Added plink tool (version without console, except if output is generated)

Added possibility to build console application or windows application in makefile.after

1 files changed, 1010 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/plink/sshrsa.c b/tools/plink/sshrsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d06e9d6f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/plink/sshrsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1010 @@
+/*

+ * RSA implementation for PuTTY.

+ */

+

+#include <stdio.h>

+#include <stdlib.h>

+#include <string.h>

+#include <assert.h>

+

+#include "ssh.h"

+#include "misc.h"

+

+int makekey(unsigned char *data, int len, struct RSAKey *result,

+	    unsigned char **keystr, int order)

+{

+    unsigned char *p = data;

+    int i, n;

+

+    if (len < 4)

+	return -1;

+

+    if (result) {

+	result->bits = 0;

+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)

+	    result->bits = (result->bits << 8) + *p++;

+    } else

+	p += 4;

+

+    len -= 4;

+

+    /*

+     * order=0 means exponent then modulus (the keys sent by the

+     * server). order=1 means modulus then exponent (the keys

+     * stored in a keyfile).

+     */

+

+    if (order == 0) {

+	n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, len, result ? &result->exponent : NULL);

+	if (n < 0) return -1;

+	p += n;

+	len -= n;

+    }

+

+    n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, len, result ? &result->modulus : NULL);

+    if (n < 0 || (result && bignum_bitcount(result->modulus) == 0)) return -1;

+    if (result)

+	result->bytes = n - 2;

+    if (keystr)

+	*keystr = p + 2;

+    p += n;

+    len -= n;

+

+    if (order == 1) {

+	n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, len, result ? &result->exponent : NULL);

+	if (n < 0) return -1;

+	p += n;

+	len -= n;

+    }

+    return p - data;

+}

+

+int makeprivate(unsigned char *data, int len, struct RSAKey *result)

+{

+    return ssh1_read_bignum(data, len, &result->private_exponent);

+}

+

+int rsaencrypt(unsigned char *data, int length, struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    Bignum b1, b2;

+    int i;

+    unsigned char *p;

+

+    if (key->bytes < length + 4)

+	return 0;		       /* RSA key too short! */

+

+    memmove(data + key->bytes - length, data, length);

+    data[0] = 0;

+    data[1] = 2;

+

+    for (i = 2; i < key->bytes - length - 1; i++) {

+	do {

+	    data[i] = random_byte();

+	} while (data[i] == 0);

+    }

+    data[key->bytes - length - 1] = 0;

+

+    b1 = bignum_from_bytes(data, key->bytes);

+

+    b2 = modpow(b1, key->exponent, key->modulus);

+

+    p = data;

+    for (i = key->bytes; i--;) {

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(b2, i);

+    }

+

+    freebn(b1);

+    freebn(b2);

+

+    return 1;

+}

+

+static void sha512_mpint(SHA512_State * s, Bignum b)

+{

+    unsigned char lenbuf[4];

+    int len;

+    len = (bignum_bitcount(b) + 8) / 8;

+    PUT_32BIT(lenbuf, len);

+    SHA512_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 4);

+    while (len-- > 0) {

+	lenbuf[0] = bignum_byte(b, len);

+	SHA512_Bytes(s, lenbuf, 1);

+    }

+    memset(lenbuf, 0, sizeof(lenbuf));

+}

+

+/*

+ * This function is a wrapper on modpow(). It has the same effect

+ * as modpow(), but employs RSA blinding to protect against timing

+ * attacks.

+ */

+static Bignum rsa_privkey_op(Bignum input, struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    Bignum random, random_encrypted, random_inverse;

+    Bignum input_blinded, ret_blinded;

+    Bignum ret;

+

+    SHA512_State ss;

+    unsigned char digest512[64];

+    int digestused = lenof(digest512);

+    int hashseq = 0;

+

+    /*

+     * Start by inventing a random number chosen uniformly from the

+     * range 2..modulus-1. (We do this by preparing a random number

+     * of the right length and retrying if it's greater than the

+     * modulus, to prevent any potential Bleichenbacher-like

+     * attacks making use of the uneven distribution within the

+     * range that would arise from just reducing our number mod n.

