diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c | 3488 |
1 files changed, 1747 insertions, 1741 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index 5cdd7e572..1ebad6166 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1,1741 +1,1747 @@ -/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#include <openssl/ocsp.h> -#include "ssl_locl.h" - -const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess); -#endif - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ - tls1_enc, - tls1_mac, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - }; - -long tls1_default_timeout(void) - { - /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec - * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ - return(60*60*2); - } - -int tls1_new(SSL *s) - { - if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); - s->method->ssl_clear(s); - return(1); - } - -void tls1_free(SSL *s) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ - ssl3_free(s); - } - -void tls1_clear(SSL *s) - { - ssl3_clear(s); - s->version=TLS1_VERSION; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -static int nid_list[] = - { - NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ - NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ - NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ - }; - -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) - { - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > - sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) - return 0; - return nid_list[curve_id-1]; - } - -int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) - { - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - switch (nid) - { - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ - return 1; - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ - return 2; - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ - return 3; - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ - return 4; - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ - return 5; - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ - return 6; - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ - return 7; - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ - return 8; - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ - return 9; - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ - return 10; - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ - return 11; - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ - return 12; - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ - return 13; - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ - return 14; - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ - return 15; - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ - return 16; - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ - return 17; - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ - return 18; - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ - return 19; - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ - return 20; - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ - return 21; - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ - return 22; - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ - return 23; - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ - return 24; - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ - return 25; - default: - return 0; - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION - && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; - - ret+=2; - - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) - { - /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ - unsigned long size_str; - long lenmax; - - /* check for enough space. - 4 for the servername type and entension length - 2 for servernamelist length - 1 for the hostname type - 2 for hostname length - + hostname length - */ - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 - || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) - return NULL; - - /* extension type and length */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); - s2n(size_str+5,ret); - - /* length of servername list */ - s2n(size_str+3,ret); - - /* hostname type, length and hostname */ - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - s2n(size_str,ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); - ret+=size_str; - } - - /* Add RI if renegotiating */ - if (s->new_session) - { - int el; - - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ - long lenmax; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); - s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - } - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ - long lenmax; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); - s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); - - /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for - * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. - * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html - * resolves this to two bytes. - */ - s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); - ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) - { - int ticklen; - if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) - { - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - return NULL; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, - ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; - } - else - ticklen = 0; - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) - goto skip_ext; - /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len - * rest for ticket - */ - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); - s2n(ticklen,ret); - if (ticklen) - { - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); - ret += ticklen; - } - } - skip_ext: - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) - return NULL; - if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); - s2n(col + 2, ret); - s2n(col, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); - ret += col; - } -#endif - - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - int i; - long extlen, idlen, itmp; - OCSP_RESPID *id; - - idlen = 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) - { - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - if (itmp <= 0) - return NULL; - idlen += itmp + 2; - } - - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) - { - extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if (extlen < 0) - return NULL; - } - else - extlen = 0; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) - return NULL; - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - s2n(idlen, ret); - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) - { - /* save position of id len */ - unsigned char *q = ret; - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - /* skip over id len */ - ret += 2; - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); - /* write id len */ - s2n(itmp, q); - } - s2n(extlen, ret); - if (extlen > 0) - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen,p); - return ret; - } - -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; - - ret+=2; - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - - if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) - { - int el; - - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ - long lenmax; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); - s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - - } - /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected - && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) - return NULL; - if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); - s2n(sol + 2, ret); - s2n(sol, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); - ret += sol; - } -#endif - if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) - { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { - 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ - 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ - 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, - 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, - 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, - 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; - if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; - memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); - ret+=36; - - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen,p); - return ret; - } - -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned short len; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - - s->servername_done = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - goto ri_check; - n2s(data,len); - - if (data > (d+n-len)) - goto ri_check; - - while (data <= (d+n-4)) - { - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (data+size > (d+n)) - goto ri_check; -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); -#endif - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); -/* The servername extension is treated as follows: - - - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. - - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, - in which case an fatal alert is generated. - - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. - - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order - to allow the application to position itself to the right context. - - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when - it is identical to a previously used for the same session. - Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time - set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the - case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and - a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername - presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches - the value of the Host: field. - - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, - i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. - - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. - -*/ - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - { - unsigned char *sdata; - int servname_type; - int dsize; - - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size ) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - sdata = data; - while (dsize > 3) - { - servname_type = *(sdata++); - n2s(sdata,len); - dsize -= 3; - - if (len > dsize) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) - { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) - { - if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - } - else - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - dsize -= len; - } - if (dsize != 0) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->hit) - { - if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); - } -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr,"\n"); -#endif - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); - ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); - - if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->hit) - { - if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); - } -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr,"\n"); -#endif - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - - if (size < 5) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; - size--; - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) - { - const unsigned char *sdata; - int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size ) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - while (dsize > 0) - { - OCSP_RESPID *id; - int idsize; - if (dsize < 4) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, idsize); - dsize -= 2 + idsize; - if (dsize < 0) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, - &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (data != sdata) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Read in request_extensions */ - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) - { - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, - &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts - || (data + dsize != sdata)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - /* We don't know what to do with any other type - * so ignore it. - */ - else - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ - data+=size; - } - - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* Need RI if renegotiating */ - - if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } - -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short length; - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int tlsext_servername = 0; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - goto ri_check; - - n2s(data,length); - if (data+length != d+n) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - while(data <= (d+n-4)) - { - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (data+size > (d+n)) - goto ri_check; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - tlsext_servername = 1; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); -#if 0 - fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr,"\n"); -#endif - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - || (size > 0)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested - * a status request message. - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } - data+=size; - } - - if (data != d+n) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) - { - if (s->tlsext_hostname) - { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) - { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) - { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - } - else - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to - * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server - * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an - * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server - * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI - * absence on initial connect only. - */ - if (!renegotiate_seen - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } - - -int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats - * and elliptic curves we support. - */ - int using_ecc = 0; - int i; - unsigned char *j; - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); - - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) - { - SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); - - alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) - { - using_ecc = 1; - break; - } - } - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION); - if (using_ecc) - { - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - - /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2; - if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) - { - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <= - sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) - s2n(i,j); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - { - int r = 1; - - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) - { - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); - if (!r) - return -1; - } - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) - { - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } - - if (r == 2) - /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } -#endif - - return 1; - } - -int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support - * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not - * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. - */ - - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); - - if (using_ecc) - { - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - return 1; - } - -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ - /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ -#endif - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - /* If status request then ask callback what to do. - * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case - * the certificate has changed. - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int r; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - switch (r) - { - /* We don't want to send a status request response */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* status request response should be sent */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* something bad happened */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - { - /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), - * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, - * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */ - - int r = 1; - - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) - { - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); - if (!r) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) - { - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) - { - /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input - * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - else - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } - } - - if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, - * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; - * abort the handshake. - */ - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - } - } - -#endif - err: - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done=0; - default: - return 1; - } - } - -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension - * it must contain uncompressed. - */ - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && - (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && - ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) - { - /* we are using an ECC cipher */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *list; - int found_uncompressed = 0; - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - { - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) - { - found_uncompressed = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!found_uncompressed) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); - return -1; - } - } - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) - { - /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. - * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - } - - /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check - * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) - { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - } -#endif - - /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one - * tell the callback - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) - && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int r; - /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows - * there is no response. - */ - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (r == 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - if (r < 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - } - - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done=0; - default: - return 1; - } - } - -/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client - * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS - * session ticket extension at the same time. - */ - -int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) - { - /* Point after session ID in client hello */ - const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; - unsigned short i; - - /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present - * to permit stateful resumption. - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - return 1; - - if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) - return 1; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - i = *(p++); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - } - /* Skip past cipher list */ - n2s(p, i); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ - i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p > limit) - return -1; - /* Now at start of extensions */ - if ((p + 2) >= limit) - return 1; - n2s(p, i); - while ((p + 4) <= limit) - { - unsigned short type, size; - n2s(p, type); - n2s(p, size); - if (p + size > limit) - return 1; - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will - * trigger a full handshake - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - return 1; - /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket - * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake - */ - if (size == 0) - { - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 0; /* Cache miss */ - } - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) - { - /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of - * generating the session from ticket now, - * trigger abbreviated handshake based on - * external mechanism to calculate the master - * secret later. */ - return 0; - } - return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, - ret); - } - p += size; - } - return 1; - } - -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess) - { - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char *sdec; - const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; - unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ - if (eticklen < 48) - goto tickerr; - /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) - { - unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; - int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, - &ctx, &hctx, 0); - if (rv < 0) - return -1; - if (rv == 0) - goto tickerr; - if (rv == 2) - renew_ticket = 1; - } - else - { - /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) - goto tickerr; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); - } - /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and - * integrity checks on ticket. - */ - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); - if (mlen < 0) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - eticklen -= mlen; - /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) - goto tickerr; - /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ - /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (!sdec) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) - goto tickerr; - slen += mlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - p = sdec; - - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); - OPENSSL_free(sdec); - if (sess) - { - /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to - * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to - * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero - * as required by standard. - */ - if (sesslen) - memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); - sess->session_id_length = sesslen; - *psess = sess; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; - return 1; - } - /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to - * send a new ticket - */ - tickerr: - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 0; - } - -#endif +/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess);
+#endif
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ };
+
+long tls1_default_timeout(void)
+ {
+ /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
+ * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
+ return(60*60*2);
+ }
+
+int tls1_new(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+void tls1_free(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ ssl3_free(s);
+ }
+
+void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
+ {
+ ssl3_clear(s);
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int nid_list[] =
+ {
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ };
+
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+ {
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
+ sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
+ return 0;
+ return nid_list[curve_id-1];
+ }
+
+int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
+ {
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+ switch (nid)
+ {
+ case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ return 1;
+ case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ return 2;
+ case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ return 3;
+ case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ return 4;
+ case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ return 5;
+ case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ return 6;
+ case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ return 7;
+ case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ return 8;
+ case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ return 9;
+ case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ return 10;
+ case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ return 11;
+ case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ return 12;
+ case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ return 13;
+ case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ return 14;
+ case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ return 15;
+ case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ return 16;
+ case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ return 17;
+ case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ return 18;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ return 19;
+ case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ return 20;
+ case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ return 21;
+ case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ return 22;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ return 23;
+ case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ return 24;
+ case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ return 25;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ int extdatalen=0;
+ unsigned char *ret = p;
+
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
+ && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return p;
+
+ ret+=2;
+
+ if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+ unsigned long size_str;
+ long lenmax;
+
+ /* check for enough space.
+ 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ 2 for servernamelist length
+ 1 for the hostname type
+ 2 for hostname length
+ + hostname length
+ */
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
+ || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* extension type and length */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
+ s2n(size_str+5,ret);
+
+ /* length of servername list */
+ s2n(size_str+3,ret);
+
+ /* hostname type, length and hostname */
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ s2n(size_str,ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
+ ret+=size_str;
+ }
+
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+ if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
+ s2n(el,ret);
+
+ if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret += el;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
+
+ /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
+ * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
+ * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
+ * resolves this to two bytes.
+ */
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
+ {
+ int ticklen;
+ if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+ else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
+ {
+ ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
+ ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ }
+ else
+ ticklen = 0;
+ if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
+ goto skip_ext;
+ /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
+ * rest for ticket
+ */
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
+ s2n(ticklen,ret);
+ if (ticklen)
+ {
+ memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
+ ret += ticklen;
+ }
+ }
+ skip_ext:
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
+ return NULL;
+ if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(col + 2, ret);
+ s2n(col, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
+ ret += col;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ int i;
+ long extlen, idlen, itmp;
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+
+ idlen = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
+ {
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+ if (itmp <= 0)
+ return NULL;
+ idlen += itmp + 2;
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+ {
+ extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
+ if (extlen < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ extlen = 0;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
+ *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+ s2n(idlen, ret);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
+ {
+ /* save position of id len */
+ unsigned char *q = ret;
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ /* skip over id len */
+ ret += 2;
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
+ /* write id len */
+ s2n(itmp, q);
+ }
+ s2n(extlen, ret);
+ if (extlen > 0)
+ i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
+ return p;
+
+ s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ int extdatalen=0;
+ unsigned char *ret = p;
+
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return p;
+
+ ret+=2;
+ if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
+ s2n(0,ret);
+ }
+
+ if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+ if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
+ s2n(el,ret);
+
+ if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret += el;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+
+ }
+ /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
+ && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
+ {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
+ s2n(0,ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
+ s2n(0,ret);
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(sol + 2, ret);
+ s2n(sol, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
+ ret += sol;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
+ && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
+ { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
+ 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
+ 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
+ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
+ 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
+ 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
+ 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
+ if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
+ memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
+ ret+=36;
+
+ }
+
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
+ return p;
+
+ s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+ {
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned short len;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+
+ if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ goto ri_check;
+ n2s(data,len);
+
+ if (data > (d+n-len))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ while (data <= (d+n-4))
+ {
+ n2s(data,type);
+ n2s(data,size);
+
+ if (data+size > (d+n))
+ goto ri_check;
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
+#endif
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
+
+ - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+ - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
+ in which case an fatal alert is generated.
+ - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+ - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+ to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+ - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+ it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+ Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
+ set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+ case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+ a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+ presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+ the value of the Host: field.
+ - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
+ i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
+ - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
+
+*/
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata;
+ int servname_type;
+ int dsize;
+
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data,dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size )
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sdata = data;
+ while (dsize > 3)
+ {
+ servname_type = *(sdata++);
+ n2s(sdata,len);
+ dsize -= 3;
+
+ if (len > dsize)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->servername_done == 0)
+ switch (servname_type)
+ {
+ case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
+ if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->servername_done = 1;
+
+ }
+ else
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
+ && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dsize -= len;
+ }
+ if (dsize != 0)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
+ ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
+
+ if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ }
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+#endif
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ {
+ if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ }
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+
+ if (size < 5)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
+ size--;
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *sdata;
+ int dsize;
+ /* Read in responder_id_list */
+ n2s(data,dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size )
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (dsize > 0)
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+ int idsize;
+ if (dsize < 4)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data, idsize);
+ dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+ size -= 2 + idsize;
+ if (dsize < 0)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sdata = data;
+ data += idsize;
+ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
+ &sdata, idsize);
+ if (!id)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (data != sdata)
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
+ && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Read in request_extensions */
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data,dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize != size)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sdata = data;
+ if (dsize > 0)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+ d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
+ &sdata, dsize);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
+ || (data + dsize != sdata))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* We don't know what to do with any other type
+ * so ignore it.
+ */
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ }
+
+ /* session ticket processed earlier */
+ data+=size;
+ }
+
+ *p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+ {
+ unsigned short length;
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int tlsext_servername = 0;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+ if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data,length);
+ if (data+length != d+n)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while(data <= (d+n-4))
+ {
+ n2s(data,type);
+ n2s(data,size);
+
+ if (data+size > (d+n))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tlsext_servername = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+#endif
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ || (size > 0))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
+ * a status request message.
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ }
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ {
+ if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ }
+ data+=size;
+ }
+
+ if (data != d+n)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+ {
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
+ * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
+ * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
+ * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
+ * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
+ * absence on initial connect only.
+ */
+ if (!renegotiate_seen
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
+ * and elliptic curves we support.
+ */
+ int using_ecc = 0;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *j;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+ {
+ using_ecc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
+ if (using_ecc)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+
+ /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
+ if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
+ sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
+ s2n(i,j);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
+ {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+
+ if (r == 2)
+ /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
+ * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
+ * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
+ */
+
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+
+ if (using_ecc)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
+ * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+ /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
+ * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+#endif
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+ /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+ * the certificate has changed.
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+ int r;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ switch (r)
+ {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
+ * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
+ * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
+ {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
+ {
+ /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
+ * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
+ * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
+ * abort the handshake.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+#endif
+ err:
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done=0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+ * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
+ * it must contain uncompressed.
+ */
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
+ (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
+ ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+ {
+ /* we are using an ECC cipher */
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *list;
+ int found_uncompressed = 0;
+ list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ {
+ if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
+ {
+ found_uncompressed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found_uncompressed)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
+ {
+ /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
+ * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
+ * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
+ * tell the callback
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+ int r;
+ /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
+ * there is no response.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (r == 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done=0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
+ * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
+ * session ticket extension at the same time.
+ */
+
+int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+ {
+ /* Point after session ID in client hello */
+ const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
+ unsigned short i;
+
+ /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
+ * to permit stateful resumption.
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ return 1;
+
+ if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
+ return 1;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ i = *(p++);
+ p+= i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Skip past cipher list */
+ n2s(p, i);
+ p+= i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+ i = *(p++);
+ p += i;
+ if (p > limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Now at start of extensions */
+ if ((p + 2) >= limit)
+ return 1;
+ n2s(p, i);
+ while ((p + 4) <= limit)
+ {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ n2s(p, type);
+ n2s(p, size);
+ if (p + size > limit)
+ return 1;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ {
+ /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
+ * trigger a full handshake
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ return 1;
+ /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
+ * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 0; /* Cache miss */
+ }
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+ {
+ /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
+ * generating the session from ticket now,
+ * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
+ * external mechanism to calculate the master
+ * secret later. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
+ ret);
+ }
+ p += size;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *sdec;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+ if (eticklen < 48)
+ goto tickerr;
+ /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+ int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+ &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ goto tickerr;
+ if (rv == 2)
+ renew_ticket = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Check key name matches */
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
+ goto tickerr;
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+ }
+ /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
+ * integrity checks on ticket.
+ */
+ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ if (mlen < 0)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ eticklen -= mlen;
+ /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+ goto tickerr;
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
+ if (!sdec)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
+ goto tickerr;
+ slen += mlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ p = sdec;
+
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ if (sess)
+ {
+ /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
+ * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
+ * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
+ * as required by standard.
+ */
+ if (sesslen)
+ memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
+ sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
+ *psess = sess;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
+ * send a new ticket
+ */
+ tickerr:
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#endif
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