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-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_both.c162
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c25
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c3
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c38
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c37
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c53
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/dtls1.h8
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/kssl.c72
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c7
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c12
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c9
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c22
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_both.c1
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c131
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c3
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c16
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c5
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c5
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c143
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/srtp.h4
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl.h28
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl3.h13
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c29
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c12
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c46
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h7
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c16
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/ssltest.c77
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c70
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c38
30 files changed, 646 insertions, 446 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 2e4250fcf..1b9d64bf6 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -156,9 +156,8 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe
static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
-static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
+static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500, 512, 256};
-static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
unsigned long frag_len);
static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
@@ -211,8 +210,7 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
return frag;
}
-static void
-dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
{
if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
@@ -225,53 +223,50 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
OPENSSL_free(frag);
}
-/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
- {
- int ret;
- int curr_mtu;
- unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
+static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
+{
+ if(s->d1->link_mtu)
+ {
+ s->d1->mtu = s->d1->link_mtu-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
+ }
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
{
- s->d1->mtu =
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-
- /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
- * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+ if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
{
- s->d1->mtu = 0;
- s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
- s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ s->d1->mtu =
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+ /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+ * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
+ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
+ {
+ /* Set to min mtu */
+ s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+ s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ }
}
+ else
+ return 0;
}
-#if 0
- mtu = s->d1->mtu;
-
- fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
-
- mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
- curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ return 1;
+}
- if ( curr_mtu > 0)
- mtu = curr_mtu;
- else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
- return ret;
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int curr_mtu;
+ int retry = 1;
+ unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
- if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
- {
- ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if ( ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
- }
-#endif
+ if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+ return -1;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something reasonable now */
if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
@@ -289,10 +284,15 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
- while( s->init_num)
+ /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
+ while(s->init_num > 0)
{
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
+ used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ + mac_size + blocksize;
+ if(s->d1->mtu > used_len)
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+ else
+ curr_mtu = 0;
if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
@@ -300,15 +300,27 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if ( ret <= 0)
return ret;
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
- mac_size - blocksize;
+ used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
+ if(s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return -1;
+ }
}
- if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+ /* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
+ if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
+ /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+ if(len > INT_MAX)
+ len = INT_MAX;
/* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
@@ -319,18 +331,29 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+ /* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
+ if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
}
+ /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+ if(len > INT_MAX)
+ len = INT_MAX;
+
+ if ( len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH )
+ {
+ /*
+ * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
+ * so fail
+ */
+ return -1;
+ }
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
-
- OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
}
ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
@@ -343,12 +366,23 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
* is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
* retransmit
*/
- if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ if ( retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
- s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
- BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+ {
+ if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+ {
+ if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+ return -1;
+ /* Have one more go */
+ retry = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
else
+ {
return(-1);
+ }
}
else
{
@@ -1412,28 +1446,20 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
return p;
}
-unsigned int
-dtls1_min_mtu(void)
+unsigned int
+dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
{
return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
}
-static unsigned int
-dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
+unsigned int
+dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned int i;
-
- if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
- return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
-
- for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
- if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
- return g_probable_mtu[i];
-
- return curr_mtu;
+ return dtls1_link_min_mtu()-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
}
+
void
dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index fd6562c11..9045fb990 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
s->hit = 0;
