From a33de30073bfa0ee1abba186dba9fa52cf0aa23a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: marha Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 14:04:46 +0200 Subject: Updated to following packages: freetype-2.4.10 libXaw-1.0.11 openssl-1.0.1c --- openssl/CHANGES | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'openssl/CHANGES') diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES index 03d731451..7013e4c12 100644 --- a/openssl/CHANGES +++ b/openssl/CHANGES @@ -2,6 +2,78 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] + + *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS + 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack. + + Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic + fuzzing as a service testing platform. + (CVE-2012-2333) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. + Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. + [Steve Henson] + + *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not + approved. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] + + *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and + 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately + mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting + SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng + TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to + 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against + OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 + will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in + inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context, + in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below]. + [Steve Henson] + + *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not + disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are + protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means + that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and + above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass + SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to + client side. + [Andy Polyakov] + + Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] + + *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio + BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer + in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. + + Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this + issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. + (CVE-2012-2110) + [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] + + *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections. + [Adam Langley] + + *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello + record length exceeds 255 bytes. + + 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client + hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. + 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate + the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be + set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: + -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. + Most broken servers should now work. + 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable + TLS 1.2 client support entirely. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. + [Andy Polyakov] + Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET @@ -285,7 +357,18 @@ Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] - Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] + + *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness + in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for + content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack + needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The + old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the + CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where + an MMA defence is not necessary. + Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) + [Steve Henson] *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to -- cgit v1.2.3