diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl')
54 files changed, 656 insertions, 212 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES index a0de5abb6..67ff293f3 100644 --- a/openssl/CHANGES +++ b/openssl/CHANGES @@ -2,6 +2,73 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] + + *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. + Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and + Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and + preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) + [Antonio Martin] + + Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] + + *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension + of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption + which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against + the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing + differences arising during decryption processing. A research + paper describing this attack can be found at: + http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann + <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de> + for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) + [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] + + *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. + (CVE-2011-4576) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George + Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and + Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) + [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>] + + *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. + Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw + and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) + [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>] + + *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. + [Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>] + + *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. + [Emilia Käsper (Google)] + + *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different + interpretations of the '..._len' fields). + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than + BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent + threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. + + This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING + lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of + BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, + the last update always remained unused). + [Emilia Käsper (Google)] + + *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf. + [Bob Buckholz (Google)] + Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011] *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted @@ -906,8 +973,67 @@ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] + + Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] + + *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. + Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and + Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and + preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) + [Antonio Martin] - Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] + + *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension + of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption + which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against + the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing + differences arising during decryption processing. A research + paper describing this attack can be found at: + http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann + <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de> + for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) + [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] + + *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109) + [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>] + + *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. + (CVE-2011-4576) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George + Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and + Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. + Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw + and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) + [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>] + + *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. + [Emilia Käsper (Google)] + + *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different + interpretations of the '..._len' fields). + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than + BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent + threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. + + This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING + lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of + BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, + the last update always remained unused). + [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular for multi-threaded use of ECDH. diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure index f07c31455..eb8744d6b 100644 --- a/openssl/Configure +++ b/openssl/Configure @@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ my %table=( "cc", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::", ####VOS Configurations -"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:", -"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:", +"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:", +"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:", #### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups # -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have to do it @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ my %table=( "darwin64-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc64_asm}:osx64:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "debug-darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -g3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", -"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", +"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", "debug-darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DB_ENDIAN -g -Wall -O::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", ##### A/UX diff --git a/openssl/FAQ b/openssl/FAQ index fe54856a6..2a271ed67 100644 --- a/openssl/FAQ +++ b/openssl/FAQ @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions * Which is the current version of OpenSSL? The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>. -OpenSSL 1.0.0e was released on Sep 6th, 2011. +OpenSSL 1.0.0g was released on Jan 18th, 2012. In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL: diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS index 672810dcc..1264201ef 100644 --- a/openssl/NEWS +++ b/openssl/NEWS @@ -5,6 +5,18 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g: + + o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 + + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f: + + o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 + o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 + o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 + o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027 + o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e: o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207 diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README index 898437989..6144ddf01 100644 --- a/openssl/README +++ b/openssl/README @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011 + OpenSSL 1.0.0g 18 Jan 2012 Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson diff --git a/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com b/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com index 794e1de62..b0d1fdaac 