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+ /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -370,20 +373,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- if (ret == 2)
- {
- s->hit = 1;
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
- }
-#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -506,7 +495,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
else
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
@@ -527,7 +515,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
@@ -1730,6 +1717,12 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+ if (!l)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
index 712c4647f..3da2b4c8c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
return 0;
}
- EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ if(EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l) < 1)
+ return -1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 82ca65392..14337b31a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
+ d1->link_mtu = 0;
+ d1->mtu = 0;
+
if( ! d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || ! d1->processed_rcds.q
|| ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages || ! d1->buffered_app_data.q)
{
@@ -161,16 +164,14 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL)
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL)
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
pqueue sent_messages;
pqueue buffered_app_data;
unsigned int mtu;
+ unsigned int link_mtu;
if (s->d1)
{
@@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+ link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
dtls1_clear_queues(s);
@@ -232,6 +235,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)
{
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
+ s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
}
s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
@@ -276,7 +280,22 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
/* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
* fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
-
+ case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
+ if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
+ return 0;
+ s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
+ return 1;
+ case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
+ return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+ /*
+ * We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
+ * We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
+ */
+ if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
+ return 0;
+ s->d1->mtu = larg;
+ return larg;
default:
ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
break;
@@ -415,12 +434,17 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
{
+ unsigned int mtu;
+
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
- if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
+ if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
+ && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
{
- s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
+ mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
+ if(mtu < s->d1->mtu)
+ s->d1->mtu = mtu;
}
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 438c0913d..0059fe2f1 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
return 0;
-
+
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
@@ -247,18 +247,22 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
- return(0);
+ return(-1);
}
/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
- return(0);
+ return(-1);
}
return(1);
@@ -314,8 +318,9 @@ dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
return(0);
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
- s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
+ if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
+ s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
+ return -1;
}
}
@@ -530,7 +535,6 @@ printf("\n");
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length=0;
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
return(1);
f_err:
@@ -563,7 +567,8 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
- dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
+ if(dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)<0)
+ return -1;
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
@@ -642,8 +647,6 @@ again:
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
-
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
@@ -678,7 +681,8 @@ again:
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
- *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+ s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
@@ -701,7 +705,9 @@ again:
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
+ if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num)<0)
+ return -1;
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
@@ -714,6 +720,7 @@ again:
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
return(1);
@@ -865,7 +872,11 @@ start:
* buffer the application data for later processing rather
* than dropping the connection.
*/
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
+ if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num)<0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
@@ -1619,7 +1630,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
wr->length += bs;
}
- s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+ if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1) < 1) goto err;
/* record length after mac and block padding */
/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index 4b8ba3e45..da4c21e06 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
@@ -246,6 +247,9 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
}
s->init_num=0;
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+ /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
@@ -450,24 +454,15 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- /* clear this, it may get reset by
- * send_server_key_exchange */
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- )
- /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
- * even when forbidden by protocol specs
- * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
- * be able to handle this) */
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+ /*
+ * clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
- if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ if (0
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -658,8 +653,14 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ /*
+ * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+ * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+ * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+ * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -675,7 +676,18 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
+ * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
+ * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -1604,6 +1616,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
}
l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+ if (!l)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
index 192c5deff..338575268 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ extern "C" {
#define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP"
#endif
+/* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */
+#define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD 48
+
typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st
{
unsigned long map; /* track 32 packets on 32-bit systems
@@ -231,6 +234,7 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
/* Is set when listening for new connections with dtls1_listen() */
unsigned int listen;
+ unsigned int link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */
unsigned int mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */
struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
@@ -252,6 +256,10 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
unsigned int retransmitting;
+ /*
+ * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
+ * Cleared after the message has been processed.
