diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/plink/x11fwd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | tools/plink/x11fwd.c | 1884 |
1 files changed, 1088 insertions, 796 deletions
diff --git a/tools/plink/x11fwd.c b/tools/plink/x11fwd.c index d98908a77..7ecb4cc27 100644 --- a/tools/plink/x11fwd.c +++ b/tools/plink/x11fwd.c @@ -1,796 +1,1088 @@ -/*
- * Platform-independent bits of X11 forwarding.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include "putty.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "tree234.h"
-
-#define GET_16BIT(endian, cp) \
- (endian=='B' ? GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp) : GET_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp))
-
-#define PUT_16BIT(endian, cp, val) \
- (endian=='B' ? PUT_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp, val) : PUT_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp, val))
-
-const char *const x11_authnames[] = {
- "", "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1"
-};
-
-struct XDMSeen {
- unsigned int time;
- unsigned char clientid[6];
-};
-
-struct X11Private {
- const struct plug_function_table *fn;
- /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */
- unsigned char firstpkt[12]; /* first X data packet */
- struct X11Display *disp;
- char *auth_protocol;
- unsigned char *auth_data;
- int data_read, auth_plen, auth_psize, auth_dlen, auth_dsize;
- int verified;
- int throttled, throttle_override;
- unsigned long peer_ip;
- int peer_port;
- void *c; /* data used by ssh.c */
- Socket s;
-};
-
-static int xdmseen_cmp(void *a, void *b)
-{
- struct XDMSeen *sa = a, *sb = b;
- return sa->time > sb->time ? 1 :
- sa->time < sb->time ? -1 :
- memcmp(sa->clientid, sb->clientid, sizeof(sa->clientid));
-}
-
-/* Do-nothing "plug" implementation, used by x11_setup_display() when it
- * creates a trial connection (and then immediately closes it).
- * XXX: bit out of place here, could in principle live in a platform-
- * independent network.c or something */
-static void dummy_plug_log(Plug p, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
- const char *error_msg, int error_code) { }
-static int dummy_plug_closing
- (Plug p, const char *error_msg, int error_code, int calling_back)
-{ return 1; }
-static int dummy_plug_receive(Plug p, int urgent, char *data, int len)
-{ return 1; }
-static void dummy_plug_sent(Plug p, int bufsize) { }
-static int dummy_plug_accepting(Plug p, OSSocket sock) { return 1; }
-static const struct plug_function_table dummy_plug = {
- dummy_plug_log, dummy_plug_closing, dummy_plug_receive,
- dummy_plug_sent, dummy_plug_accepting
-};
-
-struct X11Display *x11_setup_display(char *display, int authtype, Conf *conf)
-{
- struct X11Display *disp = snew(struct X11Display);
- char *localcopy;
- int i;
-
- if (!display || !*display) {
- localcopy = platform_get_x_display();
- if (!localcopy || !*localcopy) {
- sfree(localcopy);
- localcopy = dupstr(":0"); /* plausible default for any platform */
- }
- } else
- localcopy = dupstr(display);
-
- /*
- * Parse the display name.
- *
- * We expect this to have one of the following forms:
- *
- * - the standard X format which looks like
- * [ [ protocol '/' ] host ] ':' displaynumber [ '.' screennumber ]
- * (X11 also permits a double colon to indicate DECnet, but
- * that's not our problem, thankfully!)
- *
- * - only seen in the wild on MacOS (so far): a pathname to a
- * Unix-domain socket, which will typically and confusingly
- * end in ":0", and which I'm currently distinguishing from
- * the standard scheme by noting that it starts with '/'.
- */
- if (localcopy[0] == '/') {
- disp->unixsocketpath = localcopy;
- disp->unixdomain = TRUE;
- disp->hostname = NULL;
- disp->displaynum = -1;
- disp->screennum = 0;
- disp->addr = NULL;
- } else {
- char *colon, *dot, *slash;
- char *protocol, *hostname;
-
- colon = strrchr(localcopy, ':');
- if (!colon) {
- sfree(disp);
- sfree(localcopy);
- return NULL; /* FIXME: report a specific error? */
- }
-
- *colon++ = '\0';
- dot = strchr(colon, '.');
- if (dot)
- *dot++ = '\0';
-
- disp->displaynum = atoi(colon);
- if (dot)
- disp->screennum = atoi(dot);
- else
- disp->screennum = 0;
-
- protocol = NULL;
- hostname = localcopy;
- if (colon > localcopy) {
- slash = strchr(localcopy, '/');
- if (slash) {
- *slash++ = '\0';
- protocol = localcopy;
- hostname = slash;
- }
- }
-
- disp->hostname = *hostname ? dupstr(hostname) : NULL;
-
- if (protocol)
- disp->unixdomain = (!strcmp(protocol, "local") ||
- !strcmp(protocol, "unix"));
- else if (!*hostname || !strcmp(hostname, "unix"))
- disp->unixdomain = platform_uses_x11_unix_by_default;
- else
- disp->unixdomain = FALSE;
-
- if (!disp->hostname && !disp->unixdomain)
- disp->hostname = dupstr("localhost");
-
- disp->unixsocketpath = NULL;
- disp->addr = NULL;
-
- sfree(localcopy);
- }
-
- /*
- * Look up the display hostname, if we need to.
- */
- if (!disp->unixdomain) {
- const char *err;
-
- disp->port = 6000 + disp->displaynum;
- disp->addr = name_lookup(disp->hostname, disp->port,
- &disp->realhost, conf, ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC);
-
- if ((err = sk_addr_error(disp->addr)) != NULL) {
- sk_addr_free(disp->addr);
- sfree(disp->hostname);
- sfree(disp->unixsocketpath);
- return NULL; /* FIXME: report an error */
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Try upgrading an IP-style localhost display to a Unix-socket
- * display (as the standard X connection libraries do).
- */
- if (!disp->unixdomain && sk_address_is_local(disp->addr)) {
- SockAddr ux = platform_get_x11_unix_address(NULL, disp->displaynum);
- const char *err = sk_addr_error(ux);
- if (!err) {
- /* Create trial connection to see if there is a useful Unix-domain
- * socket */
- const struct plug_function_table *dummy = &dummy_plug;
- Socket s = sk_new(sk_addr_dup(ux), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (Plug)&dummy);
- err = sk_socket_error(s);
- sk_close(s);
- }
- if (err) {
- sk_addr_free(ux);
- } else {
- sk_addr_free(disp->addr);
- disp->unixdomain = TRUE;
- disp->addr = ux;
- /* Fill in the rest in a moment */
- }
- }
-
- if (disp->unixdomain) {
- if (!disp->addr)
- disp->addr = platform_get_x11_unix_address(disp->unixsocketpath,
- disp->displaynum);
- if (disp->unixsocketpath)
- disp->realhost = dupstr(disp->unixsocketpath);
- else
- disp->realhost = dupprintf("unix:%d", disp->displaynum);
- disp->port = 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Invent the remote authorisation details.