100644 --- a/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com +++ b/openssl/VMS/mkshared.com @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ $! P2: Zlib object library path (optional). $! $! Input: [.UTIL]LIBEAY.NUM,[.xxx.EXE.CRYPTO]SSL_LIBCRYPTO[32].OLB $! [.UTIL]SSLEAY.NUM,[.xxx.EXE.SSL]SSL_LIBSSL[32].OLB +$! [.CRYPTO.xxx]OPENSSLCONF.H $! Output: [.xxx.EXE.CRYPTO]SSL_LIBCRYPTO_SHR[32].OPT,.MAP,.EXE $! [.xxx.EXE.SSL]SSL_LIBSSL_SRH[32].OPT,.MAP,.EXE $! @@ -70,6 +71,9 @@ $ endif $ endif $ endif $! +$! ----- Prepare info for processing: disabled algorithms info +$ gosub read_disabled_algorithms_info +$! $ ZLIB = p2 $ zlib_lib = "" $ if (ZLIB .nes. "") @@ -384,8 +388,7 @@ $ alg_i = alg_i + 1 $ if alg_entry .eqs. "" then goto loop2 $ if alg_entry .nes. "," $ then -$ if alg_entry .eqs. "KRB5" then goto loop ! Special for now -$ if alg_entry .eqs. "STATIC_ENGINE" then goto loop ! Special for now +$ if disabled_algorithms - ("," + alg_entry + ",") .nes disabled_algorithms then goto loop $ if f$trnlnm("OPENSSL_NO_"+alg_entry) .nes. "" then goto loop $ goto loop2 $ endif @@ -452,3 +455,22 @@ $ endif $ endloop_rvi: $ close vf $ return +$ +$! The disabled algorithms reader +$ read_disabled_algorithms_info: +$ disabled_algorithms = "," +$ open /read cf [.CRYPTO.'ARCH']OPENSSLCONF.H +$ loop_rci: +$ read/err=endloop_rci/end=endloop_rci cf rci_line +$ rci_line = f$edit(rci_line,"TRIM,COMPRESS") +$ rci_ei = 0 +$ if f$extract(0,9,rci_line) .eqs. "# define " then rci_ei = 2 +$ if f$extract(0,8,rci_line) .eqs. "#define " then rci_ei = 1 +$ if rci_ei .eq. 0 then goto loop_rci +$ rci_e = f$element(rci_ei," ",rci_line) +$ if f$extract(0,11,rci_e) .nes. "OPENSSL_NO_" then goto loop_rci +$ disabled_algorithms = disabled_algorithms + f$extract(11,999,rci_e) + "," +$ goto loop_rci +$ endloop_rci: +$ close cf +$ return diff --git a/openssl/apps/ca.c b/openssl/apps/ca.c index 6b8b0ef8f..5d11948bb 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/ca.c +++ b/openssl/apps/ca.c @@ -2536,7 +2536,7 @@ static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db) /* Make it Upper Case */ for (i=0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++) - row[DB_serial][i] = toupper(row[DB_serial][i]); + row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]); ok=1; diff --git a/openssl/apps/cms.c b/openssl/apps/cms.c index d29a88490..d15925a59 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/cms.c +++ b/openssl/apps/cms.c @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n"); BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file signer certificate file\n"); BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip file recipient certificate file for decryption\n"); - BIO_printf (bio_err, "-skeyid use subject key identifier\n"); + BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid use subject key identifier\n"); BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file input file\n"); BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n"); BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n"); diff --git a/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf b/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf index 20ed61bc3..45e46a0fb 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf +++ b/openssl/apps/openssl-vms.cnf @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) #organizationalUnitName_default = -commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) +commonName = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) commonName_max = 64 emailAddress = Email Address diff --git a/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf b/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf index 9d2cd5bfa..18760c6e6 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf +++ b/openssl/apps/openssl.cnf @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) #organizationalUnitName_default = -commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) +commonName = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) commonName_max = 64 emailAddress = Email Address diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/openssl/apps/s_client.c index 34ad2cec7..53be0f8f8 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_client.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_client.c @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) psk_key=*(++argv); for (j = 0; j < strlen(psk_key); j++) { - if (isxdigit((int)psk_key[j])) + if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[j])) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv); goto bad; diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/openssl/apps/s_server.c index 8a0c34cf0..a3a04d473 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/s_server.c +++ b/openssl/apps/s_server.c @@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) psk_key=*(++argv); for (i=0; i<strlen(psk_key); i++) { - if (isxdigit((int)psk_key[i])) + if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[i])) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv); goto bad; diff --git a/openssl/apps/x509.c b/openssl/apps/x509.c index ed1e8c69a..9f5eaeb6b 100644 --- a/openssl/apps/x509.c +++ b/openssl/apps/x509.c @@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ bad: else { pk=load_key(bio_err, - keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, + keyfile, keyformat, 0, passin, e, "request key"); if (pk == NULL) goto end; } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl index c57b3a2d6..403c4d129 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl @@ -1176,6 +1176,7 @@ ___ # As UltraSPARC T1, a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU, FP nops can have # undesired effect, so just omit them and sacrifice some portion of # percent in performance... -$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gem; +$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gm; print $code; +close STDOUT; # ensure flush diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c index 3348b8762..ad0d2506f 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c @@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a) if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long)) { - /* hmm... a bit ugly */ - return(0xffffffffL); + /* hmm... a bit ugly, return all ones */ + return -1; } if (a->data == NULL) return 0; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c index c1d1b1229..bbc495291 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value) if(name) { if(!(tmpname = BUF_strdup(name))) return NULL; for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) { - c = *p; + c = (unsigned char)*p; if(isupper(c)) { c = tolower(c); *p = c; @@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value) if(value) { if(!