+ */
unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/kssl.c b/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
index fd7c67bb1..950a0c56f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -954,15 +954,15 @@ print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
{
int i;
- printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++)
{
if (0 && isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
- printf( "%c ", kdata->data[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%c ", kdata->data[i]);
else
- printf( "%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
}
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
@@ -973,20 +973,20 @@ print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata)
{
if (adata == NULL)
{
- printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s, authdata==0\n", label);
return;
}
- printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
#if 0
{
int i;
- printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
for (i=0; i < adata->length; i++)
{
- printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
+ fprintf(stderr,(isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
adata->contents[i]);
}
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
#endif
}
@@ -1001,24 +1001,24 @@ print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
if (keyblk == NULL)
{
- printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
return;
}
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
keyblk->keyvalue->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
{
- printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
}
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#else
- printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++)
{
- printf("%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
}
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
@@ -1031,17 +1031,17 @@ print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
{
int i, ui, uj;
- printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%s principal Realm: ", label);
if (princ == NULL) return;
for (ui=0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++) putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
- printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
+ fprintf(stderr," (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
for (i=0; i < (int)princ->length; i++)
{
- printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
for (uj=0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++) {
putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
}
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
return;
}
@@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@ kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
+ fprintf(stderr,"in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (!krb5context && (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
@@ -1481,18 +1481,18 @@ kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
- printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
- printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
+ fprintf(stderr,"Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
&(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
- printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
if (paddr)
{
- printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tcaddrs:\n");
for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
{
krb5_data d;
@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
}
}
- printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
@@ -1976,7 +1976,7 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times( krb5_timestamp atime,
if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<- | %d - %d | < %d ->| %d\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_validate_times: %d |<- | %d - %d | < %d ->| %d\n",
start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -2027,10 +2027,10 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
unsigned int ui;
- printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
p = authentp->data;
- for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++) printf("%02x ",p[ui]);
- printf("\n");
+ for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x ",p[ui]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -2095,9 +2095,9 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
int padl;
- printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
- for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
+ for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -2132,10 +2132,10 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data)
- printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
- else printf("NULL\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
+ else fprintf(stderr,"NULL\n");
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
err:
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 93ca7d53c..3178815ec 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
@@ -602,12 +603,14 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
- s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
- if (s->method == NULL)
+ const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
+ new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+ if (new_method == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
+ s->method = new_method;
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
index ff3395f45..a35968f63 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ err:
/* read/writes from s->s2->mac_data using length for encrypt and
* decrypt. It sets s->s2->padding and s->[rw]length
- * if we are encrypting */
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ * if we are encrypting
+ * Returns 0 on error and 1 on success */
+int ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
}
/* check for NULL cipher */
- if (ds == NULL) return;
+ if (ds == NULL) return 1;
bs=ds->cipher->block_size;
@@ -145,7 +146,10 @@ void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
if (bs == 8)
l=(l+7)/8*8;
- EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l);
+ if(EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l) < 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
}
void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *md, int send)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index 8bb6ab8ba..acd61dc54 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -265,7 +265,11 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
if ((!s->s2->clear_text) &&
(s->s2->rlength >= (unsigned int)mac_size))
{
- ssl2_enc(s,0);
+ if(!ssl2_enc(s,0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ return(-1);
+ }
s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
@@ -616,7 +620,8 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
s->s2->wact_data_length=len+p;
ssl2_mac(s,s->s2->mac_data,1);
s->s2->wlength+=p+mac_size;
- ssl2_enc(s,1);
+ if(ssl2_enc(s,1) < 1)
+ return -1;
}
/* package up the header */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 2cba426bb..59ced3f30 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -188,13 +188,21 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
- buf=s->init_buf;
- if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
- { ret= -1; goto end; }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)
- SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
- { ret= -1; goto end; }
- s->init_buf=buf;
+ if(s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int) SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+ {
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ }
s->init_num=0;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
s->handshake_func=ssl2_accept;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
index 53b9390fd..3581fbf4f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
goto f_err;
}
*ok=1;
+ s->state = stn;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
return s->init_num;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 263e6348c..769271698 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -167,9 +167,9 @@
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl3_connect,
ssl3_get_client_method)
+#endif
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
@@ -272,6 +273,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num=0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
@@ -312,20 +316,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- if (ret == 2)
- {
- s->hit = 1;
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
- }
-#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
/* or PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
@@ -433,12 +423,10 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
@@ -450,7 +438,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
@@ -510,7 +497,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
@@ -559,7 +545,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
@@ -669,11 +654,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
!sess->session_id_length ||
-#else
- (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
(sess->not_resumable))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
@@ -879,6 +860,8 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ s->hit = 0;
+
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
@@ -902,12 +885,12 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->hit = 1;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
- if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+ if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
{
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
@@ -918,14 +901,13 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit=1;
}
- else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+ /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+ if (!s->hit)
{
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
- s->hit=0;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
@@ -1203,9 +1185,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
? 0 : 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
- printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
- printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+ fprintf(stderr,"pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
+ fprintf(stderr,"cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -1295,6 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -1305,14 +1289,26 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
+ /*
+ * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+ * ciphersuite.