+     * There are timing implications to the potential retries, of

+     * course, but all they tell you is the modulus, which you

+     * already knew.)

+     * 

+     * To preserve determinism and avoid Pageant needing to share

+     * the random number pool, we actually generate this `random'

+     * number by hashing stuff with the private key.

+     */

+    while (1) {

+	int bits, byte, bitsleft, v;

+	random = copybn(key->modulus);

+	/*

+	 * Find the topmost set bit. (This function will return its

+	 * index plus one.) Then we'll set all bits from that one

+	 * downwards randomly.

+	 */

+	bits = bignum_bitcount(random);

+	byte = 0;

+	bitsleft = 0;

+	while (bits--) {

+	    if (bitsleft <= 0) {

+		bitsleft = 8;

+		/*

+		 * Conceptually the following few lines are equivalent to

+		 *    byte = random_byte();

+		 */

+		if (digestused >= lenof(digest512)) {

+		    unsigned char seqbuf[4];

+		    PUT_32BIT(seqbuf, hashseq);

+		    SHA512_Init(&ss);

+		    SHA512_Bytes(&ss, "RSA deterministic blinding", 26);

+		    SHA512_Bytes(&ss, seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));

+		    sha512_mpint(&ss, key->private_exponent);

+		    SHA512_Final(&ss, digest512);

+		    hashseq++;

+

+		    /*

+		     * Now hash that digest plus the signature

+		     * input.

+		     */

+		    SHA512_Init(&ss);

+		    SHA512_Bytes(&ss, digest512, sizeof(digest512));

+		    sha512_mpint(&ss, input);

+		    SHA512_Final(&ss, digest512);

+

+		    digestused = 0;

+		}

+		byte = digest512[digestused++];

+	    }

+	    v = byte & 1;

+	    byte >>= 1;

+	    bitsleft--;

+	    bignum_set_bit(random, bits, v);

+	}

+

+	/*

+	 * Now check that this number is strictly greater than

+	 * zero, and strictly less than modulus.

+	 */

+	if (bignum_cmp(random, Zero) <= 0 ||

+	    bignum_cmp(random, key->modulus) >= 0) {

+	    freebn(random);

+	    continue;

+	} else {

+	    break;

+	}

+    }

+

+    /*

+     * RSA blinding relies on the fact that (xy)^d mod n is equal

+     * to (x^d mod n) * (y^d mod n) mod n. We invent a random pair

+     * y and y^d; then we multiply x by y, raise to the power d mod

+     * n as usual, and divide by y^d to recover x^d. Thus an

+     * attacker can't correlate the timing of the modpow with the

+     * input, because they don't know anything about the number

+     * that was input to the actual modpow.

+     * 

+     * The clever bit is that we don't have to do a huge modpow to

+     * get y and y^d; we will use the number we just invented as

+     * _y^d_, and use the _public_ exponent to compute (y^d)^e = y

+     * from it, which is much faster to do.

+     */

+    random_encrypted = modpow(random, key->exponent, key->modulus);

+    random_inverse = modinv(random, key->modulus);

+    input_blinded = modmul(input, random_encrypted, key->modulus);

+    ret_blinded = modpow(input_blinded, key->private_exponent, key->modulus);

+    ret = modmul(ret_blinded, random_inverse, key->modulus);

+

+    freebn(ret_blinded);

+    freebn(input_blinded);

+    freebn(random_inverse);

+    freebn(random_encrypted);

+    freebn(random);

+

+    return ret;

+}

+

+Bignum rsadecrypt(Bignum input, struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    return rsa_privkey_op(input, key);

+}

+

+int rsastr_len(struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    Bignum md, ex;

+    int mdlen, exlen;

+

+    md = key->modulus;

+    ex = key->exponent;

+    mdlen = (bignum_bitcount(md) + 15) / 16;

+    exlen = (bignum_bitcount(ex) + 15) / 16;

+    return 4 * (mdlen + exlen) + 20;

+}

+

+void rsastr_fmt(char *str, struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    Bignum md, ex;