(tmpval = BUF_strdup(value))) return NULL; for(p = tmpval ; *p; p++) { - c = *p; + c = (unsigned char)*p; if(isupper(c)) { c = tolower(c); *p = c; @@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value) tmpname = BUF_strdup(name); if(!tmpname) return 0; for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) { - c = *p; + c = (unsigned char)*p; if(isupper(c)) { c = tolower(c); *p = c; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c index e061f2ffa..89e7a7f54 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/t_x509.c @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags, unsigned long cflag) if (bs->length <= 4) { l=ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs); - if (l < 0) + if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { l= -l; neg="-"; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c index c1fd75aaa..4b5a132d8 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start: /* add to buffer and return */ if (i >= inl) { - memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl); + memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl); ctx->obuf_len+=inl; return(num+inl); } @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start: { if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */ { - memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i); + memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i); in+=i; inl-=i; num+=i; @@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES: ret=0; p1=ctx->ibuf; - for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++) + for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++) { - if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++; + if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++; } break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: @@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) for (;;) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); - if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off) + if (ctx->obuf_len > 0) { r=BIO_write(b->next_bio, &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]), - ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off); + ctx->obuf_len); #if 0 -fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r); +fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r); #endif BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (r <= 0) return((long)r); ctx->obuf_off+=r; + ctx->obuf_len-=r; } else { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h index 152802fbd..ab47abcf1 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h @@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO) typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct { + /* Buffers are setup like this: + * + * <---------------------- size -----------------------> + * +---------------------------------------------------+ + * | consumed | remaining | free space | + * +---------------------------------------------------+ + * <-- off --><------- len -------> + */ + /* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */ int ibuf_size; /* how big is the input buffer */ int obuf_size; /* how big is the output buffer */ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl index 37c65d351..f4093177e 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl @@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ $data=<<EOF; addze r11,r0 #mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $LD r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4) - $LD r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r4) + $LD r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5) $UMULL r8,r6,r7 $UMULH r9,r6,r7 addc r12,r8,r12 diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl index 5cd3cd2ed..e8f6b0508 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl @@ -527,8 +527,10 @@ $sbit=$num; &jle (&label("sqradd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); - &lea ("edx",&DWP(0,$sbit,"edx",2)); + &add ("edx","edx"); &shr ($carry,31); + &add ("edx",$sbit); + &adc ($carry,0); &set_label("sqrlast"); &mov ($word,$_n0); &mov ($inp,$_np); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c index e060592fd..9ed8bc2b4 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */ #endif CRYPTO_THREADID tid; - unsigned int counter; + int counter; unsigned long flags; BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx; int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, @@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod) if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER; + /* Set the counter to the special value -1 + * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding + * that does not need updating before first use. */ + ret->counter = -1; CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&ret->tid); return(ret); err: @@ -190,7 +193,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) goto err; } - if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL && + if (b->counter == -1) + b->counter = 0; + + if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL && !(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE)) { /* re-create blinding parameters */ @@ -205,8 +211,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) ret=1; err: - if (b->counter == 0) - b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER; + if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER) + b->counter = 0; return(ret); } @@ -227,6 +233,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) return(0); } + if (b->counter == -1) + /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */ + b->counter = 0; + else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx)) + return(0); + if (r != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0; @@ -247,22 +259,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct int ret; bn_check_top(n); - if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) - { - BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); - return(0); - } if (r != NULL) ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx); else - ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx); - - if (ret >= 0) { - if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx)) + if (b->Ai == NULL) + { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return(0); + } + ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx); } + bn_check_top(n); return(ret); } diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c index af94458ca..03deae667 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c @@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_ field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; /* only support affine coordinates */ - if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err; + if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1; if (ctx == NULL) { diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c index 26a4a9ee7..c3c20c38b 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c @@ -286,9 +286,13 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out) size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL; EC_GROUP *group; + ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL; unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20]; - unsigned char *signature = NULL; - unsigned int sig_len; + unsigned char *signature = NULL; + const unsigned char *sig_ptr; + unsigned char *sig_ptr2; + unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL; + unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len; int nid, ret = 0; /* fill digest values with some random data */ @@ -338,7 +342,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out) if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) goto builtin_err; EC_GROUP_free(group); - if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) < 160) + degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); + if (degree < 160) /* drop the curve */ { EC_KEY_free(eckey); @@ -414,26 +419,89 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out) } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); - /* modify a single byte of the signature */ - offset = signature[10] % sig_len; - dirt = signature[11]; - signature[offset] ^= dirt ? dirt : 1; + /* wrong length */ + if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1, + eckey) == 1) + { + BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); + goto builtin_err; + } + BIO_printf(out, "."); + (void)BIO_flush(out); + + /* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't + * garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and + * modify a byte in one of the bignums directly. */ + sig_ptr = signature; + if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL) + { + BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); + goto builtin_err; + } + + /* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */ + r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r); + s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s); + bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8; + if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len)) + { + BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); + goto builtin_err; + } + buf_len = 2 * bn_len; + if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) + goto builtin_err; + /* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */ + memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len); + BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len); + BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len); + + /* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */ + offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len; + dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1; + raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; + /* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */ + if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) || + (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL)) + goto builtin_err; + + sig_ptr2 = signature; + sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2); if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } + /* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */ + raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; + if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) || + (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL)) + goto builtin_err; + + sig_ptr2 = signature; + sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2); + if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) + { + BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); + goto builtin_err; + } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); BIO_printf(out, " ok\n"); /* cleanup */ + /* clean bogus errors */ + ERR_clear_error(); OPENSSL_free(signature); signature = NULL; EC_KEY_free(eckey); eckey = NULL; EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); wrong_eckey = NULL; + ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); + ecdsa_sig = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); + raw_buf = NULL; } ret = 1; @@ -442,8 +510,12 @@ builtin_err: EC_KEY_free(eckey); if (wrong_eckey) EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); + if (ecdsa_sig) + ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); if (signature) OPENSSL_free(signature); + if (raw_buf) + OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); if (curves) OPENSSL_free(curves); diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h index 310a3387b..a368f6fc7 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000005fL +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000007fL #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0e-fips 6 Sep 2011" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0g-fips 18 Jan 2012" #else -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0e 6 Sep 2011" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0g 18 Jan 2012" #endif #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c index e9ead3a52..e3a65571c 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c @@ -133,47 +133,87 @@ # define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set)) #endif -#ifdef __VOS__ +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) + +/* The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock + (RTC) to generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm + relies upon the uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors + such as cache misses, interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and + upon the rather large relative difference between the speed of the + clock and the rate at which it can be read. + + If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is + more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the + clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the + results would be far more predictable. + + As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of + seed data. */ + int RAND_poll(void) { - unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; + short int code; + gid_t curr_gid; pid_t curr_pid; uid_t curr_uid; - static int first=1; - int i; - long rnd = 0; + int i, k; struct timespec ts; - unsigned seed; - -/* The VOS random() function starts from a static seed so its - initial value is predictable. If random() returns the - initial value, reseed it with dynamic data. The VOS - real-time clock has a granularity of 1 nsec so it should be - reasonably difficult to predict its exact value. Do not - gratuitously reseed the PRNG because other code in this - process or thread may be using it. */ - - if (first) { - first = 0; - rnd = random (); - if (rnd == 1804289383) { - clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); - curr_pid = getpid(); - curr_uid = getuid(); - seed = ts.tv_sec ^ ts.tv_nsec ^ curr_pid ^ curr_uid; - srandom (seed); - } - } + unsigned char v; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) { - if (i % 4 == 0) - rnd = random(); - buf[i] = rnd; - rnd >>= 8; - } - RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED); - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA + long duration; + extern void s$sleep (long *_duration, short int *_code); +#else +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 + long long duration; + extern void s$sleep2 (long long *_duration, short int *_code); +#else +#error "Unsupported Platform." +#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */ + + /* Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some* + variation between different processes. */ + + curr_gid = getgid(); + RAND_add (&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1); + curr_gid = 0; + + curr_pid = getpid(); + RAND_add (&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1); + curr_pid = 0; + + curr_uid = getuid(); + RAND_add (&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1); + curr_uid = 0; + for (i=0; i<(ENTROPY_NEEDED*4); i++) + { + /* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache + collisions, bus interference, etc. */ + for (k=0; k<99; k++) + ts.tv_nsec = random (); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA + /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */ + duration = 1; + s$sleep (&duration, &code); +#else +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 + /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */ + duration = 1; + s$sleep2 (&duration, &code); +#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */ + + /* get wall clock time. */ + clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); + + /* take 8 bits */ + v = (unsigned char) (ts.tv_nsec % 256); + RAND_add (&v, sizeof v, 1); + v = 0; + } return 1; } #elif defined __OpenBSD__ diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c index bc7d9c580..030e07f41 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) in=fopen(file,"rb"); #endif if (in == NULL) goto err; -#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_POSIX_IO) +#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) { /* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number * of bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index 7c941885f..2e1ddd48d 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -314,51 +314,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) return ret; } -static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, - BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (local) +static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, + BN_CTX *ctx) + { + if (unblind == NULL) + /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor + * in BN_BLINDING. */ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); else { - int ret; - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - return ret; - } -} - -static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, - BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (local) - return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); - else - { + /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor + * outside BN_BLINDING. */ int ret; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); + ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); return ret; } -} + } + +static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, + BN_CTX *ctx) + { + /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex + * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. + * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: + * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, + * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. + * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock. + */ + return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); + } /* signing */ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res; + BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; int local_blinding = 0; + /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); @@ -406,8 +411,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, } if (blinding != NULL) - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) + { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; + } if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && @@ -441,7 +453,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, } if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) @@ -480,18 +492,21 @@ err: static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br; + BIGNUM *f, *ret; int j,num=0,r= -1; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; int local_blinding = 0; + /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); @@ -529,8 +544,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, } if (blinding != NULL) - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) + { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) + goto err; + } /* do the decrypt */ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || @@ -564,7 +586,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, } if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; p=buf; diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 5a0b0249b..701ec565e 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) atm.length=sizeof(buff2); atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; - if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) + if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) return 0; if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c index 0d70e8696..df46a4983 100644 --- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c +++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c @@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f) * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array. * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed. */ -static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr, +static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, const int length, const unsigned char fill) { - OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length); + if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length) + return 0; if (bs->length > 0) { memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length); if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) { @@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr, } } memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length); + return 1; } /* @@ -181,15 +183,13 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out, return 0; switch (afi) { case IANA_AFI_IPV4: - if (bs->length > 4) + if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill)) return 0; - addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill); BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]); break; case IANA_AFI_IPV6: - if (bs->length > 16) + if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill)) return 0; - addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill); for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2) ; for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2) @@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, /* * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange * elements. + * + * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an + * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool, + * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this + * function returns -1. If this messes up your preferred sort order + * for garbage input, tough noogies. */ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a, const IPAddressOrRange *b, @@ -326,22 +332,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a, switch (a->type) { case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: - addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00); + if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00)) + return -1; prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix); break; case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: - addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00); + if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00)) + return -1; prefixlen_a = length * 8; break; } switch (b->type) { case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: - addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00); + if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00)) + return -1; prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix); break; case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: - addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00); + if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00)) + return -1; prefixlen_b = length * 8; break; } @@ -383,6 +393,7 @@ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min, unsigned char mask; int i, j; + OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0); for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++) ; for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--) @@ -601,10 +612,10 @@ static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr, return NULL; switch (afi) { case IANA_AFI_IPV4: - sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp); + (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp); break; case IANA_AFI_IPV6: - sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp); + (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp); break; } f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges; @@ -656,22 +667,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr, /* * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange. */ -static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor, +static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor, unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max, int length) { - OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL); + if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL) + return 0; switch (aor->type) { case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: - addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00); - addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF); - return; + return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) && + addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF)); case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: - addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00); - addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF); - return; + return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) && + addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF)); } + return 0; } /* @@ -687,9 +698,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor, if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL || afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length || (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix && - aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange)) + aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) || + !