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authormarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2014-10-19 11:31:33 +0200
committermarha <marha@users.sourceforge.net>2014-10-19 11:33:30 +0200
commita14858a22f164b5accc4bd192a5d3de21d88e3d1 (patch)
tree6a0005fed0f248559139016a7310add07fcb62df /openssl/ssl
parentfa5a6df66cfe9b19014ea9d2fca35b762f457041 (diff)
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Update to openssl-1.0.1j
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl')
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/Makefile86
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_both.c3
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c10
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c93
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/dtls1.h3
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c12
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c21
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c4
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c65
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c250
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c40
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c19
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c113
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/srtp.h4
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com21
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl.h9
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl3.h7
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c75
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c1
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c12
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/tls1.h15
23 files changed, 546 insertions, 321 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
index bffd928f5..8dd390e67 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
@@ -547,26 +547,27 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c
+s3_cbc.o: ssl_locl.h
s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -671,28 +672,29 @@ s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h
+s3_srvr.o: s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
ssl_algs.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 89cdca806..2e4250fcf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1492,6 +1492,9 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Read type and payload length first */
if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
+ if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 6bde16fa2..82ca65392 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -266,6 +266,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
+#endif
+ /* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
+ * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
+ return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
default:
ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
index ab9c41922..535539ba3 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
return 1;
}
-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
- {
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
-
- p=srtp_known_profiles;
- while(p->name)
- {
- if(p->id == profile_num)
- {
- *pptr=p;
- return 0;
- }
- p++;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTE
if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
{
+ if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
return 1;
}
@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
{
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
int ct;
int mki_len;
- int i,j;
- int id;
- int ret;
+ int i, srtp_pref;
+ unsigned int id;
/* Length value + the MKI length */
if(len < 3)
@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
return 1;
}
+ srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+ /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
+ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
- clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
-
while(ct)
{
n2s(d,id);
ct-=2;
len-=2;
- if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
+ /*
+ * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
+ * current match.
+ * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
+ * does nothing.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
{
- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
- }
- else
- {
- ; /* Ignore */
+ sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+ if (sprof->id == id)
+ {
+ s->srtp_profile = sprof;
+ srtp_pref = i;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
return 1;
}
- srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
- /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
- configured then the outer loop doesn't run
- (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
- and so we just return without doing anything */
- for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
- {
- sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
-
- for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
- {
- cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
-
- if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
- {
- s->srtp_profile=sprof;
- *al=0;
- ret=0;
- goto done;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ret=0;
-
-done:
- if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
-
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
index e65d50119..192c5deff 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
#define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF
+#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION
+
#define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100
#if 0
@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
}
#endif
#endif
-
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 2b93c639d..86ab3de1c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_client_method());
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_client_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
@@ -698,6 +700,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
/* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
@@ -712,7 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
}
- else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ else
+#endif
+ if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
@@ -736,6 +741,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
+ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
{
/* fatal alert */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 2901a6bd0..93ca7d53c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
@@ -421,6 +423,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
+ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
@@ -597,6 +602,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+ s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+ if (s->method == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
@@ -624,14 +635,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
- if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
- s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
- else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
- s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
- else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
- s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
- else
- s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
index c0bdae549..c63be3052 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
ret=s->hit;
break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+ return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
default:
break;
}
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
if (p != NULL)
{
l=c->id;
- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
+ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index 443a31e74..11f13adbf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
*
*/
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -67,37 +68,6 @@
* supported by TLS.) */
#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
-/* Some utility functions are needed:
- *
- * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
- * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
- * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
- * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
-
-/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
- {
- a -= b;
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
- }
-
-/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
- {
- a -= b;
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
- }
-
-/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
- {
- unsigned c = a ^ b;
- c--;
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
- }
-
/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
* record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
*
@@ -126,8 +96,8 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
rec->length -= padding_length;
rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
- return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
-}
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+ }
/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
* record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
@@ -208,7 +178,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
{
- unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+ unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
* |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
@@ -216,20 +186,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
}
/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
- * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
- * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
- * bits. */
- good &= good >> 4;
- good &= good >> 2;
- good &= good >> 1;
- good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
- good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
-
+ * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+ */
+ good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
rec->length -= padding_length;
rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
- return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
}
/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
@@ -296,8 +260,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
{
- unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
- unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+ unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
+ unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
@@ -683,12 +647,12 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
b = data[k-header_length];
k++;
- is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
- is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+ is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+ is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c+1);
/* If this is the block containing the end of the
* application data, and we are at the offset for the
* 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
- b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+ b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
/* If this the the block containing the end of the
* application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
* just write zero. */
@@ -704,7 +668,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
{
/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
- b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+ b = constant_time_select_8(
+ is_block_b, length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)], b);