- */
- if (authtype == X11_MIT) {
- disp->remoteauthproto = X11_MIT;
-
- /* MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1. Cookie size is 128 bits (16 bytes). */
- disp->remoteauthdata = snewn(16, unsigned char);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- disp->remoteauthdata[i] = random_byte();
- disp->remoteauthdatalen = 16;
-
- disp->xdmseen = NULL;
- } else {
- assert(authtype == X11_XDM);
- disp->remoteauthproto = X11_XDM;
-
- /* XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1. Cookie size is 16 bytes; byte 8 is zero. */
- disp->remoteauthdata = snewn(16, unsigned char);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- disp->remoteauthdata[i] = (i == 8 ? 0 : random_byte());
- disp->remoteauthdatalen = 16;
-
- disp->xdmseen = newtree234(xdmseen_cmp);
- }
- disp->remoteauthprotoname = dupstr(x11_authnames[disp->remoteauthproto]);
- disp->remoteauthdatastring = snewn(disp->remoteauthdatalen * 2 + 1, char);
- for (i = 0; i < disp->remoteauthdatalen; i++)
- sprintf(disp->remoteauthdatastring + i*2, "%02x",
- disp->remoteauthdata[i]);
-
- /*
- * Fetch the local authorisation details.
- */
- disp->localauthproto = X11_NO_AUTH;
- disp->localauthdata = NULL;
- disp->localauthdatalen = 0;
- platform_get_x11_auth(disp, conf);
-
- return disp;
-}
-
-void x11_free_display(struct X11Display *disp)
-{
- if (disp->xdmseen != NULL) {
- struct XDMSeen *seen;
- while ((seen = delpos234(disp->xdmseen, 0)) != NULL)
- sfree(seen);
- freetree234(disp->xdmseen);
- }
- sfree(disp->hostname);
- sfree(disp->unixsocketpath);
- if (disp->localauthdata)
- memset(disp->localauthdata, 0, disp->localauthdatalen);
- sfree(disp->localauthdata);
- if (disp->remoteauthdata)
- memset(disp->remoteauthdata, 0, disp->remoteauthdatalen);
- sfree(disp->remoteauthdata);
- sfree(disp->remoteauthprotoname);
- sfree(disp->remoteauthdatastring);
- sk_addr_free(disp->addr);
- sfree(disp);
-}
-
-#define XDM_MAXSKEW 20*60 /* 20 minute clock skew should be OK */
-
-static char *x11_verify(unsigned long peer_ip, int peer_port,
- struct X11Display *disp, char *proto,
- unsigned char *data, int dlen)
-{
- if (strcmp(proto, x11_authnames[disp->remoteauthproto]) != 0)
- return "wrong authorisation protocol attempted";
- if (disp->remoteauthproto == X11_MIT) {
- if (dlen != disp->remoteauthdatalen)
- return "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 data was wrong length";
- if (memcmp(disp->remoteauthdata, data, dlen) != 0)
- return "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 data did not match";
- }
- if (disp->remoteauthproto == X11_XDM) {
- unsigned long t;
- time_t tim;
- int i;
- struct XDMSeen *seen, *ret;
-
- if (dlen != 24)
- return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data was wrong length";
- if (peer_port == -1)
- return "cannot do XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 without remote address data";
- des_decrypt_xdmauth(disp->remoteauthdata+9, data, 24);
- if (memcmp(disp->remoteauthdata, data, 8) != 0)
- return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* cookie wrong */
- if (GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+8) != peer_ip)
- return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* IP wrong */
- if ((int)GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+12) != peer_port)
- return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* port wrong */
- t = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+14);
- for (i = 18; i < 24; i++)
- if (data[i] != 0) /* zero padding wrong */
- return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check";
- tim = time(NULL);
- if (abs(t - tim) > XDM_MAXSKEW)
- return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 time stamp was too far out";
- seen = snew(struct XDMSeen);
- seen->time = t;
- memcpy(seen->clientid, data+8, 6);
- assert(disp->xdmseen != NULL);
- ret = add234(disp->xdmseen, seen);
- if (ret != seen) {
- sfree(seen);
- return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data replayed";
- }
- /* While we're here, purge entries too old to be replayed. */
- for (;;) {
- seen = index234(disp->xdmseen, 0);
- assert(seen != NULL);
- if (t - seen->time <= XDM_MAXSKEW)
- break;
- sfree(delpos234(disp->xdmseen, 0));
- }
- }
- /* implement other protocols here if ever required */
- return NULL;
-}
-
-void x11_get_auth_from_authfile(struct X11Display *disp,
- const char *authfilename)
-{
- FILE *authfp;
- char *buf, *ptr, *str[4];
- int len[4];
- int family, protocol;
- int ideal_match = FALSE;
- char *ourhostname = get_hostname();
-
- /*
- * Normally we should look for precisely the details specified in
- * `disp'. However, there's an oddity when the display is local:
- * displays like "localhost:0" usually have their details stored
- * in a Unix-domain-socket record (even if there isn't actually a
- * real Unix-domain socket available, as with OpenSSH's proxy X11
- * server).
- *
- * This is apparently a fudge to get round the meaninglessness of
- * "localhost" in a shared-home-directory context -- xauth entries
- * for Unix-domain sockets already disambiguate this by storing
- * the *local* hostname in the conveniently-blank hostname field,
- * but IP "localhost" records couldn't do this. So, typically, an
- * IP "localhost" entry in the auth database isn't present and if
- * it were it would be ignored.
- *
- * However, we don't entirely trust that (say) Windows X servers
- * won't rely on a straight "localhost" entry, bad idea though
- * that is; so if we can't find a Unix-domain-socket entry we'll
- * fall back to an IP-based entry if we can find one.
- */
- int localhost = !disp->unixdomain && sk_address_is_local(disp->addr);
-
- authfp = fopen(authfilename, "rb");
- if (!authfp)
- return;
-
- /* Records in .Xauthority contain four strings of up to 64K each */
- buf = snewn(65537 * 4, char);
-
- while (!ideal_match) {
- int c, i, j, match = FALSE;
-
-#define GET do { c = fgetc(authfp); if (c == EOF) goto done; c = (unsigned char)c; } while (0)
- /* Expect a big-endian 2-byte number giving address family */
- GET; family = c;
- GET; family = (family << 8) | c;
- /* Then expect four strings, each composed of a big-endian 2-byte
- * length field followed by that many bytes of data */
- ptr = buf;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- GET; len[i] = c;
- GET; len[i] = (len[i] << 8) | c;
- str[i] = ptr;
- for (j = 0; j < len[i]; j++) {
- GET; *ptr++ = c;
- }
- *ptr++ = '\0';
- }
-#undef GET
-
- /*
- * Now we have a full X authority record in memory. See
- * whether it matches the display we're trying to
- * authenticate to.
- *
- * The details we've just read should be interpreted as
- * follows:
- *
- * - 'family' is the network address family used to
- * connect to the display. 0 means IPv4; 6 means IPv6;
- * 256 means Unix-domain sockets.
- *
- * - str[0] is the network address itself. For IPv4 and
- * IPv6, this is a string of binary data of the
- * appropriate length (respectively 4 and 16 bytes)
- * representing the address in big-endian format, e.g.
- * 7F 00 00 01 means IPv4 localhost. For Unix-domain
- * sockets, this is the host name of the machine on
- * which the Unix-domain display resides (so that an
- * .Xauthority file on a shared file system can contain
- * authority entries for Unix-domain displays on
- * several machines without them clashing).
- *
- * - str[1] is the display number. I've no idea why
- * .Xauthority stores this as a string when it has a
- * perfectly good integer format, but there we go.
