 +273,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
@@ -312,20 +316,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				s->hit = 1;
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				break;
-				}
-#endif
 			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
 			/* or PSK */
 			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
@@ -433,12 +423,10 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			else
 				{
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 				}
 			if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
 				{
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -450,7 +438,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
@@ -510,7 +497,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
 
 			/* clear flags */
@@ -559,7 +545,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-
 			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
@@ -669,11 +654,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
 		if ((sess == NULL) ||
 			(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 			!sess->session_id_length ||
-#else
-			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
 			(sess->not_resumable))
 			{
 			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
@@ -879,6 +860,8 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 	memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
+	s->hit = 0;
+
 	/* get the session-id */
 	j= *(p++);
 
@@ -902,12 +885,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			{
 			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
 				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
-	    		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			s->hit = 1;
 			}
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
-	if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+	if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
 	    && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
 	    {
 	    if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
@@ -918,14 +901,13 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
-	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 	    s->hit=1;
 	    }
-	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
+	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
+	if (!s->hit)
 		{
 		/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
 		 * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
-		s->hit=0;
 		if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
 			{
 			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
@@ -1203,9 +1185,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 	            ? 0 : 1;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
-	printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
-	printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+	fprintf(stderr,"pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
+	fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
+	fprintf(stderr,"cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
 		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -1295,6 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
 #endif
 
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
 	/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
 	 * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -1305,14 +1289,26 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		&ok);
 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
 
+	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
 		{
+		/*
+		 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+		 * ciphersuite.
+		 */
+		if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 		/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
 		   omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
 		   session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
 		   later.*/
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
 			{
 			s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
 			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
@@ -1357,9 +1353,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
 	param_len=0;
 
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 
 	al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 
@@ -1543,6 +1537,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 		{
+		/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
+		if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -2174,24 +2175,13 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
 		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
 		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
-		-1,
+		SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
 		16384,
 		&ok);
 
 	if (!ok)
 		return((int)n);
 
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
 	if (n < 6)
 		{
 		/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
@@ -2223,7 +2213,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 		}
 	memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
 	s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
-	/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
+	/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session.
 	 * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
 	 * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
 	 * client session ID matching to work and we know much 
@@ -2462,7 +2452,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+			fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
 				alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -2478,9 +2468,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			    goto err;
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 			{
-			printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+			fprintf(stderr,"kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
 			if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
-			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+			  fprintf(stderr,"kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
 			}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -3309,6 +3299,12 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
 		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
 			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return 0;
+			}
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;
 		}
@@ -3478,40 +3474,9 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-}
+        }
 #endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
 
-/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
- * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
- * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	long n;
-	/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
-	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		return 1;
-	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
-	 * message, so permit appropriate message length */
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
-		return 2;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-#endif
-
 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
 	{
 	int i = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 9db45af7e..89c133e68 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -535,7 +535,8 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 			/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
 			}
 		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		if(EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l) < 1)
+			return -1;
 
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
 			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 3f1745336..e7cbef481 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3810,17 +3810,17 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
 	for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr) ; ++i)
 		{
 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr,i);
-		printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+		fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
 		}
-	printf("Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
 	for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt) ; ++i)
 	    {
 	    c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt,i);
-	    printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+	    fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
 	    }
 #endif
 
@@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-/*		printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
+/*		fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 		alg_k=c->algorithm_mkey;
@@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 			{
 			ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
+			fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
 			       (void *)c,c->name);
 #endif
 			}
@@ -3891,7 +3891,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 			{
 			ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
+			fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
 			       c->name);
 #endif
 			}
@@ -4000,6 +4000,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 				}
 			ok = ok && ec_ok;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 		if (
 			/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC key */
 			(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
@@ -4047,6 +4048,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 				}
 			ok = ok && ec_ok;
 			}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
index cdddb17b6..4dec7033d 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver)
 	{
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
@@ -73,5 +73,4 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_method,
 			 ssl3_accept,
 			 ssl3_connect,
 			 ssl3_get_method)
-
-
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 4c9285f35..1ec9e6ea4 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 	 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
 	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
+		if (left == 0 && extend)
+			return 0;
 		if (left > 0 && n > left)
 			n = left;
 		}
@@ -856,8 +858,7 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 		wr->length += eivlen;
 		}
 
-	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
-	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+	if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
 
 	/* record length after mac and block padding */
 	s2n(wr->length,plen);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index c23d98708..fadca74ec 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
 #endif
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
@@ -180,6 +181,12 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
 		return(NULL);
 	}
 
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+			ssl3_accept,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			ssl3_get_server_method)
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
 	{
@@ -206,11 +213,6 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
 	}
 #endif
 