+    int len = 0, i, nibbles;

+    static const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";

+

+    md = key->modulus;

+    ex = key->exponent;

+

+    len += sprintf(str + len, "0x");

+

+    nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(ex)) / 4;

+    if (nibbles < 1)

+	nibbles = 1;

+    for (i = nibbles; i--;)

+	str[len++] = hex[(bignum_byte(ex, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];

+

+    len += sprintf(str + len, ",0x");

+

+    nibbles = (3 + bignum_bitcount(md)) / 4;

+    if (nibbles < 1)

+	nibbles = 1;

+    for (i = nibbles; i--;)

+	str[len++] = hex[(bignum_byte(md, i / 2) >> (4 * (i % 2))) & 0xF];

+

+    str[len] = '\0';

+}

+

+/*

+ * Generate a fingerprint string for the key. Compatible with the

+ * OpenSSH fingerprint code.

+ */

+void rsa_fingerprint(char *str, int len, struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    struct MD5Context md5c;

+    unsigned char digest[16];

+    char buffer[16 * 3 + 40];

+    int numlen, slen, i;

+

+    MD5Init(&md5c);

+    numlen = ssh1_bignum_length(key->modulus) - 2;

+    for (i = numlen; i--;) {

+	unsigned char c = bignum_byte(key->modulus, i);

+	MD5Update(&md5c, &c, 1);

+    }

+    numlen = ssh1_bignum_length(key->exponent) - 2;

+    for (i = numlen; i--;) {

+	unsigned char c = bignum_byte(key->exponent, i);

+	MD5Update(&md5c, &c, 1);

+    }

+    MD5Final(digest, &md5c);

+

+    sprintf(buffer, "%d ", bignum_bitcount(key->modulus));

+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)

+	sprintf(buffer + strlen(buffer), "%s%02x", i ? ":" : "",

+		digest[i]);

+    strncpy(str, buffer, len);

+    str[len - 1] = '\0';

+    slen = strlen(str);

+    if (key->comment && slen < len - 1) {

+	str[slen] = ' ';

+	strncpy(str + slen + 1, key->comment, len - slen - 1);

+	str[len - 1] = '\0';

+    }

+}

+

+/*

+ * Verify that the public data in an RSA key matches the private

+ * data. We also check the private data itself: we ensure that p >

+ * q and that iqmp really is the inverse of q mod p.

+ */

+int rsa_verify(struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    Bignum n, ed, pm1, qm1;

+    int cmp;

+

+    /* n must equal pq. */

+    n = bigmul(key->p, key->q);

+    cmp = bignum_cmp(n, key->modulus);

+    freebn(n);

+    if (cmp != 0)

+	return 0;

+

+    /* e * d must be congruent to 1, modulo (p-1) and modulo (q-1). */

+    pm1 = copybn(key->p);

+    decbn(pm1);

+    ed = modmul(key->exponent, key->private_exponent, pm1);

+    cmp = bignum_cmp(ed, One);

+    sfree(ed);

+    if (cmp != 0)

+	return 0;

+

+    qm1 = copybn(key->q);

+    decbn(qm1);

+    ed = modmul(key->exponent, key->private_exponent, qm1);

+    cmp = bignum_cmp(ed, One);

+    sfree(ed);

+    if (cmp != 0)

+	return 0;

+

+    /*

+     * Ensure p > q.

+     *

+     * I have seen key blobs in the wild which were generated with

+     * p < q, so instead of rejecting the key in this case we

+     * should instead flip them round into the canonical order of

+     * p > q. This also involves regenerating iqmp.

+     */

+    if (bignum_cmp(key->p, key->q) <= 0) {

+	Bignum tmp = key->p;

+	key->p = key->q;

+	key->q = tmp;

+

+	freebn(key->iqmp);

+	key->iqmp = modinv(key->q, key->p);

+    }

+

+    /*

+     * Ensure iqmp * q is congruent to 1, modulo p.

