Update to openssl-1.0.2c

Conflicts:
	openssl/Makefile

23 files changed, 968 insertions, 403 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
index a7bd4ee14..42f1af5c8 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
@@ -89,12 +89,13 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
-depend:
-	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
-	    $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
-	else \
-	    $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC); \
-	fi
+update: local_depend
+	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
 
 dclean:
 	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
@@ -486,26 +487,27 @@ s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
 s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
 s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_pkt.c
 s2_pkt.o: ssl_locl.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_srvr.c
+s2_srvr.o: ssl_locl.h
 s3_both.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 21048003b..b4ee7abe2 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -489,6 +489,12 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
         return i;
     }
 
+    if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
     msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
 
@@ -873,6 +879,20 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
     /* parse the message fragment header */
     dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
 
+    len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+    frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+    frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+
+    /*
+     * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
+     * Fragments must not span records.
+     */
+    if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
+        al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
     /*
      * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
      * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
@@ -883,10 +903,6 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
         && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
         return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
 
-    len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
-    frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
-    frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
-
     if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
         return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
 
@@ -917,17 +933,16 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
     if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max)))
         goto f_err;
 
-    /* XDTLS:  ressurect this when restart is in place */
-    s->state = stn;
-
     if (frag_len > 0) {
         unsigned char *p =
             (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
         i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
                                       &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
+
         /*
-         * XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets
+         * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
+         * that we have enough data in the record
          */
         if (i <= 0) {
             s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
@@ -948,6 +963,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
     }
 
     *ok = 1;
+    s->state = stn;
 
     /*
      * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
@@ -1420,7 +1436,10 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
         memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
         bp += payload;
         /* Random padding */
-        RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+            return -1;
+        }
 
         r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
 
@@ -1454,7 +1473,7 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 {
     unsigned char *buf, *p;
-    int ret;
+    int ret = -1;
     unsigned int payload = 18;  /* Sequence number + random bytes */
     unsigned int padding = 16;  /* Use minimum padding */
 
@@ -1502,10 +1521,12 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
     /* Sequence number */
     s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
     /* 16 random bytes */
-    RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
+        goto err;
     p += 16;
     /* Random padding */
-    RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
+        goto err;
 
     ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
     if (ret >= 0) {
@@ -1518,6 +1539,7 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
         s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
     }
 
+err:
     OPENSSL_free(buf);
 
     return ret;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 1858263e1..4c2ccbf5a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
                 (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -237,10 +238,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
             if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
                 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -249,12 +252,14 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 
             if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
             /* setup buffing BIO */
             if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -433,6 +438,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
              */
             if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
             break;
@@ -564,6 +570,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 #endif
             if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -571,6 +578,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
                                                           SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
             {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -751,6 +759,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
             goto end;
             /* break; */
 
+        case SSL_ST_ERR:
         default:
             SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
             ret = -1;
@@ -842,5 +851,6 @@ static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
 
  f_err:
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return -1;
 }
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 940ca6927..fe30ec7d0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
             SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
-            goto err;
+            goto f_err;
         }
 
         /*
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index eafa0127b..655333a25 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -240,11 +240,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
             if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
                 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
                     BUF_MEM_free(buf);
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -252,6 +254,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
             if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -273,6 +276,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 #endif
                     if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
                         ret = -1;
+                        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                         goto end;
                     }
 
@@ -486,7 +490,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
                 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
 #endif
-                || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
+                || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
                 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
                 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
                     && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
@@ -661,11 +665,14 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
                  */
                 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     return -1;
                 }
                 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
-                if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     return -1;
+                }
             } else {
                 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
                 s->init_num = 0;
@@ -688,15 +695,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
         case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
         case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-            /*
-             * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
-             * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
-             * to set this here because we don't know if we're
-             * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
-             */
-            if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-                s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
-            /* we should decide if we expected this one */
             ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
             if (ret <= 0)
                 goto end;
@@ -713,11 +711,10 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
         case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
         case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
             /*
-             * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
-             * In a full handshake, we end up here through
-             * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
-             * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
-             * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+             * Enable CCS. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+             * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
+             * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
+             * cautious.
              * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
              * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
              * the client's Finished message is read.
@@ -767,6 +764,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
             s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
             if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -795,6 +793,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
                                                           SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
             {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -875,6 +874,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
             goto end;
             /* break; */
 
+        case SSL_ST_ERR:
         default:
             SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
             ret = -1;
@@ -933,6 +933,7 @@ int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
                                       &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
                    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return 0;
         }
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index 614b9a35d..7a6188813 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -576,6 +576,20 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
     s->s2->padding = p;
     s->s2->mac_data = &(s->s2->wbuf[3]);
     s->s2->wact_data = &(s->s2->wbuf[3 + mac_size]);
+
+    /*
+     * It would be clearer to write this as follows:
+     *     if (mac_size + len + p > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER)
+     * However |len| is user input that could in theory be very large. We
+     * know |mac_size| and |p| are small, so to avoid any possibility of
+     * overflow we write it like this.
+     *
+     * In theory this should never fail because the logic above should have
+     * modified |len| if it is too big. But we are being cautious.
+     */
+    if (len > (SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER - (mac_size + p))) {
+        return -1;
+    }
     /* we copy the data into s->s2->wbuf */
     memcpy(s->s2->wact_data, buf, len);
     if (p)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 19bb48c9c..4289272b7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
 