+ */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
@@ -1357,9 +1353,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
- alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -1543,6 +1537,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
+ /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
+ if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -2174,24 +2175,13 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
- -1,
+ SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
16384,
&ok);
if (!ok)
return((int)n);
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
- {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- return(1);
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
if (n < 6)
{
/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
@@ -2223,7 +2213,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
- /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
+ /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session.
* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
@@ -2462,7 +2452,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -2478,9 +2468,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -3309,6 +3299,12 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+ if (!l)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
}
@@ -3478,40 +3474,9 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
}
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-}
+ }
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
-/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
- * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
- * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
- {
- int ok;
- long n;
- /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
- return 1;
- /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
- * message, so permit appropriate message length */
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
- -1,
- s->max_cert_list,
- &ok);
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
- || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
- return 2;
-
- return 1;
- }
-#endif
-
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 9db45af7e..89c133e68 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -535,7 +535,8 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
}
- EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ if(EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l) < 1)
+ return -1;
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 3f1745336..e7cbef481 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3810,17 +3810,17 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
#endif
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr) ; ++i)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr,i);
- printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
}
- printf("Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt) ; ++i)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt,i);
- printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
}
#endif
@@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-/* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
+/* fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
alg_k=c->algorithm_mkey;
@@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
{
ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
+ fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
(void *)c,c->name);
#endif
}
@@ -3891,7 +3891,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
{
ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
+ fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
c->name);
#endif
}
@@ -4000,6 +4000,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
}
ok = ok && ec_ok;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (
/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC key */
(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
@@ -4047,6 +4048,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
}
ok = ok && ec_ok;
}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
index cdddb17b6..4dec7033d 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
@@ -73,5 +73,4 @@ IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_method,
ssl3_accept,
ssl3_connect,
ssl3_get_method)
-
-
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 4c9285f35..1ec9e6ea4 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
* at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
+ if (left == 0 && extend)
+ return 0;
if (left > 0 && n > left)
n = left;
}
@@ -856,8 +858,7 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
wr->length += eivlen;
}
- /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
- s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+ if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
/* record length after mac and block padding */
s2n(wr->length,plen);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index c23d98708..fadca74ec 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
@@ -180,6 +181,12 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
return(NULL);
}
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_get_server_method)
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
@@ -206,11 +213,6 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
}
#endif
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl3_get_server_method)
-
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
@@ -284,6 +286,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
@@ -298,6 +301,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
@@ -441,20 +447,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- /* clear this, it may get reset by
- * send_server_key_exchange */
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- )
- /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
- * even when forbidden by protocol specs
- * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
- * be able to handle this) */
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+ /*
+ * clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
@@ -468,7 +465,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ if (0
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -674,8 +671,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+ * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+ * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+ * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -694,6 +697,19 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
+ * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+ * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
@@ -703,7 +719,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
+ * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+ * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -775,7 +802,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
{
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
}
else
@@ -1017,7 +1043,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
else
{
i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
- if (i == 1)
+ /*
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ */
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
@@ -1112,14 +1147,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
id=s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+ fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id)
{
@@ -2171,6 +2207,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+ size_t j;
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
@@ -2209,8 +2246,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
{
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
else
p-=2;
@@ -2219,6 +2257,20 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n=i;
}
+ /*
+ * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
+ * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
+ * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
+ * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
+ * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+ */
+ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
* of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
* RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
@@ -2266,19 +2318,23 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* to remain non-zero (0xff). */
decrypt_good &= version_good;
- /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
- * decrypt_good_mask. */
- for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+ /*
+ * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+ * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+ * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
{
- p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
- rand_premaster_secret[i]);
+ p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
- p,i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+ p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
}
else
#endif
@@ -2420,10 +2476,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
&kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
@@ -2437,10 +2493,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
@@ -2958,7 +3014,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ if (peer != NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
@@ -3362,6 +3418,11 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
}
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+ if (!l)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
index 24f23309d..096b624d0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/tls1.h */
+/* ssl/srtp.h */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@
#ifndef HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
#define HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index b78a1cce4..2ba592320 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -596,9 +596,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L
/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L
-/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations,
- * even when this violates protocol specs */
-#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x00200000L
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
+#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0
/* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's
* preferences */
#define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L
@@ -654,8 +653,13 @@ struct ssl_session_st
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
- * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
- * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+ * To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
+ *
+ * DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake.
+ * Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance
+ * in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+ */
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
@@ -688,6 +692,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
#define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+#define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+#define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL)
#define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
@@ -1627,6 +1635,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83
#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
+#define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU 120
+#define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU 121
#define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
@@ -1878,13 +1888,15 @@ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
+#endif
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
index 85f150409..6fad054e0 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -393,8 +393,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
+/*
+ * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
+ * Cleared after the message has been processed.
+ */
#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
-
+
/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
* restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
* from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
@@ -456,8 +460,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
* and freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in
* this array */
EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
- /* this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message
- * come in when we are not looking for one */
+ /*
+ * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
+ * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
+ * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
+ */
int change_cipher_spec;
int warn_alert;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 5123a8918..cef3ff46e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -286,35 +286,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
- switch(i)
- {
- /* If there was anything special to do for
- * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
- * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- /* We have an RSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
- /* We have a DSA key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
- case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
- /* We have a DH key. */
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
- /* We have an ECC key */
- break;
-
- default:
- /* Can't happen. */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- }
}
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 8188ff5d9..b767361e7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
co_list_num++;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
/*
if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
int reverse = 0;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
+ fprintf(stderr, "Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength, strength_bits);
#endif
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
else
{
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
#endif
if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
}
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("Action = %d\n", rule);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
#endif
/* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
*/
num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
if (co_list == NULL)
@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
{
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
+ fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
#endif
}
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 3f66fc061..4a62b4a79 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -383,13 +383,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
return(s);
err:
if (s != NULL)
- {
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
- if (s->ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
+ SSL_free(s);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
@@ -1080,19 +1074,6 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
l=s->max_cert_list;
s->max_cert_list=larg;
return(l);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
- return 0;
-#endif
-
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
- SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- s->d1->mtu = larg;
- return larg;
- }
- return 0;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
@@ -1507,6 +1488,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
+ p += n;
continue;
}
@@ -2112,7 +2094,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
#endif
@@ -2996,10 +2978,32 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
}
ssl_cert_free(ocert);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+ * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+ /*
+ * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+ * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+ * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+ * leave it unchanged.
+ */
+ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+ (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0))
+ {
+ ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+ }
+
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
return(ssl->ctx);
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 98888d2df..1b8fa8c4c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
+int ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
void ssl2_mac(SSL *s,unsigned char *mac,int send_data);
const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p);
@@ -997,7 +997,9 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
/* some client-only functions */
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -1014,7 +1016,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
# endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index ad40fadd0..235f92d82 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -335,7 +335,21 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
return(0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
+ /*
+ * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+ * Note that:
+ * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+ * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+ * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+ * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+ * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+ * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+ * whether a ticket is expected or not.
+ *
+ * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+ * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+ * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+ */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
{
ss->session_id_length = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
index 4f80be8ee..08889569f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
fprintf(stderr," -ssl2 - use SSLv2\n");
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
fprintf(stderr," -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
@@ -368,7 +368,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
" Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n" \
" (default is sect163r2).\n");
#endif
- fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - Verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists.\n"
+ " When this option is requested, the cipherlist\n"
+ " tests are run instead of handshake tests.\n");
}
static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
@@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
int fips_mode=0;
#endif
+ int no_protocol = 0;
verbose = 0;
debug = 0;
@@ -658,11 +661,26 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
- ssl2=1;
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ ssl2 = 1;
+ }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-tls1") == 0)
- tls1=1;
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ tls1 = 1;
+ }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
- ssl3=1;
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ ssl3 = 1;
+ }
else if (strncmp(*argv,"-num",4) == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -781,15 +799,41 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
+ /*
+ * test_cipherlist prevails over protocol switch: we test the cipherlist
+ * for all enabled protocols.