+     */

+    n = modmul(key->iqmp, key->q, key->p);

+    cmp = bignum_cmp(n, One);

+    sfree(n);

+    if (cmp != 0)

+	return 0;

+

+    return 1;

+}

+

+/* Public key blob as used by Pageant: exponent before modulus. */

+unsigned char *rsa_public_blob(struct RSAKey *key, int *len)

+{

+    int length, pos;

+    unsigned char *ret;

+

+    length = (ssh1_bignum_length(key->modulus) +

+	      ssh1_bignum_length(key->exponent) + 4);

+    ret = snewn(length, unsigned char);

+

+    PUT_32BIT(ret, bignum_bitcount(key->modulus));

+    pos = 4;

+    pos += ssh1_write_bignum(ret + pos, key->exponent);

+    pos += ssh1_write_bignum(ret + pos, key->modulus);

+

+    *len = length;

+    return ret;

+}

+

+/* Given a public blob, determine its length. */

+int rsa_public_blob_len(void *data, int maxlen)

+{

+    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)data;

+    int n;

+

+    if (maxlen < 4)

+	return -1;

+    p += 4;			       /* length word */

+    maxlen -= 4;

+

+    n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, maxlen, NULL);    /* exponent */

+    if (n < 0)

+	return -1;

+    p += n;

+

+    n = ssh1_read_bignum(p, maxlen, NULL);    /* modulus */

+    if (n < 0)

+	return -1;

+    p += n;

+

+    return p - (unsigned char *)data;

+}

+

+void freersakey(struct RSAKey *key)

+{

+    if (key->modulus)

+	freebn(key->modulus);

+    if (key->exponent)

+	freebn(key->exponent);

+    if (key->private_exponent)

+	freebn(key->private_exponent);

+    if (key->p)

+	freebn(key->p);

+    if (key->q)

+	freebn(key->q);

+    if (key->iqmp)

+	freebn(key->iqmp);

+    if (key->comment)

+	sfree(key->comment);

+}

+

+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------

+ * Implementation of the ssh-rsa signing key type. 

+ */

+

+static void getstring(char **data, int *datalen, char **p, int *length)

+{

+    *p = NULL;

+    if (*datalen < 4)

+	return;

+    *length = GET_32BIT(*data);

+    *datalen -= 4;

+    *data += 4;

+    if (*datalen < *length)

+	return;

+    *p = *data;

+    *data += *length;

+    *datalen -= *length;

+}

+static Bignum getmp(char **data, int *datalen)

+{

+    char *p;

+    int length;

+    Bignum b;

+

+    getstring(data, datalen, &p, &length);

+    if (!p)

+	return NULL;

+    b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);

+    return b;

+}

+

+static void *rsa2_newkey(char *data, int len)

+{

+    char *p;

+    int slen;

+    struct RSAKey *rsa;

+

+    rsa = snew(struct RSAKey);

+    if (!rsa)

+	return NULL;

+    getstring(&data, &len, &p, &slen);

+

+    if (!p || slen != 7 || memcmp(p, "ssh-rsa", 7)) {

+	sfree(rsa);

+	return NULL;

+    }

+    rsa->exponent = getmp(&data, &len);

+    rsa->modulus = getmp(&data, &len);

+    rsa->private_exponent = NULL;

+    rsa->p = rsa->q = rsa->iqmp = NULL;

+    rsa->comment = NULL;

+

+    return rsa;

+}

+

+static void rsa2_freekey(void *key)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    freersakey(rsa);

+    sfree(rsa);

+}

+

+static char *rsa2_fmtkey(void *key)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    char *p;

+    int len;

+

+    len = rsastr_len(rsa);

+    p = snewn(len, char);

+    rsastr_fmt(p, rsa);

+    return p;

+}

+

+static unsigned char *rsa2_public_blob(void *key, int *len)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    int elen, mlen, bloblen;

+    int i;

+    unsigned char *blob, *p;

+

+    elen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->exponent) + 8) / 8;

+    mlen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus) + 8) / 8;

+

+    /*

+     * string "ssh-rsa", mpint exp, mpint mod. Total 19+elen+mlen.

+     * (three length fields, 12+7=19).