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
 # include <stdio.h>
 # include <openssl/bio.h>
 # include <openssl/rand.h>
@@ -372,12 +373,15 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
 static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 {
     int is_export, i, n, keya;
-    unsigned int ek;
+    unsigned int num_encrypted_key_bytes, key_length;
     unsigned long len;
     unsigned char *p;
     const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
     const EVP_CIPHER *c;
     const EVP_MD *md;
+    unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char decrypt_good;
+    size_t j;
 
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
     if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) {
@@ -465,12 +469,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
         return (0);
     }
 
-    if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) {
-        is_export = 1;
-        ek = 8;
-    } else
-        ek = 5;
-
     /*
      * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
      * 1 byte message type
@@ -484,12 +482,27 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
      *
      * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
      * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
-     * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
-     * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
-     * must be zero).
+     * this portion is in |num_encrypted_key_bytes|. If the cipher is not an
+     * export cipher, then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear
+     * key length must be zero).
      */
-    if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
-        (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+    key_length = (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+    if (key_length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+        ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) {
+        is_export = 1;
+        num_encrypted_key_bytes = 8;
+    } else if (is_export) {
+        num_encrypted_key_bytes = 5;
+    } else {
+        num_encrypted_key_bytes = key_length;
+    }
+
+    if (s->s2->tmp.clear + num_encrypted_key_bytes != key_length) {
         ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
         SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
         return -1;
@@ -499,64 +512,49 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
      * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
      * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
      */
-    if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
-        (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+    if (s->s2->tmp.enc < num_encrypted_key_bytes) {
         ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
         SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
         return -1;
     }
 
+    /*
+     * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+     * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+     * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+     * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
+     * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
+     */
+    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+                          (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
     i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
                                 &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
                                 &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
                                 (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
                                 RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
-    /* bad decrypt */
-# if 1
+    ERR_clear_error();
     /*
      * If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
      * secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
      */
-    if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
-                    || (is_export && i != (int)ek))) {
-        ERR_clear_error();
-        if (is_export)
-            i = ek;
-        else
-            i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0)
-            return 0;
-    }
-# else
-    if (i < 0) {
-        error = 1;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
-    }
-    /* incorrect number of key bytes for non export cipher */
-    else if ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-             || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear + i !=
-                                             EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))) {
-        error = 1;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS);
-    }
-    if (error) {
-        ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-        return (-1);
+    decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(i, (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes);
+    for (j = 0; j < num_encrypted_key_bytes; j++) {
+        p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j] =
+                constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j],
+                                       rand_premaster_secret[j]);
     }
-# endif
 
-    if (is_export)
-        i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+    s->session->master_key_length = (int)key_length;
+    memcpy(s->session->master_key, p, key_length);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(p, key_length);
 
-    if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
-        ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return -1;
-    }
-    s->session->master_key_length = i;
-    memcpy(s->session->master_key, p, (unsigned int)i);
-    return (1);
+    return 1;
 }
 
 static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
index c92fd721e..019e21cd0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
         i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
                                                   sender, slen,
                                                   s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
-        if (i == 0)
+        if (i <= 0)
             return 0;
         s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
         memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index f31dc046f..a0edcef90 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
      */
     if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) {
         /* First packet is even in size, so check */
-        if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) &&
+        if ((CRYPTO_memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) &&
             !(padding_length & 1)) {
             s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
         }
@@ -639,12 +639,22 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
 
     if (k > 0) {
         if (is_sslv3) {
+            unsigned overhang;
+
             /*
              * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
              * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header
-             * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5).
+             * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no
+             * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and
+             * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be
+             * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just
+             * in case
              */
-            unsigned overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
+            if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
+                /* Should never happen */
+                return;
+            }
+            overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
             md_transform(md_state.c, header);
             memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
             memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 91053d59e..2346ce50c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -168,6 +168,9 @@
 #endif
 
 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+#endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
@@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 
             if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 ret = -1;
                 goto end;
             }
@@ -245,10 +249,12 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
             if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
                 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -263,6 +269,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
             /* setup buffing BIO */
             if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -317,12 +324,24 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
             break;
         case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
         case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+            /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
+            ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
+            if (ret < 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (ret == 1) {
+                s->hit = 1;
+                s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+                s->init_num = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+#endif
             /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
             /* or PSK */
             if (!
                 (s->s3->tmp.
                  new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
-&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+                    && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
                 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
                 if (ret <= 0)
                     goto end;
@@ -358,6 +377,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
              */
             if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
             break;
@@ -381,6 +401,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
                 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
                     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
             }
@@ -472,6 +493,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 #endif
             if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -479,6 +501,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
                                                           SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
             {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -553,7 +576,8 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 
         case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
         case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-            s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+            if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+                s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
             ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
                                     SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
             if (ret <= 0)
@@ -612,6 +636,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
             goto end;
             /* break; */
 