+ */
if (test_cipherlist == 1)
{
/* ensure that the cipher list are correctly sorted and exit */
+ fprintf(stdout, "Testing cipherlist order only. Ignoring all "
+ "other options.\n");
if (do_test_cipherlist() == 0)
EXIT(1);
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
+ if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 > 1)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
+ "be requested.\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Testing was requested for a compiled-out protocol (e.g. SSLv2).
+ * Ideally, we would error out, but the generic test wrapper can't know
+ * when to expect failure. So we do nothing and return success.
+ */
+ if (no_protocol)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Testing was requested for a disabled protocol. "
+ "Skipping tests.\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force)
{
fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. Use -f to perform "
@@ -868,30 +912,25 @@ bad:
}
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+/* At this point, ssl2/ssl3/tls1 is only set if the protocol is available.
+ * (Otherwise we exit early.)
+ * However the compiler doesn't know this, so we ifdef. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ssl2)
meth=SSLv2_method();
- else
- if (tls1)
- meth=TLSv1_method();
else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ssl3)
meth=SSLv3_method();
else
- meth=SSLv23_method();
-#else
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
if (tls1)
meth=TLSv1_method();
else
- if (ssl3)
- meth=SSLv3_method();
- else
- meth=SSLv23_method();
-#else
- meth=SSLv2_method();
-#endif
#endif
+ meth=SSLv23_method();
c_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
s_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 1923cf3e9..1308c0344 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -303,15 +303,15 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
km,tmp,num);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
s->session->master_key_length);
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
{
- printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
}
- printf("\n"); }
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
return ret;
}
@@ -349,19 +349,19 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
comp);
- printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
- printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
- printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
{
int i;
for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -540,11 +540,11 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
int i;
- printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
- printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
- printf("\n");
- printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", key[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02x", iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
int ret=0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
@@ -812,18 +812,18 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
unsigned long ui;
- printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
- printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
ds->cipher->iv_len);
- printf("\t\tIV: ");
- for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
- printf("\n");
- printf("\trec->input=");
- for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\t\tIV: ");
+ for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\trec->input=");
+ for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -848,9 +848,9 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
unsigned long i;
- printf("\trec->data=");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\trec->data=");
for (i=0; i<l; i++)
- printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," %02x", rec->data[i]); fprintf(stderr,"\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -1048,10 +1048,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
if (!stream_mac)
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",rec->data[z]); printf("\n"); }
+fprintf(stderr,"seq=");
+{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",seq[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
+fprintf(stderr,"rec=");
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
#endif
if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ printf("rec=");
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) fprintf(stderr,"%02X ",md[z]); fprintf(stderr,"\n"); }
#endif
return(md_size);
}
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
#endif
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
}
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
int rv;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
out,buff,olen);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
goto ret;
err1:
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index d6aff4b68..179b467d4 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -204,28 +204,40 @@ static int nid_list[] =
static int pref_list[] =
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+#endif
NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+#endif
NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+#endif
NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+#endif
NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+#endif
NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+#endif
NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
@@ -233,7 +245,7 @@ static int pref_list[] =
int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
{
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
return 0;
@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
switch (nid)
{
case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
@@ -488,11 +500,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned c
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
- /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
- * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
- * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
- * resolves this to two bytes.
- */
s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
@@ -998,6 +1005,16 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
@@ -1192,7 +1209,9 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
- ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
+ ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
+ /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
+ ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
@@ -1506,6 +1525,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
@@ -1800,7 +1820,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
- /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
+ /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-24 11:46:21 +0000