+     */

+    bloblen = 19 + elen + mlen;

+    blob = snewn(bloblen, unsigned char);

+    p = blob;

+    PUT_32BIT(p, 7);

+    p += 4;

+    memcpy(p, "ssh-rsa", 7);

+    p += 7;

+    PUT_32BIT(p, elen);

+    p += 4;

+    for (i = elen; i--;)

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->exponent, i);

+    PUT_32BIT(p, mlen);

+    p += 4;

+    for (i = mlen; i--;)

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->modulus, i);

+    assert(p == blob + bloblen);

+    *len = bloblen;

+    return blob;

+}

+

+static unsigned char *rsa2_private_blob(void *key, int *len)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    int dlen, plen, qlen, ulen, bloblen;

+    int i;

+    unsigned char *blob, *p;

+

+    dlen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->private_exponent) + 8) / 8;

+    plen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->p) + 8) / 8;

+    qlen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->q) + 8) / 8;

+    ulen = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->iqmp) + 8) / 8;

+

+    /*

+     * mpint private_exp, mpint p, mpint q, mpint iqmp. Total 16 +

+     * sum of lengths.

+     */

+    bloblen = 16 + dlen + plen + qlen + ulen;

+    blob = snewn(bloblen, unsigned char);

+    p = blob;

+    PUT_32BIT(p, dlen);

+    p += 4;

+    for (i = dlen; i--;)

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->private_exponent, i);

+    PUT_32BIT(p, plen);

+    p += 4;

+    for (i = plen; i--;)

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->p, i);

+    PUT_32BIT(p, qlen);

+    p += 4;

+    for (i = qlen; i--;)

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->q, i);

+    PUT_32BIT(p, ulen);

+    p += 4;

+    for (i = ulen; i--;)

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(rsa->iqmp, i);

+    assert(p == blob + bloblen);

+    *len = bloblen;

+    return blob;

+}

+

+static void *rsa2_createkey(unsigned char *pub_blob, int pub_len,

+			    unsigned char *priv_blob, int priv_len)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa;

+    char *pb = (char *) priv_blob;

+

+    rsa = rsa2_newkey((char *) pub_blob, pub_len);

+    rsa->private_exponent = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);

+    rsa->p = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);

+    rsa->q = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);

+    rsa->iqmp = getmp(&pb, &priv_len);

+

+    if (!rsa_verify(rsa)) {

+	rsa2_freekey(rsa);

+	return NULL;

+    }

+

+    return rsa;

+}

+

+static void *rsa2_openssh_createkey(unsigned char **blob, int *len)

+{

+    char **b = (char **) blob;

+    struct RSAKey *rsa;

+

+    rsa = snew(struct RSAKey);

+    if (!rsa)

+	return NULL;

+    rsa->comment = NULL;

+

+    rsa->modulus = getmp(b, len);

+    rsa->exponent = getmp(b, len);

+    rsa->private_exponent = getmp(b, len);

+    rsa->iqmp = getmp(b, len);

+    rsa->p = getmp(b, len);

+    rsa->q = getmp(b, len);

+

+    if (!rsa->modulus || !rsa->exponent || !rsa->private_exponent ||

+	!rsa->iqmp || !rsa->p || !rsa->q) {

+	sfree(rsa->modulus);

+	sfree(rsa->exponent);

+	sfree(rsa->private_exponent);

+	sfree(rsa->iqmp);

+	sfree(rsa->p);

+	sfree(rsa->q);

+	sfree(rsa);

+	return NULL;

+    }

+

+    return rsa;

+}

+

+static int rsa2_openssh_fmtkey(void *key, unsigned char *blob, int len)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    int bloblen, i;

+

+    bloblen =

+	ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->modulus) +

+	ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->exponent) +

+	ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->private_exponent) +

+	ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->iqmp) +

+	ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->p) + ssh2_bignum_length(rsa->q);

+

+    if (bloblen > len)

+	return bloblen;

+

+    bloblen = 0;

+#define ENC(x) \

+    PUT_32BIT(blob+bloblen, ssh2_bignum_length((x))-4); bloblen += 4; \

+    for (i = ssh2_bignum_length((x))-4; i-- ;) blob[bloblen++]=bignum_byte((x),i);