+        case SSL_ST_ERR:
         default:
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
             ret = -1;
@@ -659,9 +684,17 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
     buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
     if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
         SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
-        if ((sess == NULL) ||
-            (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-            !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) {
+        if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+            !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+            /*
+             * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+             * "ticket" without a session ID.
+             */
+            (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+            (sess->not_resumable)) {
             if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
                 goto err;
         }
@@ -853,6 +886,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
     /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
     return ssl_do_write(s);
  err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -924,7 +958,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
             al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
             goto f_err;
         }
-        s->version = s->method->version;
+        s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
     }
 
     if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
@@ -952,10 +986,19 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
     }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
     /*
-     * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
-     * secret
+     * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+     * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+     * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+     * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+     * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+     * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+     * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+     * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+     * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+     * server wants to resume.
      */
-    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+    if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+        s->session->tlsext_tick) {
         SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
         s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
         if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
@@ -964,12 +1007,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                                      s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
             s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
                 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
-            s->hit = 1;
+        } else {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            goto f_err;
         }
     }
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
-    if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+    if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
         && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
         if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
             || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
@@ -980,12 +1026,13 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
             goto f_err;
         }
         s->hit = 1;
-    }
-    /* a miss or crap from the other end */
-    if (!s->hit) {
+    } else {
         /*
-         * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
-         * we don't stuff up other people
+         * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+         * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+         * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+         * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+         * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
          */
         if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
             if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
@@ -1113,6 +1160,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
  f_err:
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -1298,8 +1346,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
     if (0) {
  f_err:
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-    }
  err:
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    }
+
     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
     X509_free(x);
     sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
@@ -1621,6 +1671,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             goto err;
         }
+
+        if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
         s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
         rsa = NULL;
     }
@@ -1965,6 +2022,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
 #endif
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -2140,7 +2198,10 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
     ca_sk = NULL;
 
     ret = 1;
+    goto done;
  err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ done:
     if (ca_sk != NULL)
         sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
     return (ret);
@@ -2175,6 +2236,38 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
     }
 
     p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+    if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+        int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+        SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+        /*
+         * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+         * one
+         */
+        if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+            /*
+             * Remove the old session from the cache
+             */
+            if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
+                if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+                    s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+                                                      s->session);
+            } else {
+                /* We carry on if this fails */
+                SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = new_sess;
+    }
+
     n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
     n2s(p, ticklen);
     /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
@@ -2217,6 +2310,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
  f_err:
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -2277,6 +2371,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
     return 1;
  f_err:
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 #endif
@@ -2298,12 +2393,32 @@ int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
         /* should contain no data */
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
         return -1;
     }
     ret = 1;
     return (ret);
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *get_server_static_dh_key(SESS_CERT *scert)
+{
+    DH *dh_srvr = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
+    int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
+
+    if (idx >= 0)
+        spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+    if (spkey) {
+        dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
+    }
+    if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return dh_srvr;
+}
+#endif
+
 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 {
     unsigned char *p;
@@ -2546,25 +2661,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 goto err;
             }
 
-            if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+            if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
                 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
-            else {
-                /* we get them from the cert */
-                int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
-                EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
-                dh_srvr = NULL;
-                if (idx >= 0)
-                    spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
-                if (spkey) {
-                    dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
-                    EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
-                }
-                if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
-                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            } else {
+                dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(scert);
+                if (dh_srvr == NULL)
                     goto err;
-                }
             }
+
             if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
                 /* Use client certificate key */
                 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
@@ -2624,8 +2728,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             }
 
             DH_free(dh_clnt);
-
-            /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
         }
 #endif
 
@@ -2847,7 +2949,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
             EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
             /* Generate session key */
-            RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32);
+            if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+                EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+                goto err;
+            }
             /*
              * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
              */
@@ -3061,6 +3166,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
     EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
 #endif
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -3189,6 +3295,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
  err:
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -3252,6 +3359,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
             }
             if (i == 0) {
                 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 return 0;
             }
             s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
@@ -3312,6 +3420,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
                                      2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return 0;
         }
     }
@@ -3326,6 +3435,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
     int i, idx;
     long alg_k, alg_a;
     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int pkey_bits;
     SESS_CERT *sc;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
     RSA *rsa;
@@ -3333,6 +3443,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     DH *dh;
 #endif
+    int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 
     alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
     alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
@@ -3375,6 +3486,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
     }
 #endif
     pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+    pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
     i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 
@@ -3392,40 +3504,82 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
     }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
-        !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
-               SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
-        goto f_err;
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+        if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+            !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                   SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+            goto f_err;
+        } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+            if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+                if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                           SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                if (rsa != NULL) {
+                    /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+            }
+        }
     }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-    if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
-        !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
+        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto f_err;
-    } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+    }
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
                !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
         goto f_err;
     }
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-    else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
-             !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
+    if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+        !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
         goto f_err;
     }
 # endif
-#endif
 
-    if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+        int dh_size;
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+            dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+        } else {
+            DH *dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(sc);
+            if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+                goto f_err;
+            dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh_srvr->p);
+            DH_free(dh_srvr);
+        }
+
+        if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
+            || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+    if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+        pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
         if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
-            if (rsa == NULL
-                || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
+            if (rsa == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                       SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+                goto f_err;
+            } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
                 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+                /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
+                al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                        SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
                 goto f_err;
@@ -3433,14 +3587,21 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
         } else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-        if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
-            if (dh == NULL
-                || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+            if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
                 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+                /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
+                al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
                        SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
                 goto f_err;
             }
+        } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+            /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
+            al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+                   SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+                goto f_err;
         } else
 #endif
         {
@@ -3451,12 +3612,62 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
     }
     return (1);
  f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  err:
     return (0);
 }
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
+ * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
+ * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
+ * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
+ * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
+ * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
+ * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ok = 0;
+
+    if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
+        !s->session->tlsext_tick)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
+    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+    /*
+     * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
+     * so permit appropriate message length.
+     * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
+     * and not its length.
+     */
+    s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                               SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+                               SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+                               -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+    s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+    if (!ok)
+        return -1;
+
+    s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
+    if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+        ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 {
     unsigned int len, padding_len;
@@ -3479,8 +3690,8 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 
     return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
 }
-#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT &&
-                                 * !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
 {
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 28129f68d..5db349a23 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
 /* The DH ciphers */
 /* Cipher 0B */
     {
-     1,
+     0,
      SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
      SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
      SSL_kDHd,
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
 