}
block[j] = b;
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index ea0c82de4..263e6348c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -326,9 +326,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
break;
}
#endif
- /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
+ /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
/* or PSK */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
@@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
- int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
- long n,alg_k,alg_a;
+ int al,j,ok;
+ long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -1354,36 +1354,48 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
+ /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
+
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- if (param_len > n)
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
@@ -1395,6 +1407,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -1407,14 +1420,22 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
- n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+ param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1422,14 +1443,24 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1437,15 +1468,25 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+
+ if (1 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 1;
+
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
- param_len+=i+1;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1453,14 +1494,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1498,14 +1548,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+
+ param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1513,14 +1572,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1552,14 +1620,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+
+ param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1567,14 +1644,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1582,14 +1668,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1641,12 +1736,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
- * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+ * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
+ * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
- param_len=3;
- if ((param_len > n) ||
- (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
- ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
+ param_len=4;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+ ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
@@ -1688,15 +1790,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
- param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
- if ((param_len > n) ||
+
+ if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
@@ -1739,7 +1841,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ int sigalg;
+ if (2 > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
/* Should never happen */
if (sigalg == -1)
{
@@ -1757,7 +1867,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (md == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
@@ -1768,15 +1877,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
-
+
+ if (2 > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ /* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -1785,6 +1900,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
int num;
+ unsigned int size;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
@@ -1797,9 +1913,9 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
- q+=i;
- j+=i;
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
+ q+=size;
+ j+=size;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
@@ -1835,8 +1951,8 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
}
else
{
- if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
- /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
+ /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
+ if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
@@ -1844,7 +1960,6 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -2846,7 +2961,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
- char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+ /* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes
+ * to return a \0-terminated identity. The last byte
+ * is for us for simulating strnlen. */
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
+ size_t identity_len;
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
@@ -2860,8 +2979,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+ identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
@@ -2875,7 +2995,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
-
+ identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+ identity_len = strlen(identity);
+ if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
@@ -2909,14 +3036,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
- n = strlen(identity);
- s2n(n, p);
- memcpy(p, identity, n);
- n+=2;
+ psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+ s2n(identity_len, p);
+ memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
+ n = 2 + identity_len;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 996267725..9db45af7e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
default: return(-1);
}
}
-
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 4835bef1a..3f1745336 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3355,6 +3355,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
#endif
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
+ return 1;
+ /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
+ * (not at its highest protocol version). */
+ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
+ {
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
+#endif
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+ return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+ return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
+ }
+ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -3714,6 +3741,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
break;
#endif
#endif
+
default:
return(0);
}
@@ -3822,10 +3850,15 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- mask_k=cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
- emask_k=cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+ if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)
+ {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ }
#endif
-
+
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
/* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -4291,4 +4324,3 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
return alg2;
}
-
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index eff7356a3..4c9285f35 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -273,6 +273,12 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
return(n);
}
+/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
+ * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
+ * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
+ * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
/* Call this to get a new input record.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
@@ -293,6 +299,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
short version;
unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
size_t extra;
+ unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess=s->session;
@@ -523,7 +530,17 @@ printf("\n");
s->packet_length=0;
/* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ empty_record_count++;
+ if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ goto again;
+ }
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 286750128..c23d98708 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
@@ -410,9 +411,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -1846,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n+=2+nr[i];
}
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
@@ -2166,6 +2168,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
+ unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int decrypt_len;
+ unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
{
@@ -2213,54 +2219,61 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n=i;
}
- i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
- al = -1;
-
- if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
- }
-
- if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
- {
- /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version.
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
- if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
- (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+ /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
+ * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
+ * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
+ * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
+ * case that the decrypt fails. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
- /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
- * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
- * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
- * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
- * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
- * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
- }
+ /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
+ * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
+ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+ /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
+ * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
+ * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+ * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
+ * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
+ * decryption error. */
+ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
+ version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
+
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+ * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
+ * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
+ * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
+ * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
+ * support the requested protocol version. If
+ * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
+ {
+ unsigned char workaround_good;
+ workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
+ workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
+ version_good |= workaround_good;
+ }
+
+ /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
+ * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
+ decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+ /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+ {
+ p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
+ rand_premaster_secret[i]);
}
- if (al != -1)
- {
- /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
- * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
- ERR_clear_error();
- i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
- goto err;
- }
-
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
index c0cf33ef2..24f23309d 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ extern "C" {
#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80 0x0005
#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 0x0006
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles);
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
@@ -137,6 +139,8 @@ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
index 05bda755b..7303bc4dd 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl-lib.com
@@ -213,16 +213,16 @@ $ ENDIF
$!
