diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 46 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c index 0f8dd3e00..88088ce73 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c @@ -126,10 +126,6 @@ #include <openssl/crypto.h> #include <openssl/err.h> -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#include <openssl/fips.h> -#endif - #ifdef BN_DEBUG # define PREDICT @@ -149,7 +145,7 @@ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND * (to prevent double locking) */ /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ -static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ +static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ #ifdef PREDICT @@ -217,8 +213,10 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) /* check if we already have the lock */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -274,8 +272,16 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) } else MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); - + + /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ MD_Update(&m,buf,j); + /* We know that line may cause programs such as + purify and valgrind to complain about use of + uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's + with the caller. Removing that line will make + sure you get really bad randomness and thereby + other problems such as very insecure keys. */ + MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); MD_Final(&m,local_md); md_c[1]++; @@ -336,14 +342,6 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) #endif int do_stir_pool = 0; -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if(FIPS_mode()) - { - FIPSerr(FIPS_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,FIPS_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD); - return 0; - } -#endif - #ifdef PREDICT if (rand_predictable) { @@ -384,7 +382,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; @@ -476,9 +474,15 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) #endif MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); -#ifndef PURIFY - MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */ + +#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ + /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ + MD_Update(&m,buf,j); + /* We know that line may cause programs such as + purify and valgrind to complain about use of + uninitialized data. */ #endif + k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num; if (k > 0) { @@ -539,15 +543,17 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) static int ssleay_rand_status(void) { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; int ret; int do_not_lock; + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); /* check if we already have the lock * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -559,7 +565,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; } |