 /* Cipher 0E */
     {
-     1,
+     0,
      SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
      SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
      SSL_kDHr,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 221ae039e..603c285ac 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -361,11 +361,22 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
             if (version != s->version) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
                 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
-                    && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+                    && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+                    if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+                        /*
+                         * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
+                         * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
+                         * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
+                         * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
+                         * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
+                         */
+                         goto err;
+                    }
                     /*
                      * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
                      */
                     s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+                }
                 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
                 goto f_err;
             }
@@ -708,7 +719,7 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
                 packlen *= 4;
 
             wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
-            if(!wb->buf) {
+            if (!wb->buf) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                 return -1;
             }
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index c016139b1..8885694c0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
             if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 return -1;
             }
             s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
@@ -273,11 +274,13 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
             if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
                 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
                     BUF_MEM_free(buf);
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
                 s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -285,6 +288,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
             if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -303,6 +307,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                  */
                 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
 
@@ -320,6 +325,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
                 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             } else {
                 /*
@@ -379,6 +385,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
                     ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
                     ret = -1;
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     goto end;
                 }
             }
@@ -529,9 +536,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                 skip = 1;
                 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
                 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-                if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-                    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+                    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+                        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                         return -1;
+                    }
+                }
             } else {
                 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
                 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
@@ -621,11 +631,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                  */
                 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     return -1;
                 }
                 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
-                if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+                    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                     return -1;
+                }
             } else {
                 int offset = 0;
                 int dgst_num;
@@ -639,9 +652,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                  * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
                  * step
                  */
-                if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-                    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+                    if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+                        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                         return -1;
+                    }
+                }
                 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
                     if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
                         int dgst_size;
@@ -657,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                         dgst_size =
                             EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
                         if (dgst_size < 0) {
+                            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                             ret = -1;
                             goto end;
                         }
@@ -667,15 +684,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
         case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
         case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-            /*
-             * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
-             * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
-             * to set this here because we don't know if we're
-             * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
-             */
-            if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-                s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-            /* we should decide if we expected this one */
             ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
             if (ret <= 0)
                 goto end;
@@ -695,11 +703,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
         case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
         case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
             /*
-             * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
-             * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
-             * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
-             * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
-             * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+             * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+             * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
+             * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
+             * cautious.
              * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
              * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
              * the client's Finished message is read.
@@ -718,10 +725,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
         case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
         case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
             /*
-             * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
-             * In a full handshake, we end up here through
-             * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
-             * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+             * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
+             * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
              * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
              * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
              * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
@@ -771,6 +776,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
             s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
             if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -787,6 +793,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                                           SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
             {
                 ret = -1;
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 goto end;
             }
 
@@ -849,6 +856,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
             goto end;
             /* break; */
 
+        case SSL_ST_ERR:
         default:
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
             ret = -1;
@@ -931,6 +939,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
     d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 
     /*
+     * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
+     * for session id length
+     */
+    if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /*
      * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
      * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
      */
@@ -962,6 +980,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
 
         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
         cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
 
         if (cookie_length == 0)
@@ -975,6 +999,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
     /* get the session-id */
     j = *(p++);
 
+    if (p + j > d + n) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
     s->hit = 0;
     /*
      * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
@@ -1019,8 +1049,19 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
         /* cookie stuff */
+        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
         cookie_len = *(p++);
 
+        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
         /*
          * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
          * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
@@ -1086,27 +1127,33 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         }
     }
 
+    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
     n2s(p, i);
-    if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
-        /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
+
+    if (i == 0) {
         al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
         goto f_err;
     }
-    if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
+
+    /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
         /* not enough data */
         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
         goto f_err;
     }
-    if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
-                    == NULL)) {
+    if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
         goto err;
     }
     p += i;
 
     /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
-    if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
+    if (s->hit) {
         j = 0;
         id = s->session->cipher->id;
 
@@ -1335,8 +1382,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
             sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
         s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
         if (ciphers == NULL) {
-            al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             goto f_err;
         }
         ciphers = NULL;
@@ -1424,8 +1471,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
     if (0) {
  f_err:
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-    }
  err:
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    }
+
     if (ciphers != NULL)
         sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
     return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
@@ -1443,8 +1492,10 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
         buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
         p = s->s3->server_random;
-        if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+        if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return -1;
+        }
 #endif
         /* Do the message type and length last */
         d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
@@ -1479,6 +1530,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
         sl = s->session->session_id_length;
         if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return -1;
         }
         *(p++) = sl;
@@ -1501,6 +1553,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
         if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return -1;
         }
         if ((p =
@@ -1508,6 +1561,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
                                         &al)) == NULL) {
             ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return -1;
         }
 #endif
@@ -1970,6 +2024,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 #endif
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -2063,6 +2118,7 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
     /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
     return ssl_do_write(s);
  err:
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -2355,6 +2411,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         int padl, outl;
         krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
         krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+        int kerr = 0;
 