$! Define The Different SSL "library" Files.
$!
-$ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth,s2_srvr,s2_clnt,s2_lib,s2_enc,s2_pkt,"+ -
- "s3_meth,s3_srvr,s3_clnt,s3_lib,s3_enc,s3_pkt,s3_both,s3_cbc,"+ -
- "s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib,s23_pkt,"+ -
- "t1_meth,t1_srvr,t1_clnt,t1_lib,t1_enc,"+ -
- "d1_meth,d1_srvr,d1_clnt,d1_lib,d1_pkt,"+ -
+$ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth, s2_srvr, s2_clnt, s2_lib, s2_enc, s2_pkt,"+ -
+ "s3_meth, s3_srvr, s3_clnt, s3_lib, s3_enc, s3_pkt, s3_both, s3_cbc,"+ -
+ "s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib, s23_pkt,"+ -
+ "t1_meth, t1_srvr, t1_clnt, t1_lib, t1_enc,"+ -
+ "d1_meth, d1_srvr, d1_clnt, d1_lib, d1_pkt,"+ -
"d1_both,d1_enc,d1_srtp,"+ -
"ssl_lib,ssl_err2,ssl_cert,ssl_sess,"+ -
"ssl_ciph,ssl_stat,ssl_rsa,"+ -
"ssl_asn1,ssl_txt,ssl_algs,"+ -
- "bio_ssl,ssl_err,kssl,tls_srp,t1_reneg"
+ "bio_ssl,ssl_err,kssl,tls_srp,t1_reneg,ssl_utst"
$!
$ COMPILEWITH_CC5 = ""
$!
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ $ NEXT_FILE:
$!
$! O.K, Extract The File Name From The File List.
$!
-$ FILE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",LIB_SSL)
+$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",LIB_SSL),"COLLAPSE")
$!
$! Check To See If We Are At The End Of The File List.
$!
@@ -858,8 +858,11 @@ $ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
$ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
-$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
- CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
+$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. ""
+$ THEN
+$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + ","
+$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
+$ ENDIF
$!
$! Check To See If We Have A ZLIB Option.
$!
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index b73da5ee1..b78a1cce4 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -653,6 +653,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
*/
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
+/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
* they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@@ -1511,6 +1515,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
#define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
#define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
@@ -1621,6 +1626,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
#define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82
#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83
+#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
+
#define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
#define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
@@ -2379,6 +2386,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
+#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
#define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
@@ -2525,6 +2533,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
index 37f19e3ab..85f150409 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
+/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
+ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
#define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
+ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
+#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
+
#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index d2f0dec71..1b7eb47e1 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"},
@@ -529,6 +530,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 82a2c8012..3f66fc061 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1387,6 +1387,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
if (sk == NULL) return(0);
q=p;
+ if (put_cb == NULL)
+ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
@@ -1411,24 +1413,36 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
- j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+ j = put_cb(c,p);
p+=j;
}
- /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
- * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
- */
- if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
+ /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
+ * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
+ if (p != q)
{
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+ if (!s->renegotiate)
{
- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- };
- j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
- p+=j;
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+ {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+ p+=j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
- }
+ }
+
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+ {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+ }
return(p-q);
}
@@ -1439,11 +1453,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
int i,n;
+
if (s->s3)
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
- if ((num%n) != 0)
+ if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return(NULL);
@@ -1458,7 +1473,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
{
- /* Check for SCSV */
+ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
@@ -1478,6 +1493,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
continue;
}
+ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+ {
+ /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
+ * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
+ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ if (s->s3)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
p+=n;
if (c != NULL)
@@ -2944,15 +2976,26 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
{
+ CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
return ssl->ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ctx == NULL)
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
#endif
- if (ssl->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (ocert != NULL)
+ {
+ int i;
+ /* Copy negotiated digests from original */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i;
+ CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i;
+ rpk->digest = cpk->digest;
+ }
+ ssl_cert_free(ocert);
+ }
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 1427484a3..1923cf3e9 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
(DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 022a4fb28..d6aff4b68 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
{
int el;
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if(s->srtp_profile)
+ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
{
int el;
@@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
{
if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
@@ -1698,7 +1699,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
{
if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
@@ -2347,7 +2348,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
+ }
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
index c992091e3..6ae887646 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" {
#define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
#define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
+#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION
+
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
-#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
-#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
#define TLS1_get_version(s) \
((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */
#define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */
#define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */
#define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
#define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */