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path: root/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c738
1 files changed, 356 insertions, 382 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index 71f2ddb49..d93b14fa2 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -62,394 +63,367 @@
#include "cms_lcl.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
-int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
- unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
- {
- CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
- if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI);
- return 0;
- }
-
- pwri = ri->d.pwri;
- pwri->pass = pass;
- if (pass && passlen < 0)
- passlen = strlen((char *)pass);
- pwri->passlen = passlen;
- return 1;
- }
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
+{
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ pwri->pass = pass;
+ if (pass && passlen < 0)
+ passlen = strlen((char *)pass);
+ pwri->passlen = passlen;
+ return 1;
+}
CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- int iter, int wrap_nid, int pbe_nid,
- unsigned char *pass,
- ossl_ssize_t passlen,
- const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
- {
- CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
- CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
- CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int ivlen;
-
- env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
- if (!env)
- return NULL;
-
- if (wrap_nid <= 0)
- wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
-
- if (pbe_nid <= 0)
- pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
-
- /* Get from enveloped data */
- if (kekciph == NULL)
- kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
-
- if (kekciph == NULL)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
- CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
- encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-
- if (ivlen > 0)
- {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (!encalg->parameter)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
-
- encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(&ctx));
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- /* Initialize recipient info */
- ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
- if (!ri)
- goto merr;
-
- ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
- if (!ri->d.pwri)
- goto merr;
- ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
-
- pwri = ri->d.pwri;
- /* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
- X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
- if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm)
- goto merr;
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter)
- goto merr;
-
- if(!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
- &pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->value.sequence))
- goto merr;
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-
- X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
- encalg = NULL;
-
- /* Setup PBE algorithm */
-
- pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
-
- if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm)
- goto err;
-
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
- pwri->version = 0;
-
- if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
- goto merr;
-
- return ri;
-
- merr:
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- if (ri)
- M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
- if (encalg)
- X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
- return NULL;
-
- }
-
-/* This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211,
- * at some point this should go into EVP.
+ int iter, int wrap_nid,
+ int pbe_nid,
+ unsigned char *pass,
+ ossl_ssize_t passlen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
+{
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
+ CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int ivlen;
+
+ env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+ if (!env)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (wrap_nid <= 0)
+ wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
+
+ if (pbe_nid <= 0)
+ pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
+
+ /* Get from enveloped data */
+ if (kekciph == NULL)
+ kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
+
+ if (kekciph == NULL) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
+ encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+
+ if (ivlen > 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (!encalg->parameter) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(&ctx));
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ /* Initialize recipient info */
+ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri)
+ goto merr;
+
+ ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri->d.pwri)
+ goto merr;
+ ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ /* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
+ X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm)
+ goto merr;
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter)
+ goto merr;
+
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
+ &pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->
+ value.sequence))
+ goto merr;
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+ X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+ encalg = NULL;
+
+ /* Setup PBE algorithm */
+
+ pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
+
+ if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
+ pwri->version = 0;
+
+ if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
+ goto merr;
+
+ return ri;
+
+ merr:
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ if (ri)
+ M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (encalg)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+ return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211, at
+ * some point this should go into EVP.
*/
static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- {
- size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
- unsigned char *tmp;
- int outl, rv = 0;
- if (inlen < 2 * blocklen)
- {
- /* too small */
- return 0;
- }
- if (inlen % blocklen)
- {
- /* Invalid size */
- return 0;
- }
- tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
- /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
- in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2);
- /* Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value
- * output it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block
- * this works because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
- */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl,
- tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen);
- /* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen);
-
- /* Reset IV to original value */
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- /* Decrypt again */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen);
- /* Check check bytes */
- if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff)
- {
- /* Check byte failure */
- goto err;
- }
- if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4 ))
- {
- /* Invalid length value */
- goto err;
- }
- *outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
- memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
- rv = 1;
- err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, inlen);
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- return rv;
-
- }
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+ int outl, rv = 0;
+ if (inlen < 2 * blocklen) {
+ /* too small */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inlen % blocklen) {
+ /* Invalid size */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
+ /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
+ in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2);
+ /*
+ * Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value output
+ * it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block this works
+ * because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
+ */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen);
+ /* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen);
+
+ /* Reset IV to original value */
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ /* Decrypt again */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen);
+ /* Check check bytes */
+ if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff) {
+ /* Check byte failure */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4)) {
+ /* Invalid length value */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
+ memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, inlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ return rv;
+
+}
static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- {
- size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
- size_t olen;
- int dummy;
- /* First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to
- * multiple of block length.
- */
- olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1)/blocklen;
- olen *= blocklen;
- if (olen < 2 * blocklen)
- {
- /* Key too small */
- return 0;
- }
- if (inlen > 0xFF)
- {
- /* Key too large */
- return 0;
- }
- if (out)
- {
- /* Set header */
- out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen;
- out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF;
- out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF;
- out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
- memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
- /* Add random padding to end */
- if (olen > inlen + 4)
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen);
- /* Encrypt twice */
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
- }
-
- *outlen = olen;
-
- return 1;
- }
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+ size_t olen;
+ int dummy;
+ /*
+ * First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to
+ * multiple of block length.
+ */
+ olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1) / blocklen;
+ olen *= blocklen;
+ if (olen < 2 * blocklen) {
+ /* Key too small */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inlen > 0xFF) {
+ /* Key too large */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (out) {
+ /* Set header */
+ out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen;
+ out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF;
+ out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF;
+ out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
+ memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
+ /* Add random padding to end */
+ if (olen > inlen + 4)
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen);
+ /* Encrypt twice */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
+ }
+
+ *outlen = olen;
+
+ return 1;
+}
/* Encrypt/Decrypt content key in PWRI recipient info */
int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
- int en_de)
- {
- CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
- CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
- const unsigned char *p = NULL;
- int plen;
- int r = 0;
- X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX kekctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
- unsigned char *key = NULL;
- size_t keylen;
-
- ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
-
- pwri = ri->d.pwri;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&kekctx);
-
- if (!pwri->pass)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
- return 0;
- }
- algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
-
- if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (algtmp->parameter->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- {
- p = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->data;
- plen = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->length;
- kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
- }
- if (kekalg == NULL)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
-
- if(!kekcipher)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
- goto err;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&kekctx, 0);
- if(EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(&kekctx, kekalg->parameter) < 0)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
-
- /* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
-
- if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm,
- (char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen,
- algtmp->parameter, &kekctx, en_de) < 0)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
-
- if (en_de)
- {
-
- if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
- goto err;
-
- key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
-
- if (!key)
- goto err;
-
- if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
- goto err;
- pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
- pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen;
- }
- else
- {
- key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
-
- if (!key)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
- pwri->encryptedKey->data,
- pwri->encryptedKey->length, &kekctx))
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ec->key = key;
- ec->keylen = keylen;
-
- }
-
- r = 1;
-
- err:
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kekctx);
-
- if (!r && key)
- OPENSSL_free(key);
- X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
-
- return r;
-
- }
+ int en_de)
+{
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ int plen;
+ int r = 0;
+ X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX kekctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+ unsigned char *key = NULL;
+ size_t keylen;
+
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&kekctx);
+
+ if (!pwri->pass) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+
+ if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (algtmp->parameter->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ p = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+ kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+ }
+ if (kekalg == NULL) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
+
+ if (!kekcipher) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
+ goto err;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&kekctx, 0);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(&kekctx, kekalg->parameter) < 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
+
+ /* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
+
+ if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm,
+ (char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen,
+ algtmp->parameter, &kekctx, en_de) < 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
+
+ if (en_de) {
+
+ if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
+
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
+ goto err;
+ pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
+ pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen;
+ } else {
+ key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
+
+ if (!key) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
+ pwri->encryptedKey->data,
+ pwri->encryptedKey->length, &kekctx)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ec->key = key;
+ ec->keylen = keylen;
+
+ }
+
+ r = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kekctx);
+
+ if (!r && key)
+ OPENSSL_free(key);
+ X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
+
+ return r;
+
+}