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
 
@@ -2458,23 +2515,27 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                    SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-            goto err;
+            kerr = 1;
+            goto kclean;
         }
         if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                    SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-            goto err;
+            kerr = 1;
+            goto kclean;
         }
         if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                    SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-            goto err;
+            kerr = 1;
+            goto kclean;
         }
         outl += padl;
         if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                    SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-            goto err;
+            kerr = 1;
+            goto kclean;
         }
         if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
               && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
@@ -2491,7 +2552,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-                goto err;
+                kerr = 1;
+                goto kclean;
             }
         }
 
@@ -2517,6 +2579,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
          *  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
          *  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
          */
+
+ kclean:
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
+        if (kerr)
+            goto err;
     } else
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
@@ -2835,6 +2902,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                                         s->
                                                         session->master_key,
                                                         premaster_secret, 32);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
         /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
         if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
             (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
@@ -2867,6 +2935,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
     BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 #endif
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -2882,39 +2951,31 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
     EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
 
+    /*
+     * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
+     * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
+     * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
+     * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
+     * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
+     * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
+     */
+    if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+        ret = 1;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
     n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                                    SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
                                    SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-                                   -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+                                   SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+                                   SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
 
     if (!ok)
         return ((int)n);
 
-    if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
-        peer = s->session->peer;
-        pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
-        type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
-    } else {
-        peer = NULL;
-        pkey = NULL;
-    }
-
-    if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
-        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-        if (peer != NULL) {
-            al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
-            goto f_err;
-        }
-        ret = 1;
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (peer == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
-        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-        goto f_err;
-    }
+    peer = s->session->peer;
+    pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+    type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
 
     if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
@@ -2923,12 +2984,6 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
         goto f_err;
     }
 
-    if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
-        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-        goto f_err;
-    }
-
     /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
     /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
@@ -3069,6 +3124,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
     if (0) {
  f_err:
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     }
  end:
     if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
@@ -3227,8 +3283,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
     if (0) {
  f_err:
         ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-    }
  err:
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+    }
+
     if (x != NULL)
         X509_free(x);
     if (sk != NULL)
@@ -3248,12 +3306,14 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
                 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
                 return (0);
             }
         }
 
         if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return (0);
         }
         s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
@@ -3287,11 +3347,15 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
          * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
          * long
          */
-        if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
+        if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return -1;
+        }
         senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
-        if (!senc)
+        if (!senc) {
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return -1;
+        }
 
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
         HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
@@ -3391,10 +3455,10 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
         /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
         /* Total length */
         len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
-        ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
         /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
         p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
         s2n(len - 6, p);
+        ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
         s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
         OPENSSL_free(senc);
     }
@@ -3406,6 +3470,7 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
         OPENSSL_free(senc);
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
     HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return -1;
 }
 
@@ -3419,8 +3484,10 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
          * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
          * + (ocsp response)
          */
-        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
+            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
             return -1;
+        }
 
         p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 
@@ -3463,6 +3530,7 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
     if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
                SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
         return -1;
     }
 
@@ -3482,11 +3550,14 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
      */
     if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
         return -1;
     }
 
-    if (n < 2)
+    if (n < 2) {
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
         return 0;               /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+    }
 
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 
@@ -3498,15 +3569,20 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
      *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
      */
     proto_len = p[0];
-    if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+    if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
         return 0;
+    }
     padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
-    if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
+    if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
         return 0;
+    }
 
     s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
     if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
         return 0;
     }
     memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index a6d845dc9..6fe1a2474 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1727,6 +1727,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define SSL_ST_BEFORE                   0x4000
 # define SSL_ST_OK                       0x03
 # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE              (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
+# define SSL_ST_ERR                      0x05
 
 # define SSL_CB_LOOP                     0x01
 # define SSL_CB_EXIT                     0x02
@@ -2640,6 +2641,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY                      107
 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED                        108
 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO                           109
+# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY                   340
 # define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY                          110
 # define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION                            111
 # define SSL_F_READ_N                                     112
@@ -2670,6 +2672,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE                   129
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM              130
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO                    304
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED                        339
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO                          131
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT                               132
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL                                  213
@@ -2784,6 +2787,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT                     188
 # define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT                320
 # define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT                321
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP                            348
 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW                            189
 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP                       190
 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT                312
@@ -2904,6 +2908,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG                       146
 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED                          147
 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC        281
+# define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           372
 # define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG            148
 # define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED                        149
 # define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG                       334
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index ab3aa2337..1a6030e62 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED), "GET_SERVER_FINISHED"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY), "GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY), "GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION), "i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N), "READ_N"},
@@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),
      "ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO), "ssl3_check_client_hello"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED), "SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "ssl3_client_hello"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "ssl3_connect"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "ssl3_ctrl"},
@@ -310,6 +312,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
      "SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
      "SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
     {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),
@@ -458,6 +461,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
      "decryption failed or bad record mac"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
      "dh public value length is wrong"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"},
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index e9ad2bc81..c0931e787 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1510,9 +1510,13 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
                SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
         return (NULL);
     }
-    if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+    if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
         sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
-    else {
+        if(sk == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else {
         sk = *skp;
         sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
     }
@@ -2326,7 +2330,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
     if (dh_dsa_export)
         emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
 