+    ENC(rsa->modulus);

+    ENC(rsa->exponent);

+    ENC(rsa->private_exponent);

+    ENC(rsa->iqmp);

+    ENC(rsa->p);

+    ENC(rsa->q);

+

+    return bloblen;

+}

+

+static int rsa2_pubkey_bits(void *blob, int len)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa;

+    int ret;

+

+    rsa = rsa2_newkey((char *) blob, len);

+    ret = bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus);

+    rsa2_freekey(rsa);

+

+    return ret;

+}

+

+static char *rsa2_fingerprint(void *key)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    struct MD5Context md5c;

+    unsigned char digest[16], lenbuf[4];

+    char buffer[16 * 3 + 40];

+    char *ret;

+    int numlen, i;

+

+    MD5Init(&md5c);

+    MD5Update(&md5c, (unsigned char *)"\0\0\0\7ssh-rsa", 11);

+

+#define ADD_BIGNUM(bignum) \

+    numlen = (bignum_bitcount(bignum)+8)/8; \

+    PUT_32BIT(lenbuf, numlen); MD5Update(&md5c, lenbuf, 4); \

+    for (i = numlen; i-- ;) { \

+        unsigned char c = bignum_byte(bignum, i); \

+        MD5Update(&md5c, &c, 1); \

+    }

+    ADD_BIGNUM(rsa->exponent);

+    ADD_BIGNUM(rsa->modulus);

+#undef ADD_BIGNUM

+

+    MD5Final(digest, &md5c);

+

+    sprintf(buffer, "ssh-rsa %d ", bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus));

+    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)

+	sprintf(buffer + strlen(buffer), "%s%02x", i ? ":" : "",

+		digest[i]);

+    ret = snewn(strlen(buffer) + 1, char);

+    if (ret)

+	strcpy(ret, buffer);

+    return ret;

+}

+

+/*

+ * This is the magic ASN.1/DER prefix that goes in the decoded

+ * signature, between the string of FFs and the actual SHA hash

+ * value. The meaning of it is:

+ * 

+ * 00 -- this marks the end of the FFs; not part of the ASN.1 bit itself

+ * 

+ * 30 21 -- a constructed SEQUENCE of length 0x21

+ *    30 09 -- a constructed sub-SEQUENCE of length 9

+ *       06 05 -- an object identifier, length 5

+ *          2B 0E 03 02 1A -- object id { 1 3 14 3 2 26 }

+ *                            (the 1,3 comes from 0x2B = 43 = 40*1+3)

+ *       05 00 -- NULL

+ *    04 14 -- a primitive OCTET STRING of length 0x14

+ *       [0x14 bytes of hash data follows]

+ * 

+ * The object id in the middle there is listed as `id-sha1' in

+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1d2.asn (the

+ * ASN module for PKCS #1) and its expanded form is as follows:

+ * 

+ * id-sha1                OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {

+ *    iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)

+ *    algorithms(2) 26 }

+ */

+static const unsigned char asn1_weird_stuff[] = {

+    0x00, 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2B,

+    0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14,

+};

+

+#define ASN1_LEN ( (int) sizeof(asn1_weird_stuff) )

+

+static int rsa2_verifysig(void *key, char *sig, int siglen,

+			  char *data, int datalen)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    Bignum in, out;

+    char *p;

+    int slen;

+    int bytes, i, j, ret;

+    unsigned char hash[20];

+

+    getstring(&sig, &siglen, &p, &slen);

+    if (!p || slen != 7 || memcmp(p, "ssh-rsa", 7)) {

+	return 0;

+    }

+    in = getmp(&sig, &siglen);

+    out = modpow(in, rsa->exponent, rsa->modulus);

+    freebn(in);

+

+    ret = 1;

+

+    bytes = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus)+7) / 8;

+    /* Top (partial) byte should be zero. */

+    if (bignum_byte(out, bytes - 1) != 0)

+	ret = 0;

+    /* First whole byte should be 1. */

+    if (bignum_byte(out, bytes - 2) != 1)

+	ret = 0;

