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-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h11
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c52
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c27
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c1
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c88
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/opensslv.h6
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c3
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c2
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/symhacks.h6
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c6
-rw-r--r--openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c5
17 files changed, 190 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
index 41f2e46f6..bd7f45b85 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ _vpaes_consts:
.Lk_dsbo: # decryption sbox final output
.quad 0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D
.quad 0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C
-.asciz "Vector Permutaion AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
+.asciz "Vector Permutation AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
.align 64
.size _vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts
___
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
index 1a30bf119..aa60203ba 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),"unknown public key type"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM),"unknown signature algorithm"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG) ,"unknown tag"},
-{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT) ,"unkown format"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT) ,"unknown format"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE),"unsupported any defined by type"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER) ,"unsupported cipher"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported encryption algorithm"},
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
index b7dce5c1a..2227b2b52 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_log.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK slg_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
static void xopenlog(BIO* bp, char* name, int level)
{
- if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+ if (check_winnt())
bp->ptr = RegisterEventSourceA(NULL,name);
else
bp->ptr = NULL;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
index f34248ec4..21a1a3fe3 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
/* Deprecated versions */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -774,11 +776,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
#define bn_fix_top(a) bn_check_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+ do { \
+ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+ assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+ } while(0)
+
#else /* !BN_DEBUG */
#define bn_pollute(a)
#define bn_check_top(a)
#define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 7a5676de6..5461e6ee7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
}
return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
}
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0. The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap. The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+ {
+ BN_ULONG t;
+ int i;
+
+ bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+ bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+ assert(a != b);
+ assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+ assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+ condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+ t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+ a->top ^= t;
+ b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+ do { \
+ t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+ a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+ b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+ } while (0)
+
+
+ switch (nwords) {
+ default:
+ for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++)
+ BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+ }
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
index b62d1bfac..ba08279a0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
@@ -465,8 +465,6 @@ int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert)
pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
if (!pcerts)
return 0;
- if (!pcerts)
- return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++)
{
cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index da3949fa1..50cec9fbe 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal (const char *fmta,...)
#if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
/* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
- if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000 && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0)
+ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0)
{ HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0,_T("OPENSSL"));
const TCHAR *pmsg=buf;
ReportEvent(h,EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE,0,0,0,1,0,&pmsg,0);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
index 26f4a783f..1c575dc47 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
@@ -208,11 +208,15 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIG
return ret;
}
+
/* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
* point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
* Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
* GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
+ * avoiding conditional branches.
*/
static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -246,6 +250,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
x2 = &r->X;
z2 = &r->Y;
+ bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -270,16 +279,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
word = scalar->d[i];
while (mask)
{
- if (word & mask)
- {
- if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
- }
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+ if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
mask >>= 1;
}
mask = BN_TBIT;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
index 27846edb1..95c858960 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) ||
!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD",
load_dir, 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) ||
!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
goto notfound;
return iterator;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index 72a2a6727..ac6d441aa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
}
/* we fell off the end without starting */
- if (j == i)
+ if ((j == i) && (num == 0))
{
/* Is this is one long chunk?, if so, keep on
* reading until a new line. */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
index 250063de8..e1dc2b0f4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -810,7 +810,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,const unsigned char *iv,size_t len)
GCM_MUL(ctx,Yi);
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
}
@@ -818,7 +822,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,const unsigned char *iv,size_t len)
(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EK0.c,ctx->key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
}
@@ -913,7 +921,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -947,7 +959,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -969,7 +985,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -988,7 +1008,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1004,7 +1028,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
@@ -1022,7 +1050,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
}
@@ -1066,7 +1098,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -1103,7 +1139,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1123,7 +1163,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i)
@@ -1141,7 +1185,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
for (i=0; i<16/sizeof(size_t); ++i) {
@@ -1159,7 +1207,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
@@ -1180,7 +1232,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
}
@@ -1225,7 +1281,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -1247,7 +1307,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,GHASH_CHUNK/16,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += GHASH_CHUNK/16;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
GHASH(ctx,out,GHASH_CHUNK);
@@ -1262,7 +1326,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,j,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += (unsigned int)j;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
in += i;
@@ -1282,7 +1350,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
@@ -1324,7 +1396,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
}
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]);
+#else
ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c+12);
+#endif
else
ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3];
@@ -1349,7 +1425,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,GHASH_CHUNK/16,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += GHASH_CHUNK/16;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
out += GHASH_CHUNK;
@@ -1375,7 +1455,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*stream)(in,out,j,key,ctx->Yi.c);
ctr += (unsigned int)j;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
out += i;
@@ -1386,7 +1470,11 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,
(*ctx->block)(ctx->Yi.c,ctx->EKi.c,key);
++ctr;
if (is_endian.little)
+#ifdef BSWAP4
+ ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr);
+#else
PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c+12,ctr);
+#endif
else
ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr;
while (len--) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index b27a5bb8c..ebe718072 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000106fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000107fL
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f-fips 6 Jan 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1g-fips 7 Apr 2014"
#else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1f 6 Jan 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index dd2916372..aee1c30b0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
EVP_MD_CTX m;
int do_not_lock;
+ if (!num)
+ return;
+
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
*
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index 5d134e186..34ffcd23f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ static void readscreen(void)
int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
- if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000 && OPENSSL_isservice()>0)
+ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice()>0)
return;
/* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h b/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
index 07a412f84..bd2f000d5 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/symhacks.h
@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@
#define SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb
#undef SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb
#define SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb
+#undef ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported
+#define ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported ssl3_cbc_record_digest_support
+#undef ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late
+#define ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late ssl_check_clihello_tlsext_late
+#undef ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early
+#define ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early ssl_check_clihello_tlsext_early
/* Hack some long ENGINE names */
#undef ENGINE_get_default_BN_mod_exp_crt
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
index 27ca5150c..c6602dae4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
s=dir;
p=s;
- for (;;p++)
+ do
{
if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0'))
{
@@ -264,9 +264,7 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type)
return 0;
}
}
- if (*p == '\0')
- break;
- }
+ } while (*p++ != '\0');
return 1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5195ffef2..920066aeb 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1462,10 +1462,9 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-01 04:46:46 +0000