-    if (emask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
+    if (mask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
         mask_a |= SSL_aDH;
 
     if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
@@ -2832,6 +2836,12 @@ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
         return ("SSLv3");
     else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
         return ("SSLv2");
+    else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return ("DTLSv0.9");
+    else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+        return ("DTLSv1");
+    else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return ("DTLSv1.2");
     else
         return ("unknown");
 }
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 79b85b9ed..6c2c551e5 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
 int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
 int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len,
                          const unsigned char *limit);
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
 int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
 DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
 int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
@@ -1230,7 +1231,6 @@ int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
 
 int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b);
-int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
 int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
 int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
 int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 1e1002fc8..07e7379ab 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -227,6 +227,130 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
     return (ss);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+    dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
+    if (dest == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+    memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+
+    /*
+     * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
+     * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    dest->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+    dest->ciphers = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+    dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+    dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    dest->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+    memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
+
+    /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
+    dest->prev = NULL;
+    dest->next = NULL;
+
+    dest->references = 1;
+
+    if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+
+    if (src->peer != NULL)
+        CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
+        dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (src->psk_identity) {
+        dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
+        if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if(src->ciphers != NULL) {
+        dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
+        if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+                                            &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    if (src->tlsext_hostname) {
+        dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
+        if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+        dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+            BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                       src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+        if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+        dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+            BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                       src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+        if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+    if (ticket != 0) {
+        dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
+        if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+        dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    if (src->srp_username) {
+        dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
+        if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    return dest;
+err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
 const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
                                         unsigned int *len)
 {
@@ -449,9 +573,14 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
     int r;
 #endif
 
-    if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+    if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
         goto err;
 
+    if (session_id + len > limit) {
+        fatal = 1;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     if (len == 0)
         try_session_cache = 0;
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
index d725d7834..1b9069f97 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s)
     case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
         str = "ok/accept SSL initialization";
         break;
+    case SSL_ST_ERR:
+        str = "error";
+        break;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
     case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
         str = "SSLv2 client start encryption";
@@ -496,6 +499,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s)
     case SSL_ST_OK:
         str = "SSLOK ";
         break;
+    case SSL_ST_ERR:
+        str = "SSLERR";
+        break;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
     case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
         str = "2CSENC";
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
index 9f5d58624..6737adf23 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -692,7 +692,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
             " -bytes <val>  - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n");
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     fprintf(stderr,
-            " -dhe1024      - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE\n");
+            " -dhe512       - use 512 bit key for DHE (to test failure)\n");
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            " -dhe1024      - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE (default, no-op)\n");
     fprintf(stderr,
             " -dhe1024dsa   - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n");
     fprintf(stderr, " -no_dhe       - disable DHE\n");
@@ -716,6 +718,10 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
     fprintf(stderr, " -tls1         - use TLSv1\n");
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    fprintf(stderr, " -dtls1        - use DTLSv1\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, " -dtls12       - use DTLSv1.2\n");
+#endif
     fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
     fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
     fprintf(stderr, " -cert arg     - Server certificate file\n");
@@ -877,7 +883,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
     int badop = 0;
     int bio_pair = 0;
     int force = 0;
-    int tls1 = 0, ssl2 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
+    int dtls1 = 0, dtls12 = 0, tls1 = 0, ssl2 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
     int client_auth = 0;
     int server_auth = 0, i;
     struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
@@ -897,7 +903,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
     long bytes = 256L;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     DH *dh;
-    int dhe1024 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
+    int dhe512 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
     EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
@@ -977,19 +983,19 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
             debug = 1;
         else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reuse") == 0)
             reuse = 1;
-        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024") == 0) {
+        else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe512") == 0) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-            dhe1024 = 1;
+            dhe512 = 1;
 #else
             fprintf(stderr,
-                    "ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+                    "ignoring -dhe512, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
 #endif
         } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024dsa") == 0) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
             dhe1024dsa = 1;
 #else
             fprintf(stderr,
-                    "ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+                    "ignoring -dhe1024dsa, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
 #endif
         } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0)
             no_dhe = 1;
@@ -1037,6 +1043,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
             no_protocol = 1;
 #endif
             ssl3 = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+            dtls1 = 1;
+        } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls12") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+            no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+            dtls12 = 1;
         } else if (strncmp(*argv, "-num", 4) == 0) {
             if (--argc < 1)
                 goto bad;
@@ -1172,8 +1188,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
         goto end;
     }
 
-    if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 > 1) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
+    if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 + dtls1 + dtls12 > 1) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls1 or -dtls12 should "
                 "be requested.\n");
         EXIT(1);
     }
@@ -1190,10 +1206,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
         goto end;
     }
 