- *
- * - str[2] is the authorisation method, encoded as its
- * canonical string name (i.e. "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1",
- * "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1" or something we don't
- * recognise).
- *
- * - str[3] is the actual authorisation data, stored in
- * binary form.
- */
-
- if (disp->displaynum < 0 || disp->displaynum != atoi(str[1]))
- continue; /* not the one */
-
- for (protocol = 1; protocol < lenof(x11_authnames); protocol++)
- if (!strcmp(str[2], x11_authnames[protocol]))
- break;
- if (protocol == lenof(x11_authnames))
- continue; /* don't recognise this protocol, look for another */
-
- switch (family) {
- case 0: /* IPv4 */
- if (!disp->unixdomain &&
- sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV4) {
- char buf[4];
- sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf);
- if (len[0] == 4 && !memcmp(str[0], buf, 4)) {
- match = TRUE;
- /* If this is a "localhost" entry, note it down
- * but carry on looking for a Unix-domain entry. */
- ideal_match = !localhost;
- }
- }
- break;
- case 6: /* IPv6 */
- if (!disp->unixdomain &&
- sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV6) {
- char buf[16];
- sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf);
- if (len[0] == 16 && !memcmp(str[0], buf, 16)) {
- match = TRUE;
- ideal_match = !localhost;
- }
- }
- break;
- case 256: /* Unix-domain / localhost */
- if ((disp->unixdomain || localhost)
- && ourhostname && !strcmp(ourhostname, str[0]))
- /* A matching Unix-domain socket is always the best
- * match. */
- match = ideal_match = TRUE;
- break;
- }
-
- if (match) {
- /* Current best guess -- may be overridden if !ideal_match */
- disp->localauthproto = protocol;
- sfree(disp->localauthdata); /* free previous guess, if any */
- disp->localauthdata = snewn(len[3], unsigned char);
- memcpy(disp->localauthdata, str[3], len[3]);
- disp->localauthdatalen = len[3];
- }
- }
-
- done:
- fclose(authfp);
- memset(buf, 0, 65537 * 4);
- sfree(buf);
- sfree(ourhostname);
-}
-
-static void x11_log(Plug p, int type, SockAddr addr, int port,
- const char *error_msg, int error_code)
-{
- /* We have no interface to the logging module here, so we drop these. */
-}
-
-static int x11_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code,
- int calling_back)
-{
- struct X11Private *pr = (struct X11Private *) plug;
-
- /*
- * We have no way to communicate down the forwarded connection,
- * so if an error occurred on the socket, we just ignore it
- * and treat it like a proper close.
- *
- * FIXME: except we could initiate a full close here instead of
- * just an outgoing EOF? ssh.c currently has no API for that, but
- * it could.
- */
- sshfwd_write_eof(pr->c);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int x11_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len)
-{
- struct X11Private *pr = (struct X11Private *) plug;
-
- if (sshfwd_write(pr->c, data, len) > 0) {
- pr->throttled = 1;
- sk_set_frozen(pr->s, 1);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void x11_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize)
-{
- struct X11Private *pr = (struct X11Private *) plug;
-
- sshfwd_unthrottle(pr->c, bufsize);
-}
-
-/*
- * When setting up X forwarding, we should send the screen number
- * from the specified local display. This function extracts it from
- * the display string.
- */
-int x11_get_screen_number(char *display)
-{
- int n;
-
- n = strcspn(display, ":");
- if (!display[n])
- return 0;
- n = strcspn(display, ".");
- if (!display[n])
- return 0;
- return atoi(display + n + 1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Called to set up the raw connection.
- *
- * Returns an error message, or NULL on success.
- * also, fills the SocketsStructure
- */
-extern const char *x11_init(Socket *s, struct X11Display *disp, void *c,
- const char *peeraddr, int peerport, Conf *conf)
-{
- static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
- x11_log,
- x11_closing,
- x11_receive,
- x11_sent,
- NULL
- };
-
- const char *err;
- struct X11Private *pr;
-
- /*
- * Open socket.
- */
- pr = snew(struct X11Private);
- pr->fn = &fn_table;
- pr->auth_protocol = NULL;
- pr->disp = disp;
- pr->verified = 0;
- pr->data_read = 0;
- pr->throttled = pr->throttle_override = 0;
- pr->c = c;
-
- pr->s = *s = new_connection(sk_addr_dup(disp->addr),
- disp->realhost, disp->port,
- 0, 1, 0, 0, (Plug) pr, conf);
- if ((err = sk_socket_error(*s)) != NULL) {
- sfree(pr);
- return err;
- }
-
- /*
- * See if we can make sense of the peer address we were given.
- */
- {
- int i[4];
- if (peeraddr &&
- 4 == sscanf(peeraddr, "%d.%d.%d.%d", i+0, i+1, i+2, i+3)) {
- pr->peer_ip = (i[0] << 24) | (i[1] << 16) | (i[2] << 8) | i[3];
- pr->peer_port = peerport;
- } else {
- pr->peer_ip = 0;
- pr->peer_port = -1;
- }
- }
-
- sk_set_private_ptr(*s, pr);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-void x11_close(Socket s)
-{
- struct X11Private *pr;
- if (!s)
- return;
- pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
- if (pr->auth_protocol) {
- sfree(pr->auth_protocol);
- sfree(pr->auth_data);
- }
-
- sfree(pr);
-
- sk_close(s);
-}
-
-void x11_unthrottle(Socket s)
-{
- struct X11Private *pr;
- if (!s)
- return;
- pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
-
- pr->throttled = 0;
- sk_set_frozen(s, pr->throttled || pr->throttle_override);
-}
-
-void x11_override_throttle(Socket s, int enable)
-{
- struct X11Private *pr;
- if (!s)
- return;
- pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
-
- pr->throttle_override = enable;
- sk_set_frozen(s, pr->throttled || pr->throttle_override);
-}
-
-/*
- * Called to send data down the raw connection.
- */
-int x11_send(Socket s, char *data, int len)
-{
- struct X11Private *pr;
- if (!s)
- return 0;
- pr = (struct X11Private *) sk_get_private_ptr(s);
-
- /*
- * Read the first packet.
- */
- while (len > 0 && pr->data_read < 12)
- pr->firstpkt[pr->data_read++] = (unsigned char) (len--, *data++);
- if (pr->data_read < 12)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * If we have not allocated the auth_protocol and auth_data
- * strings, do so now.
- */
- if (!pr->auth_protocol) {
- pr->auth_plen = GET_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 6);
- pr->auth_dlen = GET_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 8);
- pr->auth_psize = (pr->auth_plen + 3) & ~3;
- pr->auth_dsize = (pr->auth_dlen + 3) & ~3;
- /* Leave room for a terminating zero, to make our lives easier. */
- pr->auth_protocol = snewn(pr->auth_psize + 1, char);
- pr->auth_data = snewn(pr->auth_dsize, unsigned char);
- }
-
- /*
- * Read the auth_protocol and auth_data strings.
- */
- while (len > 0 && pr->data_read < 12 + pr->auth_psize)
- pr->auth_protocol[pr->data_read++ - 12] = (len--, *data++);
- while (len > 0 && pr->data_read < 12 + pr->auth_psize + pr->auth_dsize)
- pr->auth_data[pr->data_read++ - 12 -
- pr->auth_psize] = (unsigned char) (len--, *data++);
- if (pr->data_read < 12 + pr->auth_psize + pr->auth_dsize)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * If we haven't verified the authorisation, do so now.