+    /* Most of the rest should be FF. */

+    for (i = bytes - 3; i >= 20 + ASN1_LEN; i--) {

+	if (bignum_byte(out, i) != 0xFF)

+	    ret = 0;

+    }

+    /* Then we expect to see the asn1_weird_stuff. */

+    for (i = 20 + ASN1_LEN - 1, j = 0; i >= 20; i--, j++) {

+	if (bignum_byte(out, i) != asn1_weird_stuff[j])

+	    ret = 0;

+    }

+    /* Finally, we expect to see the SHA-1 hash of the signed data. */

+    SHA_Simple(data, datalen, hash);

+    for (i = 19, j = 0; i >= 0; i--, j++) {

+	if (bignum_byte(out, i) != hash[j])

+	    ret = 0;

+    }

+    freebn(out);

+

+    return ret;

+}

+

+static unsigned char *rsa2_sign(void *key, char *data, int datalen,

+				int *siglen)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    unsigned char *bytes;

+    int nbytes;

+    unsigned char hash[20];

+    Bignum in, out;

+    int i, j;

+

+    SHA_Simple(data, datalen, hash);

+

+    nbytes = (bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus) - 1) / 8;

+    assert(1 <= nbytes - 20 - ASN1_LEN);

+    bytes = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);

+

+    bytes[0] = 1;

+    for (i = 1; i < nbytes - 20 - ASN1_LEN; i++)

+	bytes[i] = 0xFF;

+    for (i = nbytes - 20 - ASN1_LEN, j = 0; i < nbytes - 20; i++, j++)

+	bytes[i] = asn1_weird_stuff[j];

+    for (i = nbytes - 20, j = 0; i < nbytes; i++, j++)

+	bytes[i] = hash[j];

+

+    in = bignum_from_bytes(bytes, nbytes);

+    sfree(bytes);

+

+    out = rsa_privkey_op(in, rsa);

+    freebn(in);

+

+    nbytes = (bignum_bitcount(out) + 7) / 8;

+    bytes = snewn(4 + 7 + 4 + nbytes, unsigned char);

+    PUT_32BIT(bytes, 7);

+    memcpy(bytes + 4, "ssh-rsa", 7);

+    PUT_32BIT(bytes + 4 + 7, nbytes);

+    for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++)

+	bytes[4 + 7 + 4 + i] = bignum_byte(out, nbytes - 1 - i);

+    freebn(out);

+

+    *siglen = 4 + 7 + 4 + nbytes;

+    return bytes;

+}

+

+const struct ssh_signkey ssh_rsa = {

+    rsa2_newkey,

+    rsa2_freekey,

+    rsa2_fmtkey,

+    rsa2_public_blob,

+    rsa2_private_blob,

+    rsa2_createkey,

+    rsa2_openssh_createkey,

+    rsa2_openssh_fmtkey,

+    rsa2_pubkey_bits,

+    rsa2_fingerprint,

+    rsa2_verifysig,

+    rsa2_sign,

+    "ssh-rsa",

+    "rsa2"

+};

+

+void *ssh_rsakex_newkey(char *data, int len)

+{

+    return rsa2_newkey(data, len);

+}

+

+void ssh_rsakex_freekey(void *key)

+{

+    rsa2_freekey(key);

+}

+

+int ssh_rsakex_klen(void *key)

+{

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+

+    return bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus);

+}

+

+static void oaep_mask(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *seed, int seedlen,

+		      void *vdata, int datalen)

+{

+    unsigned char *data = (unsigned char *)vdata;

+    unsigned count = 0;

+

+    while (datalen > 0) {

+        int i, max = (datalen > h->hlen ? h->hlen : datalen);

+        void *s;

+        unsigned char counter[4], hash[SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN];

+

+	assert(h->hlen <= SSH2_KEX_MAX_HASH_LEN);

+        PUT_32BIT(counter, count);

+        s = h->init();

+        h->bytes(s, seed, seedlen);

+        h->bytes(s, counter, 4);

+        h->final(s, hash);

+        count++;

+

+        for (i = 0; i < max; i++)

+            data[i] ^= hash[i];

+

+        data += max;

+        datalen -= max;