-    if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
+    if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && !dtls1 && !dtls12 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
         fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work.  Use -f to perform "
                 "the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
-                "or add one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -reuse\n"
+                "or add one of ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls1, -dtls12, -reuse\n"
                 "to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
         EXIT(1);
     }
@@ -1271,6 +1287,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
         meth = SSLv3_method();
     else
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+    if (dtls1)
+        meth = DTLSv1_method();
+    else if (dtls12)
+        meth = DTLSv1_2_method();
+    else
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
     if (tls1)
         meth = TLSv1_method();
@@ -1297,10 +1320,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
              */
             SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
             dh = get_dh1024dsa();
-        } else if (dhe1024)
-            dh = get_dh1024();
-        else
+        } else if (dhe512)
             dh = get_dh512();
+        else
+            dh = get_dh1024();
         SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh);
         DH_free(dh);
     }
@@ -1318,12 +1341,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
                 BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
                 goto end;
             }
-        } else
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+        } else {
             nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
-# else
-            nid = NID_sect163r2;
-# endif
+        }
 
         ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
         if (ecdh == NULL) {
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 577885fe0..e2a8f8691 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
         if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
             count++;
     }
-    if(!count) {
+    if (!count) {
         /* Should never happen */
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
@@ -404,9 +404,9 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
         }
 #endif
         /*
-         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
          */
-        if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
             memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
         mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
         mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
@@ -442,9 +442,9 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
         }
 #endif
         /*
-         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+         * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
          */
-        if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+        if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
             memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
         mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
         mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
 
         if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
-            unsigned char buf[13], *seq;
+            unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
 
             seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
 
@@ -827,7 +827,10 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
             buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
             buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
             buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
-            pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
+            pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+                                      EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
+            if (pad <= 0)
+                return -1;
             if (send) {
                 l += pad;
                 rec->length += pad;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index d85d26e59..210a5e874 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -113,9 +113,11 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
 # include <openssl/ec.h>
 #endif
+#endif
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
@@ -260,47 +262,68 @@ static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
     TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
 };
 
-static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-    0, 14,                      /* sect571r1 (14) */
-    0, 13,                      /* sect571k1 (13) */
-# endif
+/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
+static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
+    /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+    0, 23,                      /* secp256r1 (23) */
+    /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
     0, 25,                      /* secp521r1 (25) */
     0, 28,                      /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+    0, 27,                      /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+    0, 24,                      /* secp384r1 (24) */
+    0, 26,                      /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+    0, 22,                      /* secp256k1 (22) */
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
+    0, 14,                      /* sect571r1 (14) */
+    0, 13,                      /* sect571k1 (13) */
     0, 11,                      /* sect409k1 (11) */
     0, 12,                      /* sect409r1 (12) */
+    0, 9,                       /* sect283k1 (9) */
+    0, 10,                      /* sect283r1 (10) */
 # endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
+    /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+    0, 23,                      /* secp256r1 (23) */
+    /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
+    0, 25,                      /* secp521r1 (25) */
+    0, 28,                      /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
     0, 27,                      /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
     0, 24,                      /* secp384r1 (24) */
+    0, 26,                      /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+    0, 22,                      /* secp256k1 (22) */
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
+    0, 14,                      /* sect571r1 (14) */
+    0, 13,                      /* sect571k1 (13) */
+    0, 11,                      /* sect409k1 (11) */
+    0, 12,                      /* sect409r1 (12) */
     0, 9,                       /* sect283k1 (9) */
     0, 10,                      /* sect283r1 (10) */
 # endif
-    0, 26,                      /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
-    0, 22,                      /* secp256k1 (22) */
-    0, 23,                      /* secp256r1 (23) */
+    /*
+     * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
+     * via an explicit callback or parameters.
+     */
+    0, 20,                      /* secp224k1 (20) */
+    0, 21,                      /* secp224r1 (21) */
+    0, 18,                      /* secp192k1 (18) */
+    0, 19,                      /* secp192r1 (19) */
+    0, 15,                      /* secp160k1 (15) */
+    0, 16,                      /* secp160r1 (16) */
+    0, 17,                      /* secp160r2 (17) */
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     0, 8,                       /* sect239k1 (8) */
     0, 6,                       /* sect233k1 (6) */
     0, 7,                       /* sect233r1 (7) */
-# endif
-    0, 20,                      /* secp224k1 (20) */
-    0, 21,                      /* secp224r1 (21) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     0, 4,                       /* sect193r1 (4) */
     0, 5,                       /* sect193r2 (5) */
-# endif
-    0, 18,                      /* secp192k1 (18) */
-    0, 19,                      /* secp192r1 (19) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
     0, 1,                       /* sect163k1 (1) */
     0, 2,                       /* sect163r1 (2) */
     0, 3,                       /* sect163r2 (3) */
 # endif
-    0, 15,                      /* secp160k1 (15) */
-    0, 16,                      /* secp160r1 (16) */
-    0, 17,                      /* secp160r2 (17) */
 };
 
 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
@@ -474,8 +497,13 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
             } else
 # endif
             {
-                *pcurves = eccurves_default;
-                pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
+                if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
+                    *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
+                    pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
+                } else {
+                    *pcurves = eccurves_all;
+                    pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
+                }
             }
         }
     }
@@ -565,6 +593,20 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
         (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
          &num_pref))
         return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
+
+    /*
+     * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
+     * are allowed.
+     */
+    if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
+        supp = eccurves_all;
+        num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
+    } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
+        (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
+        pref = eccurves_all;
+        num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
+    }
+
     k = 0;
     for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
         const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
@@ -761,6 +803,16 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
     for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
         if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
             return 0;
+        if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
+            /*
+             * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
+             * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
+             * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
+             * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
+             * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
+             */
+            break;
+        }
         for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
             if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
                 break;
@@ -1964,19 +2016,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
 
     s->srtp_profile = NULL;
 