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length)) return 0; - extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length); + return afi_length; } @@ -771,8 +783,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr) IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1); - extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); - extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length); + if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) || + !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length)) + return 0; /* * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range. @@ -800,14 +813,17 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr) } /* - * Check final range to see if it should be a prefix. + * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a + * prefix. */ j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; { IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); - if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { - extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); - if (range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0) + if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { + if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length)) + return 0; + if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 || + range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0) return 0; } } @@ -841,8 +857,16 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors, unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; - extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); - extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length); + if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) || + !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length)) + return 0; + + /* + * Punt inverted ranges. + */ + if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 || + memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0) + return 0; /* * Punt overlaps. @@ -860,8 +884,8 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors, IPAddressOrRange *merged; if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length)) return 0; - sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged); - sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1); + (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged); + (void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1); IPAddressOrRange_free(a); IPAddressOrRange_free(b); --i; @@ -869,6 +893,20 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors, } } + /* + * Check for inverted final range. + */ + j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; + { + IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); + if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { + unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; + extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length); + if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0) + return 0; + } + } + return 1; } @@ -885,7 +923,7 @@ int v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr) v3_addr_get_afi(f))) return 0; } - sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp); + (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp); sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr); OPENSSL_assert(v3_addr_is_canonical(addr)); return 1; @@ -1017,6 +1055,11 @@ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(const struct v3_ext_method *method, X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } + if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) { + X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); + X509V3_conf_err(val); + goto err; + } if (!v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; @@ -1102,13 +1145,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent, p = 0; for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) { - extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c), - c_min, c_max, length); + if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c), + c_min, c_max, length)) + return -1; for (;; p++) { if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent)) return 0; - extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p), - p_min, p_max, length); + if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p), + p_min, p_max, length)) + return 0; if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0) continue; if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0) @@ -1130,7 +1175,7 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b) return 1; if (b == NULL || v3_addr_inherits(a) || v3_addr_inherits(b)) return 0; - sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp); + (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp); for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) { IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i); int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa); @@ -1195,7 +1240,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, } if (!v3_addr_is_canonical(ext)) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION); - sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp); + (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp); if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; @@ -1221,7 +1266,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, } continue; } - sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp); + (void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp); for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) { IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j); int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc); diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod index 49b10f224..20edff97f 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ using the public key B<eckey>. ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error. -ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or -1 +ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or 0 on error. ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod index 8e077e31c..d4df1bfac 100644 --- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod +++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod @@ -39,10 +39,16 @@ for a description of the method's properties. SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions (some of these settings were made automatically during the last -handshake). It only makes sense when opening a new session (or reusing -an old one) with the same peer that shares these settings. -SSL_clear() is not a short form for the sequence -L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>; . +handshake). It only makes sense for a new connection with the exact +same peer that shares these settings, and may fail if that peer +changes its settings between connections. Use the sequence +L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>; +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>; +L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>; +L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> +instead to avoid such failures +(or simply L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> +if session reuse is not desired). =head1 RETURN VALUES diff --git a/openssl/e_os2.h b/openssl/e_os2.h index 4c785c62c..d30724d30 100644 --- a/openssl/e_os2.h +++ b/openssl/e_os2.h @@ -193,8 +193,14 @@ extern "C" { #endif /* --------------------------------- VOS ----------------------------------- */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS +#if defined(__VOS__) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS) # define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS +#ifdef __HPPA__ +# define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA +#endif +#ifdef __IA32__ +# define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 +#endif #endif /* ------------------------------- VxWorks --------------------------------- */ diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c index 00759bcab..c74810285 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c @@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_l } param = get_encryption_params(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher); + if(!param){ + goto err; + } + gost_init(&ctx,param->sblock); OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8); memcpy(wrappedKey,gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->data,8); diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c index 624be586a..0d7d3ffe6 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c @@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ int pkey_GOST94cp_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_len } param = get_encryption_params(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher); + if(!param){ + goto err; + } + gost_init(&cctx,param->sblock); OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8); memcpy(wrappedKey,gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->data,8); diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c index caaea99d3..4a05853e5 100644 --- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c +++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl94_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, } if (strlen(value) == 1) { - switch(toupper(value[0])) + switch(toupper((unsigned char)value[0])) { case 'A': param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; @@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl94_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, break; } } - else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper(value[0]) == 'X')) + else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper((unsigned char)value[0]) == 'X')) { - switch (toupper(value[1])) + switch (toupper((unsigned char)value[1])) { case 'A': param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet; @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl01_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, } if (strlen(value) == 1) { - switch(toupper(value[0])) + switch(toupper((unsigned char)value[0])) { case 'A': param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; @@ -217,9 +217,9 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl01_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, break; } } - else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper(value[0]) == 'X')) + else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper((unsigned char)value[0]) == 'X')) { - switch (toupper(value[1])) + switch (toupper((unsigned char)value[1])) { case 'A': param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet; diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec index e4db87553..d4f31f7b6 100644 --- a/openssl/openssl.spec +++ b/openssl/openssl.spec @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ %define libmaj 1 %define libmin 0 %define librel 0 -%define librev e +%define librev g Release: 1 %define openssldir /var/ssl diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index 2180c6d4d..9f898d699 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28}; -static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void); static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu); static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); @@ -264,11 +263,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) return ret; mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); } - - OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0); /* should have something reasonable now */ - #endif + OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */ + if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); @@ -795,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) *ok = 0; return i; } - OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */ + if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } /* parse the message fragment header */ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); @@ -867,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the * handshake to fail */ - OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len); + if (i != (int)frag_len) + { + al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + goto f_err; + } *ok = 1; @@ -1367,7 +1376,7 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) return p; } -static unsigned int +unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void) { return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c index 48e8b6ffb..c3b77c889 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) pqueue buffered_messages; pqueue sent_messages; pqueue buffered_app_data; - + unsigned int mtu; + if (s->d1) { unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q; @@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages; sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages; buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q; + mtu = s->d1->mtu; dtls1_clear_queues(s); @@ -222,6 +224,11 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie); } + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) + { + s->d1->mtu = mtu; + } + s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds; s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds; s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages; diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c index 39aac73e1..de30a505a 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -375,6 +375,8 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned int mac_size; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; + unsigned char *mac = NULL; rr= &(s->s3->rrec); @@ -409,13 +411,10 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); if (enc_err <= 0) { - /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ - if (enc_err < 0) - { - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - } - goto err; + /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always + * perform all computations before discarding the message. + */ + decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG @@ -445,28 +444,32 @@ printf("\n"); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; #else - goto err; + decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; #endif } /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ - if (rr->length < mac_size) + if (rr->length >= mac_size) { -#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; -#else - goto err; -#endif + rr->length -= mac_size; + mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } - rr->length-=mac_size; + else + rr->length = 0; i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); - if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0) + if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { - goto err; + decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; } } + if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) + { + /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ + rr->length = 0; + s->packet_length = 0; + goto err; + } + /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c index a6a4c87ea..149983be3 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 