- */
- if (!pr->verified) {
- char *err;
-
- pr->auth_protocol[pr->auth_plen] = '\0'; /* ASCIZ */
- err = x11_verify(pr->peer_ip, pr->peer_port,
- pr->disp, pr->auth_protocol,
- pr->auth_data, pr->auth_dlen);
-
- /*
- * If authorisation failed, construct and send an error
- * packet, then terminate the connection.
- */
- if (err) {
- char *message;
- int msglen, msgsize;
- unsigned char *reply;
-
- message = dupprintf("%s X11 proxy: %s", appname, err);
- msglen = strlen(message);
- reply = snewn(8 + msglen+1 + 4, unsigned char); /* include zero */
- msgsize = (msglen + 3) & ~3;
- reply[0] = 0; /* failure */
- reply[1] = msglen; /* length of reason string */
- memcpy(reply + 2, pr->firstpkt + 2, 4); /* major/minor proto vsn */
- PUT_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], reply + 6, msgsize >> 2);/* data len */
- memset(reply + 8, 0, msgsize);
- memcpy(reply + 8, message, msglen);
- sshfwd_write(pr->c, (char *)reply, 8 + msgsize);
- sshfwd_write_eof(pr->c);
- sfree(reply);
- sfree(message);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Now we know we're going to accept the connection. Strip
- * the fake auth data, and optionally put real auth data in
- * instead.
- */
- {
- char realauthdata[64];
- int realauthlen = 0;
- int authstrlen = strlen(x11_authnames[pr->disp->localauthproto]);
- int buflen = 0; /* initialise to placate optimiser */
- static const char zeroes[4] = { 0,0,0,0 };
- void *buf;
-
- if (pr->disp->localauthproto == X11_MIT) {
- assert(pr->disp->localauthdatalen <= lenof(realauthdata));
- realauthlen = pr->disp->localauthdatalen;
- memcpy(realauthdata, pr->disp->localauthdata, realauthlen);
- } else if (pr->disp->localauthproto == X11_XDM &&
- pr->disp->localauthdatalen == 16 &&
- ((buf = sk_getxdmdata(s, &buflen))!=0)) {
- time_t t;
- realauthlen = (buflen+12+7) & ~7;
- assert(realauthlen <= lenof(realauthdata));
- memset(realauthdata, 0, realauthlen);
- memcpy(realauthdata, pr->disp->localauthdata, 8);
- memcpy(realauthdata+8, buf, buflen);
- t = time(NULL);
- PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(realauthdata+8+buflen, t);
- des_encrypt_xdmauth(pr->disp->localauthdata+9,
- (unsigned char *)realauthdata,
- realauthlen);
- sfree(buf);
- }
- /* implement other auth methods here if required */
-
- PUT_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 6, authstrlen);
- PUT_16BIT(pr->firstpkt[0], pr->firstpkt + 8, realauthlen);
-
- sk_write(s, (char *)pr->firstpkt, 12);
-
- if (authstrlen) {
- sk_write(s, x11_authnames[pr->disp->localauthproto],
- authstrlen);
- sk_write(s, zeroes, 3 & (-authstrlen));
- }
- if (realauthlen) {
- sk_write(s, realauthdata, realauthlen);
- sk_write(s, zeroes, 3 & (-realauthlen));
- }
- }
- pr->verified = 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * After initialisation, just copy data simply.
- */
-
- return sk_write(s, data, len);
-}
-
-void x11_send_eof(Socket s)
-{
- sk_write_eof(s);
-}
+/* + * Platform-independent bits of X11 forwarding. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <time.h> + +#include "putty.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "tree234.h" + +#define GET_16BIT(endian, cp) \ + (endian=='B' ? GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp) : GET_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp)) + +#define PUT_16BIT(endian, cp, val) \ + (endian=='B' ? PUT_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(cp, val) : PUT_16BIT_LSB_FIRST(cp, val)) + +const char *const x11_authnames[] = { + "", "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1" +}; + +struct XDMSeen { + unsigned int time; + unsigned char clientid[6]; +}; + +struct X11Connection { + const struct plug_function_table *fn; + /* the above variable absolutely *must* be the first in this structure */ + unsigned char firstpkt[12]; /* first X data packet */ + tree234 *authtree; + struct X11Display *disp; + char *auth_protocol; + unsigned char *auth_data; + int data_read, auth_plen, auth_psize, auth_dlen, auth_dsize; + int verified; + int throttled, throttle_override; + int no_data_sent_to_x_client; + char *peer_addr; + int peer_port; + struct ssh_channel *c; /* channel structure held by ssh.c */ + Socket s; +}; + +static int xdmseen_cmp(void *a, void *b) +{ + struct XDMSeen *sa = a, *sb = b; + return sa->time > sb->time ? 1 : + sa->time < sb->time ? -1 : + memcmp(sa->clientid, sb->clientid, sizeof(sa->clientid)); +} + +/* Do-nothing "plug" implementation, used by x11_setup_display() when it + * creates a trial connection (and then immediately closes it). + * XXX: bit out of place here, could in principle live in a platform- + * independent network.c or something */ +static void dummy_plug_log(Plug p, int type, SockAddr addr, int port, + const char *error_msg, int error_code) { } +static int dummy_plug_closing + (Plug p, const char *error_msg, int error_code, int calling_back) +{ return 1; } +static int dummy_plug_receive(Plug p, int urgent, char *data, int len) +{ return 1; } +static void dummy_plug_sent(Plug p, int bufsize) { } +static int dummy_plug_accepting(Plug p, accept_fn_t constructor, accept_ctx_t ctx) { return 1; } +static const struct plug_function_table dummy_plug = { + dummy_plug_log, dummy_plug_closing, dummy_plug_receive, + dummy_plug_sent, dummy_plug_accepting +}; + +struct X11FakeAuth *x11_invent_fake_auth(tree234 *authtree, int authtype) +{ + struct X11FakeAuth *auth = snew(struct X11FakeAuth); + int i; + + /* + * This function has the job of inventing a set of X11 fake auth + * data, and adding it to 'authtree'. We must preserve the + * property that for any given actual authorisation attempt, _at + * most one_ thing in the tree can possibly match it. + * + * For MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1, that's not too difficult: the match + * criterion is simply that the entire cookie is correct, so we + * just have to make sure we don't make up two cookies the same. + * (Vanishingly unlikely, but we check anyway to be sure, and go + * round again inventing a new cookie if add234 tells us the one + * we thought of is already in use.) + * + * For XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1, it's a little more fiddly. The setup + * with XA1 is that half the cookie is used as a DES key with + * which to CBC-encrypt an assortment of stuff. Happily, the stuff + * encrypted _begins_ with the other half of the cookie, and the + * IV is always zero, which means that any valid XA1 authorisation + * attempt for a given cookie must begin with the same cipher + * block, consisting of the DES ECB encryption of the first half + * of the cookie using the second half as a key. So we compute + * that cipher block here and now, and use it as the sorting key + * for distinguishing XA1 entries in the tree. + */ + + if (authtype == X11_MIT) { + auth->proto = X11_MIT; + + /* MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1. Cookie size is 128 bits (16 bytes). */ + auth->datalen = 16; + auth->data = snewn(auth->datalen, unsigned char); + auth->xa1_firstblock = NULL; + + while (1) { + for (i = 0; i < auth->datalen; i++) + auth->data[i] = random_byte(); + if (add234(authtree, auth) == auth) + break; + } + + auth->xdmseen = NULL; + } else { + assert(authtype == X11_XDM); + auth->proto = X11_XDM; + + /* XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1. Cookie size is 16 bytes; byte 8 is zero. */ + auth->datalen = 16; + auth->data = snewn(auth->datalen, unsigned char); + auth->xa1_firstblock = snewn(8, unsigned char); + memset(auth->xa1_firstblock, 0, 8); + + while (1) { + for (i = 0; i < auth->datalen; i++) + auth->data[i] = (i == 8 ? 