-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+    if (data == d + n)
         goto ri_check;
+
+    if (data > (d + n - 2))
+        goto err;
+
     n2s(data, len);
 
     if (data > (d + n - len))
-        goto ri_check;
+        goto err;
 
     while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
         n2s(data, type);
         n2s(data, size);
 
         if (data + size > (d + n))
-            goto ri_check;
+            goto err;
 # if 0
         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
 # endif
@@ -2012,16 +2068,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
             int servname_type;
             int dsize;
 
-            if (size < 2) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (size < 2)
+                goto err;
             n2s(data, dsize);
             size -= 2;
-            if (dsize > size) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (dsize > size)
+                goto err;
 
             sdata = data;
             while (dsize > 3) {
@@ -2029,18 +2081,16 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
                 n2s(sdata, len);
                 dsize -= 3;
 
-                if (len > dsize) {
-                    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                    return 0;
-                }
+                if (len > dsize)
+                    goto err;
+
                 if (s->servername_done == 0)
                     switch (servname_type) {
                     case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
                         if (!s->hit) {
-                            if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
-                                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                                return 0;
-                            }
+                            if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+                                goto err;
+
                             if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
                                 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
                                 return 0;
@@ -2074,31 +2124,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
 
                 dsize -= len;
             }
-            if (dsize != 0) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (dsize != 0)
+                goto err;
 
         }
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
         else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
-            if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
-            if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
+                goto err;
+            if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+                goto err;
             if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
                 return -1;
             memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
             s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
 
-            if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
+                goto err;
         }
 # endif
 
@@ -2108,10 +2150,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
             int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
 
             if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
-                ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
-                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+                ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
+                goto err;
             if (!s->hit) {
                 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
                     OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
@@ -2145,15 +2185,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
             if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
                 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
                 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
-                ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
-                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+                ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
+                    goto err;
+
             if (!s->hit) {
-                if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
-                    *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                    return 0;
-                }
+                if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+                    goto err;
+
                 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
                 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
                      OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
@@ -2221,26 +2259,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
             renegotiate_seen = 1;
         } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
             int dsize;
-            if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
+                goto err;
             n2s(data, dsize);
             size -= 2;
-            if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
-            if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
+                goto err;
+            if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
+                goto err;
         } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
 
-            if (size < 5) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
+            if (size < 5)
+                goto err;
 
             s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
             size--;
@@ -2250,35 +2280,26 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
                 /* Read in responder_id_list */
                 n2s(data, dsize);
                 size -= 2;
-                if (dsize > size) {
-                    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                    return 0;
-                }
+                if (dsize > size)
+                    goto err;
                 while (dsize > 0) {
                     OCSP_RESPID *id;
                     int idsize;
-                    if (dsize < 4) {
-                        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        return 0;
-                    }
+                    if (dsize < 4)
+                        goto err;
                     n2s(data, idsize);
                     dsize -= 2 + idsize;
                     size -= 2 + idsize;
-                    if (dsize < 0) {
-                        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        return 0;
-                    }
+                    if (dsize < 0)
+                        goto err;
                     sdata = data;
                     data += idsize;
                     id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
-                    if (!id) {
-                        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        return 0;
-                    }
+                    if (!id)
+                        goto err;
                     if (data != sdata) {
                         OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
-                        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        return 0;
+                        goto err;
                     }
                     if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
                         && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
@@ -2295,16 +2316,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
                 }
 
                 /* Read in request_extensions */
-                if (size < 2) {
-                    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                    return 0;
-                }
+                if (size < 2)
+                    goto err;
                 n2s(data, dsize);
                 size -= 2;
-                if (dsize != size) {
-                    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                    return 0;
-                }
+                if (dsize != size)
+                    goto err;
                 sdata = data;
                 if (dsize > 0) {
                     if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
@@ -2314,10 +2331,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
 
                     s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
                         d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
-                    if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
-                        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        return 0;
-                    }
+                    if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
+                        goto err;
                 }
             }
             /*
@@ -2389,6 +2404,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
         data += size;
     }
 
+    /* Spurious data on the end */
+    if (data != d + n)
+        goto err;
+
     *p = data;
 
  ri_check:
@@ -2404,6 +2423,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
     }
 
     return 1;
+err:
+    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3837,7 +3859,10 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
         memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
         bp += payload;
         /* Random padding */
-        RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+            OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+            return -1;
+        }
 
         r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
                              3 + payload + padding);
@@ -3872,7 +3897,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 {
     unsigned char *buf, *p;
-    int ret;
+    int ret = -1;
     unsigned int payload = 18;  /* Sequence number + random bytes */
     unsigned int padding = 16;  /* Use minimum padding */
 
@@ -3920,10 +3945,16 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
     /* Sequence number */
     s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
     /* 16 random bytes */
-    RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
     p += 16;
     /* Random padding */
-    RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+    if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
 
     ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
     if (ret >= 0) {
@@ -3935,6 +3966,7 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
         s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
     }
 
+err:
     OPENSSL_free(buf);
 
     return ret;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
index d36cfa0a5..bb719ba4c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -454,7 +454,8 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
 {
     unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
-    RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+    if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
+        return -1;
     s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
     OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));