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_get_server_method)
-
 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *buf;
@@ -284,6 +286,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 					}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
 					{
+					BUF_MEM_free(buf);
 					ret= -1;
 					goto end;
 					}
@@ -298,6 +301,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 			s->init_num=0;
 			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
 
 			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
 				{
@@ -441,20 +447,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+			/*
+			 * clear this, it may get reset by
+			 * send_server_key_exchange
+			 */
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
 
 			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
@@ -468,7 +465,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			 * server certificate contains the server's
 			 * public key for key exchange.
 			 */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			if (0
 			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
 			 * hint if provided */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -674,8 +671,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			/*
+			 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+			 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+			 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+			 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -694,6 +697,19 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+			/*
+			 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
+			 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
+			 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+			 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+			 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+			 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+			 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+			 * the client's Finished message is read.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
 			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->init_num = 0;
@@ -703,7 +719,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			/*
+			 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
+			 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+			 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+			 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+			 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+			 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+			 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+			 * the client's Finished message is read.
+			 */
+			if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+				s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -775,7 +802,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 #else
 				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
 					{
-					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
 					}
 				else
@@ -1017,7 +1043,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	else
 		{
 		i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
-		if (i == 1)
+		/*
+		 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+		 * version.
+		 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+		 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+		 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+		 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+		 * will abort the handshake with an error.
+		 */
+		if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
 			{ /* previous session */
 			s->hit=1;
 			}
@@ -1112,14 +1147,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		id=s->session->cipher->id;
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-		printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+		fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
 #endif
 		for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
 			{
 			c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
-				i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+			fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+				i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
+				SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
 #endif
 			if (c->id == id)
 				{
@@ -2171,6 +2207,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 		int decrypt_len;
 		unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+		size_t j;
 
 		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
 		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
@@ -2209,8 +2246,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				{
 				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
 					{
+					al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-					goto err;
+					goto f_err;
 					}
 				else
 					p-=2;
@@ -2219,6 +2257,20 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				n=i;
 			}
 
+		/*
+		 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
+		 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
+		 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
+		 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
+		 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+		 */
+		if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+			{
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
 		/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
 		 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
 		 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
@@ -2266,19 +2318,23 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
 		decrypt_good &= version_good;
 
-		/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
-		 * decrypt_good_mask. */
-		for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+		/*
+		 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+		 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+		 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+		 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+		 */
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
 			{
-			p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
-						      rand_premaster_secret[i]);
+			p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
+						      rand_premaster_secret[j]);
 			}
 
 		s->session->master_key_length=
 			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
 				s->session->master_key,
-				p,i);
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+				p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
 		}
 	else
 #endif
@@ -2420,10 +2476,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					&kssl_err)) != 0)
 			{
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+			fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
 				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
 			if (kssl_err.text)
-				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+				fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				kssl_err.reason);
@@ -2437,10 +2493,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
 			{
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+			fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
 				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
 			if (kssl_err.text)
-				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+				fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 				kssl_err.reason);
@@ -2958,7 +3014,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
 		{
 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+		if (peer != NULL)
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
@@ -3362,6 +3418,11 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 			}
 
 		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+		if (!l)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return(0);
+			}
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
 		s->init_num=(int)l;
 		s->init_off=0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
index 24f23309d..096b624d0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/tls1.h */
+/* ssl/srtp.h */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
 #define HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
 
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index b78a1cce4..2ba592320 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -596,9 +596,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE				0x00080000L
 /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
 #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE				0x00100000L
-/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations,
- * even when this violates protocol specs */
-#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x00200000L
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
+#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x0
 /* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's
  * preferences */
 #define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE			0x00400000L
@@ -654,8 +653,13 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
 /* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
- * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
- * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+ * To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
+ *
+ * DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake.
+ * Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance
+ * in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+ */
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
 
 /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
@@ -688,6 +692,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
         SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
 #define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
         SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+#define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+#define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL)
 
 #define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
 	SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
@@ -1627,6 +1635,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS	83
 
 #define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION		119
+#define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU			120
+#define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU		121
 
 #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
@@ -1878,13 +1888,15 @@ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void);	/* SSLv2 */
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void);	/* SSLv2 */
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void);		/* SSLv3 */
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void);	/* SSLv3 */
 const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void);	/* SSLv3 */
+#endif
 