0 : random_byte()); + memcpy(auth->xa1_firstblock, auth->data, 8); + des_encrypt_xdmauth(auth->data + 9, auth->xa1_firstblock, 8); + if (add234(authtree, auth) == auth) + break; + } + + auth->xdmseen = newtree234(xdmseen_cmp); + } + auth->protoname = dupstr(x11_authnames[auth->proto]); + auth->datastring = snewn(auth->datalen * 2 + 1, char); + for (i = 0; i < auth->datalen; i++) + sprintf(auth->datastring + i*2, "%02x", + auth->data[i]); + + auth->disp = NULL; + auth->share_cs = auth->share_chan = NULL; + + return auth; +} + +void x11_free_fake_auth(struct X11FakeAuth *auth) +{ + if (auth->data) + smemclr(auth->data, auth->datalen); + sfree(auth->data); + sfree(auth->protoname); + sfree(auth->datastring); + sfree(auth->xa1_firstblock); + if (auth->xdmseen != NULL) { + struct XDMSeen *seen; + while ((seen = delpos234(auth->xdmseen, 0)) != NULL) + sfree(seen); + freetree234(auth->xdmseen); + } + sfree(auth); +} + +int x11_authcmp(void *av, void *bv) +{ + struct X11FakeAuth *a = (struct X11FakeAuth *)av; + struct X11FakeAuth *b = (struct X11FakeAuth *)bv; + + if (a->proto < b->proto) + return -1; + else if (a->proto > b->proto) + return +1; + + if (a->proto == X11_MIT) { + if (a->datalen < b->datalen) + return -1; + else if (a->datalen > b->datalen) + return +1; + + return memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->datalen); + } else { + assert(a->proto == X11_XDM); + + return memcmp(a->xa1_firstblock, b->xa1_firstblock, 8); + } +} + +struct X11Display *x11_setup_display(char *display, Conf *conf) +{ + struct X11Display *disp = snew(struct X11Display); + char *localcopy; + + if (!display || !*display) { + localcopy = platform_get_x_display(); + if (!localcopy || !*localcopy) { + sfree(localcopy); + localcopy = dupstr(":0"); /* plausible default for any platform */ + } + } else + localcopy = dupstr(display); + + /* + * Parse the display name. + * + * We expect this to have one of the following forms: + * + * - the standard X format which looks like + * [ [ protocol '/' ] host ] ':' displaynumber [ '.' screennumber ] + * (X11 also permits a double colon to indicate DECnet, but + * that's not our problem, thankfully!) + * + * - only seen in the wild on MacOS (so far): a pathname to a + * Unix-domain socket, which will typically and confusingly + * end in ":0", and which I'm currently distinguishing from + * the standard scheme by noting that it starts with '/'. + */ + if (localcopy[0] == '/') { + disp->unixsocketpath = localcopy; + disp->unixdomain = TRUE; + disp->hostname = NULL; + disp->displaynum = -1; + disp->screennum = 0; + disp->addr = NULL; + } else { + char *colon, *dot, *slash; + char *protocol, *hostname; + + colon = host_strrchr(localcopy, ':'); + if (!colon) { + sfree(disp); + sfree(localcopy); + return NULL; /* FIXME: report a specific error? */ + } + + *colon++ = '\0'; + dot = strchr(colon, '.'); + if (dot) + *dot++ = '\0'; + + disp->displaynum = atoi(colon); + if (dot) + disp->screennum = atoi(dot); + else + disp->screennum = 0; + + protocol = NULL; + hostname = localcopy; + if (colon > localcopy) { + slash = strchr(localcopy, '/'); + if (slash) { + *slash++ = '\0'; + protocol = localcopy; + hostname = slash; + } + } + + disp->hostname = *hostname ? dupstr(hostname) : NULL; + + if (protocol) + disp->unixdomain = (!strcmp(protocol, "local") || + !strcmp(protocol, "unix")); + else if (!*hostname || !strcmp(hostname, "unix")) + disp->unixdomain = platform_uses_x11_unix_by_default; + else + disp->unixdomain = FALSE; + + if (!disp->hostname && !disp->unixdomain) + disp->hostname = dupstr("localhost"); + + disp->unixsocketpath = NULL; + disp->addr = NULL; + + sfree(localcopy); + } + + /* + * Look up the display hostname, if we need to. + */ + if (!disp->unixdomain) { + const char *err; + + disp->port = 6000 + disp->displaynum; + disp->addr = name_lookup(disp->hostname, disp->port, + &disp->realhost, conf, ADDRTYPE_UNSPEC); + + if ((err = sk_addr_error(disp->addr)) != NULL) { + sk_addr_free(disp->addr); + sfree(disp->hostname); + sfree(disp->unixsocketpath); + sfree(disp); + return NULL; /* FIXME: report an error */ + } + } + + /* + * Try upgrading an IP-style localhost display to a Unix-socket + * display (as the standard X connection libraries do). + */ + if (!disp->unixdomain && sk_address_is_local(disp->addr)) { + SockAddr ux = platform_get_x11_unix_address(NULL, disp->displaynum); + const char *err = sk_addr_error(ux); + if (!err) { + /* Create trial connection to see if there is a useful Unix-domain + * socket */ + const struct plug_function_table *dummy = &dummy_plug; + Socket s = sk_new(sk_addr_dup(ux), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (Plug)&dummy); + err = sk_socket_error(s); + sk_close(s); + } + if (err) { + sk_addr_free(ux); + } else { + sk_addr_free(disp->addr); + disp->unixdomain = TRUE; + disp->addr = ux; + /* Fill in the rest in a moment */ + } + } + + if (disp->unixdomain) { + if (!disp->addr) + disp->addr = platform_get_x11_unix_address(disp->unixsocketpath, + disp->displaynum); + if (disp->unixsocketpath) + disp->realhost = dupstr(disp->unixsocketpath); + else + disp->realhost = dupprintf("unix:%d", disp->displaynum); + disp->port = 0; + } + + /* + * Fetch the local authorisation details. + */ + disp->localauthproto = X11_NO_AUTH; + disp->localauthdata = NULL; + disp->localauthdatalen = 0; + platform_get_x11_auth(disp, conf); + + return disp; +} + +void x11_free_display(struct X11Display *disp) +{ + sfree(disp->hostname); + sfree(disp->unixsocketpath); + if (disp->localauthdata) + smemclr(disp->localauthdata, disp->localauthdatalen); + sfree(disp->localauthdata); + sk_addr_free(disp->addr); + sfree(disp); +} + +#define XDM_MAXSKEW 20*60 /* 20 minute clock skew should be OK */ + +static char *x11_verify(unsigned long peer_ip, int peer_port, + tree234 *authtree, char *proto, + unsigned char *data, int dlen, + struct X11FakeAuth **auth_ret) +{ + struct X11FakeAuth match_dummy; /* for passing to find234 */ + struct X11FakeAuth *auth; + + /* + * First, do a lookup in our tree to find the only authorisation + * record that _might_ match. + */ + if (!strcmp(proto, x11_authnames[X11_MIT])) { + /* + * Just look up the whole cookie that was