+    }

+}

+

+void ssh_rsakex_encrypt(const struct ssh_hash *h, unsigned char *in, int inlen,

+                        unsigned char *out, int outlen,

+                        void *key)

+{

+    Bignum b1, b2;

+    struct RSAKey *rsa = (struct RSAKey *) key;

+    int k, i;

+    char *p;

+    const int HLEN = h->hlen;

+

+    /*

+     * Here we encrypt using RSAES-OAEP. Essentially this means:

+     * 

+     *  - we have a SHA-based `mask generation function' which

+     *    creates a pseudo-random stream of mask data

+     *    deterministically from an input chunk of data.

+     * 

+     *  - we have a random chunk of data called a seed.

+     * 

+     *  - we use the seed to generate a mask which we XOR with our

+     *    plaintext.

+     * 

+     *  - then we use _the masked plaintext_ to generate a mask

+     *    which we XOR with the seed.

+     * 

+     *  - then we concatenate the masked seed and the masked

+     *    plaintext, and RSA-encrypt that lot.

+     * 

+     * The result is that the data input to the encryption function

+     * is random-looking and (hopefully) contains no exploitable

+     * structure such as PKCS1-v1_5 does.

+     * 

+     * For a precise specification, see RFC 3447, section 7.1.1.

+     * Some of the variable names below are derived from that, so

+     * it'd probably help to read it anyway.

+     */

+

+    /* k denotes the length in octets of the RSA modulus. */

+    k = (7 + bignum_bitcount(rsa->modulus)) / 8;

+

+    /* The length of the input data must be at most k - 2hLen - 2. */

+    assert(inlen > 0 && inlen <= k - 2*HLEN - 2);

+

+    /* The length of the output data wants to be precisely k. */

+    assert(outlen == k);

+

+    /*

+     * Now perform EME-OAEP encoding. First set up all the unmasked

+     * output data.

+     */

+    /* Leading byte zero. */

+    out[0] = 0;

+    /* At position 1, the seed: HLEN bytes of random data. */

+    for (i = 0; i < HLEN; i++)

+        out[i + 1] = random_byte();

+    /* At position 1+HLEN, the data block DB, consisting of: */

+    /* The hash of the label (we only support an empty label here) */

+    h->final(h->init(), out + HLEN + 1);

+    /* A bunch of zero octets */

+    memset(out + 2*HLEN + 1, 0, outlen - (2*HLEN + 1));

+    /* A single 1 octet, followed by the input message data. */

+    out[outlen - inlen - 1] = 1;

+    memcpy(out + outlen - inlen, in, inlen);

+

+    /*

+     * Now use the seed data to mask the block DB.

+     */

+    oaep_mask(h, out+1, HLEN, out+HLEN+1, outlen-HLEN-1);

+

+    /*

+     * And now use the masked DB to mask the seed itself.

+     */

+    oaep_mask(h, out+HLEN+1, outlen-HLEN-1, out+1, HLEN);

+

+    /*

+     * Now `out' contains precisely the data we want to

+     * RSA-encrypt.

+     */

+    b1 = bignum_from_bytes(out, outlen);

+    b2 = modpow(b1, rsa->exponent, rsa->modulus);

+    p = (char *)out;

+    for (i = outlen; i--;) {

+	*p++ = bignum_byte(b2, i);

+    }

+    freebn(b1);

+    freebn(b2);

+

+    /*

+     * And we're done.

+     */

+}

+

+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_rsa_kex_sha1 = {

+    "rsa1024-sha1", NULL, KEXTYPE_RSA, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha1

+};

+

+static const struct ssh_kex ssh_rsa_kex_sha256 = {

+    "rsa2048-sha256", NULL, KEXTYPE_RSA, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &ssh_sha256

+};

+

+static const struct ssh_kex *const rsa_kex_list[] = {

+    &ssh_rsa_kex_sha256,

+    &ssh_rsa_kex_sha1

+};

+

+const struct ssh_kexes ssh_rsa_kex = {

+    sizeof(rsa_kex_list) / sizeof(*rsa_kex_list),

+    rsa_kex_list

+};