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);	/* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);	/* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);	/* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
 
 const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void);		/* TLSv1.0 */
 const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.0 */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
index 85f150409..6fad054e0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -393,8 +393,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
+/*
+ * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
+ * Cleared after the message has been processed.
+ */
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0080
- 
+
 /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
  * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
@@ -456,8 +460,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 	 * and freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in
 	 * this array */
 	EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
-	/* this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message
-	 * come in when we are not looking for one */
+	/*
+	 * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
+	 * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
+	 * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
+	 */
 	int change_cipher_spec;
 
 	int warn_alert;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 5123a8918..cef3ff46e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -286,35 +286,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
 			ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
 			CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
 				CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
-			switch(i) 
-				{
-				/* If there was anything special to do for
-				 * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
-				 * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have an RSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have a DSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
-				/* We have a DH key. */
-				break;
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
-				/* We have an ECC key */
-				break;
-
-			default:
-				/* Can't happen. */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-				}
 			}
 		}
 	
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 8188ff5d9..b767361e7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 			co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
 			co_list_num++;
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
+			fprintf(stderr,"\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 			/*
 			if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 	int reverse = 0;
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
+	fprintf(stderr, "Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
 		rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength, strength_bits);
 #endif
 
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 		else
 			{
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
+			fprintf(stderr, "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
 #endif
 
 			if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 			}
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-		printf("Action = %d\n", rule);
+		fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
 #endif
 
 		/* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 	 */
 	num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
+	fprintf(stderr,"ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
 	if (co_list == NULL)
@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 			{
 			sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
+			fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
 #endif
 			}
 		}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 3f66fc061..4a62b4a79 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -383,13 +383,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 	return(s);
 err:
 	if (s != NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->cert != NULL)
-			ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
-		if (s->ctx != NULL)
-			SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
-		OPENSSL_free(s);
-		}
+		SSL_free(s);
 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	return(NULL);
 	}
@@ -1080,19 +1074,6 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
 		l=s->max_cert_list;
 		s->max_cert_list=larg;
 		return(l);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
-		if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
-			return 0;
-#endif
-
-		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
-		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
-			s->d1->mtu = larg;
-			return larg;
-			}
-		return 0;
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
 		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
 			return 0;
@@ -1507,6 +1488,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
 				goto err;
 				}
+			p += n;
 			continue;
 			}
 
@@ -2112,7 +2094,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 	
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+	fprintf(stderr,"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
 	        rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
 		rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
 #endif
@@ -2996,10 +2978,32 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
 			}
 		ssl_cert_free(ocert);
 		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+	 * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+	/*
+	 * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+	 * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+	 * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+	 * leave it unchanged.
+	 */
+	if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+		(ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+		(memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0))
+		{
+		ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+		memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+		}
+
 	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 	if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
 	ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
 	return(ssl->ctx);
 	}
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 98888d2df..1b8fa8c4c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
 
 int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
 int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
+int ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
 void ssl2_mac(SSL *s,unsigned char *mac,int send_data);
 const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
 int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p);
@@ -997,7 +997,9 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
 
 /* some client-only functions */
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -1014,7 +1016,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
 # endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index ad40fadd0..235f92d82 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -335,7 +335,21 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
 			return(0);
 			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		/* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
+		/*
+		 * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+		 * Note that:
+		 * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+		 *     ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+		 *     When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+		 *     ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+		 *     At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+		 *     however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+		 *     whether a ticket is expected or not.
+		 *
+		 * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+		 *     ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+		 *     ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+		 */
 		if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
 			{
 			ss->session_id_length = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
index 4f80be8ee..08889569f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 	fprintf(stderr," -ssl2         - use SSLv2\n");
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 	fprintf(stderr," -ssl3         - use SSLv3\n");
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
@@ -368,7 +368,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	               "                 Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n"  \
 	               "                 (default is sect163r2).\n");
 #endif
-	fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
+	fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - Verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists.\n"
+		       "                    When this option is requested, the cipherlist\n"
+		       "                    tests are run instead of handshake tests.\n");
 	}
 
 static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
@@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	int fips_mode=0;
 #endif
+        int no_protocol = 0;
 
 	verbose = 0;
 	debug = 0;
@@ -658,11 +661,26 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			}
 #endif
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
-			ssl2=1;
+			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+			no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+			ssl2 = 1;
+			}
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-tls1") == 0)
-			tls1=1;
+			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+			no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+			tls1 = 1;
+			}
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
-			ssl3=1;
+			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+			no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+			ssl3 = 1;
+			}
 		else if	(strncmp(*argv,"-num",4) == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -781,15 +799,41 @@ bad:
 		goto end;
 		}
 
+	/*
+	 * test_cipherlist prevails over protocol switch: we test the cipherlist
+	 * for all enabled protocols.
+	 */
 	if (test_cipherlist == 1)
 		{
 		/* ensure that the cipher list are correctly sorted and exit */
+		fprintf(stdout, "Testing cipherlist order only. Ignoring all "
+			"other options.\n");
 		if (do_test_cipherlist() == 0)
 			EXIT(1);
 		ret = 0;
 		goto end;
 		}
 