presented to us, + * which x11_authcmp will compare against the cookies we + * currently believe in. + */ + match_dummy.proto = X11_MIT; + match_dummy.datalen = dlen; + match_dummy.data = data; + } else if (!strcmp(proto, x11_authnames[X11_XDM])) { + /* + * Look up the first cipher block, against the stored first + * cipher blocks for the XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 cookies we + * currently know. (See comment in x11_invent_fake_auth.) + */ + match_dummy.proto = X11_XDM; + match_dummy.xa1_firstblock = data; + } else { + return "Unsupported authorisation protocol"; + } + + if ((auth = find234(authtree, &match_dummy, 0)) == NULL) + return "Authorisation not recognised"; + + /* + * If we're using MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1, that was all we needed. If + * we're doing XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1, though, we have to check the + * rest of the auth data. + */ + if (auth->proto == X11_XDM) { + unsigned long t; + time_t tim; + int i; + struct XDMSeen *seen, *ret; + + if (dlen != 24) + return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data was wrong length"; + if (peer_port == -1) + return "cannot do XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 without remote address data"; + des_decrypt_xdmauth(auth->data+9, data, 24); + if (memcmp(auth->data, data, 8) != 0) + return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* cookie wrong */ + if (GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+8) != peer_ip) + return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* IP wrong */ + if ((int)GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+12) != peer_port) + return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; /* port wrong */ + t = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(data+14); + for (i = 18; i < 24; i++) + if (data[i] != 0) /* zero padding wrong */ + return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data failed check"; + tim = time(NULL); + if (abs(t - tim) > XDM_MAXSKEW) + return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 time stamp was too far out"; + seen = snew(struct XDMSeen); + seen->time = t; + memcpy(seen->clientid, data+8, 6); + assert(auth->xdmseen != NULL); + ret = add234(auth->xdmseen, seen); + if (ret != seen) { + sfree(seen); + return "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data replayed"; + } + /* While we're here, purge entries too old to be replayed. */ + for (;;) { + seen = index234(auth->xdmseen, 0); + assert(seen != NULL); + if (t - seen->time <= XDM_MAXSKEW) + break; + sfree(delpos234(auth->xdmseen, 0)); + } + } + /* implement other protocols here if ever required */ + + *auth_ret = auth; + return NULL; +} + +void x11_get_auth_from_authfile(struct X11Display *disp, + const char *authfilename) +{ + FILE *authfp; + char *buf, *ptr, *str[4]; + int len[4]; + int family, protocol; + int ideal_match = FALSE; + char *ourhostname; + + /* + * Normally we should look for precisely the details specified in + * `disp'. However, there's an oddity when the display is local: + * displays like "localhost:0" usually have their details stored + * in a Unix-domain-socket record (even if there isn't actually a + * real Unix-domain socket available, as with OpenSSH's proxy X11 + * server). + * + * This is apparently a fudge to get round the meaninglessness of + * "localhost" in a shared-home-directory context -- xauth entries + * for Unix-domain sockets already disambiguate this by storing + * the *local* hostname in the conveniently-blank hostname field, + * but IP "localhost" records couldn't do this. So, typically, an + * IP "localhost" entry in the auth database isn't present and if + * it were it would be ignored. + * + * However, we don't entirely trust that (say) Windows X servers + * won't rely on a straight "localhost" entry, bad idea though + * that is; so if we can't find a Unix-domain-socket entry we'll + * fall back to an IP-based entry if we can find one. + */ + int localhost = !disp->unixdomain && sk_address_is_local(disp->addr); + + authfp = fopen(authfilename, "rb"); + if (!authfp) + return; + + ourhostname = get_hostname(); + + /* Records in .Xauthority contain four strings of up to 64K each */ + buf = snewn(65537 * 4, char); + + while (!ideal_match) { + int c, i, j, match = FALSE; + +#define GET do { c = fgetc(authfp); if (c == EOF) goto done; c = (unsigned char)c; } while (0) + /* Expect a big-endian 2-byte number giving address family */ + GET; family = c; + GET; family = (family << 8) | c; + /* Then expect four strings, each composed of a big-endian 2-byte + * length field followed by that many bytes of data */ + ptr = buf; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + GET; len[i] = c; + GET; len[i] = (len[i] << 8) | c; + str[i] = ptr; + for (j = 0; j < len[i]; j++) { + GET; *ptr++ = c; + } + *ptr++ = '\0'; + } +#undef GET + + /* + * Now we have a full X authority record in memory. See + * whether it matches the display we're trying to + * authenticate to. + * + * The details we've just read should be interpreted as + * follows: + * + * - 'family' is the network address family used to + * connect to the display. 0 means IPv4; 6 means IPv6; + * 256 means Unix-domain sockets. + * + * - str[0] is the network address itself. For IPv4 and + * IPv6, this is a string of binary data of the + * appropriate length (respectively 4 and 16 bytes) + * representing the address in big-endian format, e.g. + * 7F 00 00 01 means IPv4 localhost. For Unix-domain + * sockets, this is the host name of the machine on + * which the Unix-domain display resides (so that an + * .Xauthority file on a shared file system can contain + * authority entries for Unix-domain displays on + * several machines without them clashing). + * + * - str[1] is the display number. I've no idea why + * .Xauthority stores this as a string when it has a + * perfectly good integer format, but there we go. + * + * - str[2] is the authorisation method, encoded as its + * canonical string name (i.e. "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", + * "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1" or something we don't + * recognise). + * + * - str[3] is the actual authorisation data, stored in + * binary form. + */ + + if (disp->displaynum < 0 || disp->displaynum != atoi(str[1])) + continue; /* not the one */ + + for (protocol = 1; protocol < lenof(x11_authnames); protocol++) + if (!strcmp(str[2], x11_authnames[protocol])) + break; + if (protocol == lenof(x11_authnames)) + continue; /* don't recognise this protocol, look for another */ + + switch (family) { + case 0: /* IPv4 */ + if (!disp->unixdomain && + sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV4) { + char buf[4]; + sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf); + if (len[0] == 4 && !memcmp(str[0], buf, 4)) { + match = TRUE; + /* If this is a "localhost" entry, note