50bd415b5..53223bd38 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) /* wrong packet length */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto err; + goto f_err; } return(1); @@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) if (n < 6) { /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } @@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ if (ticklen + 6 != n) { - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c index 58386e1ba..b14597076 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -511,6 +511,9 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ l+=i; + /* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten + * with the padding length. */ + memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); rec->length+=i; rec->input[l-1]=(i-1); } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c index 62c791cb7..1130244ae 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -2177,6 +2177,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) { unsigned char *rp,*wp; size_t rlen, wlen; + int init_extra; #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) @@ -2215,6 +2216,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf; rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len; wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len; + init_extra = s->s3->init_extra; if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; @@ -2227,6 +2229,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp; s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen; s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen; + s->s3->init_extra = init_extra; ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index c3b5ff33f..d734c359f 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) } s->init_num=0; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { @@ -755,6 +756,14 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) int ok; long n; + /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per + * negotiation. */ + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); + return -1; + } + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, * so permit appropriate message length */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, @@ -783,6 +792,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; } #endif + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; return 2; } return 1; @@ -2130,6 +2140,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + BN_clear_free(pub); goto err; } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index e4c3f6501..8f922eea7 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -1882,6 +1882,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 +#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 @@ -2139,6 +2140,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173 #define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174 +#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 346 #define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177 diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h index baaa89e71..9c2c41287 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h @@ -379,6 +379,17 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st #define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER 0x0004 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010 + +/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we + * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us + * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a + * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart + * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS + * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to + * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be + * effected, but we can't prevent that. + */ +#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040 typedef struct ssl3_state_st { diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index a8ce186b7..54ba7ef5b 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(void) sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp); } } + sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); } MemCheck_on(); } diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c index 0eed46474..e9be77109 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* ssl/ssl_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL), "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM), "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "SSL3_CONNECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "SSL3_CTRL"}, @@ -397,6 +398,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY) ,"missing tmp rsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY) ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"}, diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 46732791f..6688f19a6 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1054,6 +1054,11 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) s->max_cert_list=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 + if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu()) + return 0; +#endif + if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { @@ -3042,4 +3047,3 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); - diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h index 4c78393f3..cea622a2a 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s); int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s); void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); +unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void); /* some client-only functions */ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s); diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index 85371c87b..26cbae449 100644 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -971,6 +971,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in sdata = data; if (dsize > 0) { + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) + { + sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, + X509_EXTENSION_free); + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); diff --git a/openssl/test/testssl b/openssl/test/testssl index f9d7c5d65..b55364ae8 100644 --- a/openssl/test/testssl +++ b/openssl/test/testssl @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair $ssltest $extra || exit 1 if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then - echo test sslv2/sslv3 w/o DHE via BIO pair - $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe $extra || exit 1 + echo 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair' + $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe -no_ecdhe $extra || exit 1 fi echo test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair @@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ fi if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then echo skipping RSA tests else - echo test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no DHE, multiple handshakes - ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1 + echo 'test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes' + ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -no_ecdhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1 if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then echo skipping RSA+DHE tests diff --git a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl index 2c99467d3..aec401c77 100644 --- a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl +++ b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl @@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ EOF undef %err_reason_strings; } -if($debug && defined(%notrans)) { +if($debug && %notrans) { print STDERR "The following function codes were not translated:\n"; foreach(sort keys %notrans) { |