+	if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 > 1)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
+			"be requested.\n");
+		EXIT(1);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Testing was requested for a compiled-out protocol (e.g. SSLv2).
+         * Ideally, we would error out, but the generic test wrapper can't know
+	 * when to expect failure. So we do nothing and return success.
+	 */
+	if (no_protocol)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Testing was requested for a disabled protocol. "
+			"Skipping tests.\n");
+		ret = 0;
+		goto end;
+		}
+
 	if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force)
 		{
 		fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work.  Use -f to perform "
@@ -868,30 +912,25 @@ bad:
 	}
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+/* At this point, ssl2/ssl3/tls1 is only set if the protocol is available.
+ * (Otherwise we exit early.)
+ * However the compiler doesn't know this, so we ifdef. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 	if (ssl2)
 		meth=SSLv2_method();
-	else 
-	if (tls1)
-		meth=TLSv1_method();
 	else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ssl3)
 		meth=SSLv3_method();
 	else
-		meth=SSLv23_method();
-#else
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
 	if (tls1)
 		meth=TLSv1_method();
 	else
-	if (ssl3)
-		meth=SSLv3_method();
-	else
-		meth=SSLv23_method();
-#else
-	meth=SSLv2_method();
-#endif
 #endif
+	meth=SSLv23_method();
 
 	c_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
 	s_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 1923cf3e9..1308c0344 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -303,15 +303,15 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
 		 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
 		 km,tmp,num);
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
                 s->session->master_key_length);
 	{
         int i;
         for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
                 {
-                printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
+                fprintf(stderr,"%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
                 }
-        printf("\n");  }
+        fprintf(stderr,"\n");  }
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	return ret;
 	}
@@ -349,19 +349,19 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
-	printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
 	       s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
 	       s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
 	       comp);
-	printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
-	printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
+	fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
                 c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
-	printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
 	{
         int i;
         for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-		printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  fprintf(stderr,"\n");
         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -540,11 +540,11 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	{
         int i;
-	printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
-	printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
-	printf("\n");
-	printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
-	printf("\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", key[i]);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", iv[i]);
+	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
 	int ret=0;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
@@ -812,18 +812,18 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
 		unsigned long ui;
-		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
+		fprintf(stderr,"EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
 			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
+		fprintf(stderr,"\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
 			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
 			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
 			ds->cipher->iv_len);
-		printf("\t\tIV: ");
-		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
-		printf("\n");
-		printf("\trec->input=");
-		for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
-		printf("\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"\t\tIV: ");
+		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+		fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+		fprintf(stderr,"\trec->input=");
+		for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+		fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -848,9 +848,9 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
 		unsigned long i;
-		printf("\trec->data=");
+		fprintf(stderr,"\trec->data=");
 		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+			fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->data[i]);  fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -1048,10 +1048,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	if (!stream_mac)
 		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",rec->data[z]); printf("\n"); }
+fprintf(stderr,"seq=");
+{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",seq[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
+fprintf(stderr,"rec=");
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
 #endif
 
 	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ printf("rec=");
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",md[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
 #endif
 	return(md_size);
 	}
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
 	}
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 	int rv;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 		      out,buff,olen);
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+	fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	goto ret;
 err1:
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index d6aff4b68..179b467d4 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -204,28 +204,40 @@ static int nid_list[] =
 
 static int pref_list[] =
 	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 		NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
 		NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+#endif
 		NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 		NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
 		NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+#endif
 		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
 		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+#endif
 		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
 		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
 		NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
 		NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+#endif
 		NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
 		NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 		NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
 		NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+#endif
 		NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
 		NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
 		NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
 		NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+#endif
 		NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
 		NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
 		NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
@@ -233,7 +245,7 @@ static int pref_list[] =
 
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 	{
-	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+	/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
 	if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
 				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
 		return 0;
@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 
 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
 	{
-	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+	/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
 	switch (nid)
 		{
 	case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
@@ -488,11 +500,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
 		s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
 
-		/* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
-		 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
-		 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
-		 * resolves this to two bytes.
-		 */
 		s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
 		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
 		ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
@@ -998,6 +1005,16 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+		s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+		}
+#endif
+
+	s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
 	n2s(data,len);
@@ -1192,7 +1209,9 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
 
 			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
-				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
+				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
+				/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
+				ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1506,6 +1525,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
 #endif
+	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
 	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
@@ -1800,7 +1820,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
 		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
 
-		/* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
+		/* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
 		if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
 		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
 		if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)