it down + * but carry on looking for a Unix-domain entry. */ + ideal_match = !localhost; + } + } + break; + case 6: /* IPv6 */ + if (!disp->unixdomain && + sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV6) { + char buf[16]; + sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf); + if (len[0] == 16 && !memcmp(str[0], buf, 16)) { + match = TRUE; + ideal_match = !localhost; + } + } + break; + case 256: /* Unix-domain / localhost */ + if ((disp->unixdomain || localhost) + && ourhostname && !strcmp(ourhostname, str[0])) + /* A matching Unix-domain socket is always the best + * match. */ + match = ideal_match = TRUE; + break; + } + + if (match) { + /* Current best guess -- may be overridden if !ideal_match */ + disp->localauthproto = protocol; + sfree(disp->localauthdata); /* free previous guess, if any */ + disp->localauthdata = snewn(len[3], unsigned char); + memcpy(disp->localauthdata, str[3], len[3]); + disp->localauthdatalen = len[3]; + } + } + + done: + fclose(authfp); + smemclr(buf, 65537 * 4); + sfree(buf); + sfree(ourhostname); +} + +static void x11_log(Plug p, int type, SockAddr addr, int port, + const char *error_msg, int error_code) +{ + /* We have no interface to the logging module here, so we drop these. */ +} + +static void x11_send_init_error(struct X11Connection *conn, + const char *err_message); + +static int x11_closing(Plug plug, const char *error_msg, int error_code, + int calling_back) +{ + struct X11Connection *xconn = (struct X11Connection *) plug; + + if (error_msg) { + /* + * Socket error. If we're still at the connection setup stage, + * construct an X11 error packet passing on the problem. + */ + if (xconn->no_data_sent_to_x_client) { + char *err_message = dupprintf("unable to connect to forwarded " + "X server: %s", error_msg); + x11_send_init_error(xconn, err_message); + sfree(err_message); + } + + /* + * Whether we did that or not, now we slam the connection + * shut. + */ + sshfwd_unclean_close(xconn->c, error_msg); + } else { + /* + * Ordinary EOF received on socket. Send an EOF on the SSH + * channel. + */ + if (xconn->c) + sshfwd_write_eof(xconn->c); + } + + return 1; +} + +static int x11_receive(Plug plug, int urgent, char *data, int len) +{ + struct X11Connection *xconn = (struct X11Connection *) plug; + + if (sshfwd_write(xconn->c, data, len) > 0) { + xconn->throttled = 1; + xconn->no_data_sent_to_x_client = FALSE; + sk_set_frozen(xconn->s, 1); + } + + return 1; +} + +static void x11_sent(Plug plug, int bufsize) +{ + struct X11Connection *xconn = (struct X11Connection *) plug; + + sshfwd_unthrottle(xconn->c, bufsize); +} + +/* + * When setting up X forwarding, we should send the screen number + * from the specified local display. This function extracts it from + * the display string. + */ +int x11_get_screen_number(char *display) +{ + int n; + + n = host_strcspn(display, ":"); + if (!display[n]) + return 0; + n = strcspn(display, "."); + if (!display[n]) + return 0; + return atoi(display + n + 1); +} + +/* + * Called to set up the X11Connection structure, though this does not + * yet connect to an actual server. + */ +struct X11Connection *x11_init(tree234 *authtree, void *c, + const char *peeraddr, int peerport) +{ + static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = { + x11_log, + x11_closing, + x11_receive, + x11_sent, + NULL + }; + + struct X11Connection *xconn; + + /* + * Open socket. + */ + xconn = snew(struct X11Connection); + xconn->fn = &fn_table; + xconn->auth_protocol = NULL; + xconn->authtree = authtree; + xconn->verified = 0; + xconn->data_read = 0; + xconn->throttled = xconn->throttle_override = 0; + xconn->no_data_sent_to_x_client = TRUE; + xconn->c = c; + + /* + * We don't actually open a local socket to the X server just yet, + * because we don't know which one it is. Instead, we'll wait + * until we see the incoming authentication data, which may tell + * us what display to connect to, or whether we have to divert + * this X forwarding channel to a connection-sharing downstream + * rather than handling it ourself. + */ + xconn->disp = NULL; + xconn->s = NULL; + + /* + * Stash the peer address we were given in its original text form. + */ + xconn->peer_addr = peeraddr ? dupstr(peeraddr) : NULL; + xconn->peer_port = peerport; + + return xconn; +} + +void x11_close(struct X11Connection *xconn) +{ + if (!xconn) + return; + + if (xconn->auth_protocol) { + sfree(xconn->auth_protocol); + sfree(xconn->auth_data); + } + + if (xconn->s) + sk_close(xconn->s); + + sfree(xconn->peer_addr); + sfree(xconn); +} + +void x11_unthrottle(struct X11Connection *xconn) +{ + if (!xconn) + return; + + xconn->throttled = 0; + if (xconn->s) + sk_set_frozen(xconn->s, xconn->throttled || xconn->throttle_override); +} + +void x11_override_throttle(struct X11Connection *xconn, int enable) +{ + if (!xconn) + return; + + xconn->throttle_override = enable; + if (xconn->s) + sk_set_frozen(xconn->s, xconn->throttled || xconn->throttle_override); +} + +static void x11_send_init_error(struct X11Connection *xconn, + const char *err_message) +{ + char *full_message; + int msglen, msgsize; + unsigned char *reply; + + full_message = dupprintf("%s X11 proxy: %s\n", appname, err_message); + + msglen = strlen(full_message); + reply = snewn(8 + msglen+1 + 4, unsigned char); /* include zero */ + msgsize = (msglen + 3) & ~3; + reply[0] = 0; /* failure */ + reply[1] = msglen; /* length of reason string */ + memcpy(reply + 2, xconn->firstpkt + 2, 4); /* major/minor proto vsn */ + PUT_16BIT(xconn->firstpkt[0], reply + 6, msgsize >> 2);/* data len */ + memset(reply + 8, 0, msgsize); + memcpy(reply + 8, full_message, msglen); + sshfwd_write(xconn->c, (char *)reply, 8 + msgsize); + sshfwd_write_eof(xconn->c); + xconn->no_data_sent_to_x_client = FALSE; + sfree(reply); + sfree(full_message); +} + +static int x11_parse_ip(const char *addr_string, unsigned long *ip) +{ + + /* + * See if we can make sense of this string as an IPv4 address, for + * XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 purposes. + */ + int i[4]; + if (addr_string && + 4 == sscanf(addr_string, "%d.%d.%d.%d", i+0, i+1, i+2, i+3)) { + *ip = (i[0] << 24) | (i[1] << 16) | (i[2] << 8) | i[3]; + return TRUE; + } else { + return FALSE; + } +} + +/* + * Called to send data down the raw connection. + */ +int x11_send(struct X11Connection *xconn, char *data, int len) +{ + if (!xconn) + return 0; + + /* + * Read the first packet. + */ + while (len > 0 && xconn->data_read < 12) + xconn->firstpkt[xconn->data_read++] = (unsigned char) (len--, *data++); + if (xconn->data_read < 12) + return 0; + + /* + * If we have not allocated the auth_protocol and auth_data + * strings, do so now. + */ + if (!xconn->auth_protocol) { + xconn->auth_plen = GET_16BIT(xconn->firstpkt[0], xconn->firstpkt + 6); + xconn->auth_dlen = GET_16BIT(xconn->firstpkt[0], xconn->firstpkt + 8); + xconn->auth_psize = (xconn->auth_plen + 3) & ~3; + xconn->auth_dsize = (xconn->auth_dlen + 3) & ~3; + /* Leave room for a terminating zero, to make our lives easier. */ + xconn->auth_protocol = snewn(xconn->auth_psize + 1, char); + xconn->auth_data = snewn(xconn->auth_dsize, unsigned char); + } + + /* + * Read the auth_protocol and auth_data strings. + */ + while (len > 0 && + xconn->data_read < 12 + xconn->auth_psize) + xconn->auth_protocol[xconn->data_read++ - 12] = (len--, *data++); + while (len > 0 && + xconn->data_read < 12 + xconn->auth_psize + xconn->auth_dsize) + xconn->auth_data[xconn->data_read++ - 12 - + xconn->auth_psize] = (unsigned char) (len--, *data++); + if (xconn->data_read < 12 + xconn->auth_psize + xconn->auth_dsize) + return 0; + + /* + * If we haven't verified the authorisation, do so now. + */ + if (!xconn->verified) { + const char *err; + struct X11FakeAuth *auth_matched = NULL; + unsigned long peer_ip; + int peer_port; + int protomajor, protominor; + void *greeting; + int greeting_len; + unsigned char *socketdata; + int socketdatalen; + char new_peer_addr[32]; + int new_peer_port; + + protomajor = GET_16BIT(xconn->firstpkt[0], xconn->firstpkt + 2); + protominor = GET_16BIT(xconn->firstpkt[0], xconn->firstpkt + 4); + + assert(!xconn->s); + + xconn->auth_protocol[xconn->auth_plen] = '\0'; /* ASCIZ */ + + peer_ip = 0; /* placate optimiser */ + if (x11_parse_ip(xconn->peer_addr, &peer_ip)) + peer_port = xconn->peer_port; + else + peer_port = -1; /* signal no peer address data available */ + + err = x11_verify(peer_ip, peer_port, + xconn->authtree, xconn->auth_protocol, + xconn->auth_data, xconn->auth_dlen, &auth_matched); + if (err) { + x11_send_init_error(xconn, err); + return 0; + } + assert(auth_matched); + + /* + * If this auth points to a connection-sharing downstream + * rather than an X display we know how to connect to + * directly, pass it off to the sharing module now. + */ + if (auth_matched->share_cs) { + sshfwd_x11_sharing_handover(xconn->c, auth_matched->share_cs, + auth_matched->share_chan, + xconn->peer_addr, xconn->peer_port, + xconn->firstpkt[0], + protomajor, protominor, data, len); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Now we know we're going to accept the connection, and what + * X display to connect to. Actually connect to it. + */ + sshfwd_x11_is_local(xconn->c); + xconn->disp = auth_matched->disp; + xconn->s = new_connection(sk_addr_dup(xconn->disp->addr), + xconn->disp->realhost, xconn->disp->port, + 0, 1, 0, 0, (Plug) xconn, + sshfwd_get_conf(xconn->c)); + if ((err = sk_socket_error(xconn->s)) != NULL) { + char *err_message = dupprintf("unable to connect to" + " forwarded X server: %s", err); + x11_send_init_error(xconn, err_message); + sfree(err_message); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Write a new connection header containing our replacement + * auth data. + */ + + socketdata = sk_getxdmdata(xconn->s, &socketdatalen); + if (socketdata && socketdatalen==6) { + sprintf(new_peer_addr, "%d.%d.%d.%d", socketdata[0], + socketdata[1], socketdata[2], socketdata[3]); + new_peer_port = GET_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(socketdata + 4); + } else { + strcpy(new_peer_addr, "0.0.0.0"); + new_peer_port = 0; + } + + greeting = x11_make_greeting(xconn->firstpkt[0], + protomajor, protominor, + xconn->disp->localauthproto, + xconn->disp->localauthdata, + xconn->disp->localauthdatalen, + new_peer_addr, new_peer_port, + &greeting_len); + + sk_write(xconn->s, greeting, greeting_len); + + smemclr(greeting, greeting_len); + sfree(greeting); + + /* + * Now we're done. + */ + xconn->verified = 1; + } + + /* + * After initialisation, just copy data simply. + */ + + return sk_write(xconn->s, data, len); +} + +void x11_send_eof(struct X11Connection *xconn) +{ + if (xconn->s) { + sk_write_eof(xconn->s); + } else { + /* + * If EOF is received from the X client before we've got to + * the point of actually connecting to an X server, then we + * should send an EOF back to the client so that the + * forwarded channel will be terminated. + */ + if (xconn->c) + sshfwd_write_eof(xconn->c); + } +} + +/* + * Utility functions used by connection sharing to convert textual + * representations of an X11 auth protocol name + hex cookie into our + * usual integer protocol id and binary auth data. + */ +int x11_identify_auth_proto(const char *protoname) +{ + int protocol; + + for (protocol = 1; protocol < lenof(x11_authnames); protocol++) + if (!strcmp(protoname, x11_authnames[protocol])) + return protocol; + return -1; +} + +void *x11_dehexify(const char *hex, int *outlen) +{ + int len, i; + unsigned char *ret; + + len = strlen(hex) / 2; + ret = snewn(len, unsigned char); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + char bytestr[3]; + unsigned val = 0; + bytestr[0] = hex[2*i]; + bytestr[1] = hex[2*i+1]; + bytestr[2] = '\0'; + sscanf(bytestr, "%x", &val); + ret[i] = val; + } + + *outlen = len; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Construct an X11 greeting packet, including making up the right + * authorisation data. + */ +void *x11_make_greeting(int endian, int protomajor, int protominor, + int auth_proto, const void *auth_data, int auth_len, + const char *peer_addr, int peer_port, + int *outlen) +{ + unsigned char *greeting; + unsigned char realauthdata[64]; + const char *authname; + const unsigned char *authdata; + int authnamelen, authnamelen_pad; + int authdatalen, authdatalen_pad; + int greeting_len; + + authname = x11_authnames[auth_proto]; + authnamelen = strlen(authname); + authnamelen_pad = (authnamelen + 3) & ~3; + + if (auth_proto == X11_MIT) { + authdata = auth_data; + authdatalen = auth_len; + } else if (auth_proto == X11_XDM && auth_len == 16) { + time_t t; + unsigned long peer_ip = 0; + + x11_parse_ip(peer_addr, &peer_ip); + + authdata = realauthdata; + authdatalen = 24; + memset(realauthdata, 0, authdatalen); + memcpy(realauthdata, auth_data, 8); + PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(realauthdata+8, peer_ip); + PUT_16BIT_MSB_FIRST(realauthdata+12, peer_port); + t = time(NULL); + PUT_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(realauthdata+14, t); + + des_encrypt_xdmauth((const unsigned char *)auth_data + 9, + realauthdata, authdatalen); + } else { + authdata = realauthdata; + authdatalen = 0; + } + + authdatalen_pad = (authdatalen + 3) & ~3; + greeting_len = 12 + authnamelen_pad + authdatalen_pad; + + greeting = snewn(greeting_len, unsigned char); + memset(greeting, 0, greeting_len); + greeting[0] = endian; + PUT_16BIT(endian, greeting+2, protomajor); + PUT_16BIT(endian, greeting+4, protominor); + PUT_16BIT(endian, greeting+6, authnamelen); + PUT_16BIT(endian, greeting+8, authdatalen); + memcpy(greeting+12, authname, authnamelen); + memcpy(greeting+12+authnamelen_pad, authdata, authdatalen); + + smemclr(realauthdata, sizeof(realauthdata)); + + *outlen = greeting_len; + return greeting; +} |